source stringclasses 1
value | protocol stringclasses 17
values | title stringlengths 4 24 | severity_raw stringclasses 8
values | severity stringclasses 8
values | description stringlengths 198 2k | vulnerable_code stringlengths 0 2k | fixed_code stringlengths 0 2k | recommendation stringclasses 1
value | category stringclasses 12
values | report_url stringlengths 71 98 | collected_at stringlengths 32 32 | source_hash stringlengths 64 64 | code_block_count int64 0 10 | solidity_block_count int64 0 10 | total_code_chars int64 0 1.73k | github_ref_count int64 0 26 | vulnerable_code_is_url bool 2
classes | fixed_code_is_url bool 2
classes | has_code_in_description bool 2
classes | has_recommendation bool 1
class | quality_estimate stringclasses 2
values | primary_code stringlengths 0 1.72k | primary_code_language stringclasses 19
values | primary_code_char_count int64 0 1.72k | all_code_blocks stringlengths 0 1.87k | all_code_blocks_count int64 0 10 | has_diff_blocks bool 2
classes | diff_code stringclasses 71
values | solidity_code stringlengths 0 1.68k | github_refs_formatted stringlengths 0 562 | github_files_list stringlengths 0 203 | github_refs_count int64 0 26 | vulnerable_code_actual stringlengths 0 2k | has_vulnerable_code_snippet bool 2
classes | fixed_code_actual stringlengths 0 2k | has_fixed_code_snippet bool 2
classes | has_vuln_fix_pair bool 2
classes | content_richness_score float64 2.4 15 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
c4 | 08-dopex | Stormreckson Q | Medium | medium | 1- https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex/blob/b174dcd7b68a5372d7b9a97c9dd50895e742689c/contracts/core/RdpxV2Core.sol#L894-L899
In the `bond` function,the `_to` parameter represents the recipient of the bond receipt, it wouldbe rational for `_to` to be `msg.sender`.
Setting `_to` as `msg.sender` would ensure tha... | /**
* @notice Pauses the vault for emergency cases
* @dev Can only be called by the owner
**/
function pause() external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
/**
* @notice Unpauses the vault
* @dev Can only be called by the owner
**/
function unpause() external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
... | for (uint256 i = 0; i < optionIds.length; i++) {
uint256 strike = optionPositions[optionIds[i]].strike;
uint256 amount = optionPositions[optionIds[i]].amount; | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/Stormreckson-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:06.298300+00:00 | 7dd4302390137f624f7255a4eea45494334c4822fbd0ce5489adf028034e6389 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | RdpxV2Core.sol#L894-L899 | RdpxV2Core.sol | 1 | /**
* @notice Pauses the vault for emergency cases
* @dev Can only be called by the owner
**/
function pause() external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
/**
* @notice Unpauses the vault
* @dev Can only be called by the owner
**/
function unpause() external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
... | true | for (uint256 i = 0; i < optionIds.length; i++) {
uint256 strike = optionPositions[optionIds[i]].strike;
uint256 amount = optionPositions[optionIds[i]].amount; | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 06-lybra | Grzegorz Q | Unknown | unknown | # The LybraConfigurator.setBadCollateralRatio function emits incorrect event. It should emit BadCollaterialRatioChanged instead of SafeCollateralRatioChanged.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra/blob/7b73ef2fbb542b569e182d9abf79be643ca883ee/contracts/lybra/configuration/LybraConfigurator.sol#L126C1-L130
```
... | function setBadCollateralRatio(address pool, uint256 newRatio) external onlyRole(DAO) {
require(newRatio >= 130 * 1e18 && newRatio <= 150 * 1e18 && newRatio <= vaultSafeCollateralRatio[pool] + 1e19, "LNA");
vaultBadCollateralRatio[pool] = newRatio;
emit SafeCollateralRatioChanged(pool, newRa... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/Grzegorz-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:22:18.637042+00:00 | 7df409d514853d59f1774f62f18e050953a09966404a86f751746de08625b4e1 | 1 | 0 | 327 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | function setBadCollateralRatio(address pool, uint256 newRatio) external onlyRole(DAO) {
require(newRatio >= 130 * 1e18 && newRatio <= 150 * 1e18 && newRatio <= vaultSafeCollateralRatio[pool] + 1e19, "LNA");
vaultBadCollateralRatio[pool] = newRatio;
emit SafeCollateralRatioChanged(pool, newRatio)... | unknown | 327 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function setBadCollateralRatio(address pool, uint256 newRatio) external onlyRole(DAO) {
require(newRatio >= 130 * 1e18 && newRatio <= 150 * 1e18 && newRatio <= vaultSafeCollateralRatio[pool] + 1e19, "LNA");
vaultBadCollateralRatio[pool] = newRatio;
emit SafeCollateralR... | 1 | false | LybraConfigurator.sol#L126-L1 | LybraConfigurator.sol | 1 | function setBadCollateralRatio(address pool, uint256 newRatio) external onlyRole(DAO) {
require(newRatio >= 130 * 1e18 && newRatio <= 150 * 1e18 && newRatio <= vaultSafeCollateralRatio[pool] + 1e19, "LNA");
vaultBadCollateralRatio[pool] = newRatio;
emit SafeCollateralRatioChanged(pool, newRa... | true | false | false | 5.15 | |||||
c4 | 02-ethos | 0xhacksmithh G | High | high |
### [Gas-01] Struct can be packed
*instances(16 structs)*
```
File: Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol#L27-L32
````
```
File: Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/b... | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol#L27-L32 | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol#L47-L64
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol#L66-L78 | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/0xhacksmithh-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:50.939639+00:00 | 7e433d257bfa97f476e33ea7c0bc09510dbdfe3103762108cbca9391cb1f8d61 | 6 | 0 | 1,680 | 15 | false | false | true | false | high | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol#L27-L32 | unknown | 151 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
File: Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol#L27-L32
// Code block 2 (unknown):
File: Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Cor... | 6 | false | CollateralConfig.sol#L27-L32, BorrowerOperations.sol#L47-L64, BorrowerOperations.sol#L66-L78, TroveManager.sol#L129-L138, TroveManager.sol#L140-L144, TroveManager.sol#L146-L158, TroveManager.sol#L160-L170, TroveManager.sol#L172-L182, TroveManager.sol#L1, ActivePool.sol#L220-L237, StabilityPool.sol#L214, StabilityPool.s... | StabilityPool.sol, TroveManager.sol, BorrowerOperations.sol, ReaperVaultV2.sol, LUSDToken.sol, ActivePool.sol, CollateralConfig.sol | 15 | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol#L27-L32 | true | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol#L47-L64
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol#L66-L78 | true | true | 12 | |||
c4 | 01-salty | Kaysoft G | Low | low | ## [GAS-1] The Ownable library is unnecessary on the `USDS.sol` contract.
There is 1 instance of this
- https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/53516c2cdfdfacb662cdea6417c52f23c94d5b5b/src/stable/USDS.sol#L14
The `onlyOwner` modifier of the `ownable` contract was used only once in the function that is to be ... | File: src/stable/USDS.sol
28: // This will be called only once - at deployment time
29: function setCollateralAndLiquidity( ICollateralAndLiquidity _collateralAndLiquidity ) external onlyOwner
30: {
31: collateralAndLiquidity = _collateralAndLiquidity; //@audit set this in the constructor since it will be called at d... | constructor(ICollateralAndLiquidity _collateralAndLiquidity) ERC20( "USDS", "USDS" ) {
collateralAndLiquidity = _collateralAndLiquidity;// also emit event.
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/Kaysoft-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:22.828009+00:00 | 7e4afb64b7b1b9b688e69cd46417c317e275c4098e31b4bfda2c70a373265865 | 2 | 0 | 614 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File: src/stable/USDS.sol
28: // This will be called only once - at deployment time
29: function setCollateralAndLiquidity( ICollateralAndLiquidity _collateralAndLiquidity ) external onlyOwner
30: {
31: collateralAndLiquidity = _collateralAndLiquidity; //@audit set this in the constructor since it will be called at d... | unknown | 454 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
File: src/stable/USDS.sol
28: // This will be called only once - at deployment time
29: function setCollateralAndLiquidity( ICollateralAndLiquidity _collateralAndLiquidity ) external onlyOwner
30: {
31: collateralAndLiquidity = _collateralAndLiquidity; //@audit set this in the constructor s... | 2 | false | USDS.sol#L14 | USDS.sol | 1 | File: src/stable/USDS.sol
28: // This will be called only once - at deployment time
29: function setCollateralAndLiquidity( ICollateralAndLiquidity _collateralAndLiquidity ) external onlyOwner
30: {
31: collateralAndLiquidity = _collateralAndLiquidity; //@audit set this in the constructor since it will be called at d... | true | constructor(ICollateralAndLiquidity _collateralAndLiquidity) ERC20( "USDS", "USDS" ) {
collateralAndLiquidity = _collateralAndLiquidity;// also emit event.
} | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 08-dopex | Brenzee Q | Low | low | ## L-01 `removeAssetFromTokenReserves` function does not remove assets correctly from the `reserveTokens` array
[Link to the code](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex/blob/main/contracts/core/RdpxV2Core.sol#L287)
`removeAssetFromtokenReserves` function removes tokens from `reserveAsset`, `reserveIndex`, and `... | reservesIndex[reserveTokens[reserveTokens.length - 1]] = index;
// update the index of reserveAsset with the last element
reserveAsset[index] = reserveAsset[reserveAsset.length - 1];
// remove the last element
reserveAsset.pop();
reserveTokens.pop(); | reservesIndex[reserveTokens[reserveTokens.length - 1]] = index;
// update the index of reserveAsset with the last element
string memory lastElement = reserveTokens[reserveTokens.length - 1];
reservesIndex[lastElement] = index;
reserveTokens[index] = lastElement;
// remove the last element
... | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/Brenzee-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:32.627535+00:00 | 7e8f1ca85faf427214059076790d60e739b8d017f4886727ed7f3faf779d9d5a | 2 | 2 | 632 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | reservesIndex[reserveTokens[reserveTokens.length - 1]] = index;
// update the index of reserveAsset with the last element
reserveAsset[index] = reserveAsset[reserveAsset.length - 1];
// remove the last element
reserveAsset.pop();
reserveTokens.pop(); | solidity | 272 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
reservesIndex[reserveTokens[reserveTokens.length - 1]] = index;
// update the index of reserveAsset with the last element
reserveAsset[index] = reserveAsset[reserveAsset.length - 1];
// remove the last element
reserveAsset.pop();
reserveTokens.pop();
// Code block 2 (s... | 2 | false | reservesIndex[reserveTokens[reserveTokens.length - 1]] = index;
// update the index of reserveAsset with the last element
reserveAsset[index] = reserveAsset[reserveAsset.length - 1];
// remove the last element
reserveAsset.pop();
reserveTokens.pop();
reservesIndex[reserveTokens[reserveTokens.leng... | RdpxV2Core.sol#L287 | RdpxV2Core.sol | 1 | reservesIndex[reserveTokens[reserveTokens.length - 1]] = index;
// update the index of reserveAsset with the last element
reserveAsset[index] = reserveAsset[reserveAsset.length - 1];
// remove the last element
reserveAsset.pop();
reserveTokens.pop(); | true | reservesIndex[reserveTokens[reserveTokens.length - 1]] = index;
// update the index of reserveAsset with the last element
string memory lastElement = reserveTokens[reserveTokens.length - 1];
reservesIndex[lastElement] = index;
reserveTokens[index] = lastElement;
// remove the last element
... | true | true | 7.43 | ||
c4 | 01-ondo | Breeje G | High | high | ## Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [GAS-1](#GAS-1) | ++I/I++ SHOULD BE UNCHECKED{++I}/UNCHECKED{I++} WHEN IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO OVERFLOW | 12 |
| [GAS-2](#GAS-2) | SPLITTING REQUIRE() STATEMENTS THAT USE && SAVES GAS | 3 |
| [GAS-3](#GAS-3) | NOT USING THE NAMED RETURN VARIABLES WHEN A FUNC... | File: cash/CashManager.sol
750: for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
786: for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
933: for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
961: for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length; ++i) {
| File: cash/factory/CashFactory.sol
127: for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length; ++i) {
| oracle | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/Breeje-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:32.886548+00:00 | 7e98d70f660362059de51c0ac48877384ae0d17274b0aef9f7ce195e2d6071fe | 8 | 8 | 1,036 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | File: cash/CashManager.sol
750: for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
786: for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
933: for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
961: for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length; ++i) { | solidity | 231 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: cash/CashManager.sol
750: for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
786: for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
933: for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
961: for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length; ++i) {
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: cash/factory/CashFactory.... | 8 | false | File: cash/CashManager.sol
750: for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
786: for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
933: for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
961: for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length; ++i) {
File: cash/factory/CashFactory.sol
127: for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length... | 0 | File: cash/CashManager.sol
750: for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
786: for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
933: for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
961: for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length; ++i) {
| true | File: cash/factory/CashFactory.sol
127: for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length; ++i) {
| true | true | 13 | ||||
c4 | 07-amphora | SM3_SS G | High | high |
# Gas Optimizations Summary
| NO | Issue | Instances |
|------|-----------|-------------|
|[G-01]| Cache external calls outside of loop to avoid re-calling function on each iteration | 6 |
|[G-02]| Combine events to save 2 Glogtopic (375 gas) | 6 |
|[G-03]| Use calldata instead of memory for function argum... | file: contracts/core/VaultController.sol
255 for (uint256 _i; _i < _tokenAddresses.length;) {
_tokenId = _oldVaultController.tokenId(_tokenAddresses[_i]);
if (_tokenId == 0) revert VaultController_WrongCollateralAddress();
_tokensRegistered++;
CollateralInfo memory _collateral = _old... | file: contracts/core/Vault.sol
169 for (uint256 _i; _i < _tokenAddresses.length;) {
IVaultController.CollateralInfo memory _collateralInfo = CONTROLLER.tokenCollateralInfo(_tokenAddresses[_i]);
if (_collateralInfo.tokenId == 0) revert Vault_TokenNotRegistered();
if (_collateralInfo.collater... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/SM3_SS-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:34.956595+00:00 | 7ed4258f919bf1ab195da26ef2309ac7d49a3e29557ac4510bfdccc5b28fc787 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | file: contracts/core/VaultController.sol
255 for (uint256 _i; _i < _tokenAddresses.length;) {
_tokenId = _oldVaultController.tokenId(_tokenAddresses[_i]);
if (_tokenId == 0) revert VaultController_WrongCollateralAddress();
_tokensRegistered++;
CollateralInfo memory _collateral = _old... | true | file: contracts/core/Vault.sol
169 for (uint256 _i; _i < _tokenAddresses.length;) {
IVaultController.CollateralInfo memory _collateralInfo = CONTROLLER.tokenCollateralInfo(_tokenAddresses[_i]);
if (_collateralInfo.tokenId == 0) revert Vault_TokenNotRegistered();
if (_collateralInfo.collater... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | charlesjhongc G | Gas | gas | # Gas Optmization Findings
## Replace i++ in for loop
Could be replace with ++i or unchecked math block
```solidity
// option1
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; ++i)
{
// ...
}
```
```solidity
// option2
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount;)
{
// ...
unchecked{
++i;
}
}
```
Occurrenc... | // option1
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; ++i)
{
// ...
} | // option2
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount;)
{
// ...
unchecked{
++i;
}
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/charlesjhongc-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:58.029003+00:00 | 7ee48b947ff4b3edc0b404f414c7002851b5d7f8b978d3c5e2ce51dd91ac2df8 | 3 | 3 | 474 | 7 | false | false | true | false | high | // option1
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; ++i)
{
// ...
} | solidity | 71 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
// option1
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; ++i)
{
// ...
}
// Code block 2 (solidity):
// option2
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount;)
{
// ...
unchecked{
++i;
}
}
// Code block 3 (solidity):
function adjustWeight(
uint256 _derivativeIndex,
uin... | 3 | false | // option1
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; ++i)
{
// ...
}
// option2
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount;)
{
// ...
unchecked{
++i;
}
}
function adjustWeight(
uint256 _derivativeIndex,
uint256 _weight
) external onlyOwner {
uint256 originalWeight = weights[_derivative... | SafEth.sol#L71, SafEth.sol#L84, SafEth.sol#L113, SafEth.sol#L140, SafEth.sol#L147, SafEth.sol#L171, SafEth.sol#L191 | SafEth.sol | 7 | // option1
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; ++i)
{
// ...
} | true | // option2
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount;)
{
// ...
unchecked{
++i;
}
} | true | true | 9 | ||
c4 | 06-lybra | Tripathi Q | Low | low | ### Low Risk Issues
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [L‑01] | `_mintEUSD ` emits incorrect parameter in `Mint` event | 1 |
### [L‑01] `_mintEUSD ` emits incorrect parameter in `Mint` event
`_mintEUSD ` is a internal function in pool/base contracts which emit an event after sucessfull minting of eUSD. ... | File: contracts/lybra/pools/base/LybraEUSDVaultBase.sol
268: emit Mint(msg.sender, _onBehalfOf, _mintAmount, block.timestamp);
| upgrade | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/Tripathi-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:22:48.520496+00:00 | 7ef01520e9e6be6ec27bd5f6bff246b6ea91901d320fd3eddf2afe8abf39b9db | 1 | 1 | 142 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | File: contracts/lybra/pools/base/LybraEUSDVaultBase.sol
268: emit Mint(msg.sender, _onBehalfOf, _mintAmount, block.timestamp); | solidity | 142 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: contracts/lybra/pools/base/LybraEUSDVaultBase.sol
268: emit Mint(msg.sender, _onBehalfOf, _mintAmount, block.timestamp); | 1 | false | File: contracts/lybra/pools/base/LybraEUSDVaultBase.sol
268: emit Mint(msg.sender, _onBehalfOf, _mintAmount, block.timestamp); | LybraEUSDVaultBase.sol#L268-L5 | LybraEUSDVaultBase.sol | 1 | File: contracts/lybra/pools/base/LybraEUSDVaultBase.sol
268: emit Mint(msg.sender, _onBehalfOf, _mintAmount, block.timestamp);
| true | false | false | 4.8 | ||||
c4 | 01-salty | 0xOmer Q | Low | low | ## Missing check for wallets to not be the same addresses
`ManagedWallet` contract introduces 2 wallets `mainWallet` and `confirmationWallet`. It is possible to pick them as same addresses. Since they have different roles they must not be same. Consider adding relevant checks both in `constructor` and `proposeWallets()... | front-running | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/0xOmer-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:04.711888+00:00 | 7f224500569bd7a1ab5688c5c93e08214498a088114a775c56d0b9dbf31e1022 | 1 | 0 | 424 | 2 | true | true | true | false | medium | src/staking/Liquidity.sol:
86 if (swapAmountA > 0) {
87: tokenA.approve(address(pools), swapAmountA);
88
100 else if (swapAmountB > 0) {
101: tokenB.approve(address(pools), swapAmountB);
102
154 // Approve the liquidity to add
155: toke... | ruby | 424 | // Code block 1 (ruby):
src/staking/Liquidity.sol:
86 if (swapAmountA > 0) {
87: tokenA.approve(address(pools), swapAmountA);
88
100 else if (swapAmountB > 0) {
101: tokenB.approve(address(pools), swapAmountB);
102
154 // Approve the liquidity to... | 1 | false | ManagedWallet.sol#L48, ManagedWallet.sol#L49 | ManagedWallet.sol | 2 | false | false | false | 5 | |||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | ch0bu Q | Critical | critical | ## 1. For modern and more readable code; update import usages
Solidity code is also cleaner in another way that might not be noticeable: the struct Point. We were importing it previously with global import but not using it. The Point struct `polluted the source code` with an unnecessary object we were not using becaus... | 58 function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner { | 51 function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner { | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/ch0bu-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:56.224747+00:00 | 7f3c9bbca9058fd9d5875f07db5c2b6f711cb4656df218745dbf41458d5a81d5 | 4 | 0 | 514 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | 58 function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner { | unknown | 66 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
58 function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
// Code block 2 (unknown):
51 function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
// Code block 3 (unknown):
48 function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
// Code block 4 (unknown):
44 maxSl... | 4 | false | Reth.sol, SfrxEth.sol, WstEth.sol | SfrxEth.sol, Reth.sol, WstEth.sol | 3 | 58 function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner { | true | 51 function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner { | true | true | 10 | |||
c4 | 08-dopex | JP_Courses Q | Low | low | 0. QA/LOW: RdpxV2Core - Likely incorrect/misleading comment regarding precision for state variable `slippageTolerance`, or precision hasn't been added to variable value yet.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex/blob/e96aaa5ea21f11b29d828dbe2d0745974cd046ed/contracts/core/RdpxV2Core.sol#L99-L100
L100:
`slippag... | /// @notice The slippage tolernce in swaps in 1e8 precision
uint256 public slippageTolerance = 5e5; // 0.5% | uint256 public slippageTolerance = 5e5 * 1e8; // 0.5% | slippage | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/JP_Courses-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:42.947830+00:00 | 7f478a7aba7e18c9a6f6450734d49b236e944c4b0e7d59bf44f9cf4f47e0336f | 3 | 3 | 261 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | /// @notice The slippage tolernce in swaps in 1e8 precision
uint256 public slippageTolerance = 5e5; // 0.5% | solidity | 109 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
/// @notice The slippage tolernce in swaps in 1e8 precision
uint256 public slippageTolerance = 5e5; // 0.5%
// Code block 2 (solidity):
uint256 public slippageTolerance = 5e5 * 1e8; // 0.5%
// Code block 3 (solidity):
/// @notice Liquidity slippage tolerance
uint256 public liquiditySli... | 3 | false | /// @notice The slippage tolernce in swaps in 1e8 precision
uint256 public slippageTolerance = 5e5; // 0.5%
uint256 public slippageTolerance = 5e5 * 1e8; // 0.5%
/// @notice Liquidity slippage tolerance
uint256 public liquiditySlippageTolerance = 5e5; // 0.5% | RdpxV2Core.sol#L99-L100, RdpxV2Core.sol#L102-L103 | RdpxV2Core.sol | 2 | /// @notice The slippage tolernce in swaps in 1e8 precision
uint256 public slippageTolerance = 5e5; // 0.5% | true | uint256 public slippageTolerance = 5e5 * 1e8; // 0.5% | true | true | 8.44 | ||
c4 | 05-ajna | Jorgect G | Informational | informational | #GAS OPTMIZATION
## [G-01] CREATING A NEW MODIFIER CAN SAVE GAS
the next owner validation is used in 3 different function, can crate a modifier to save gas:
```
file: ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
if (msg.sender != stakeInfo.owner) revert NotOwnerOfDeposit();
```
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/276... | file: ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
if (msg.sender != stakeInfo.owner) revert NotOwnerOfDeposit(); | modifier isOwner(uint256 id) {
if (msg.sender != stakes[id].owner) revert NotOwnerOfDeposit();
_;
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/Jorgect-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:01.294904+00:00 | 7f74723f0d86f50ee287a2ceff750192ce03aecc922ae70866d60bd2e7883de2 | 2 | 0 | 200 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | file: ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
if (msg.sender != stakeInfo.owner) revert NotOwnerOfDeposit(); | unknown | 101 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
file: ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
if (msg.sender != stakeInfo.owner) revert NotOwnerOfDeposit();
// Code block 2 (unknown):
modifier isOwner(uint256 id) {
if (msg.sender != stakes[id].owner) revert NotOwnerOfDeposit();
_;
} | 2 | false | RewardsManager.sol#L120, RewardsManager.sol#L143, RewardsManager.sol#L275 | RewardsManager.sol | 3 | file: ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
if (msg.sender != stakeInfo.owner) revert NotOwnerOfDeposit(); | true | modifier isOwner(uint256 id) {
if (msg.sender != stakes[id].owner) revert NotOwnerOfDeposit();
_;
} | true | true | 6.59 | |||
c4 | 09-ondo | 0xblackskull Q | Low | low | 1- Missing events in rescueTokens and zero address check
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L322
```
function rescueTokens(address _token) external onlyOwner {
uint256 balance = IRWALike(_token).balanceOf(address(this));
IRWALike(_token).transfer(owner(... | function rescueTokens(address _token) external onlyOwner {
uint256 balance = IRWALike(_token).balanceOf(address(this));
IRWALike(_token).transfer(owner(), balance);
} | function transferShares(
address _recipient,
uint256 _sharesAmount
) public returns (uint256) {
_transferShares(msg.sender, _recipient, _sharesAmount);
emit TransferShares(msg.sender, _recipient, _sharesAmount);
uint256 tokensAmount = getRUSDYByShares(_sharesAmount);
emit Transfer(msg.sender... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/0xblackskull-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:16.380790+00:00 | 7fb79f0261ec089d7681f3aee1055dbcc06f049ca7f9bf3b56d40dcc38fadad6 | 3 | 0 | 987 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | function rescueTokens(address _token) external onlyOwner {
uint256 balance = IRWALike(_token).balanceOf(address(this));
IRWALike(_token).transfer(owner(), balance);
} | unknown | 176 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function rescueTokens(address _token) external onlyOwner {
uint256 balance = IRWALike(_token).balanceOf(address(this));
IRWALike(_token).transfer(owner(), balance);
}
// Code block 2 (unknown):
function transferShares(
address _recipient,
uint256 _sharesAmount
) public re... | 3 | false | DestinationBridge.sol#L322, rUSDY.sol#L421 | rUSDY.sol, DestinationBridge.sol | 2 | function rescueTokens(address _token) external onlyOwner {
uint256 balance = IRWALike(_token).balanceOf(address(this));
IRWALike(_token).transfer(owner(), balance);
} | true | function transferShares(
address _recipient,
uint256 _sharesAmount
) public returns (uint256) {
_transferShares(msg.sender, _recipient, _sharesAmount);
emit TransferShares(msg.sender, _recipient, _sharesAmount);
uint256 tokensAmount = getRUSDYByShares(_sharesAmount);
emit Transfer(msg.sender... | true | true | 8.79 | |||
c4 | 01-salty | 0xbrett8571 Analysis | Critical | critical | ## Introduction
Salty.IO is an Ethereum-based decentralized exchange (DEX) that aims to provide zero swap fees, yield from automatic arbitrage, and a native stablecoin (USDS) backed by WBTC/WETH collateral.
In this report, I analyze the Salty.IO smart contract architecture and identifies strengths, risks, and recomm... | ┌──────────────────────┐
│ │
│ DAO.sol │
│ Governance │
│ │
└───────────┬──────────┘
│
┌───────────┴──────────┐
│ Pools.sol │
│ AMM + Arbitrage │
└───────────┬──────────┘
... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/0xbrett8571-Analysis.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:09.470602+00:00 | 7fd895abe60e09f3bf918153aa85c2c91c0e58c1b3f62452442a7467a604b9c8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | Pools.sol, DAO.sol, Upkeep.sol, PriceAggregator.sol, USDS.sol, CollateralAndLiquidity.sol | Pools.sol, DAO.sol, CollateralAndLiquidity.sol, Upkeep.sol, USDS.sol, PriceAggregator.sol | 6 | ┌──────────────────────┐
│ │
│ DAO.sol │
│ Governance │
│ │
└───────────┬──────────┘
│
┌───────────┴──────────┐
│ Pools.sol │
│ AMM + Arbitrage │
└───────────┬──────────┘
... | true | false | false | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | Lef Q | Low | low | 1) Unused function parameters should be commented out as a better and declarative way to silence runtime warning messages. As an example, the following functions may have these parameters refactored to:
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/d016bef40dc745b6a16e18d83bd4f7d776245903/contracts/SafEth/der... | function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
change to
function ethPerDerivative() public view returns (uint256) { | function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
change to
function ethPerDerivative() public view returns (uint256) { | slippage | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Lef-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:17.074827+00:00 | 7ffa0b43cbb2dcb86fb162eb2ff033960fec0094b4c96d4f4c5bcb1c13e06049 | 3 | 0 | 424 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
change to
function ethPerDerivative() public view returns (uint256) { | unknown | 154 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
change to
function ethPerDerivative() public view returns (uint256) {
// Code block 2 (unknown):
function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
change to
function ethPerDeriva... | 3 | false | SfrxEth.sol#L111, WstEth.sol#L86, SafEth.sol#L207, SafEth.sol#L25 | SfrxEth.sol, WstEth.sol, SafEth.sol | 4 | function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
change to
function ethPerDerivative() public view returns (uint256) { | true | function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
change to
function ethPerDerivative() public view returns (uint256) { | true | true | 8.96 | |||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | KmanOfficial Q | Low | low | ### Low Risk / QA Issues
### [01] Unnecessary emit of PointsAdded event for the Merging Pool when a fight has been won but the stakeAtRisk is more than 0.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/main/src/RankedBattle.sol#L416-L500
```
if (battleResult == 0) {
/// If the user won the match
... | if (battleResult == 0) {
/// If the user won the match
/// If the user has no NRNs at risk, then they can earn points
if (stakeAtRisk == 0) {
points = stakingFactor[tokenId] * eloFactor;
}
/// Divert a portion of the points to the merging poo... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/KmanOfficial-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:30.473118+00:00 | 800636e4fbd7190d3687ffe469d0914595e5e3b68c20c25163e681028254dba4 | 1 | 0 | 501 | 2 | false | true | true | false | medium | if (battleResult == 0) {
/// If the user won the match
/// If the user has no NRNs at risk, then they can earn points
if (stakeAtRisk == 0) {
points = stakingFactor[tokenId] * eloFactor;
}
/// Divert a portion of the points to the merging poo... | unknown | 501 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
if (battleResult == 0) {
/// If the user won the match
/// If the user has no NRNs at risk, then they can earn points
if (stakeAtRisk == 0) {
points = stakingFactor[tokenId] * eloFactor;
}
/// Divert a portion of th... | 1 | false | RankedBattle.sol#L416-L500, RankedBattle.sol#L348 | RankedBattle.sol | 2 | if (battleResult == 0) {
/// If the user won the match
/// If the user has no NRNs at risk, then they can earn points
if (stakeAtRisk == 0) {
points = stakingFactor[tokenId] * eloFactor;
}
/// Divert a portion of the points to the merging poo... | true | false | false | 6 | |||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | Rickard G | Low | low | # [G-01] Setting the constructor to `payable`
You can cut out 10 opcodes in the creation-time EVM bytecode if you declare a constructor `payable`. Making the constructor payable eliminates the need for an initial check of `msg.value == 0` and saves 13 gas on deployment with no security risks.
## Context
4 results - 4 f... | contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol
24: constructor() { | contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
33: constructor() { | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Rickard-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:28.768234+00:00 | 8007a934d07033020384f902f3ef515ce0c0b04ce6d11290512036b74927efdc | 4 | 4 | 251 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol
24: constructor() { | solidity | 63 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol
24: constructor() {
// Code block 2 (solidity):
contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
33: constructor() {
// Code block 3 (solidity):
contracts/SafEth/derivatives/SfrxEth.sol
27: constructor() {
// Code block 4 (solidity):
contracts/SafE... | 4 | false | contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol
24: constructor() {
contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
33: constructor() {
contracts/SafEth/derivatives/SfrxEth.sol
27: constructor() {
contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol
24: constructor() { | WstEth.sol#L24, Reth.sol#L33, SfrxEth.sol#L27 | SfrxEth.sol, Reth.sol, WstEth.sol | 3 | contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol
24: constructor() { | true | contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
33: constructor() { | true | true | 10 | ||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | 0xMAKEOUTHILL Q | Low | low | **Low** - There will always be **1** unused NRN token, because of the following statement in `mint` in `Neuron.sol`:
```
function mint(address to, uint256 amount) public virtual {
//@audit this won't mint the last token of the MAX_SUPPLY
@>>> require(totalSupply() + amount < MAX_SUPPLY, "Trying to ... | function mint(address to, uint256 amount) public virtual {
//@audit this won't mint the last token of the MAX_SUPPLY
@>>> require(totalSupply() + amount < MAX_SUPPLY, "Trying to mint more than the max supply");
require(hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, msg.sender), "ERC20: must have minter role to mint")... | constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) {
_ownerAddress = msg.sender;
// Initialize the probabilities for each attribute
addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);
uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
for (uint8 i = 0; i < attributesLength; i++) {
... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/0xMAKEOUTHILL-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:03.325756+00:00 | 803db6a08d215cf17d771e5c5414fac8ce7a371fc5bbbac58ee2d878144042ae | 2 | 0 | 894 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function mint(address to, uint256 amount) public virtual {
//@audit this won't mint the last token of the MAX_SUPPLY
@>>> require(totalSupply() + amount < MAX_SUPPLY, "Trying to mint more than the max supply");
require(hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, msg.sender), "ERC20: must have minter role to mint")... | unknown | 354 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function mint(address to, uint256 amount) public virtual {
//@audit this won't mint the last token of the MAX_SUPPLY
@>>> require(totalSupply() + amount < MAX_SUPPLY, "Trying to mint more than the max supply");
require(hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, msg.sender), "ERC20: must... | 2 | false | 0 | function mint(address to, uint256 amount) public virtual {
//@audit this won't mint the last token of the MAX_SUPPLY
@>>> require(totalSupply() + amount < MAX_SUPPLY, "Trying to mint more than the max supply");
require(hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, msg.sender), "ERC20: must have minter role to mint")... | true | constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) {
_ownerAddress = msg.sender;
// Initialize the probabilities for each attribute
addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);
uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
for (uint8 i = 0; i < attributesLength; i++) {
... | true | true | 7 | |||||
c4 | 10-badger | SpicyMeatball Q | High | high | ### Redundant check
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/main/packages/contracts/contracts/LiquidationLibrary.sol#L863
`_redistributeDebt` will never be called if debt = 0
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/main/packages/contracts/contracts/LiquidationLibrary.sol#L525-L527
### BaseMath is no... | keccak256(
"PermitPositionManagerApproval(address borrower,address positionManager,uint8 status,uint256 nonce,uint256 deadline)"
); | function syncGlobalAccounting() external {
_requireCallerIsBorrowerOperations();
_syncGlobalAccounting();
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/SpicyMeatball-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:38.335591+00:00 | 80733ad2dc320877ecf50b4eb1c022072ff9b8b127c018ca3f4ae689440323dd | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | LiquidationLibrary.sol#L863, LiquidationLibrary.sol#L525-L527, EBTCToken.sol#L323, EBTCToken.sol#L297, EBTCToken.sol#L248, CdpManager.sol#L830, CdpManager.sol#L624, CdpManagerStorage.sol#L269-L274, CdpManagerStorage.sol#L471, BorrowerOperations.sol#L963 | CdpManagerStorage.sol, BorrowerOperations.sol, CdpManager.sol, EBTCToken.sol, LiquidationLibrary.sol | 10 | keccak256(
"PermitPositionManagerApproval(address borrower,address positionManager,uint8 status,uint256 nonce,uint256 deadline)"
); | true | function syncGlobalAccounting() external {
_requireCallerIsBorrowerOperations();
_syncGlobalAccounting();
} | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | MatricksDeCoder G | Critical | critical | #### GAS-1 Optimize Address Storage Value Management with assembly
Assembly storing leads to gas savings as it has less overheads compared to abstractions
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/cd1a0e6d1b40168657d1aaee8223dc050e15f8cc/src/Neuron.sol#L71
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blo... | struct GameItemAttributes {
string name;
bool finiteSupply;
bool transferable;
uint256 itemsRemaining;
uint256 itemPrice;
uint256 dailyAllowance;
} | function setValue(uint256 _value) external onlyOwner {
value = _value;
}
Can be rewritten
function setValue(uint256 _value) external onlyOwner {
assembly {
sstore(value.slot,_value);
}
}
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/MatricksDeCoder-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:33.167040+00:00 | 80ab38cc488f76c720600a7edee52ddfa5593926fb1a74111683653aabbd256f | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | Neuron.sol#L71, Neuron.sol#L72, Neuron.sol#L87, RankedBattle.sol#L152, RankedBattle.sol#L153, RankedBattle.sol#L169, RankedBattle.sol#L186, RankedBattle.sol#L194, AiArenaHelper.sol#L42, AiArenaHelper.sol#L63, FighterFarm.sol#L107, FighterFarm.sol#L108, FighterFarm.sol#L109, FighterFarm.sol#L122, GameItems.sol#L96 | GameItems.sol, Neuron.sol, RankedBattle.sol, FighterFarm.sol, AiArenaHelper.sol | 15 | struct GameItemAttributes {
string name;
bool finiteSupply;
bool transferable;
uint256 itemsRemaining;
uint256 itemPrice;
uint256 dailyAllowance;
} | true | function setValue(uint256 _value) external onlyOwner {
value = _value;
}
Can be rewritten
function setValue(uint256 _value) external onlyOwner {
assembly {
sstore(value.slot,_value);
}
}
| true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 08-dopex | 0xhacksmithh Q | High | high | ### [Low-01] Code is contradicting comments
In `decreaseAmount()` according to comment it decreases bond amount (rdpxAmount) associated with corresponding `bondId`
But in code instead of substracting `decreaseAmount` from bond's rdpxAmount it directly set that variable('rdpxAmount') to inputed decreaseAmount.
There ... | /// @notice Decreases the bond amount
/// @dev Can only be called by the rdpxV2Core
/// @param bondId id of the bond to decrease
/// @param amount amount to decrease
function decreaseAmount(
uint256 bondId,
uint256 amount
) public onlyRole(RDPXV2CORE_ROLE) {
_whenNotPaused();
- bonds[bondId].... | file: contracts/decaying-bonds/RdpxDecayingBonds.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex/blob/main/contracts/decaying-bonds/RdpxDecayingBonds.sol#L139-L145 | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/0xhacksmithh-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:24.962531+00:00 | 80b47367c3b51a974de236961de94703069b4e82873325dd552f5f81866fd72f | 4 | 2 | 882 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | /// @notice Decreases the bond amount
/// @dev Can only be called by the rdpxV2Core
/// @param bondId id of the bond to decrease
/// @param amount amount to decrease
function decreaseAmount(
uint256 bondId,
uint256 amount
) public onlyRole(RDPXV2CORE_ROLE) {
_whenNotPaused();
- bonds[bondId].rd... | solidity | 450 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
/// @notice Decreases the bond amount
/// @dev Can only be called by the rdpxV2Core
/// @param bondId id of the bond to decrease
/// @param amount amount to decrease
function decreaseAmount(
uint256 bondId,
uint256 amount
) public onlyRole(RDPXV2CORE_ROLE) {
_whenNotPa... | 4 | false | /// @notice Decreases the bond amount
/// @dev Can only be called by the rdpxV2Core
/// @param bondId id of the bond to decrease
/// @param amount amount to decrease
function decreaseAmount(
uint256 bondId,
uint256 amount
) public onlyRole(RDPXV2CORE_ROLE) {
_whenNotPaused();
- bonds[bondId].rd... | RdpxDecayingBonds.sol#L139-L145, PerpetualAtlanticVaultLP.sol#L180-L182 | RdpxDecayingBonds.sol, PerpetualAtlanticVaultLP.sol | 2 | /// @notice Decreases the bond amount
/// @dev Can only be called by the rdpxV2Core
/// @param bondId id of the bond to decrease
/// @param amount amount to decrease
function decreaseAmount(
uint256 bondId,
uint256 amount
) public onlyRole(RDPXV2CORE_ROLE) {
_whenNotPaused();
- bonds[bondId].... | true | file: contracts/decaying-bonds/RdpxDecayingBonds.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex/blob/main/contracts/decaying-bonds/RdpxDecayingBonds.sol#L139-L145 | true | true | 10 | ||
c4 | 02-ethos | lukris02 G | Low | low | # Gas Optimizations Report for Ethos Reserve contest
## Overview
During the audit, 2 gas issues were found.
№ | Title | Instance Count
--- | --- | ---
G-1 | Use unchecked blocks for subtractions where underflow is impossible | 14
G-2 | Using ```storage``` pointer to ```struct```/```array```/```mapping``` is cheap... | ##### Description
When you copy a storage ```struct```/```array```/```mapping``` to a memory variable, you are copying each member by reading it from the storage, which is expensive, but when you use the ```storage``` keyword, you are just storing a pointer to the storage, which is much cheaper.
##### Instances
- [```S... | to: | overflow | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/lukris02-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:21.724451+00:00 | 80c36a1eb6451ea239394e992195a932deb6129e66326bda49a556ece205225a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | ReaperVaultV2.sol#L235, ReaperVaultV2.sol#L384, ReaperVaultV2.sol#L526, ReaperVaultV2.sol#L528, ReaperVaultV2.sol#L535, ReaperVaultERC4626.sol#L82, StabilityPool.sol#L687, StabilityPool.sol#L722 | ReaperVaultV2.sol, ReaperVaultERC4626.sol, StabilityPool.sol | 8 | ##### Description
When you copy a storage ```struct```/```array```/```mapping``` to a memory variable, you are copying each member by reading it from the storage, which is expensive, but when you use the ```storage``` keyword, you are just storing a pointer to the storage, which is much cheaper.
##### Instances
- [```S... | true | to: | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | EvanW Q | Low | low | [QA-01] **NatSpec comments provide rich code documentation. The following functions are some examples that miss the `@param` and/or `@return` comments.**
```solidity
contracts/SafEth/derivativrs/WstEth.sol
48: function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
56: function withdraw(uint256 _amount) extern... | contracts/SafEth/derivativrs/WstEth.sol
48: function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
56: function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner {
86: function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
contracts/SafEth/derivativrs/SfrxEth.sol
51: function setMaxSlippage(uin... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/EvanW-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:04.733109+00:00 | 80c4de361a59aff4d1b684a8564e01340be2df37cdf057118c6133f0c398d730 | 1 | 1 | 535 | 0 | false | true | true | false | medium | contracts/SafEth/derivativrs/WstEth.sol
48: function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
56: function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner {
86: function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
contracts/SafEth/derivativrs/SfrxEth.sol
51: function setMaxSlippage(uin... | solidity | 535 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
contracts/SafEth/derivativrs/WstEth.sol
48: function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
56: function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner {
86: function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
contracts/SafEth/derivativrs/SfrxEth.sol
51:... | 1 | false | contracts/SafEth/derivativrs/WstEth.sol
48: function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
56: function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner {
86: function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
contracts/SafEth/derivativrs/SfrxEth.sol
51: function setMaxSlippage(uin... | 0 | contracts/SafEth/derivativrs/WstEth.sol
48: function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
56: function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner {
86: function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
contracts/SafEth/derivativrs/SfrxEth.sol
51: function setMaxSlippage(uin... | true | false | false | 3.41 | ||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | Infect3d Q | Critical | critical | # Low Risk and Non-Critical Issues
## N-01 Better to use `__ownable_init()` instead of `_transferOwnership()` as this is the recommended way to initialize the Ownable contract.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L53
##### SafEth::initialize
```solidity
File: contrac... | File: contracts\SafeEth.sol
48: function initialize(
49: string memory _tokenName,
50: string memory _tokenSymbol
51: ) external initializer {
52: ERC20Upgradeable.__ERC20_init(_tokenName, _tokenSymbol);
53: _transferOwnership(msg.sender);
| File: contracts\SafeEth.sol
48: function initialize(
49: string memory _tokenName,
50: string memory _tokenSymbol
51: ) external initializer {
52: ERC20Upgradeable.__ERC20_init(_tokenName, _tokenSymbol);
53: _transferOwnership(msg.sender);
54: minAmount = 5 * 10 ** 17; //... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Infect3d-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:10.674441+00:00 | 80d6712a55742a60b12599c67b5feea997433bbcaa40cc83ed7fabbb09819643 | 2 | 2 | 725 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | File: contracts\SafeEth.sol
48: function initialize(
49: string memory _tokenName,
50: string memory _tokenSymbol
51: ) external initializer {
52: ERC20Upgradeable.__ERC20_init(_tokenName, _tokenSymbol);
53: _transferOwnership(msg.sender); | solidity | 279 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: contracts\SafeEth.sol
48: function initialize(
49: string memory _tokenName,
50: string memory _tokenSymbol
51: ) external initializer {
52: ERC20Upgradeable.__ERC20_init(_tokenName, _tokenSymbol);
53: _transferOwnership(msg.sender);
// Code blo... | 2 | false | File: contracts\SafeEth.sol
48: function initialize(
49: string memory _tokenName,
50: string memory _tokenSymbol
51: ) external initializer {
52: ERC20Upgradeable.__ERC20_init(_tokenName, _tokenSymbol);
53: _transferOwnership(msg.sender);
File: contracts\SafeEth.sol
48: fun... | SafEth.sol#L53, SafEth.sol#L54-L55 | SafEth.sol | 2 | File: contracts\SafeEth.sol
48: function initialize(
49: string memory _tokenName,
50: string memory _tokenSymbol
51: ) external initializer {
52: ERC20Upgradeable.__ERC20_init(_tokenName, _tokenSymbol);
53: _transferOwnership(msg.sender);
| true | File: contracts\SafeEth.sol
48: function initialize(
49: string memory _tokenName,
50: string memory _tokenSymbol
51: ) external initializer {
52: ERC20Upgradeable.__ERC20_init(_tokenName, _tokenSymbol);
53: _transferOwnership(msg.sender);
54: minAmount = 5 * 10 ** 17; //... | true | true | 7.63 | ||
c4 | 01-biconomy | seeu G | Gas | gas | ## Missing implementation Shift Right/Left for division and multiplication
### Description
The `SHR` opcode only utilizes 3 gas, compared to the 5 gas used by the `DIV` opcode. Additionally, shifting is used to get around Solidity's division operation's division-by-0 prohibition.
### Findings
```
https://github.com... | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/libs/Math.sol#L36 => return (a & b) + (a ^ b) / 2;
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L200 => uint256 startGas = gasleft() + 21000 +... | upgrade | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/seeu-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:08.735589+00:00 | 80d95b4934806dde337d3a05718a750eaa68e50b08015fecdd6c0be79c9c3d6e | 1 | 0 | 341 | 2 | false | true | true | false | medium | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/libs/Math.sol#L36 => return (a & b) + (a ^ b) / 2;
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L200 => uint256 startGas = gasleft() + 21000 +... | unknown | 341 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/libs/Math.sol#L36 => return (a & b) + (a ^ b) / 2;
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L200 => uint256 sta... | 1 | false | Math.sol#L36, SmartAccount.sol#L200 | Math.sol, SmartAccount.sol | 2 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/libs/Math.sol#L36 => return (a & b) + (a ^ b) / 2;
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L200 => uint256 startGas = gasleft() + 21000 +... | true | false | false | 4.88 | |||||
c4 | 01-salty | 0xta G | Medium | medium | # Gas Optimization
## [G-01] Pre-increment and pre-decrement are cheaper than +1 ,-1
```solidity
File: src/stable/CollateralAndLiquidity.sol
350 return findLiquidatableUsers( 0, numberOfUsersWithBorrowedUSDS() - 1 );
```
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/main/src/stable/CollateralAndLiquidity.sol#L3... | File: src/stable/CollateralAndLiquidity.sol
350 return findLiquidatableUsers( 0, numberOfUsersWithBorrowedUSDS() - 1 ); | File: src/stable/StableConfig.sol
52 uint256 remainingRatioAfterReward = minimumCollateralRatioPercent - rewardPercentForCallingLiquidation - 1;
128 uint256 remainingRatioAfterReward = minimumCollateralRatioPercent - 1 - rewardPercentForCallingLiquidation; | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/0xta-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:10.387362+00:00 | 80dc568d9d5dfdf0a5341b69317e924815c9e128a437c06dfe5d95af944140fc | 6 | 6 | 1,164 | 6 | false | false | true | false | high | File: src/stable/CollateralAndLiquidity.sol
350 return findLiquidatableUsers( 0, numberOfUsersWithBorrowedUSDS() - 1 ); | solidity | 121 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: src/stable/CollateralAndLiquidity.sol
350 return findLiquidatableUsers( 0, numberOfUsersWithBorrowedUSDS() - 1 );
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: src/stable/StableConfig.sol
52 uint256 remainingRatioAfterReward = minimumCollateralRatioPercent - rewardPercentForCallingLiquidatio... | 6 | false | File: src/stable/CollateralAndLiquidity.sol
350 return findLiquidatableUsers( 0, numberOfUsersWithBorrowedUSDS() - 1 );
File: src/stable/StableConfig.sol
52 uint256 remainingRatioAfterReward = minimumCollateralRatioPercent - rewardPercentForCallingLiquidation - 1;
128 uint256 remainingRatioAfterReward = minimu... | CollateralAndLiquidity.sol#L350, StableConfig.sol#L52, Staking.sol#L160, CollateralAndLiquidity.sol#L313, AccessManager.sol#L43, Airdrop.sol#L48 | Airdrop.sol, AccessManager.sol, CollateralAndLiquidity.sol, Staking.sol, StableConfig.sol | 6 | File: src/stable/CollateralAndLiquidity.sol
350 return findLiquidatableUsers( 0, numberOfUsersWithBorrowedUSDS() - 1 ); | true | File: src/stable/StableConfig.sol
52 uint256 remainingRatioAfterReward = minimumCollateralRatioPercent - rewardPercentForCallingLiquidation - 1;
128 uint256 remainingRatioAfterReward = minimumCollateralRatioPercent - 1 - rewardPercentForCallingLiquidation; | true | true | 12 | ||
c4 | 11-kelp | cheatc0d3 G | Medium | medium | ## Gas Optimization Report for Kelp DAO
### Use Smaller Integer Types for State Variables
Smaller integer types can reduce gas costs significantly when used in state variables.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/main/src/LRTConfig.sol#L16
**Instances:**
- `depositLimitByAsset` mapping uses `uint256` fo... | mapping(address token => uint256 amount) public depositLimitByAsset; | mapping(address token => uint128 amount) public depositLimitByAsset; | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/cheatc0d3-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:53.762769+00:00 | 80e69bbede4c3279812c3cbbd7dc177adc260399ca0c1fd3f3b074af9a480d5e | 5 | 5 | 621 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | mapping(address token => uint256 amount) public depositLimitByAsset; | solidity | 68 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
mapping(address token => uint256 amount) public depositLimitByAsset;
// Code block 2 (solidity):
mapping(address token => uint128 amount) public depositLimitByAsset;
// Code block 3 (solidity):
function _addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) private {
UtilLib.checkN... | 5 | false | mapping(address token => uint256 amount) public depositLimitByAsset;
mapping(address token => uint128 amount) public depositLimitByAsset;
function _addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(asset);
if (isSupportedAsset[asset]) {
revert AssetAlready... | LRTConfig.sol#L16, LRTConfig.sol#L80, LRTConfig.sol#L21 | LRTConfig.sol | 3 | mapping(address token => uint256 amount) public depositLimitByAsset; | true | mapping(address token => uint128 amount) public depositLimitByAsset; | true | true | 11 | ||
c4 | 01-salty | 0xMango Q | High | high | ## It is possible to use invalid signatures to vote in ```BoostrapBallot.sol```
Signature malleability:
Due to the lack of checks in the ```SigningTools.sol``` contract, given signatures can be modified for invalid ```s``` and ```v```. These signatures if passed into ```SigningTools._verifySignature()``` will still ge... | Signature malleability:
Due to the lack of checks in the ```SigningTools.sol``` contract, given signatures can be modified for invalid ```s``` and ```v```. These signatures if passed into ```SigningTools._verifySignature()``` will still generate the desired public key & have the function call pass.
Affected line in qu... | Original Signature: | oracle | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/0xMango-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:04.235391+00:00 | 80fe5184a4fabe97343401c74f0d05c265f79525892cb3c4951f6c874afdb2ab | 4 | 0 | 537 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | Signature malleability:
Due to the lack of checks in the | unknown | 56 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
Signature malleability:
Due to the lack of checks in the
// Code block 2 (unknown):
hex"0x291f777bcf554105b4067f14d2bb3da27f778af49fe2f008e718328a91cae2f8e1314f4b12e29a3ab940f9fc393caa97141250333d7957bb1d3c1093d96480e11b"
// Code block 3 (unknown):
hex"291f777bcf554105b4067f14d2bb3da27f778a... | 4 | false | SigningTools.sol#L11, Deployment.sol#L120 | SigningTools.sol, Deployment.sol | 2 | Signature malleability:
Due to the lack of checks in the ```SigningTools.sol``` contract, given signatures can be modified for invalid ```s``` and ```v```. These signatures if passed into ```SigningTools._verifySignature()``` will still generate the desired public key & have the function call pass.
Affected line in qu... | true | Original Signature: | true | true | 10 | |||
c4 | 08-dopex | 0x180db Q | Low | low | # L-01
Potential DoS: If the admin sets the `_fundingDuration` variable to a value of `0` in the `updateFundingDuration` function, then the `nextFundingPaymentTimestamp()` function will always return the value of the `genesis` variable. As a result, the expression in the loop of the `updateFundingPaymentPointer()` func... | function updateFundingDuration(
uint256 _fundingDuration
) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
fundingDuration = _fundingDuration;
} | function nextFundingPaymentTimestamp()
public
view
returns (uint256 timestamp)
{
return genesis + (latestFundingPaymentPointer * fundingDuration);
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/0x180db-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:09.652285+00:00 | 81453ba3d0c98d20af97b0f8ec1ad421b64f1134e084689155d79b7eb0cff163 | 4 | 0 | 482 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | function updateFundingDuration(
uint256 _fundingDuration
) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
fundingDuration = _fundingDuration;
} | unknown | 148 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function updateFundingDuration(
uint256 _fundingDuration
) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
fundingDuration = _fundingDuration;
}
// Code block 2 (unknown):
function nextFundingPaymentTimestamp()
public
view
returns (uint256 timestamp)
{
return genesis + ... | 4 | false | PerpetualAtlanticVault.sol#L237, PerpetualAtlanticVault.sol#L568, PerpetualAtlanticVault.sol#L463 | PerpetualAtlanticVault.sol | 3 | function updateFundingDuration(
uint256 _fundingDuration
) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
fundingDuration = _fundingDuration;
} | true | function nextFundingPaymentTimestamp()
public
view
returns (uint256 timestamp)
{
return genesis + (latestFundingPaymentPointer * fundingDuration);
} | true | true | 10 | |||
c4 | 01-biconomy | IllIllI G | High | high | ## Summary
### Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Instances|Total Gas Saved|
|-|:-|:-:|:-:|
| [G‑01] | `internal` functions only called once can be inlined to save gas | 9 | 180 |
| [G‑02] | Add `unchecked {}` for subtractions where the operands cannot underflow because of a previous `require()` or `if`-stateme... | File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/EntryPoint.sol
203: function _copyUserOpToMemory(UserOperation calldata userOp, MemoryUserOp memory mUserOp) internal pure {
248: function _getRequiredPrefund(MemoryUserOp memory mUserOp) internal view returns (uint256 requiredPrefund) {
261:... | File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol
181: function max(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
| reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/IllIllI-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:06.662772+00:00 | 818e17d7791b2d404101c346c1fbf4b662bae6660247d85c7815964be1a4d478 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/EntryPoint.sol
203: function _copyUserOpToMemory(UserOperation calldata userOp, MemoryUserOp memory mUserOp) internal pure {
248: function _getRequiredPrefund(MemoryUserOp memory mUserOp) internal view returns (uint256 requiredPrefund) {
261:... | true | File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol
181: function max(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
| true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | JCN G | High | high | # Summary
A majority of the optimizations were benchmarked via the protocol's tests, i.e. using the following config: `solc version 0.8.19`, `optimizer on`, and `200 runs`. Optimizations that were not benchmarked are explained via EVM gas costs and opcodes.
Below are the overall average gas savings for the following t... | File: src/EthRouter.sol
106: for (uint256 i = 0; i < buys.length; i++) {
107: if (buys[i].isPublicPool) {
108: // execute the buy against a public pool
109: uint256 inputAmount = Pair(buys[i].pool).nftBuy{value: buys[i].baseTokenAmount}(
110: buys[i].to... | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/EthRouter.sol#L159-L200
### Cache calldata pointers for `sells[i]` and `sells[i].tokenIds`
*Gas Savings for `EthRouter.sell`, obtained via protocol's tests: Avg 5422 gas*
| | Med | Max | Avg | # calls |
| ------ | -------- | -------- | ... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/JCN-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:43.003199+00:00 | 81b5be42872e4837c77c91b9425ae34e9790d2375de1eefd6439936e83848673 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | EthRouter.sol#L159-L200 | EthRouter.sol | 1 | File: src/EthRouter.sol
106: for (uint256 i = 0; i < buys.length; i++) {
107: if (buys[i].isPublicPool) {
108: // execute the buy against a public pool
109: uint256 inputAmount = Pair(buys[i].pool).nftBuy{value: buys[i].baseTokenAmount}(
110: buys[i].to... | true | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/EthRouter.sol#L159-L200
### Cache calldata pointers for `sells[i]` and `sells[i].tokenIds`
*Gas Savings for `EthRouter.sell`, obtained via protocol's tests: Avg 5422 gas*
| | Med | Max | Avg | # calls |
| ------ | -------- | -------- | ... | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 02-ethos | SleepingBugs Q | Critical | critical |
# Low
| | Issue index |
| ----------- | ----------- |
| 1 | [New `tvlCap` can be less than current value locked](#new-`tvlcap`-can-be-less-than-current-value-locked) |
| 2 | [Use of `asserts()`](#use-of-`asserts()`) |
| 3 | [Upgradeable contract is missing a `__gap[50]` storage variable to allow for new storage vari... | UUPSUpgradeable,
AccessControlEnumerableUpgradeable | function fund(uint amount) external onlyOwner {
require(amount != 0, "cannot fund 0");
OathToken.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
// roll any unissued OATH into new distribution
if (lastIssuanceTimestamp < lastDistributionTime) {
uint timeLeft = lastDi... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/SleepingBugs-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:39.182796+00:00 | 81eda70199e104311f416204305952e26cd5b1943971afce2f783ee3341fdf59 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | UUPSUpgradeable,
AccessControlEnumerableUpgradeable | true | function fund(uint amount) external onlyOwner {
require(amount != 0, "cannot fund 0");
OathToken.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
// roll any unissued OATH into new distribution
if (lastIssuanceTimestamp < lastDistributionTime) {
uint timeLeft = lastDi... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 01-salty | 7ashraf G | High | high | # Gas Efficiency Report
## Summary:
The gas report highlights potential optimizations to reduce gas consumption in the codebase. Instances in [Proposals.sol #90, #324, #326, #329] involve on-chain computations for known results, suggesting gas savings by avoiding unnecessary calculations. Furthermore, [Dao.sol #121] ... | uint256 requiredXSalt = ( totalStaked * daoConfig.requiredProposalPercentStakeTimes1000() ) / ( 100 * 1000 );
| requiredQuorum = ( 1 * totalStaked * daoConfig.baseBallotQuorumPercentTimes1000()) / ( 100 * 1000 );
| other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/7ashraf-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:11.315351+00:00 | 8242ea1b26a1c197d5e725d4d67d01df629990e89fe8d47ff10a9b079d70add8 | 3 | 3 | 309 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | uint256 requiredXSalt = ( totalStaked * daoConfig.requiredProposalPercentStakeTimes1000() ) / ( 100 * 1000 ); | solidity | 109 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
uint256 requiredXSalt = ( totalStaked * daoConfig.requiredProposalPercentStakeTimes1000() ) / ( 100 * 1000 );
// Code block 2 (solidity):
requiredQuorum = ( 1 * totalStaked * daoConfig.baseBallotQuorumPercentTimes1000()) / ( 100 * 1000 );
// Code block 3 (solidity):
requiredQuorum = ( 2 * ... | 3 | false | uint256 requiredXSalt = ( totalStaked * daoConfig.requiredProposalPercentStakeTimes1000() ) / ( 100 * 1000 );
requiredQuorum = ( 1 * totalStaked * daoConfig.baseBallotQuorumPercentTimes1000()) / ( 100 * 1000 );
requiredQuorum = ( 2 * totalStaked * daoConfig.baseBallotQuorumPercentTimes1000()) / ( 100 * 1000 ); | Proposals.sol#L90, Proposals.sol#L324, Proposals.sol#L326, Proposals.sol#L329 | Proposals.sol | 4 | uint256 requiredXSalt = ( totalStaked * daoConfig.requiredProposalPercentStakeTimes1000() ) / ( 100 * 1000 );
| true | requiredQuorum = ( 1 * totalStaked * daoConfig.baseBallotQuorumPercentTimes1000()) / ( 100 * 1000 );
| true | true | 9 | ||
c4 | 01-ondo | Breeje Q | Low | low | ## QA Report
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [L-1](#L-1) | NO ZERO ADDRESS CHECK IN CONSTRUCTOR FOR KEY ADDRESSES | 3 |
| [L-2](#L-2) | USE OF FLOATING PRAGMA | 26 |
| [L-3](#L-3) | USERS CAN'T CLAIM MINT AFTER DEPOSIT AND DEPEND ON `SETTER_ADMIN` TO SET THE EXCHANGE RATE FIRST | 1 |
| [L-4](#L-4) | MISSING CONTRAC... | File: cash/factory/CashFactory.sol
130: address managerAdmin,
131: address pauser,
| File: lending/JumpRateModelV2.sol
66: owner = owner_;
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/Breeje-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:33.319511+00:00 | 8255a398c66d2f2c75ddc8f87f65834b3b291518fe35788d130de0915cbd3fb7 | 1 | 0 | 112 | 6 | false | false | true | false | high | [Link to Code](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/main/contracts/factory/CashFactory.sol#L130-L131) | unknown | 112 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
[Link to Code](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/main/contracts/factory/CashFactory.sol#L130-L131) | 1 | false | CashFactory.sol#L130-L131, JumpRateModelV2.sol#L66, JumpRateModelV2.sol#L1, IOndo.sol#L2, LinearTimelock.sol#L2, CCash.sol#L2 | IOndo.sol, LinearTimelock.sol, CashFactory.sol, JumpRateModelV2.sol, CCash.sol | 6 | File: cash/factory/CashFactory.sol
130: address managerAdmin,
131: address pauser,
| true | File: lending/JumpRateModelV2.sol
66: owner = owner_;
| true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | TheSavageTeddy G | Low | low | # Use `unchecked{}` for subtraction operations where operands cannot underflow because of a previous `require` statement
Using `unchecked{}` for operations that cannot underflow because of a previous `require` statement saves gas as it ignores the overflow/underflow checks.
*There is 1 instance of this issue:*
```soli... | File: Reth.sol
200: require(rethBalance2 > rethBalance1, "No rETH was minted");
201: uint256 rethMinted = rethBalance2 - rethBalance1; // @audit use unchecked{} cannot overflow because of previous require | overflow | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/TheSavageTeddy-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:36.921890+00:00 | 825fcd26e1e58b3c41d6c007737da20e8421be7700fc0bc8d72bc6d33ef57491 | 1 | 1 | 228 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | File: Reth.sol
200: require(rethBalance2 > rethBalance1, "No rETH was minted");
201: uint256 rethMinted = rethBalance2 - rethBalance1; // @audit use unchecked{} cannot overflow because of previous require | solidity | 228 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: Reth.sol
200: require(rethBalance2 > rethBalance1, "No rETH was minted");
201: uint256 rethMinted = rethBalance2 - rethBalance1; // @audit use unchecked{} cannot overflow because of previous require | 1 | false | File: Reth.sol
200: require(rethBalance2 > rethBalance1, "No rETH was minted");
201: uint256 rethMinted = rethBalance2 - rethBalance1; // @audit use unchecked{} cannot overflow because of previous require | Reth.sol#L200-L201 | Reth.sol | 1 | File: Reth.sol
200: require(rethBalance2 > rethBalance1, "No rETH was minted");
201: uint256 rethMinted = rethBalance2 - rethBalance1; // @audit use unchecked{} cannot overflow because of previous require | true | false | false | 4.33 | ||||
c4 | 07-amphora | dharma09 G | Medium | medium | # GAS OPTIMIZATIONS
All the gas optimizations are determined based on opcodes and sample tests.
| Count | Issues | Instances | Gas Saved |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [[G-1]](#) | Use of memory instead of storage for struct/array state variables | 3 | 6300 |
| [[G-2]](#) | Emitting storage values instead of the memor... | File: [/contracts/core/Vault.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main/core/solidity/contracts/core/Vault.sol#L170)
170: IVaultController.CollateralInfo memory _collateralInfo = CONTROLLER.tokenCollateralInfo(_tokenAddresses[_i]); | File: [/contracts/governance/GovernorCharlie.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main/core/solidity/contracts/governance/GovernorCharlie.sol#L452)
449: function getReceipt(
450: uint256 _proposalId,
451: address _voter
452: ) external view override returns (Receipt memory _votingReceipt) { /... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/dharma09-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:43.467729+00:00 | 827c6ebd846959d3b495664dc2f62b19d7042d9dca255152f7f8f64d9b85fc15 | 1 | 1 | 251 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | File: [/contracts/core/Vault.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main/core/solidity/contracts/core/Vault.sol#L170)
170: IVaultController.CollateralInfo memory _collateralInfo = CONTROLLER.tokenCollateralInfo(_tokenAddresses[_i]); | solidity | 251 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: [/contracts/core/Vault.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main/core/solidity/contracts/core/Vault.sol#L170)
170: IVaultController.CollateralInfo memory _collateralInfo = CONTROLLER.tokenCollateralInfo(_tokenAddresses[_i]); | 1 | false | File: [/contracts/core/Vault.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main/core/solidity/contracts/core/Vault.sol#L170)
170: IVaultController.CollateralInfo memory _collateralInfo = CONTROLLER.tokenCollateralInfo(_tokenAddresses[_i]); | Vault.sol#L170, GovernorCharlie.sol#L452 | GovernorCharlie.sol, Vault.sol | 2 | File: [/contracts/core/Vault.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main/core/solidity/contracts/core/Vault.sol#L170)
170: IVaultController.CollateralInfo memory _collateralInfo = CONTROLLER.tokenCollateralInfo(_tokenAddresses[_i]); | true | File: [/contracts/governance/GovernorCharlie.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main/core/solidity/contracts/governance/GovernorCharlie.sol#L452)
449: function getReceipt(
450: uint256 _proposalId,
451: address _voter
452: ) external view override returns (Receipt memory _votingReceipt) { /... | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 09-ondo | SAQ G | Medium | medium | ## Summary
### Gas Optimization
no | Issue |Instances||
|-|:-|:-:|:-:|
| [G-01] | Avoid contract existence checks by using low level calls | 2 | - |
| [G-02] | Pre-increments and pre-decrements are cheaper than post-increments and post-decrements | 1 | - |
| [G-03] | Using fixed bytes is cheaper than using string | 2... | file: /contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol
125 destChainToContractAddr[destinationChain] = AddressToString.toString(
126 contractAddress
127 );
| file: /contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
323 uint256 balance = IRWALike(_token).balanceOf(address(this));
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/SAQ-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:39.450061+00:00 | 8318e29e57e20b0fd364173358c3726ecbf24f7598e98155e8ca2d5e3e9b948e | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | file: /contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol
125 destChainToContractAddr[destinationChain] = AddressToString.toString(
126 contractAddress
127 );
| true | file: /contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
323 uint256 balance = IRWALike(_token).balanceOf(address(this));
| true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 10-badger | ether_sky Q | Low | low | I believe this is an incorrect check for `partial debt size`.
Partial `liquidation` or `redemption` should reserve `collateral` of at least 2 `stEth`.
We have below check for this.
```
function _requirePartialLiqCollSize(uint256 _entireColl) internal pure {
require(
_entireColl >= MIN_NET_STETH_BALANCE,
... | function _requirePartialLiqCollSize(uint256 _entireColl) internal pure {
require(
_entireColl >= MIN_NET_STETH_BALANCE,
"LiquidationLibrary: Coll remaining in partially liquidated CDP must be >= minimum"
);
} | require(
(_partialDebt + _convertDebtDenominationToBtc(MIN_NET_STETH_BALANCE, _price)) <=
_entireDebt,
"LiquidationLibrary: Partial debt liquidated must be less than total debt"
); | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/ether_sky-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:47.851710+00:00 | 832254f384ce2bf2b140f5c7e85a9f48a3646b7787714fd6950c0d07c99e6003 | 2 | 0 | 433 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | function _requirePartialLiqCollSize(uint256 _entireColl) internal pure {
require(
_entireColl >= MIN_NET_STETH_BALANCE,
"LiquidationLibrary: Coll remaining in partially liquidated CDP must be >= minimum"
);
} | unknown | 232 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function _requirePartialLiqCollSize(uint256 _entireColl) internal pure {
require(
_entireColl >= MIN_NET_STETH_BALANCE,
"LiquidationLibrary: Coll remaining in partially liquidated CDP must be >= minimum"
);
}
// Code block 2 (unknown):
require(
(_partialDebt + _c... | 2 | false | LiquidationLibrary.sol#L896-L906 | LiquidationLibrary.sol | 1 | function _requirePartialLiqCollSize(uint256 _entireColl) internal pure {
require(
_entireColl >= MIN_NET_STETH_BALANCE,
"LiquidationLibrary: Coll remaining in partially liquidated CDP must be >= minimum"
);
} | true | require(
(_partialDebt + _convertDebtDenominationToBtc(MIN_NET_STETH_BALANCE, _price)) <=
_entireDebt,
"LiquidationLibrary: Partial debt liquidated must be less than total debt"
); | true | true | 6.7 | |||
c4 | 11-kelp | hihen Q | Critical | critical | # QA Report
## Summary
### Low Issues
Total **23 instances** over **4 issues**:
|ID|Issue|Instances|
|:--:|:---|:--:|
| [[L-01]](#l-01-owner-can-renounce-while-system-is-paused) | Owner can renounce while system is paused | 4 |
| [[L-02]](#l-02-revert-on-transfer-to-the-zero-address) | Revert on transfer to the zer... | 208: function pause() external onlyLRTManager {
209: _pause();
210: } | 102: function pause() external onlyLRTManager {
103: _pause();
104: } | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/hihen-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:28:06.373019+00:00 | 834785d8137ee8512fe3a37ceb1724f8d925f0e44efad278d01bde2775d81950 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | 208: function pause() external onlyLRTManager {
209: _pause();
210: } | true | 102: function pause() external onlyLRTManager {
103: _pause();
104: } | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 06-lybra | devival Q | Low | low | ## Title QA
EUSD shares can be transferred to EUSD contract itself
## Links to affected code:
Provide GitHub links, including line numbers, to all instances of this bug throughout the repo.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra/blob/7b73ef2fbb542b569e182d9abf79be643ca883ee/contracts/lybra/token/EUSD.sol#L334-L3... | function transferShares(address _recipient, uint256 _sharesAmount) public returns (uint256) {
address owner = _msgSender();
_transferShares(owner, _recipient, _sharesAmount);
emit TransferShares(owner, _recipient, _sharesAmount);
uint256 tokensAmount = getMintedEUSDByShares(_sharesAm... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/devival-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:22:55.229158+00:00 | 836851a5017d66b98725fccb8b6cff5b59845d13668a2f775fa686e5d7b3087a | 1 | 0 | 959 | 2 | false | true | true | false | medium | function transferShares(address _recipient, uint256 _sharesAmount) public returns (uint256) {
address owner = _msgSender();
_transferShares(owner, _recipient, _sharesAmount);
emit TransferShares(owner, _recipient, _sharesAmount);
uint256 tokensAmount = getMintedEUSDByShares(_sharesAmount... | unknown | 959 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function transferShares(address _recipient, uint256 _sharesAmount) public returns (uint256) {
address owner = _msgSender();
_transferShares(owner, _recipient, _sharesAmount);
emit TransferShares(owner, _recipient, _sharesAmount);
uint256 tokensAmount = getMinte... | 1 | false | EUSD.sol#L334-L341, EUSD.sol#L391-L400 | EUSD.sol | 2 | function transferShares(address _recipient, uint256 _sharesAmount) public returns (uint256) {
address owner = _msgSender();
_transferShares(owner, _recipient, _sharesAmount);
emit TransferShares(owner, _recipient, _sharesAmount);
uint256 tokensAmount = getMintedEUSDByShares(_sharesAm... | true | false | false | 6 | |||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | arialblack14 G | High | high | # GAS OPTIMIZATION REPORT
---
### Summary of optimizations
| Number | Issue details | Instances |
|---|---|:---:|
| [G-1](#G1) |Usage of `uint`s/`int`s smaller than 32 bytes (256 bits) incurs overhead. | 1
| [G-2](#G2) |Multiple accesses of a mapping/array should use a local variable cache. | 7
| [G-3](#G3) |`>=` cost... | 86: uint24 _poolFee, | 73: (derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
74: derivatives[i].balance()) /
115: uint256 derivativeAmount = (derivatives[i].balance() *
118: derivatives[i].withdraw(derivativeAmount);
141: if (derivatives[i].balance() > 0)
142: derivatives[i].withdraw(derivatives[i].balance());
152: derivatives[i].... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/arialblack14-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:48.140662+00:00 | 839e15a30bc5514c320906ee22d0ab11b2f90567a5d02c338db74686651d9cac | 1 | 1 | 20 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | 86: uint24 _poolFee, | solidity | 20 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
86: uint24 _poolFee, | 1 | false | 86: uint24 _poolFee, | Reth.sol#L86 | Reth.sol | 1 | 86: uint24 _poolFee, | true | 73: (derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
74: derivatives[i].balance()) /
115: uint256 derivativeAmount = (derivatives[i].balance() *
118: derivatives[i].withdraw(derivativeAmount);
141: if (derivatives[i].balance() > 0)
142: derivatives[i].withdraw(derivatives[i].balance());
152: derivatives[i].... | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 01-salty | 0x11singh99 Q | Critical | critical | # Quality Assurance Report
| QA Issues | Issues | Instances |
| --------- | ---------------------------------------------- | --------- |
| [[L-01](#l-01-in-poolsremoveliquidity-function-reservesreserve0-used-twice-in-one-condition-but-reservesreserve1-not-checked)] | In `Pools:... | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/main/src/pools/Pools.sol#L185C3-L187C146
## [L-02] Check value before dividing by zero
Checking for zero before performing a division operation is crucial to prevent division by zero errors. If you attempt to divide a number by zero in most programming languages, it wi... | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/main/src/pools/Pools.sol#L179C1-L180C75
### Check `reserve1` and `reserve0`
| reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/0x11singh99-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:01.381753+00:00 | 83eb7ee32086634c4771a2970243e702102716c6b9f2f580e05c333bd9e10798 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | Pools.sol#L185-L3, Pools.sol#L179-L1 | Pools.sol | 2 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/main/src/pools/Pools.sol#L185C3-L187C146
## [L-02] Check value before dividing by zero
Checking for zero before performing a division operation is crucial to prevent division by zero errors. If you attempt to divide a number by zero in most programming languages, it wi... | true | false | false | 5 | |||||||
c4 | 07-amphora | K42 G | Medium | medium | ## Gas Optimization Report for [Amphora](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora) by K42
### Possible Optimization in [VaultController.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main/core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol)
General Optimizations =
- Reducing the number of storage operatio... | struct VaultControllerStorage {
uint192 totalBaseLiability;
uint192 protocolFee;
uint192 initialBorrowingFee;
uint192 liquidationFee;
}
VaultControllerStorage public vaultControllerStorage; | vaultControllerStorage.totalBaseLiability | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/K42-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:26.902175+00:00 | 844decfefd359bc0cea36e435a6407047c4aed357e893b2946905a49d8c3a29a | 2 | 2 | 247 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | struct VaultControllerStorage {
uint192 totalBaseLiability;
uint192 protocolFee;
uint192 initialBorrowingFee;
uint192 liquidationFee;
}
VaultControllerStorage public vaultControllerStorage; | solidity | 206 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
struct VaultControllerStorage {
uint192 totalBaseLiability;
uint192 protocolFee;
uint192 initialBorrowingFee;
uint192 liquidationFee;
}
VaultControllerStorage public vaultControllerStorage;
// Code block 2 (solidity):
vaultControllerStorage.totalBaseLiability | 2 | false | struct VaultControllerStorage {
uint192 totalBaseLiability;
uint192 protocolFee;
uint192 initialBorrowingFee;
uint192 liquidationFee;
}
VaultControllerStorage public vaultControllerStorage;
vaultControllerStorage.totalBaseLiability | VaultController.sol, VaultController.sol#L65-L1, VaultController.sol#L743-L1, VaultController.sol#L646-L1 | VaultController.sol | 4 | struct VaultControllerStorage {
uint192 totalBaseLiability;
uint192 protocolFee;
uint192 initialBorrowingFee;
uint192 liquidationFee;
}
VaultControllerStorage public vaultControllerStorage; | true | vaultControllerStorage.totalBaseLiability | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 04-caviar | atharvasama G | Medium | medium | # Gas Optimizations list
| Number | Details | Instances |
| ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------- |
| 1 | ```x += y```/```x -= y``` COSTS MORE ... | 230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
323: virtualBaseTokenReserves -= uint128(netOutputAmount + protocolFeeAmount + feeAmount);
324: virtualNftReserves += uint128(weightSum); | 109: uint256 inputAmount = Pair(buys[i].pool).nftBuy{value: buys[i].baseTokenAmount}(
115: uint256 salePrice = inputAmount / buys[i].tokenIds.length;
118: (uint256 royaltyFee, address royaltyRecipient) =
170: uint256 outputAmount = Pair(sell... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/atharvasama-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:15.230524+00:00 | 845a06fd2f76f824d99211287e05f869b209a858059946ae715d7abd99c34410 | 1 | 0 | 309 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | 230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
323: virtualBaseTokenReserves -= uint128(netOutputAmount + protocolFeeAmount + feeAmount);
324: virtualNftReserves += uint128(weightSum); | js | 309 | // Code block 1 (js):
230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
323: virtualBaseTokenReserves -= uint128(netOutputAmount + protocolFeeAmount + feeAmount);
324: virtualNftReserves += uint128(... | 1 | false | 0 | 230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
323: virtualBaseTokenReserves -= uint128(netOutputAmount + protocolFeeAmount + feeAmount);
324: virtualNftReserves += uint128(weightSum); | true | 109: uint256 inputAmount = Pair(buys[i].pool).nftBuy{value: buys[i].baseTokenAmount}(
115: uint256 salePrice = inputAmount / buys[i].tokenIds.length;
118: (uint256 royaltyFee, address royaltyRecipient) =
170: uint256 outputAmount = Pair(sell... | true | true | 6 | |||||
c4 | 04-caviar | ayden Q | High | high | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/PrivatePool.sol#L143
1.Lack of a zero address(0) check
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/PrivatePool.sol#L157
2.Initializers could be front-run, allowing an attacker to either set their own values, take ownership of the contract, and i... | + require(tokenIds.length > 0 && tokenIds.length == tokenWeights.length, "Invalid input arrays"); | if (_protocolFeeRate > 5_000) revert ProtocolRateTooHigh(); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/ayden-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:16.745396+00:00 | 847481039a3ffc7b9ef39fdae11c63d363d4ab5f012a8e428ee761ce08d3e432 | 3 | 3 | 539 | 7 | false | false | true | false | high | + require(tokenIds.length > 0 && tokenIds.length == tokenWeights.length, "Invalid input arrays"); | solidity | 97 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
+ require(tokenIds.length > 0 && tokenIds.length == tokenWeights.length, "Invalid input arrays");
// Code block 2 (solidity):
if (_protocolFeeRate > 5_000) revert ProtocolRateTooHigh();
// Code block 3 (solidity):
- virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolF... | 3 | false | + require(tokenIds.length > 0 && tokenIds.length == tokenWeights.length, "Invalid input arrays");
if (_protocolFeeRate > 5_000) revert ProtocolRateTooHigh();
- virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
- virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
+ uint256 totalNetInputAmoun... | PrivatePool.sol#L143, PrivatePool.sol#L157, PrivatePool.sol#L211, Factory.sol#L142, PrivatePool.sol#L230, PrivatePool.sol#L323, PrivatePool.sol#L506 | PrivatePool.sol, Factory.sol | 7 | + require(tokenIds.length > 0 && tokenIds.length == tokenWeights.length, "Invalid input arrays"); | true | if (_protocolFeeRate > 5_000) revert ProtocolRateTooHigh(); | true | true | 9 | ||
c4 | 02-ethos | luxartvinsec Q | Medium | medium | # 1. Possible integer overflow in `CollateralConfig` contract
### Link : https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol#L66
### Summary:
The `CollateralConfig` contract contains a constant variable `MIN_ALLOWED_CCR` with the value 1.5 ether. The value of ether is ass... | uint256 constant public MIN_ALLOWED_MCR = 110e16; // 110%
uint256 constant public MIN_ALLOWED_CCR = 150e16; // 150% | import "./Dependencies/SafeMath.sol";
// ...
uint256 constant public MIN_ALLOWED_MCR = 110e16; // 110%
uint256 constant public MIN_ALLOWED_CCR = 150e16; // 150%
using SafeMath for uint256;
// ...
require(_MCRs[i].safeMul(1e18) >= MIN_ALLOWED_MCR, "MCR below allowed minimum");
config.MCR = _MCRs[i];
require(_CCRs[... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/luxartvinsec-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:22.610750+00:00 | 847aa02276856f1efa1f17c9681aff21bf1a6bbe519e8e2b62ca70051544e125 | 2 | 0 | 524 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | uint256 constant public MIN_ALLOWED_MCR = 110e16; // 110%
uint256 constant public MIN_ALLOWED_CCR = 150e16; // 150% | unknown | 115 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
uint256 constant public MIN_ALLOWED_MCR = 110e16; // 110%
uint256 constant public MIN_ALLOWED_CCR = 150e16; // 150%
// Code block 2 (unknown):
import "./Dependencies/SafeMath.sol";
// ...
uint256 constant public MIN_ALLOWED_MCR = 110e16; // 110%
uint256 constant public MIN_ALLOWED_CCR = 15... | 2 | false | CollateralConfig.sol#L66 | CollateralConfig.sol | 1 | uint256 constant public MIN_ALLOWED_MCR = 110e16; // 110%
uint256 constant public MIN_ALLOWED_CCR = 150e16; // 150% | true | import "./Dependencies/SafeMath.sol";
// ...
uint256 constant public MIN_ALLOWED_MCR = 110e16; // 110%
uint256 constant public MIN_ALLOWED_CCR = 150e16; // 150%
using SafeMath for uint256;
// ...
require(_MCRs[i].safeMul(1e18) >= MIN_ALLOWED_MCR, "MCR below allowed minimum");
config.MCR = _MCRs[i];
require(_CCRs[... | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 08-dopex | 0xSmartContract Analysis | Critical | critical | # 🛠️ Analysis - Dopex Protocol 
### Summary
| List |Head |Details|
|:--|:----------------|:------|
|a) |The approach I followed when reviewing the code | Stages in my code review and analysis |
|b) |Analysis o... | Readme.md
- What is the overall line coverage percentage provided by your tests?: 95% | contracts\core\RdpxV2Core.sol:
1015 **/
1016: function redeem(
1017: uint256 id,
1018: address to
1019: ) external returns (uint256 receiptTokenAmount) {
1020: // Validate bond ID
1021: _validate(bonds[id].timestamp > 0, 6);
1022: // Validate if bond has matured
1023: _... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/0xSmartContract-Analysis.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:19.115772+00:00 | 84c1a3e7a61690548eea0b2e8f6d3361c572515977e94ed0eee5a3a3178b15ee | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | Readme.md
- What is the overall line coverage percentage provided by your tests?: 95% | true | contracts\core\RdpxV2Core.sol:
1015 **/
1016: function redeem(
1017: uint256 id,
1018: address to
1019: ) external returns (uint256 receiptTokenAmount) {
1020: // Validate bond ID
1021: _validate(bonds[id].timestamp > 0, 6);
1022: // Validate if bond has matured
1023: _... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | RaymondFam G | High | high | ## For loop pre-condition
In `rebalanceToWeights()` of SatEth.sol, `ethAmountToRebalance == 0` should be moved out of the if block before the for loop to save gas on iterations. This is because if `ethAmountToRebalance` is ever true, it means there is no ETH available to deposit into any of the derivatives.
Consider r... | ## Use array of mappings
When a derivative has turned obsolete, i.e. weights assigned zero and the associated underlyingValue has been fully drained after [`rebalanceToWeights()`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L138-L155) is called, it does not make sense the deriv... | [File: SafEth.sol#L109](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L109)
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/RaymondFam-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:26.976547+00:00 | 84da2365b327e8c6474299f4edb00c2cc14955ddd9d2dbd187fffe306c980467 | 1 | 1 | 466 | 8 | false | false | true | false | high | + if (ethAmountToRebalance == 0) return;
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
- if (weights[i] == 0 || ethAmountToRebalance == 0) continue;
+ if (weights[i] == 0) continue;
uint256 ethAmount = (ethAmountToRebalance * weights[i]) /
totalWeight;
... | diff | 466 | // Code block 1 (diff):
+ if (ethAmountToRebalance == 0) return;
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
- if (weights[i] == 0 || ethAmountToRebalance == 0) continue;
+ if (weights[i] == 0) continue;
uint256 ethAmount = (ethAmountToRebalance * weights[i]) /
... | 1 | true | + if (ethAmountToRebalance == 0) return;
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
- if (weights[i] == 0 || ethAmountToRebalance == 0) continue;
+ if (weights[i] == 0) continue;
uint256 ethAmount = (ethAmountToRebalance * weights[i]) /
totalWeight;
... | SafEth.sol#L147-L155, SafEth.sol#L138-L155, SafEth.sol#L182-L195, SafEth.sol#L71-L96, SafEth.sol#L1, SafEth.sol#L113-L119, SafEth.sol#L64, SafEth.sol#L109 | SafEth.sol | 8 | ## Use array of mappings
When a derivative has turned obsolete, i.e. weights assigned zero and the associated underlyingValue has been fully drained after [`rebalanceToWeights()`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L138-L155) is called, it does not make sense the deriv... | true | [File: SafEth.sol#L109](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L109)
| true | true | 9 | ||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | chriszhou G | Gas | gas | ### Using private rather than public for constants, saves gas
If needed, the values can be read from the verified contract source code, or if there are multiple values there can be a single getter function that returns a tuple of the values of all currently-public constants. Saves 3406-3606 gas in deployment gas due t... | File: ./contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
20: address public constant ROCKET_STORAGE_ADDRESS =
22: address public constant W_ETH_ADDRESS =
24: address public constant UNISWAP_ROUTER =
26: address public constant UNI_V3_FACTORY = | File: ./contracts/SafEth/derivatives/SfrxEth.sol
14: address public constant SFRX_ETH_ADDRESS =
16: address public constant FRX_ETH_ADDRESS =
18: address public constant FRX_ETH_CRV_POOL_ADDRESS =
20: address public constant FRX_ETH_MINTER_ADDRESS = | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/chriszhou-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:58.486199+00:00 | 84e3c3578e67a54833e2ad95ea7b9cce700cab16e8904e8e807f3f2a90110182 | 3 | 0 | 699 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | File: ./contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
20: address public constant ROCKET_STORAGE_ADDRESS =
22: address public constant W_ETH_ADDRESS =
24: address public constant UNISWAP_ROUTER =
26: address public constant UNI_V3_FACTORY = | unknown | 249 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
File: ./contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
20: address public constant ROCKET_STORAGE_ADDRESS =
22: address public constant W_ETH_ADDRESS =
24: address public constant UNISWAP_ROUTER =
26: address public constant UNI_V3_FACTORY =
// Code block 2 (unknown):
File: ./contrac... | 3 | false | 0 | File: ./contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
20: address public constant ROCKET_STORAGE_ADDRESS =
22: address public constant W_ETH_ADDRESS =
24: address public constant UNISWAP_ROUTER =
26: address public constant UNI_V3_FACTORY = | true | File: ./contracts/SafEth/derivatives/SfrxEth.sol
14: address public constant SFRX_ETH_ADDRESS =
16: address public constant FRX_ETH_ADDRESS =
18: address public constant FRX_ETH_CRV_POOL_ADDRESS =
20: address public constant FRX_ETH_MINTER_ADDRESS = | true | true | 7.61 | |||||
c4 | 04-caviar | decade Q | High | high | ## Q/A
---
#### 1. ProtocolFee should have max limit check before being initialized or updated.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/cd8a92667bcb6657f70657183769c244d04c015c/src/Factory.sol#L141
```
/// @notice Sets the protocol fee that is taken on each buy/sell/change. It's in basis points: 350 = 3.... | /// @notice Sets the protocol fee that is taken on each buy/sell/change. It's in basis points: 350 = 3.5%.
/// @param _protocolFeeRate The protocol fee.
function setProtocolFeeRate(uint16 _protocolFeeRate) public onlyOwner {
protocolFeeRate = _protocolFeeRate;
} | function setPrivatePoolImplementation(address _privatePoolImplementation) public onlyOwner {
privatePoolImplementation = _privatePoolImplementation;
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/decade-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:28.172546+00:00 | 84fbf6846341e4e84e77f7e773a03c136e3405124bccdb6efc36d7f388d81bc5 | 2 | 0 | 444 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | /// @notice Sets the protocol fee that is taken on each buy/sell/change. It's in basis points: 350 = 3.5%.
/// @param _protocolFeeRate The protocol fee.
function setProtocolFeeRate(uint16 _protocolFeeRate) public onlyOwner {
protocolFeeRate = _protocolFeeRate;
} | unknown | 282 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
/// @notice Sets the protocol fee that is taken on each buy/sell/change. It's in basis points: 350 = 3.5%.
/// @param _protocolFeeRate The protocol fee.
function setProtocolFeeRate(uint16 _protocolFeeRate) public onlyOwner {
protocolFeeRate = _protocolFeeRate;
}
// Code b... | 2 | false | Factory.sol#L141, Factory.sol#L135, Owned.sol, PrivatePool.sol#L661-L6 | PrivatePool.sol, Owned.sol, Factory.sol | 4 | /// @notice Sets the protocol fee that is taken on each buy/sell/change. It's in basis points: 350 = 3.5%.
/// @param _protocolFeeRate The protocol fee.
function setProtocolFeeRate(uint16 _protocolFeeRate) public onlyOwner {
protocolFeeRate = _protocolFeeRate;
} | true | function setPrivatePoolImplementation(address _privatePoolImplementation) public onlyOwner {
privatePoolImplementation = _privatePoolImplementation;
} | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 09-ondo | zigtur G | Unknown | unknown |
# SharesBurnt event is incorrect
In _burnShares, `preRebaseTokenAmount` and `postRebaseTokenAmount` get their value from `getRUSDYByShares(_sharesAmount)` before and after burning shares (`totalShares` and `shares[account]` are updated).
As `getRUSDYByShares` doesn't use any of the updated value and `sharesAmount` is... | uint256 preRebaseTokenAmount = getRUSDYByShares(_sharesAmount);
totalShares -= _sharesAmount;
shares[_account] = accountShares - _sharesAmount;
uint256 postRebaseTokenAmount = preRebaseTokenAmount; | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/zigtur-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:23.409060+00:00 | 8500acd0402597630f7657d6e32a005c8ed6ccd4d2fe2885f036b9c9e96579de | 1 | 1 | 212 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | uint256 preRebaseTokenAmount = getRUSDYByShares(_sharesAmount);
totalShares -= _sharesAmount;
shares[_account] = accountShares - _sharesAmount;
uint256 postRebaseTokenAmount = preRebaseTokenAmount; | solidity | 212 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
uint256 preRebaseTokenAmount = getRUSDYByShares(_sharesAmount);
totalShares -= _sharesAmount;
shares[_account] = accountShares - _sharesAmount;
uint256 postRebaseTokenAmount = preRebaseTokenAmount; | 1 | false | uint256 preRebaseTokenAmount = getRUSDYByShares(_sharesAmount);
totalShares -= _sharesAmount;
shares[_account] = accountShares - _sharesAmount;
uint256 postRebaseTokenAmount = preRebaseTokenAmount; | rUSDY.sol#L586-L592 | rUSDY.sol | 1 | uint256 preRebaseTokenAmount = getRUSDYByShares(_sharesAmount);
totalShares -= _sharesAmount;
shares[_account] = accountShares - _sharesAmount;
uint256 postRebaseTokenAmount = preRebaseTokenAmount; | true | false | false | 4.5 | ||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | brgltd Q | Critical | critical | # [01] Add checks for weight values
Currently it's possible to set any value for the weights. Some combinations for weights could result in issues while calculating `ethAmount`.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L169
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/... | msg.value = 5e17 = 0.5e18
weight1 = 5e17 = 0.5e18
weight2 = 19e18 = 19e18
weight3 = 19e19 = 190e18
ethAmount = (msg.value * weight) / totalWeight
5e17 * 5e17 / (5e17 + 19e18 + 19e19) | require(!pausedStaking && !pauseUnstaking, "error"); | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/brgltd-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:52.178518+00:00 | 853d0794da09eda82b319b58158a0cff945cbeac6ffc045b106a7ec300796373 | 1 | 0 | 188 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | msg.value = 5e17 = 0.5e18
weight1 = 5e17 = 0.5e18
weight2 = 19e18 = 19e18
weight3 = 19e19 = 190e18
ethAmount = (msg.value * weight) / totalWeight
5e17 * 5e17 / (5e17 + 19e18 + 19e19) | unknown | 188 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
msg.value = 5e17 = 0.5e18
weight1 = 5e17 = 0.5e18
weight2 = 19e18 = 19e18
weight3 = 19e19 = 190e18
ethAmount = (msg.value * weight) / totalWeight
5e17 * 5e17 / (5e17 + 19e18 + 19e19) | 1 | false | SafEth.sol#L169, SafEth.sol#L187, SafEth.sol#L88, SafEth.sol#L113-L120 | SafEth.sol | 4 | msg.value = 5e17 = 0.5e18
weight1 = 5e17 = 0.5e18
weight2 = 19e18 = 19e18
weight3 = 19e19 = 190e18
ethAmount = (msg.value * weight) / totalWeight
5e17 * 5e17 / (5e17 + 19e18 + 19e19) | true | require(!pausedStaking && !pauseUnstaking, "error"); | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 05-ajna | MohammedRizwan G | Medium | medium | ## Summary
### Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Instances| |
|-|:-|:-:|:-:|
| [G‑01] | <x> += <y> costs more gas than <x> = <x> + <y> for state variables | 30 |
| [G‑02] | Don’t initialize variables with default value | 22 |
| [G‑03] | Use nested if and, avoid multiple check combinations | 5 |
### [G&... | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
62 treasury += fundingAmount_; | File: ajna-core/src/PositionManager.sol
202 position.lps += lpBalance; | upgrade | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/MohammedRizwan-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:06.101668+00:00 | 854a8eea77aab159e8d38b72a5776158996c9710cfb2e1a92dc883300e4fd1e7 | 4 | 4 | 397 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
62 treasury += fundingAmount_; | solidity | 81 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
62 treasury += fundingAmount_;
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: ajna-core/src/PositionManager.sol
202 position.lps += lpBalance;
// Code block 3 (solidity):
File: ajna-core/src/PositionManager.sol
320 fromPosition.lps ... | 4 | false | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
62 treasury += fundingAmount_;
File: ajna-core/src/PositionManager.sol
202 position.lps += lpBalance;
File: ajna-core/src/PositionManager.sol
320 fromPosition.lps -= vars.lpbAmountFrom;
321 toPosition.lps += vars.lpbAmountTo;
File: ajna-... | GrantFund.sol, PositionManager.sol, RewardsManager.sol | RewardsManager.sol, GrantFund.sol, PositionManager.sol | 3 | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
62 treasury += fundingAmount_; | true | File: ajna-core/src/PositionManager.sol
202 position.lps += lpBalance; | true | true | 10 | ||
c4 | 10-badger | Topmark Q | Low | low | ### Report 1:
Typographical Error in L48 & L61 of CdpManagerStorage.sol contract, It should be "purposes" not "pruposes"
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/main/packages/contracts/contracts/CdpManagerStorage.sol#L48
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/main/packages/contracts/contracts/CdpMa... | /// @dev Internal notify called by Redemptions and Liquidations
>>> /// @dev Specified TCR is emitted for notification pruposes regardless of whether the Grace Period timestamp is set
function _startGracePeriod(uint256 _tcr) internal { | >>> /// @dev Specified TCR is emitted for notification pruposes regardless of whether the Grace Period timestamp is set
/// @dev Internal notify called by Redemptions and Liquidations
function _endGracePeriod(uint256 _tcr) internal { | oracle | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/Topmark-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:39.235037+00:00 | 856ac000be33b68389595c20b4aa034e0061d9357698584110a2ebd6543b8bff | 2 | 2 | 485 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | /// @dev Internal notify called by Redemptions and Liquidations
>>> /// @dev Specified TCR is emitted for notification pruposes regardless of whether the Grace Period timestamp is set
function _startGracePeriod(uint256 _tcr) internal { | solidity | 242 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
/// @dev Internal notify called by Redemptions and Liquidations
>>> /// @dev Specified TCR is emitted for notification pruposes regardless of whether the Grace Period timestamp is set
function _startGracePeriod(uint256 _tcr) internal {
// Code block 2 (solidity):
>>> /// @dev Speci... | 2 | false | /// @dev Internal notify called by Redemptions and Liquidations
>>> /// @dev Specified TCR is emitted for notification pruposes regardless of whether the Grace Period timestamp is set
function _startGracePeriod(uint256 _tcr) internal {
>>> /// @dev Specified TCR is emitted for notification pruposes regardless... | CdpManagerStorage.sol#L48, CdpManagerStorage.sol#L61, PriceFeed.sol#L687-L722 | PriceFeed.sol, CdpManagerStorage.sol | 3 | /// @dev Internal notify called by Redemptions and Liquidations
>>> /// @dev Specified TCR is emitted for notification pruposes regardless of whether the Grace Period timestamp is set
function _startGracePeriod(uint256 _tcr) internal { | true | >>> /// @dev Specified TCR is emitted for notification pruposes regardless of whether the Grace Period timestamp is set
/// @dev Internal notify called by Redemptions and Liquidations
function _endGracePeriod(uint256 _tcr) internal { | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 05-ajna | rfa G | Gas | gas | ## [G-1] Using storage pointer to declare `positions` var
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/main/ajna-core/src/PositionManager.sol#L190
By using `storage` to declare `positions` and remove L207, we can save at least 103 gas per loop
Recommended mitigation step:
```solidity
//change this line
Position... | //change this line
Position storage position = positions[params_.tokenId][index];
// check for previous deposits
if (position.depositTime != 0) {
// check that bucket didn't go bankrupt after prior memorialization
if (_bucketBankruptAfterDeposit(pool, index, po... | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/rfa-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:45.436070+00:00 | 85c38cea0ee480297d4a30b3591177807497d308ecd3987a5e9a71b1bac51038 | 1 | 1 | 813 | 1 | false | true | true | false | high | //change this line
Position storage position = positions[params_.tokenId][index];
// check for previous deposits
if (position.depositTime != 0) {
// check that bucket didn't go bankrupt after prior memorialization
if (_bucketBankruptAfterDeposit(pool, index, pos... | solidity | 813 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
//change this line
Position storage position = positions[params_.tokenId][index];
// check for previous deposits
if (position.depositTime != 0) {
// check that bucket didn't go bankrupt after prior memorialization
if (_bucketBankruptA... | 1 | false | //change this line
Position storage position = positions[params_.tokenId][index];
// check for previous deposits
if (position.depositTime != 0) {
// check that bucket didn't go bankrupt after prior memorialization
if (_bucketBankruptAfterDeposit(pool, index, pos... | PositionManager.sol#L190 | PositionManager.sol | 1 | //change this line
Position storage position = positions[params_.tokenId][index];
// check for previous deposits
if (position.depositTime != 0) {
// check that bucket didn't go bankrupt after prior memorialization
if (_bucketBankruptAfterDeposit(pool, index, po... | true | false | false | 5.22 | ||||
c4 | 01-salty | Audinarey Q | Low | low | ## [L-01] Parameter Ballot can be proposed with invalid `parameterType`
If [`Proposals.proposeParameterBallot(...)`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/53516c2cdfdfacb662cdea6417c52f23c94d5b5b/src/dao/Proposals.sol#L155-L159) is called with an invalid `parameterType` the function does not revert. I am re... | function proposeParameterBallot( uint256 parameterType, string calldata description ) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 ballotID)
{
+ require(parameterType < 26, "Invalid ParameterType");
string memory ballotName = string.concat("parameter:", Strings.toString(parameterType) );
return _possiblyCreateProposal... | function proposeSendSALT( address wallet, uint256 amount, string calldata description ) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 ballotID)
{
...
uint256 balance = exchangeConfig.salt().balanceOf( address(exchangeConfig.dao()) );
require(balance > 100 wei, "Insufficient SALT balance");
uint256 maxSendable = bala... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/Audinarey-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:12.238535+00:00 | 85fac863dfaf96c86a505f542ed1d38faea7b73b5d05408b7093f091e9bb66b7 | 2 | 1 | 750 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | function proposeParameterBallot( uint256 parameterType, string calldata description ) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 ballotID)
{
+ require(parameterType < 26, "Invalid ParameterType");
string memory ballotName = string.concat("parameter:", Strings.toString(parameterType) );
return _possiblyCreateProposal... | unknown | 405 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function proposeParameterBallot( uint256 parameterType, string calldata description ) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 ballotID)
{
+ require(parameterType < 26, "Invalid ParameterType");
string memory ballotName = string.concat("parameter:", Strings.toString(parameterType) );
ret... | 2 | false | function proposeSendSALT( address wallet, uint256 amount, string calldata description ) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 ballotID)
{
...
uint256 balance = exchangeConfig.salt().balanceOf( address(exchangeConfig.dao()) );
require(balance > 100 wei, "Insufficient SALT balance");
uint256 maxSendable = bala... | Proposals.sol#L155-L159, Proposals.sol#L196-L209 | Proposals.sol | 2 | function proposeParameterBallot( uint256 parameterType, string calldata description ) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 ballotID)
{
+ require(parameterType < 26, "Invalid ParameterType");
string memory ballotName = string.concat("parameter:", Strings.toString(parameterType) );
return _possiblyCreateProposal... | true | function proposeSendSALT( address wallet, uint256 amount, string calldata description ) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 ballotID)
{
...
uint256 balance = exchangeConfig.salt().balanceOf( address(exchangeConfig.dao()) );
require(balance > 100 wei, "Insufficient SALT balance");
uint256 maxSendable = bala... | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 04-caviar | Tomio G | Low | low | Title: Consider delete empty block or emit something
impact:
The code should be refactored such that they no longer exist, or the block should do something useful, such as emitting an event or reverting.
Proof of Concept:
[Factory.sol#L55](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/Factory.sol#L55)
[E... | function sumWeightsAndValidateProof(
uint256[] memory tokenIds,
uint256[] memory tokenWeights,
MerkleMultiProof memory proof
) public view returns (uint256 sum) { //@audit-info: set here | require(
(_baseToken == address(0) && msg.value != baseTokenAmount) ||
(_baseToken != address(0) && msg.value > 0),
"Invalid ETH amount"
); | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/Tomio-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:09.673461+00:00 | 864631986dbe65ac76bbaa9ca7258f4a29f528c316f458a6fea641553a7d42af | 1 | 0 | 214 | 5 | false | false | true | false | high | function sumWeightsAndValidateProof(
uint256[] memory tokenIds,
uint256[] memory tokenWeights,
MerkleMultiProof memory proof
) public view returns (uint256 sum) { //@audit-info: set here | unknown | 214 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function sumWeightsAndValidateProof(
uint256[] memory tokenIds,
uint256[] memory tokenWeights,
MerkleMultiProof memory proof
) public view returns (uint256 sum) { //@audit-info: set here | 1 | false | Factory.sol#L55, EthRouter.sol#L88, Factory.sol#L38-L39, Factory.sol#L74-L75, PrivatePool.sol#L671 | EthRouter.sol, Factory.sol, PrivatePool.sol | 5 | function sumWeightsAndValidateProof(
uint256[] memory tokenIds,
uint256[] memory tokenWeights,
MerkleMultiProof memory proof
) public view returns (uint256 sum) { //@audit-info: set here | true | require(
(_baseToken == address(0) && msg.value != baseTokenAmount) ||
(_baseToken != address(0) && msg.value > 0),
"Invalid ETH amount"
); | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 11-kelp | QiuhaoLi Q | Low | low | ## [LOW] LRTConfigRoleChecker should add a storage gap
`LRTConfigRoleChecker` is a contract inherited by `LRTDepositPool`, `LRTOracle`, `NodeDelegator`, `RSETH`, etc, which are upgradable contracts. E.g. for `LRTDepositPool`, it's defined as:
```solidity
contract LRTDepositPool is ILRTDepositPool, LRTConfigRoleChecke... | contract LRTDepositPool is ILRTDepositPool, LRTConfigRoleChecker, PausableUpgradeable, ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable { | abstract contract LRTConfigRoleChecker {
ILRTConfig public lrtConfig;
......
} | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/QiuhaoLi-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:34.501771+00:00 | 868825dd3726ec10b0113280077060055ee62741dafe8bc1a0017cd0809d3b6c | 3 | 3 | 480 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | contract LRTDepositPool is ILRTDepositPool, LRTConfigRoleChecker, PausableUpgradeable, ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable { | solidity | 115 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
contract LRTDepositPool is ILRTDepositPool, LRTConfigRoleChecker, PausableUpgradeable, ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable {
// Code block 2 (solidity):
abstract contract LRTConfigRoleChecker {
ILRTConfig public lrtConfig;
......
}
// Code block 3 (solidity):
**
* @dev This empty reserved ... | 3 | false | contract LRTDepositPool is ILRTDepositPool, LRTConfigRoleChecker, PausableUpgradeable, ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable {
abstract contract LRTConfigRoleChecker {
ILRTConfig public lrtConfig;
......
}
**
* @dev This empty reserved space is put in place to allow future versions to add new
* variables without s... | 0 | contract LRTDepositPool is ILRTDepositPool, LRTConfigRoleChecker, PausableUpgradeable, ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable { | true | abstract contract LRTConfigRoleChecker {
ILRTConfig public lrtConfig;
......
} | true | true | 6.97 | ||||
c4 | 01-ondo | amshirif G | Low | low | Require statements are used after making calls/not the first line(s) of a function call. In most cases only a very small amount of gas would be lost. I will list them below, however they do not amount to much. The main concern would be in contracts `contracts/lending/tokens/cCash/CCashDelegate.sol` and `contracts/lendi... | function _becomeImplementation(bytes) public virtual override {
require(
msg.sender == admin,
"only the admin may call _becomeImplementation"
);
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/amshirif-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:53.789828+00:00 | 86ac76e665db5efa383b227c725b778dbe711b7985516a6e1c5ca0c4e79cde8f | 1 | 1 | 168 | 5 | false | true | true | false | high | function _becomeImplementation(bytes) public virtual override {
require(
msg.sender == admin,
"only the admin may call _becomeImplementation"
);
} | solidity | 168 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function _becomeImplementation(bytes) public virtual override {
require(
msg.sender == admin,
"only the admin may call _becomeImplementation"
);
} | 1 | false | function _becomeImplementation(bytes) public virtual override {
require(
msg.sender == admin,
"only the admin may call _becomeImplementation"
);
} | CCashDelegate.sol#L21-L34, CTokenDelegate.sol#L21-L34, Cash.sol#L29-L40, CashKYCSender.sol#L56-L75, CashKYCSenderReceiver.sol#L56-L83 | CashKYCSenderReceiver.sol, CTokenDelegate.sol, CashKYCSender.sol, Cash.sol, CCashDelegate.sol | 5 | function _becomeImplementation(bytes) public virtual override {
require(
msg.sender == admin,
"only the admin may call _becomeImplementation"
);
} | true | false | false | 6 | ||||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | Benterkiii G | Gas | gas | # Improvements to `createPhysicalAttributes` Function
**Variable Declaration Order:**
The function variable `attributesLength` should be declared before the array `finalAttributeProbabilityIndexes`.
```solidity
uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
uint256[] memory finalAttributeProbabilityIndexes = ne... | uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
uint256[] memory finalAttributeProbabilityIndexes = new uint[](attributesLength); | function createPhysicalAttributes(
uint256 dna,
uint8 generation,
uint8 iconsType,
bool dendroidBool
)
external
view
returns (FighterOps.FighterPhysicalAttributes memory)
{
if (dendroidBool) {
return FighterOps.FighterPhysicalAtt... | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/Benterkiii-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:16.581893+00:00 | 87c6097e804e0ba1690f9ad6f8e8dcc5f0f1b418f273a27c40ce8dc69d2e5a7c | 1 | 1 | 130 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
uint256[] memory finalAttributeProbabilityIndexes = new uint[](attributesLength); | solidity | 130 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
uint256[] memory finalAttributeProbabilityIndexes = new uint[](attributesLength); | 1 | false | uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
uint256[] memory finalAttributeProbabilityIndexes = new uint[](attributesLength); | AiArenaHelper.sol#L96 | AiArenaHelper.sol | 1 | uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
uint256[] memory finalAttributeProbabilityIndexes = new uint[](attributesLength); | true | function createPhysicalAttributes(
uint256 dna,
uint8 generation,
uint8 iconsType,
bool dendroidBool
)
external
view
returns (FighterOps.FighterPhysicalAttributes memory)
{
if (dendroidBool) {
return FighterOps.FighterPhysicalAtt... | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | Kaysoft Q | Low | low | ## [L-1] Consider using 2 step ownership transfer
The Neuron.sol#transferOwnership() function transfers ownership in a single step. This can cause the ownership of the contract to be easily lost when a wrong address is mistakenly entered.
With 2 step ownership transfer, the above mistake can be recovered from becaus... | File: Neuron.sol
function transferOwnership(address newOwnerAddress) external {
require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress);
_ownerAddress = newOwnerAddress;
} | /// @notice Adds a new address that is allowed to stake fighters on behalf of users.
/// @dev Only the owner address is authorized to call this function.
/// @param newStaker The address of the new staker
function addStaker(address newStaker) external {
require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress);
... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/Kaysoft-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:30.026125+00:00 | 8811288dac3252016a440f0569684c8a05feaec0c6bba2b9cedb3865db3e32dc | 1 | 0 | 172 | 8 | false | false | true | false | high | File: Neuron.sol
function transferOwnership(address newOwnerAddress) external {
require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress);
_ownerAddress = newOwnerAddress;
} | unknown | 172 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
File: Neuron.sol
function transferOwnership(address newOwnerAddress) external {
require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress);
_ownerAddress = newOwnerAddress;
} | 1 | false | Neuron.sol#L85-L5, AiArenaHelper.sol#L61-L5, FighterFarm.sol#L120, GameItems.sol#L108, MergingPool.sol#L89, RankedBattle.sol#L167, VoltageManager.sol#L64, Neuron.sol#L93-L5 | GameItems.sol, Neuron.sol, VoltageManager.sol, RankedBattle.sol, FighterFarm.sol, MergingPool.sol, AiArenaHelper.sol | 8 | File: Neuron.sol
function transferOwnership(address newOwnerAddress) external {
require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress);
_ownerAddress = newOwnerAddress;
} | true | /// @notice Adds a new address that is allowed to stake fighters on behalf of users.
/// @dev Only the owner address is authorized to call this function.
/// @param newStaker The address of the new staker
function addStaker(address newStaker) external {
require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress);
... | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 04-caviar | matrix_0wl G | High | high | ## Gas Optimizations
| | Issue |
| ------ | :-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------... | File: src/EthRouter.sol
141: if (address(this).balance > 0) {
142: msg.sender.safeTransferETH(address(this).balance);
203: if (address(this).balance < minOutputAmount) {
208: msg.sender.safeTransferETH(address(this).balance);
290: if (address(this).balance > 0) {
291: ... | File: src/PrivatePool.sol
230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
247: royaltyFeeAmount += royaltyFee;
252: netInputAmount += royaltyFeeAmount;
323: virtualBaseTokenReser... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/matrix_0wl-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:41.121073+00:00 | 88bf20273d6b8a7fcaba825d1329adac9d04420186802e4249a904e5425b5151 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: src/EthRouter.sol
141: if (address(this).balance > 0) {
142: msg.sender.safeTransferETH(address(this).balance);
203: if (address(this).balance < minOutputAmount) {
208: msg.sender.safeTransferETH(address(this).balance);
290: if (address(this).balance > 0) {
291: ... | true | File: src/PrivatePool.sol
230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
247: royaltyFeeAmount += royaltyFee;
252: netInputAmount += royaltyFeeAmount;
323: virtualBaseTokenReser... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 10-badger | Daniel526 Q | Low | low | ## A. Possible underflow when decreasing system Debt:
[Link](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/f2f2e2cf9965a1020661d179af46cb49e993cb7e/packages/contracts/contracts/ActivePool.sol#L207-L214)
If `_amount` is greater than `systemDebt` and not properly handled elsewhere in the code, it could lead to an und... | function decreaseSystemDebt(uint256 _amount) external override {
_requireCallerIsBOorCdpM();
require(_amount <= systemDebt, "ActivePool: Amount exceeds systemDebt");
uint256 cachedSystemDebt = systemDebt - _amount;
systemDebt = cachedSystemDebt;
emit ActivePoolEBTCDebtUpdated(cachedSystemDebt);
} | // ...
// Use a require statement to check the success of the transfer
require(collateral.transfer(address(receiver), amount), "ActivePool: Transfer failed");
// ...
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/Daniel526-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:30.855005+00:00 | 88c2d750ae211ebec1c0f0f96b732217ef9e9044bd16a68c0af9f4eb101511f1 | 1 | 1 | 320 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | function decreaseSystemDebt(uint256 _amount) external override {
_requireCallerIsBOorCdpM();
require(_amount <= systemDebt, "ActivePool: Amount exceeds systemDebt");
uint256 cachedSystemDebt = systemDebt - _amount;
systemDebt = cachedSystemDebt;
emit ActivePoolEBTCDebtUpdated(cachedSystemDebt);
} | solidity | 320 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function decreaseSystemDebt(uint256 _amount) external override {
_requireCallerIsBOorCdpM();
require(_amount <= systemDebt, "ActivePool: Amount exceeds systemDebt");
uint256 cachedSystemDebt = systemDebt - _amount;
systemDebt = cachedSystemDebt;
emit ActivePoolEBTCDebt... | 1 | false | function decreaseSystemDebt(uint256 _amount) external override {
_requireCallerIsBOorCdpM();
require(_amount <= systemDebt, "ActivePool: Amount exceeds systemDebt");
uint256 cachedSystemDebt = systemDebt - _amount;
systemDebt = cachedSystemDebt;
emit ActivePoolEBTCDebtUpdated(cachedSystemDebt);
} | ActivePool.sol#L207-L214, ActivePool.sol#L261-L310 | ActivePool.sol | 2 | function decreaseSystemDebt(uint256 _amount) external override {
_requireCallerIsBOorCdpM();
require(_amount <= systemDebt, "ActivePool: Amount exceeds systemDebt");
uint256 cachedSystemDebt = systemDebt - _amount;
systemDebt = cachedSystemDebt;
emit ActivePoolEBTCDebtUpdated(cachedSystemDebt);
} | true | // ...
// Use a require statement to check the success of the transfer
require(collateral.transfer(address(receiver), amount), "ActivePool: Transfer failed");
// ...
| true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 06-lybra | 3agle Q | Critical | critical | ### Issues Template
|Letter |Name|Description|
|--|-------|-------|
| NC | Non-critical | Non risky findings |
| R | Refactor | Changing the code |
| Total Found Issues | 4 |
|:--:|:--:|
### Non-Critical Template
| Count | Explanation | Instances |
|:--:|:-------|:--:|
| [L-01] | Missing checks | 2 |
### Refacto... | /**
* @notice Burn the amount of EUSD and payback the amount of minted EUSD
* Emits a `Burn` event.
* Requirements:
* - `onBehalfOf` cannot be the zero address.
* - `amount` Must be higher than 0.
* @dev Calling the internal`_repay`function.
*/
function burn(address onBehalfOf... | /**
* @notice The mint amount number of EUSD is minted to the address
* Emits a `Mint` event.
*
* Requirements:
* - `onBehalfOf` cannot be the zero address.
* - `amount` Must be higher than 0. Individual mint amount shouldn't surpass 10% when the circulation reaches 10_000_000
*/
... | dos | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/3agle-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:22:07.430886+00:00 | 892e10030f53424d09d56d031d7b10ee309ec65c02cb1c02e1b9e938f71d405c | 1 | 1 | 527 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | /**
* @notice Burn the amount of EUSD and payback the amount of minted EUSD
* Emits a `Burn` event.
* Requirements:
* - `onBehalfOf` cannot be the zero address.
* - `amount` Must be higher than 0.
* @dev Calling the internal`_repay`function.
*/
function burn(address onBehalfOf, ui... | solidity | 527 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
/**
* @notice Burn the amount of EUSD and payback the amount of minted EUSD
* Emits a `Burn` event.
* Requirements:
* - `onBehalfOf` cannot be the zero address.
* - `amount` Must be higher than 0.
* @dev Calling the internal`_repay`function.
*/
function... | 1 | false | /**
* @notice Burn the amount of EUSD and payback the amount of minted EUSD
* Emits a `Burn` event.
* Requirements:
* - `onBehalfOf` cannot be the zero address.
* - `amount` Must be higher than 0.
* @dev Calling the internal`_repay`function.
*/
function burn(address onBehalfOf, ui... | LybraEUSDVaultBase.sol#L137, LybraEUSDVaultBase.sol#L118-L130 | LybraEUSDVaultBase.sol | 2 | /**
* @notice Burn the amount of EUSD and payback the amount of minted EUSD
* Emits a `Burn` event.
* Requirements:
* - `onBehalfOf` cannot be the zero address.
* - `amount` Must be higher than 0.
* @dev Calling the internal`_repay`function.
*/
function burn(address onBehalfOf... | true | /**
* @notice The mint amount number of EUSD is minted to the address
* Emits a `Mint` event.
*
* Requirements:
* - `onBehalfOf` cannot be the zero address.
* - `amount` Must be higher than 0. Individual mint amount shouldn't surpass 10% when the circulation reaches 10_000_000
*/
... | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 02-ethos | p0wd3r Q | Unknown | unknown | # The liquidateTroves function in TroveManager does not verify if the Trove is active.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol#L513
Compared to the `liquidate` function, the `liquidateTroves` function is also an external function and does not check if the Trove is ... | function liquidate(address _borrower, address _collateral) external override {
_requireTroveIsActive(_borrower, _collateral);
...
} | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/p0wd3r-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:27.553424+00:00 | 89c198cf11c141ce5b41959211bfbca79b0c58a5ea828ddbb6cb3e4294fb1bc2 | 1 | 0 | 147 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | function liquidate(address _borrower, address _collateral) external override {
_requireTroveIsActive(_borrower, _collateral);
...
} | unknown | 147 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function liquidate(address _borrower, address _collateral) external override {
_requireTroveIsActive(_borrower, _collateral);
...
} | 1 | false | TroveManager.sol#L513 | TroveManager.sol | 1 | function liquidate(address _borrower, address _collateral) external override {
_requireTroveIsActive(_borrower, _collateral);
...
} | true | false | false | 4.43 | |||||
c4 | 07-amphora | Bauchibred Q | High | high | # Amphora Protocol QA Report
## **Table of Contents**
| Identifier | Issue |
| ---------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| QA-01 | Prevent underflows in the recovery of stranded to... | function recoverDust(address _to) external onlyOwner {
uint256 _amount = sUSD.balanceOf(address(this)) - reserveAmount;
require(sUSD.transfer(_to, _amount), "Transfer failed");
} | function recoverDust(address _to) external onlyOwner {
uint256 balance = sUSD.balanceOf(address(this));
require(balance > reserveAmount, "Insufficient balance to recover dust");
uint256 _amount = balance - reserveAmount;
require(sUSD.transfer(_to, _amount), "Transfer failed");
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/Bauchibred-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:23.731855+00:00 | 89c5dfdf9e7334bb3f61d2b901b8b8bfcb35905b283d8a42e3e7b13be83ca10c | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | function recoverDust(address _to) external onlyOwner {
uint256 _amount = sUSD.balanceOf(address(this)) - reserveAmount;
require(sUSD.transfer(_to, _amount), "Transfer failed");
} | true | function recoverDust(address _to) external onlyOwner {
uint256 balance = sUSD.balanceOf(address(this));
require(balance > reserveAmount, "Insufficient balance to recover dust");
uint256 _amount = balance - reserveAmount;
require(sUSD.transfer(_to, _amount), "Transfer failed");
} | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 07-amphora | Raihan G | High | high | # Gas Optamization
## Note: The last 5 types were not found completely by the bots {30,31,32,33,34,35}
I found that it was missed by the bots
# SUMMRY
| | ISSUE | INSTANCE |
|------|--------------|-------------|
|[G-01]| Can Make The Variable Outside The Loop To Save Gas |13|
|[G-02]| Use do while ... | contract MyContract {
function sum(uint256[] memory values) public pure returns (uint256) {
uint256 total = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < values.length; i++) {
total += values[i];
}
return total;
}
} | File: core/solidity/contracts/core/Vault.sol
177 uint256 _crvReward = _rewardsContract.earned(address(this));
187 uint256 _extraRewards = _rewardsContract.extraRewardsLength();
209 (uint256 _takenCVX, uint256 _takenCRV, uint256 _claimableAmph) =
_amphClaimer.claimable(address(this), this.id(), _total... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/Raihan-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:30.916689+00:00 | 89ce191a11abb63ff8aedee6fd7b030355bcacb1a9486e53591a39301dc9892a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | contract MyContract {
function sum(uint256[] memory values) public pure returns (uint256) {
uint256 total = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < values.length; i++) {
total += values[i];
}
return total;
}
} | true | File: core/solidity/contracts/core/Vault.sol
177 uint256 _crvReward = _rewardsContract.earned(address(this));
187 uint256 _extraRewards = _rewardsContract.extraRewardsLength();
209 (uint256 _takenCVX, uint256 _takenCRV, uint256 _claimableAmph) =
_amphClaimer.claimable(address(this), this.id(), _total... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 10-badger | bdmcbri Q | Critical | critical | # QA Report
## Low Findings
### L01 - Loop conditions in `_descendList` and `_ascendList` contain incorrect termination condition
The first loop condition when [ascending](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/f2f2e2cf9965a1020661d179af46cb49e993cb7e/packages/contracts/contracts/SortedCdps.sol#L642) and [d... | However, removing the first condition also is perfectly valid as the necessary logic for loop termination is redundantly captured in `_validInsertPosition`. The following logic also works:
| If this is not correct, the test cases do not reflect the need for this condition, as all three instances pass the tests.
## Non-Critical Findings
### NC01 - Unnecessary containment check for EnumerableSet
In `RolesAuthority.sol` there are a couple checks to see if an EnumerableSet contains an item before adding it t... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/bdmcbri-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:43.269995+00:00 | 89da2380963ddead8a5b00bb1d21352cc6980e0b1d5bc7cef877cd9c96a3da3c | 1 | 1 | 1,197 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | diff --git a/packages/contracts/contracts/SortedCdps.sol b/packages/contracts/contracts/SortedCdps.sol
index 0fd34e7..f37cdc4 100644
--- a/packages/contracts/contracts/SortedCdps.sol
+++ b/packages/contracts/contracts/SortedCdps.sol
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ contract SortedCdps is ISortedCdps {
bytes32 nextId = data... | diff | 1,197 | // Code block 1 (diff):
diff --git a/packages/contracts/contracts/SortedCdps.sol b/packages/contracts/contracts/SortedCdps.sol
index 0fd34e7..f37cdc4 100644
--- a/packages/contracts/contracts/SortedCdps.sol
+++ b/packages/contracts/contracts/SortedCdps.sol
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ contract SortedCdps is ISortedCdps {
... | 1 | true | diff --git a/packages/contracts/contracts/SortedCdps.sol b/packages/contracts/contracts/SortedCdps.sol
index 0fd34e7..f37cdc4 100644
--- a/packages/contracts/contracts/SortedCdps.sol
+++ b/packages/contracts/contracts/SortedCdps.sol
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ contract SortedCdps is ISortedCdps {
bytes32 nextId = data... | SortedCdps.sol#L642, SortedCdps.sol#L619, RolesAuthority.sol#L116 | SortedCdps.sol, RolesAuthority.sol | 3 | However, removing the first condition also is perfectly valid as the necessary logic for loop termination is redundantly captured in `_validInsertPosition`. The following logic also works:
| true | If this is not correct, the test cases do not reflect the need for this condition, as all three instances pass the tests.
## Non-Critical Findings
### NC01 - Unnecessary containment check for EnumerableSet
In `RolesAuthority.sol` there are a couple checks to see if an EnumerableSet contains an item before adding it t... | true | true | 9 | ||
c4 | 01-biconomy | ro Q | High | high | 1. The entry point address must be a contract, currently, there is no input validation. You can provide an EOA as the entry point.
Instances:
- https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L173
- https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconom... | But the compliant magic value for the eip is: 0x1626ba7e
2: Update the "isValidSignature" parameters.
In the validation signature, the interface for isValidSignature is:
function isValidSignature(bytes memory _data, bytes memory _signature) public view virtual returns (bytes4);
Bu... | function _validateSignature(UserOperation calldata userOp, bytes32 userOpHash, address)
internal override virtual returns (uint256 sigTimeRange) {
bytes32 hash = userOpHash.toEthSignedMessageHash();
if (owner != hash.recover(userOp.signature))
return SIG_VALIDATION_FAILED;
retur... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/ro-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:05.634877+00:00 | 89f977c40b5285af41fe80629c72e6105de3e2da5adf4e72d02925e43714a39a | 1 | 1 | 104 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | require(owner == hash.recover(userOp.signature) || tx.origin == address(0), "account: wrong signature"); | solidity | 104 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
require(owner == hash.recover(userOp.signature) || tx.origin == address(0), "account: wrong signature"); | 1 | false | require(owner == hash.recover(userOp.signature) || tx.origin == address(0), "account: wrong signature"); | SmartAccount.sol#L173, SmartAccount.sol#L506 | SmartAccount.sol | 2 | But the compliant magic value for the eip is: 0x1626ba7e
2: Update the "isValidSignature" parameters.
In the validation signature, the interface for isValidSignature is:
function isValidSignature(bytes memory _data, bytes memory _signature) public view virtual returns (bytes4);
Bu... | true | function _validateSignature(UserOperation calldata userOp, bytes32 userOpHash, address)
internal override virtual returns (uint256 sigTimeRange) {
bytes32 hash = userOpHash.toEthSignedMessageHash();
if (owner != hash.recover(userOp.signature))
return SIG_VALIDATION_FAILED;
retur... | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | RaymondFam Q | Critical | critical | ## Timelock for `adjustWeight()` and `addDerivative()`
Changes made via `adjustWeight()` and `addDerivative()` are sensitive transactions that may go against users` original portfolio plan with Asymmetry Finance. As such, users of the system should have assurances about the behavior of the changed action(s) they’re abo... | ## Parameterized address variables
Addresses should be parameterized and initialized instead of being declared as constants.
Here are the contract instances entailed:
[File: Reth.sol#L20-L27](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol#L20-L27)
[File: SfrxEth.sol#L1... | ## No storage gap for upgradeable contracts
Consider adding a storage gap at the end of an upgradeable contract, just in case it would entail some child contracts in the future. This would ensure no shifting down of storage in the inheritance chain.
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/RaymondFam-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:27.425953+00:00 | 8a17b2c3452639080afe77001a52d2c7cb39ec99060f54af19de818482cecbf7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | SafEth.sol#L165-L175, SafEth.sol#L182-L195, Reth.sol#L20-L27, SfrxEth.sol#L15-L21, WstEth.sol#L13-L18 | SfrxEth.sol, Reth.sol, WstEth.sol, SafEth.sol | 5 | ## Parameterized address variables
Addresses should be parameterized and initialized instead of being declared as constants.
Here are the contract instances entailed:
[File: Reth.sol#L20-L27](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol#L20-L27)
[File: SfrxEth.sol#L1... | true | ## No storage gap for upgradeable contracts
Consider adding a storage gap at the end of an upgradeable contract, just in case it would entail some child contracts in the future. This would ensure no shifting down of storage in the inheritance chain.
| true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 08-dopex | Nikki Q | Low | low | 1. Incorrect POP operation of the value `reserveTokens` in the function `removeAssetFromtokenReserves`.
Link:
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex/blob/main/contracts/core/RdpxV2Core.sol#L287
Summary:
```solidity
// remove the asset from the mapping
reservesIndex[_assetSymbol] = 0;
// add new index... | // remove the asset from the mapping
reservesIndex[_assetSymbol] = 0;
// add new index for the last element
reservesIndex[reserveTokens[reserveTokens.length - 1]] = index;
// update the index of reserveAsset with the last element
reserveAsset[index] = reserveAsset[reserveAsset.length - 1];
... | function testPopBugPoc() public {
// rdpxV2Core.addAssetTotokenReserves(address(rdpx), "RDPX"); - 1
// rdpxV2Core.addAssetTotokenReserves(address(weth), "WETH"); - 2
// rdpxV2Core.addAssetTotokenReserves(address(dpxETH), "DPXETH"); - 3
assertEq(rdpxV2Core.getReserveAssetLength(), 4);
asser... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/Nikki-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:55.554199+00:00 | 8addecbb94f796a35b207b254f8ab9e824447c4b4121bcf8c0a980754dfff5ff | 2 | 2 | 995 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | // remove the asset from the mapping
reservesIndex[_assetSymbol] = 0;
// add new index for the last element
reservesIndex[reserveTokens[reserveTokens.length - 1]] = index;
// update the index of reserveAsset with the last element
reserveAsset[index] = reserveAsset[reserveAsset.length - 1];
//... | solidity | 393 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
// remove the asset from the mapping
reservesIndex[_assetSymbol] = 0;
// add new index for the last element
reservesIndex[reserveTokens[reserveTokens.length - 1]] = index;
// update the index of reserveAsset with the last element
reserveAsset[index] = reserveAsset[reser... | 2 | false | // remove the asset from the mapping
reservesIndex[_assetSymbol] = 0;
// add new index for the last element
reservesIndex[reserveTokens[reserveTokens.length - 1]] = index;
// update the index of reserveAsset with the last element
reserveAsset[index] = reserveAsset[reserveAsset.length - 1];
//... | RdpxV2Core.sol#L287 | RdpxV2Core.sol | 1 | // remove the asset from the mapping
reservesIndex[_assetSymbol] = 0;
// add new index for the last element
reservesIndex[reserveTokens[reserveTokens.length - 1]] = index;
// update the index of reserveAsset with the last element
reserveAsset[index] = reserveAsset[reserveAsset.length - 1];
... | true | function testPopBugPoc() public {
// rdpxV2Core.addAssetTotokenReserves(address(rdpx), "RDPX"); - 1
// rdpxV2Core.addAssetTotokenReserves(address(weth), "WETH"); - 2
// rdpxV2Core.addAssetTotokenReserves(address(dpxETH), "DPXETH"); - 3
assertEq(rdpxV2Core.getReserveAssetLength(), 4);
asser... | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 03-revert-lend | InAllHonesty G | Medium | medium | ## [G-01] `Unauthorized` check in `V3Vault::borrow` should be moved right below the `bool isTransformMode` declaration line to save gas in case of failure.
The function below performs 2 internal functions calls (`_updateGlobalInterest` and `_resetDailyDebtIncreaseLimit`) and a SLOAD before executing the `if (!isTransf... | function borrow(uint256 tokenId, uint256 assets) external override {
bool isTransformMode =
transformedTokenId > 0 && transformedTokenId == tokenId && transformerAllowList[msg.sender];
(uint256 newDebtExchangeRateX96, uint256 newLendExchangeRateX96) = _updateGlobalInterest();
_rese... | function testBorrowUnauthorized() external {
// 0 borrow loan
uint256 amount = 1e6;
_setupBasicLoan(false);
(,, uint256 collateralValue,,) = vault.loanInfo(TEST_NFT);
vm.assume(amount <= collateralValue * 100);
uint256 debtLimit = vault.globalDebtLimit();
u... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/blob/main/data/InAllHonesty-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:59.256371+00:00 | 8b92a64d785190ad99bdf79cdb79ee2600ba498036cb0a14ab754e3f079d1cb3 | 1 | 0 | 653 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | function borrow(uint256 tokenId, uint256 assets) external override {
bool isTransformMode =
transformedTokenId > 0 && transformedTokenId == tokenId && transformerAllowList[msg.sender];
(uint256 newDebtExchangeRateX96, uint256 newLendExchangeRateX96) = _updateGlobalInterest();
_rese... | unknown | 653 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function borrow(uint256 tokenId, uint256 assets) external override {
bool isTransformMode =
transformedTokenId > 0 && transformedTokenId == tokenId && transformerAllowList[msg.sender];
(uint256 newDebtExchangeRateX96, uint256 newLendExchangeRateX96) = _updateGloba... | 1 | false | V3Vault.sol#L552 | V3Vault.sol | 1 | function borrow(uint256 tokenId, uint256 assets) external override {
bool isTransformMode =
transformedTokenId > 0 && transformedTokenId == tokenId && transformerAllowList[msg.sender];
(uint256 newDebtExchangeRateX96, uint256 newLendExchangeRateX96) = _updateGlobalInterest();
_rese... | true | function testBorrowUnauthorized() external {
// 0 borrow loan
uint256 amount = 1e6;
_setupBasicLoan(false);
(,, uint256 collateralValue,,) = vault.loanInfo(TEST_NFT);
vm.assume(amount <= collateralValue * 100);
uint256 debtLimit = vault.globalDebtLimit();
u... | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 10-badger | alpha Q | Critical | critical | 1. Use braces around operators with uncertain precedence
In RolesAuthority::canCall we see the following code
```
File: package/contracts/contracts/Dependencies/RolesAuthority.sol
function canCall(
address user,
address target,
bytes4 functionSig
) public view virtual override returns (bool)... | File: package/contracts/contracts/Dependencies/RolesAuthority.sol
function canCall(
address user,
address target,
bytes4 functionSig
) public view virtual override returns (bool) {
return bytes32(0) != getUserRoles[user] & getRolesWithCapability[target][functionSig]; | File: package/contracts/contracts/Dependencies/RolesAuthority.sol
function setRoleCapability(
uint8 role,
address target,
bytes4 functionSig,
bool enabled
) public virtual requiresAuth {
require(capabilityFlag[target][functionSig] == CapabilityFlag.None,"xxx"); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/alpha-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:42.388998+00:00 | 8bd7cbf80f8c2d973ccf5d66f796ecb13f06541a0f5c866759ee3307bb9ddcca | 3 | 0 | 812 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | File: package/contracts/contracts/Dependencies/RolesAuthority.sol
function canCall(
address user,
address target,
bytes4 functionSig
) public view virtual override returns (bool) {
return bytes32(0) != getUserRoles[user] & getRolesWithCapability[target][functionSig]; | unknown | 295 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
File: package/contracts/contracts/Dependencies/RolesAuthority.sol
function canCall(
address user,
address target,
bytes4 functionSig
) public view virtual override returns (bool) {
return bytes32(0) != getUserRoles[user] & getRolesWithCapability[target][functionSig... | 3 | false | 0 | File: package/contracts/contracts/Dependencies/RolesAuthority.sol
function canCall(
address user,
address target,
bytes4 functionSig
) public view virtual override returns (bool) {
return bytes32(0) != getUserRoles[user] & getRolesWithCapability[target][functionSig]; | true | File: package/contracts/contracts/Dependencies/RolesAuthority.sol
function setRoleCapability(
uint8 role,
address target,
bytes4 functionSig,
bool enabled
) public virtual requiresAuth {
require(capabilityFlag[target][functionSig] == CapabilityFlag.None,"xxx"); | true | true | 8 | |||||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | 0xpoor4ever Q | Unknown | unknown | Incorrect comment, The correct comment should be: "Mapping of tokenId to fighter points."
[MergingPool.sol#L50](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/main/src/MergingPool.sol#L50)
```
/// @notice Mapping of address to fighter points.
mapping(uint256 => uint256) public fighterPoints;
``` | /// @notice Mapping of address to fighter points.
mapping(uint256 => uint256) public fighterPoints; | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/0xpoor4ever-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:09.638689+00:00 | 8c1b67315b8585c7a8c7b1fc419b6cbe157c1312b99d8d02bc3c2fd78f473fb0 | 1 | 0 | 103 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | /// @notice Mapping of address to fighter points.
mapping(uint256 => uint256) public fighterPoints; | unknown | 103 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
/// @notice Mapping of address to fighter points.
mapping(uint256 => uint256) public fighterPoints; | 1 | false | MergingPool.sol#L50 | MergingPool.sol | 1 | /// @notice Mapping of address to fighter points.
mapping(uint256 => uint256) public fighterPoints; | true | false | false | 3.62 | |||||
c4 | 11-kelp | adriro Q | Critical | critical | # Report
## Summary
### Low Issues
Total of **7 issues**:
|ID|Issue|
|:--:|:---|
| [L-1](#l-1-supported-assets-cannot-be-removed) | Supported assets cannot be removed |
| [L-2](#l-2-duplicate-access-list-in-rseth-contract) | Duplicate access list in RSETH contract |
| [L-3](#l-3-admin-could-get-locked-out-when-upda... | 73: function addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) external onlyRole(LRTConstants.MANAGER) {
74: _addNewSupportedAsset(asset, depositLimit);
75: } | 47: function updateLRTConfig(address lrtConfigAddr) external virtual onlyLRTAdmin {
48: UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(lrtConfigAddr);
49: lrtConfig = ILRTConfig(lrtConfigAddr);
50: emit UpdatedLRTConfig(lrtConfigAddr);
51: } | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/adriro-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:47.522225+00:00 | 8c2ffe8f6b34ec677b8185448f9dbc1b2cec540d961394effd7648969b922986 | 1 | 1 | 182 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | 73: function addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) external onlyRole(LRTConstants.MANAGER) {
74: _addNewSupportedAsset(asset, depositLimit);
75: } | solidity | 182 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
73: function addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) external onlyRole(LRTConstants.MANAGER) {
74: _addNewSupportedAsset(asset, depositLimit);
75: } | 1 | false | 73: function addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) external onlyRole(LRTConstants.MANAGER) {
74: _addNewSupportedAsset(asset, depositLimit);
75: } | LRTConfig.sol#L73-L75 | LRTConfig.sol | 1 | 73: function addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) external onlyRole(LRTConstants.MANAGER) {
74: _addNewSupportedAsset(asset, depositLimit);
75: } | true | 47: function updateLRTConfig(address lrtConfigAddr) external virtual onlyLRTAdmin {
48: UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(lrtConfigAddr);
49: lrtConfig = ILRTConfig(lrtConfigAddr);
50: emit UpdatedLRTConfig(lrtConfigAddr);
51: } | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 04-caviar | holyhansss_kr Q | Critical | critical | ## no event on critical events
```solidity
function setPrivatePoolMetadata()
function setPrivatePoolImplementation()
function setProtocolFeeRate()
```
## use safeTransfer and safeTransferFrom on ERC20 transfer
[https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/cd8a92667bcb6657f70657183769c244d04c015c/src/PrivatePool... | function setPrivatePoolMetadata()
function setPrivatePoolImplementation()
function setProtocolFeeRate() | upgrade | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/holyhansss_kr-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:34.562131+00:00 | 8c3ec08de187024538f1c44270bdc1cf5daf73dd7572abee0fcc6d854eb70031 | 1 | 1 | 103 | 3 | false | true | true | false | high | function setPrivatePoolMetadata()
function setPrivatePoolImplementation()
function setProtocolFeeRate() | solidity | 103 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function setPrivatePoolMetadata()
function setPrivatePoolImplementation()
function setProtocolFeeRate() | 1 | false | function setPrivatePoolMetadata()
function setPrivatePoolImplementation()
function setProtocolFeeRate() | PrivatePool.sol#L365, PrivatePool.sol#L527, PrivatePool.sol#L651 | PrivatePool.sol | 3 | function setPrivatePoolMetadata()
function setPrivatePoolImplementation()
function setProtocolFeeRate() | true | false | false | 5.05 | ||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | ladboy233 Q | High | high | # ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable is not initalized in the init function of the SmartAccount
### Line of Code
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/53c8c3823175aeb26dee5529eeefa81240a406ba/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L28
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/... | contract SmartAccount is
Singleton,
BaseSmartAccount,
IERC165,
ModuleManager,
SignatureDecoder,
SecuredTokenTransfer,
ISignatureValidatorConstants,
FallbackManager,
Initializable,
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable
{ | // init
// Initialize / Setup
// Used to setup
// i. owner ii. entry point address iii. handler
function init(address _owner, address _entryPointAddress, address _handler) public override initializer {
require(owner == address(0), "Already initialized");
require(address(_entryPoint)... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/ladboy233-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:53.076295+00:00 | 8c8e482e81f125107ad29e3c7509b1c5286f8d6aa39f4434727166aca78dfade | 2 | 2 | 1,023 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | contract SmartAccount is
Singleton,
BaseSmartAccount,
IERC165,
ModuleManager,
SignatureDecoder,
SecuredTokenTransfer,
ISignatureValidatorConstants,
FallbackManager,
Initializable,
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable
{ | solidity | 263 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
contract SmartAccount is
Singleton,
BaseSmartAccount,
IERC165,
ModuleManager,
SignatureDecoder,
SecuredTokenTransfer,
ISignatureValidatorConstants,
FallbackManager,
Initializable,
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable
{
// Code block 2 (solidity):... | 2 | false | contract SmartAccount is
Singleton,
BaseSmartAccount,
IERC165,
ModuleManager,
SignatureDecoder,
SecuredTokenTransfer,
ISignatureValidatorConstants,
FallbackManager,
Initializable,
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable
{
// init
// Initialize / Setup
// Used to setup
... | SmartAccount.sol#L28, SmartAccount.sol#L166 | SmartAccount.sol | 2 | contract SmartAccount is
Singleton,
BaseSmartAccount,
IERC165,
ModuleManager,
SignatureDecoder,
SecuredTokenTransfer,
ISignatureValidatorConstants,
FallbackManager,
Initializable,
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable
{ | true | // init
// Initialize / Setup
// Used to setup
// i. owner ii. entry point address iii. handler
function init(address _owner, address _entryPointAddress, address _handler) public override initializer {
require(owner == address(0), "Already initialized");
require(address(_entryPoint)... | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 09-ondo | pipidu83 Q | Medium | medium | # Low Risk Issues
## 1. ShareBurnt event is emitted with two identical inputs.
```preRebaseTokenAmount``` and ```postRebaseTokenAmount``` calculations will always return the same value in the ```_burnShares``` function as they take the same input parameter ```_sharesAmount``` and they share an identical timestamp (us... | function _burnShares(
address _account,
uint256 _sharesAmount
) internal whenNotPaused returns (uint256) {
require(_account != address(0), "BURN_FROM_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS");
_beforeTokenTransfer(_account, address(0), _sharesAmount);
uint256 accountShares = shares[_account];
require(_sharesAmount <= accountShares, "BURN_A... | function getRUSDYByShares(uint256 _shares) public view returns (uint256) {
return (_shares * oracle.getPrice()) / (1e18 * BPS_DENOMINATOR);
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/pipidu83-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:13.116692+00:00 | 8c902165392d821b45987b7bfef84699f07bc39f453dbcfa09defedd3d8cd9db | 2 | 2 | 1,358 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | function _burnShares(
address _account,
uint256 _sharesAmount
) internal whenNotPaused returns (uint256) {
require(_account != address(0), "BURN_FROM_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS");
_beforeTokenTransfer(_account, address(0), _sharesAmount);
uint256 accountShares = shares[_account];
require(_sharesAmount <= accountShares, "BURN_A... | solidity | 1,217 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function _burnShares(
address _account,
uint256 _sharesAmount
) internal whenNotPaused returns (uint256) {
require(_account != address(0), "BURN_FROM_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS");
_beforeTokenTransfer(_account, address(0), _sharesAmount);
uint256 accountShares = shares[_account];
require(_sharesAmou... | 2 | false | function _burnShares(
address _account,
uint256 _sharesAmount
) internal whenNotPaused returns (uint256) {
require(_account != address(0), "BURN_FROM_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS");
_beforeTokenTransfer(_account, address(0), _sharesAmount);
uint256 accountShares = shares[_account];
require(_sharesAmount <= accountShares, "BURN_A... | rUSDY.sol#L397 | rUSDY.sol | 1 | function _burnShares(
address _account,
uint256 _sharesAmount
) internal whenNotPaused returns (uint256) {
require(_account != address(0), "BURN_FROM_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS");
_beforeTokenTransfer(_account, address(0), _sharesAmount);
uint256 accountShares = shares[_account];
require(_sharesAmount <= accountShares, "BURN_A... | true | function getRUSDYByShares(uint256 _shares) public view returns (uint256) {
return (_shares * oracle.getPrice()) / (1e18 * BPS_DENOMINATOR);
} | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | SY_S G | Medium | medium | ## Summary
### Gas Optimization
no |Issue |Instances||
|-|:-|:-:|:-:|
| [G-01] |Mappings not used externally/internally can be marked private | |17|--|
| [G-02] |Redundant state variable getters | |15|--|
| [G-03] |Use named returns for local variables of pure/view functions where it is possible | ||--|
| [G-0... | file:/src/AiArenaHelper.sol
30 mapping(uint256 => mapping(string => uint8[])) public attributeProbabilities;
33 mapping(string => uint8) public attributeToDnaDivisor;
| File: /src/FighterFarm.sol
76 mapping(uint256 => bool) public fighterStaked;
79 mapping(uint256 => uint8) public numRerolls;
82 mapping(address => bool) public hasStakerRole;
85 mapping(uint8 => uint8) public numElements;
88 mapping(address => mapping(uint8 => uint8)) public nftsClaimed;
... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/SY_S-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:44.292605+00:00 | 8cb0ed9cf03211e22487c28da94fa1abbaf0ea34ccc1ac2912b803e02f5ffc35 | 1 | 1 | 172 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | file:/src/AiArenaHelper.sol
30 mapping(uint256 => mapping(string => uint8[])) public attributeProbabilities;
33 mapping(string => uint8) public attributeToDnaDivisor; | solidity | 172 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
file:/src/AiArenaHelper.sol
30 mapping(uint256 => mapping(string => uint8[])) public attributeProbabilities;
33 mapping(string => uint8) public attributeToDnaDivisor; | 1 | false | file:/src/AiArenaHelper.sol
30 mapping(uint256 => mapping(string => uint8[])) public attributeProbabilities;
33 mapping(string => uint8) public attributeToDnaDivisor; | 0 | file:/src/AiArenaHelper.sol
30 mapping(uint256 => mapping(string => uint8[])) public attributeProbabilities;
33 mapping(string => uint8) public attributeToDnaDivisor;
| true | File: /src/FighterFarm.sol
76 mapping(uint256 => bool) public fighterStaked;
79 mapping(uint256 => uint8) public numRerolls;
82 mapping(address => bool) public hasStakerRole;
85 mapping(uint8 => uint8) public numElements;
88 mapping(address => mapping(uint8 => uint8)) public nftsClaimed;
... | true | true | 6 | ||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | ballx G | High | high | # c4udit Report
## Files analyzed
- contracts/smart-contract-wallet/BaseSmartAccount.sol
- contracts/smart-contract-wallet/Proxy.sol
- contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol
- contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountFactory.sol
- contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountNoAuth.sol
- contracts/smart-co... | contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::234 => uint256 payment = 0;
contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::310 => uint256 i = 0;
contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::468 => for (uint i = 0; i < dest.length;) {
contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountNoAuth.sol::234 => uint256 payme... | contracts/smart-contract-wallet/BaseSmartAccount.sol::64 => if (userOp.initCode.length == 0) {
contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::199 => // ~= 21k + calldata.length * [1/3 * 16 + 2/3 * 4]
contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::200 => uint256 startGas = gasleft() + 21000 + msg.data.l... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/ballx-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:32.370602+00:00 | 8cbe7bb37cb487c9d88940654256f76d036c9aec1314ba26fbc886126e328596 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::234 => uint256 payment = 0;
contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::310 => uint256 i = 0;
contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::468 => for (uint i = 0; i < dest.length;) {
contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountNoAuth.sol::234 => uint256 payme... | true | contracts/smart-contract-wallet/BaseSmartAccount.sol::64 => if (userOp.initCode.length == 0) {
contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::199 => // ~= 21k + calldata.length * [1/3 * 16 + 2/3 * 4]
contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::200 => uint256 startGas = gasleft() + 21000 + msg.data.l... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 06-lybra | Rolezn Q | Critical | critical | ## QA Summary<a name="QA Summary">
### Low Risk Issues
| |Issue|Contexts|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [LOW‑1](#LOW‑1) | IERC20 `approve()` Is Deprecated | 2 |
| [LOW‑2](#LOW‑2) | Consider the case where `totalsupply` is 0 | 1 |
| [LOW‑3](#LOW‑3) | Do not allow fees to be set to `100%` | 2 |
... | 302: EUSD.approve(address(curvePool), balance); | 35: lido.approve(address(collateralAsset), msg.value); | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/Rolezn-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:22:40.420046+00:00 | 8cffb094df680b6e22d918e1856224e865114b64ce0c3618189fc37e6a8da3f9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | 302: EUSD.approve(address(curvePool), balance); | true | 35: lido.approve(address(collateralAsset), msg.value); | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 01-salty | forkforkdog Q | Low | low | ## Adding reserves with a large disproportion can lead to subsequent *k* manipulation due to rounding errors
**Github:** [Liquidity.sol:l146](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/53516c2cdfdfacb662cdea6417c52f23c94d5b5b/src/staking/Liquidity.sol#L146)
### Vulnerability details:
Calling depositLiquidityAn... | function testMultipleInteractions() public {
vm.startPrank(address(collateralAndLiquidity));
IERC20 token0 = new TestERC20("TEST", 18);
IERC20 token1 = new TestERC20("TEST", 18);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.prank(address(dao));
poolsConfig.whitelistPool(pools, token0, token1);
vm.startPrank(addres... | rounding | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/forkforkdog-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:40.805842+00:00 | 8d0dff9948d72c245bc43235977aefc287a4e7175769ec6a9217a61f7f1c2e75 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | Liquidity.sol#L146 | Liquidity.sol | 1 | function testMultipleInteractions() public {
vm.startPrank(address(collateralAndLiquidity));
IERC20 token0 = new TestERC20("TEST", 18);
IERC20 token1 = new TestERC20("TEST", 18);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.prank(address(dao));
poolsConfig.whitelistPool(pools, token0, token1);
vm.startPrank(addres... | true | false | false | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 02-ethos | hl_ Q | Low | low | # Table of contents
- [N-01] Insufficient test coverage
- [N-02] Use `require` instead of `assert`
- [N-03] Values such as a call to keccak256() should used to `immutable` rather than `constant`
- [N-04] `0 address` check for `asset`
- [N-05] Use a more recent version of solidity
- [N-06] Avoid the use of sensitive te... | LUSDToken.sol:
311 function _transfer(address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount) internal {
312: assert(sender != address(0));
313: assert(recipient != address(0)); | ReaperVaultV2.sol (L73 - 76):
bytes32 public constant DEPOSITOR = keccak256("DEPOSITOR");
bytes32 public constant STRATEGIST = keccak256("STRATEGIST");
bytes32 public constant GUARDIAN = keccak256("GUARDIAN");
bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN"); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/hl_-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:17.227544+00:00 | 8d131c30a875cab4f5ced3af58c7e681a01133eaf2490834c84fdc23de883f16 | 1 | 1 | 182 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | LUSDToken.sol:
311 function _transfer(address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount) internal {
312: assert(sender != address(0));
313: assert(recipient != address(0)); | solidity | 182 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
LUSDToken.sol:
311 function _transfer(address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount) internal {
312: assert(sender != address(0));
313: assert(recipient != address(0)); | 1 | false | LUSDToken.sol:
311 function _transfer(address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount) internal {
312: assert(sender != address(0));
313: assert(recipient != address(0)); | 0 | LUSDToken.sol:
311 function _transfer(address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount) internal {
312: assert(sender != address(0));
313: assert(recipient != address(0)); | true | ReaperVaultV2.sol (L73 - 76):
bytes32 public constant DEPOSITOR = keccak256("DEPOSITOR");
bytes32 public constant STRATEGIST = keccak256("STRATEGIST");
bytes32 public constant GUARDIAN = keccak256("GUARDIAN");
bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN"); | true | true | 6 | ||||
c4 | 06-lybra | btk Q | Low | low | | Issues Summarize|
|-----------------|
| Risk | Issues Details |
|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [QA-01] | Owner may delete al... | function setPools(address[] memory _pools) external onlyOwner {
for (uint i = 0; i < _pools.length; i++) {
require(configurator.mintVault(_pools[i]), "NOT_VAULT");
}
pools = _pools;
} | function setPools(address[] memory _pools) external onlyOwner {
for (uint i = 0; i < _pools.length; i++) {
require(configurator.mintVault(_pools[i]), "NOT_VAULT");
pools.push(_pools[i]);
}
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/btk-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:22:53.011165+00:00 | 8d73a3c1a72f45960466d7b20692efecb3f258089df650800545cd4daa4b5683 | 2 | 2 | 457 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | function setPools(address[] memory _pools) external onlyOwner {
for (uint i = 0; i < _pools.length; i++) {
require(configurator.mintVault(_pools[i]), "NOT_VAULT");
}
pools = _pools;
} | solidity | 223 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function setPools(address[] memory _pools) external onlyOwner {
for (uint i = 0; i < _pools.length; i++) {
require(configurator.mintVault(_pools[i]), "NOT_VAULT");
}
pools = _pools;
}
// Code block 2 (solidity):
function setPools(address[] memory _poo... | 2 | false | function setPools(address[] memory _pools) external onlyOwner {
for (uint i = 0; i < _pools.length; i++) {
require(configurator.mintVault(_pools[i]), "NOT_VAULT");
}
pools = _pools;
}
function setPools(address[] memory _pools) external onlyOwner {
for (uint i = 0; i < _p... | EUSDMiningIncentives.sol#L93-L98 | EUSDMiningIncentives.sol | 1 | function setPools(address[] memory _pools) external onlyOwner {
for (uint i = 0; i < _pools.length; i++) {
require(configurator.mintVault(_pools[i]), "NOT_VAULT");
}
pools = _pools;
} | true | function setPools(address[] memory _pools) external onlyOwner {
for (uint i = 0; i < _pools.length; i++) {
require(configurator.mintVault(_pools[i]), "NOT_VAULT");
pools.push(_pools[i]);
}
} | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | 0xdaydream G | High | high | # Details
| Number | Optimization Details | Instances | Total Gas Saved |
|---|---|---|---|
| [G-01] | With assembly, `.call (bool success)` transfer can be done gas-optimized | 5 | 594 |
| [G-02] | Functions guaranteed to revert when callled by normal users can be marked `payable` | 9 | 192 |
| [G-03] | Setting the _... | [SafEth.sol#L124](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L124)
| [Reth.sol#L110](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol#L110)
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/0xdaydream-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:40.489196+00:00 | 8d842137cf06667cb831e947041ae1fb04004004dde11b730c1a5054bce34e38 | 2 | 2 | 574 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L124:
- (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: ethAmountToWithdraw}(
- ""
- );
+ bool sent;
+ address sender = msg.sender;
+ // solhint-disable-next-line
+ assembly { ... | diff | 413 | // Code block 1 (diff):
contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L124:
- (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: ethAmountToWithdraw}(
- ""
- );
+ bool sent;
+ address sender = msg.sender;
+ // solhint-disable-next-line
+ assembly { ... | 2 | true | contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L124:
- (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: ethAmountToWithdraw}(
- ""
- );
+ bool sent;
+ address sender = msg.sender;
+ // solhint-disable-next-line
+ assembly { ... | contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol#L110:
110: (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: address(this).balance}(
111: ""
112: ); | SafEth.sol#L124, Reth.sol#L110 | Reth.sol, SafEth.sol | 2 | [SafEth.sol#L124](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L124)
| true | [Reth.sol#L110](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol#L110)
| true | true | 10 | |
c4 | 02-ethos | ABA Q | Critical | critical | # QA Report for Ethos Reserve contest
## Overview
During the audit, 7 low and 14 non-critical issues were found.
### Low Risk Issues
Total: 11 instances over 7 issues
|#|Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [L-01] | `hasPendingRewards` only checks for pending collateral rewards and not for pending LUSD Debt Rewards | 1 | ... | function applyPendingRewards(address _borrower, address _collateral) external override {
_requireCallerIsBorrowerOperationsOrRedemptionHelper();
return _applyPendingRewards(activePool, defaultPool, _borrower, _collateral);
}
// Add the borrowers's coll and debt rewards earned from redistri... | return (rewardSnapshots[_borrower][_collateral].collAmount < L_Collateral[_collateral]); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/ABA-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:55.898692+00:00 | 8d9c18891e70726acf212b3428a84aac199837b601ae9c580ce9e79643256935 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | function applyPendingRewards(address _borrower, address _collateral) external override {
_requireCallerIsBorrowerOperationsOrRedemptionHelper();
return _applyPendingRewards(activePool, defaultPool, _borrower, _collateral);
}
// Add the borrowers's coll and debt rewards earned from redistri... | true | return (rewardSnapshots[_borrower][_collateral].collAmount < L_Collateral[_collateral]); | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 06-lybra | itzr Q | Critical | critical |
# Issue 1
## `TIMELOCK` role is not assigned to any address/account
In `GovernanceTimelock::constructor`, roles and role admins are granted, yet the `TIMELOCK` role is not assigned to any address.
```
constructor(uint256 minDelay, address[] memory proposers, address[] memory executors, address admin) TimelockContr... | constructor(uint256 minDelay, address[] memory proposers, address[] memory executors, address admin) TimelockController(minDelay, proposers, executors, admin) {
_setRoleAdmin(DAO, GOV);
_setRoleAdmin(TIMELOCK, GOV);
_setRoleAdmin(ADMIN, GOV);
_grantRole(DAO, address(this));
_grantRole(DAO, msg.sender);
... | constructor(uint256 minDelay, address[] memory proposers, address[] memory executors, address admin) TimelockController(minDelay, proposers, executors, admin) {
_setRoleAdmin(DAO, GOV);
_setRoleAdmin(TIMELOCK, GOV);
_setRoleAdmin(ADMIN, GOV);
_grantRole(DAO, address(this));
_grantRole(DAO, msg.sender);
... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/itzr-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:01.513213+00:00 | 8da1978be2551fab05891268aeedea426082b7fbd0489b11c6718fd6d765b25f | 1 | 0 | 352 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | constructor(uint256 minDelay, address[] memory proposers, address[] memory executors, address admin) TimelockController(minDelay, proposers, executors, admin) {
_setRoleAdmin(DAO, GOV);
_setRoleAdmin(TIMELOCK, GOV);
_setRoleAdmin(ADMIN, GOV);
_grantRole(DAO, address(this));
_grantRole(DAO, msg.sender);
... | unknown | 352 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
constructor(uint256 minDelay, address[] memory proposers, address[] memory executors, address admin) TimelockController(minDelay, proposers, executors, admin) {
_setRoleAdmin(DAO, GOV);
_setRoleAdmin(TIMELOCK, GOV);
_setRoleAdmin(ADMIN, GOV);
_grantRole(DAO, address(this));
_gr... | 1 | false | 0 | constructor(uint256 minDelay, address[] memory proposers, address[] memory executors, address admin) TimelockController(minDelay, proposers, executors, admin) {
_setRoleAdmin(DAO, GOV);
_setRoleAdmin(TIMELOCK, GOV);
_setRoleAdmin(ADMIN, GOV);
_grantRole(DAO, address(this));
_grantRole(DAO, msg.sender);
... | true | constructor(uint256 minDelay, address[] memory proposers, address[] memory executors, address admin) TimelockController(minDelay, proposers, executors, admin) {
_setRoleAdmin(DAO, GOV);
_setRoleAdmin(TIMELOCK, GOV);
_setRoleAdmin(ADMIN, GOV);
_grantRole(DAO, address(this));
_grantRole(DAO, msg.sender);
... | true | true | 6 | |||||
c4 | 10-badger | Madalad Q | Critical | critical | # QA Report
## Low Risk
| |Issue|Instances|
|:-:|:-|:-:|
|[[L-01]](#l-01-potential-dos-if-constantimmutable-address-becomes-blacklisted)|Potential DOS if `constant`/`immutable` address becomes blacklisted|1|
|[[L-02]](#l-02-chainlink-aggregators-return-the-incorrect-price-if-it-drops-below-minanswer)|Chainlink aggrega... | File: packages/contracts/contracts/CollSurplusPool.sol
148: IERC20(token).safeTransfer(feeRecipientAddress, amount);
| File: packages/contracts/contracts/PriceFeed.sol
634: try ETH_BTC_CL_FEED.latestRoundData() returns (
635: uint80 roundId,
636: int256 answer,
637: uint256,
638: /* startedAt */
639: uint256 timestamp,
640: uint80 /* answeredInRound */
641... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/Madalad-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:34.701616+00:00 | 8df2c1b8a029728788d0f9e633f97f333e7bed7780e1ef58f09d51564ef0c587 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: packages/contracts/contracts/CollSurplusPool.sol
148: IERC20(token).safeTransfer(feeRecipientAddress, amount);
| true | File: packages/contracts/contracts/PriceFeed.sol
634: try ETH_BTC_CL_FEED.latestRoundData() returns (
635: uint80 roundId,
636: int256 answer,
637: uint256,
638: /* startedAt */
639: uint256 timestamp,
640: uint80 /* answeredInRound */
641... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 11-kelp | Walter G | Low | low | ## NodeDelegator
1) IERC20(token) in line 60(https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/f751d7594051c0766c7ecd1e68daeb0661e43ee3/src/NodeDelegator.sol#L60) could be implemented directly inside the lines without creating temp variable,following the standard of other functions like ``maxApproveToEigenStrategyManager... | function depositAssetIntoStrategy(address asset)
external
override
whenNotPaused
nonReentrant
onlySupportedAsset(asset)
onlyLRTManager
{
address strategy = lrtConfig.assetStrategy(asset);
address eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress = lrtConfig.getCont... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/Walter-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:43.897994+00:00 | 8e12c568d4ce70304bc7245460b1544acc48a7ab7f6566b7290a1a6d1a142fe9 | 1 | 0 | 628 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | function depositAssetIntoStrategy(address asset)
external
override
whenNotPaused
nonReentrant
onlySupportedAsset(asset)
onlyLRTManager
{
address strategy = lrtConfig.assetStrategy(asset);
address eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress = lrtConfig.getContract... | unknown | 628 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function depositAssetIntoStrategy(address asset)
external
override
whenNotPaused
nonReentrant
onlySupportedAsset(asset)
onlyLRTManager
{
address strategy = lrtConfig.assetStrategy(asset);
address eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddr... | 1 | false | NodeDelegator.sol#L60 | NodeDelegator.sol | 1 | function depositAssetIntoStrategy(address asset)
external
override
whenNotPaused
nonReentrant
onlySupportedAsset(asset)
onlyLRTManager
{
address strategy = lrtConfig.assetStrategy(asset);
address eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress = lrtConfig.getCont... | true | false | false | 5.2 | |||||
c4 | 05-ajna | Raihan G | High | high | # Gas optimization
### Note: The Last types 5 Not Find by Bots completly ([G-33],[G-34],[G-35],[G-36],[G-37])
## Summary
| | Issue | Instance |
|------|----------|------------|
|[G‑01]| Use calldata instead of memory | 14 |
|[G-02]| Can Make The Variable Outside The Loop To Save Gas | 3 |
|[G-03]| Access m... | File: /ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
135 function moveStakedLiquidity(
uint256 tokenId_,
uint256[] memory fromBuckets_,
uint256[] memory toBuckets_,
uint256 expiry_
) external nonReentrant override {
| File: /ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.so
22 function hashProposal(
address[] memory targets_,
uint256[] memory values_,
bytes[] memory calldatas_,
bytes32 descriptionHash_
) external pure override returns (uint256 proposalId_) { | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/Raihan-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:09.426934+00:00 | 8e48b696b006a7ba1f5340e7521994e64b1eddf4eb93f185666fdb6cc087f4a2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: /ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
135 function moveStakedLiquidity(
uint256 tokenId_,
uint256[] memory fromBuckets_,
uint256[] memory toBuckets_,
uint256 expiry_
) external nonReentrant override {
| true | File: /ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.so
22 function hashProposal(
address[] memory targets_,
uint256[] memory values_,
bytes[] memory calldatas_,
bytes32 descriptionHash_
) external pure override returns (uint256 proposalId_) { | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 11-kelp | 0xta G | Low | low | # Gas Optimization
# Summary
| Number | Gas Optimization | Context |
| :----: | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :-----: |
| [G-01] | Shorten arrays with in... | File: src/NodeDelegator.sol
106 assets = new address[](strategiesLength);
107 assetBalances = new uint256[](strategiesLength); | File: src/LRTDepositPool.sol
162 function addNodeDelegatorContractToQueue(address[] calldata nodeDelegatorContracts) external onlyLRTAdmin { | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/0xta-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:16.430496+00:00 | 8e6af943895fdf6c497235f3d54ddb0dca7c22c2e6fda9d27fce206557bd771d | 1 | 1 | 142 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File: src/NodeDelegator.sol
106 assets = new address[](strategiesLength);
107 assetBalances = new uint256[](strategiesLength); | solidity | 142 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: src/NodeDelegator.sol
106 assets = new address[](strategiesLength);
107 assetBalances = new uint256[](strategiesLength); | 1 | false | File: src/NodeDelegator.sol
106 assets = new address[](strategiesLength);
107 assetBalances = new uint256[](strategiesLength); | NodeDelegator.sol#L106-L107 | NodeDelegator.sol | 1 | File: src/NodeDelegator.sol
106 assets = new address[](strategiesLength);
107 assetBalances = new uint256[](strategiesLength); | true | File: src/LRTDepositPool.sol
162 function addNodeDelegatorContractToQueue(address[] calldata nodeDelegatorContracts) external onlyLRTAdmin { | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 10-badger | SY_S G | Medium | medium | ## Summary
### Gas Optimization
no | Issue |Instances||
|-|:-|:-:|:-:|
| [G-01] |Require()/Revert() string longer than 32 bytes cost extra gas | |10| |
| [G-02] |Bytes constants are more efficient than String constants | |6| |
| [G-03] |Require() or revert() statements that check input arguments should be at the to... | file: /contracts/contracts/ActivePool.sol
137 require(cachedSystemCollShares >= _shares, "ActivePool: Insufficient collateral shares");
162 require(cachedSystemCollShares >= _shares, "ActivePool: Insufficient collateral shares");
220 require(
msg.sender == borrowerOperationsAddres... | file: /contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
145 require(locked == OPEN, "BorrowerOperations: Reentrancy in nonReentrant call");
require(
ReentrancyGuard(address(cdpManager)).locked() == OPEN,
"CdpManager: Reentrancy in nonReentrant call"
);
| reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/SY_S-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:36.987170+00:00 | 8e72ce1f80dd9518bd8116e775eb3deaeb6af3d24301df87c577b969513e84b6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | file: /contracts/contracts/ActivePool.sol
137 require(cachedSystemCollShares >= _shares, "ActivePool: Insufficient collateral shares");
162 require(cachedSystemCollShares >= _shares, "ActivePool: Insufficient collateral shares");
220 require(
msg.sender == borrowerOperationsAddres... | true | file: /contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
145 require(locked == OPEN, "BorrowerOperations: Reentrancy in nonReentrant call");
require(
ReentrancyGuard(address(cdpManager)).locked() == OPEN,
"CdpManager: Reentrancy in nonReentrant call"
);
| true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | 0xAleko Q | Unknown | unknown | 1. https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/1d18d1298729e443e14fea08149c77182a65da32/src/MergingPool.sol#L206
points array length is 1. If user input maxId more than 1, function will be reverted: Index out of bound.
PoC:
```
function testRevertGetFighterPoints() public {
// owner mints a fighter by... | function testRevertGetFighterPoints() public {
// owner mints a fighter by claiming
_mintFromMergingPool(_ownerAddress);
_mintFromMergingPool(_ownerAddress);
_mintFromMergingPool(_ownerAddress);
address owner = _fighterFarmContract.ownerOf(0);
assertEq(owner, _ownerAddre... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/0xAleko-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:58.815748+00:00 | 8ec2934a7861c281e4c69219dc353a4cc87d5b5bf17d5f5c0139f209fcd22182 | 1 | 0 | 869 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | function testRevertGetFighterPoints() public {
// owner mints a fighter by claiming
_mintFromMergingPool(_ownerAddress);
_mintFromMergingPool(_ownerAddress);
_mintFromMergingPool(_ownerAddress);
address owner = _fighterFarmContract.ownerOf(0);
assertEq(owner, _ownerAddre... | unknown | 869 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function testRevertGetFighterPoints() public {
// owner mints a fighter by claiming
_mintFromMergingPool(_ownerAddress);
_mintFromMergingPool(_ownerAddress);
_mintFromMergingPool(_ownerAddress);
address owner = _fighterFarmContract.ownerOf(0);
... | 1 | false | MergingPool.sol#L206 | MergingPool.sol | 1 | function testRevertGetFighterPoints() public {
// owner mints a fighter by claiming
_mintFromMergingPool(_ownerAddress);
_mintFromMergingPool(_ownerAddress);
_mintFromMergingPool(_ownerAddress);
address owner = _fighterFarmContract.ownerOf(0);
assertEq(owner, _ownerAddre... | true | false | false | 5.45 | |||||
c4 | 08-dopex | Sathish9098 G | High | high | # GAS OPTIMIZATION
The final gas calculations are determined based on the ``OPCODEs`` and the ``sample tests``. The ``OPCODEs`` are the basic instructions that are used to execute code in Solidity. The sample test is a piece of code that is used to test the gas consumption of a function.
The gas costs of each ``OPCOD... | ### ``_amount0Min`` and ``_amount1Min`` can be packed to same slot : Saves ``2000 GAS`` , ``1 SLOT``
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex/blob/eb4d4a201b3a75dd4bddc74a34e9c42c71d0d12f/contracts/amo/UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol#L50-L60
``_amount0Min`` and ``_amount1Min`` store the minimum allowed values, which are not... | ##
## [G-2] The result of a function calls should be cached rather than re-calling the function
External calls are expensive
### ``getEthPrice()``,``getDpxEthPrice()``, ``getRdpxPrice()`` functions should be cached : Saves ``300 GAS``
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex/blob/eb4d4a201b3a75dd4bddc74a34e9c42... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/Sathish9098-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:04.051487+00:00 | 8ecae52b45de9c7e8df0db79bc304fe8983dbc121eb595e1fbda6215a75b51bb | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol#L50-L60, RdpxV2Core.sol#L546-L549 | RdpxV2Core.sol, UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol | 2 | ### ``_amount0Min`` and ``_amount1Min`` can be packed to same slot : Saves ``2000 GAS`` , ``1 SLOT``
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex/blob/eb4d4a201b3a75dd4bddc74a34e9c42c71d0d12f/contracts/amo/UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol#L50-L60
``_amount0Min`` and ``_amount1Min`` store the minimum allowed values, which are not... | true | ##
## [G-2] The result of a function calls should be cached rather than re-calling the function
External calls are expensive
### ``getEthPrice()``,``getDpxEthPrice()``, ``getRdpxPrice()`` functions should be cached : Saves ``300 GAS``
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex/blob/eb4d4a201b3a75dd4bddc74a34e9c42... | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | 0xmystery Q | Critical | critical | ## [L-01] Incomplete array length check
`FighterFarm.redeemMintPass()`'s design requires equal lengths for arrays such as `mintpassIdsToBurn`, `mintPassDnas`, `fighterTypes`, `modelHashes`, and `modelTypes` to ensure each element corresponds across these arrays during the fighter creation process. However, the initial ... | ## [L-02] Fighters should not be allowed to initiate a fight with zero voltage left
`RankedBattle.updateBattleRecord()` allows for battle initiation even if the fighter's owner lacks the necessary voltage, provided the voltage replenishment time has passed as indicated in the following checks:
https://github.com/code... | The delay could possibly lead to dodging point deduction to claim more NRN tokens for the current round and be leveraged in the next round. The loser fighter could also facilitate unstaking NRN tokens during this window to have 0 `curStakeAtRisk` transferred to `_stakeAtRiskAddress` later that I have reported separatel... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/0xmystery-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:09.180252+00:00 | 8f1f00c31cfae4d8abdac745fed3c4f15fdeea231e8f240b12833a8727196a93 | 2 | 2 | 534 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | require(
mintpassIdsToBurn.length == mintPassDnas.length &&
mintPassDnas.length == fighterTypes.length &&
fighterTypes.length == modelHashes.length &&
+ fighterTypes.length == iconTypes.length &&
modelHashes.length == modelTypes.length
); | diff | 307 | // Code block 1 (diff):
require(
mintpassIdsToBurn.length == mintPassDnas.length &&
mintPassDnas.length == fighterTypes.length &&
fighterTypes.length == modelHashes.length &&
+ fighterTypes.length == iconTypes.length &&
modelHashes.length == modelTypes.length... | 2 | true | require(
mintpassIdsToBurn.length == mintPassDnas.length &&
mintPassDnas.length == fighterTypes.length &&
fighterTypes.length == modelHashes.length &&
+ fighterTypes.length == iconTypes.length &&
modelHashes.length == modelTypes.length
); | require(
!initiatorBool ||
_voltageManagerInstance.ownerVoltageReplenishTime(fighterOwner) <= block.timestamp ||
_voltageManagerInstance.ownerVoltage(fighterOwner) >= VOLTAGE_COST
); | FighterFarm.sol#L243-L248, RankedBattle.sol#L334-L338, GameItems.sol#L185-L188 | GameItems.sol, FighterFarm.sol, RankedBattle.sol | 3 | ## [L-02] Fighters should not be allowed to initiate a fight with zero voltage left
`RankedBattle.updateBattleRecord()` allows for battle initiation even if the fighter's owner lacks the necessary voltage, provided the voltage replenishment time has passed as indicated in the following checks:
https://github.com/code... | true | The delay could possibly lead to dodging point deduction to claim more NRN tokens for the current round and be leveraged in the next round. The loser fighter could also facilitate unstaking NRN tokens during this window to have 0 `curStakeAtRisk` transferred to `_stakeAtRiskAddress` later that I have reported separatel... | true | true | 10 | |
c4 | 07-amphora | LeoS G | High | high | # Summary
| | Issue | Instances | Gas Saved |
|--------|-------|-----------|-----------|
|[G-01]|Compiling with another version|-|-415800|
|[G-02]|Change the number of runs|-|-12369516|
|[G-03]|Review of automated finding G-05 and G-09|-|-|
The gas saved column simply adds up the evolution in the snapshot, usi... | testCallModifyLiability(address) (gas: -1 (-0.000%))
testCallVaultControllerTransfer(address) (gas: 4 (0.002%))
testRevertIfVaultInsolvent(address) (gas: 4 (0.003%))
testRevertIfVaultInsolvent() (gas: 4 (0.003%))
testLiquidateWithCurveLpAsCollateral() (gas: -14 (-0.003%))
testCheckVaultInsolvent() (gas: 8 (0.003%))
tes... | testRevertIfProvideOnlyOneAnchor() (gas: -3 (-0.007%))
testEmitEvent() (gas: 33 (0.037%))
testCap() (gas: 162 (0.045%))
testDepositSUSD() (gas: 105 (0.045%))
testDonateSUSD() (gas: 102 (0.047%))
testStakeAndWithdrawCurveLP() (gas: 552 (0.050%))
testStakeCrvLpAfterPoolIdUpdate() (gas: 441 (0.051%))
testEmitEvent(uint56)... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/LeoS-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:27.807783+00:00 | 8f5225e05af895637437bfac3fd5a39a5559fb4092f10ced691deefb4361cc44 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | testCallModifyLiability(address) (gas: -1 (-0.000%))
testCallVaultControllerTransfer(address) (gas: 4 (0.002%))
testRevertIfVaultInsolvent(address) (gas: 4 (0.003%))
testRevertIfVaultInsolvent() (gas: 4 (0.003%))
testLiquidateWithCurveLpAsCollateral() (gas: -14 (-0.003%))
testCheckVaultInsolvent() (gas: 8 (0.003%))
tes... | true | testRevertIfProvideOnlyOneAnchor() (gas: -3 (-0.007%))
testEmitEvent() (gas: 33 (0.037%))
testCap() (gas: 162 (0.045%))
testDepositSUSD() (gas: 105 (0.045%))
testDonateSUSD() (gas: 102 (0.047%))
testStakeAndWithdrawCurveLP() (gas: 552 (0.050%))
testStakeCrvLpAfterPoolIdUpdate() (gas: 441 (0.051%))
testEmitEvent(uint56)... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 02-ethos | W0RR1O G | Low | low | Splitting `require()` statements that uses `&&` saves gas
====================================
Description:
-------------
Instead of using the `&&` operator on a single require statement, use two `require` can save more gas
i.e for `require(version==1 && balance >= 0, "Error")` use
```
require(version==1);
require(bal... | require(version==1);
require(balance>=0); | * https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/LUSDToken.sol#L348 | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/W0RR1O-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:44.127165+00:00 | 8f70030ad381f680ff6eda7bff30710e1c6f6278de2cd09ab94741e46bf7dbc2 | 4 | 0 | 330 | 8 | false | false | true | false | high | require(version==1);
require(balance>=0); | unknown | 41 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
require(version==1);
require(balance>=0);
// Code block 2 (unknown):
* https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/LUSDToken.sol#L348
// Code block 3 (unknown):
* https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/LUSDToken.sol#L353
//... | 4 | false | BorrowerOperations.sol#L653, LUSDToken.sol#L348, LUSDToken.sol#L353, TroveManager.sol#L1539, ActivePool.sol#L320, BorrowerOperations.sol#L438, BorrowerOperations.sol#L455, BorrowerOperations.sol#L476 | LUSDToken.sol, BorrowerOperations.sol, ActivePool.sol, TroveManager.sol | 8 | require(version==1);
require(balance>=0); | true | * https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/LUSDToken.sol#L348 | true | true | 10 | |||
c4 | 03-revert-lend | JecikPo Q | High | high | ## [L-01] repay() function can be front-run with repaying dust
Anyone can repay any loan. So when an original loan owner wishes to repay the whole debt by specifying the attributes of the `repay()`, the transaction could be front-run by an attacker where he repays the exact amount so that the `loan.debtShares` decreme... | File: src/V3Vault.sol
973: if (shares > currentShares) {
revert RepayExceedsDebt();
} | 973: if (shares > currentShares) {
shares = currentShares
assets = _convertToAssets(shares, newDebtExchangeRateX96, Math.Rounding.Up);
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/blob/main/data/JecikPo-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:03:00.608209+00:00 | 8f939d087fdb487ef24d0a7b31af81618584ec0b09f5846058fa9a260177d63f | 2 | 2 | 265 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File: src/V3Vault.sol
973: if (shares > currentShares) {
revert RepayExceedsDebt();
} | solidity | 106 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: src/V3Vault.sol
973: if (shares > currentShares) {
revert RepayExceedsDebt();
}
// Code block 2 (solidity):
973: if (shares > currentShares) {
shares = currentShares
assets = _convertToAssets(shares, newDebtExchangeRateX96, Math.Rounding.Up);
... | 2 | false | File: src/V3Vault.sol
973: if (shares > currentShares) {
revert RepayExceedsDebt();
}
973: if (shares > currentShares) {
shares = currentShares
assets = _convertToAssets(shares, newDebtExchangeRateX96, Math.Rounding.Up);
} | V3Vault.sol#L973 | V3Vault.sol | 1 | File: src/V3Vault.sol
973: if (shares > currentShares) {
revert RepayExceedsDebt();
} | true | 973: if (shares > currentShares) {
shares = currentShares
assets = _convertToAssets(shares, newDebtExchangeRateX96, Math.Rounding.Up);
} | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 01-biconomy | pauliax Q | Low | low | * ```ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable``` is not initialized by calling ```__ReentrancyGuard_init``` or ```__ReentrancyGuard_init_unchained```:
```solidity
contract SmartAccount is
...
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable
```
https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts-upgradeable/blob/master/contracts/security/Re... | contract SmartAccount is
...
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable | function setOwner(address _newOwner) external mixedAuth | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/pauliax-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:00.243513+00:00 | 8fc76fd34862ce6eabfcbb00ef241fd7089f0a0e5187c376906cd802342f6b90 | 6 | 6 | 617 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | contract SmartAccount is
...
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable | solidity | 66 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
contract SmartAccount is
...
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable
// Code block 2 (solidity):
function setOwner(address _newOwner) external mixedAuth
// Code block 3 (solidity):
function getChainId() public view returns (uint256) {
uint256 id;
// solhint-disable-next-line no-inline-... | 6 | false | contract SmartAccount is
...
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable
function setOwner(address _newOwner) external mixedAuth
function getChainId() public view returns (uint256) {
uint256 id;
// solhint-disable-next-line no-inline-assembly
assembly {
id := chainid()
}
return id;
}
require(stake < ... | ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol#L40-L46 | ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol | 1 | contract SmartAccount is
...
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable | true | function setOwner(address _newOwner) external mixedAuth | true | true | 12 |
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