source stringclasses 1
value | protocol stringclasses 17
values | title stringlengths 4 24 | severity_raw stringclasses 8
values | severity stringclasses 8
values | description stringlengths 198 2k | vulnerable_code stringlengths 0 2k | fixed_code stringlengths 0 2k | recommendation stringclasses 1
value | category stringclasses 12
values | report_url stringlengths 71 98 | collected_at stringlengths 32 32 | source_hash stringlengths 64 64 | code_block_count int64 0 10 | solidity_block_count int64 0 10 | total_code_chars int64 0 1.73k | github_ref_count int64 0 26 | vulnerable_code_is_url bool 2
classes | fixed_code_is_url bool 2
classes | has_code_in_description bool 2
classes | has_recommendation bool 1
class | quality_estimate stringclasses 2
values | primary_code stringlengths 0 1.72k | primary_code_language stringclasses 19
values | primary_code_char_count int64 0 1.72k | all_code_blocks stringlengths 0 1.87k | all_code_blocks_count int64 0 10 | has_diff_blocks bool 2
classes | diff_code stringclasses 71
values | solidity_code stringlengths 0 1.68k | github_refs_formatted stringlengths 0 562 | github_files_list stringlengths 0 203 | github_refs_count int64 0 26 | vulnerable_code_actual stringlengths 0 2k | has_vulnerable_code_snippet bool 2
classes | fixed_code_actual stringlengths 0 2k | has_fixed_code_snippet bool 2
classes | has_vuln_fix_pair bool 2
classes | content_richness_score float64 2.4 15 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
c4 | 03-revert-lend | cryptothemex Q | Critical | critical | ### [L-01]<a name="l-01"></a> Local variable shadowing
Shadowing of other variables using local variables. **Recom** Rename the local variables that shadow another component.
*There are 21 instance(s) of this issue:*
```solidity
File: src/V3Vault.sol
/// @audit ******************* Issue Detail *******************
... | File: src/V3Vault.sol
/// @audit ******************* Issue Detail *******************
V3Vault._repay(uint256,uint256,bool,bytes).owner (L#1001) shadows:
- Ownable.owner() (L#43-45) (function)
/// @audit ****************** Affected Code *******************
1001: address owner = tokenOwner[tokenId]; | File: src/V3Vault.sol
/// @audit ******************* Issue Detail *******************
V3Vault._cleanupLoan(uint256,uint256,uint256,address).owner (L#1077) shadows:
- Ownable.owner() (L#43-45) (function)
/// @audit ****************** Affected Code *******************
1077: function _cleanupLoan(uint256 tokenId, u... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/blob/main/data/cryptothemex-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:03:10.038809+00:00 | 59ae18f0632203b5eeb4d7ddded495b09776eaf2f1ae3125a039991eaa9b6e16 | 4 | 4 | 1,358 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | File: src/V3Vault.sol
/// @audit ******************* Issue Detail *******************
V3Vault._repay(uint256,uint256,bool,bytes).owner (L#1001) shadows:
- Ownable.owner() (L#43-45) (function)
/// @audit ****************** Affected Code *******************
1001: address owner = tokenOwner[tokenId]; | solidity | 309 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: src/V3Vault.sol
/// @audit ******************* Issue Detail *******************
V3Vault._repay(uint256,uint256,bool,bytes).owner (L#1001) shadows:
- Ownable.owner() (L#43-45) (function)
/// @audit ****************** Affected Code *******************
1001: address owner = tok... | 4 | false | File: src/V3Vault.sol
/// @audit ******************* Issue Detail *******************
V3Vault._repay(uint256,uint256,bool,bytes).owner (L#1001) shadows:
- Ownable.owner() (L#43-45) (function)
/// @audit ****************** Affected Code *******************
1001: address owner = tokenOwner[tokenId];
File: src... | V3Vault.sol#L1001, V3Vault.sol#L1077, V3Vault.sol#L531 | V3Vault.sol | 3 | File: src/V3Vault.sol
/// @audit ******************* Issue Detail *******************
V3Vault._repay(uint256,uint256,bool,bytes).owner (L#1001) shadows:
- Ownable.owner() (L#43-45) (function)
/// @audit ****************** Affected Code *******************
1001: address owner = tokenOwner[tokenId]; | true | File: src/V3Vault.sol
/// @audit ******************* Issue Detail *******************
V3Vault._cleanupLoan(uint256,uint256,uint256,address).owner (L#1077) shadows:
- Ownable.owner() (L#43-45) (function)
/// @audit ****************** Affected Code *******************
1077: function _cleanupLoan(uint256 tokenId, u... | true | true | 10 | ||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | Lavishq Q | High | high | ## G1 - require statement can be chained using && operator
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L65 and L66 can be chained in a single require() statement as such `require(msg.value >= minAmount && msg.value <= maxAmount, "invalid amount");` (error could be a custom err... | function stake() external payable {
require(pauseStaking == false, "staking is paused");
require(msg.value >= minAmount && msg.value <= maxAmount, "invalid amount"); // This is taken from G1 of my report
uint256 underlyingValue;
uint256 totalStakeValueEth; // total amount of derivatives worth of ETH in system
... | upgrade | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Lavishq-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:16.618495+00:00 | 59ba6ccc8f5fedb064ab1b4c3173675b6893674a7f9bd5be811135f3fc584b2c | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | SafEth.sol#L65, SafEth.sol#L63 | SafEth.sol | 2 | function stake() external payable {
require(pauseStaking == false, "staking is paused");
require(msg.value >= minAmount && msg.value <= maxAmount, "invalid amount"); // This is taken from G1 of my report
uint256 underlyingValue;
uint256 totalStakeValueEth; // total amount of derivatives worth of ETH in system
... | true | false | false | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 05-ajna | 0xnev Q | Critical | critical | ### Issues Template
| Letter | Name | Description |
|:--:|:-------:|:-------:|
| L | Low risk | Potential risk |
| NC | Non-critical | Non risky findings |
| R | Refactor | Code changes |
| Total Found Issues | 14 |
|:--:|:--:|
### Low Risk Template
| Count | Title | Instances |
|:--:|:-------|:--:|
| [L-01] | `ge... | function getPositionInfo(
uint256 tokenId_,
uint256 index_
) external view override returns (uint256, uint256) {
return (
positions[tokenId_][index_].lps,
positions[tokenId_][index_].depositTime
);
} | function mint(
MintParams calldata params_
) external override nonReentrant returns (uint256 tokenId_) {
tokenId_ = _nextId++;
// revert if the address is not a valid Ajna pool
if (!_isAjnaPool(params_.pool, params_.poolSubsetHash)) revert NotAjnaPool();
// record which pool the tokenId was minted... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/0xnev-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:51.687549+00:00 | 59c104f7862c3fc5403be98ae287f97207cd7c7bed5b92b97e27a5eca7277bea | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | function getPositionInfo(
uint256 tokenId_,
uint256 index_
) external view override returns (uint256, uint256) {
return (
positions[tokenId_][index_].lps,
positions[tokenId_][index_].depositTime
);
} | true | function mint(
MintParams calldata params_
) external override nonReentrant returns (uint256 tokenId_) {
tokenId_ = _nextId++;
// revert if the address is not a valid Ajna pool
if (!_isAjnaPool(params_.pool, params_.poolSubsetHash)) revert NotAjnaPool();
// record which pool the tokenId was minted... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 10-badger | Sathish9098 G | Medium | medium | # GAS OPTIMIZATIONS
##
## [G-1] Optimizing storage usage with packed structs
### Saves ``8000 GAS`` , ``4 SLOT``
Each slot saved can avoid an extra Gsset (20000 gas) for the first setting of the struct.
Subsequent reads as well as writes have smaller gas savings.
### [G-1.1] user,isCollIncrease,isDebtIncrease can... | ### [G-1.2] roundEthBtcId , roundStEthEthId , success can be packed with same slot : Saves 1 SLOT , 2000 GAS
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/f2f2e2cf9965a1020661d179af46cb49e993cb7e/packages/contracts/contracts/Interfaces/IPriceFeed.sol#L17-L24
| ### [G-1.3] timestamp , success can be packed with same slot : Saves ``1 SLOT`` , ``2000 GAS``
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/f2f2e2cf9965a1020661d179af46cb49e993cb7e/packages/contracts/contracts/Interfaces/IPriceFeed.sol#L26-L30
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/Sathish9098-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:37.448138+00:00 | 5a1845cb2150173925378a4f09004af5942bfd14c6418848276cd09f726de454 | 2 | 2 | 701 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | FILE: Breadcrumbs2023-10-badger/packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
struct MoveTokensParams {
address user;
+ bool isCollIncrease;
+ bool isDebtIncrease;
uint256 collSharesChange;
uint256 collAddUnderlying; // ONLY for isCollIncrease=true
- bool isCollIncre... | diff | 391 | // Code block 1 (diff):
FILE: Breadcrumbs2023-10-badger/packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
struct MoveTokensParams {
address user;
+ bool isCollIncrease;
+ bool isDebtIncrease;
uint256 collSharesChange;
uint256 collAddUnderlying; // ONLY for isCollIncrease=true
-... | 2 | true | FILE: Breadcrumbs2023-10-badger/packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
struct MoveTokensParams {
address user;
+ bool isCollIncrease;
+ bool isDebtIncrease;
uint256 collSharesChange;
uint256 collAddUnderlying; // ONLY for isCollIncrease=true
- bool isCollIncre... | BorrowerOperations.sol#L97-L104, IPriceFeed.sol#L17-L24, IPriceFeed.sol#L26-L30 | BorrowerOperations.sol, IPriceFeed.sol | 3 | ### [G-1.2] roundEthBtcId , roundStEthEthId , success can be packed with same slot : Saves 1 SLOT , 2000 GAS
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/f2f2e2cf9965a1020661d179af46cb49e993cb7e/packages/contracts/contracts/Interfaces/IPriceFeed.sol#L17-L24
| true | ### [G-1.3] timestamp , success can be packed with same slot : Saves ``1 SLOT`` , ``2000 GAS``
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/f2f2e2cf9965a1020661d179af46cb49e993cb7e/packages/contracts/contracts/Interfaces/IPriceFeed.sol#L26-L30
| true | true | 10 | ||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | atharvasama G | Medium | medium | # Gas Optimizations list
| Number | Details | Instances |
| ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------- |
| 1 | ```x += y```/```x -= y``` COSTS MORE ... | 72: underlyingValue +=
73: (derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
74: derivatives[i].balance()) /
75: 10 ** 18;
172: localTotalWeight += weights[i];
192: localTotalWeight += weights[i]; | 85: uint256 weight = weights[i];
86: IDerivative derivative = derivatives[i];
88: uint256 ethAmount = (msg.value * weight) / totalWeight;
91: uint256 depositAmount = derivative.deposit{value: ethAmount}();
92: uint derivativeReceivedEthValue = (derivative.e... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/atharvasama-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:49.479635+00:00 | 5a2535aec50d6895580d167f2a1210db7ae86ecc6bb8cdc00d690f92cf5e2385 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | SafEth.sol | SafEth.sol | 1 | 72: underlyingValue +=
73: (derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
74: derivatives[i].balance()) /
75: 10 ** 18;
172: localTotalWeight += weights[i];
192: localTotalWeight += weights[i]; | true | 85: uint256 weight = weights[i];
86: IDerivative derivative = derivatives[i];
88: uint256 ethAmount = (msg.value * weight) / totalWeight;
91: uint256 depositAmount = derivative.deposit{value: ethAmount}();
92: uint derivativeReceivedEthValue = (derivative.e... | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 02-ethos | MohammedRizwan G | High | high | ## Summary
### Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Instances| |
|-|:-|:-:|:-:|
| [G‑01] | require() or revert() statements that check input arguments should be at the top of the function | 2 |
| [G‑02] | Splitting require() statements that use && saves gas | 4 |
| [G‑03] | [Ethos-Core contracts] ++i/i++ s... | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol
66 require(_MCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_MCR, "MCR below allowed minimum");
---
69 require(_CCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_CCR, "CCR below allowed minimum");
| File: Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
653 require(_maxFeePercentage >= BORROWING_FEE_FLOOR && _maxFeePercentage <= DECIMAL_PRECISION, | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/MohammedRizwan-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:22.060175+00:00 | 5a4d38d152286922dab01717ff5f3e87ffab349d723d4cfe17a8a9a720a6834b | 1 | 1 | 216 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol
66 require(_MCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_MCR, "MCR below allowed minimum");
---
69 require(_CCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_CCR, "CCR below allowed minimum"); | solidity | 216 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol
66 require(_MCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_MCR, "MCR below allowed minimum");
---
69 require(_CCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_CCR, "CCR below allowed minimum"); | 1 | false | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol
66 require(_MCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_MCR, "MCR below allowed minimum");
---
69 require(_CCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_CCR, "CCR below allowed minimum"); | CollateralConfig.sol#L66, CollateralConfig.sol#L69 | CollateralConfig.sol | 2 | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol
66 require(_MCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_MCR, "MCR below allowed minimum");
---
69 require(_CCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_CCR, "CCR below allowed minimum");
| true | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
653 require(_maxFeePercentage >= BORROWING_FEE_FLOOR && _maxFeePercentage <= DECIMAL_PRECISION, | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 02-ethos | joss G | Gas | gas | Use custom solidity errors instead of require statements to save gas on string allocation.
Ex: Instead of this
`require(someBool, "Error Message");`
use this
```
error ErrorMessage(); // declare error
// logically same as require. Reverts state to before function was called.
// Saves gas on string allocation.
if(!... | error ErrorMessage(); // declare error
// logically same as require. Reverts state to before function was called.
// Saves gas on string allocation.
if(!someBool){
revert ErrorMessage();
} | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/joss-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:19.471004+00:00 | 5a6c8e58ca56ccca34610f0e2a0766bf8dbf1bb9c393fb77179c1765211d5272 | 1 | 0 | 192 | 0 | false | true | true | false | medium | error ErrorMessage(); // declare error
// logically same as require. Reverts state to before function was called.
// Saves gas on string allocation.
if(!someBool){
revert ErrorMessage();
} | unknown | 192 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
error ErrorMessage(); // declare error
// logically same as require. Reverts state to before function was called.
// Saves gas on string allocation.
if(!someBool){
revert ErrorMessage();
} | 1 | false | 0 | error ErrorMessage(); // declare error
// logically same as require. Reverts state to before function was called.
// Saves gas on string allocation.
if(!someBool){
revert ErrorMessage();
} | true | false | false | 3.69 | |||||||
c4 | 10-badger | report | Critical | critical | ---
sponsor: "eBTC Protocol"
slug: "2023-10-badger"
date: "2024-02-13"
title: "Badger eBTC Audit + Certora Formal Verification Competition"
findings: "https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/issues"
contest: 300
---
# Overview
## About C4
Code4rena (C4) is an open organization consisting of security re... | /// @notice Deploys a new macro for you
function deployNewMacro() external returns (address) {
return deployNewMacro(msg.sender);
} | /// @notice Deploys a new macro for an owner, only they can operate the macro
function deployNewMacro(address _owner) public returns (address) {
address addy = address(
new LeverageMacroReference(
borrowerOperations,
activePool,
cdpManager,
... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/report.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:07.045365+00:00 | 5ac68c03d9b0e6531e71eb02e468f880b538f886054628f7af30166ed17cd723 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | /// @notice Deploys a new macro for you
function deployNewMacro() external returns (address) {
return deployNewMacro(msg.sender);
} | true | /// @notice Deploys a new macro for an owner, only they can operate the macro
function deployNewMacro(address _owner) public returns (address) {
address addy = address(
new LeverageMacroReference(
borrowerOperations,
activePool,
cdpManager,
... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 10-badger | lsaudit G | High | high | # [G-01] Using bools for storage incurs overhead
Booleans are more expensive than uint256 or any type that takes up a full word because each write operation emits an extra SLOAD to first read the slot's contents, replace the bits taken up by the boolean, and then write back. This is the compiler's defense against contr... | ./CdpManagerStorage.sol:143: bool public redemptionsPaused;
./ERC3156FlashLender.sol:15: bool public flashLoansPaused;
./LeverageMacroBase.sol:35: bool internal immutable willSweep;
./AuthNoOwner.sol:14: bool private _authorityInitialized; | ./Auth.sol:18: constructor(address _owner, Authority _authority) {
./RolesAuthority.sol:20: constructor(address _owner, Authority _authority) Auth(_owner, _authority) {}
./Governor.sol:36: constructor(address _owner) RolesAuthority(_owner, Authority(address(this))) {}
./EbtcBase.sol:52: constructor(address ... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/lsaudit-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:55.154263+00:00 | 5acc684967018e5749642c07cd02c0c833257e6dfda871e89ad65f1772841ed4 | 2 | 0 | 829 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | ./CdpManagerStorage.sol:143: bool public redemptionsPaused;
./ERC3156FlashLender.sol:15: bool public flashLoansPaused;
./LeverageMacroBase.sol:35: bool internal immutable willSweep;
./AuthNoOwner.sol:14: bool private _authorityInitialized; | unknown | 251 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
./CdpManagerStorage.sol:143: bool public redemptionsPaused;
./ERC3156FlashLender.sol:15: bool public flashLoansPaused;
./LeverageMacroBase.sol:35: bool internal immutable willSweep;
./AuthNoOwner.sol:14: bool private _authorityInitialized;
// Code block 2 (unknown):
./Auth.sol:18... | 2 | false | 0 | ./CdpManagerStorage.sol:143: bool public redemptionsPaused;
./ERC3156FlashLender.sol:15: bool public flashLoansPaused;
./LeverageMacroBase.sol:35: bool internal immutable willSweep;
./AuthNoOwner.sol:14: bool private _authorityInitialized; | true | ./Auth.sol:18: constructor(address _owner, Authority _authority) {
./RolesAuthority.sol:20: constructor(address _owner, Authority _authority) Auth(_owner, _authority) {}
./Governor.sol:36: constructor(address _owner) RolesAuthority(_owner, Authority(address(this))) {}
./EbtcBase.sol:52: constructor(address ... | true | true | 7 | |||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | Breeje Q | High | high | # QA Report
## Low Risk Issues
| Count | Explanation | Instances |
|:--:|:-------|:--:|
| [L-01] | Possible DOS in `stake` in future | 1 |
| [L-02] | `receive` function can be removed to prevent accidental sending of Eth | 3 |
| Total Low Risk Issues | 2 |
|:--:|:--:|
### [L-01] Possible DOS in `stake` in future
`s... | File: SafEth.sol
function stake() external payable {
require(pauseStaking == false, "staking is paused");
require(msg.value >= minAmount, "amount too low");
require(msg.value <= maxAmount, "amount too high");
uint256 underlyingValue = 0;
// Getting underlying value in terms ... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Breeje-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:56.595409+00:00 | 5b0f0af217bfa9254bd155021f521cc9cea2fbdfb5ec8a79ddfecb9a4e93a4f3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: SafEth.sol
function stake() external payable {
require(pauseStaking == false, "staking is paused");
require(msg.value >= minAmount, "amount too low");
require(msg.value <= maxAmount, "amount too high");
uint256 underlyingValue = 0;
// Getting underlying value in terms ... | true | false | false | 4 | ||||||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | jnrlouis G | Low | low | ### Gas Optimization Report
## Summary
## Gas Optimizations
| | Issue | Instances |
| --- | --- | ---|
| 1 | Setting the `constructor` to `payable` | 3 |
| 2 | Functions guaranteed to revert when normal users call can be marked `payable` | 11 |
| 3 | Use Assembly to check for `address(0)` | 21 |
| 4 | Splitting `r... | File: src/PrivatePool.sol
143 constructor(address _factory, address _royaltyRegistry, address _stolenNftOracle) | File: src/Factory.sol
53 constructor() ERC721("Caviar Private Pools", "POOL") Owned(msg.sender) {}
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/jnrlouis-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:36.807612+00:00 | 5b11d0fead3b926ed4c8811a2e79ec4bfab79401bb136f3e1a9c34a8e5cc0069 | 3 | 0 | 285 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | File: src/PrivatePool.sol
143 constructor(address _factory, address _royaltyRegistry, address _stolenNftOracle) | javascript | 115 | // Code block 1 (javascript):
File: src/PrivatePool.sol
143 constructor(address _factory, address _royaltyRegistry, address _stolenNftOracle)
// Code block 2 (javascript):
File: src/Factory.sol
53 constructor() ERC721("Caviar Private Pools", "POOL") Owned(msg.sender) {}
// Code block 3 (javascript):
File: src... | 3 | false | PrivatePool.sol#L143, Factory.sol#L53, EthRouter.sol#L90 | EthRouter.sol, PrivatePool.sol, Factory.sol | 3 | File: src/PrivatePool.sol
143 constructor(address _factory, address _royaltyRegistry, address _stolenNftOracle) | true | File: src/Factory.sol
53 constructor() ERC721("Caviar Private Pools", "POOL") Owned(msg.sender) {}
| true | true | 9 | |||
c4 | 02-ethos | descharre Q | Critical | critical | # Summary
## Low Risk
|ID | Finding| Instances |
|:----: | :--- | :----: |
|L-01 |Missing 0 checks in constructor|4|
|L-02 |Unspecific compiler version pragma|-|
|L-03 |Not every year equals 365 days|1|
|L-04 | Not enough checks on withdraw and deposit function | 2 |
##... | - [ActivePool.sol#L313-L342](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/ActivePool.sol#L313-L342)
- [BorrowerOperations.sol#L524-L656](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol#L524-L656)
- [LUSDToken.sol#L346-L395](https://github.c... | - [ActivePool.sol#L269](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/ActivePool.sol#L269): wrong spacing
- [BorrowerOperations.sol#L633](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol#L633)
- [TroveManager.sol#L1539](https://github.com/cod... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/descharre-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:05.603431+00:00 | 5b2d47f309effc6f8184a1f2149cf58aa49481f8def9afa7b75cbbd3cfa99da5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | ReaperVaultV2.sol#L111-L136, ReaperBaseStrategyv4.sol#L72-L73, ReaperBaseStrategyv4.sol#L82-L85, ActivePool.sol#L313-L342, BorrowerOperations.sol#L524-L656, LUSDToken.sol#L346-L395, StabilityPool.sol#L848-L875, TroveManager.sol#L1522-L1540, ActivePool.sol#L58-L67, ReaperVaultV2.sol#L80-L100, CollateralConfig.sol#L37-L3... | StabilityPool.sol, TroveManager.sol, BorrowerOperations.sol, ReaperBaseStrategyv4.sol, ReaperVaultV2.sol, LUSDToken.sol, ActivePool.sol, CollateralConfig.sol | 18 | - [ActivePool.sol#L313-L342](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/ActivePool.sol#L313-L342)
- [BorrowerOperations.sol#L524-L656](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol#L524-L656)
- [LUSDToken.sol#L346-L395](https://github.c... | true | - [ActivePool.sol#L269](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/ActivePool.sol#L269): wrong spacing
- [BorrowerOperations.sol#L633](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol#L633)
- [TroveManager.sol#L1539](https://github.com/cod... | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 01-ondo | Rolezn G | High | high | ## Summary<a name="Summary">
### Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Contexts|Estimated Gas Saved|
|-|:-|:-|:-:|
| [GAS‑1](#GAS‑1) | `abi.encode()` is less efficient than `abi.encodepacked()` | 1 | 100 |
| [GAS‑2](#GAS‑2) | State variables only set in the `constructor` should be declared immutable |... | 94: abi.encode(_APPROVAL_TYPEHASH, kycRequirementGroup, user, deadline) | 66: owner = owner_ | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/Rolezn-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:45.303218+00:00 | 5bacf61088fbd678df0a4564985cf5f2afc58cc209e02654c32615e9e3403b73 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | 94: abi.encode(_APPROVAL_TYPEHASH, kycRequirementGroup, user, deadline) | true | 66: owner = owner_ | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 08-dopex | Rolezn Q | Critical | critical | ## QA Summary<a name="QA Summary">
Low Severity Risks
### Low Risk Issues
| |Issue|Contexts|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [LOW‑1](#LOW‑1) | Consider checking that `mint` to `address(this)` is disabled | 4 |
| [LOW‑2](#LOW‑2) | Consider implementing two-step procedure for updating protocol addresses | 6 |
|... | File: RdpxV2Bond.sol
37: function mint(
address to
) public onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE) returns (uint256 tokenId) {
tokenId = _tokenIdCounter.current();
_tokenIdCounter.increment();
_mint(to, tokenId);
}
| File: RdpxDecayingBonds.sol
114: function mint(
address to,
uint256 expiry,
uint256 rdpxAmount
) external onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE) {
_whenNotPaused();
require(hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, msg.sender), "Caller is not a minter");
uint256 bondId = _mintToken(to);
bonds[bondId] = Bond(to, expiry, rdpxAm... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/Rolezn-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:00.031791+00:00 | 5bc88d3d3b88c188e9f9a7e125fabfe54dbe6c06ef8599a7d792562b949457f2 | 1 | 1 | 218 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | File: RdpxV2Bond.sol
37: function mint(
address to
) public onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE) returns (uint256 tokenId) {
tokenId = _tokenIdCounter.current();
_tokenIdCounter.increment();
_mint(to, tokenId);
} | solidity | 218 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: RdpxV2Bond.sol
37: function mint(
address to
) public onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE) returns (uint256 tokenId) {
tokenId = _tokenIdCounter.current();
_tokenIdCounter.increment();
_mint(to, tokenId);
} | 1 | false | File: RdpxV2Bond.sol
37: function mint(
address to
) public onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE) returns (uint256 tokenId) {
tokenId = _tokenIdCounter.current();
_tokenIdCounter.increment();
_mint(to, tokenId);
} | 0 | File: RdpxV2Bond.sol
37: function mint(
address to
) public onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE) returns (uint256 tokenId) {
tokenId = _tokenIdCounter.current();
_tokenIdCounter.increment();
_mint(to, tokenId);
}
| true | File: RdpxDecayingBonds.sol
114: function mint(
address to,
uint256 expiry,
uint256 rdpxAmount
) external onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE) {
_whenNotPaused();
require(hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, msg.sender), "Caller is not a minter");
uint256 bondId = _mintToken(to);
bonds[bondId] = Bond(to, expiry, rdpxAm... | true | true | 6 | ||||
c4 | 10-badger | SAQ Q | Low | low |
## Summary
### Low Risk Issues
no | Issue |Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [L-01] | Loss of precision | 3 |
| [L-02] | Consider implementing two-step procedure for updating protocol addresses | 1 |
| [L-03] | Missing checks for address(0x0) in the constructor | 15 |
| [L-04] | receive()/payable fallback() function does n... | file: /contracts/contracts/LiquidationLibrary.sol
882 uint256 EBTCDebtRewardPerUnitStaked = EBTCDebtNumerator / _totalStakes;
| file: contracts/contracts/CdpManagerStorage.sol
564 uint256 _feeTaken = collateral.getSharesByPooledEth(_deltaFeeSplit) / DECIMAL_PRECISION;
567 uint256 _deltaFeePerUnit = _deltaFeeSplitShare / _cachedAllStakes;
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/SAQ-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:36.548894+00:00 | 5bd5e6d99b20bcf201e8511e41f24c3713645592d90061aefb8621da670b7cee | 3 | 3 | 598 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | file: /contracts/contracts/LiquidationLibrary.sol
882 uint256 EBTCDebtRewardPerUnitStaked = EBTCDebtNumerator / _totalStakes; | solidity | 134 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
file: /contracts/contracts/LiquidationLibrary.sol
882 uint256 EBTCDebtRewardPerUnitStaked = EBTCDebtNumerator / _totalStakes;
// Code block 2 (solidity):
file: contracts/contracts/CdpManagerStorage.sol
564 uint256 _feeTaken = collateral.getSharesByPooledEth(_deltaFeeSplit) ... | 3 | false | file: /contracts/contracts/LiquidationLibrary.sol
882 uint256 EBTCDebtRewardPerUnitStaked = EBTCDebtNumerator / _totalStakes;
file: contracts/contracts/CdpManagerStorage.sol
564 uint256 _feeTaken = collateral.getSharesByPooledEth(_deltaFeeSplit) / DECIMAL_PRECISION;
567 uint256 _deltaFeePerUni... | LiquidationLibrary.sol#L882, CdpManagerStorage.sol#L564, PriceFeed.sol#L801-L804 | PriceFeed.sol, LiquidationLibrary.sol, CdpManagerStorage.sol | 3 | file: /contracts/contracts/LiquidationLibrary.sol
882 uint256 EBTCDebtRewardPerUnitStaked = EBTCDebtNumerator / _totalStakes;
| true | file: contracts/contracts/CdpManagerStorage.sol
564 uint256 _feeTaken = collateral.getSharesByPooledEth(_deltaFeeSplit) / DECIMAL_PRECISION;
567 uint256 _deltaFeePerUnit = _deltaFeeSplitShare / _cachedAllStakes;
| true | true | 9 | ||
c4 | 01-biconomy | Fon Q | Unknown | unknown | function nonce
```solidity
function nonce(uint256 _batchId) public view virtual override returns (uint256) {
return nonces[_batchId];
}
```
and function getNonce
```solidity
function getNonce(uint256 batchId)
public view
returns (uint256) {
return nonces[batchId];
}
```
do exactly the sa... | function nonce(uint256 _batchId) public view virtual override returns (uint256) {
return nonces[_batchId];
} | function getNonce(uint256 batchId)
public view
returns (uint256) {
return nonces[batchId];
} | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/Fon-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:05.329638+00:00 | 5bf0865353ffcef6c6fdfec5df6acc1f78c7305eef3932b49722320754b5b0b4 | 2 | 2 | 232 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function nonce(uint256 _batchId) public view virtual override returns (uint256) {
return nonces[_batchId];
} | solidity | 120 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function nonce(uint256 _batchId) public view virtual override returns (uint256) {
return nonces[_batchId];
}
// Code block 2 (solidity):
function getNonce(uint256 batchId)
public view
returns (uint256) {
return nonces[batchId];
} | 2 | false | function nonce(uint256 _batchId) public view virtual override returns (uint256) {
return nonces[_batchId];
}
function getNonce(uint256 batchId)
public view
returns (uint256) {
return nonces[batchId];
} | 0 | function nonce(uint256 _batchId) public view virtual override returns (uint256) {
return nonces[_batchId];
} | true | function getNonce(uint256 batchId)
public view
returns (uint256) {
return nonces[batchId];
} | true | true | 4.72 | ||||
c4 | 09-ondo | Krace Q | Low | low | ## [Low] dailyInterestRate maybe wrongly set, causing zero price
`dailyInterestRate` is used to calculate the current price of USDY. Once it is set to zero, the price will become zero.
When admin sets the Range, `dailyInterestRate` should be checked to ensure it's not zero.
```
roundUpTo8(
_rmul(
_rp... | roundUpTo8(
_rmul(
_rpow(currentRange.dailyInterestRate, elapsedDays + 1, ONE),
currentRange.prevRangeClosePrice
)
); | /*//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Public Functions
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////*/
/**
* @notice internal function to mint a transaction if it has passed the threshold
* for the number of approvers
*
* @pa... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/Krace-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:34.945876+00:00 | 5c06d48b47b628c79a2b1774a207c00bd0dc187539480b0d4fdaad0bc9198b2f | 2 | 0 | 1,117 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | roundUpTo8(
_rmul(
_rpow(currentRange.dailyInterestRate, elapsedDays + 1, ONE),
currentRange.prevRangeClosePrice
)
); | unknown | 159 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
roundUpTo8(
_rmul(
_rpow(currentRange.dailyInterestRate, elapsedDays + 1, ONE),
currentRange.prevRangeClosePrice
)
);
// Code block 2 (unknown):
/*//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Public Functions... | 2 | false | 0 | roundUpTo8(
_rmul(
_rpow(currentRange.dailyInterestRate, elapsedDays + 1, ONE),
currentRange.prevRangeClosePrice
)
); | true | /*//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Public Functions
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////*/
/**
* @notice internal function to mint a transaction if it has passed the threshold
* for the number of approvers
*
* @pa... | true | true | 7 | |||||
c4 | 09-ondo | 0xpanicError Q | Critical | critical | # Low Issues
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [L-1](#L-1) | There should be a cap on `dailyInterestRate` | 2 |
| [L-2](#L-2) | `getPrice` can return 0 if startTime is set more than block.timestamp | 1 |
### [L-1] There should be a cap on `dailyInterestRate`
`dailyInterestRate` is a value set in range by the admin. Si... | Contracts in scope: https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
*Instances (2)*: <br>
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol#L151 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol#L186 | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/0xpanicError-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:18.257345+00:00 | 5c338a659bbd3b5507bb2bffe2e680c18eeeee47c80f4b46c66acde498b91aa8 | 2 | 0 | 336 | 3 | false | true | true | false | medium | Contracts in scope: https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
*Instances (2)*: <br>
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol#L151 | unknown | 237 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
Contracts in scope: https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
*Instances (2)*: <br>
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol#L151
// Code block 2 (unknown):
https://github.com/code-423... | 2 | false | RWADynamicOracle.sol, RWADynamicOracle.sol#L151, RWADynamicOracle.sol#L186 | RWADynamicOracle.sol | 3 | Contracts in scope: https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
*Instances (2)*: <br>
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol#L151 | true | false | false | 7 | ||||
c4 | 11-kelp | catellatech Q | High | high | # QA report for Kelp DAO contest by Catellatech
## [QA-01] onlyLRTManager can approve the max asset in NodeDelegator::maxApproveToEigenStrategyManager even when the contract is paused
Consider add the `whenNotPaused` modifier to the function `NodeDelegator::maxApproveToEigenStrategyManager` as well.
- https://github... | function maxApproveToEigenStrategyManager(address asset)
external
override
onlySupportedAsset(asset)
onlyLRTManager
{
address eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress = lrtConfig.getContract(LRTConstants.EIGEN_STRATEGY_MANAGER);
IERC20(asset).approve(eigenlayerStrategyMan... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/catellatech-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:52.438605+00:00 | 5c3e897af29a7edf87385859570ef90aae93c1f258c5559e83e4238500d3cb4f | 1 | 1 | 354 | 2 | false | true | true | false | high | function maxApproveToEigenStrategyManager(address asset)
external
override
onlySupportedAsset(asset)
onlyLRTManager
{
address eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress = lrtConfig.getContract(LRTConstants.EIGEN_STRATEGY_MANAGER);
IERC20(asset).approve(eigenlayerStrategyManager... | solidity | 354 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function maxApproveToEigenStrategyManager(address asset)
external
override
onlySupportedAsset(asset)
onlyLRTManager
{
address eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress = lrtConfig.getContract(LRTConstants.EIGEN_STRATEGY_MANAGER);
IERC20(asset).appro... | 1 | false | function maxApproveToEigenStrategyManager(address asset)
external
override
onlySupportedAsset(asset)
onlyLRTManager
{
address eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress = lrtConfig.getContract(LRTConstants.EIGEN_STRATEGY_MANAGER);
IERC20(asset).approve(eigenlayerStrategyManager... | NodeDelegator.sol#L38-L1, LRTDepositPool.sol#L78 | NodeDelegator.sol, LRTDepositPool.sol | 2 | function maxApproveToEigenStrategyManager(address asset)
external
override
onlySupportedAsset(asset)
onlyLRTManager
{
address eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress = lrtConfig.getContract(LRTConstants.EIGEN_STRATEGY_MANAGER);
IERC20(asset).approve(eigenlayerStrategyMan... | true | false | false | 6 | ||||
c4 | 01-ondo | chaduke Q | High | high | GA1. https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/f3426e5b6b4561e09460b2e6471eb694efdd6c70/contracts/lending/tokens/cToken/CTokenModified.sol#L576-L587
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/f3426e5b6b4561e09460b2e6471eb694efdd6c70/contracts/lending/tokens/cToken/CTokenModified.sol#L584-L587
We need to chec... | require(
(redeemTokensIn >0 && redeemAmountIn == 0) || (redeemTokensIn == 0 && redeemAmountIn > 0),
"Only one of redeemTokensIn and redeemAmountIn must be zero"
); | actualRedeemAmount = doTransferOut(redeemer, redeemAmount);
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/chaduke-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:00.086008+00:00 | 5c7600a395249ba004f7b39e5ceba038c0e902f6aeb63542b6338f295b07d5b5 | 2 | 0 | 238 | 7 | false | false | true | false | high | require(
(redeemTokensIn >0 && redeemAmountIn == 0) || (redeemTokensIn == 0 && redeemAmountIn > 0),
"Only one of redeemTokensIn and redeemAmountIn must be zero"
); | unknown | 179 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
require(
(redeemTokensIn >0 && redeemAmountIn == 0) || (redeemTokensIn == 0 && redeemAmountIn > 0),
"Only one of redeemTokensIn and redeemAmountIn must be zero"
);
// Code block 2 (unknown):
actualRedeemAmount = doTransferOut(redeemer, redeemAmount); | 2 | false | CTokenModified.sol#L576-L587, CTokenModified.sol#L584-L587, CTokenModified.sol#L650, CTokenModified.sol#L795, CTokenModified.sol#L94, CTokenModified.sol#L479, CTokenInterfacesModifiedCash.sol#L2 | CTokenInterfacesModifiedCash.sol, CTokenModified.sol | 7 | require(
(redeemTokensIn >0 && redeemAmountIn == 0) || (redeemTokensIn == 0 && redeemAmountIn > 0),
"Only one of redeemTokensIn and redeemAmountIn must be zero"
); | true | actualRedeemAmount = doTransferOut(redeemer, redeemAmount);
| true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | 14si2o_Flint Q | Medium | medium | ## [L-01] globalStakedAmount is greater than actual staked amount
The `globalStakedAmount` state variable in `RankedBattle.sol` keeps track of the overall staked amount in the protocol. It is increased by staking and decreased by unstaking.
However, it does not take into account the stake moved to the `StakeAtRisk` co... | ## [L-03] Incomplete require check in GameItems.mint
The 4th require statement in `GameItems.mint` checks that the `quantity` demanded does not exceed the dailyAllowance or the allowanceRemaining.
Yet the first part of the require only checks if the user can replenish his allowance, **not** that the `quantity` is equ... | ## [L-04] GameItems.remainingSupply will return 0 for a game item with infinite supply
When a game item is created, if `finiteSupply == true` then the `itemsRemaining` is set to a specific number.
However, when `finiteSupply == false` then the `itemsRemaining` is set to 0. This is confirmed in the `Deployer` script f... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/14si2o_Flint-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:11.999981+00:00 | 5ccd3d144cf534713210fef903cf02a856d816ec9fa1b549c4163c01c26dffb0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | ## [L-03] Incomplete require check in GameItems.mint
The 4th require statement in `GameItems.mint` checks that the `quantity` demanded does not exceed the dailyAllowance or the allowanceRemaining.
Yet the first part of the require only checks if the user can replenish his allowance, **not** that the `quantity` is equ... | true | ## [L-04] GameItems.remainingSupply will return 0 for a game item with infinite supply
When a game item is created, if `finiteSupply == true` then the `itemsRemaining` is set to a specific number.
However, when `finiteSupply == false` then the `itemsRemaining` is set to 0. This is confirmed in the `Deployer` script f... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 10-badger | TrungOre Q | Medium | medium | # Low Risk Issues
| Number | Issue |
|--------|--------|
|[L-01]| Redundant requirement `require(vars.netStEthBalance > 0, "BorrowerOperations: zero collateral for openCdp()!");` in function `_openCdp()` |
|[L-02]| Unused array `_liqFlags` |
|[L-03]| Function `LiquidationLibrary._redistributeDebt()` shouldn't return... | 454 _requireAtLeastMinNetStEthBalance(vars.netStEthBalance); | 751 bool[] memory _liqFlags = new bool[](_cnt); | flash-loan | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/TrungOre-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:39.674422+00:00 | 5dd2c216f6e28fa21821833c7fc892049059623d9ebb7fd2fca8e81858d4a13b | 2 | 2 | 121 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | 454 _requireAtLeastMinNetStEthBalance(vars.netStEthBalance); | solidity | 67 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
454 _requireAtLeastMinNetStEthBalance(vars.netStEthBalance);
// Code block 2 (solidity):
751 bool[] memory _liqFlags = new bool[](_cnt); | 2 | false | 454 _requireAtLeastMinNetStEthBalance(vars.netStEthBalance);
751 bool[] memory _liqFlags = new bool[](_cnt); | BorrowerOperations.sol#L454, BorrowerOperations.sol#L463-L17, LiquidationLibrary.sol#L751 | BorrowerOperations.sol, LiquidationLibrary.sol | 3 | 454 _requireAtLeastMinNetStEthBalance(vars.netStEthBalance); | true | 751 bool[] memory _liqFlags = new bool[](_cnt); | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 09-ondo | kutugu Q | Critical | critical | # Findings Summary
| ID | Title | Severity |
| ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------- |
| [L-01] | setThresholds should prohibit equal amount ... | function setThresholds(
string calldata srcChain,
uint256[] calldata amounts,
uint256[] calldata numOfApprovers
) external onlyOwner {
if (amounts.length != numOfApprovers.length) {
revert ArrayLengthMismatch();
}
delete chainToThresholds[srcChain];
for (uint256 i = 0; i < amounts.... | function addChainSupport(
string calldata srcChain,
string calldata srcContractAddress
) external onlyOwner {
chainToApprovedSender[srcChain] = keccak256(abi.encode(srcContractAddress));
emit ChainIdSupported(srcChain, srcContractAddress);
}
// @audit may revert here
if (isSpentNonce[chainToA... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/kutugu-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:02.781113+00:00 | 5dd6b708d1332b7915e984883bb4a4a02c5c61701d7d8e3d2ef05fd0d413888d | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | function setThresholds(
string calldata srcChain,
uint256[] calldata amounts,
uint256[] calldata numOfApprovers
) external onlyOwner {
if (amounts.length != numOfApprovers.length) {
revert ArrayLengthMismatch();
}
delete chainToThresholds[srcChain];
for (uint256 i = 0; i < amounts.... | true | function addChainSupport(
string calldata srcChain,
string calldata srcContractAddress
) external onlyOwner {
chainToApprovedSender[srcChain] = keccak256(abi.encode(srcContractAddress));
emit ChainIdSupported(srcChain, srcContractAddress);
}
// @audit may revert here
if (isSpentNonce[chainToA... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | latt1ce Q | Low | low | ## Solmate’s SafeTransferLib doesn’t check whether the ERC20 contract exists
Solmate’s SafeTransferLib, which is often used to interact with non-compliant/unsafe ERC20 tokens, does not check whether the ERC20 contract exists. The following code will not revert in case the token doesn’t exist.
Code snippet : https://gi... | pragma solidity >=0.8.0;
function isContract(address _addr) private returns (bool isContract) {
isContract = _addr.code.length > 0;
} | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/latt1ce-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:38.217342+00:00 | 5dd792acc3cbac7f8f42044d60219e28ba399a3583cedb1b4124439d6b042fcd | 1 | 1 | 137 | 5 | false | true | true | false | medium | pragma solidity >=0.8.0;
function isContract(address _addr) private returns (bool isContract) {
isContract = _addr.code.length > 0;
} | solidity | 137 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
pragma solidity >=0.8.0;
function isContract(address _addr) private returns (bool isContract) {
isContract = _addr.code.length > 0;
} | 1 | false | pragma solidity >=0.8.0;
function isContract(address _addr) private returns (bool isContract) {
isContract = _addr.code.length > 0;
} | SafeTransferLib.sol#L9, PrivatePool.sol#L256, PrivatePool.sol#L346, PrivatePool.sol#L423, PrivatePool.sol#L502 | PrivatePool.sol, SafeTransferLib.sol | 5 | pragma solidity >=0.8.0;
function isContract(address _addr) private returns (bool isContract) {
isContract = _addr.code.length > 0;
} | true | false | false | 4.89 | ||||
c4 | 02-ethos | flacko Q | Unknown | unknown | # Lock pragma version
## Proof of Concept
A few of the contracts within the scope of the contest have a floating pragma:
- Ethos-Vault/contracts/ReaperVaultV2.sol
- Ethos-Vault/contracts/ReaperVaultERC4626.sol
- Ethos-Vault/contracts/ReparerBaseStrategyv4.sol
```
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
```
CWE: https://swcregistry... | pragma solidity ^0.8.0; | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/flacko-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:11.859025+00:00 | 5df4cdc91f2e94a341e3fd1d48870ce22aca48f9d6848ae40512ab340ae544f1 | 1 | 0 | 23 | 0 | false | true | true | false | medium | pragma solidity ^0.8.0; | unknown | 23 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
pragma solidity ^0.8.0; | 1 | false | 0 | pragma solidity ^0.8.0; | true | false | false | 3.16 | |||||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | cthulhu_cult G | High | high | ## GAS-1: Consider using IR Cogen compiler pipeline for gas optimization
- Description: The IR-based code generator was introduced with an aim to not only allow code generation to be more transparent and auditable but also to enable more powerful optimization passes that span across functions.
- Location: Project Wide
... | ```bash
$ npx hardhat test --ir
127771000000000000
✓ can send transactions and charge wallet for fees in erc20 tokens
·----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------·
| Solc version: 0.8.12 · O... | // Before
modifier onlyOwner {
require(msg.sender == owner, "Smart Account:: Sender is not authorized");
_;
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/cthulhu_cult-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:39.586294+00:00 | 5e2243ae249175741ba8a5fb5a4993c9b6825f7f495169d52d1a2ff75ad965b5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | ```bash
$ npx hardhat test --ir
127771000000000000
✓ can send transactions and charge wallet for fees in erc20 tokens
·----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------·
| Solc version: 0.8.12 · O... | true | // Before
modifier onlyOwner {
require(msg.sender == owner, "Smart Account:: Sender is not authorized");
_;
} | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 11-kelp | 0xAadi Q | Critical | critical | ## Summary
### Low Risk Issues
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [[L‑01](#l01-tokenMap-mapping)] | The `tokenMap` mapping in the `LRTConfig` contract serves no significant purpose in the protocol, and its presence does not impact the current implementation. | 1 |
| [[L‑02](#l02-three-mappings)] | The thr... | File: src/LRTConfig.sol
13: mapping(bytes32 tokenKey => address tokenAddress) public tokenMap;
58: _setToken(LRTConstants.ST_ETH_TOKEN, stETH);
59: _setToken(LRTConstants.R_ETH_TOKEN, rETH);
60: _setToken(LRTConstants.CB_ETH_TOKEN, cbETH);
127: function getLSTToken(bytes32 tokenKey) extern... | File: src/LRTConfig.sol
15: mapping(address token => bool isSupported) public isSupportedAsset;
16: mapping(address token => uint256 amount) public depositLimitByAsset;
17: mapping(address token => address strategy) public override assetStrategy; | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/0xAadi-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:09.153198+00:00 | 5e336c6ba5866a6bb4e70a20efe0486a607465ccdca60da2e0e4663642ad63b3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: src/LRTConfig.sol
13: mapping(bytes32 tokenKey => address tokenAddress) public tokenMap;
58: _setToken(LRTConstants.ST_ETH_TOKEN, stETH);
59: _setToken(LRTConstants.R_ETH_TOKEN, rETH);
60: _setToken(LRTConstants.CB_ETH_TOKEN, cbETH);
127: function getLSTToken(bytes32 tokenKey) extern... | true | File: src/LRTConfig.sol
15: mapping(address token => bool isSupported) public isSupportedAsset;
16: mapping(address token => uint256 amount) public depositLimitByAsset;
17: mapping(address token => address strategy) public override assetStrategy; | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 06-lybra | 8olidity Q | Unknown | unknown | ## `depositEtherToMint()` code redundancy
Since the `depositEtherToMint()` function stores eth, the value of `collateralAsset.balanceOf(address(this))` will not change, but the code judges the balance of collateralAsset before and after the deposit operation, which is redundant code
```solidity
function depositEtherTo... | function depositEtherToMint(uint256 mintAmount) external payable override {
require(msg.value >= 1 ether, "DNL");
uint256 preBalance = collateralAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
rkPool.deposit{value: msg.value}();
uint256 balance = collateralAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
depositedAsset[msg.sender] ... | ## The function does not exist in the WBETH interface
The LybraWBETHVault contract comment wrote that the WBETH address is 0xae78736Cd615f374D3085123A210448E74Fc6393 , but in the https://etherscan.io/address/0xae78736cd615f374d3085123a210448e74fc6393#readContract , the contract does not have the `deposit` and `exchang... | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/8olidity-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:22:07.890649+00:00 | 5e8458e132b85b2d4c6ed997c38a6a3e7c70b204767dc7a095da094798ba21d8 | 2 | 2 | 1,146 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function depositEtherToMint(uint256 mintAmount) external payable override {
require(msg.value >= 1 ether, "DNL");
uint256 preBalance = collateralAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
rkPool.deposit{value: msg.value}();
uint256 balance = collateralAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
depositedAsset[msg.sender] ... | solidity | 572 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function depositEtherToMint(uint256 mintAmount) external payable override {
require(msg.value >= 1 ether, "DNL");
uint256 preBalance = collateralAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
rkPool.deposit{value: msg.value}();
uint256 balance = collateralAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
... | 2 | true | function depositEtherToMint(uint256 mintAmount) external payable override {
require(msg.value >= 1 ether, "DNL");
- uint256 preBalance = collateralAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
rkPool.deposit{value: msg.value}();
- uint256 balance = collateralAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
- depositedAsset[msg.sender... | function depositEtherToMint(uint256 mintAmount) external payable override {
require(msg.value >= 1 ether, "DNL");
uint256 preBalance = collateralAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
rkPool.deposit{value: msg.value}();
uint256 balance = collateralAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
depositedAsset[msg.sender] ... | 0 | function depositEtherToMint(uint256 mintAmount) external payable override {
require(msg.value >= 1 ether, "DNL");
uint256 preBalance = collateralAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
rkPool.deposit{value: msg.value}();
uint256 balance = collateralAsset.balanceOf(address(this));
depositedAsset[msg.sender] ... | true | ## The function does not exist in the WBETH interface
The LybraWBETHVault contract comment wrote that the WBETH address is 0xae78736Cd615f374D3085123A210448E74Fc6393 , but in the https://etherscan.io/address/0xae78736cd615f374d3085123a210448e74fc6393#readContract , the contract does not have the `deposit` and `exchang... | true | true | 9 | |||
c4 | 01-salty | Beepidibop G | High | high | # Gas Findings
## [GAS-1] `Airdrop`: Use Merkle Roots for Airdrops Instead of Adding Addresses One-by-one
You can save gas for the deployer by using a Merkle Root to determine eligibility for airdrops. The current way of adding `_authorizedUsers` one by one with `authorizeWallet(address)` is gas extensive. Or at leas... | // The confirmation wallet confirms or rejects wallet proposals by sending a specific amount of ETH to this contract
receive() external payable
{
require( msg.sender == confirmationWallet, "Invalid sender" );
// Confirm if .05 or more ether is sent and otherwise reject.
... | // The confirmation wallet confirms or rejects wallet proposals by sending a specific amount of ETH to this contract
receive() external payable
{
require( msg.sender == confirmationWallet, "Invalid sender" );
// Confirm if .05 or more ether is sent and otherwise reject.
... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/Beepidibop-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:13.646685+00:00 | 5ea93cf06df49a3e8a811f3abf2fac2a8b6e3fa62fdea1d0c70ffb3ae12a7a4f | 1 | 0 | 730 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | // The confirmation wallet confirms or rejects wallet proposals by sending a specific amount of ETH to this contract
receive() external payable
{
require( msg.sender == confirmationWallet, "Invalid sender" );
// Confirm if .05 or more ether is sent and otherwise reject.
// D... | unknown | 730 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
// The confirmation wallet confirms or rejects wallet proposals by sending a specific amount of ETH to this contract
receive() external payable
{
require( msg.sender == confirmationWallet, "Invalid sender" );
// Confirm if .05 or more ether is sent and othe... | 1 | false | Airdrop.sol#L46-L52 | Airdrop.sol | 1 | // The confirmation wallet confirms or rejects wallet proposals by sending a specific amount of ETH to this contract
receive() external payable
{
require( msg.sender == confirmationWallet, "Invalid sender" );
// Confirm if .05 or more ether is sent and otherwise reject.
... | true | // The confirmation wallet confirms or rejects wallet proposals by sending a specific amount of ETH to this contract
receive() external payable
{
require( msg.sender == confirmationWallet, "Invalid sender" );
// Confirm if .05 or more ether is sent and otherwise reject.
... | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | UdarTeam Q | Critical | critical | ### Issues Template
| Letter | Name | Description |
|:--:|:-------:|:-------:|
| L | Low risk | Potential risk |
| NC | Non-critical | Non risky findings |
| R | Refactor | Changing the code |
| O | Ordinary | Often found issues |
| Total Found Issues | 16 |
|:--:|:--:|
### Low Risk Issues Template
| Count | Expla... | contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
15: contract SafEth is
16: Initializable,
17: ERC20Upgradeable,
18: OwnableUpgradeable,
19: SafEthStorage
20: { | contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
19: contract Reth is IDerivative, Initializable, OwnableUpgradeable { | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/UdarTeam-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:37.385246+00:00 | 5f1497055a62d5744cd654e0a8c81bcff70ee62ea6c909aba93677edc461b645 | 1 | 1 | 174 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
15: contract SafEth is
16: Initializable,
17: ERC20Upgradeable,
18: OwnableUpgradeable,
19: SafEthStorage
20: { | solidity | 174 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
15: contract SafEth is
16: Initializable,
17: ERC20Upgradeable,
18: OwnableUpgradeable,
19: SafEthStorage
20: { | 1 | false | contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
15: contract SafEth is
16: Initializable,
17: ERC20Upgradeable,
18: OwnableUpgradeable,
19: SafEthStorage
20: { | 0 | contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
15: contract SafEth is
16: Initializable,
17: ERC20Upgradeable,
18: OwnableUpgradeable,
19: SafEthStorage
20: { | true | contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
19: contract Reth is IDerivative, Initializable, OwnableUpgradeable { | true | true | 6 | ||||
c4 | 09-ondo | AISec Q | Low | low | ## Impact
Missing constructor sanity checks
The implementation of constructor() functions are missing some sanity checks.
## Proof of Concept
Missing sanity check for != address(0)
There're no sanity checks for the constructor argument _guardian.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/usdy... | constructor(address _guardian) {
guardian = _guardian;
} | constructor(
address admin,
address setter,
address pauser,
uint256 firstRangeStart,
uint256 firstRangeEnd,
uint256 dailyIR,
uint256 startPrice
) {
_grantRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, admin);
_grantRole(PAUSER_ROLE, pauser);
_grantRole(SETTER_ROLE, setter);
if (firstRangeStar... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/AISec-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:22.370903+00:00 | 5f1d7af86bf35d931ef1812e885cd78ee2eb64ee4bd837965690edff0562f813 | 3 | 0 | 834 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | constructor(address _guardian) {
guardian = _guardian;
} | unknown | 62 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
constructor(address _guardian) {
guardian = _guardian;
}
// Code block 2 (unknown):
constructor(
address admin,
address setter,
address pauser,
uint256 firstRangeStart,
uint256 firstRangeEnd,
uint256 dailyIR,
uint256 startPrice
) {
_grantRole(DEFAULT_A... | 3 | false | rUSDYFactory.sol, RWADynamicOracle.sol, SourceBridge.sol, DestinationBridge.sol | DestinationBridge.sol, rUSDYFactory.sol, RWADynamicOracle.sol, SourceBridge.sol | 4 | constructor(address _guardian) {
guardian = _guardian;
} | true | constructor(
address admin,
address setter,
address pauser,
uint256 firstRangeStart,
uint256 firstRangeEnd,
uint256 dailyIR,
uint256 startPrice
) {
_grantRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, admin);
_grantRole(PAUSER_ROLE, pauser);
_grantRole(SETTER_ROLE, setter);
if (firstRangeStar... | true | true | 9 | |||
c4 | 01-ondo | Mukund G | High | high | | Index | Issue |
|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 | USE UNCHECK BLOCK FOR OPERATION THAT CAN NOT OVERFLOW/UNDERFLOW |
| 2 | Using c... | for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++) { | function multiexcall(
ExCallData[] calldata exCallData
)
external
payable
override
nonReentrant
onlyRole(MANAGER_ADMIN)
whenPaused
returns (bytes[] memory results) | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/Mukund-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:41.331283+00:00 | 5f43d4b538861589e9a37e51648512f234cc7ad3e445e4e6ea654959a2e93876 | 2 | 2 | 235 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++) { | solidity | 38 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++) {
// Code block 2 (solidity):
function multiexcall(
ExCallData[] calldata exCallData
)
external
payable
override
nonReentrant
onlyRole(MANAGER_ADMIN)
whenPaused
returns (bytes[] memory results) | 2 | false | for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++) {
function multiexcall(
ExCallData[] calldata exCallData
)
external
payable
override
nonReentrant
onlyRole(MANAGER_ADMIN)
whenPaused
returns (bytes[] memory results) | KYCRegistry.sol#L163, KYCRegistry.sol#L180 | KYCRegistry.sol | 2 | for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++) { | true | function multiexcall(
ExCallData[] calldata exCallData
)
external
payable
override
nonReentrant
onlyRole(MANAGER_ADMIN)
whenPaused
returns (bytes[] memory results) | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 01-biconomy | horsefacts Q | Critical | critical | ## Low
### `SmartAccount`: Initialize implementation contract
`SmartAccount` has an unprotected intializer that can be called by anyone to claim ownership of the contract.
```solidity
// init
// Initialize / Setup
// Used to setup
// i. owner ii. entry point address iii. handler
function init(add... | // init
// Initialize / Setup
// Used to setup
// i. owner ii. entry point address iii. handler
function init(address _owner, address _entryPointAddress, address _handler) public override initializer {
require(owner == address(0), "Already initialized");
require(address(_entryPoint) ... | constructor() {
_disableInitializers();
} | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/horsefacts-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:49.969480+00:00 | 5f878d0385fc498adcb8d217ba6cafded0d6a9d5166155b87666df824cc2f328 | 2 | 2 | 804 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | // init
// Initialize / Setup
// Used to setup
// i. owner ii. entry point address iii. handler
function init(address _owner, address _entryPointAddress, address _handler) public override initializer {
require(owner == address(0), "Already initialized");
require(address(_entryPoint) == a... | solidity | 759 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
// init
// Initialize / Setup
// Used to setup
// i. owner ii. entry point address iii. handler
function init(address _owner, address _entryPointAddress, address _handler) public override initializer {
require(owner == address(0), "Already initialized");
requi... | 2 | false | // init
// Initialize / Setup
// Used to setup
// i. owner ii. entry point address iii. handler
function init(address _owner, address _entryPointAddress, address _handler) public override initializer {
require(owner == address(0), "Already initialized");
require(address(_entryPoint) == a... | 0 | // init
// Initialize / Setup
// Used to setup
// i. owner ii. entry point address iii. handler
function init(address _owner, address _entryPointAddress, address _handler) public override initializer {
require(owner == address(0), "Already initialized");
require(address(_entryPoint) ... | true | constructor() {
_disableInitializers();
} | true | true | 7 | ||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | 2997ms Q | Critical | critical | ## Summary
### Low Risk Issues
| | Issue | Contexts |
| ----- | :----------------------- | :------: |
| LOW-1 | Change the order of emit | 1 |
| LOW-2 | Avoid to create a sender with address 0 | 1 |
| LOW-3 | Initilize() function can be called by an... | entryPoint = IEntryPoint(payable(_newEntryPoint));
emit EntryPointChanged(address(_entryPoint), _newEntryPoint); | ### [LOW-04] Lack the validation that the divisor should not be 0.
If b is 0, the transaction will be reverted because there is no validation that b != 0.
As it is a very basic function in math.sol, so we need to add a message to tell the customers why the transaction being reverted.
**Proof Of Concept**
https://git... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/2997ms-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:12:52.656625+00:00 | 5f8a66b7c96e362c8d8289fb3f095929dbb9c7123fa53a61d74688953a408633 | 1 | 0 | 112 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | entryPoint = IEntryPoint(payable(_newEntryPoint));
emit EntryPointChanged(address(_entryPoint), _newEntryPoint); | unknown | 112 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
entryPoint = IEntryPoint(payable(_newEntryPoint));
emit EntryPointChanged(address(_entryPoint), _newEntryPoint); | 1 | false | SmartAccount.sol#L129-L130, Math.sol#L45-L47 | Math.sol, SmartAccount.sol | 2 | entryPoint = IEntryPoint(payable(_newEntryPoint));
emit EntryPointChanged(address(_entryPoint), _newEntryPoint); | true | ### [LOW-04] Lack the validation that the divisor should not be 0.
If b is 0, the transaction will be reverted because there is no validation that b != 0.
As it is a very basic function in math.sol, so we need to add a message to tell the customers why the transaction being reverted.
**Proof Of Concept**
https://git... | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 01-biconomy | ro G | Low | low | 1. The initializer modifier in the init function is not needed:
```solidity
function init(
address _owner,
address _entryPointAddress,
address _handler
) public override initializer
```
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/S... | function init(
address _owner,
address _entryPointAddress,
address _handler
) public override initializer | require(owner == address(0), "Already initialized"); | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/ro-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:05.189173+00:00 | 5fa6fd3a3cf4a0ee858a2e5ef50f0fc283324b1279005ea1949bf40de7d03146 | 6 | 6 | 616 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | function init(
address _owner,
address _entryPointAddress,
address _handler
) public override initializer | solidity | 133 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function init(
address _owner,
address _entryPointAddress,
address _handler
) public override initializer
// Code block 2 (solidity):
require(owner == address(0), "Already initialized");
// Code block 3 (solidity):
require(address(_entryPoint) == address(0), "Al... | 6 | false | function init(
address _owner,
address _entryPointAddress,
address _handler
) public override initializer
require(owner == address(0), "Already initialized");
require(address(_entryPoint) == address(0), "Already initialized");
require(owner == address(0), "Already initialized");
function... | SmartAccount.sol#L166, SmartAccount.sol#L168, SmartAccount.sol#L449, SmartAccount.sol#L247 | SmartAccount.sol | 4 | function init(
address _owner,
address _entryPointAddress,
address _handler
) public override initializer | true | require(owner == address(0), "Already initialized"); | true | true | 12 | ||
c4 | 01-biconomy | Aymen0909 G | Medium | medium | # Gas Optimizations
## Summary
| | Issue | Instances |
| :-------------: |:-------------|:-------------:|
| 1 | Use `unchecked` blocks to save gas | 2 |
| 2 | Redundant check in `init` function should be removed | 1 |
| 3 | `x += y/x -= y` costs more gas than `x = x + y/x = x - y` for... | info.deposit = uint112(info.deposit - withdrawAmount); | paymasterIdBalances[msg.sender] -= amount; | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/Aymen0909-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:12:54.910840+00:00 | 5face008d856002630859ba60a8053be3dcbc1207e9e2f490ae5668405238453 | 2 | 0 | 96 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | info.deposit = uint112(info.deposit - withdrawAmount); | unknown | 54 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
info.deposit = uint112(info.deposit - withdrawAmount);
// Code block 2 (unknown):
paymasterIdBalances[msg.sender] -= amount; | 2 | false | StakeManager.sol#L118, StakeManager.sol#L117, VerifyingSingletonPaymaster.sol#L58 | VerifyingSingletonPaymaster.sol, StakeManager.sol | 3 | info.deposit = uint112(info.deposit - withdrawAmount); | true | paymasterIdBalances[msg.sender] -= amount; | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 11-kelp | Giorgio Q | Unknown | unknown | ## Misleading comment in `LTRDepositPool::addNodeDelegatorContractToQueue()`
## Issue
The comment above the `addNodeDelegatorContractToQueue()` function indicate that the `manager` should call this function, but the modifier used is for `admin`. This is confusing.
## Link
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/... | /// @dev only callable by LRT admin | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/Giorgio-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:28.656752+00:00 | 5ff66088ad255407dfc22d609fb155cd588b57d8a82ff5f7deec8455447821e4 | 1 | 0 | 35 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | /// @dev only callable by LRT admin | unknown | 35 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
/// @dev only callable by LRT admin | 1 | false | LRTDepositPool.sol#L160-L162 | LRTDepositPool.sol | 1 | /// @dev only callable by LRT admin | true | false | false | 4.1 | |||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | siddhpurakaran G | High | high | ## [G-01] USE FUNCTION INSTEAD OF MODIFIERS (3 INSTANCES)
Functions saves gas as compared to modifiers.
Example :
```
-----------------------Before-----------------------------------
modifier onlyMinters() {
require(minters[msg.sender] == true, "Only minters");
_;
}
function minter_mint(address... | -----------------------Before-----------------------------------
modifier onlyMinters() {
require(minters[msg.sender] == true, "Only minters");
_;
}
function minter_mint(address m_address, uint256 m_amount) public onlyMinters {
onlyMinters();
super._mint(m_address, m_amount);... | L76 modifier onlyOwner {
L82 modifier mixedAuth {
L88 modifier onlyEntryPoint { | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/siddhpurakaran-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:10.536026+00:00 | 5ffa09e4ae9759773b60417bade8552ea2664d62d2bf14a6b5d20226933a62c2 | 2 | 0 | 820 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | -----------------------Before-----------------------------------
modifier onlyMinters() {
require(minters[msg.sender] == true, "Only minters");
_;
}
function minter_mint(address m_address, uint256 m_amount) public onlyMinters {
onlyMinters();
super._mint(m_address, m_amount);... | unknown | 714 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
-----------------------Before-----------------------------------
modifier onlyMinters() {
require(minters[msg.sender] == true, "Only minters");
_;
}
function minter_mint(address m_address, uint256 m_amount) public onlyMinters {
onlyMinters();
super.... | 2 | false | 0 | -----------------------Before-----------------------------------
modifier onlyMinters() {
require(minters[msg.sender] == true, "Only minters");
_;
}
function minter_mint(address m_address, uint256 m_amount) public onlyMinters {
onlyMinters();
super._mint(m_address, m_amount);... | true | L76 modifier onlyOwner {
L82 modifier mixedAuth {
L88 modifier onlyEntryPoint { | true | true | 7 | |||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | Bloqarl G | Medium | medium | ## Gas Optimization report
# [G-01] Avoid comparing a bool to true/false
It is not necessary to compare `pauseUnstaking` and `pausestaking` to true or false in the require(). Since they are booleans it is enough to write `require(!pauseUnstaking)`.
There are two instances in SafEth.sol.
Gas saved per instance: 18 ... | for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
localTotalWeight += weights[i]; | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Bloqarl-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:54.808462+00:00 | 5fff0342714277c3ce06a42a25c8c76dfa3057f91375e2b9ab4146a3cc54c098 | 1 | 0 | 89 | 6 | false | true | true | false | medium | for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
localTotalWeight += weights[i]; | unknown | 89 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
localTotalWeight += weights[i]; | 1 | false | SafEth.sol#L64, SafEth.sol#L109, SafEth.sol#L72, SafEth.sol#L95, SafEth.sol#L172, SafEth.sol#L192 | SafEth.sol | 6 | for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
localTotalWeight += weights[i]; | true | false | false | 6 | |||||
c4 | 01-ondo | Bauer G | Gas | gas | ## 1.addKYCAddresses() and removeKYCAddresses() can be combined into one to save gas
KYCRegister.sol
Function call addKYCAddresses() and removeKYCAddresses() can be combined into one to save gas
```
function addKYCAddresses(
uint256 kycRequirementGroup,
address[] calldata addresses
) external onlyRole(kycG... | function addKYCAddresses(
uint256 kycRequirementGroup,
address[] calldata addresses
) external onlyRole(kycGroupRoles[kycRequirementGroup]) {
uint256 length = addresses.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++) {
kycState[kycRequirementGroup][addresses[i]] = true;
}
emit KYCAddresse... | function updateKYCAddresses(
uint256 kycRequirementGroup,
address[] calldata addresses,
bool v,
) external onlyRole(kycGroupRoles[kycRequirementGroup]) {
uint256 length = addresses.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++) {
kycState[kycRequirementGroup][addresses[i]] = v;
}
emit K... | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/Bauer-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:31.073650+00:00 | 601ba39695b3ecc17c51a2da75ae2a822d461187d87f83f174a102610208f910 | 2 | 0 | 1,140 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function addKYCAddresses(
uint256 kycRequirementGroup,
address[] calldata addresses
) external onlyRole(kycGroupRoles[kycRequirementGroup]) {
uint256 length = addresses.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++) {
kycState[kycRequirementGroup][addresses[i]] = true;
}
emit KYCAddressesA... | unknown | 755 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function addKYCAddresses(
uint256 kycRequirementGroup,
address[] calldata addresses
) external onlyRole(kycGroupRoles[kycRequirementGroup]) {
uint256 length = addresses.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++) {
kycState[kycRequirementGroup][addresses[i]] = true;
... | 2 | false | 0 | function addKYCAddresses(
uint256 kycRequirementGroup,
address[] calldata addresses
) external onlyRole(kycGroupRoles[kycRequirementGroup]) {
uint256 length = addresses.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++) {
kycState[kycRequirementGroup][addresses[i]] = true;
}
emit KYCAddresse... | true | function updateKYCAddresses(
uint256 kycRequirementGroup,
address[] calldata addresses,
bool v,
) external onlyRole(kycGroupRoles[kycRequirementGroup]) {
uint256 length = addresses.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++) {
kycState[kycRequirementGroup][addresses[i]] = v;
}
emit K... | true | true | 6.78 | |||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | Rolezn G | High | high | ## Summary<a name="Summary">
### Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Contexts|Estimated Gas Saved|
|-|:-|:-|:-:|
| [GAS‑1](#GAS‑1) | `abi.encode()` is less efficient than `abi.encodepacked()` | 5 | 500 |
| [GAS‑2](#GAS‑2) | State variables only set in the `constructor` should be declared immutable |... | 136: return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_SEPARATOR_TYPEHASH, getChainId(), this)); | 431: abi.encode( | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/Rolezn-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:17.004532+00:00 | 602d85521af9a896443bcf5621f0f6672b04f1f2e0d3b1d7d5e3324890b8a7e3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | 136: return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_SEPARATOR_TYPEHASH, getChainId(), this)); | true | 431: abi.encode( | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 06-lybra | Sathish9098 G | High | high | # GAS OPTIMIZATION
## TABLE OF CONTENTS
Total Gas saved from all findings - ``68800 GAS``
### FINDINGS
- [Optimizing gas consumption with tight variable packing- Saves ``20000 GAS , 10 SLOTS``](#g-1-optimizing-gas-consumption-with-tight-variable-packing)
- [ ``EUSDMiningIncentives.sol``: ``duration ,finishAt, up... | ### ``LybraConfigurator.sol``: ``redemptionFee ,flashloanFee ,maxStableRatio `` can be uint94 instead of uint256. Saves ``6000 GAS, 3 SLOT``
- ``redemptionFee`` is not exceeds`` 500`` because of this check ``require(newFee <= 500, "Max Redemption Fee is 5%");``
- ``flashloanFee `` is not exceeds ``10_000`` because of... | ### ``ProtocolRewardsPool.sol``: ``grabFeeRatio`` can be uint94 instead of uint256 since the value not exceeds ``8000 `` as per this check ``require(_ratio <= 8000, "BCE");`` : Saves ``2000 GAS, 1 SLOD``
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra/blob/7b73ef2fbb542b569e182d9abf79be643ca883ee/contracts/lybra/miner/Pro... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/Sathish9098-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:22:44.019554+00:00 | 608c17617956b9f004dbe0ef38224bd6b7c14e1caabac9e5a86006b3e51d152a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | LybraConfigurator.sol#L49-L61, ProtocolRewardsPool.sol#L27-L41 | LybraConfigurator.sol, ProtocolRewardsPool.sol | 2 | ### ``LybraConfigurator.sol``: ``redemptionFee ,flashloanFee ,maxStableRatio `` can be uint94 instead of uint256. Saves ``6000 GAS, 3 SLOT``
- ``redemptionFee`` is not exceeds`` 500`` because of this check ``require(newFee <= 500, "Max Redemption Fee is 5%");``
- ``flashloanFee `` is not exceeds ``10_000`` because of... | true | ### ``ProtocolRewardsPool.sol``: ``grabFeeRatio`` can be uint94 instead of uint256 since the value not exceeds ``8000 `` as per this check ``require(_ratio <= 8000, "BCE");`` : Saves ``2000 GAS, 1 SLOD``
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra/blob/7b73ef2fbb542b569e182d9abf79be643ca883ee/contracts/lybra/miner/Pro... | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 01-ondo | saneryee G | Medium | medium | # Gas Optimizations Report
| | Issue | Instances |
| ------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :-------: |
| [G-001] ... | 792: totalCashAmountRefunded += cashAmountBurned; | 649: currentRedeemAmount += amount; | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/saneryee-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:30.454551+00:00 | 60a090e882f41996ae0c4e10271f7a7078eaae602af2f2c1211ee751e77fdf89 | 1 | 1 | 52 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | 792: totalCashAmountRefunded += cashAmountBurned; | solidity | 52 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
792: totalCashAmountRefunded += cashAmountBurned; | 1 | false | 792: totalCashAmountRefunded += cashAmountBurned; | CashManager.sol#L792 | CashManager.sol | 1 | 792: totalCashAmountRefunded += cashAmountBurned; | true | 649: currentRedeemAmount += amount; | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | 0xWagmi Q | Critical | critical |
| Letter | Name | Description |
|:--:|:-------:|:-------:|
| L | Low risk | Potential risk |
| NC | Non-critical | Non risky findings |
| R | Refactor | Changing the code |
| O | Ordinary | Often found issues |
| Total Found Issues | 10 |
|:--:|:--:|
### Non-Critical
| Count | Explanation | Instances |
|:--:|:... | - bool public pauseStaking; // true if staking is paused
- bool public pauseUnstaking; // true if unstaking is pause | uint256 private constant notpaused = 1 ;
uint256 private constant paused = 2;
uint256 private stakelock ;
uint256 private unstakelock ; | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/0xWagmi-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:38.241366+00:00 | 60e466df92a8e6d03d1544aa6ba8beb5d31fad60ae182348761b936ec7d7ba8b | 4 | 0 | 562 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | - bool public pauseStaking; // true if staking is paused
- bool public pauseUnstaking; // true if unstaking is pause | js | 123 | // Code block 1 (js):
- bool public pauseStaking; // true if staking is paused
- bool public pauseUnstaking; // true if unstaking is pause
// Code block 2 (js):
uint256 private constant notpaused = 1 ;
uint256 private constant paused = 2;
uint256 private stakelock ;
uint256 private unstakelock ;
//... | 4 | false | 0 | - bool public pauseStaking; // true if staking is paused
- bool public pauseUnstaking; // true if unstaking is pause | true | uint256 private constant notpaused = 1 ;
uint256 private constant paused = 2;
uint256 private stakelock ;
uint256 private unstakelock ; | true | true | 9 | |||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | Bnke0x0 Q | Critical | critical |
### [L01] require() should be used instead of assert()
#### Findings:
```
2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/Proxy.sol::16 => assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1));
2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/common/Singleto... | 2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/Proxy.sol::16 => assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1));
2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/common/Singleton.sol::13 => assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconom... | 2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::112 => owner = _newOwner;
2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::172 => owner = _owner;
2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountFactory.sol::19 => _defaultImpl = _baseImpl;
2023-01-biconomy... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/Bnke0x0-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:12:59.027900+00:00 | 610162e9bc861900865a59fa7b682d24b4efe74d809820fe8a28dcfdcc88f714 | 3 | 0 | 1,239 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | 2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/Proxy.sol::16 => assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1));
2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/common/Singleton.sol::13 => assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconom... | unknown | 356 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/Proxy.sol::16 => assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1));
2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/common/Singleton.sol::13 => assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32... | 3 | false | 0 | 2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/Proxy.sol::16 => assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1));
2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/common/Singleton.sol::13 => assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconom... | true | 2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::112 => owner = _newOwner;
2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::172 => owner = _owner;
2023-01-biconomy-main/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountFactory.sol::19 => _defaultImpl = _baseImpl;
2023-01-biconomy... | true | true | 8 | |||||
c4 | 11-kelp | JCK G | Low | low |
## Gas Optimizations
| Number | Issue | Instances |
|--------|-------|-----------|
|[G-01]| Use a do while loop instead of a for loop | 4 | |
|[G-02]| Don’t cache calls that are only used once | 8 | |
|[G-03]| Possible Optimizations in LRTConfig.sol | 4 | |
|[G-04]| Do not cache immutable values | ... | file: blob/main/src/NodeDelegator.sol
109 for (uint256 i = 0; i < strategiesLength;) {
| file: blob/main/src/LRTDepositPool.sol
82 for (uint256 i; i < ndcsCount;) {
168 for (uint256 i; i < length;) {
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/JCK-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:29.564591+00:00 | 6184559ec93d68057534e35ce73de6221ecd9fffba422d54c047db3461ed9478 | 4 | 4 | 448 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | file: blob/main/src/NodeDelegator.sol
109 for (uint256 i = 0; i < strategiesLength;) { | solidity | 89 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
file: blob/main/src/NodeDelegator.sol
109 for (uint256 i = 0; i < strategiesLength;) {
// Code block 2 (solidity):
file: blob/main/src/LRTDepositPool.sol
82 for (uint256 i; i < ndcsCount;) {
168 for (uint256 i; i < length;) {
// Code block 3 (solidity):
file: blob/main/src/LRTOracl... | 4 | false | file: blob/main/src/NodeDelegator.sol
109 for (uint256 i = 0; i < strategiesLength;) {
file: blob/main/src/LRTDepositPool.sol
82 for (uint256 i; i < ndcsCount;) {
168 for (uint256 i; i < length;) {
file: blob/main/src/LRTOracle.sol
66 for (uint16 asset_idx; asset_idx < supportedAssetCount;) {
file: blob/ma... | NodeDelegator.sol#L109, LRTDepositPool.sol#L82, LRTOracle.sol#L66 | NodeDelegator.sol, LRTDepositPool.sol, LRTOracle.sol | 3 | file: blob/main/src/NodeDelegator.sol
109 for (uint256 i = 0; i < strategiesLength;) {
| true | file: blob/main/src/LRTDepositPool.sol
82 for (uint256 i; i < ndcsCount;) {
168 for (uint256 i; i < length;) {
| true | true | 10 | ||
c4 | 01-biconomy | Dinesh11G Q | Low | low | ### Unspecific Compiler Version Pragma
#### Impact
Issue Information:
Avoid floating pragmas for non-library contracts.
While floating pragmas make sense for libraries to allow them to be included with multiple different versions of applications, it may be a security risk for application implementations.
A known vu... | 2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/BaseAccount.sol::2 => pragma solidity ^0.8.12;
2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/BasePaymaster.sol::2 => pragma solidity ^0.8.12;
2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/c... | upgrade | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/Dinesh11G-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:04.001501+00:00 | 6187a5398c9a35fc108cfe477b993e284db602eaa49716ffba7b5edb37dcab6c | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | 2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/BaseAccount.sol::2 => pragma solidity ^0.8.12;
2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/BasePaymaster.sol::2 => pragma solidity ^0.8.12;
2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/c... | true | false | false | 4 | ||||||||||
c4 | 03-revert-lend | 0xGreyWolf Q | Unknown | unknown | # Custom errors and revert statement was only introduced in Solidity version 0.8.4 but contracts use ^0.8.0
## Description
The `revert-error` pattern cannot be implemented until the introduction of custom error and revert statements in Solidity version `0.8.4`. These contracts will not compile in Solidity versions 0.8... | if(msg.sender != owner) revert Unauthorized; | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/blob/main/data/0xGreyWolf-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:52.588448+00:00 | 61979e9cdfa5d74310f6127b771a6a9727b7c243db7666163fbfb8455f7b3ce1 | 1 | 1 | 44 | 0 | false | true | true | false | medium | if(msg.sender != owner) revert Unauthorized; | solidity | 44 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
if(msg.sender != owner) revert Unauthorized; | 1 | false | if(msg.sender != owner) revert Unauthorized; | 0 | if(msg.sender != owner) revert Unauthorized; | true | false | false | 3.33 | ||||||
c4 | 05-ajna | GG_Security Q | Medium | medium | ## [L-01] Hardcoded Ajna token address is a bad practice
[https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/main/ajna-grants/src/grants/base/Funding.sol#L21](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/main/ajna-grants/src/grants/base/Funding.sol#L21)
```
address public immutable ajnaTokenAddress = 0x9a96ec9B57Fb64F... | address public immutable ajnaTokenAddress = 0x9a96ec9B57Fb64FbC60B423d1f4da7691Bd35079; | if(block.number < _getChallengeStageEndBlock(currentDistribution.endBlock))` | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/GG_Security-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:58.886147+00:00 | 61b9ebd85128bf3c332152eee022a38319d6aa0f8987a53aae514b10ac8383a7 | 4 | 0 | 615 | 5 | false | false | true | false | high | address public immutable ajnaTokenAddress = 0x9a96ec9B57Fb64FbC60B423d1f4da7691Bd35079; | unknown | 87 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
address public immutable ajnaTokenAddress = 0x9a96ec9B57Fb64FbC60B423d1f4da7691Bd35079;
// Code block 2 (unknown):
if(block.number < _getChallengeStageEndBlock(currentDistribution.endBlock))`
// Code block 3 (unknown):
toBucket.lpsAtStakeTime = uint128(positionManager.getLP(tokenId_, toInd... | 4 | false | Funding.sol#L21, StandardFunding.sol#L245, RewardsManager.sol#L179-L180, RewardsManager.sol#L235-L241, PositionManager.sol#L262-L333 | RewardsManager.sol, Funding.sol, StandardFunding.sol, PositionManager.sol | 5 | address public immutable ajnaTokenAddress = 0x9a96ec9B57Fb64FbC60B423d1f4da7691Bd35079; | true | if(block.number < _getChallengeStageEndBlock(currentDistribution.endBlock))` | true | true | 10 | |||
c4 | 05-ajna | hals Q | Low | low | # Low/QA
## [QA-01]
Different solidity versions and different license were spotted in the smart contracts.
## Proof of Concept
Instances: 2
```solidity
File: ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
File: ajna-core/src/PositionManager.sol.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity 0.8.14;
```
```solidity
F... | File: ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
File: ajna-core/src/PositionManager.sol.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity 0.8.14; | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/ExtraordinaryFunding.sol
File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/StandardFunding.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.16; | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/hals-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:28.842944+00:00 | 61ba5d8b6007f977a62cd21f05a23153226ecfa07eb95cc5bfe7ccac797cac2b | 3 | 3 | 434 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | File: ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
File: ajna-core/src/PositionManager.sol.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity 0.8.14; | solidity | 144 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
File: ajna-core/src/PositionManager.sol.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity 0.8.14;
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/ExtraordinaryFunding.sol
File: ajna-grant... | 3 | false | File: ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
File: ajna-core/src/PositionManager.sol.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity 0.8.14;
File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/ExtraordinaryFunding.sol
File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/StandardFunding.sol
// SPDX-License-I... | 0 | File: ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
File: ajna-core/src/PositionManager.sol.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
pragma solidity 0.8.14; | true | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/ExtraordinaryFunding.sol
File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/StandardFunding.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.16; | true | true | 7.24 | ||||
c4 | 01-ondo | joestakey Q | Critical | critical | ## Summary
### Low Risk
| | Issue |
|------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| L-01 | CashManager.cash should not be immutable |
| L-02 | Additional ... | 43: Cash public immutable cash | 375: epochToExchangeRate[epochToSet] = correctExchangeRate; | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/joestakey-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:15.220397+00:00 | 61c5dc5ed740ac0f4b12fc87deea329e50c7da7c5023dde63b7a91e5e0f77e4f | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | 43: Cash public immutable cash | true | 375: epochToExchangeRate[epochToSet] = correctExchangeRate; | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 02-ethos | cryptonue Q | Critical | critical | # Tellor delay period of suggested to be 15 minutes instead of 20 minutes
In a case where Chainlink is unable to respond price query, Tellor will be use as an alternative. Due to recent issue of Liquity on Tellor response is possible to be disputed resulting in bad price return, the Tellor provide a failsafe of immuta... | File: PriceFeed.sol
140: // Admin function to update the Chainlink aggregator address for a particular collateral.
141: //
142: // !!!PLEASE USE EXTREME CARE AND CAUTION!!!
143: function updateChainlinkAggregator(
144: address _collateral,
145: address _priceAggregatorAddress
146: ) ... | File: CommunityIssuance.sol
120: function updateDistributionPeriod(uint256 _newDistributionPeriod) external onlyOwner {
121: distributionPeriod = _newDistributionPeriod;
122: } | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/cryptonue-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:00.234327+00:00 | 61c847f069bf97ff6a6af6ca2eeb8ce78a5841c655ce3992eabbe75b084d6993 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: PriceFeed.sol
140: // Admin function to update the Chainlink aggregator address for a particular collateral.
141: //
142: // !!!PLEASE USE EXTREME CARE AND CAUTION!!!
143: function updateChainlinkAggregator(
144: address _collateral,
145: address _priceAggregatorAddress
146: ) ... | true | File: CommunityIssuance.sol
120: function updateDistributionPeriod(uint256 _newDistributionPeriod) external onlyOwner {
121: distributionPeriod = _newDistributionPeriod;
122: } | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 08-dopex | Rickard Q | Low | low | # [L-01] Redundant Usage of `SafeMath` Library in Solidity 0.8.19
## Lines of code
[https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex/blob/main/contracts/amo/UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol#L29](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex/blob/main/contracts/amo/UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol#L29)
[https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-0... | function sortTokens(address tokenA, address tokenB) internal pure returns (address token0, address token1) {
require(tokenA != tokenB, "IDENTICAL_ADDRESSES");
(token0, token1) = tokenA < tokenB ? (tokenA, tokenB) : (tokenB, tokenA);
require(token0 != address(0), "ZERO_ADDRESS");
//@audit-issue M:should ... | function sortTokens(address tokenA, address tokenB) internal pure returns (address token0, address token1) {
require(tokenA != tokenB, "IDENTICAL_ADDRESSES");
(token0, token1) = tokenA < tokenB ? (tokenA, tokenB) : (tokenB, tokenA);
require(token0 != address(0), "ZERO_ADDRESS");
require(token1 != addres... | overflow | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/Rickard-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:59.131472+00:00 | 61e343768d3fc9570d5185bb2a3f27302e706befbcea3b86f70b28350dc1a0ed | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol#L29, UniV2LiquidityAmo.sol#L24, ReLPContract.sol#L27, UniswapV2Library.sol#L16-L23 | ReLPContract.sol, UniV2LiquidityAmo.sol, UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol, UniswapV2Library.sol | 4 | function sortTokens(address tokenA, address tokenB) internal pure returns (address token0, address token1) {
require(tokenA != tokenB, "IDENTICAL_ADDRESSES");
(token0, token1) = tokenA < tokenB ? (tokenA, tokenB) : (tokenB, tokenA);
require(token0 != address(0), "ZERO_ADDRESS");
//@audit-issue M:should ... | true | function sortTokens(address tokenA, address tokenB) internal pure returns (address token0, address token1) {
require(tokenA != tokenB, "IDENTICAL_ADDRESSES");
(token0, token1) = tokenA < tokenB ? (tokenA, tokenB) : (tokenB, tokenA);
require(token0 != address(0), "ZERO_ADDRESS");
require(token1 != addres... | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 01-ondo | 2997ms Q | Critical | critical | ## Summary
### Low Risk Issues
| | Issue |
| ----- | :--------------------------------------- |
| LOW-01 | The divisor may be 0 |
| LOW-02| Validate the ```cash decimals >= collateral decimals.``` |
### Non-critical Issues
| | Issue ... | In the annotation, we assume ````cash decimals >= collateral decimals```, but actually we need one line to validate it.
**Proof Of Concept**
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/main/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol#L178-L182
**Recommended Mitigation Steps**
Validate the cash decimals >= collateral decima... | **Recommended Mitigation Steps**
Add code like this; if (mintFee ==_mintFee);
### [NC-05] Check the Address 0 | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/2997ms-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:25.226653+00:00 | 61f3d5174f1f653ac8573f9e192d557af66b930b8c3f3176f6119ac0b2193b82 | 1 | 0 | 28 | 5 | false | false | true | false | high | In the annotation, we assume | unknown | 28 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
In the annotation, we assume | 1 | false | CashManager.sol#L176, CashManager.sol#L178-L182, KYCRegistry.sol#L87, CTokenModified.sol#L573-L574, cErc20ModifiedDelegator.sol | CashManager.sol, cErc20ModifiedDelegator.sol, KYCRegistry.sol, CTokenModified.sol | 5 | In the annotation, we assume ````cash decimals >= collateral decimals```, but actually we need one line to validate it.
**Proof Of Concept**
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/main/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol#L178-L182
**Recommended Mitigation Steps**
Validate the cash decimals >= collateral decima... | true | **Recommended Mitigation Steps**
Add code like this; if (mintFee ==_mintFee);
### [NC-05] Check the Address 0 | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | Logesh_N Q | Medium | medium | ## The code which does not follow the best practice of `Check-Effects-Interaction`
The code should adhere to the best practice known as *check-effects-interaction*, ensuring that state variables are modified before any *external calls* are executed. This approach effectively mitigates a wide range of *reentrancy vul... | File: src/AiArenaHelper.sol
/// @audit The cumulative probability is updated within a loop, following the check-effects-interaction pattern.
179: cumProb += attrProbabilities[i]; | File: src/FighterFarm.sol
/// @audit The 'generation' array is incremented for the specified 'fighterType' in 'incrementGeneration()' before certain assignments.
131: generation[fighterType] += 1;
/// @audit The 'maxRerollsAllowed' array is incremented for the specified 'fighterType' in 'incrementGener... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/Logesh_N-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:31.806524+00:00 | 620ba9af714ade33d6a18a5e5745ac136b09231c68eff47f42be8b07adc1b7ce | 2 | 0 | 1,311 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | File: src/AiArenaHelper.sol
/// @audit The cumulative probability is updated within a loop, following the check-effects-interaction pattern.
179: cumProb += attrProbabilities[i]; | javascript | 196 | // Code block 1 (javascript):
File: src/AiArenaHelper.sol
/// @audit The cumulative probability is updated within a loop, following the check-effects-interaction pattern.
179: cumProb += attrProbabilities[i];
// Code block 2 (javascript):
File: src/FighterFarm.sol
/// @audit The 'generation' array i... | 2 | false | AiArenaHelper.sol#L179, FighterFarm.sol#L131 | AiArenaHelper.sol, FighterFarm.sol | 2 | File: src/AiArenaHelper.sol
/// @audit The cumulative probability is updated within a loop, following the check-effects-interaction pattern.
179: cumProb += attrProbabilities[i]; | true | File: src/FighterFarm.sol
/// @audit The 'generation' array is incremented for the specified 'fighterType' in 'incrementGeneration()' before certain assignments.
131: generation[fighterType] += 1;
/// @audit The 'maxRerollsAllowed' array is incremented for the specified 'fighterType' in 'incrementGener... | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 06-lybra | mgf15 Q | Critical | critical | ## Summary
Low Issues , Non Critical
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [Low-1](#Low-1) | Unsafe ERC20 operation(s) | 32 |
| [Low-2](#Low-2) | The `owner` is a single point of failure and a centralization risk | 16 |
| [Low-4](#Low-4) | Void constructor | 2 |
| [Low-5](#Low-5) | `Keccak` Constant values should used to `... | File:2023-06-lybra/blob/main/contracts/lybra/pools/LybraWstETHVault.sol
35: lido.approve(address(collateralAsset), msg.value); | File:2023-06-lybra/blob/main/contracts/lybra/pools/LybraStETHVault.sol
70: bool success = EUSD.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(configurator), income);
85: bool success = EUSD.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(configurator), payAmount);
93: collateralAsset.transfer(msg.sender, realAmount); | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/mgf15-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:10.008245+00:00 | 62822293b375228511a220d8dec166597b1fef60a85e03295917a6f5c9f35687 | 1 | 1 | 133 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File:2023-06-lybra/blob/main/contracts/lybra/pools/LybraWstETHVault.sol
35: lido.approve(address(collateralAsset), msg.value); | solidity | 133 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File:2023-06-lybra/blob/main/contracts/lybra/pools/LybraWstETHVault.sol
35: lido.approve(address(collateralAsset), msg.value); | 1 | false | File:2023-06-lybra/blob/main/contracts/lybra/pools/LybraWstETHVault.sol
35: lido.approve(address(collateralAsset), msg.value); | LybraWstETHVault.sol#L35 | LybraWstETHVault.sol | 1 | File:2023-06-lybra/blob/main/contracts/lybra/pools/LybraWstETHVault.sol
35: lido.approve(address(collateralAsset), msg.value); | true | File:2023-06-lybra/blob/main/contracts/lybra/pools/LybraStETHVault.sol
70: bool success = EUSD.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(configurator), income);
85: bool success = EUSD.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(configurator), payAmount);
93: collateralAsset.transfer(msg.sender, realAmount); | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | BRONZEDISC Q | Medium | medium | ## QA
---
### Function Visibility [1]
- Order of Functions: Ordering helps readers identify which functions they can call and to find the constructor and fallback definitions easier. Functions should be grouped according to their visibility and ordered: constructor, receive function (if exists), fallback function (if... | // receive function should come before all the other functions
246: receive() external payable {} | // public functions coming after external ones
44: function name() public pure returns (string memory) {
111: function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
122: function balance() public view returns (uint256) {
// receive function should come before all the other functions
126: ... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/BRONZEDISC-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:52.592376+00:00 | 62aeead7e574bb4a41007971d0b5acd39765eefdc64d0cfef87290bbc82954d2 | 3 | 3 | 995 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | // receive function should come before all the other functions
246: receive() external payable {} | solidity | 100 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
// receive function should come before all the other functions
246: receive() external payable {}
// Code block 2 (solidity):
// public functions coming after external ones
44: function name() public pure returns (string memory) {
111: function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) pub... | 3 | false | // receive function should come before all the other functions
246: receive() external payable {}
// public functions coming after external ones
44: function name() public pure returns (string memory) {
111: function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
122: function balance() ... | SafEth.sol, SfrxEth.sol, Reth.sol | SfrxEth.sol, Reth.sol, SafEth.sol | 3 | // receive function should come before all the other functions
246: receive() external payable {} | true | // public functions coming after external ones
44: function name() public pure returns (string memory) {
111: function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
122: function balance() public view returns (uint256) {
// receive function should come before all the other functions
126: ... | true | true | 9 | ||
c4 | 01-biconomy | 0x73696d616f Q | Low | low | # [L-01] Ownership transferral should be implemented in 2 steps
## SmartAccount.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L109
## Description
The function `setOwner(args...)` should be done in a 2 step process.
```
function setOwn... | function setOwner(address _newOwner) external mixedAuth {
require(_newOwner != address(0), "Smart Account:: new Signatory address cannot be zero");
address oldOwner = owner;
owner = _newOwner;
emit EOAChanged(address(this), oldOwner, _newOwner);
} | function setPendingOwner(address _newOwner) external mixedAuth {
require(_newOwner != address(0), "Smart Account:: new Signatory address cannot be zero");
pendingOwner = _newOwner;
}
function acceptOwnership() external {
require(msg.sender == pendingOwner, "not pending owner");
... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/0x73696d616f-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:12:45.858642+00:00 | 62bb259027d1675a8e5e996ab1ac2b734aafe741df339252a9205cdb78d0477c | 2 | 0 | 756 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | function setOwner(address _newOwner) external mixedAuth {
require(_newOwner != address(0), "Smart Account:: new Signatory address cannot be zero");
address oldOwner = owner;
owner = _newOwner;
emit EOAChanged(address(this), oldOwner, _newOwner);
} | unknown | 283 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function setOwner(address _newOwner) external mixedAuth {
require(_newOwner != address(0), "Smart Account:: new Signatory address cannot be zero");
address oldOwner = owner;
owner = _newOwner;
emit EOAChanged(address(this), oldOwner, _newOwner);
}
// Code ... | 2 | false | SmartAccount.sol#L109, SmartAccountFactory.sol#L53, SmartAccountFactory.sol#L33 | SmartAccount.sol, SmartAccountFactory.sol | 3 | function setOwner(address _newOwner) external mixedAuth {
require(_newOwner != address(0), "Smart Account:: new Signatory address cannot be zero");
address oldOwner = owner;
owner = _newOwner;
emit EOAChanged(address(this), oldOwner, _newOwner);
} | true | function setPendingOwner(address _newOwner) external mixedAuth {
require(_newOwner != address(0), "Smart Account:: new Signatory address cannot be zero");
pendingOwner = _newOwner;
}
function acceptOwnership() external {
require(msg.sender == pendingOwner, "not pending owner");
... | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | AlexCzm Q | Medium | medium | ### L-01 `attributeProbabilities` are set twice in AiArenaHelper constructor;
Remove `addAttributeProbabilities()` [function call](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/cd1a0e6d1b40168657d1aaee8223dc050e15f8cc/src/AiArenaHelper.sol#L45) from `AiArenaHelper` constructor.
```solidity
constructor(uint... | constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) {
_ownerAddress = msg.sender;
// Initialize the probabilities for each attribute
addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);// @audit-qa remove this function call
uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
for (uint8 i = 0; i ... | enum battleResult {
invalidResult,
won,
tie,
lost
}
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/cd1a0e6d1b40168657d1aaee8223dc050e15f8cc/src/RankedBattle.sol#L440
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/cd1a0e6d1b40168657d1aaee8223dc050e15f8cc/src/RankedBatt... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/AlexCzm-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:13.835090+00:00 | 62c9a0359e9025b8448db15331c5e4a2f39c34a44e30d52f2ae86298c799dae4 | 1 | 1 | 551 | 6 | false | false | true | false | high | constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) {
_ownerAddress = msg.sender;
// Initialize the probabilities for each attribute
addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);// @audit-qa remove this function call
uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
for (uint8 i = 0; i < at... | solidity | 551 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) {
_ownerAddress = msg.sender;
// Initialize the probabilities for each attribute
addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);// @audit-qa remove this function call
uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
... | 1 | false | constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) {
_ownerAddress = msg.sender;
// Initialize the probabilities for each attribute
addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);// @audit-qa remove this function call
uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
for (uint8 i = 0; i < at... | AiArenaHelper.sol#L45, Neuron.sol#L163-L165, Neuron.sol#L156, RankedBattle.sol#L286, RankedBattle.sol#L440, RankedBattle.sol#L505-L513 | Neuron.sol, AiArenaHelper.sol, RankedBattle.sol | 6 | constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) {
_ownerAddress = msg.sender;
// Initialize the probabilities for each attribute
addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);// @audit-qa remove this function call
uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
for (uint8 i = 0; i ... | true | enum battleResult {
invalidResult,
won,
tie,
lost
}
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/cd1a0e6d1b40168657d1aaee8223dc050e15f8cc/src/RankedBattle.sol#L440
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/cd1a0e6d1b40168657d1aaee8223dc050e15f8cc/src/RankedBatt... | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 10-badger | JCK G | Medium | medium | ## Gas Optimizations
| Number | Issue | Instances | Total gas saved |
|--------|-------|-----------|-----------------|
|[G-01]| Pack structs by putting data types that can fit together next to each other | 8 | 16000 |
|[G-02]| Possible Optimization 1 | 8 | |
|[G-03]| Possible Optimization 2 | 3 | |
|[G-04]|... | file: main/packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
97 struct MoveTokensParams {
address user;
uint256 collSharesChange;
uint256 collAddUnderlying; // ONLY for isCollIncrease=true
bool isCollIncrease;
uint256 netDebtChange;
bool isDebtIncrease;
}
| file: main/packages/contracts/contracts/LeverageMacroBase.sol
268 struct SwapOperation {
// Swap Data
address tokenForSwap;
address addressForApprove;
uint256 exactApproveAmount;
address addressForSwap;
bytes calldataForSwap;
SwapCheck[] swapChecks; // Empty to... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/JCK-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:32.316425+00:00 | 62fba8d8022a547133e71f3a12e8bc23fdf91013f4c90a4b3861d07297de1fc3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | file: main/packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
97 struct MoveTokensParams {
address user;
uint256 collSharesChange;
uint256 collAddUnderlying; // ONLY for isCollIncrease=true
bool isCollIncrease;
uint256 netDebtChange;
bool isDebtIncrease;
}
| true | file: main/packages/contracts/contracts/LeverageMacroBase.sol
268 struct SwapOperation {
// Swap Data
address tokenForSwap;
address addressForApprove;
uint256 exactApproveAmount;
address addressForSwap;
bytes calldataForSwap;
SwapCheck[] swapChecks; // Empty to... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | bshramin G | High | high | # GR1 - Fail fast(I)
In the eth router contract we should change this check:
```solidity
if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
revert DeadlinePassed();
}
```
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/EthRouter.sol#L101
to this:
```solidity
if (deadline != 0 && block.timestamp > deadli... | if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
revert DeadlinePassed();
} | if (deadline != 0 && block.timestamp > deadline) {
revert DeadlinePassed();
} | upgrade | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/bshramin-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:18.700448+00:00 | 63436c05ae07ffc3a6c93a48c08e5db269e4aac7296d4c4bea098a4e51f4727d | 4 | 4 | 280 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
revert DeadlinePassed();
} | solidity | 81 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
revert DeadlinePassed();
}
// Code block 2 (solidity):
if (deadline != 0 && block.timestamp > deadline) {
revert DeadlinePassed();
}
// Code block 3 (solidity):
if (baseToken != address(0) && msg.value > 0) revert InvalidEthAmount(... | 4 | false | if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
revert DeadlinePassed();
}
if (deadline != 0 && block.timestamp > deadline) {
revert DeadlinePassed();
}
if (baseToken != address(0) && msg.value > 0) revert InvalidEthAmount();
if (_feeRate > 5_000) revert FeeRateTooHigh(); | EthRouter.sol#L101, PrivatePool.sol#L225, PrivatePool.sol#L172 | EthRouter.sol, PrivatePool.sol | 3 | if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
revert DeadlinePassed();
} | true | if (deadline != 0 && block.timestamp > deadline) {
revert DeadlinePassed();
} | true | true | 9.46 | ||
c4 | 01-biconomy | 0xhacksmithh G | High | high | ### [Gas-01] Should Use ```require()``` Instead of ```assert()```
when assert() executed, it revert all state variable change and consume all remaining gas
when require() executed, it reverts all state variable change and return all remaining gas to caller
From gas saving perspective its recommended to use require() i... | when assert() executed, it revert all state variable change and consume all remaining gas
when require() executed, it reverts all state variable change and return all remaining gas to caller
From gas saving perspective its recommended to use require() instead of assert()
*Instances(2)* | ```solidity
File: common/Singleton.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/common/Singleton.sol#L13 | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/0xhacksmithh-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:12:50.403351+00:00 | 63bbe82bcfed8e009b8b16fafd5a0af0794d28a4349e157eb4699f280a2c9f9e | 3 | 0 | 315 | 10 | false | false | true | false | high | when assert() executed, it revert all state variable change and consume all remaining gas
when require() executed, it reverts all state variable change and return all remaining gas to caller
From gas saving perspective its recommended to use require() instead of assert()
*Instances(2)* | unknown | 288 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
when assert() executed, it revert all state variable change and consume all remaining gas
when require() executed, it reverts all state variable change and return all remaining gas to caller
From gas saving perspective its recommended to use require() instead of assert()
*Instances(2)*
// ... | 3 | false | Proxy.sol#L16, Singleton.sol#L13, SmartAccount.sol#L449-L453, SmartAccount.sol#L455-L458, SmartAccount.sol#L460-L463, SmartAccount.sol#L465-L473, SmartAccount.sol#L536-L538, BasePaymaster.sol#L67, BasePaymaster.sol#L75, BasePaymaster.sol#L90 | SmartAccount.sol, Proxy.sol, BasePaymaster.sol, Singleton.sol | 10 | when assert() executed, it revert all state variable change and consume all remaining gas
when require() executed, it reverts all state variable change and return all remaining gas to caller
From gas saving perspective its recommended to use require() instead of assert()
*Instances(2)* | true | ```solidity
File: common/Singleton.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/common/Singleton.sol#L13 | true | true | 9 | |||
c4 | 02-ethos | dec3ntraliz3d Q | Low | low | ## QA Report
## N-01
Remove unnecessary type casting in the constructor parameters of ReaperVaultV2.sol
## Summary
In ReaperVaultV2.sol, the constructor takes several input parameters, including _name and _symbol, which are of type string. In the current implementation, these parameters are being unnecessarily cast... | constructor(
address _token,
string memory _name,
string memory _symbol,
uint256 _tvlCap,
address _treasury,
address[] memory _strategists,
address[] memory _multisigRoles
) ERC20(_name, _symbol) {
// rest of the constructor code
}
| function increaseLUSDDebt(address _collateral, uint _amount) external override {
_requireValidCollateralAddress(_collateral);
_requireCallerIsBOorTroveM();
LUSDDebt[_collateral] = LUSDDebt[_collateral].add(_amount);
ActivePoolLUSDDebtUpdated(_collateral, LUSDDebt[_collateral]);
} | upgrade | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/dec3ntraliz3d-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:04.209433+00:00 | 63fe600f52ec850168b8224a84221587550951e80021e230bb11816c32d48b19 | 2 | 1 | 579 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | constructor(
address _token,
string memory _name,
string memory _symbol,
uint256 _tvlCap,
address _treasury,
address[] memory _strategists,
address[] memory _multisigRoles
) ERC20(_name, _symbol) {
// rest of the constructor code
} | solidity | 263 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
constructor(
address _token,
string memory _name,
string memory _symbol,
uint256 _tvlCap,
address _treasury,
address[] memory _strategists,
address[] memory _multisigRoles
) ERC20(_name, _symbol) {
// rest of the constructor code
}
// Code block 2 (unknown):
... | 2 | false | constructor(
address _token,
string memory _name,
string memory _symbol,
uint256 _tvlCap,
address _treasury,
address[] memory _strategists,
address[] memory _multisigRoles
) ERC20(_name, _symbol) {
// rest of the constructor code
} | ReaperVaultV2.sol#L111-L119, ActivePool.sol#L190-L202 | ReaperVaultV2.sol, ActivePool.sol | 2 | constructor(
address _token,
string memory _name,
string memory _symbol,
uint256 _tvlCap,
address _treasury,
address[] memory _strategists,
address[] memory _multisigRoles
) ERC20(_name, _symbol) {
// rest of the constructor code
}
| true | function increaseLUSDDebt(address _collateral, uint _amount) external override {
_requireValidCollateralAddress(_collateral);
_requireCallerIsBOorTroveM();
LUSDDebt[_collateral] = LUSDDebt[_collateral].add(_amount);
ActivePoolLUSDDebtUpdated(_collateral, LUSDDebt[_collateral]);
} | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 05-ajna | petrichor G | Medium | medium | # Summary
## Gas Optimization
| No | Issue | Instances |
|------- | ------- | ------- |
| [G-01] | Structs can be packed into fewer storage slots | 1 | - |
| [G-02] | Use hardcode address instead address(this) | 4 | - |
| [G-03] | Do not calculate constants | 4 | - |
| [G-04] | Use bitmaps to save... | 110 struct QuarterlyDistribution {
uint24 id;
uint48 startBlock;
uint48 endBlock;
uint128 fundsAvailable;
uint256 fundingVotePowerCast;
bytes32 fundedSlateHash;
} | File: /ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
250 IERC721(address(positionManager)).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), tokenId_);
## [G-4] Use bitmaps to save gas
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/petrichor-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:43.050148+00:00 | 6417b0021a80adc83d15dce7184ddef7aaa5f0df1eac4ac8332022050ee45be1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | 110 struct QuarterlyDistribution {
uint24 id;
uint48 startBlock;
uint48 endBlock;
uint128 fundsAvailable;
uint256 fundingVotePowerCast;
bytes32 fundedSlateHash;
} | true | File: /ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
250 IERC721(address(positionManager)).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), tokenId_);
## [G-4] Use bitmaps to save gas
| true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | Brenzee Q | Critical | critical | # Summary
## Low Risk issues
| | Issue | Instances |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------... | function deposit(uint256[] calldata tokenIds, uint256 baseTokenAmount) public payable onlyOwner | function sumWeightsAndValidateProof(
uint256[] memory tokenIds,
uint256[] memory tokenWeights,
MerkleMultiProof memory proof
) public view returns (uint256) {
require(inputTokenIds.length == inputTokenWeights.length, "Arrays are not equal length");
// if the merkle root... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/Brenzee-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:33.861282+00:00 | 64236b2e1c1c7a7f8d1a7a98da1b9ff3d1d690d42f0db57a6227430c762922ff | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | function deposit(uint256[] calldata tokenIds, uint256 baseTokenAmount) public payable onlyOwner | true | function sumWeightsAndValidateProof(
uint256[] memory tokenIds,
uint256[] memory tokenWeights,
MerkleMultiProof memory proof
) public view returns (uint256) {
require(inputTokenIds.length == inputTokenWeights.length, "Arrays are not equal length");
// if the merkle root... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | YY Q | Low | low | # The calculation of derivativeAmount in unstake function which could potentially lead to an integer overflow, which can cause unexpected behavior and loss of funds.
## Affected Code
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L108-L129
```
uint256 derivativeAmount = (deriva... | uint256 derivativeAmount = (derivatives[i].balance() * _safEthAmount) / safEthTotalSupply; | overflow | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/YY-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:40.949717+00:00 | 6444de7df881122f447ad67abefe29d5e537b2e3adb39587b30c9eb0282607c6 | 1 | 0 | 90 | 2 | false | true | true | false | medium | uint256 derivativeAmount = (derivatives[i].balance() * _safEthAmount) / safEthTotalSupply; | unknown | 90 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
uint256 derivativeAmount = (derivatives[i].balance() * _safEthAmount) / safEthTotalSupply; | 1 | false | SafEth.sol#L108-L129, SafeMath.sol | SafeMath.sol, SafEth.sol | 2 | uint256 derivativeAmount = (derivatives[i].balance() * _safEthAmount) / safEthTotalSupply; | true | false | false | 5.47 | |||||
c4 | 04-caviar | Kaysoft G | Gas | gas | ## [GAS-01] x += y/x -= y costs more gas than x = x + y/x = x - y for state variables
Files: https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/PrivatePool.sol#L230L231
```
virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
``... | virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/Kaysoft-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:45.203274+00:00 | 647046a55242fa29d2fae7c22ad67ef66e203592cc307b7b33580a9cd5502d4f | 2 | 1 | 382 | 5 | false | true | true | false | high | virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum); | unknown | 134 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
// Code block 2 (diff):
function setPrivatePoolMetadata(address _privatePoolMetadata) public onlyOwner {
- privatePoolMetadata = _privatePoolMetadata; ... | 2 | true | function setPrivatePoolMetadata(address _privatePoolMetadata) public onlyOwner {
- privatePoolMetadata = _privatePoolMetadata; //@audit centeralization. use timelock.
+ assembly{
+ sstore(privateMetadata.slot, _privatePoolMetadata);
+ }
} | PrivatePool.sol#L230, Factory.sol#L129-L131, Factory.sol#L53, EthRouter.sol#L90, PrivatePool.sol#L143 | EthRouter.sol, PrivatePool.sol, Factory.sol | 5 | virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum); | true | false | false | 8.53 | ||||
c4 | 05-ajna | ro1sharkm Q | Medium | medium | ## [QA-1] Misleading comments
Comments are meant to describe the intent of the code block. However, in multiple parts of the codebase, comments are not consistent with the code that is written or do not add any value to the reader. These are some examples:
In the contract `positionManager.sol` The comment associated ... | /// @dev Mapping of `token id => ajna pool address` for which token was minted.
mapping(uint256 => mapping(uint256 => Position)) internal positions; | * @dev === Revert on ===
* @dev positions token to burn has liquidity `LiquidityNotRemoved()` | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/ro1sharkm-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:45.909923+00:00 | 65038d83e734d626c65ca9a82bf8257e8062fd633fac8b9fb84930469c76597a | 1 | 0 | 315 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | The comment in the `memorisePosition` function of `positionManager.sol` states that the function will revert if the position token to burn has `liquidity LiquidityNotRemoved() `. However, the function does not implement such a revert and it is unclear what the intended behavior of the comment on the functionality. | unknown | 315 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
The comment in the `memorisePosition` function of `positionManager.sol` states that the function will revert if the position token to burn has `liquidity LiquidityNotRemoved() `. However, the function does not implement such a revert and it is unclear what the intended behavior of the comment... | 1 | false | PositionManager.sol#L170-L216 | PositionManager.sol | 1 | /// @dev Mapping of `token id => ajna pool address` for which token was minted.
mapping(uint256 => mapping(uint256 => Position)) internal positions; | true | * @dev === Revert on ===
* @dev positions token to burn has liquidity `LiquidityNotRemoved()` | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 01-biconomy | oyc_109 Q | Critical | critical |
## [L-01] Use of Block.timestamp
Block timestamps have historically been used for a variety of applications, such as entropy for random numbers (see the Entropy Illusion for further details), locking funds for periods of time, and various state-changing conditional statements that are time-dependent. Miners have the... | 2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/BaseSmartAccount.sol::83 => * @return deadline the last block timestamp this operation is valid, or zero if it is valid indefinitely.
2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/BaseSmartAccount.sol::84 => * Note that the validation ... | 2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::550 => receive() external payable {}
2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountNoAuth.sol::540 => receive() external payable {} | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/oyc_109-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:59.347503+00:00 | 651eb7ba3769ff2e7d58f8a6a0aeb7bf2f8b8c1e30ff2f356837ea0017560715 | 2 | 0 | 620 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | 2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/BaseSmartAccount.sol::83 => * @return deadline the last block timestamp this operation is valid, or zero if it is valid indefinitely.
2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/BaseSmartAccount.sol::84 => * Note that the validation ... | unknown | 379 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/BaseSmartAccount.sol::83 => * @return deadline the last block timestamp this operation is valid, or zero if it is valid indefinitely.
2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/BaseSmartAccount.sol::84 => * ... | 2 | false | 0 | 2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/BaseSmartAccount.sol::83 => * @return deadline the last block timestamp this operation is valid, or zero if it is valid indefinitely.
2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/BaseSmartAccount.sol::84 => * Note that the validation ... | true | 2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol::550 => receive() external payable {}
2023-01-biconomy/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountNoAuth.sol::540 => receive() external payable {} | true | true | 7 | |||||
c4 | 09-ondo | Matin Q | High | high | ### Low-Risk Issues
| | Issue | Instances |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [L‑01] | `indexed` keyword for reference type variables such as `string` in events may lead to data loss. | 1 |
Total: 1 instance over 1 issue
Note: The above tables were created, considering the automatic findings and thus, those are not included.
... | event DestinationChainContractAddressSet(
string indexed destinationChain,
address contractAddress
); | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/Matin-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:35.835188+00:00 | 65357fc2373bdec95b44d1919bd47d5cbb6aeaaf260c3946d7f865220e75bee0 | 1 | 1 | 111 | 1 | false | true | true | false | high | event DestinationChainContractAddressSet(
string indexed destinationChain,
address contractAddress
); | solidity | 111 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
event DestinationChainContractAddressSet(
string indexed destinationChain,
address contractAddress
); | 1 | false | event DestinationChainContractAddressSet(
string indexed destinationChain,
address contractAddress
); | SourceBridge.sol#L183-L1 | SourceBridge.sol | 1 | event DestinationChainContractAddressSet(
string indexed destinationChain,
address contractAddress
); | true | false | false | 5.52 | ||||
c4 | 11-kelp | lsaudit Q | Medium | medium | # [QA-01] `updatePriceFeedFor()` emits an event even when the priceFeed has not been changed
[File: ChainlinkPriceOracle.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/f751d7594051c0766c7ecd1e68daeb0661e43ee3/src/oracles/ChainlinkPriceOracle.sol#L45-L49)
```
function updatePriceFeedFor(address asset, addres... | function updatePriceFeedFor(address asset, address priceFeed) external onlyLRTManager onlySupportedAsset(asset) {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(priceFeed);
assetPriceFeed[asset] = priceFeed;
emit AssetPriceFeedUpdate(asset, priceFeed);
} | function updatePriceOracleFor(
address asset,
address priceOracle
)
external
onlyLRTManager
onlySupportedAsset(asset)
{
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(priceOracle);
assetPriceOracle[asset] = priceOracle;
emit AssetPriceOracleUpdate(asset, priceOracle... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/lsaudit-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:28:14.047449+00:00 | 654cd56ea6fc2b3e62548a144e9aaba30ebe8c4fb6a9a25899e3a31d86115bc5 | 4 | 0 | 742 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | function updatePriceFeedFor(address asset, address priceFeed) external onlyLRTManager onlySupportedAsset(asset) {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(priceFeed);
assetPriceFeed[asset] = priceFeed;
emit AssetPriceFeedUpdate(asset, priceFeed);
} | unknown | 263 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function updatePriceFeedFor(address asset, address priceFeed) external onlyLRTManager onlySupportedAsset(asset) {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(priceFeed);
assetPriceFeed[asset] = priceFeed;
emit AssetPriceFeedUpdate(asset, priceFeed);
}
// Code block 2 (unknown):
f... | 4 | false | ChainlinkPriceOracle.sol#L45-L49, LRTOracle.sol#L88-L99, LRTConfig.sol#L118 | LRTConfig.sol, ChainlinkPriceOracle.sol, LRTOracle.sol | 3 | function updatePriceFeedFor(address asset, address priceFeed) external onlyLRTManager onlySupportedAsset(asset) {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(priceFeed);
assetPriceFeed[asset] = priceFeed;
emit AssetPriceFeedUpdate(asset, priceFeed);
} | true | function updatePriceOracleFor(
address asset,
address priceOracle
)
external
onlyLRTManager
onlySupportedAsset(asset)
{
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(priceOracle);
assetPriceOracle[asset] = priceOracle;
emit AssetPriceOracleUpdate(asset, priceOracle... | true | true | 10 | |||
c4 | 01-salty | 0xVolcano G | High | high | # Gas report
## Table of contents
- [Gas report](#gas-report)
- [Table of contents](#table-of-contents)
- [In accordance to the sponsors requirements, this report only focuses on issues that save more than 100 Gas](#in-accordance-to-the-sponsors-requirements-this-report-only-focuses-on-issues-that-save-more-tha... | File: /src/Upkeep.sol
63: uint256 public lastUpkeepTimeEmissions;
64: uint256 public lastUpkeepTimeRewardsEmitters; | 86: lastUpkeepTimeEmissions = block.timestamp;
87: lastUpkeepTimeRewardsEmitters = block.timestamp; | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/0xVolcano-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:07.974020+00:00 | 65fb8a730cbb7b74bdda3374e74d75a8b2b853cf3dcf7726578480e8e9653445 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: /src/Upkeep.sol
63: uint256 public lastUpkeepTimeEmissions;
64: uint256 public lastUpkeepTimeRewardsEmitters; | true | 86: lastUpkeepTimeEmissions = block.timestamp;
87: lastUpkeepTimeRewardsEmitters = block.timestamp; | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | btk Q | Critical | critical | | Total Low issues |
|------------------|
| Risk | Issues Details | Number |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| [... | /**
* @dev This empty reserved space is put in place to allow future versions to add new
* variables without shifting down storage in the inheritance chain.
* See https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/4.x/upgradeable#storage_gaps
*/
uint256[50] private __gap; | uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/btk-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:52.622138+00:00 | 661972e95f3870af809554ca99efb76e018579102932a5627cd2bc02f6d390e8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | /**
* @dev This empty reserved space is put in place to allow future versions to add new
* variables without shifting down storage in the inheritance chain.
* See https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/4.x/upgradeable#storage_gaps
*/
uint256[50] private __gap; | true | uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 08-dopex | Raihan G | High | high | # gas
### Note: last 6 types ([G-18],[G-19],[G-20],[G-21],[G-22],[G-23]) that the automated report missed.
# summary
| | issue | instance |
|------|-------|----------|
|[G-01]|Use calldata instead of memory for function arguments that do not get mutated|3|
|[G-02]|Avoid contract existence checks by using low ... | File: core/RdpxV2Core.sol
765 uint256[] memory optionIds | File: perp-vault/PerpetualAtlanticVault.sol
316 uint256[] memory optionIds
406 uint256[] memory strikes | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/Raihan-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:58.245313+00:00 | 663500923bd2440c35b3bb35f63b3107129c4fd8bf8434f8df88c6e8a0b09ac3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: core/RdpxV2Core.sol
765 uint256[] memory optionIds | true | File: perp-vault/PerpetualAtlanticVault.sol
316 uint256[] memory optionIds
406 uint256[] memory strikes | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | ayden G | Gas | gas |
1.The way to save on gas costs with a for lop
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L71
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L84
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L113
ht... | + for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length;) {
+ unchecked {
+ ++i;
+ }
}
} | function rebalanceToWeights() external onlyOwner {
uint256 ethAmountBefore = address(this).balance;
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
if (derivatives[i].balance() > 0)
derivatives[i].withdraw(derivatives[i].balance());
}
uint256 ethAmountAfter =... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/ayden-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:49.932379+00:00 | 66368ea58e10b4d015da16ad3a43c72b213b7c9b0025bd727ef3216a9be2a04c | 2 | 2 | 1,028 | 8 | false | false | true | false | high | + for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length;) {
+ unchecked {
+ ++i;
+ }
}
} | solidity | 100 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
+ for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length;) {
+ unchecked {
+ ++i;
+ }
}
}
// Code block 2 (solidity):
function rebalanceToWeights() external onlyOwner {
uint256 ethAmountBefore = address(this).balance;
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
... | 2 | false | + for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length;) {
+ unchecked {
+ ++i;
+ }
}
}
function rebalanceToWeights() external onlyOwner {
uint256 ethAmountBefore = address(this).balance;
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
if (derivatives[i].balance() > 0)
... | SafEth.sol#L71, SafEth.sol#L84, SafEth.sol#L113, SafEth.sol#L140, SafEth.sol#L147, SafEth.sol#L171, SafEth.sol#L191, SafEth.sol#L138 | SafEth.sol | 8 | + for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length;) {
+ unchecked {
+ ++i;
+ }
}
} | true | function rebalanceToWeights() external onlyOwner {
uint256 ethAmountBefore = address(this).balance;
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
if (derivatives[i].balance() > 0)
derivatives[i].withdraw(derivatives[i].balance());
}
uint256 ethAmountAfter =... | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | adeolu Q | Unknown | unknown | ## Unused argument in ethPerDerivative function in SfrxEth and WstEth contracts
The ethPerDerivative function in SfrxEth and WstEth contracts accepts `uint256 _amount` argument which is unused in the logic of the function. It is not needed, it can be removed.
- **Proof of Concept**
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023... | function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
return IWStETH(WST_ETH).getStETHByWstETH(10 ** 18);
} | function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
uint256 frxAmount = IsFrxEth(SFRX_ETH_ADDRESS).convertToAssets(
10 ** 18
);
return ((10 ** 18 * frxAmount) /
IFrxEthEthPool(FRX_ETH_CRV_POOL_ADDRESS).price_oracle());
} | oracle | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/adeolu-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:43.637384+00:00 | 6659707b45f57d1a4a0fbf9d2bf6e72082eb0e4b2eea287f8bab0f9e480af304 | 2 | 0 | 435 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
return IWStETH(WST_ETH).getStETHByWstETH(10 ** 18);
} | unknown | 140 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
return IWStETH(WST_ETH).getStETHByWstETH(10 ** 18);
}
// Code block 2 (unknown):
function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
uint256 frxAmount = IsFrxEth(SFRX_ETH_ADD... | 2 | false | WstEth.sol#L86, SfrxEth.sol#L111 | SfrxEth.sol, WstEth.sol | 2 | function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
return IWStETH(WST_ETH).getStETHByWstETH(10 ** 18);
} | true | function ethPerDerivative(uint256 _amount) public view returns (uint256) {
uint256 frxAmount = IsFrxEth(SFRX_ETH_ADDRESS).convertToAssets(
10 ** 18
);
return ((10 ** 18 * frxAmount) /
IFrxEthEthPool(FRX_ETH_CRV_POOL_ADDRESS).price_oracle());
} | true | true | 7.72 | |||
c4 | 04-caviar | Aymen0909 Q | Critical | critical | # QA Report
## Summary
| | Issue | Risk | Instances |
| :-------------: |:-------------|:-------------:|:-------------:|
| 1 | Possible loss of `msg.value` when calling the `flashloan` function | Low | 1 |
| 2 | slippage protection should be included in `sell` function | Low | 1 |
| 3 | ... | if (baseToken == address(0) && msg.value < fee) revert InvalidEthAmount(); | if ((baseToken == address(0) && msg.value < fee) || (baseToken != address(0) && msg.value > 0)) revert InvalidEthAmount(); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/Aymen0909-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:29.387040+00:00 | 672d1fd3c2cdc11c8e963ee451af9358e6cc4a6c0a31c76c909bf7ffc8dce4d7 | 1 | 0 | 74 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | if (baseToken == address(0) && msg.value < fee) revert InvalidEthAmount(); | unknown | 74 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
if (baseToken == address(0) && msg.value < fee) revert InvalidEthAmount(); | 1 | false | PrivatePool.sol#L635 | PrivatePool.sol | 1 | if (baseToken == address(0) && msg.value < fee) revert InvalidEthAmount(); | true | if ((baseToken == address(0) && msg.value < fee) || (baseToken != address(0) && msg.value > 0)) revert InvalidEthAmount(); | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 03-revert-lend | 14si2o_Flint Q | High | high |
## [L-01] Valid collateralValueLimitFactorX32 value will cause a revert
In the `_updateAndCheckCollateral` function, there are 2 checks to make sure that the `collateralValueLimitFactorX32` does not exceed `type(uint32).max`. This is because this maximal value represents a collateral value limit of 100%.
However in... | ## [L-02] No slippage protection in Vault:liquidate
In the `Vault` `liquidate` function, the internal function `_sendPositionValue` is called which calls `nonfungiblePositionManager.decreaseLiquidity` with 100% slippage tolerance.
Meaning MEV bots will take advantage and the liquidity returned will be either extremely... | ## [L-03] Inconsistent Lending rounding in view functions
The `vaultInfo` function calculates the total lent by Rounding Up `_convertToAssets`.
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/blob/main/data/14si2o_Flint-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:56.574592+00:00 | 6792270437d2e5619c34b9a0d1e052a9d0e160929c04f188b0f225f57e2997d4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | ## [L-02] No slippage protection in Vault:liquidate
In the `Vault` `liquidate` function, the internal function `_sendPositionValue` is called which calls `nonfungiblePositionManager.decreaseLiquidity` with 100% slippage tolerance.
Meaning MEV bots will take advantage and the liquidity returned will be either extremely... | true | ## [L-03] Inconsistent Lending rounding in view functions
The `vaultInfo` function calculates the total lent by Rounding Up `_convertToAssets`.
| true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | avik_saikat G | Medium | medium | # array.length inside loop
## Vulnerability details
Caching the array length outside a loop saves reading it on each iteration, as long as the array's length is not changed during the loop.
You save `3 gas` by not reading array.length - `3 gas` per instance - `27 gas` saved
## Lines of code
### Total 23
- https://gi... | # Default assignment
## Vulnerability details
Uninitialized variables are assigned with the types default value.
Explicitly initializing a variable with it's default value costs unnecessary gas.
## Lines of code
### Total 21
- https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/EthRouter.sol#L106
- https://gi... | 🚀 Good: | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/avik_saikat-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:15.734656+00:00 | 679976113ab61520326bf72d6d7e4cb2d138cf284bab817598fb0a803d310b3d | 0 | 0 | 0 | 26 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | EthRouter.sol#L106, EthRouter.sol#L115, EthRouter.sol#L116, EthRouter.sol#L134, EthRouter.sol#L159, EthRouter.sol#L161, EthRouter.sol#L182, EthRouter.sol#L183, EthRouter.sol#L239, EthRouter.sol#L261, EthRouter.sol#L265, EthRouter.sol#L284, Factory.sol#L119, PrivatePool.sol#L236, PrivatePool.sol#L238, PrivatePool.sol#L2... | EthRouter.sol, Factory.sol, PrivatePool.sol | 26 | # Default assignment
## Vulnerability details
Uninitialized variables are assigned with the types default value.
Explicitly initializing a variable with it's default value costs unnecessary gas.
## Lines of code
### Total 21
- https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/EthRouter.sol#L106
- https://gi... | true | 🚀 Good: | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 09-ondo | albahaca G | Medium | medium | # gas
# summary
| | issue | instance |
|------|-------|----------|
|[G-01]| Use Assembly To Check For address(0)|6|
|[G-02]| Avoid contract existence checks by using low level calls |2|
|[G-03]| Use do while loops instead of for loops|2|
|[G-04]| Functions guaranteed to revert when called by normal users can be... | contract MyContract {
function isZeroAddress(address addr) public pure returns (bool) {
uint256 addrInt = uint256(addr);
assembly {
// Load the zero address into memory
let zero := mload(0x00)
// Compare the address to the zero address
... | File: contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol
490 require(_owner != address(0), "APPROVE_FROM_ZERO_ADDRESS");
491 require(_spender != address(0), "APPROVE_TO_ZERO_ADDRESS");
519 require(_sender != address(0), "TRANSFER_FROM_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS");
520 require(_recipient != address(0), "TRANSFER_TO_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS");
... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/albahaca-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:46.643966+00:00 | 67aeb87ed6c4fa637d60305824287875c0e567871021311272bb207608a01dfc | 1 | 0 | 482 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | contract MyContract {
function isZeroAddress(address addr) public pure returns (bool) {
uint256 addrInt = uint256(addr);
assembly {
// Load the zero address into memory
let zero := mload(0x00)
// Compare the address to the zero address
... | unknown | 482 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
contract MyContract {
function isZeroAddress(address addr) public pure returns (bool) {
uint256 addrInt = uint256(addr);
assembly {
// Load the zero address into memory
let zero := mload(0x00)
// Compare the address... | 1 | false | 0 | contract MyContract {
function isZeroAddress(address addr) public pure returns (bool) {
uint256 addrInt = uint256(addr);
assembly {
// Load the zero address into memory
let zero := mload(0x00)
// Compare the address to the zero address
... | true | File: contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol
490 require(_owner != address(0), "APPROVE_FROM_ZERO_ADDRESS");
491 require(_spender != address(0), "APPROVE_TO_ZERO_ADDRESS");
519 require(_sender != address(0), "TRANSFER_FROM_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS");
520 require(_recipient != address(0), "TRANSFER_TO_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS");
... | true | true | 6 | |||||
c4 | 06-lybra | hunter_w3b G | High | high | # Gas Optimization
# Summary
| Number | Optimization Details | Context |
| :----: | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :-----: |
| [G-01] | Avoid contract `existence` checks by using low level calls ... | File: contracts/lybra/miner/ProtocolRewardsPool.sol
172 amount = IEUSD(configurator.getEUSDAddress()).getMintedEUSDByShares(earned(user));
232 uint256 share = IEUSD(configurator.getEUSDAddress()).getSharesByMintedEUSD(amount);
| file: lybra/token/EUSD.sol
99 function name() public pure returns (string memory) {
100 return "eUSD";
101 }
102
103 /**
104 * @return the symbol of the token, usually a shorter version of the
105 * name.
106 */
107 function symbol() public pure returns (string memory) {
108 retur... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/hunter_w3b-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:00.621060+00:00 | 67caf5733ef1fbe3b8eeef79291c64bbfd372cbd75ba4aa3c1f123bf8c919cc4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: contracts/lybra/miner/ProtocolRewardsPool.sol
172 amount = IEUSD(configurator.getEUSDAddress()).getMintedEUSDByShares(earned(user));
232 uint256 share = IEUSD(configurator.getEUSDAddress()).getSharesByMintedEUSD(amount);
| true | file: lybra/token/EUSD.sol
99 function name() public pure returns (string memory) {
100 return "eUSD";
101 }
102
103 /**
104 * @return the symbol of the token, usually a shorter version of the
105 * name.
106 */
107 function symbol() public pure returns (string memory) {
108 retur... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 11-kelp | hunter_w3b Q | High | high | ## [L-01] Deposit limits can be updated by the manager role, but there is no check to prevent reducing limits. This could lock user assets
The addNewSupportedAsset function allows the manager role to update the deposit limit amount for any supported asset. However, there is no check to prevent reducing this limit to a... | File: src/LRTConfig.sol
73 function addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) external onlyRole(LRTConstants.MANAGER) {
74 _addNewSupportedAsset(asset, depositLimit);
75 }
76
77 /// @dev private function to add a new supported asset
78 /// @param asset Asset address
79 /// @param ... | File: src/LRTConfig.sol
109 function updateAssetStrategy(
110 address asset,
111 address strategy
112 )
113 external
114 onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE)
115 onlySupportedAsset(asset)
116 {
117 UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(strategy);
118 if (assetStrategy[asset] == s... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/hunter_w3b-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:28:07.747855+00:00 | 6813ecec7dbe95b1c95812e4d2c9fe4503c178e967863fbba7718dc823044b3f | 1 | 1 | 794 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File: src/LRTConfig.sol
73 function addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) external onlyRole(LRTConstants.MANAGER) {
74 _addNewSupportedAsset(asset, depositLimit);
75 }
76
77 /// @dev private function to add a new supported asset
78 /// @param asset Asset address
79 /// @param ... | solidity | 794 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: src/LRTConfig.sol
73 function addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) external onlyRole(LRTConstants.MANAGER) {
74 _addNewSupportedAsset(asset, depositLimit);
75 }
76
77 /// @dev private function to add a new supported asset
78 /// @param asset Ass... | 1 | false | File: src/LRTConfig.sol
73 function addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) external onlyRole(LRTConstants.MANAGER) {
74 _addNewSupportedAsset(asset, depositLimit);
75 }
76
77 /// @dev private function to add a new supported asset
78 /// @param asset Asset address
79 /// @param ... | LRTConfig.sol#L73-L89 | LRTConfig.sol | 1 | File: src/LRTConfig.sol
73 function addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) external onlyRole(LRTConstants.MANAGER) {
74 _addNewSupportedAsset(asset, depositLimit);
75 }
76
77 /// @dev private function to add a new supported asset
78 /// @param asset Asset address
79 /// @param ... | true | File: src/LRTConfig.sol
109 function updateAssetStrategy(
110 address asset,
111 address strategy
112 )
113 external
114 onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE)
115 onlySupportedAsset(asset)
116 {
117 UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(strategy);
118 if (assetStrategy[asset] == s... | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | alexzoid G | Gas | gas | ## [G-01] Storage Variable Accessed Multiple Times
The `derivativeCount` storage variable is accessed multiple times within for-loops, which can lead to inefficient gas usage:
- https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L71
```solidity
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; ... | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) { | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/alexzoid-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:46.332691+00:00 | 68271f1bf842354f43254c19a8bc052266596697ad1c58ada065b5d91500366b | 9 | 9 | 683 | 9 | false | false | true | false | high | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) | solidity | 42 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
// Code block 2 (solidity):
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
// Code block 3 (solidity):
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
// Code block 4 (solidity):
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
// Code block 5 (solidi... | 9 | false | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i... | SafEth.sol#L71, SafEth.sol#L84, SafEth.sol#L113, SafEth.sol#L140, SafEth.sol#L147, SafEth.sol#L171, SafEth.sol#L191, SafEth.sol#L186-L188, SafEth.sol#L73-L74 | SafEth.sol | 9 | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) | true | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) { | true | true | 15 | ||
c4 | 11-kelp | digitizeworx Analysis | Critical | critical | ## Overview
Kelp DAO aims to provide higher yield opportunities for staked ETH assets like rETH by "restaking" them into liquidity strategies. The core components are:
**LRTConfig** - Stores configuration and contract addresses. Controls access.
**LRTDepositPool** - Receives user deposits and mints rsETH tokens.
**... | function deposit(uint amount) external {
// Transfer asset from user
// Mint rsETH
// Emit deposit event
}
// No withdraw function! | // ADMIN_ROLE
// MANAGER_ROLE | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/digitizeworx-Analysis.md | 2026-01-02T18:28:00.548141+00:00 | 689c33fa2e7203c2ff1b2e04800ada95e0b20cdb837fb31cad8815843dc9fbae | 1 | 1 | 143 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | function deposit(uint amount) external {
// Transfer asset from user
// Mint rsETH
// Emit deposit event
}
// No withdraw function! | solidity | 143 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function deposit(uint amount) external {
// Transfer asset from user
// Mint rsETH
// Emit deposit event
}
// No withdraw function! | 1 | false | function deposit(uint amount) external {
// Transfer asset from user
// Mint rsETH
// Emit deposit event
}
// No withdraw function! | LRTDepositPool.sol#L119-L144 | LRTDepositPool.sol | 1 | function deposit(uint amount) external {
// Transfer asset from user
// Mint rsETH
// Emit deposit event
}
// No withdraw function! | true | // ADMIN_ROLE
// MANAGER_ROLE | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 05-ajna | evmboi32 Q | Unknown | unknown | # Incorrect ```GLOBAL_BUDGET_CONSTRAINT```
If we look at the whitepaper it states that ```GLOBAL_BUDGET_CONSTRAINT``` should be set to 2%.
> On a quarterly basis, up to 2% of the treasury (30% of the AJNA token supply on launch) is
distributed to facilitate growth of the Ajna system.
The actual implementation has this... | If we look at the whitepaper it states that ```GLOBAL_BUDGET_CONSTRAINT``` should be set to 2%.
> On a quarterly basis, up to 2% of the treasury (30% of the AJNA token supply on launch) is
distributed to facilitate growth of the Ajna system.
The actual implementation has this value set to 3%
StandardFunding.sol#27 | upgrade | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/evmboi32-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:26.888745+00:00 | 68a238d0e8c651d4c1c9ecdb9a9cbb673847d0d868fc834831a0fa298412a5f9 | 2 | 1 | 108 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | If we look at the whitepaper it states that | unknown | 43 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
If we look at the whitepaper it states that
// Code block 2 (solidity):
uint256 internal constant GLOBAL_BUDGET_CONSTRAINT = 0.03 * 1e18; | 2 | false | uint256 internal constant GLOBAL_BUDGET_CONSTRAINT = 0.03 * 1e18; | StandardFunding.sol#L27 | StandardFunding.sol | 1 | If we look at the whitepaper it states that ```GLOBAL_BUDGET_CONSTRAINT``` should be set to 2%.
> On a quarterly basis, up to 2% of the treasury (30% of the AJNA token supply on launch) is
distributed to facilitate growth of the Ajna system.
The actual implementation has this value set to 3%
StandardFunding.sol#27 | true | false | false | 5.18 | ||||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | KupiaSec Q | Low | low | ## [L-01] function `MergingPool.pickWinner()` has no event
It is recommended to emit events on important functions
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/cd1a0e6d1b40168657d1aaee8223dc050e15f8cc/src/MergingPool.sol#L118-L132
```solidity
function pickWinner(uint256[] calldata winners) external {
... | function pickWinner(uint256[] calldata winners) external {
require(isAdmin[msg.sender]);
require(winners.length == winnersPerPeriod, "Incorrect number of winners");
require(!isSelectionComplete[roundId], "Winners are already selected");
uint256 winnersLength = winners.length;
... | function redeemMintPass(
uint256[] calldata mintpassIdsToBurn,
uint8[] calldata fighterTypes,
uint8[] calldata iconsTypes,
string[] calldata mintPassDnas,
string[] calldata modelHashes,
string[] calldata modelTypes
)
external
{
require(
... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/KupiaSec-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:30.914715+00:00 | 68a393688a6b932053577047740a87a7e8555ad22fe545d401db834dd388a0d2 | 1 | 1 | 763 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | function pickWinner(uint256[] calldata winners) external {
require(isAdmin[msg.sender]);
require(winners.length == winnersPerPeriod, "Incorrect number of winners");
require(!isSelectionComplete[roundId], "Winners are already selected");
uint256 winnersLength = winners.length;
add... | solidity | 763 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function pickWinner(uint256[] calldata winners) external {
require(isAdmin[msg.sender]);
require(winners.length == winnersPerPeriod, "Incorrect number of winners");
require(!isSelectionComplete[roundId], "Winners are already selected");
uint256 winnersLength =... | 1 | false | function pickWinner(uint256[] calldata winners) external {
require(isAdmin[msg.sender]);
require(winners.length == winnersPerPeriod, "Incorrect number of winners");
require(!isSelectionComplete[roundId], "Winners are already selected");
uint256 winnersLength = winners.length;
add... | MergingPool.sol#L118-L132 | MergingPool.sol | 1 | function pickWinner(uint256[] calldata winners) external {
require(isAdmin[msg.sender]);
require(winners.length == winnersPerPeriod, "Incorrect number of winners");
require(!isSelectionComplete[roundId], "Winners are already selected");
uint256 winnersLength = winners.length;
... | true | function redeemMintPass(
uint256[] calldata mintpassIdsToBurn,
uint8[] calldata fighterTypes,
uint8[] calldata iconsTypes,
string[] calldata mintPassDnas,
string[] calldata modelHashes,
string[] calldata modelTypes
)
external
{
require(
... | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | c3phas Q | High | high | ### Table of Contents
## QA Findings
- [QA Findings](#qa-findings)
- [Upgradeable contract missing a `__gap` storage variable](#upgradeable-contract-missing-a-__gap-storage-variable)
- [Avoid Naming collisions, totalSupply should be renamed](#avoid-naming-collisions-totalsupply-should-be-renamed)
- [Unused local variab... | File: /contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
15: contract SafEth is
16: Initializable,
17: ERC20Upgradeable,
18: OwnableUpgradeable,
19: SafEthStorage
20:{ | File: /contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol
12: contract WstEth is IDerivative, Initializable, OwnableUpgradeable { | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/c3phas-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:53.510902+00:00 | 68dd55cdc1f5a5632c66c69498dccfcf9e38ca0de725b1fe79535cc58e72ea9e | 2 | 2 | 278 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | File: /contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
15: contract SafEth is
16: Initializable,
17: ERC20Upgradeable,
18: OwnableUpgradeable,
19: SafEthStorage
20:{ | solidity | 157 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: /contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
15: contract SafEth is
16: Initializable,
17: ERC20Upgradeable,
18: OwnableUpgradeable,
19: SafEthStorage
20:{
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: /contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol
12: contract WstEth is IDerivative, Initializable, Owna... | 2 | false | File: /contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
15: contract SafEth is
16: Initializable,
17: ERC20Upgradeable,
18: OwnableUpgradeable,
19: SafEthStorage
20:{
File: /contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol
12: contract WstEth is IDerivative, Initializable, OwnableUpgradeable { | SafEth.sol#L15-L20, WstEth.sol#L12 | WstEth.sol, SafEth.sol | 2 | File: /contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
15: contract SafEth is
16: Initializable,
17: ERC20Upgradeable,
18: OwnableUpgradeable,
19: SafEthStorage
20:{ | true | File: /contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol
12: contract WstEth is IDerivative, Initializable, OwnableUpgradeable { | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 01-salty | foxb868 Analysis | High | high | Based on reviewing the Salty.IO codebase and architecture, the main objectives of the project appear to be:
1. To build a decentralized exchange (DEX) with zero swap fees and automatic yield generation.
The core Pools.sol contract implements an automated market maker (AMM) model and arbitrage functionality to gener... | **Trust Minimization**
- DAO contract is the only privileged role in Salty - avoiding single points of compromise.
- USDS design depends on collateral health without system ability to liquidate assets in black swan events.
| - Failure to attract liquidity makes architecture unsustainable.
**Sustainability Incentives**
Salty rewards liquidity with protocol fees:
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/foxb868-Analysis.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:41.711712+00:00 | 691a3f119776c8f1d165323301056807d7b60f92b634b59412271776ced4d54d | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | **Trust Minimization**
- DAO contract is the only privileged role in Salty - avoiding single points of compromise.
- USDS design depends on collateral health without system ability to liquidate assets in black swan events.
| true | - Failure to attract liquidity makes architecture unsustainable.
**Sustainability Incentives**
Salty rewards liquidity with protocol fees:
| true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 08-dopex | MaNcHaSsS Q | Unknown | unknown | `totalWethDelegated` is not updated when user withdraws delegated WETH from contract.
```
function withdraw(
uint256 delegateId
) external returns (uint256 amountWithdrawn) {
_whenNotPaused();
_validate(delegateId < delegates.length, 14);
Delegate storage delegate = delegates[delegateId];
_valid... | function withdraw(
uint256 delegateId
) external returns (uint256 amountWithdrawn) {
_whenNotPaused();
_validate(delegateId < delegates.length, 14);
Delegate storage delegate = delegates[delegateId];
_validate(delegate.owner == msg.sender, 9);
amountWithdrawn = delegate.amount - delegate.acti... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/MaNcHaSsS-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:51.077835+00:00 | 6968300822ded5805d528c7f39797552dbf1ba79559ec0bdc0223fe51ec81d61 | 1 | 0 | 555 | 0 | false | true | true | false | medium | function withdraw(
uint256 delegateId
) external returns (uint256 amountWithdrawn) {
_whenNotPaused();
_validate(delegateId < delegates.length, 14);
Delegate storage delegate = delegates[delegateId];
_validate(delegate.owner == msg.sender, 9);
amountWithdrawn = delegate.amount - delegate.acti... | unknown | 555 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function withdraw(
uint256 delegateId
) external returns (uint256 amountWithdrawn) {
_whenNotPaused();
_validate(delegateId < delegates.length, 14);
Delegate storage delegate = delegates[delegateId];
_validate(delegate.owner == msg.sender, 9);
amountWithdrawn = dele... | 1 | false | 0 | function withdraw(
uint256 delegateId
) external returns (uint256 amountWithdrawn) {
_whenNotPaused();
_validate(delegateId < delegates.length, 14);
Delegate storage delegate = delegates[delegateId];
_validate(delegate.owner == msg.sender, 9);
amountWithdrawn = delegate.amount - delegate.acti... | true | false | false | 3.3 | |||||||
c4 | 03-revert-lend | 0xblackskull Q | Low | low | ### If `totalRewardX64` set to 0 then there is no way to set new value
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend/blob/main/src/transformers/AutoCompound.sol#L243-L247
```
function setReward(uint64 _totalRewardX64) external onlyOwner {
//@audit-qa
require(_totalRewardX64 <= totalRewardX64, ">tot... | function setReward(uint64 _totalRewardX64) external onlyOwner {
//@audit-qa
require(_totalRewardX64 <= totalRewardX64, ">totalRewardX64");
totalRewardX64 = _totalRewardX64;
emit RewardUpdated(msg.sender, _totalRewardX64);
} | require(_totalRewardX64 != 0); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/blob/main/data/0xblackskull-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:54.346703+00:00 | 69716233d7c520bc7c5949fb76e732c9ab102796f3d99bccc11c39cb4239b578 | 4 | 0 | 1,329 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | function setReward(uint64 _totalRewardX64) external onlyOwner {
//@audit-qa
require(_totalRewardX64 <= totalRewardX64, ">totalRewardX64");
totalRewardX64 = _totalRewardX64;
emit RewardUpdated(msg.sender, _totalRewardX64);
} | unknown | 260 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function setReward(uint64 _totalRewardX64) external onlyOwner {
//@audit-qa
require(_totalRewardX64 <= totalRewardX64, ">totalRewardX64");
totalRewardX64 = _totalRewardX64;
emit RewardUpdated(msg.sender, _totalRewardX64);
}
// Code block 2 (unknown):
requ... | 4 | false | AutoCompound.sol#L243-L247, V3Vault.sol#L1150-L1165, Automator.sol#L69-L72 | AutoCompound.sol, V3Vault.sol, Automator.sol | 3 | function setReward(uint64 _totalRewardX64) external onlyOwner {
//@audit-qa
require(_totalRewardX64 <= totalRewardX64, ">totalRewardX64");
totalRewardX64 = _totalRewardX64;
emit RewardUpdated(msg.sender, _totalRewardX64);
} | true | require(_totalRewardX64 != 0); | true | true | 10 | |||
c4 | 08-dopex | 0xMosh Q | High | high | # L-01 : Have a nonreentrant modifier in `emergencyWithdraw` function
The `emergencyWithdraw` function in RpdxDecayingBonds.sol deals with eth transfers to an externel account . Exteranal calls with may reenter to the contract before state changes properly . However , having a nonreentrant modifier is always preferr... | function decreaseAmount(
uint256 bondId,
uint256 amount
) public onlyRole(RDPXV2CORE_ROLE) {
_whenNotPaused();
bonds[bondId].rdpxAmount = amount;
} | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/0xMosh-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:18.177602+00:00 | 697cfc90cdda795ba3697864114cf49639095b9c0ec94bd39acb6d2e12014189 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | RdpxDecayingBonds.sol#L89, PerpetualAtlanticVault.sol#L113, PerpetualAtlanticVaultLP.sol#L218 | PerpetualAtlanticVault.sol, RdpxDecayingBonds.sol, PerpetualAtlanticVaultLP.sol | 3 | function decreaseAmount(
uint256 bondId,
uint256 amount
) public onlyRole(RDPXV2CORE_ROLE) {
_whenNotPaused();
bonds[bondId].rdpxAmount = amount;
} | true | false | false | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | Bason Q | Critical | critical | ## Low and Non-Critical Issues Summary
| Number |Issues Details |
|:--:|:-------|
|[NC-01]| Use latest Solidity version
|[NC-02]| Use stable pragma statement
|[NC-03]| Use named imports instead of plain `import FILE.SOL`
|[NC-04]| Constants should be defined rather than using magic numbers
|[NC-05]| You can use named p... | Reth.sol
Create a custom event DepositSuccessful(indexed address depositor) | WstEth.sol
Create a custom event DepositSuccessful(indexed address depositor)
function deposit(
uint256 wstEthAmount = wstEthBalancePost - wstEthBalancePre;
emit DepositSuccessful(WST_ETH) | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Bason-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:53.913907+00:00 | 69cf991bb0401e8898725ddc2dcdc418a5cc7b4cdf9cd921171ab7f92c73ff2c | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | Reth.sol
Create a custom event DepositSuccessful(indexed address depositor) | true | WstEth.sol
Create a custom event DepositSuccessful(indexed address depositor)
function deposit(
uint256 wstEthAmount = wstEthBalancePost - wstEthBalancePre;
emit DepositSuccessful(WST_ETH) | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | BRONZEDISC Q | Medium | medium | ## QA
---
### Layout Order [1]
- The best-practices for layout within a contract is the following order: state variables, events, modifiers, constructor and functions.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountFactory.sol
```solidity
// event ... | // event coming after constructor
24: event SmartAccountCreated(address indexed _proxy, address indexed _implementation, address indexed _owner, string version, uint256 _index); | // events is coming after functions
17: event CalledFrom(address sender);
// state vars are coming after functions
22: mapping(uint256 => uint256) public xxx;
23: uint256 public offset; | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/BRONZEDISC-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:12:57.204394+00:00 | 6a22d30580ffe9d48caa15845a2515c6f764298ccd4dbe108e901106b0c16a39 | 6 | 6 | 814 | 6 | false | false | true | false | high | // event coming after constructor
24: event SmartAccountCreated(address indexed _proxy, address indexed _implementation, address indexed _owner, string version, uint256 _index); | solidity | 180 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
// event coming after constructor
24: event SmartAccountCreated(address indexed _proxy, address indexed _implementation, address indexed _owner, string version, uint256 _index);
// Code block 2 (solidity):
// events is coming after functions
17: event CalledFrom(address sender);
// s... | 6 | false | // event coming after constructor
24: event SmartAccountCreated(address indexed _proxy, address indexed _implementation, address indexed _owner, string version, uint256 _index);
// events is coming after functions
17: event CalledFrom(address sender);
// state vars are coming after functions
22: mapping(uint... | SmartAccountFactory.sol, TestCounter.sol, EntryPoint.sol, ModuleManager.sol, SelfAuthorized.sol, Button.sol | SelfAuthorized.sol, TestCounter.sol, Button.sol, SmartAccountFactory.sol, EntryPoint.sol, ModuleManager.sol | 6 | // event coming after constructor
24: event SmartAccountCreated(address indexed _proxy, address indexed _implementation, address indexed _owner, string version, uint256 _index); | true | // events is coming after functions
17: event CalledFrom(address sender);
// state vars are coming after functions
22: mapping(uint256 => uint256) public xxx;
23: uint256 public offset; | true | true | 12 | ||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | caglankaan G | Critical | critical | # Using Prefix Operators Costs Less Gas Than Postfix Operators in Loops
### Description
In Solidity, there are two ways to increment a variable within a loop: i++ and ++i. The difference between them is that i++ is a post-increment operator, which increments the value of i after the expression has been evaluated, whil... | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) { | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/caglankaan-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:53.958108+00:00 | 6a2641a8c1993d3d5f17f8afe6bcf57e07084f7b564f84d65fd72f05c6142f07 | 2 | 2 | 134 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) | solidity | 42 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
// Code block 2 (solidity):
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) { | 2 | false | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) { | 0 | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) | true | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) { | true | true | 7 | ||||
c4 | 01-ondo | lukris02 Q | Critical | critical | # QA Report for Ondo Finance contest
## Overview
During the audit, 6 non-critical issues were found.
№ | Title | Risk Rating | Instance Count
--- | --- | --- | ---
NC-1 | Order of Functions | Non-Critical | 9
NC-2 | Order of Layout | Non-Critical | 13
NC-3 | Typos | Non-Critical | 7
NC-4 | Unused named return variable... | - [```function assignRoletoKYCGroup(```](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/main/contracts/cash/kyc/KYCRegistry.sol#L144) => ```RoleTo```
- (L205) [```* @param addresses Array of addresses being added as elligible```](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/main/contracts/cash/kyc/KYCRegi... | to | oracle | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/lukris02-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:16.989690+00:00 | 6a75fca29ac9449852fb7e62c832ece98dca6ded60755ead6235664512fd4446 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | CashManager.sol#L589-L615, CashManager.sol#L798-L876, CashManager.sol#L938-L968, CashFactory.sol#L143, CashKYCSenderFactory.sol#L153, KYCRegistry.sol#L144, KYCRegistry.sol#L205, KYCRegistry.sol#L236, CashManager.sol#L429, IKYCRegistryClient.sol#L38, IOndoPriceOracleV2.sol#L95, CashManager.sol#L784-L795 | CashManager.sol, CashKYCSenderFactory.sol, IKYCRegistryClient.sol, IOndoPriceOracleV2.sol, CashFactory.sol, KYCRegistry.sol | 12 | - [```function assignRoletoKYCGroup(```](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/main/contracts/cash/kyc/KYCRegistry.sol#L144) => ```RoleTo```
- (L205) [```* @param addresses Array of addresses being added as elligible```](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/main/contracts/cash/kyc/KYCRegi... | true | to | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 03-revert-lend | Topmark Q | Low | low | ### Report 1:
#### No KinkX96 Boundary Validation
As noted from the code provided below in the InterestRateModel contract, it can be noted that `kinkX96` is set without any form of validation like the other variables, this would allow owner to unfairly set value that could break protocol functionality, this should be c... | function setValues(
uint256 baseRatePerYearX96,
uint256 multiplierPerYearX96,
uint256 jumpMultiplierPerYearX96,
uint256 _kinkX96
) public onlyOwner {
if (
baseRatePerYearX96 > MAX_BASE_RATE_X96 || multiplierPerYearX96 > MAX_MULTIPLIER_X96
|| jumpM... | function vaultInfo()
external
view
override
returns (
uint256 debt,
uint256 lent,
uint256 balance,
uint256 available,
uint256 reserves,
uint256 debtExchangeRateX96,
uint256 lendExchangeRateX96
)... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/blob/main/data/Topmark-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:03:05.973559+00:00 | 6aadc0a2e8db01c465e7e6381af5b965a37851390a2549680455052c5d17b0ae | 1 | 1 | 763 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | function setValues(
uint256 baseRatePerYearX96,
uint256 multiplierPerYearX96,
uint256 jumpMultiplierPerYearX96,
uint256 _kinkX96
) public onlyOwner {
if (
baseRatePerYearX96 > MAX_BASE_RATE_X96 || multiplierPerYearX96 > MAX_MULTIPLIER_X96
|| jumpMu... | solidity | 763 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function setValues(
uint256 baseRatePerYearX96,
uint256 multiplierPerYearX96,
uint256 jumpMultiplierPerYearX96,
uint256 _kinkX96
) public onlyOwner {
if (
baseRatePerYearX96 > MAX_BASE_RATE_X96 || multiplierPerYearX96 > MAX_MULTIPLIER_X... | 1 | false | function setValues(
uint256 baseRatePerYearX96,
uint256 multiplierPerYearX96,
uint256 jumpMultiplierPerYearX96,
uint256 _kinkX96
) public onlyOwner {
if (
baseRatePerYearX96 > MAX_BASE_RATE_X96 || multiplierPerYearX96 > MAX_MULTIPLIER_X96
|| jumpMu... | InterestRateModel.sol#L98, V3Vault.sol#L213, V3Vault.sol#L221 | V3Vault.sol, InterestRateModel.sol | 3 | function setValues(
uint256 baseRatePerYearX96,
uint256 multiplierPerYearX96,
uint256 jumpMultiplierPerYearX96,
uint256 _kinkX96
) public onlyOwner {
if (
baseRatePerYearX96 > MAX_BASE_RATE_X96 || multiplierPerYearX96 > MAX_MULTIPLIER_X96
|| jumpM... | true | function vaultInfo()
external
view
override
returns (
uint256 debt,
uint256 lent,
uint256 balance,
uint256 available,
uint256 reserves,
uint256 debtExchangeRateX96,
uint256 lendExchangeRateX96
)... | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 11-kelp | lsaudit G | High | high | # [G-01] Redundant variable in `LRTConfigRoleChecker.sol`
[File: LRTConfigRoleChecker.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/f751d7594051c0766c7ecd1e68daeb0661e43ee3/src/utils/LRTConfigRoleChecker.sol#L27-L33)
```
modifier onlyLRTAdmin() {
bytes32 DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE = 0x00;
if (!IAcce... | modifier onlyLRTAdmin() {
bytes32 DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE = 0x00;
if (!IAccessControl(address(lrtConfig)).hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, msg.sender)) {
revert ILRTConfig.CallerNotLRTConfigAdmin();
}
_;
} | modifier onlyLRTAdmin() {
if (!IAccessControl(address(lrtConfig)).hasRole(0x00, msg.sender)) {
revert ILRTConfig.CallerNotLRTConfigAdmin();
}
_;
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/lsaudit-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:28:13.606681+00:00 | 6ab3d40ab932cd1cfe0c010c74c753167577afecc8617770d8ee28a9aca1dd9e | 3 | 0 | 1,424 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | modifier onlyLRTAdmin() {
bytes32 DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE = 0x00;
if (!IAccessControl(address(lrtConfig)).hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, msg.sender)) {
revert ILRTConfig.CallerNotLRTConfigAdmin();
}
_;
} | unknown | 243 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
modifier onlyLRTAdmin() {
bytes32 DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE = 0x00;
if (!IAccessControl(address(lrtConfig)).hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, msg.sender)) {
revert ILRTConfig.CallerNotLRTConfigAdmin();
}
_;
}
// Code block 2 (unknown):
modifier onlyLRTAdmin... | 3 | false | LRTConfigRoleChecker.sol#L27-L33, LRTOracle.sol#L52-L73 | LRTOracle.sol, LRTConfigRoleChecker.sol | 2 | modifier onlyLRTAdmin() {
bytes32 DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE = 0x00;
if (!IAccessControl(address(lrtConfig)).hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, msg.sender)) {
revert ILRTConfig.CallerNotLRTConfigAdmin();
}
_;
} | true | modifier onlyLRTAdmin() {
if (!IAccessControl(address(lrtConfig)).hasRole(0x00, msg.sender)) {
revert ILRTConfig.CallerNotLRTConfigAdmin();
}
_;
} | true | true | 9 | |||
c4 | 10-badger | kinggvd G | Low | low | The code below may produce timeouts even if the response did not actually timeout and returned a valid response due to ms difference, thus wasting resources. Consider adding a small buffer when _response.success == true.
```
function _responseTimeout(uint256 _timestamp, uint256 _timeout) internal view returns (boo... | function _responseTimeout(uint256 _timestamp, uint256 _timeout) internal view returns (bool) {
return block.timestamp - _timestamp > _timeout;
}
to
function _responseTimeout(uint256 _timestamp, uint256 _timeout, uint256 _eps) internal view returns (bool) {
return block.timestamp - _timesta... | function _chainlinkIsFrozen(ChainlinkResponse memory _response) internal view returns (bool) {
return
_responseTimeout(_response.timestampEthBtc, TIMEOUT_ETH_BTC_FEED) ||
_responseTimeout(_response.timestampStEthEth, TIMEOUT_STETH_ETH_FEED);
}
function _fallbackIsFrozen(
... | oracle | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/kinggvd-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:53.360878+00:00 | 6aeb1fcf909ca627e3c6badb25b76aa33b770ccbdb552600b09e7bfc724e2818 | 2 | 0 | 903 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function _responseTimeout(uint256 _timestamp, uint256 _timeout) internal view returns (bool) {
return block.timestamp - _timestamp > _timeout;
}
to
function _responseTimeout(uint256 _timestamp, uint256 _timeout, uint256 _eps) internal view returns (bool) {
return block.timestamp - _timestamp >... | unknown | 343 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function _responseTimeout(uint256 _timestamp, uint256 _timeout) internal view returns (bool) {
return block.timestamp - _timestamp > _timeout;
}
to
function _responseTimeout(uint256 _timestamp, uint256 _timeout, uint256 _eps) internal view returns (bool) {
return blo... | 2 | false | 0 | function _responseTimeout(uint256 _timestamp, uint256 _timeout) internal view returns (bool) {
return block.timestamp - _timestamp > _timeout;
}
to
function _responseTimeout(uint256 _timestamp, uint256 _timeout, uint256 _eps) internal view returns (bool) {
return block.timestamp - _timesta... | true | function _chainlinkIsFrozen(ChainlinkResponse memory _response) internal view returns (bool) {
return
_responseTimeout(_response.timestampEthBtc, TIMEOUT_ETH_BTC_FEED) ||
_responseTimeout(_response.timestampStEthEth, TIMEOUT_STETH_ETH_FEED);
}
function _fallbackIsFrozen(
... | true | true | 6.32 | |||||
c4 | 01-salty | Rolezn Q | Critical | critical | ## QA Summary<a name="QA Summary">
### QA Issues
| |Issue|Contexts|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [QA‑1](#QA‑1) | `address wallet` in `USDS.mintTo()` can be `address(collateralAndLiquidity)` | 1 |
| [QA‑2](#QA‑2) | `ecrecover` may return empty address | 1 |
| [QA‑3](#QA‑3) | `forceApprove` sho... | File: USDS.sol
40: function mintTo( address wallet, uint256 amount ) external
{
require( msg.sender == address(collateralAndLiquidity), "USDS.mintTo is only callable from the Collateral contract" );
require( amount > 0, "Cannot mint zero USDS" );
_mint( wallet, amount );
emit USDSMinted(wallet, amount);
... | File: SigningTools.sol
26: address recoveredAddress = ecrecover(messageHash, v, r, s); | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/Rolezn-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:27.766697+00:00 | 6af565ee3e5a93136bc8328dc76d25c3a36b24f25628406ccbd1c819df73aad3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: USDS.sol
40: function mintTo( address wallet, uint256 amount ) external
{
require( msg.sender == address(collateralAndLiquidity), "USDS.mintTo is only callable from the Collateral contract" );
require( amount > 0, "Cannot mint zero USDS" );
_mint( wallet, amount );
emit USDSMinted(wallet, amount);
... | true | File: SigningTools.sol
26: address recoveredAddress = ecrecover(messageHash, v, r, s); | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 08-dopex | MiniGlome Q | Low | low | ## [LOW] Emited event is always address(0)
In `UniV3LiquidityAmo::removeLiquidity()` the event `log()` is emited with a mapping element that has just been deleted as parameter. This will always log `address(0)`.
```solidity
File UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol
L263: delete positions_mapping[pos.token_id]; //@audit delete mappin... | File UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol
L263: delete positions_mapping[pos.token_id]; //@audit delete mapping element
// send tokens to rdpxV2Core
_sendTokensToRdpxV2Core(tokenA, tokenB);
emit log(positions_array.length);
emit log(positions_mapping[pos.token_id].token_id); //@audit has just been deleted | File UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol
L289: ISwapRouter.ExactInputSingleParams memory swap_params = ISwapRouter
.ExactInputSingleParams(
_tokenA,
_tokenB,
_fee_tier,
address(this),
2105300114, // Expiration: a long time from now //@audit Deadline is in 13 years (2036)
_amount... | slippage | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/MiniGlome-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:54.227319+00:00 | 6afeb1f802185efca6b0fd90a0b37dfdc65c459815aaf846f754e80a751eac94 | 2 | 2 | 861 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | File UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol
L263: delete positions_mapping[pos.token_id]; //@audit delete mapping element
// send tokens to rdpxV2Core
_sendTokensToRdpxV2Core(tokenA, tokenB);
emit log(positions_array.length);
emit log(positions_mapping[pos.token_id].token_id); //@audit has just been deleted | solidity | 310 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol
L263: delete positions_mapping[pos.token_id]; //@audit delete mapping element
// send tokens to rdpxV2Core
_sendTokensToRdpxV2Core(tokenA, tokenB);
emit log(positions_array.length);
emit log(positions_mapping[pos.token_id].token_id); //@audit has... | 2 | false | File UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol
L263: delete positions_mapping[pos.token_id]; //@audit delete mapping element
// send tokens to rdpxV2Core
_sendTokensToRdpxV2Core(tokenA, tokenB);
emit log(positions_array.length);
emit log(positions_mapping[pos.token_id].token_id); //@audit has just been deleted
File Uni... | UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol#L269, UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol#L295 | UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol | 2 | File UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol
L263: delete positions_mapping[pos.token_id]; //@audit delete mapping element
// send tokens to rdpxV2Core
_sendTokensToRdpxV2Core(tokenA, tokenB);
emit log(positions_array.length);
emit log(positions_mapping[pos.token_id].token_id); //@audit has just been deleted | true | File UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol
L289: ISwapRouter.ExactInputSingleParams memory swap_params = ISwapRouter
.ExactInputSingleParams(
_tokenA,
_tokenB,
_fee_tier,
address(this),
2105300114, // Expiration: a long time from now //@audit Deadline is in 13 years (2036)
_amount... | true | true | 8 |
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