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2.4
15
c4
02-ethos
Go Langer G
Low
low
## Consider optimizing sendCollateral for batch operations in ActivePool.sol ```solidity function sendCollateral(address _collateral, address _account, uint _amount) external override { _requireValidCollateralAddress(_collateral); _requireCallerIsBOorTroveMorSP(); _rebalance(_collateral, _...
function sendCollateral(address _collateral, address _account, uint _amount) external override { _requireValidCollateralAddress(_collateral); _requireCallerIsBOorTroveMorSP(); _rebalance(_collateral, _amount); collAmount[_collateral] = collAmount[_collateral].sub(_amount); em...
function batchSendCollateral(address[] calldata _collateral, address[] calldata _account, uint[] calldata _amount) external override { _requireCallerIsBOorTroveMorSP(); uint256 length = _collateral.length; for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++) { _requireValidCollateralAddress(_collate...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/Go-Langer-G.md
2026-01-02T18:16:12.984835+00:00
499c0abe9b7de3e1e73266fe988695f776d9f8a08bfc0e4a88e664d75eb75fd5
1
0
16
0
false
false
true
false
high
Refactored code:
unknown
16
// Code block 1 (unknown): Refactored code:
1
false
0
function sendCollateral(address _collateral, address _account, uint _amount) external override { _requireValidCollateralAddress(_collateral); _requireCallerIsBOorTroveMorSP(); _rebalance(_collateral, _amount); collAmount[_collateral] = collAmount[_collateral].sub(_amount); em...
true
function batchSendCollateral(address[] calldata _collateral, address[] calldata _account, uint[] calldata _amount) external override { _requireCallerIsBOorTroveMorSP(); uint256 length = _collateral.length; for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++) { _requireValidCollateralAddress(_collate...
true
true
6
c4
01-ondo
Dinesh11G G
High
high
### 1st BUG Don't Initialize Variables with Default Value #### Impact Issue Information: Uninitialized variables are assigned with the types default value. Explicitly initializing a variable with it's default value costs unnecessary gas. Example 🤦 Bad: uint256 x = 0; bool y = false; 🚀 Good: uint256 x; bool y; ...
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/external/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol::45 => uint256 length = 0; 2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/external/openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/StringsUpgradeable.sol::46 => uint256 length = 0; 2023-01-ondo/contracts/lending/CompoundLens.sol::85 => for (uint i = 0; i < cTokenCount...
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::749 => uint256 size = redeemers.length; 2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::785 => uint256 size = refundees.length; 2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::932 => uint256 size = accounts.length; 2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::960 => results = new ...
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/Dinesh11G-G.md
2026-01-02T18:14:36.466309+00:00
49a035a0e60d01deaa1d40a0cf299baf0637c3c6a0dec333e188ab05db1e61cb
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/external/openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol::45 => uint256 length = 0; 2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/external/openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/StringsUpgradeable.sol::46 => uint256 length = 0; 2023-01-ondo/contracts/lending/CompoundLens.sol::85 => for (uint i = 0; i < cTokenCount...
true
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::749 => uint256 size = redeemers.length; 2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::785 => uint256 size = refundees.length; 2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::932 => uint256 size = accounts.length; 2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::960 => results = new ...
true
true
5
c4
01-biconomy
descharre G
Low
low
## Summary |ID | Syntax | Gas saved| Instances | |:----: | :--- | :----: | :----: | |1 | Make nonces private| 22 | 1 | | 2 | refundInfo.gasPrice is redundant| 18| 1 | | 3 |Unchecked for loop| 611 | 1 | ## Details ### 1 Make nonces private Saves on averag...
function increment_unchecked(uint256 x) private pure returns (uint256) { unchecked { return x + 1; } } for (uint256 i = 0; i < opasLen; i =increment_unchecked(i++) ) { totalOps += opsPerAggregator[i].userOps.length; }
upgrade
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/descharre-G.md
2026-01-02T18:13:42.310990+00:00
49c0af40d3053bcf2cf37baa470436a9934501a9da31a95b2e469178b4cd6f67
1
0
270
5
false
true
true
false
medium
function increment_unchecked(uint256 x) private pure returns (uint256) { unchecked { return x + 1; } } for (uint256 i = 0; i < opasLen; i =increment_unchecked(i++) ) { totalOps += opsPerAggregator[i].userOps.length; }
unknown
270
// Code block 1 (unknown): function increment_unchecked(uint256 x) private pure returns (uint256) { unchecked { return x + 1; } } for (uint256 i = 0; i < opasLen; i =increment_unchecked(i++) ) { totalOps += opsPerAggregator[i].userOps.length; }
1
false
SmartAccount.sol#L55, SmartAccount.sol#L232, SmartAccount.sol#L234, EntryPoint.sol, EntryPoint.sol#L93-L142
SmartAccount.sol, EntryPoint.sol
5
function increment_unchecked(uint256 x) private pure returns (uint256) { unchecked { return x + 1; } } for (uint256 i = 0; i < opasLen; i =increment_unchecked(i++) ) { totalOps += opsPerAggregator[i].userOps.length; }
true
false
false
6
c4
07-amphora
alymurtazamemon G
High
high
# Amphora Protocol - Gas Optimization Report ## Table Of Content | Number | Issue | Instances | | :------------------------------------------------------...
Similarly for all these functions, users will save 24 gas per call just adding `payable` keyword. [AMPHClaimer.sol - Line 128](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main/core/solidity/contracts/core/AMPHClaimer.sol#L128) [AMPHClaimer.sol - Line 136](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main...
[USDA.sol - Line 132](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main/core/solidity/contracts/core/USDA.sol#L132)
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/alymurtazamemon-G.md
2026-01-02T18:23:40.796140+00:00
49c93fa4b410f7a17ce340e8bf3759b8f6fc2f72a317c82fe8a5bbd4cc4bd84e
0
0
0
16
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
AMPHClaimer.sol#L128, AMPHClaimer.sol#L136, AMPHClaimer.sol#L144, USDA.sol#L63, USDA.sol#L161, USDA.sol#L182, USDA.sol#L212, USDA.sol#L224, USDA.sol#L231, USDA.sol#L239, USDA.sol#L253, USDA.sol#L278, USDA.sol#L287, USDA.sol#L297, Vault.sol#L89, USDA.sol#L132
AMPHClaimer.sol, USDA.sol, Vault.sol
16
Similarly for all these functions, users will save 24 gas per call just adding `payable` keyword. [AMPHClaimer.sol - Line 128](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main/core/solidity/contracts/core/AMPHClaimer.sol#L128) [AMPHClaimer.sol - Line 136](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main...
true
[USDA.sol - Line 132](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main/core/solidity/contracts/core/USDA.sol#L132)
true
true
6
c4
11-kelp
peanuts Q
Low
low
### [L-01] Supported Assets cannot be removed in LRTConfig.sol The asset and deposit limit can be added to the `isSupportedAsset` mapping and is pushed to the `supportedAssetList` address array, but cannot be popped nor set to false. It would be great if the asset can be popped from the array if the supported token is...
/// @dev Adds a new supported asset /// @param asset Asset address /// @param depositLimit Deposit limit for the asset function _addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) private { UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(asset); if (isSupportedAsset[asset]) { revert Asset...
function addNodeDelegatorContractToQueue(address[] calldata nodeDelegatorContracts) external onlyLRTAdmin { uint256 length = nodeDelegatorContracts.length; if (nodeDelegatorQueue.length + length > maxNodeDelegatorCount) { revert MaximumNodeDelegatorCountReached(); } for ...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/peanuts-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:28:22.289430+00:00
49dfd5386d1bcaec422a453476e773b1e36d1644368aebee2586d3e8a92ca61b
1
0
534
1
false
false
true
false
high
/// @dev Adds a new supported asset /// @param asset Asset address /// @param depositLimit Deposit limit for the asset function _addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) private { UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(asset); if (isSupportedAsset[asset]) { revert AssetAlre...
unknown
534
// Code block 1 (unknown): /// @dev Adds a new supported asset /// @param asset Asset address /// @param depositLimit Deposit limit for the asset function _addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) private { UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(asset); if (isSupportedAsset[asset]) { ...
1
false
LRTConfig.sol
LRTConfig.sol
1
/// @dev Adds a new supported asset /// @param asset Asset address /// @param depositLimit Deposit limit for the asset function _addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) private { UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(asset); if (isSupportedAsset[asset]) { revert Asset...
true
function addNodeDelegatorContractToQueue(address[] calldata nodeDelegatorContracts) external onlyLRTAdmin { uint256 length = nodeDelegatorContracts.length; if (nodeDelegatorQueue.length + length > maxNodeDelegatorCount) { revert MaximumNodeDelegatorCountReached(); } for ...
true
true
7
c4
10-badger
Rickard G
Medium
medium
## [G-01] Use named imports instead of plain `import file.sol ## Summary Using import declarations of the form `import {<identifier_name>} from 'some/file.sol'` avoids polluting the symbol namespace making flattened files smaller, and speeds up compilation. ## Vulnerability Details ## Impact Instances (95): ````solidi...
packages\contracts\contracts\Dependencies\EbtcBase.sol 5: import "./BaseMath.sol"; 6: import "./EbtcMath.sol"; 7: import "../Interfaces/IActivePool.sol"; 8: import "../Interfaces/IPriceFeed.sol"; 9: import "../Interfaces/IEbtcBase.sol"; 10: import "../Dependencies/ICollateralToken.sol";
packages\contracts\contracts\Dependencies\ERC3156FlashLender.sol 5: import "../Interfaces/IERC3156FlashLender.sol"; 6: import "../Interfaces/IWETH.sol";
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/Rickard-G.md
2026-01-02T18:26:35.641939+00:00
49e85f205e89f1c43f95746e9f8a30233bd71935b7f57728f49e6c49ba60a7ef
10
10
1,452
0
false
false
true
false
high
packages\contracts\contracts\Dependencies\EbtcBase.sol 5: import "./BaseMath.sol"; 6: import "./EbtcMath.sol"; 7: import "../Interfaces/IActivePool.sol"; 8: import "../Interfaces/IPriceFeed.sol"; 9: import "../Interfaces/IEbtcBase.sol"; 10: import "../Dependencies/ICollateralToken.sol";
solidity
288
// Code block 1 (solidity): packages\contracts\contracts\Dependencies\EbtcBase.sol 5: import "./BaseMath.sol"; 6: import "./EbtcMath.sol"; 7: import "../Interfaces/IActivePool.sol"; 8: import "../Interfaces/IPriceFeed.sol"; 9: import "../Interfaces/IEbtcBase.sol"; 10: import "../Dependencies/ICollateralToken.sol"; //...
10
false
packages\contracts\contracts\Dependencies\EbtcBase.sol 5: import "./BaseMath.sol"; 6: import "./EbtcMath.sol"; 7: import "../Interfaces/IActivePool.sol"; 8: import "../Interfaces/IPriceFeed.sol"; 9: import "../Interfaces/IEbtcBase.sol"; 10: import "../Dependencies/ICollateralToken.sol"; packages\contracts\contracts\D...
0
packages\contracts\contracts\Dependencies\EbtcBase.sol 5: import "./BaseMath.sol"; 6: import "./EbtcMath.sol"; 7: import "../Interfaces/IActivePool.sol"; 8: import "../Interfaces/IPriceFeed.sol"; 9: import "../Interfaces/IEbtcBase.sol"; 10: import "../Dependencies/ICollateralToken.sol";
true
packages\contracts\contracts\Dependencies\ERC3156FlashLender.sol 5: import "../Interfaces/IERC3156FlashLender.sol"; 6: import "../Interfaces/IWETH.sol";
true
true
15
c4
06-lybra
0xRobocop Q
Critical
critical
The following criteria are used for suggested severity: - L - Low Severity -> Some risk - NC - Non-Critical / Informational -> Minor suggestions # L-01 Normal liquidations at the EUSD and PeUSD vaults do not take into account providers preferences over their funds. The `liquidation` function in the EUSD and PeUSD v...
@dev This function can only be called by accounts with ADMIN or higher privilege.
function setvaultMintPaused(address pool, bool isActive) external checkRole(ADMIN) { vaultMintPaused[pool] = isActive; }
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/0xRobocop-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:22:01.916892+00:00
4a15cd5fdca9722e0857a82ed0b55f02d90e75426ac12053f7c37d5bd808143e
5
5
608
0
false
false
true
false
high
@dev This function can only be called by accounts with ADMIN or higher privilege.
solidity
81
// Code block 1 (solidity): @dev This function can only be called by accounts with ADMIN or higher privilege. // Code block 2 (solidity): function setvaultMintPaused(address pool, bool isActive) external checkRole(ADMIN) { vaultMintPaused[pool] = isActive; } // Code block 3 (solidity): modifier checkRole(bytes32 ...
5
false
@dev This function can only be called by accounts with ADMIN or higher privilege. function setvaultMintPaused(address pool, bool isActive) external checkRole(ADMIN) { vaultMintPaused[pool] = isActive; } modifier checkRole(bytes32 role) { GovernanceTimelock.checkRole(role, msg.sender); _; } function checkRo...
0
@dev This function can only be called by accounts with ADMIN or higher privilege.
true
function setvaultMintPaused(address pool, bool isActive) external checkRole(ADMIN) { vaultMintPaused[pool] = isActive; }
true
true
10
c4
08-dopex
JP_Courses G
Gas
gas
0. RdpxV2Core::settle() - Gas optimization possible in `for loop`. https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex/blob/e96aaa5ea21f11b29d828dbe2d0745974cd046ed/contracts/core/RdpxV2Core.sol#L775-L777 Current code: ```solidity for (uint256 i = 0; i < optionIds.length; i++) { /// @audit-issue GAS optionsOwned[o...
for (uint256 i = 0; i < optionIds.length; i++) { /// @audit-issue GAS optionsOwned[optionIds[i]] = false; }
++ uint256 optionIdsLength = optionIds.length; ++ for (uint256 i; i < optionIdsLength;) { optionsOwned[optionIds[i]] = false; ++ unchecked { ++ i++; ++ } }
other
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/JP_Courses-G.md
2026-01-02T18:24:42.498539+00:00
4a625d90aa06f2f6abb32c28140a61bb9723aa40039d15a4d44ad594dfaaaff6
5
5
881
3
false
false
true
false
high
for (uint256 i = 0; i < optionIds.length; i++) { /// @audit-issue GAS optionsOwned[optionIds[i]] = false; }
solidity
118
// Code block 1 (solidity): for (uint256 i = 0; i < optionIds.length; i++) { /// @audit-issue GAS optionsOwned[optionIds[i]] = false; } // Code block 2 (solidity): ++ uint256 optionIdsLength = optionIds.length; ++ for (uint256 i; i < optionIdsLength;) { optionsOwned[optionIds[i]] = false; ++ ...
5
false
for (uint256 i = 0; i < optionIds.length; i++) { /// @audit-issue GAS optionsOwned[optionIds[i]] = false; } ++ uint256 optionIdsLength = optionIds.length; ++ for (uint256 i; i < optionIdsLength;) { optionsOwned[optionIds[i]] = false; ++ unchecked { ++ i++; ++ } } ++ uint256 _amo...
RdpxV2Core.sol#L775-L777, RdpxV2Core.sol#L836-L867, RdpxV2Core.sol#L167-L170
RdpxV2Core.sol
3
for (uint256 i = 0; i < optionIds.length; i++) { /// @audit-issue GAS optionsOwned[optionIds[i]] = false; }
true
++ uint256 optionIdsLength = optionIds.length; ++ for (uint256 i; i < optionIdsLength;) { optionsOwned[optionIds[i]] = false; ++ unchecked { ++ i++; ++ } }
true
true
11
c4
02-ethos
RaymondFam Q
High
high
## Impractical upper bound limit in `_requireValidMaxFeePercentage()` In `_requireValidMaxFeePercentage()` of BorrowerOperations.sol, the upper bound of `_maxFeePercentage` is `DECIMAL_PRECISION`, i.e. 1e18 (or 100%). However, when [`getBorrowingFee()`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/c...
## Uninitialized `baseRate` till the first call on `redeemCollateral()` The impact, though low, is twofold. First off, the output of `getBorrowingFee()` is always going to be `BORROWING_FEE_FLOOR`, i.e. [0.5%](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/Dependencies/LiquityBase.sol#L30) b...
Next, when `baseRate` finally gets assigned via [`updateBaseRateFromRedemption()`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol#L1408-L1417), increasing the `baseRate` based on the amount redeemed, as a proportion of total supply, is going to be minimally negligible unless...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/RaymondFam-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:16:33.279053+00:00
4a86cb98ee5c82e76e0c85b15bceecc22bad3794ddbbdb0c2daf5561311580f0
0
0
0
10
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
TroveManager.sol#L1471-L1473, BorrowerOperations.sol#L421, TroveManager.sol#L1467, TroveManager.sol#L55, LiquityBase.sol#L90, BorrowerOperations.sol#L648-L656, LiquityBase.sol#L30, TroveManager.sol#L1464-L1469, TroveManager.sol#L1408-L1417, TroveManager.sol#L1509-L1514
TroveManager.sol, BorrowerOperations.sol, LiquityBase.sol
10
## Uninitialized `baseRate` till the first call on `redeemCollateral()` The impact, though low, is twofold. First off, the output of `getBorrowingFee()` is always going to be `BORROWING_FEE_FLOOR`, i.e. [0.5%](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/Dependencies/LiquityBase.sol#L30) b...
true
Next, when `baseRate` finally gets assigned via [`updateBaseRateFromRedemption()`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol#L1408-L1417), increasing the `baseRate` based on the amount redeemed, as a proportion of total supply, is going to be minimally negligible unless...
true
true
6
c4
01-biconomy
Breeje Q
Low
low
## QA Report | |Issue|Instances| |-|:-|:-:| | [L-1](#L-1) | USE OF FLOATING PRAGMA | 13 | | [L-2](#L-2) | MISSING CONTRACT-EXISTENCE CHECKS BEFORE LOW-LEVEL CALLS | 6 | | [L-3](#L-3) | CONSIDER USING A TWO-STEP-TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP | 2 | | [L-4](#L-4) | POSSIBLE REENTRACY ATTACK | 2 | | [NC-1](#NC-1) | USE REQUIRE ...
File: Proxy.sol 28: let result := delegatecall(gas(), target, 0, calldatasize(), 0, 0)
File: aa-4337/utils/Exec.sol 35: success := delegatecall(txGas, to, add(data, 0x20), mload(data), 0, 0)
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/Breeje-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:12:59.926040+00:00
4adb40f2ba7b8682e7526502f4be2f73a04cdf5d5da8f27676870d430f0983bb
0
0
0
7
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
BasePaymaster.sol#L2, BaseAccount.sol#L2, EntryPoint.sol#L6, SenderCreator.sol#L2, StakeManager.sol#L2, IAccount.sol#L2, IAggregatedAccount.sol#L2
SenderCreator.sol, IAggregatedAccount.sol, BasePaymaster.sol, BaseAccount.sol, IAccount.sol, EntryPoint.sol, StakeManager.sol
7
File: Proxy.sol 28: let result := delegatecall(gas(), target, 0, calldatasize(), 0, 0)
true
File: aa-4337/utils/Exec.sol 35: success := delegatecall(txGas, to, add(data, 0x20), mload(data), 0, 0)
true
true
6
c4
03-asymmetry
Sathish9098 G
Critical
critical
# GAS OPTIMIZATIONS | | Issues| Instances| |:--------:|-------|----------| | [G-1] | Use a more recent version of solidity |4 | | [G-2] | Setting the constructor to payable |4 | | [G-3] | OPTIMIZE NAMES TO SAVE GAS | 37| | [G-4] | Don't declare the variables inside the loops costs mo...
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.13;
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.13;
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Sathish9098-G.md
2026-01-02T18:18:33.269005+00:00
4b36d7e0b23fe3b49d0f909f39aaf95c36982b03bf35025e8d4fd5ff7feaadc4
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.13;
true
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.13;
true
true
5
c4
05-ajna
niki Q
Unknown
unknown
### Unsafe ERC20 Operation(s) #### Findings: ``` anja\RewardsManager.sol::250 => IERC721(address(positionManager)).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), tokenId_); anja\RewardsManager.sol::302 => IERC721(address(positionManager)).transferFrom(address(this), msg.sender, tokenId_); ```
anja\RewardsManager.sol::250 => IERC721(address(positionManager)).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), tokenId_); anja\RewardsManager.sol::302 => IERC721(address(positionManager)).transferFrom(address(this), msg.sender, tokenId_);
other
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/niki-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:21:40.023188+00:00
4b4ae24260ca1ef91013250c1b7893691eab9dade881be82e5ef7f40160ca5e4
1
0
233
0
false
true
true
false
medium
anja\RewardsManager.sol::250 => IERC721(address(positionManager)).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), tokenId_); anja\RewardsManager.sol::302 => IERC721(address(positionManager)).transferFrom(address(this), msg.sender, tokenId_);
unknown
233
// Code block 1 (unknown): anja\RewardsManager.sol::250 => IERC721(address(positionManager)).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), tokenId_); anja\RewardsManager.sol::302 => IERC721(address(positionManager)).transferFrom(address(this), msg.sender, tokenId_);
1
false
0
anja\RewardsManager.sol::250 => IERC721(address(positionManager)).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), tokenId_); anja\RewardsManager.sol::302 => IERC721(address(positionManager)).transferFrom(address(this), msg.sender, tokenId_);
true
false
false
2.57
c4
06-lybra
Silvermist Q
High
high
## Emitting event before it happens ``` function setFlashloanFee(uint256 fee) external checkRole(TIMELOCK) { if (fee > 10_000) revert('EL'); emit FlashloanFeeUpdated(fee); flashloanFee = fee; } ``` https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra/blob/7b73ef2fbb542b569e182d9abf79be643ca883ee/cont...
function setFlashloanFee(uint256 fee) external checkRole(TIMELOCK) { if (fee > 10_000) revert('EL'); emit FlashloanFeeUpdated(fee); flashloanFee = fee; }
/** * @notice Update user's claimable reward data and record the timestamp. */ function refreshReward(address _account) external updateReward(_account) {}
flash-loan
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/Silvermist-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:22:44.928931+00:00
4b652fbeac5ee3232504a4428041dcd0cbcdd585f83c0650de2a169c4e3c4b20
3
0
644
3
false
false
true
false
high
function setFlashloanFee(uint256 fee) external checkRole(TIMELOCK) { if (fee > 10_000) revert('EL'); emit FlashloanFeeUpdated(fee); flashloanFee = fee; }
unknown
181
// Code block 1 (unknown): function setFlashloanFee(uint256 fee) external checkRole(TIMELOCK) { if (fee > 10_000) revert('EL'); emit FlashloanFeeUpdated(fee); flashloanFee = fee; } // Code block 2 (unknown): /** * @notice Update user's claimable reward data and record the timestamp. ...
3
false
LybraConfigurator.sol#L253-L257, EUSDMiningIncentives.sol#L171-L174, LybraConfigurator.sol#L235-L240
EUSDMiningIncentives.sol, LybraConfigurator.sol
3
function setFlashloanFee(uint256 fee) external checkRole(TIMELOCK) { if (fee > 10_000) revert('EL'); emit FlashloanFeeUpdated(fee); flashloanFee = fee; }
true
/** * @notice Update user's claimable reward data and record the timestamp. */ function refreshReward(address _account) external updateReward(_account) {}
true
true
9
c4
04-caviar
0x6980 G
Medium
medium
# 1. Use assembly to write address storage values - [EthRouter.sol#L91](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/cd8a92667bcb6657f70657183769c244d04c015c/src/EthRouter.sol#L91) ```js File: src/EthRouter.sol 90: constructor(address _royaltyRegistry) { 91: royaltyRegistry = _royaltyRegistry; 90: } ...
File: src/EthRouter.sol 90: constructor(address _royaltyRegistry) { 91: royaltyRegistry = _royaltyRegistry; 90: }
File: src/Factory.sol 129: function setPrivatePoolMetadata(address _privatePoolMetadata) public onlyOwner { 130: privatePoolMetadata = _privatePoolMetadata; 131: } 135: function setPrivatePoolImplementation(address _privatePoolImplementation) public onlyOwner { 136: privatePoolImplementation = ...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/0x6980-G.md
2026-01-02T18:19:17.172264+00:00
4ba4eb2de8d94c96bb0d31b1206019a1e888eafe4a092fb1c0929444bff788d5
3
0
606
7
false
false
true
false
high
File: src/EthRouter.sol 90: constructor(address _royaltyRegistry) { 91: royaltyRegistry = _royaltyRegistry; 90: }
js
127
// Code block 1 (js): File: src/EthRouter.sol 90: constructor(address _royaltyRegistry) { 91: royaltyRegistry = _royaltyRegistry; 90: } // Code block 2 (js): File: src/Factory.sol 129: function setPrivatePoolMetadata(address _privatePoolMetadata) public onlyOwner { 130: privatePoolMetadata = _...
3
false
EthRouter.sol#L91, Factory.sol#L130, Factory.sol#L136, EthRouter.sol#L101, EthRouter.sol#L154, EthRouter.sol#L228, EthRouter.sol#L256
EthRouter.sol, Factory.sol
7
File: src/EthRouter.sol 90: constructor(address _royaltyRegistry) { 91: royaltyRegistry = _royaltyRegistry; 90: }
true
File: src/Factory.sol 129: function setPrivatePoolMetadata(address _privatePoolMetadata) public onlyOwner { 130: privatePoolMetadata = _privatePoolMetadata; 131: } 135: function setPrivatePoolImplementation(address _privatePoolImplementation) public onlyOwner { 136: privatePoolImplementation = ...
true
true
9
c4
05-ajna
nzm_ G
Low
low
### <a> += <b> costs more gas than <a> = <a> + <b> for state variables Using the addition (or subtraction) operator instead of plus-equals (minus-equals) saves 13 gas for state variables and 7 gas for `mapping` to `struct` per iteration. 9 Instances found: https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/main/ajna-gra...
newId_ = ++_currentDistributionId
// check that the voter has enough voting power remaining to cast the vote if (cumulativeVotePowerUsed > votingPower) revert InsufficientVotingPower(); // update voter voting power accumulator voter_.remainingVotingPower = votingPower - cumulativeVotePowerUsed;
overflow
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/nzm_-G.md
2026-01-02T18:21:40.521964+00:00
4bb595ac6c5d3c0dc23f1e0e56f636dbedbee4432fce0997f0ee60894f04455b
0
0
0
14
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
GrantFund.sol#L62, ExtraordinaryFunding.sol#L78, ExtraordinaryFunding.sol#L145, StandardFunding.sol#L217, StandardFunding.sol#L648, StandardFunding.sol#L673, StandardFunding.sol#L676, PositionManager.sol#L320, PositionManager.sol#L321, Funding.sol#L54-L56, Funding.sol#L153-L155, ExtraordinaryFunding.sol#L57-L59, Extrao...
GrantFund.sol, PositionManager.sol, StandardFunding.sol, Funding.sol, ExtraordinaryFunding.sol
14
newId_ = ++_currentDistributionId
true
// check that the voter has enough voting power remaining to cast the vote if (cumulativeVotePowerUsed > votingPower) revert InsufficientVotingPower(); // update voter voting power accumulator voter_.remainingVotingPower = votingPower - cumulativeVotePowerUsed;
true
true
6
c4
01-biconomy
0xAgro G
High
high
# Gas Report ## Finding Summary ||Issue|Instances| |-|-|-| |[G-01]|Bit Shift(s) Not Used For MUL/DIV/MOD of Powers of 2|9| |[G-02]|`uint256` Iterator Checked Each Iteration|7| |[G-03]|&& In If Statement(s)|5| |[G-04]|`i++`/`i+=1` Used Over `++i`|[+4](https://gist.github.com/Picodes/0a53b4abfc71e0b9998e8b09aa283fb3)| |[...
200: uint256 startGas = gasleft() + 21000 + msg.data.length * 8; 224: require(gasleft() >= max((_tx.targetTxGas * 64) / 63,_tx.targetTxGas + 2500) + 500, "BSA010");
36: return (a & b) + (a ^ b) / 2;
overflow
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/0xAgro-G.md
2026-01-02T18:12:46.314381+00:00
4bd415f07cc7977efbc8d4e4e2849421fb5570f9adaadbb1819f3d55034fd4ad
3
3
324
3
false
false
true
false
high
200: uint256 startGas = gasleft() + 21000 + msg.data.length * 8; 224: require(gasleft() >= max((_tx.targetTxGas * 64) / 63,_tx.targetTxGas + 2500) + 500, "BSA010");
solidity
164
// Code block 1 (solidity): 200: uint256 startGas = gasleft() + 21000 + msg.data.length * 8; 224: require(gasleft() >= max((_tx.targetTxGas * 64) / 63,_tx.targetTxGas + 2500) + 500, "BSA010"); // Code block 2 (solidity): 36: return (a & b) + (a ^ b) / 2; // Code block 3 (solidity): //From for (uint256 i; i < len; ++i...
3
false
200: uint256 startGas = gasleft() + 21000 + msg.data.length * 8; 224: require(gasleft() >= max((_tx.targetTxGas * 64) / 63,_tx.targetTxGas + 2500) + 500, "BSA010"); 36: return (a & b) + (a ^ b) / 2; //From for (uint256 i; i < len; ++i) { //Do Something } //To for (uint256 i; i < len;) { //Do Something unchecked { ...
SmartAccount.sol#L200, SmartAccount.sol#L224, Math.sol#L36
Math.sol, SmartAccount.sol
3
200: uint256 startGas = gasleft() + 21000 + msg.data.length * 8; 224: require(gasleft() >= max((_tx.targetTxGas * 64) / 63,_tx.targetTxGas + 2500) + 500, "BSA010");
true
36: return (a & b) + (a ^ b) / 2;
true
true
9
c4
11-kelp
Madalad Q
Critical
critical
# QA Report ## Chainlink price feed `decimals` not checked The price value returned by a Chainlink price feed will have a different `decimals` value depending on the price feed used. While currently **most** ETH pairs use 18 decimals and USD pairs use 8 decimals (see the price feeds for [LINK/ETH](https://etherscan.i...
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/main/src/oracles/ChainlinkPriceOracle.sol#L38 ## Chainlink aggregators return the incorrect price if it drops below `minAnswer` Chainlink aggregators have a built in circuit breaker if the price of an asset goes outside of a predetermined price band. The result is that ...
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/main/src/LRTConfig.sol#L149-L163 ## LRTManager can transfer asset tokens to `NodeDelegator` while contract is paused `LRTDepositPool` uses `Pausable` to allow the manager/admin to pause the contract and prevent any sensitive actions, however `transferAssetToNodeDelegato...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/Madalad-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:27:32.262748+00:00
4bf972851ecb422c41238c74277396203df47417c23750cd1dfb90f7ec71ef3a
0
0
0
3
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
ChainlinkPriceOracle.sol#L38, LRTConfig.sol#L149-L163, LRTDepositPool.sol#L183-L192
LRTConfig.sol, ChainlinkPriceOracle.sol, LRTDepositPool.sol
3
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/main/src/oracles/ChainlinkPriceOracle.sol#L38 ## Chainlink aggregators return the incorrect price if it drops below `minAnswer` Chainlink aggregators have a built in circuit breaker if the price of an asset goes outside of a predetermined price band. The result is that ...
true
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/main/src/LRTConfig.sol#L149-L163 ## LRTManager can transfer asset tokens to `NodeDelegator` while contract is paused `LRTDepositPool` uses `Pausable` to allow the manager/admin to pause the contract and prevent any sensitive actions, however `transferAssetToNodeDelegato...
true
true
6
c4
03-asymmetry
Diana Q
Critical
critical
------- | S No. | Issue | Instances | |-----|-----|-----| | [01] | Unused receive() function will lock ether in contract | 3 | [02] | Upgradeable contract is missing a_\_gap[50] storage variable to allow for new storage variables in later versions | 4 | [03] | Use scientific notation rather than exponentiation | 21 | ...
File: SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol 244: receive() external payable {}
File: SafEth/derivatives/SfrxEth.sol 126: receive() external payable {}
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Diana-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:18:02.460718+00:00
4c1c731e39ae55deede3520e3789379e6627133bbf9f92c33831c5f05258f051
3
0
211
3
false
false
true
false
high
File: SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol 244: receive() external payable {}
unknown
69
// Code block 1 (unknown): File: SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol 244: receive() external payable {} // Code block 2 (unknown): File: SafEth/derivatives/SfrxEth.sol 126: receive() external payable {} // Code block 3 (unknown): File: SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol 97: receive() external payable {}
3
false
Reth.sol, SfrxEth.sol, WstEth.sol
SfrxEth.sol, Reth.sol, WstEth.sol
3
File: SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol 244: receive() external payable {}
true
File: SafEth/derivatives/SfrxEth.sol 126: receive() external payable {}
true
true
9
c4
05-ajna
c3phas G
High
high
### Table Of Contents - [FINDINGS](#findings) - [IF's/require() statements that check input arguments should be at the top of the function](#ifsrequire-statements-that-check-input-arguments-should-be-at-the-top-of-the-function) - [Don't read from storage if we might revert on a check that involves a function argument...
File: /ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol 135: function moveStakedLiquidity( 136: uint256 tokenId_, 137: uint256[] memory fromBuckets_, 138: uint256[] memory toBuckets_, 139: uint256 expiry_ 140: ) external nonReentrant override { 141: StakeInfo storage stakeInfo = stakes[tokenId_...
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/276942bc2f97488d07b887c8edceaaab7a5c3964/ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol#L207-L213 ### Reorder the checks here to have the cheaper one first
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/c3phas-G.md
2026-01-02T18:21:23.474205+00:00
4c2cfedb01549cfb5a03b0e766c4bb0fb166a31a0ae82579fbb718868259e37e
0
0
0
1
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
RewardsManager.sol#L207-L213
RewardsManager.sol
1
File: /ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol 135: function moveStakedLiquidity( 136: uint256 tokenId_, 137: uint256[] memory fromBuckets_, 138: uint256[] memory toBuckets_, 139: uint256 expiry_ 140: ) external nonReentrant override { 141: StakeInfo storage stakeInfo = stakes[tokenId_...
true
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/276942bc2f97488d07b887c8edceaaab7a5c3964/ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol#L207-L213 ### Reorder the checks here to have the cheaper one first
true
true
6
c4
09-ondo
djanerch Q
High
high
**Summary** The `setOracle` function in the `rUSDY.sol` contract doesn't check if the `_oracle` address is valid. This oversight can lead to problems if the contract owner mistakenly sets the address to `address(0)`. **Details:** The `setOracle` function in the `rUSDY.sol` contract allows the contract owner to updat...
function setOracle(address _oracle) external onlyRole(USDY_MANAGER_ROLE) { require(_oracle != address(0), "Invalid oracle address"); oracle = IRWADynamicOracle(_oracle); }
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/djanerch-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:25:54.704442+00:00
4c857004b4b81481e047f5e7bc091ecbae306cf6f75f9727f0be12c148d5e053
1
1
180
0
false
true
true
false
high
function setOracle(address _oracle) external onlyRole(USDY_MANAGER_ROLE) { require(_oracle != address(0), "Invalid oracle address"); oracle = IRWADynamicOracle(_oracle); }
solidity
180
// Code block 1 (solidity): function setOracle(address _oracle) external onlyRole(USDY_MANAGER_ROLE) { require(_oracle != address(0), "Invalid oracle address"); oracle = IRWADynamicOracle(_oracle); }
1
false
function setOracle(address _oracle) external onlyRole(USDY_MANAGER_ROLE) { require(_oracle != address(0), "Invalid oracle address"); oracle = IRWADynamicOracle(_oracle); }
0
function setOracle(address _oracle) external onlyRole(USDY_MANAGER_ROLE) { require(_oracle != address(0), "Invalid oracle address"); oracle = IRWADynamicOracle(_oracle); }
true
false
false
4.48
c4
03-asymmetry
ernestognw Q
Low
low
## ETH sent to the contract will be unlocked The `SafEth.sol` contract contains a `receive() external payable` function that allows depositing into the contract directly. However, there's no sweeping mechanism for ETH in the contract and the only way to get withdraw ETH from the contract is by calling `unstake()` whic...
// @notice Test function test_alterBalance() public { _deploy(); (bool success, ) = address(safEth).call{value: 1 ether}(""); require(success); assertEq(safEth.totalSupply(), 0); assertEq(address(safEth).balance, 1 ether); } function _deploy() internal { // Implementations of these omitted for c...
uint256 ethAmount = (msg.value * weight) / totalWeight;
upgrade
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/ernestognw-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:19:06.140992+00:00
4cae117ab13e871aa8b43a5bdc6e6ea5e0be098703a436db4f0c15e83501a48d
2
2
453
0
false
false
true
false
high
// @notice Test function test_alterBalance() public { _deploy(); (bool success, ) = address(safEth).call{value: 1 ether}(""); require(success); assertEq(safEth.totalSupply(), 0); assertEq(address(safEth).balance, 1 ether); } function _deploy() internal { // Implementations of these omitted for c...
solidity
398
// Code block 1 (solidity): // @notice Test function test_alterBalance() public { _deploy(); (bool success, ) = address(safEth).call{value: 1 ether}(""); require(success); assertEq(safEth.totalSupply(), 0); assertEq(address(safEth).balance, 1 ether); } function _deploy() internal { // Implementa...
2
false
// @notice Test function test_alterBalance() public { _deploy(); (bool success, ) = address(safEth).call{value: 1 ether}(""); require(success); assertEq(safEth.totalSupply(), 0); assertEq(address(safEth).balance, 1 ether); } function _deploy() internal { // Implementations of these omitted for c...
0
// @notice Test function test_alterBalance() public { _deploy(); (bool success, ) = address(safEth).call{value: 1 ether}(""); require(success); assertEq(safEth.totalSupply(), 0); assertEq(address(safEth).balance, 1 ether); } function _deploy() internal { // Implementations of these omitted for c...
true
uint256 ethAmount = (msg.value * weight) / totalWeight;
true
true
7
c4
03-asymmetry
Sabit G
Gas
gas
Here are some gas optimization issues: Redundant ERC20 balance check in withdraw() function. https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/44b5cd94ebedc187a08884a7f685e950e987261c/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol#L56 ``` function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner { IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwra...
function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner { IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount); uint256 stEthBal = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this)); // Redundant IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, stEthBal); uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; IStEthEthPo...
function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner { IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount); uint256 minOut = (_amount * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, _amount); IStEthEthPool(LIDO_CRV_POOL).exchange(1, 0, _amount, minOut); // solhint-disable-next-line ...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Sabit-G.md
2026-01-02T18:18:31.464873+00:00
4d39447627ccd4f591fbdd56e70e8a13bc754b4f14d4803f56bca3dfe7de28e5
2
0
1,001
2
false
false
true
false
high
function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner { IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount); uint256 stEthBal = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this)); // Redundant IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, stEthBal); uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; IStEthEthPo...
unknown
543
// Code block 1 (unknown): function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner { IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount); uint256 stEthBal = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this)); // Redundant IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, stEthBal); uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) ...
2
false
WstEth.sol#L56, WstEth.sol#L93
WstEth.sol
2
function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner { IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount); uint256 stEthBal = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this)); // Redundant IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, stEthBal); uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; IStEthEthPo...
true
function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner { IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount); uint256 minOut = (_amount * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, _amount); IStEthEthPool(LIDO_CRV_POOL).exchange(1, 0, _amount, minOut); // solhint-disable-next-line ...
true
true
8
c4
08-dopex
Rolezn G
High
high
## GAS Summary<a name="GAS Summary"> ### Gas Optimizations | |Issue|Contexts|Estimated Gas Saved| |-|:-|:-|:-:| | [GAS&#x2011;1](#GAS&#x2011;1) | Activate the optimizer | 1 | - | | [GAS&#x2011;2](#GAS&#x2011;2) | `address(this)` can be stored in `state variable` that will ultimately cost less, than every time calculat...
module.exports = { solidity: { version: "0.8.19", settings: { optimizer: { enabled: true, runs: 1000, }, }, }, };
for !=0 before optimization PUSH1 0x00 DUP2 EQ ISZERO PUSH1 [cont offset] JUMPI after optimization DUP1 PUSH1 [revert offset] JUMPI
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/Rolezn-G.md
2026-01-02T18:24:59.577070+00:00
4d4163ed4ef841af7c4909f90dab45a8e2a3fc30f1843351d63a2643673ea4e8
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
module.exports = { solidity: { version: "0.8.19", settings: { optimizer: { enabled: true, runs: 1000, }, }, }, };
true
for !=0 before optimization PUSH1 0x00 DUP2 EQ ISZERO PUSH1 [cont offset] JUMPI after optimization DUP1 PUSH1 [revert offset] JUMPI
true
true
5
c4
06-lybra
SAQ G
High
high
## Summary ### Gas Optimization no | Issue |Instances|| |-|:-|:-:|:-:| | [G-01] | Using fixed bytes is cheaper than using string | 1 | - | | [G-02] | Can make the variable outside the loop to save gas | 1 | - | | [G-03] | Using calldata instead of memory for read-only arguments in external functions saves gas | 2 | -...
file: /contracts/lybra/token/EUSD.sol 107 function symbol() public pure returns (string memory) { 108 return "eUSD";
file: /contracts/lybra/miner/EUSDMiningIncentives.sol 140 uint borrowed = pool.getBorrowedOf(user);
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/SAQ-G.md
2026-01-02T18:22:42.189609+00:00
4d4f806ae7ab0f5a4e04d8c5c4605eeaae2a69900075dd913a65854a8992d7e8
2
2
236
1
false
false
true
false
high
file: /contracts/lybra/token/EUSD.sol 107 function symbol() public pure returns (string memory) { 108 return "eUSD";
solidity
133
// Code block 1 (solidity): file: /contracts/lybra/token/EUSD.sol 107 function symbol() public pure returns (string memory) { 108 return "eUSD"; // Code block 2 (solidity): file: /contracts/lybra/miner/EUSDMiningIncentives.sol 140 uint borrowed = pool.getBorrowedOf(user);
2
false
file: /contracts/lybra/token/EUSD.sol 107 function symbol() public pure returns (string memory) { 108 return "eUSD"; file: /contracts/lybra/miner/EUSDMiningIncentives.sol 140 uint borrowed = pool.getBorrowedOf(user);
EUSD.sol#L107
EUSD.sol
1
file: /contracts/lybra/token/EUSD.sol 107 function symbol() public pure returns (string memory) { 108 return "eUSD";
true
file: /contracts/lybra/miner/EUSDMiningIncentives.sol 140 uint borrowed = pool.getBorrowedOf(user);
true
true
8
c4
05-ajna
0xnev G
High
high
| Count | Title | Instances | Gas Savings | |:--:|:-------|:--:|:--:| | [G-01] | Usage of uints/ints smaller than 32 bytes (256 bits) incurs overhead | 1 | 16511 | | [G-03] | Do not need to use `+=` operator, `=` can be used instead | 1 | 62631 | | [G-03] | `else if` block in `Maths.wsqrt()` can be removed | 1 | 11 | |...
62: uint176 private _nextId = 1;
rewards_ += Maths.wmul(UPDATE_CLAIM_REWARD, Maths.wmul(burnFactor, interestFactor));
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/0xnev-G.md
2026-01-02T18:20:51.186863+00:00
4d77711fe3188afa1036747365e463ed314d3bc7d186b32163cb779fa94a0b0a
1
1
35
1
false
false
true
false
high
62: uint176 private _nextId = 1;
solidity
35
// Code block 1 (solidity): 62: uint176 private _nextId = 1;
1
false
62: uint176 private _nextId = 1;
PositionManager.sol#L62
PositionManager.sol
1
62: uint176 private _nextId = 1;
true
rewards_ += Maths.wmul(UPDATE_CLAIM_REWARD, Maths.wmul(burnFactor, interestFactor));
true
true
7
c4
01-biconomy
Fahrul G
Low
low
# Replace `getChainId()` with `block.chainid` We can get the chainId using `block.chainid` instead of using `getChainId()`. *Instances (2)*: ```solidity File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol Line 135-147 function domainSeparator() public view returns (bytes32) { return keccak256(abi.encod...
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol Line 135-147 function domainSeparator() public view returns (bytes32) { return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_SEPARATOR_TYPEHASH, getChainId(), this)); } /// @dev Returns the chain id used by this contract. function getChainId() public view r...
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountNoAuth.sol Line 135-147 function domainSeparator() public view returns (bytes32) { return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_SEPARATOR_TYPEHASH, getChainId(), this)); } /// @dev Returns the chain id used by this contract. function getChainId() public ...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/Fahrul-G.md
2026-01-02T18:13:04.438303+00:00
4da68d0ba301603934d7a208864f07ac8a0d209a9e070d4ecc1fd21f1d925ad7
2
2
998
2
false
false
true
false
high
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol Line 135-147 function domainSeparator() public view returns (bytes32) { return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_SEPARATOR_TYPEHASH, getChainId(), this)); } /// @dev Returns the chain id used by this contract. function getChainId() public view r...
solidity
496
// Code block 1 (solidity): File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol Line 135-147 function domainSeparator() public view returns (bytes32) { return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_SEPARATOR_TYPEHASH, getChainId(), this)); } /// @dev Returns the chain id used by this contract. functio...
2
false
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol Line 135-147 function domainSeparator() public view returns (bytes32) { return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_SEPARATOR_TYPEHASH, getChainId(), this)); } /// @dev Returns the chain id used by this contract. function getChainId() public view r...
SmartAccount.sol, SmartAccountNoAuth.sol
SmartAccount.sol, SmartAccountNoAuth.sol
2
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol Line 135-147 function domainSeparator() public view returns (bytes32) { return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_SEPARATOR_TYPEHASH, getChainId(), this)); } /// @dev Returns the chain id used by this contract. function getChainId() public view r...
true
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountNoAuth.sol Line 135-147 function domainSeparator() public view returns (bytes32) { return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_SEPARATOR_TYPEHASH, getChainId(), this)); } /// @dev Returns the chain id used by this contract. function getChainId() public ...
true
true
8
c4
05-ajna
Blckhv G
Gas
gas
# Gas report ## Globally available variables such as block.number can be cached in variable when used multiple times in one function https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/276942bc2f97488d07b887c8edceaaab7a5c3964/ajna-grants/src/grants/base/StandardFunding.sol#L119-L164 When it's necessary to use globally ...
if (position.depositTime != 0) { // check that bucket didn't go bankrupt after prior memorialization if (_bucketBankruptAfterDeposit(pool, index, position.depositTime)) { // if bucket did go bankrupt, zero out the LP tracked by position manager pos...
if (position.depositTime != 0 && _bucketBankruptAfterDeposit(pool, index, position.depositTime) { // if bucket did go bankrupt, zero out the LP tracked by position manager position.lps = 0; }
other
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/Blckhv-G.md
2026-01-02T18:20:57.021680+00:00
4dc87e88c8e7249fbc341a0cc3f00b3ac659618bd900da0511f89482110d494f
2
0
606
4
false
false
true
false
high
if (position.depositTime != 0) { // check that bucket didn't go bankrupt after prior memorialization if (_bucketBankruptAfterDeposit(pool, index, position.depositTime)) { // if bucket did go bankrupt, zero out the LP tracked by position manager pos...
unknown
366
// Code block 1 (unknown): if (position.depositTime != 0) { // check that bucket didn't go bankrupt after prior memorialization if (_bucketBankruptAfterDeposit(pool, index, position.depositTime)) { // if bucket did go bankrupt, zero out the LP tracked by position mana...
2
false
StandardFunding.sol#L119-L164, PositionManager.sol#L193-L199, Funding.sol#L21, Funding.sol#L61
Funding.sol, StandardFunding.sol, PositionManager.sol
4
if (position.depositTime != 0) { // check that bucket didn't go bankrupt after prior memorialization if (_bucketBankruptAfterDeposit(pool, index, position.depositTime)) { // if bucket did go bankrupt, zero out the LP tracked by position manager pos...
true
if (position.depositTime != 0 && _bucketBankruptAfterDeposit(pool, index, position.depositTime) { // if bucket did go bankrupt, zero out the LP tracked by position manager position.lps = 0; }
true
true
8
c4
04-caviar
martin Q
Critical
critical
## Introduction Caviar Private Pools QA report was done by martin, with a main focus on the low severity and non-critical security aspects of the implementaion and logic of the project. ## Findings Summary The following issues were found, categorized by their severity: ## Findings Summary | ID | Title ...
File: /src/Factory.sol File: /src/PrivatePoolMetadata.sol File: /src/EthRouter.sol File: /src/PrivatePool.sol File: /src/interfaces/IStolenNftOracle.sol
251: // add the royalty fee amount to the net input aount
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/martin-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:20:40.145373+00:00
4df99fcf3a292aa164fa996fcd7350d0569b51c08273dc4915567e5fd4784cd3
0
0
0
1
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
Factory.sol#L71
Factory.sol
1
File: /src/Factory.sol File: /src/PrivatePoolMetadata.sol File: /src/EthRouter.sol File: /src/PrivatePool.sol File: /src/interfaces/IStolenNftOracle.sol
true
251: // add the royalty fee amount to the net input aount
true
true
6
c4
01-salty
lilizhu Q
Low
low
## [L-01] **Missing address(0) checks in** ManagedWallet contract ### Impact In the constructor of the ManagedWallet contract in the src/ManagedWallet.sol file, there is no verification of non-zero addresses for the input parameters. If the product team specifies _mainWallet or _confirmationWallet as address(0) durin...
constructor( address _mainWallet, address _confirmationWallet) { require( _mainWallet != address(0), "_mainWallet cannot be the zero address" ); require( _confirmationWallet != address(0), "_confirmationWallet cannot be the zero address" ); mainWallet = _mainWallet; confirmationWallet = _confirmationWallet; ...
other
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/lilizhu-Q.md
2026-01-02T19:01:51.162841+00:00
4dfcc9c61d1f17058c83eb87f53432c1bbcb0712eb425077a97c9976507d64c8
1
1
436
1
false
true
true
false
high
constructor( address _mainWallet, address _confirmationWallet) { require( _mainWallet != address(0), "_mainWallet cannot be the zero address" ); require( _confirmationWallet != address(0), "_confirmationWallet cannot be the zero address" ); mainWallet = _mainWallet; confirmationWallet = _confirmationWallet; ...
solidity
436
// Code block 1 (solidity): constructor( address _mainWallet, address _confirmationWallet) { require( _mainWallet != address(0), "_mainWallet cannot be the zero address" ); require( _confirmationWallet != address(0), "_confirmationWallet cannot be the zero address" ); mainWallet = _mainWallet; confirmationWa...
1
false
constructor( address _mainWallet, address _confirmationWallet) { require( _mainWallet != address(0), "_mainWallet cannot be the zero address" ); require( _confirmationWallet != address(0), "_confirmationWallet cannot be the zero address" ); mainWallet = _mainWallet; confirmationWallet = _confirmationWallet; ...
ManagedWallet.sol#L31
ManagedWallet.sol
1
constructor( address _mainWallet, address _confirmationWallet) { require( _mainWallet != address(0), "_mainWallet cannot be the zero address" ); require( _confirmationWallet != address(0), "_confirmationWallet cannot be the zero address" ); mainWallet = _mainWallet; confirmationWallet = _confirmationWallet; ...
true
false
false
6
c4
06-lybra
0x11singh99 Q
Critical
critical
# Non Critical 1. Function params name in all over the protocol doesn't follow one convention, sometimes it is prepended with _ sometimes not. Which is confusing. 2. named return is confusing 3. In many places natspec comments not written, which is really confusing to understand the intention of function or contract. ...
File : contracts/lybra/miner/stakerewardV2pool.sol //@audit low check balance before transfer to prevent unexpected under flow balanceOf[msg.sender] -= _amount;
overflow
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/0x11singh99-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:21:59.446429+00:00
4e4bb47984b515c5125bda256c1558512d2c3973eab10186bd55c23ea11ab5c8
1
1
172
1
false
true
true
false
high
File : contracts/lybra/miner/stakerewardV2pool.sol //@audit low check balance before transfer to prevent unexpected under flow balanceOf[msg.sender] -= _amount;
solidity
172
// Code block 1 (solidity): File : contracts/lybra/miner/stakerewardV2pool.sol //@audit low check balance before transfer to prevent unexpected under flow balanceOf[msg.sender] -= _amount;
1
false
File : contracts/lybra/miner/stakerewardV2pool.sol //@audit low check balance before transfer to prevent unexpected under flow balanceOf[msg.sender] -= _amount;
stakerewardV2pool.sol#L95
stakerewardV2pool.sol
1
File : contracts/lybra/miner/stakerewardV2pool.sol //@audit low check balance before transfer to prevent unexpected under flow balanceOf[msg.sender] -= _amount;
true
false
false
6
c4
03-asymmetry
report
Critical
critical
--- sponsor: "Asymmetry Finance" slug: "2023-03-asymmetry" date: "2023-07-28" title: "Asymmetry contest" findings: "https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/issues" contest: 226 --- # Overview ## About C4 Code4rena (C4) is an open organization consisting of security researchers, auditors, developers,...
if (totalSupply == 0) preDepositPrice = 10 ** 18; // initializes with a price of 1 else preDepositPrice = (10 ** 18 * underlyingValue) / totalSupply;
uint256 mintAmount = (totalStakeValueEth * 10 ** 18) / preDepositPrice;
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/report.md
2026-01-02T18:19:13.802042+00:00
4e764774df8407e8aaf5912b67ff33922cc9ef08537629cd89be061ac23213d0
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
if (totalSupply == 0) preDepositPrice = 10 ** 18; // initializes with a price of 1 else preDepositPrice = (10 ** 18 * underlyingValue) / totalSupply;
true
uint256 mintAmount = (totalStakeValueEth * 10 ** 18) / preDepositPrice;
true
true
5
c4
04-caviar
Rolezn G
High
high
## Summary<a name="Summary"> ### Gas Optimizations | |Issue|Contexts|Estimated Gas Saved| |-|:-|:-|:-:| | [GAS&#x2011;1](#GAS&#x2011;1) | `abi.encode()` is less efficient than `abi.encodepacked()` | 2 | 200 | | [GAS&#x2011;2](#GAS&#x2011;2) | Use calldata instead of memory for function parameters | 4 | 1200 | | [GAS&#...
177: abi.decode(abi.encode(sells[i].stolenNftProofs), (ReservoirOracle.Message[]))
675: leafs[i] = keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(tokenIds[i], tokenWeights[i]))));
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/Rolezn-G.md
2026-01-02T18:20:02.665949+00:00
4e82356509c28cac75e581f1341f4d638ac4bf4399dad1e30a72271a08c9175e
1
1
82
1
false
false
true
false
high
177: abi.decode(abi.encode(sells[i].stolenNftProofs), (ReservoirOracle.Message[]))
solidity
82
// Code block 1 (solidity): 177: abi.decode(abi.encode(sells[i].stolenNftProofs), (ReservoirOracle.Message[]))
1
false
177: abi.decode(abi.encode(sells[i].stolenNftProofs), (ReservoirOracle.Message[]))
EthRouter.sol#L177
EthRouter.sol
1
177: abi.decode(abi.encode(sells[i].stolenNftProofs), (ReservoirOracle.Message[]))
true
675: leafs[i] = keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(tokenIds[i], tokenWeights[i]))));
true
true
7
c4
02-ai-arena
0xDetermination Q
Medium
medium
# QA report by 0xDetermination |Issue number|Description| |:-|:-| |Low issues| |[L-1](#l-1)|Discrepancy between docs and code- false `initiatorBool` argument for `RankedBattle.updateBattleRecord()` should not change a fighter's points according to docs | |[L-2](#l-2)|Small stake amounts can't be lost to `StakeAtRisk` ...
function _addResultPoints( ... if (_calculatedStakingFactor[tokenId][roundId] == false) { stakingFactor[tokenId] = _getStakingFactor(tokenId, stakeAtRisk); _calculatedStakingFactor[tokenId][roundId] = true; } curStakeAtRisk = (bpsLostPerLoss * (amountStaked[t...
if (claimableNRN > 0) { amountClaimed[msg.sender] += claimableNRN; _neuronInstance.mint(msg.sender, claimableNRN);
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/0xDetermination-Q.md
2026-01-02T19:02:01.985833+00:00
4e892566e0f5e1d33f7fcef8aae694f0d23a5ee50abc31957e1ff6432ea20051
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
function _addResultPoints( ... if (_calculatedStakingFactor[tokenId][roundId] == false) { stakingFactor[tokenId] = _getStakingFactor(tokenId, stakeAtRisk); _calculatedStakingFactor[tokenId][roundId] = true; } curStakeAtRisk = (bpsLostPerLoss * (amountStaked[t...
true
if (claimableNRN > 0) { amountClaimed[msg.sender] += claimableNRN; _neuronInstance.mint(msg.sender, claimableNRN);
true
true
5
c4
03-asymmetry
chriszhou Q
Low
low
## Event is missing indexed fields Index event fields make the field more quickly accessible to off-chain tools that parse events. However, note that each index field costs extra gas during emission, so it’s not necessarily best to index the maximum allowed per event (three fields). Each event should use three indexed...
File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol 26: event Staked(address indexed recipient, uint ethIn, uint safEthOut); 27: event Unstaked(address indexed recipient, uint ethOut, uint safEthIn); 28: event WeightChange(uint indexed index, uint weight); 29-31: event DerivativeAdded( address indexed contractAdd...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/chriszhou-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:18:58.932238+00:00
4ec17de5c7cb63895ecd04770db1fdf0f7acbe4dc5d47a87a75a4e6dc4d22737
1
0
372
0
false
true
true
false
medium
File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol 26: event Staked(address indexed recipient, uint ethIn, uint safEthOut); 27: event Unstaked(address indexed recipient, uint ethOut, uint safEthIn); 28: event WeightChange(uint indexed index, uint weight); 29-31: event DerivativeAdded( address indexed contractAdd...
unknown
372
// Code block 1 (unknown): File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol 26: event Staked(address indexed recipient, uint ethIn, uint safEthOut); 27: event Unstaked(address indexed recipient, uint ethOut, uint safEthIn); 28: event WeightChange(uint indexed index, uint weight); 29-31: event DerivativeAdded( ...
1
false
0
File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol 26: event Staked(address indexed recipient, uint ethIn, uint safEthOut); 27: event Unstaked(address indexed recipient, uint ethOut, uint safEthIn); 28: event WeightChange(uint indexed index, uint weight); 29-31: event DerivativeAdded( address indexed contractAdd...
true
false
false
3.86
c4
03-asymmetry
HollaDieWaldfee Q
Critical
critical
# Asymmetry Low Risk and Non-Critical Issues ## Summary | Risk | Title | File | Instances | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | | L-01 | Use fixed compiler version | - | 4 | | L-02 | Wrong index emitted in `DerivativeAdded` event | SafEth.sol | 1 | | L-03 | OwnableUpgradeable: Do...
event DerivativeAdded( address indexed contractAddress, uint weight, uint index );
function addDerivative( address _contractAddress, uint256 _weight ) external onlyOwner { derivatives[derivativeCount] = IDerivative(_contractAddress); weights[derivativeCount] = _weight; // @audit increment happens derivativeCount++; uint256 localTotalWeight = 0; for (uint256 i = 0; i ...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/HollaDieWaldfee-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:18:07.436075+00:00
4ec54962e77764689c2c89733ac51517a9c6034cc7641d5a8d3ce6cb2f6ea4e6
1
1
94
2
false
false
true
false
high
event DerivativeAdded( address indexed contractAddress, uint weight, uint index );
solidity
94
// Code block 1 (solidity): event DerivativeAdded( address indexed contractAddress, uint weight, uint index );
1
false
event DerivativeAdded( address indexed contractAddress, uint weight, uint index );
SafEth.sol#L29-L33, SafEth.sol#L182-L195
SafEth.sol
2
event DerivativeAdded( address indexed contractAddress, uint weight, uint index );
true
function addDerivative( address _contractAddress, uint256 _weight ) external onlyOwner { derivatives[derivativeCount] = IDerivative(_contractAddress); weights[derivativeCount] = _weight; // @audit increment happens derivativeCount++; uint256 localTotalWeight = 0; for (uint256 i = 0; i ...
true
true
7
c4
09-ondo
NentoR G
Gas
gas
File: contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol, line 159. Unnecessary "if" check for the length of the "approvers" array. ``` function _approve(bytes32 txnHash) internal { // Check that the approver has not already approved TxnThreshold storage t = txnToThresholdSet[txnHash]; if (t.approvers.length > 0) { ...
function _approve(bytes32 txnHash) internal { // Check that the approver has not already approved TxnThreshold storage t = txnToThresholdSet[txnHash]; if (t.approvers.length > 0) { for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) { if (t.approvers[i] == msg.sender) { revert AlreadyA...
function _approve(bytes32 txnHash) internal { // Check that the approver has not already approved TxnThreshold storage t = txnToThresholdSet[txnHash]; for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) { if (t.approvers[i] == msg.sender) { revert AlreadyApproved(); } } t.approvers...
other
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/NentoR-G.md
2026-01-02T18:25:38.098022+00:00
4ef20e2e99d175b7a197ba73d86f4da0978501d7685c25caf6bbb6d761a4d94f
2
0
732
0
false
false
true
false
high
function _approve(bytes32 txnHash) internal { // Check that the approver has not already approved TxnThreshold storage t = txnToThresholdSet[txnHash]; if (t.approvers.length > 0) { for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) { if (t.approvers[i] == msg.sender) { revert AlreadyAp...
unknown
391
// Code block 1 (unknown): function _approve(bytes32 txnHash) internal { // Check that the approver has not already approved TxnThreshold storage t = txnToThresholdSet[txnHash]; if (t.approvers.length > 0) { for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) { if (t.approvers[i] == msg.sender) {...
2
false
0
function _approve(bytes32 txnHash) internal { // Check that the approver has not already approved TxnThreshold storage t = txnToThresholdSet[txnHash]; if (t.approvers.length > 0) { for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) { if (t.approvers[i] == msg.sender) { revert AlreadyA...
true
function _approve(bytes32 txnHash) internal { // Check that the approver has not already approved TxnThreshold storage t = txnToThresholdSet[txnHash]; for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) { if (t.approvers[i] == msg.sender) { revert AlreadyApproved(); } } t.approvers...
true
true
5.87
c4
04-caviar
Bnke0x0 Q
Critical
critical
### [L01] Missing checks for `address(0x0)` when assigning values to `address` state variables #### Findings: ``` 2023-04-caviar/src/EthRouter.sol::91 => royaltyRegistry = _royaltyRegistry; 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::130 => privatePoolMetadata = _privatePoolMetadata; 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::136 => priv...
2023-04-caviar/src/EthRouter.sol::91 => royaltyRegistry = _royaltyRegistry; 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::130 => privatePoolMetadata = _privatePoolMetadata; 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::136 => privatePoolImplementation = _privatePoolImplementation; 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::142 => protocolFeeRate = _protocol...
2023-04-caviar/src/EthRouter.sol::88 => receive() external payable {} 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::55 => receive() external payable {} 2023-04-caviar/src/PrivatePool.sol::134 => receive() external payable {}
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/Bnke0x0-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:19:33.187622+00:00
4f04b529bec88410a304c7b8718b173fa41f7c77e56ad9a1c8c0208202e51f5f
2
0
1,357
0
false
false
true
false
high
2023-04-caviar/src/EthRouter.sol::91 => royaltyRegistry = _royaltyRegistry; 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::130 => privatePoolMetadata = _privatePoolMetadata; 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::136 => privatePoolImplementation = _privatePoolImplementation; 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::142 => protocolFeeRate = _protocol...
unknown
1,147
// Code block 1 (unknown): 2023-04-caviar/src/EthRouter.sol::91 => royaltyRegistry = _royaltyRegistry; 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::130 => privatePoolMetadata = _privatePoolMetadata; 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::136 => privatePoolImplementation = _privatePoolImplementation; 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::142 => ...
2
false
0
2023-04-caviar/src/EthRouter.sol::91 => royaltyRegistry = _royaltyRegistry; 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::130 => privatePoolMetadata = _privatePoolMetadata; 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::136 => privatePoolImplementation = _privatePoolImplementation; 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::142 => protocolFeeRate = _protocol...
true
2023-04-caviar/src/EthRouter.sol::88 => receive() external payable {} 2023-04-caviar/src/Factory.sol::55 => receive() external payable {} 2023-04-caviar/src/PrivatePool.sol::134 => receive() external payable {}
true
true
7
c4
01-salty
0xSmartContract Analysis
Critical
critical
# 🛠️ Analysis - Salty.IO Audit ### Summary | List |Head |Details| |:--|:----------------|:------| |a) |The approach I followed when reviewing the code | Stages in my code review and analysis | |b) |Analysis of the code base | What is unique? How are the existing patterns used? "Solidity-metrics" was used | |c) |Test ...
## h) Gas Optimization The project is generally efficient in terms of gas optimizations, many generally accepted gas optimizations have been implemented, gas optimizations with minor effects are already mentioned in automatic finding, but gas optimizations will not be a priority considering code readability and code ba...
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/0xSmartContract-Analysis.md
2026-01-02T19:01:06.085055+00:00
4f42054a2a9bd3a4a8a79af755bb432e4796a89ee7a85798401bc67d37df1c56
0
0
0
0
false
true
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
## h) Gas Optimization The project is generally efficient in terms of gas optimizations, many generally accepted gas optimizations have been implemented, gas optimizations with minor effects are already mentioned in automatic finding, but gas optimizations will not be a priority considering code readability and code ba...
true
false
false
4
c4
09-ondo
jnrlouis Q
Low
low
## Low Risk Issues ### [L-01] Wrong Parameter emitted in the `wrap` function In the `wrap` function from `rUSDY.sol`, the `_USDYAmount` is a parameter for the function, and the `_USDYAmount` parameter is converted to shares by multiplying the amount by the `BPS_DENOMINATOR`. The issue is from the parameters of the ev...
File: usdy/rUSDY.sol 438 emit Transfer(address(0), msg.sender, getRUSDYByShares(_USDYAmount)); 439 emit TransferShares(address(0), msg.sender, _USDYAmount);
File: usdy/rUSDY.sol 436 _mintShares(msg.sender, _USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR); 437 usdy.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _USDYAmount);
other
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/jnrlouis-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:26:00.984840+00:00
4f80ba34c5e15afa7d501d4d0c320dee97cc115e3bb7d846736d4b7fa28050fb
2
0
313
0
false
false
true
false
high
File: usdy/rUSDY.sol 438 emit Transfer(address(0), msg.sender, getRUSDYByShares(_USDYAmount)); 439 emit TransferShares(address(0), msg.sender, _USDYAmount);
javascript
163
// Code block 1 (javascript): File: usdy/rUSDY.sol 438 emit Transfer(address(0), msg.sender, getRUSDYByShares(_USDYAmount)); 439 emit TransferShares(address(0), msg.sender, _USDYAmount); // Code block 2 (javascript): File: usdy/rUSDY.sol 436 _mintShares(msg.sender, _USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR); 437 usd...
2
false
0
File: usdy/rUSDY.sol 438 emit Transfer(address(0), msg.sender, getRUSDYByShares(_USDYAmount)); 439 emit TransferShares(address(0), msg.sender, _USDYAmount);
true
File: usdy/rUSDY.sol 436 _mintShares(msg.sender, _USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR); 437 usdy.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _USDYAmount);
true
true
6.76
c4
11-kelp
fr33rh Q
High
high
## The function `burn` in `src/interfaces/IRSETH.sol` not implement In `src/interfaces/IRSETH.sol` ``` function burn(address account, uint256 amount) external; ``` while in `src/RSETH.sol`,there is only a similar function named `burnFrom` ``` function burnFrom(address account, uint256 amount) external onlyRole(BURN...
function burn(address account, uint256 amount) external;
function burnFrom(address account, uint256 amount) external onlyRole(BURNER_ROLE) whenNotPaused { _burn(account, amount); }
other
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/fr33rh-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:28:03.217326+00:00
4fa857d86c934c04b28c67987b9e61750e640a27d010ddc80ef71e668380f8ba
2
0
191
0
false
false
true
false
high
function burn(address account, uint256 amount) external;
unknown
56
// Code block 1 (unknown): function burn(address account, uint256 amount) external; // Code block 2 (unknown): function burnFrom(address account, uint256 amount) external onlyRole(BURNER_ROLE) whenNotPaused { _burn(account, amount); }
2
false
0
function burn(address account, uint256 amount) external;
true
function burnFrom(address account, uint256 amount) external onlyRole(BURNER_ROLE) whenNotPaused { _burn(account, amount); }
true
true
4.77
c4
10-badger
dharma09 G
High
high
## Summary The findings from the bot should be reviewed as they contain some solid issues The following findings were missed by the bot(in some cases,bot has identified some instances but missed others, I try to explain whenever this happens) Gas estimates are done using the opcodes involved since most of this functi...
File: packages/contracts/contracts/CdpManagerStorage.sol 143: bool public redemptionsPaused;
File: packages/contracts/contracts/Dependencies/AuthNoOwner.sol 14: bool private _authorityInitialized;
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/dharma09-G.md
2026-01-02T18:26:47.412729+00:00
4fb5147230648dde39ad1d34ab04d534c07a8f6451c9650d72dacfefefafeac1
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
File: packages/contracts/contracts/CdpManagerStorage.sol 143: bool public redemptionsPaused;
true
File: packages/contracts/contracts/Dependencies/AuthNoOwner.sol 14: bool private _authorityInitialized;
true
true
5
c4
01-biconomy
Praise Q
Gas
gas
## in function deployWallet() in SmartAccountFactory.sol Lc 53, there are no zero-address checks for this parameters. address _owner, address _entryPoint, address _handler, invalid wallet addresses can be inputed and deployed. ``` function deployWallet(address _owner, address _entryPoint, address _handler) public ret...
function deployWallet(address _owner, address _entryPoint, address _handler) public returns(address proxy){ bytes memory deploymentData = abi.encodePacked(type(Proxy).creationCode, uint(uint160(_defaultImpl))); // solhint-disable-next-line no-inline-assembly assembly { proxy := cre...
function withdrawTo(address payable withdrawAddress, uint256 amount) public virtual onlyOwner { entryPoint.withdrawTo(withdrawAddress, amount); }
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/Praise-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:13:13.432028+00:00
4fce53b168910c3cbe33d1b31f37d96e8ed535e2764e29e0bbbf4df46b216dfa
3
0
786
0
false
false
true
false
high
function deployWallet(address _owner, address _entryPoint, address _handler) public returns(address proxy){ bytes memory deploymentData = abi.encodePacked(type(Proxy).creationCode, uint(uint160(_defaultImpl))); // solhint-disable-next-line no-inline-assembly assembly { proxy := crea...
unknown
500
// Code block 1 (unknown): function deployWallet(address _owner, address _entryPoint, address _handler) public returns(address proxy){ bytes memory deploymentData = abi.encodePacked(type(Proxy).creationCode, uint(uint160(_defaultImpl))); // solhint-disable-next-line no-inline-assembly assembly ...
3
false
0
function deployWallet(address _owner, address _entryPoint, address _handler) public returns(address proxy){ bytes memory deploymentData = abi.encodePacked(type(Proxy).creationCode, uint(uint160(_defaultImpl))); // solhint-disable-next-line no-inline-assembly assembly { proxy := cre...
true
function withdrawTo(address payable withdrawAddress, uint256 amount) public virtual onlyOwner { entryPoint.withdrawTo(withdrawAddress, amount); }
true
true
8
c4
01-ondo
0x1f8b G
High
high
- [Gas](#gas) - [**1. Optimize sanction List**](#1-optimize-sanction-list) - [**2. Remove return**](#2-remove-return) - [**3. Use a recent solidity version**](#3-use-a-recent-solidity-version) - [**4. Use require instead of assert**](#4-use-require-instead-of-assert) - [**5. Avoid compound assignmen...
require(!sanctionsList.isSanctioned(spender), "Spender is sanctioned"); require(!sanctionsList.isSanctioned(src), "Source is sanctioned"); require(!sanctionsList.isSanctioned(dst), "Destination is sanctioned");
pragma solidity 0.8.15; contract TesterA { uint256 private _a; function testShort() public { _a += 1; } } contract TesterB { Uint256 private _a; function testLong() public { _a = _a + 1; } }
overflow
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/0x1f8b-G.md
2026-01-02T18:14:18.885796+00:00
506d4fd82a22a6a9e4d7a93efd6f683d422b81fbfc4f9411a5887355cf21e779
1
0
218
2
false
false
true
false
high
require(!sanctionsList.isSanctioned(spender), "Spender is sanctioned"); require(!sanctionsList.isSanctioned(src), "Source is sanctioned"); require(!sanctionsList.isSanctioned(dst), "Destination is sanctioned");
js
218
// Code block 1 (js): require(!sanctionsList.isSanctioned(spender), "Spender is sanctioned"); require(!sanctionsList.isSanctioned(src), "Source is sanctioned"); require(!sanctionsList.isSanctioned(dst), "Destination is sanctioned");
1
false
CTokenModified.sol#L97-L99, CTokenModified.sol#L143
CTokenModified.sol
2
require(!sanctionsList.isSanctioned(spender), "Spender is sanctioned"); require(!sanctionsList.isSanctioned(src), "Source is sanctioned"); require(!sanctionsList.isSanctioned(dst), "Destination is sanctioned");
true
pragma solidity 0.8.15; contract TesterA { uint256 private _a; function testShort() public { _a += 1; } } contract TesterB { Uint256 private _a; function testLong() public { _a = _a + 1; } }
true
true
7
c4
02-ethos
Phantasmagoria Q
Critical
critical
# Low Risk Issues | | Issue | Instances | | :--- | :---- | :----: | | 1 | Deprecated safeApprove() function | 1 | | 2 | _safeMint() should be used rather than _mint() wherever possible | 2 | Total: 3 instances # Non-Critical Issues | | Issue...
Ethos-Vault/contracts/abstract/ReaperBaseStrategyv4.sol 74: IERC20Upgradeable(want).safeApprove(vault, type(uint256).max);
Ethos-Vault/contracts/ReaperVaultV2.sol 336: _mint(_receiver, shares);
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/Phantasmagoria-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:16:27.915289+00:00
506df4314ad615323ea563f90432bca8d4524a0fb80d12415cde83d5e60d4aa0
1
0
123
2
false
false
true
false
high
Ethos-Vault/contracts/abstract/ReaperBaseStrategyv4.sol 74: IERC20Upgradeable(want).safeApprove(vault, type(uint256).max);
unknown
123
// Code block 1 (unknown): Ethos-Vault/contracts/abstract/ReaperBaseStrategyv4.sol 74: IERC20Upgradeable(want).safeApprove(vault, type(uint256).max);
1
false
ReaperBaseStrategyv4.sol#L74, ERC721.sol#L271
ERC721.sol, ReaperBaseStrategyv4.sol
2
Ethos-Vault/contracts/abstract/ReaperBaseStrategyv4.sol 74: IERC20Upgradeable(want).safeApprove(vault, type(uint256).max);
true
Ethos-Vault/contracts/ReaperVaultV2.sol 336: _mint(_receiver, shares);
true
true
7
c4
07-amphora
petrichor G
Medium
medium
| No | Issue | Instance | |------|---------|----------| |[G-01]|Can Make The Variable Outside The Loop To Save Gas |12| |[G-02]|Expressions for constant values such as a call to keccak256(), should use immutable rather than constant|5| |[G-03]|internal functions not called by the contract should be removed to s...
177 uint256 _crvReward = _rewardsContract.earned(address(this)); 187 uint256 _extraRewards = _rewardsContract.extraRewardsLength(); 209 (uint256 _takenCVX, uint256 _takenCRV, uint256 _claimableAmph) = _amphClaimer.claimable(address(this), this.id(), _totalCvxReward, _totalCrvReward); 257 uint256 _e...
874 address _tokenAddress = enabledTokens[_i]; 876 uint256 _balance = _vault.balances(_tokenAddress); 879 uint192 _rawPrice = _safeu192(_collateral.oracle.currentValue()); 882 uint192 _tokenValue = _safeu192( 902 address _tokenAddress = enabledTokens[_i]; 904 uint256 _balance = _vault.balances(_token...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/petrichor-G.md
2026-01-02T18:23:58.633578+00:00
50844a67e13b1e09cb6cdc3f2d34d26ce6cf6647a32df75abe66b3947862f945
1
1
371
0
false
false
true
false
high
177 uint256 _crvReward = _rewardsContract.earned(address(this)); 187 uint256 _extraRewards = _rewardsContract.extraRewardsLength(); 209 (uint256 _takenCVX, uint256 _takenCRV, uint256 _claimableAmph) = _amphClaimer.claimable(address(this), this.id(), _totalCvxReward, _totalCrvReward); 257 uint256 _e...
solidity
371
// Code block 1 (solidity): 177 uint256 _crvReward = _rewardsContract.earned(address(this)); 187 uint256 _extraRewards = _rewardsContract.extraRewardsLength(); 209 (uint256 _takenCVX, uint256 _takenCRV, uint256 _claimableAmph) = _amphClaimer.claimable(address(this), this.id(), _totalCvxReward, _totalC...
1
false
177 uint256 _crvReward = _rewardsContract.earned(address(this)); 187 uint256 _extraRewards = _rewardsContract.extraRewardsLength(); 209 (uint256 _takenCVX, uint256 _takenCRV, uint256 _claimableAmph) = _amphClaimer.claimable(address(this), this.id(), _totalCvxReward, _totalCrvReward); 257 uint256 _e...
0
177 uint256 _crvReward = _rewardsContract.earned(address(this)); 187 uint256 _extraRewards = _rewardsContract.extraRewardsLength(); 209 (uint256 _takenCVX, uint256 _takenCRV, uint256 _claimableAmph) = _amphClaimer.claimable(address(this), this.id(), _totalCvxReward, _totalCrvReward); 257 uint256 _e...
true
874 address _tokenAddress = enabledTokens[_i]; 876 uint256 _balance = _vault.balances(_tokenAddress); 879 uint192 _rawPrice = _safeu192(_collateral.oracle.currentValue()); 882 uint192 _tokenValue = _safeu192( 902 address _tokenAddress = enabledTokens[_i]; 904 uint256 _balance = _vault.balances(_token...
true
true
6
c4
08-dopex
0xhex G
High
high
# Gas Optimization # Summary | Number | Gas Optimization Details | Context | | :----: | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :-----: | | [G-01] | Use solidity version 0.8.20 to gain some gas boost ...
pragma solidity 0.8.19;
pragma solidity 0.8.19;
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/0xhex-G.md
2026-01-02T18:24:25.418212+00:00
5094ed09f9d416906fb6a9c8cc0e8ca89ae57e33bad1df6deffe2fc4aa260b59
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
pragma solidity 0.8.19;
true
pragma solidity 0.8.19;
true
true
5
c4
01-ondo
DijkstraDev G
Informational
informational
# Gas Findings ## GAS-01 Caching `lastSetMintExchangeRate` (6 readings are removed) ```markdown contracts/cash/CashManager.sol | setMintExchangeRate(…) ``` Before: ```solidity uint256 rateDifference; if (exchangeRate > lastSetMintExchangeRate) { rateDifference = exchangeRate - lastSetMintExchangeRate; } else if...
Before:
After:
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/DijkstraDev-G.md
2026-01-02T18:14:36.014317+00:00
51289340be014c05dce37680c982b56c7e7c635d949d6bcb50eb7df883ce3b63
3
2
1,686
0
false
false
true
false
high
contracts/cash/CashManager.sol | setMintExchangeRate(…)
markdown
55
// Code block 1 (markdown): contracts/cash/CashManager.sol | setMintExchangeRate(…) // Code block 2 (solidity): uint256 rateDifference; if (exchangeRate > lastSetMintExchangeRate) { rateDifference = exchangeRate - lastSetMintExchangeRate; } else if (exchangeRate < lastSetMintExchangeRate) { rateDifference = lastSe...
3
false
uint256 rateDifference; if (exchangeRate > lastSetMintExchangeRate) { rateDifference = exchangeRate - lastSetMintExchangeRate; } else if (exchangeRate < lastSetMintExchangeRate) { rateDifference = lastSetMintExchangeRate - exchangeRate; } uint256 maxDifferenceThisEpoch = (lastSetMintExchangeRate * exchangeRateDe...
0
Before:
true
After:
true
true
8
c4
10-badger
debo Q
Medium
medium
## [L-01] Lengthy numerals Utilising big numerals that have a lot of precisions is within the file and this can be bettered by utilising scientific numerals. **Locations** ```sol // The number 525600000 is seen on line 60. // contracts/Dependencies/EbtcMath.sol#L60-L60 if (_minutes > 525600000) { // The number 525600...
// The number 525600000 is seen on line 60. // contracts/Dependencies/EbtcMath.sol#L60-L60 if (_minutes > 525600000) { // The number 525600000 is seen on line 61. // contracts/Dependencies/EbtcMath.sol#L61-L61 _minutes = 525600000; // The number 1030000000000000000 is seen on line 19. // contracts/Dependencies/EbtcBa...
// line 261-310 function flashLoan( IERC3156FlashBorrower receiver, address token, uint256 amount, bytes calldata data ) external override returns (bool) { require(amount > 0, "ActivePool: 0 Amount"); uint256 fee = flashFee(token, amount); // NOTE: Check for `toke...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/debo-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:26:46.946070+00:00
5195138c77e2777dbdf7f1e8d34bc30e9e40b4b0b668a55786b87e8abe565d48
1
1
728
0
false
false
true
false
high
// The number 525600000 is seen on line 60. // contracts/Dependencies/EbtcMath.sol#L60-L60 if (_minutes > 525600000) { // The number 525600000 is seen on line 61. // contracts/Dependencies/EbtcMath.sol#L61-L61 _minutes = 525600000; // The number 1030000000000000000 is seen on line 19. // contracts/Dependencies/EbtcBa...
sol
728
// Code block 1 (sol): // The number 525600000 is seen on line 60. // contracts/Dependencies/EbtcMath.sol#L60-L60 if (_minutes > 525600000) { // The number 525600000 is seen on line 61. // contracts/Dependencies/EbtcMath.sol#L61-L61 _minutes = 525600000; // The number 1030000000000000000 is seen on line 19. // contra...
1
false
// The number 525600000 is seen on line 60. // contracts/Dependencies/EbtcMath.sol#L60-L60 if (_minutes > 525600000) { // The number 525600000 is seen on line 61. // contracts/Dependencies/EbtcMath.sol#L61-L61 _minutes = 525600000; // The number 1030000000000000000 is seen on line 19. // contracts/Dependencies/EbtcBa...
0
// The number 525600000 is seen on line 60. // contracts/Dependencies/EbtcMath.sol#L60-L60 if (_minutes > 525600000) { // The number 525600000 is seen on line 61. // contracts/Dependencies/EbtcMath.sol#L61-L61 _minutes = 525600000; // The number 1030000000000000000 is seen on line 19. // contracts/Dependencies/EbtcBa...
true
// line 261-310 function flashLoan( IERC3156FlashBorrower receiver, address token, uint256 amount, bytes calldata data ) external override returns (bool) { require(amount > 0, "ActivePool: 0 Amount"); uint256 fee = flashFee(token, amount); // NOTE: Check for `toke...
true
true
6
c4
01-salty
0xAnah G
High
high
# SALTY GAS OPTIMIZATIONS ## INTRODUCTION Highlighted below are optimizations exclusively targeting state-mutating functions and view/pure functions invoked by state-mutating functions. In the discussion that follows, only runtime gas is emphasized, given its inevitable dominance over deployment gas costs throughout ...
file: src/staking/Staking.sols 171: function unstakesForUser( address user ) external view returns (Unstake[] memory) 172: { 173: // Check to see how many unstakes the user has 174: uint256[] memory unstakeIDs = _userUnstakeIDs[user]; 175: if ( unstakeIDs.length == 0 ) 176: return new Unstake[](0); 177: 178: //...
## [G-02] Pre-calculate equations or computations which contain only constant values in constructor For equations or computations that only involve constants or immutable values they could be computed in the contract's constructor and saved to an immutable variable. Using the immutable variable would be cheaper than re...
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/0xAnah-G.md
2026-01-02T19:01:01.842061+00:00
524539c8c441fdc012b9ee07bb852092d5c232cce3f45cf7349e27db7c741dc5
1
1
408
2
false
false
true
false
high
file: src/staking/Staking.sols 171: function unstakesForUser( address user ) external view returns (Unstake[] memory) 172: { 173: // Check to see how many unstakes the user has 174: uint256[] memory unstakeIDs = _userUnstakeIDs[user]; 175: if ( unstakeIDs.length == 0 ) 176: return new Unstake[](0); 177: 178: //...
solidity
408
// Code block 1 (solidity): file: src/staking/Staking.sols 171: function unstakesForUser( address user ) external view returns (Unstake[] memory) 172: { 173: // Check to see how many unstakes the user has 174: uint256[] memory unstakeIDs = _userUnstakeIDs[user]; 175: if ( unstakeIDs.length == 0 ) 176: return new...
1
false
file: src/staking/Staking.sols 171: function unstakesForUser( address user ) external view returns (Unstake[] memory) 172: { 173: // Check to see how many unstakes the user has 174: uint256[] memory unstakeIDs = _userUnstakeIDs[user]; 175: if ( unstakeIDs.length == 0 ) 176: return new Unstake[](0); 177: 178: //...
Staking.sol#L174, Proposals.sol
Staking.sol, Proposals.sol
2
file: src/staking/Staking.sols 171: function unstakesForUser( address user ) external view returns (Unstake[] memory) 172: { 173: // Check to see how many unstakes the user has 174: uint256[] memory unstakeIDs = _userUnstakeIDs[user]; 175: if ( unstakeIDs.length == 0 ) 176: return new Unstake[](0); 177: 178: //...
true
## [G-02] Pre-calculate equations or computations which contain only constant values in constructor For equations or computations that only involve constants or immutable values they could be computed in the contract's constructor and saved to an immutable variable. Using the immutable variable would be cheaper than re...
true
true
7
c4
06-lybra
TheSavageTeddy G
High
high
## Gas Optimizations List | Number | Optimization Details | Instances | |:------:|:--------------------|:---------:| | [G-01] | Expressions for constant values such as calling `keccak256()` should use `immutable` rather than `constant` | 7 | | [G-02] | `keccak256()` should only need to be called on a specific string l...
File: LybraConfigurator.sol 76: bytes32 public constant DAO = keccak256("DAO"); 77: bytes32 public constant TIMELOCK = keccak256("TIMELOCK"); 78: bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN");
File: GovernanceTimelock.sol 10: bytes32 public constant DAO = keccak256("DAO"); 11: bytes32 public constant TIMELOCK = keccak256("TIMELOCK"); 12: bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN"); 13: bytes32 public constant GOV = keccak256("GOV");
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/TheSavageTeddy-G.md
2026-01-02T18:22:47.191148+00:00
5252886db94c5c47b47b09b661fbcd4b4484d81fa1af82e97ba2598bb3562ecd
2
2
475
2
false
false
true
false
high
File: LybraConfigurator.sol 76: bytes32 public constant DAO = keccak256("DAO"); 77: bytes32 public constant TIMELOCK = keccak256("TIMELOCK"); 78: bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN");
solidity
209
// Code block 1 (solidity): File: LybraConfigurator.sol 76: bytes32 public constant DAO = keccak256("DAO"); 77: bytes32 public constant TIMELOCK = keccak256("TIMELOCK"); 78: bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN"); // Code block 2 (solidity): File: GovernanceTimelock.sol 10: bytes32 public c...
2
false
File: LybraConfigurator.sol 76: bytes32 public constant DAO = keccak256("DAO"); 77: bytes32 public constant TIMELOCK = keccak256("TIMELOCK"); 78: bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN"); File: GovernanceTimelock.sol 10: bytes32 public constant DAO = keccak256("DAO"); 11: bytes32 public c...
LybraConfigurator.sol#L76-L78, GovernanceTimelock.sol#L10-L1
GovernanceTimelock.sol, LybraConfigurator.sol
2
File: LybraConfigurator.sol 76: bytes32 public constant DAO = keccak256("DAO"); 77: bytes32 public constant TIMELOCK = keccak256("TIMELOCK"); 78: bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN");
true
File: GovernanceTimelock.sol 10: bytes32 public constant DAO = keccak256("DAO"); 11: bytes32 public constant TIMELOCK = keccak256("TIMELOCK"); 12: bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN"); 13: bytes32 public constant GOV = keccak256("GOV");
true
true
8
c4
05-ajna
report
Critical
critical
--- sponsor: "Ajna Protocol" slug: "2023-05-ajna" date: "2023-06-29" title: "Ajna Protocol" findings: "https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/issues" contest: 234 --- # Overview ## About C4 Code4rena (C4) is an open organization consisting of security researchers, auditors, developers, and individuals w...
function moveLiquidity( MoveLiquidityParams calldata params_ ) external override mayInteract(params_.pool, params_.tokenId) nonReentrant { Position storage fromPosition = positions[params_.tokenId][params_.fromIndex]; MoveLiquidityLocalVars memory vars; vars.depositTime = fromPo...
function _lpToQuoteToken( uint256 bucketLP_, uint256 bucketCollateral_, uint256 deposit_, uint256 lenderLPBalance_, uint256 maxQuoteToken_, uint256 bucketPrice_ ) pure returns (uint256 quoteTokenAmount_) { uint256 rate = Buckets.getExchangeRate(bucketColla...
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/report.md
2026-01-02T18:21:54.539008+00:00
52693aec929454234f3123280021ef3389288a2e206686c427f8d09d7efeb1fd
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
function moveLiquidity( MoveLiquidityParams calldata params_ ) external override mayInteract(params_.pool, params_.tokenId) nonReentrant { Position storage fromPosition = positions[params_.tokenId][params_.fromIndex]; MoveLiquidityLocalVars memory vars; vars.depositTime = fromPo...
true
function _lpToQuoteToken( uint256 bucketLP_, uint256 bucketCollateral_, uint256 deposit_, uint256 lenderLPBalance_, uint256 maxQuoteToken_, uint256 bucketPrice_ ) pure returns (uint256 quoteTokenAmount_) { uint256 rate = Buckets.getExchangeRate(bucketColla...
true
true
5
c4
02-ethos
Lavishq Q
Medium
medium
## 1. Use a more recent version of solidity if possible Version 0.6.11 is too old consider upgrading it that is possible to a newer solidity version as it will give `custom Error` benefits from `v0.8.4` and reduce gas usage for the users by a significant margin and has `safe math` check for under and overflow so there...
require(IERC20(_collateral).balanceOf(_user) >= _collAmount, "BorrowerOperations: Insufficient user collateral balance"); require(IERC20(_collateral).allowance(_user, address(this)) >= _collAmount, "BorrowerOperations: Insufficient collateral allowance");
eg: 2`https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol#L91` and 92 require(_MCR <= config.MCR && _CCR <= config.CCR, "Can only walk down the MCR"); and followed by the same pattern in line 94 and 97 can use require(_MCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_MCR && _CCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_C...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/Lavishq-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:16:18.901972+00:00
526de9474a95ae21705b6a421ee363729cd563326a00685ece95050c8858769a
0
0
0
9
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
CollateralConfig.sol#L8, BorrowerOperations.sol#L5, CollateralConfig.sol#L46, CollateralConfig.sol#L102, CollateralConfig.sol#L106, CollateralConfig.sol#L110, CollateralConfig.sol#L116, CollateralConfig.sol#L122, CollateralConfig.sol#L91
BorrowerOperations.sol, CollateralConfig.sol
9
require(IERC20(_collateral).balanceOf(_user) >= _collAmount, "BorrowerOperations: Insufficient user collateral balance"); require(IERC20(_collateral).allowance(_user, address(this)) >= _collAmount, "BorrowerOperations: Insufficient collateral allowance");
true
eg: 2`https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol#L91` and 92 require(_MCR <= config.MCR && _CCR <= config.CCR, "Can only walk down the MCR"); and followed by the same pattern in line 94 and 97 can use require(_MCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_MCR && _CCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_C...
true
true
6
c4
02-ethos
codeislight Q
Low
low
# Summary ## Quality Assurance Findings List: | Number |Issues Details|Instances| |:--:|:-------|:--:| |[QA-1]| internal functions used only once | 4 | |[QA-2]| Unnecessary return statement | 64 | |[QA-3]| Using a consistent data type, instead of rounding up to uint256 | 1 | |[QA-4]| The recovery mode is exclusive for ...
function updateTroveRewardSnapshots(address _borrower, address _collateral) external override { _requireCallerIsBorrowerOperations(); return _updateTroveRewardSnapshots(_borrower, _collateral); } function _updateTroveRewardSnapshots(address _borrower, address _c...
function getTroveStatus(address _borrower, address _collateral) external view override returns (uint256) { // tbd QA return uint8 instead of uint256, to maintain a consistency since enum are uint8 based return uint256(Troves[_borrower][_collateral].status); }
rounding
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/codeislight-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:16:57.999862+00:00
5291b8d50dc2b1fd4ab3e9e9d7ed571dd48adde2a21723630c3d63e5eb4cf802
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
function updateTroveRewardSnapshots(address _borrower, address _collateral) external override { _requireCallerIsBorrowerOperations(); return _updateTroveRewardSnapshots(_borrower, _collateral); } function _updateTroveRewardSnapshots(address _borrower, address _c...
true
function getTroveStatus(address _borrower, address _collateral) external view override returns (uint256) { // tbd QA return uint8 instead of uint256, to maintain a consistency since enum are uint8 based return uint256(Troves[_borrower][_collateral].status); }
true
true
5
c4
01-ondo
halden G
Low
low
## [G-01] Use assembly to check for address(0). Missed in the C4udit output File CashManager.sol: [141](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/main/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol#L141), [144](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/main/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol#L144), [147](https://github.com/cod...
(block.timestamp % _epochDuration);
uint256 rate = epochToExchangeRate[epochToClaim]; if (rate == 0) { // line 249 revert ExchangeRateNotSet(); } emit MintCompleted( user, cashOwed, collateralDeposited, rate // line 266 epochToClaim ); function _getMintAmountForEpoch( uint256 collateralAmountIn, uint256 rate // line 489...
oracle
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/halden-G.md
2026-01-02T18:15:12.488449+00:00
53204c656746d487acc5ca5f31c6683bca7d30c697cefc3117e760e0087bdaf1
1
0
35
10
false
false
true
false
high
(block.timestamp % _epochDuration);
unknown
35
// Code block 1 (unknown): (block.timestamp % _epochDuration);
1
false
CashManager.sol#L141, CashManager.sol#L144, CashManager.sol#L147, CashManager.sol#L150, KYCRegistryClient.sol#L40, CashKYCSender.sol#L68, CashKYCSenderReceiver.sol#L68, CashKYCSenderReceiver.sol#L76, CashManager.sol#L176, CashManager.sol#L249
CashManager.sol, CashKYCSenderReceiver.sol, CashKYCSender.sol, KYCRegistryClient.sol
10
(block.timestamp % _epochDuration);
true
uint256 rate = epochToExchangeRate[epochToClaim]; if (rate == 0) { // line 249 revert ExchangeRateNotSet(); } emit MintCompleted( user, cashOwed, collateralDeposited, rate // line 266 epochToClaim ); function _getMintAmountForEpoch( uint256 collateralAmountIn, uint256 rate // line 489...
true
true
7
c4
02-ethos
ansoncrypto007 G
Unknown
unknown
### Emitting a storage value instead of memory one. https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Vault/contracts/ReaperVaultV2.sol#L581 ``` 578 function updateTvlCap(uint256 _newTvlCap) public { 579 _atLeastRole(ADMIN); 580 tvlCap = _newTvlCap; 581 emit TvlCapUpdated(tvlCap); 582...
578 function updateTvlCap(uint256 _newTvlCap) public { 579 _atLeastRole(ADMIN); 580 tvlCap = _newTvlCap; 581 emit TvlCapUpdated(tvlCap); 582 }
379 uint256 strategyBal = strategies[stratAddr].allocated; 380 if (strategyBal == 0) { 381 continue; 382 } 383 384 uint256 remaining = value - vaultBalance; 385 uint256 loss = IStrategy(stratAddr).withdraw(Math.min(remaining, str...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/ansoncrypto007-G.md
2026-01-02T18:16:46.786382+00:00
535f951086917fa7a50adfa061412985ea40fda44e9fbd5f059e95bef5f6016d
2
0
950
3
false
false
true
false
high
578 function updateTvlCap(uint256 _newTvlCap) public { 579 _atLeastRole(ADMIN); 580 tvlCap = _newTvlCap; 581 emit TvlCapUpdated(tvlCap); 582 }
unknown
169
// Code block 1 (unknown): 578 function updateTvlCap(uint256 _newTvlCap) public { 579 _atLeastRole(ADMIN); 580 tvlCap = _newTvlCap; 581 emit TvlCapUpdated(tvlCap); 582 } // Code block 2 (unknown): 379 uint256 strategyBal = strategies[stratAddr].allocated; 380 if...
2
false
ReaperVaultV2.sol#L581, ReaperVaultV2.sol#L395, ReaperVaultV2.sol#L156
ReaperVaultV2.sol
3
578 function updateTvlCap(uint256 _newTvlCap) public { 579 _atLeastRole(ADMIN); 580 tvlCap = _newTvlCap; 581 emit TvlCapUpdated(tvlCap); 582 }
true
379 uint256 strategyBal = strategies[stratAddr].allocated; 380 if (strategyBal == 0) { 381 continue; 382 } 383 384 uint256 remaining = value - vaultBalance; 385 uint256 loss = IStrategy(stratAddr).withdraw(Math.min(remaining, str...
true
true
8
c4
02-ethos
hl_ G
High
high
# Table of contents - [G-01] Use a more recent version of solidity - [G-02] x += y costs more gas than x = x + y for state variables - [G-03] Duplicated require() / revert() checks should be refactored to a modifier or function - [G-04] Structs can be packed into fewer storage slots - [G-05] Use Shift Right/Left inste...
LUSDToken.sol 3: pragma solidity 0.6.11;
ReaperVaultERC4626.sol 3: pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/hl_-G.md
2026-01-02T18:17:16.789014+00:00
539b6626da2514fe235a720e3aad7be991b8b37e960a6f5daa5553dd91b238ac
3
0
226
0
false
false
true
false
high
LUSDToken.sol 3: pragma solidity 0.6.11;
unknown
43
// Code block 1 (unknown): LUSDToken.sol 3: pragma solidity 0.6.11; // Code block 2 (unknown): ReaperVaultERC4626.sol 3: pragma solidity ^0.8.0; // Code block 3 (unknown): File: 2023-02-ethos/Ethos-Vault/contracts/ReaperVaultV2.sol 168: totalAllocBPS += _allocBPS; 196: totalAllocBPS += _allocBPS;
3
false
0
LUSDToken.sol 3: pragma solidity 0.6.11;
true
ReaperVaultERC4626.sol 3: pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
true
true
8
c4
07-amphora
bigtone G
Medium
medium
## Gas Optimizations | |Issue|Instances| |-|:-|:-:| | [GAS-1](#GAS-1) | Use the returns variable directly instead of declaring the variables | 3 | ### <a name="GAS-1"></a>[GAS-1] Use the returns variable directly instead of declaring the variables *Instances (3)*: ```diff File: https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-0...
rounding
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/bigtone-G.md
2026-01-02T18:23:42.121823+00:00
5409da4d0f9f59cf3cd496cc1a14a923655d113b59419df9529a75cd504d0e61
1
1
1,085
1
true
true
true
false
medium
File: https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main/core/solidity/contracts/core/AMPHClaimer.sol -171: uint256 _cvxRewardsFeeToExchange = _totalToFraction(_cvxTotalRewards, cvxRewardFee); +171: _cvxAmountToSend = _totalToFraction(_cvxTotalRewards, cvxRewardFee); -172: uint256 _crvRe...
diff
1,085
// Code block 1 (diff): File: https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main/core/solidity/contracts/core/AMPHClaimer.sol -171: uint256 _cvxRewardsFeeToExchange = _totalToFraction(_cvxTotalRewards, cvxRewardFee); +171: _cvxAmountToSend = _totalToFraction(_cvxTotalRewards, cvxRewardFee); -172...
1
true
File: https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/main/core/solidity/contracts/core/AMPHClaimer.sol -171: uint256 _cvxRewardsFeeToExchange = _totalToFraction(_cvxTotalRewards, cvxRewardFee); +171: _cvxAmountToSend = _totalToFraction(_cvxTotalRewards, cvxRewardFee); -172: uint256 _crvRe...
AMPHClaimer.sol
AMPHClaimer.sol
1
false
false
false
6.73
c4
02-ai-arena
Myrault G
Medium
medium
## There is duplicate code in the constructor of AiArenaHelper.sol, resulting in unnecessary gas consumption ## POC The following code exists in the constructor of the AiArenaHelper contract: ``` //AiArenaHelper.sol constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) { _ownerAddress = msg.sender; // Initiali...
//AiArenaHelper.sol constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) { _ownerAddress = msg.sender; // Initialize the probabilities for each attribute addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);// @audit:init uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length; for (uint8 i = 0; i < attrib...
/// @notice Add attribute probabilities for a given generation. /// @dev Only the owner can call this function. /// @param generation The generation number. /// @param probabilities An array of attribute probabilities for the generation. function addAttributeProbabilities(uint256 generation, uint8[][...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/Myrault-G.md
2026-01-02T19:02:36.274739+00:00
5418d4713d55a607192412b5b1d57df9e6ac9eb0e82ed46675bc01c2cbc004f8
2
0
1,225
0
false
false
true
false
high
//AiArenaHelper.sol constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) { _ownerAddress = msg.sender; // Initialize the probabilities for each attribute addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);// @audit:init uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length; for (uint8 i = 0; i < attrib...
unknown
537
// Code block 1 (unknown): //AiArenaHelper.sol constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) { _ownerAddress = msg.sender; // Initialize the probabilities for each attribute addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);// @audit:init uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length; f...
2
false
0
//AiArenaHelper.sol constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) { _ownerAddress = msg.sender; // Initialize the probabilities for each attribute addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);// @audit:init uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length; for (uint8 i = 0; i < attrib...
true
/// @notice Add attribute probabilities for a given generation. /// @dev Only the owner can call this function. /// @param generation The generation number. /// @param probabilities An array of attribute probabilities for the generation. function addAttributeProbabilities(uint256 generation, uint8[][...
true
true
7
c4
02-ai-arena
0x11singh99 G
High
high
# Gas Optimizations **Note : _G-08_ and _G-09_ contains only those instances which were missed by bot. Since they are major gas savings so I included those missed instances** | Number | Issue | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------...
File : src/FighterOps.sol 26: struct FighterPhysicalAttributes { 27: uint256 head; 28: uint256 eyes; 29: uint256 mouth; 30: uint256 body; 31: uint256 hands; 32: uint256 feet; 33: }
### `dailyAllowance` and `transferable` can be packed in single storage slot `SAVES: 2000 GAS, 1 SLOT` `dailyAllowance` can easily reduced to `uint16` since in [GameItems::createGameItem](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/main/src/GameItems.sol#L208C5-L229C11) function the input parameter type for `d...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/0x11singh99-G.md
2026-01-02T19:01:57.472148+00:00
5425659cda9eacce5d10652e6b1317ea374b1e270c8b5bc6a70c8297f04b73dc
0
0
0
1
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
GameItems.sol#L208-L5
GameItems.sol
1
File : src/FighterOps.sol 26: struct FighterPhysicalAttributes { 27: uint256 head; 28: uint256 eyes; 29: uint256 mouth; 30: uint256 body; 31: uint256 hands; 32: uint256 feet; 33: }
true
### `dailyAllowance` and `transferable` can be packed in single storage slot `SAVES: 2000 GAS, 1 SLOT` `dailyAllowance` can easily reduced to `uint16` since in [GameItems::createGameItem](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/main/src/GameItems.sol#L208C5-L229C11) function the input parameter type for `d...
true
true
6
c4
04-caviar
chaduke Q
Low
low
QA1. Zero address check is recommended for the input: [https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/cd8a92667bcb6657f70657183769c244d04c015c/src/Factory.sol#L129-L131](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/cd8a92667bcb6657f70657183769c244d04c015c/src/Factory.sol#L129-L131) [https://github.com/code-4...
QA5. There is an error in the NatSpec of ``change()``: [https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/cd8a92667bcb6657f70657183769c244d04c015c/src/PrivatePool.sol#L375-L377](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/cd8a92667bcb6657f70657183769c244d04c015c/src/PrivatePool.sol#L375-L377) Mitigation: the co...
QA6. The ``buy()`` function fails to verify that a private pool only supports ETH as base tokens. Similarly, the ``deposit()`` function does not check this either. [https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/cd8a92667bcb6657f70657183769c244d04c015c/src/EthRouter.sol#L129](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-c...
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/chaduke-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:20:21.720033+00:00
5427cf89fc5c9f8cf94e3429c118b02a57db55ceb0006a6663cebc29217e110b
2
2
393
7
false
false
true
false
high
- leafs[i] = keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(tokenIds[i], tokenWeights[i])))); + leafs[i] = keccak256(abi.encode(tokenIds[i], tokenWeights[i]));
diff
156
// Code block 1 (diff): - leafs[i] = keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(tokenIds[i], tokenWeights[i])))); + leafs[i] = keccak256(abi.encode(tokenIds[i], tokenWeights[i])); // Code block 2 (diff): - The sum of the caller's NFT weights must be less than or equal to the sum of the /// output pool NFTs weight...
2
true
- leafs[i] = keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(tokenIds[i], tokenWeights[i])))); + leafs[i] = keccak256(abi.encode(tokenIds[i], tokenWeights[i])); - The sum of the caller's NFT weights must be less than or equal to the sum of the /// output pool NFTs weights. + The sum of the caller's NFT weights must b...
Factory.sol#L129-L131, Factory.sol#L135-L137, Factory.sol#L141-L143, PrivatePool.sol#L661-L687, PrivatePool.sol#L375-L377, EthRouter.sol#L129, EthRouter.sol#L247
PrivatePool.sol, Factory.sol, EthRouter.sol
7
QA5. There is an error in the NatSpec of ``change()``: [https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/cd8a92667bcb6657f70657183769c244d04c015c/src/PrivatePool.sol#L375-L377](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/cd8a92667bcb6657f70657183769c244d04c015c/src/PrivatePool.sol#L375-L377) Mitigation: the co...
true
QA6. The ``buy()`` function fails to verify that a private pool only supports ETH as base tokens. Similarly, the ``deposit()`` function does not check this either. [https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/cd8a92667bcb6657f70657183769c244d04c015c/src/EthRouter.sol#L129](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-c...
true
true
10
c4
10-badger
0xta G
Low
low
# Gas Optimization # Summary | Number | Gas Optimization | Context | | :----: | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :-----: | | [G-01] | Us...
File: contracts/contracts/LeverageMacroBase.sol 131 address(this), 143 initialCdpIndex = sortedCdps.cdpCountOf(address(this)); 149 IERC3156FlashBorrower(address(this)), 156 IERC3156FlashBorrower(address(this)), 173 bytes32 cdpId = sortedCdps.cdpOfO...
File: contracts/contracts/ActivePool.sol 283 collateral.transferFrom(address(receiver), address(this), amountWithFee); 295 collateral.balanceOf(address(this)) >= collateral.getPooledEthByShares(systemCollShares), 299 collateral.sharesOf(address(this)) >= systemCollShares, 337 ret...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/0xta-G.md
2026-01-02T18:26:27.707338+00:00
545120c003fa87cd36666221ab4ad3cc5615c37bc99bbfcd7323b409c680ad1c
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
File: contracts/contracts/LeverageMacroBase.sol 131 address(this), 143 initialCdpIndex = sortedCdps.cdpCountOf(address(this)); 149 IERC3156FlashBorrower(address(this)), 156 IERC3156FlashBorrower(address(this)), 173 bytes32 cdpId = sortedCdps.cdpOfO...
true
File: contracts/contracts/ActivePool.sol 283 collateral.transferFrom(address(receiver), address(this), amountWithFee); 295 collateral.balanceOf(address(this)) >= collateral.getPooledEthByShares(systemCollShares), 299 collateral.sharesOf(address(this)) >= systemCollShares, 337 ret...
true
true
5
c4
04-caviar
0xSmartContract Q
Critical
critical
## Summary ### Issues List | Number |Issues Details|Context| |:--:|:-------|:--:| |[L-01]|Calculation of flash loan fee should be rounded up | 1 | |[L-02]|Even if there is a fee of `msg.value`, the transaction will be reverted | 1 | |[L-03]|Missing ReEntrancy Guard to ` safeTransferFrom `in functions | 6 | |[L-04]|Prev...
uint56 public changeFee; src/PrivatePool.sol: 632: uint256 fee = flashFee(token, tokenId); function flashFee(address, uint256) public view returns (uint256) { return changeFee; }
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol"; uint256 public changeFee; function flashFee(address token, uint256 tokenId) public view returns (uint256) { uint256 fee = changeFee; uint256 amount = getFlashLoanAmount(token, tokenId); uint256 feeAmount = amount * fee / 1e18; return Math.ceil(feeA...
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/0xSmartContract-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:19:19.445295+00:00
54804e4d0b02cd77ccf4219a29295ceceee1888230d6bae1280de241f6950363
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
uint56 public changeFee; src/PrivatePool.sol: 632: uint256 fee = flashFee(token, tokenId); function flashFee(address, uint256) public view returns (uint256) { return changeFee; }
true
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol"; uint256 public changeFee; function flashFee(address token, uint256 tokenId) public view returns (uint256) { uint256 fee = changeFee; uint256 amount = getFlashLoanAmount(token, tokenId); uint256 feeAmount = amount * fee / 1e18; return Math.ceil(feeA...
true
true
5
c4
03-revert-lend
ktg Q
Low
low
### L-01: AutoRange incorrect maxAmountAdd calculation Function `AutoRange.execute` currently calculates maxAmountAdd as follows: ```solidity // max amount to add - removing max potential fees (if config.onlyFees - the have been removed already) state.maxAddAmount0 = config.onlyFees ? state.amount0 : state....
// max amount to add - removing max potential fees (if config.onlyFees - the have been removed already) state.maxAddAmount0 = config.onlyFees ? state.amount0 : state.amount0 * Q64 / (params.rewardX64 + Q64); state.maxAddAmount1 = config.onlyFees ? state.amount1 : state.amount1 * Q64 / (params.re...
address owner = nonfungiblePositionManager.ownerOf(tokenId); if (owner != msg.sender) { revert Unauthorized(); }
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/blob/main/data/ktg-Q.md
2026-01-02T19:03:14.124568+00:00
54ff08a19d1a10b1e127fb9be97afaf3505fbddec6f0e11ff7530b050066d530
4
4
770
0
false
false
true
false
high
// max amount to add - removing max potential fees (if config.onlyFees - the have been removed already) state.maxAddAmount0 = config.onlyFees ? state.amount0 : state.amount0 * Q64 / (params.rewardX64 + Q64); state.maxAddAmount1 = config.onlyFees ? state.amount1 : state.amount1 * Q64 / (params.re...
solidity
335
// Code block 1 (solidity): // max amount to add - removing max potential fees (if config.onlyFees - the have been removed already) state.maxAddAmount0 = config.onlyFees ? state.amount0 : state.amount0 * Q64 / (params.rewardX64 + Q64); state.maxAddAmount1 = config.onlyFees ? state.amount1 : stat...
4
false
// max amount to add - removing max potential fees (if config.onlyFees - the have been removed already) state.maxAddAmount0 = config.onlyFees ? state.amount0 : state.amount0 * Q64 / (params.rewardX64 + Q64); state.maxAddAmount1 = config.onlyFees ? state.amount1 : state.amount1 * Q64 / (params.re...
0
// max amount to add - removing max potential fees (if config.onlyFees - the have been removed already) state.maxAddAmount0 = config.onlyFees ? state.amount0 : state.amount0 * Q64 / (params.rewardX64 + Q64); state.maxAddAmount1 = config.onlyFees ? state.amount1 : state.amount1 * Q64 / (params.re...
true
address owner = nonfungiblePositionManager.ownerOf(tokenId); if (owner != msg.sender) { revert Unauthorized(); }
true
true
9
c4
09-ondo
K42 G
Low
low
## Gas Optimization Report for [Ondo](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo) by K42 ### Possible Optimization in [SourceBridge.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/main/contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol) Possible Optimization 1 = - Use ``immutable`` for [destChainToContractAddr mapping](https://...
mapping(string => string) public immutable destChainToContractAddr;
function burnAndCallAxelar( uint256 amount, string calldata destinationChain, uint256 newNonce ) external payable whenNotPaused { // ... existing logic nonce = newNonce; }
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/K42-G.md
2026-01-02T18:25:33.576658+00:00
55886fd1aedd7bae274f5dc64ce047c2ad91fd058550262f563367de1d50ad7d
3
3
558
3
false
false
true
false
high
mapping(string => string) public immutable destChainToContractAddr;
solidity
67
// Code block 1 (solidity): mapping(string => string) public immutable destChainToContractAddr; // Code block 2 (solidity): function burnAndCallAxelar( uint256 amount, string calldata destinationChain, uint256 newNonce ) external payable whenNotPaused { // ... existing logic nonce = newNonce; } //...
3
false
mapping(string => string) public immutable destChainToContractAddr; function burnAndCallAxelar( uint256 amount, string calldata destinationChain, uint256 newNonce ) external payable whenNotPaused { // ... existing logic nonce = newNonce; } struct MsgData { address sender; uint256 value; } ...
SourceBridge.sol, SourceBridge.sol#L15, SourceBridge.sol#L61-L1
SourceBridge.sol
3
mapping(string => string) public immutable destChainToContractAddr;
true
function burnAndCallAxelar( uint256 amount, string calldata destinationChain, uint256 newNonce ) external payable whenNotPaused { // ... existing logic nonce = newNonce; }
true
true
9
c4
03-revert-lend
report
Critical
critical
--- sponsor: "Revert Lend" slug: "2024-03-revert-lend" date: "2024-05-22" title: "Revert Lend" findings: "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/issues" contest: 342 --- # Overview ## About C4 Code4rena (C4) is an open organization consisting of security researchers, auditors, developers, and ind...
if (params.permitData.length > 0) { (ISignatureTransfer.PermitTransferFrom memory permit, bytes memory signature) = abi.decode(params.permitData, (ISignatureTransfer.PermitTransferFrom, bytes)); permit2.permitTransferFrom( permit, ISignatureTransfer.SignatureTrans...
interface ISignatureTransfer is IEIP712 { /// @notice The token and amount details for a transfer signed in the permit transfer signature struct TokenPermissions { // ERC20 token address address token; // the maximum amount that can be spent uint256 amount; } /// @notice...
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/blob/main/report.md
2026-01-02T19:03:20.499501+00:00
5589ff93f21a16501308c9c443ceee3fe5f5915e9ac613645ab3b5acd3b73e57
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
if (params.permitData.length > 0) { (ISignatureTransfer.PermitTransferFrom memory permit, bytes memory signature) = abi.decode(params.permitData, (ISignatureTransfer.PermitTransferFrom, bytes)); permit2.permitTransferFrom( permit, ISignatureTransfer.SignatureTrans...
true
interface ISignatureTransfer is IEIP712 { /// @notice The token and amount details for a transfer signed in the permit transfer signature struct TokenPermissions { // ERC20 token address address token; // the maximum amount that can be spent uint256 amount; } /// @notice...
true
true
5
c4
03-asymmetry
0xkeesmark G
Low
low
# [G-01]++i costs less gas than i++ ## Lines of code https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L71 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L84 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol...
- i++ + ++i
- for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) + for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount;) // something... + unchecked { + i++; + } }
overflow
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/0xkeesmark-G.md
2026-01-02T18:17:44.057126+00:00
558c9df7a81e6d37f4efff005c47e64c8bf5a7bc1082fa54206c0e52c771558a
2
0
148
7
false
false
true
false
high
- i++ + ++i
unknown
11
// Code block 1 (unknown): - i++ + ++i // Code block 2 (unknown): - for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) + for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount;) // something... + unchecked { + i++; + } }
2
false
SafEth.sol#L71, SafEth.sol#L84, SafEth.sol#L113, SafEth.sol#L140, SafEth.sol#L147, SafEth.sol#L171, SafEth.sol#L191
SafEth.sol
7
- i++ + ++i
true
- for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) + for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount;) // something... + unchecked { + i++; + } }
true
true
8
c4
10-badger
tabriz Q
Critical
critical
## [L-01] Stop Using Solidity's transfer() Now **Proof Of Concept** https://consensys.io/diligence/blog/2019/09/stop-using-soliditys-transfer-now/ ``` collateral.transfer(address(receiver), amount); ``` https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/main/packages/contracts/contracts/ActivePool.sol#L274C7-L274C56 ...
collateral.transfer(address(receiver), amount);
collateral.transfer(feeRecipientAddress, fee);
flash-loan
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/tabriz-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:27:03.719004+00:00
55a7f53608da02bd7a4a43f83b82c1d359103fde693bd5e933f5fd13eb2cbfcb
8
0
539
7
false
false
true
false
high
collateral.transfer(address(receiver), amount);
unknown
47
// Code block 1 (unknown): collateral.transfer(address(receiver), amount); // Code block 2 (unknown): collateral.transfer(feeRecipientAddress, fee); // Code block 3 (unknown): function transfer(address recipient, uint256 amount) external override returns (bool) { // Code block 4 (unknown): emit Transfer(account, add...
8
false
ActivePool.sol#L274-L7, ActivePool.sol#L286-L7, EBTCToken.sol#L119-L4, EBTCToken.sol#L282-L7, LeverageMacroBase.sol#L224-L12, LeverageMacroBase.sol#L37-L3, SimplifiedDiamondLike.sol#L39-L4
EBTCToken.sol, ActivePool.sol, LeverageMacroBase.sol, SimplifiedDiamondLike.sol
7
collateral.transfer(address(receiver), amount);
true
collateral.transfer(feeRecipientAddress, fee);
true
true
14
c4
09-ondo
JCK G
High
high
# Gas Optimizations | Number | Issue | Instances | Gas | |--------|-------|-----------|-----| |[G-01]| Don’t cache value if it is only used once | 5 | 450 | |[G-02]| Use assembly to check for address(0) | 12 | 72 | |[G-03]| Use hardcode address instead address(this) | 3 | | |[G-04]| Make 3 event parameters inde...
file: contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol 322 function rescueTokens(address _token) external onlyOwner { uint256 balance = IRWALike(_token).balanceOf(address(this)); IRWALike(_token).transfer(owner(), balance); }
file: contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol 337 function _mintIfThresholdMet(bytes32 txnHash) internal { bool thresholdMet = _checkThresholdMet(txnHash); Transaction memory txn = txnHashToTransaction[txnHash]; if (thresholdMet) { _checkAndUpdateInstantMintLimit(txn.amount); if (!ALLOWLIST...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/JCK-G.md
2026-01-02T18:25:30.408284+00:00
55c069d5dee90ce7fe36b92b0a242b901cd6ea6981b56c6954f53abab1dfe574
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
file: contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol 322 function rescueTokens(address _token) external onlyOwner { uint256 balance = IRWALike(_token).balanceOf(address(this)); IRWALike(_token).transfer(owner(), balance); }
true
file: contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol 337 function _mintIfThresholdMet(bytes32 txnHash) internal { bool thresholdMet = _checkThresholdMet(txnHash); Transaction memory txn = txnHashToTransaction[txnHash]; if (thresholdMet) { _checkAndUpdateInstantMintLimit(txn.amount); if (!ALLOWLIST...
true
true
5
c4
03-asymmetry
T1MOH Q
High
high
## Mark SafEthStorage as abstract This contract is dependent on SafEth.sol and provides read-only functionality, there is know sense in deploying it ## Upgradeable contract is missing a __gap[50] storage variable to allow for new storage variables in later versions See this link for a description of this storage varia...
uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; uint256 balanceBefore = address(this).balance; IStEthEthPool(LIDO_CRV_POOL).exchange(1, 0, stEthBal, minOut); uint256 balanceAfter = address(this).balance; // solhint-disable-next-line (bool sent, ) = addr...
uint256 balancePre = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this)); IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount); uint256 balancePost = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this)); uint256 stEthBal = balancePost - balancePre IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, stEthBal);
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/T1MOH-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:18:36.441340+00:00
55dac932099b4611071299cf8cc964a3faaee3fb173f2d4dc118622ee85e8026
2
2
694
2
false
false
true
false
high
uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; uint256 balanceBefore = address(this).balance; IStEthEthPool(LIDO_CRV_POOL).exchange(1, 0, stEthBal, minOut); uint256 balanceAfter = address(this).balance; // solhint-disable-next-line (bool sent, ) = address(msg....
solidity
396
// Code block 1 (solidity): uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; uint256 balanceBefore = address(this).balance; IStEthEthPool(LIDO_CRV_POOL).exchange(1, 0, stEthBal, minOut); uint256 balanceAfter = address(this).balance; // solhint-disable-next-line ...
2
false
uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; uint256 balanceBefore = address(this).balance; IStEthEthPool(LIDO_CRV_POOL).exchange(1, 0, stEthBal, minOut); uint256 balanceAfter = address(this).balance; // solhint-disable-next-line (bool sent, ) = address(msg....
WstEth.sol#L56-L63, Reth.sol#L215
Reth.sol, WstEth.sol
2
uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; uint256 balanceBefore = address(this).balance; IStEthEthPool(LIDO_CRV_POOL).exchange(1, 0, stEthBal, minOut); uint256 balanceAfter = address(this).balance; // solhint-disable-next-line (bool sent, ) = addr...
true
uint256 balancePre = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this)); IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount); uint256 balancePost = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this)); uint256 stEthBal = balancePost - balancePre IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, stEthBal);
true
true
8
c4
07-amphora
0xSmartContract Q
Critical
critical
### QA Report Issues List - [x] **Low 01** → The `execute()` function is payable and has no control of the `msg.value` value, this may cause the user to lose Money - [x] **Low 02** → Lack of price oracle output validation can result in wrong or stale price being used in UniswapV3OracleRelay.sol - [x] **Low 03** → Ther...
core/solidity/contracts/governance/GovernorCharlie.sol: 308 */ 309: function execute(uint256 _proposalId) external payable override { 310: if (state(_proposalId) != ProposalState.Queued) revert GovernorCharlie_ProposalNotQueued(); 311: Proposal storage _proposal = proposals[_proposalId]; 312: ...
core/solidity/contracts/periphery/oracles/UniswapV3OracleRelay.sol: 78 79: function _getPriceFromUniswap(uint32 _seconds, uint128 _amount) internal view virtual returns (uint256 _price) { 80: (int24 _arithmeticMeanTick,) = OracleLibrary.consult(address(POOL), _seconds); 81: _price = OracleLibrary.ge...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/0xSmartContract-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:23:19.257471+00:00
55ef1f92ab119b0a20bd36c3db5d4baaa1f30022b07587bb1e0f83d561b64a0d
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
core/solidity/contracts/governance/GovernorCharlie.sol: 308 */ 309: function execute(uint256 _proposalId) external payable override { 310: if (state(_proposalId) != ProposalState.Queued) revert GovernorCharlie_ProposalNotQueued(); 311: Proposal storage _proposal = proposals[_proposalId]; 312: ...
true
core/solidity/contracts/periphery/oracles/UniswapV3OracleRelay.sol: 78 79: function _getPriceFromUniswap(uint32 _seconds, uint128 _amount) internal view virtual returns (uint256 _price) { 80: (int24 _arithmeticMeanTick,) = OracleLibrary.consult(address(POOL), _seconds); 81: _price = OracleLibrary.ge...
true
true
5
c4
07-amphora
0xComfyCat Q
Medium
medium
# [L-01] USDA `withdrawAll` doesn’t take pending interest into account leaving user's interest unclaimed USDA `withdrawAll` and `withdrawAllTo` doesn't really withdraw all of user balance. Since it calculate withdrawal balance before doing interest accrual, accrued interest won't be reflected in the calculated balance...
function withdrawAll() external override returns (uint256 _susdWithdrawn) { uint256 _balance = this.balanceOf(_msgSender()); _susdWithdrawn = _balance > reserveAmount ? reserveAmount : _balance; // @audit calculate withdrawal balance _withdraw(_susdWithdrawn, _msgSender()); // @audit accrue interest after...
import {CommonE2EBase, IVault, console} from '@test/e2e/Common.sol'; contract WithdrawInterestPoC is CommonE2EBase { function setUp() public override { super.setUp(); // Someone borrows bobVaultId = _mintVault(bob); vm.startPrank(bob); bobVault = IVault(vaultController.vaultIdVaultAddress(bobVau...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/0xComfyCat-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:23:17.918316+00:00
55f672aec9f402cc09b276e4fcb9aad988c5e402bef01d5b6ccf80c367f8397e
1
0
526
2
false
false
true
false
high
function withdrawAll() external override returns (uint256 _susdWithdrawn) { uint256 _balance = this.balanceOf(_msgSender()); _susdWithdrawn = _balance > reserveAmount ? reserveAmount : _balance; // @audit calculate withdrawal balance _withdraw(_susdWithdrawn, _msgSender()); // @audit accrue interest after b...
unknown
526
// Code block 1 (unknown): function withdrawAll() external override returns (uint256 _susdWithdrawn) { uint256 _balance = this.balanceOf(_msgSender()); _susdWithdrawn = _balance > reserveAmount ? reserveAmount : _balance; // @audit calculate withdrawal balance _withdraw(_susdWithdrawn, _msgSender()); // @au...
1
false
USDA.sol#L126-L144, USDA.sol#L147
USDA.sol
2
function withdrawAll() external override returns (uint256 _susdWithdrawn) { uint256 _balance = this.balanceOf(_msgSender()); _susdWithdrawn = _balance > reserveAmount ? reserveAmount : _balance; // @audit calculate withdrawal balance _withdraw(_susdWithdrawn, _msgSender()); // @audit accrue interest after...
true
import {CommonE2EBase, IVault, console} from '@test/e2e/Common.sol'; contract WithdrawInterestPoC is CommonE2EBase { function setUp() public override { super.setUp(); // Someone borrows bobVaultId = _mintVault(bob); vm.startPrank(bob); bobVault = IVault(vaultController.vaultIdVaultAddress(bobVau...
true
true
7
c4
09-ondo
dd0x7e8 Q
Unknown
unknown
The issue in the `wrap()` function of `rUSDY` contract lies in the event logs for the `Transfer` and `TransferShares` events. Currently, the USDY amount (`_USDYAmount`) is being used as the value for the shares in the event logs, which is incorrect. The accurate number of shares should be `_USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR...
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L438 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L439 To address this issue, it's recommended to update the event logs to reflect the c...
other
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/dd0x7e8-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:25:52.945780+00:00
5628b376bd4be5230642a087a0a946b775ac95d1d03d8a9ee50175e5b8d363f5
1
0
378
2
false
true
true
false
medium
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L438 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L439 To address this issue, it's recommended to update the event logs to reflect the c...
unknown
378
// Code block 1 (unknown): https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L438 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L439 To address this issue, it's recommended to update the ...
1
false
rUSDY.sol#L438, rUSDY.sol#L439
rUSDY.sol
2
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L438 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L439 To address this issue, it's recommended to update the event logs to reflect the c...
true
false
false
6
c4
03-asymmetry
climber2002 Q
Unknown
unknown
# Add require(_derivativeIndex < derivativeCount) validation in SafETH.adjustWeight In [SafETH.adjustWeight](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/44b5cd94ebedc187a08884a7f685e950e987261c/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L177) it doesn't make sense if _derivativeIndex >= derivativeCount. It's better to add s...
function adjustWeight( uint256 _derivativeIndex, uint256 _weight ) external onlyOwner { require(_derivativeIndex < derivativeCount, "Invalid _derivativeIndex"); ... }
uint256 derivativeAmount = (derivatives[i].balance() * _safEthAmount) / safEthTotalSupply;
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/climber2002-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:19:00.264943+00:00
565ac524e3cb75c0dbd77bdd321f73f294d6c1b8293bfeb4d2e9d52f282529df
2
2
296
2
false
false
true
false
high
function adjustWeight( uint256 _derivativeIndex, uint256 _weight ) external onlyOwner { require(_derivativeIndex < derivativeCount, "Invalid _derivativeIndex"); ... }
solidity
190
// Code block 1 (solidity): function adjustWeight( uint256 _derivativeIndex, uint256 _weight ) external onlyOwner { require(_derivativeIndex < derivativeCount, "Invalid _derivativeIndex"); ... } // Code block 2 (solidity): uint256 derivativeAmount = (derivatives[i].balance() * _...
2
false
function adjustWeight( uint256 _derivativeIndex, uint256 _weight ) external onlyOwner { require(_derivativeIndex < derivativeCount, "Invalid _derivativeIndex"); ... } uint256 derivativeAmount = (derivatives[i].balance() * _safEthAmount) / safEthTotalSupply;
SafEth.sol#L177, SafEth.sol#L115-L116
SafEth.sol
2
function adjustWeight( uint256 _derivativeIndex, uint256 _weight ) external onlyOwner { require(_derivativeIndex < derivativeCount, "Invalid _derivativeIndex"); ... }
true
uint256 derivativeAmount = (derivatives[i].balance() * _safEthAmount) / safEthTotalSupply;
true
true
8
c4
02-ethos
Saintcode_ G
Medium
medium
# Gas Optimizations ## Consider marking constants as private Consider marking constant variables in storage as private to save gas (unless a constant variable should be easily accessible by another protocol or offchain logic). ```js contract GasTest is DSTest { Contract0 c0; Contract1 c1; function s...
contract GasTest is DSTest { Contract0 c0; Contract1 c1; function setUp() public { c0 = new Contract0(); c1 = new Contract1(); } function testGas() public view { uint256 a = 100; c0.addPublicConstant(a); c1.addPrivateConstant(a); } }...
╭───────────────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────┬────────┬─────┬─────────╮ │ src/test/GasTest.t.sol:Contract0 contract ┆ ┆ ┆ ┆ ┆ │ ╞═══════════════════════════════════════════╪═════════════════╪═════╪════════╪═════╪═════════╡ │ Deployment Cost ...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/Saintcode_-G.md
2026-01-02T18:16:37.812457+00:00
5666ce524bf34c837f5229e6ebe87f225dd8f4ebf82190eef48476aabe470965
1
0
658
0
false
false
true
false
high
contract GasTest is DSTest { Contract0 c0; Contract1 c1; function setUp() public { c0 = new Contract0(); c1 = new Contract1(); } function testGas() public view { uint256 a = 100; c0.addPublicConstant(a); c1.addPrivateConstant(a); } }...
js
658
// Code block 1 (js): contract GasTest is DSTest { Contract0 c0; Contract1 c1; function setUp() public { c0 = new Contract0(); c1 = new Contract1(); } function testGas() public view { uint256 a = 100; c0.addPublicConstant(a); c1.addPrivateConstan...
1
false
0
contract GasTest is DSTest { Contract0 c0; Contract1 c1; function setUp() public { c0 = new Contract0(); c1 = new Contract1(); } function testGas() public view { uint256 a = 100; c0.addPublicConstant(a); c1.addPrivateConstant(a); } }...
true
╭───────────────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────┬────────┬─────┬─────────╮ │ src/test/GasTest.t.sol:Contract0 contract ┆ ┆ ┆ ┆ ┆ │ ╞═══════════════════════════════════════════╪═════════════════╪═════╪════════╪═════╪═════════╡ │ Deployment Cost ...
true
true
6
c4
05-ajna
Bason G
Gas
gas
## Gas Findings | Number |Issues Details | |:--------:|:-------| | [GAS-01] | Hash keccak256 variables off-chain to save gas *** ## |[GAS-01]| Hash keccak256 variables off-chain to save gas ExtraordinaryFunding.sol ```solidity bytes32 internal constant DESCRIPTION_PREFIX_HASH_EXTRAORDINARY = keccak256(bytes("Extra...
bytes32 internal constant DESCRIPTION_PREFIX_HASH_EXTRAORDINARY = keccak256(bytes("Extraordinary Funding: "));
bytes32 internal constant DESCRIPTION_PREFIX_HASH_STANDARD = keccak256(bytes("Standard Funding: "));
other
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/Bason-G.md
2026-01-02T18:20:56.059659+00:00
5669f4215c8db762b19da10fb5ccd4cef537f5dbbdc678a60a218e8d92069e55
2
2
210
0
false
false
true
false
high
bytes32 internal constant DESCRIPTION_PREFIX_HASH_EXTRAORDINARY = keccak256(bytes("Extraordinary Funding: "));
solidity
110
// Code block 1 (solidity): bytes32 internal constant DESCRIPTION_PREFIX_HASH_EXTRAORDINARY = keccak256(bytes("Extraordinary Funding: ")); // Code block 2 (solidity): bytes32 internal constant DESCRIPTION_PREFIX_HASH_STANDARD = keccak256(bytes("Standard Funding: "));
2
false
bytes32 internal constant DESCRIPTION_PREFIX_HASH_EXTRAORDINARY = keccak256(bytes("Extraordinary Funding: ")); bytes32 internal constant DESCRIPTION_PREFIX_HASH_STANDARD = keccak256(bytes("Standard Funding: "));
0
bytes32 internal constant DESCRIPTION_PREFIX_HASH_EXTRAORDINARY = keccak256(bytes("Extraordinary Funding: "));
true
bytes32 internal constant DESCRIPTION_PREFIX_HASH_STANDARD = keccak256(bytes("Standard Funding: "));
true
true
5.31
c4
09-ondo
turvy_fuzz Q
Medium
medium
## Low - Conflicting specification to code implementation ```solidity if (newStart < ranges[indexToModify - 1].end) revert InvalidRange(); ``` This above checks that newStart goes below the end time of the previous range therefore it ensures newStart is greater than it and not less than it. However, it conflicts with t...
if (newStart < ranges[indexToModify - 1].end) revert InvalidRange();
if (txnToThresholdSet[txnHash].numberOfApprovalsNeeded == 0) { revert NoThresholdMatch(); }
oracle
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/turvy_fuzz-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:26:19.375945+00:00
567d91e84739b0b4eae492b7868824a5940273cd715856ed9599ed3c156ab8f7
2
1
169
2
false
false
true
false
high
if (newStart < ranges[indexToModify - 1].end) revert InvalidRange();
solidity
68
// Code block 1 (solidity): if (newStart < ranges[indexToModify - 1].end) revert InvalidRange(); // Code block 2 (unknown): if (txnToThresholdSet[txnHash].numberOfApprovalsNeeded == 0) { revert NoThresholdMatch(); }
2
false
if (newStart < ranges[indexToModify - 1].end) revert InvalidRange();
RWADynamicOracle.sol#L211, DestinationBridge.sol#L273
RWADynamicOracle.sol, DestinationBridge.sol
2
if (newStart < ranges[indexToModify - 1].end) revert InvalidRange();
true
if (txnToThresholdSet[txnHash].numberOfApprovalsNeeded == 0) { revert NoThresholdMatch(); }
true
true
7.15
c4
01-biconomy
yosuke G
Medium
medium
## [YO GAS-1] USE CUSTOM ERRORS RATHER THAN REVERT()/REQUIRE() STRINGS TO SAVE GAS ### Handle yosuke ## Vulnerability details ### Impact Custom errors are available from solidity version 0.8.4. Custom errors save ~50 gas each time they’re hit by avoiding having to allocate and store the revert string. Not defining th...
after
## [YO GAS-3] USING BOOLS FOR STORAGE INCURS OVERHEAD ### Handle yosuke ## Vulnerability details ### Impact Booleans are more expensive than uint256 or any type that takes up a full word because each write operation emits an extra SLOAD to first read the slot's contents, replace the bits taken up by the boolean, and ...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/yosuke-G.md
2026-01-02T18:14:15.937255+00:00
56877a3bd322130fab7cb5f3a4c316fa6c6bd48d4a689ce2e67ecdb71e42bb6e
0
0
0
23
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
BaseSmartAccount.sol#L74, SmartAccount.sol#L77, SmartAccount.sol#L83, SmartAccount.sol#L89, SmartAccount.sol#L110, SmartAccount.sol#L121, SmartAccount.sol#L128, SmartAccount.sol#L167-L171, SmartAccount.sol#L224, SmartAccount.sol#L232, SmartAccount.sol#L262, SmartAccount.sol#L265, BaseSmartAccount.sol#L120, SmartAccount...
IERC165.sol, BaseSmartAccount.sol, SmartAccountFactory.sol, ModuleManager.sol, SmartAccount.sol, SecuredTokenTransfer.sol
23
after
true
## [YO GAS-3] USING BOOLS FOR STORAGE INCURS OVERHEAD ### Handle yosuke ## Vulnerability details ### Impact Booleans are more expensive than uint256 or any type that takes up a full word because each write operation emits an extra SLOAD to first read the slot's contents, replace the bits taken up by the boolean, and ...
true
true
6
c4
02-ai-arena
report
Critical
critical
--- sponsor: "AI Arena" slug: "2024-02-ai-arena" date: "2024-05-14" title: "AI Arena" findings: "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/issues" contest: 328 --- # Overview ## About C4 Code4rena (C4) is an open organization consisting of security researchers, auditors, developers, and individuals wit...
Place the PoC into `test/RankedBattle.t.sol`, and execute with forge test --match-test testExploitTransferStakedFighterAndPlay </details> ### Impact 2: Another fighter can't win, game server unable to commit <details>
Place the PoC into `test/RankedBattle.t.sol`, and execute with forge test --match-test testExploitTransferStakeAtRiskFighterAndSpoilOtherPlayer </details> ### Recommended Mitigation Steps Remove the incomplete checks in the inherited functions `transferFrom()` and `safeTransferFrom()` of `FighterFarm` contract,...
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/report.md
2026-01-02T19:02:49.233787+00:00
568b9c0691fde7ab6f3077685f9e58176e9120d265439c5777e69cc246bb28db
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
Place the PoC into `test/RankedBattle.t.sol`, and execute with forge test --match-test testExploitTransferStakedFighterAndPlay </details> ### Impact 2: Another fighter can't win, game server unable to commit <details>
true
Place the PoC into `test/RankedBattle.t.sol`, and execute with forge test --match-test testExploitTransferStakeAtRiskFighterAndSpoilOtherPlayer </details> ### Recommended Mitigation Steps Remove the incomplete checks in the inherited functions `transferFrom()` and `safeTransferFrom()` of `FighterFarm` contract,...
true
true
5
c4
04-caviar
jnrlouis Q
Critical
critical
## Summary ## Non Critical Issues | | Issue | Instances | | --- | --- | ---| | 1 | Functions not called internally should be marked `external` | 6 | | 2 | Return value from `transfer` is ignored | 3 | | 3 | Input Validation not done | 2 | ## Non Critical Issues # [NC-01] Functions not called internally should be...
File: src/Factory.sol 129 function setPrivatePoolMetadata(address _privatePoolMetadata) public onlyOwner 135 function setPrivatePoolImplementation(address _privatePoolImplementation) public onlyOwner 141 function setProtocolFeeRate(uint16 _protocolFeeRate) public onlyOwner 148 function withdraw...
File: src/PrivatePool.sol 514 function withdraw(address _nft, uint256[] calldata tokenIds, address token, uint256 tokenAmount) public onlyOwner 742 function price() public view returns (uint256)
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/jnrlouis-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:20:37.263149+00:00
56e2c03f601e2b325ba3bdbe8c14b1f6aadff3bfbd376c027e5b6b45fccecd3c
2
0
570
6
false
false
true
false
high
File: src/Factory.sol 129 function setPrivatePoolMetadata(address _privatePoolMetadata) public onlyOwner 135 function setPrivatePoolImplementation(address _privatePoolImplementation) public onlyOwner 141 function setProtocolFeeRate(uint16 _protocolFeeRate) public onlyOwner 148 function withdraw...
javascript
368
// Code block 1 (javascript): File: src/Factory.sol 129 function setPrivatePoolMetadata(address _privatePoolMetadata) public onlyOwner 135 function setPrivatePoolImplementation(address _privatePoolImplementation) public onlyOwner 141 function setProtocolFeeRate(uint16 _protocolFeeRate) public onlyOwner ...
2
false
Factory.sol#L129, Factory.sol#L135, Factory.sol#L141, Factory.sol#L148, PrivatePool.sol#L514, PrivatePool.sol#L742
PrivatePool.sol, Factory.sol
6
File: src/Factory.sol 129 function setPrivatePoolMetadata(address _privatePoolMetadata) public onlyOwner 135 function setPrivatePoolImplementation(address _privatePoolImplementation) public onlyOwner 141 function setProtocolFeeRate(uint16 _protocolFeeRate) public onlyOwner 148 function withdraw...
true
File: src/PrivatePool.sol 514 function withdraw(address _nft, uint256[] calldata tokenIds, address token, uint256 tokenAmount) public onlyOwner 742 function price() public view returns (uint256)
true
true
8
c4
02-ai-arena
ADM Q
Medium
medium
#### [L01] addAttributeProbabilities should be called when generation is incremented. (otherwise reroll may have no stats) ###### Summary: When FighterFarm#incrementGeneration() is called both the generation and the maxRerollsAllowed are incremented. However if a user decides to utilise this reroll before an admin has ...
function incrementGeneration(uint8 fighterType, uint8[][] memory probabilities)) external returns (uint8) { require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress); generation[fighterType] += 1; _aiArenaHelperInstance.addAttributeProbabilities(generation[fighterType], probabilities) maxRerollsAllowed[fighterType] += 1; return gener...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/ADM-Q.md
2026-01-02T19:02:12.912902+00:00
56fb47f578fba5ad44d1b74756ab5e27de9345fbe3629cb766f22dbc8a44923f
1
1
341
3
false
true
true
false
high
function incrementGeneration(uint8 fighterType, uint8[][] memory probabilities)) external returns (uint8) { require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress); generation[fighterType] += 1; _aiArenaHelperInstance.addAttributeProbabilities(generation[fighterType], probabilities) maxRerollsAllowed[fighterType] += 1; return gener...
solidity
341
// Code block 1 (solidity): function incrementGeneration(uint8 fighterType, uint8[][] memory probabilities)) external returns (uint8) { require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress); generation[fighterType] += 1; _aiArenaHelperInstance.addAttributeProbabilities(generation[fighterType], probabilities) maxRerollsAllowed[figh...
1
false
function incrementGeneration(uint8 fighterType, uint8[][] memory probabilities)) external returns (uint8) { require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress); generation[fighterType] += 1; _aiArenaHelperInstance.addAttributeProbabilities(generation[fighterType], probabilities) maxRerollsAllowed[fighterType] += 1; return gener...
FighterFarm.sol#L129-L134, FighterFarm.sol#L383-L388, AiArenaHelper.sol#L131-L139
FighterFarm.sol, AiArenaHelper.sol
3
function incrementGeneration(uint8 fighterType, uint8[][] memory probabilities)) external returns (uint8) { require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress); generation[fighterType] += 1; _aiArenaHelperInstance.addAttributeProbabilities(generation[fighterType], probabilities) maxRerollsAllowed[fighterType] += 1; return gener...
true
false
false
6
c4
08-dopex
Shubham G
Medium
medium
## Gas Optimization | |Issue|Instances| |-|:-|:-:| | [G-01](#G-01) | Successive sorting of token addresses wastes gas | 1 | | [G-02](#G-02) | Checking the value of `supply` early on can prevent execution of external calls & calculations | 1 | ## [G-01] Successive sorting of token addresses wastes gas In 'reLP()', f...
File: contracts/reLP/ReLPContract function reLP(uint256 _amount) external onlyRole(RDPXV2CORE_ROLE) { // get the pool reserves (address tokenASorted, address tokenBSorted) = UniswapV2Library.sortTokens( addresses.tokenA, addresses.tokenB ); (uint256 reserveA, uint256 reserveB) = Uniswap...
File: UniswapV2Library.sol function getReserves( address factory, address tokenA, address tokenB ) internal view returns (uint256 reserveA, uint256 reserveB) { (address token0, ) = sortTokens(tokenA, tokenB); --------> Sorting already happens here (uint256 reserve0, uint25...
other
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/Shubham-G.md
2026-01-02T18:25:05.848256+00:00
56fd4311de8eae0bce02552df9ecc7cdc698f16ccbe908c163ddeab5d5090cd2
2
2
958
1
false
false
true
false
high
File: contracts/reLP/ReLPContract function reLP(uint256 _amount) external onlyRole(RDPXV2CORE_ROLE) { // get the pool reserves (address tokenASorted, address tokenBSorted) = UniswapV2Library.sortTokens( addresses.tokenA, addresses.tokenB ); (uint256 reserveA, uint256 reserveB) = Uniswap...
solidity
438
// Code block 1 (solidity): File: contracts/reLP/ReLPContract function reLP(uint256 _amount) external onlyRole(RDPXV2CORE_ROLE) { // get the pool reserves (address tokenASorted, address tokenBSorted) = UniswapV2Library.sortTokens( addresses.tokenA, addresses.tokenB ); (uint256 reserveA,...
2
false
File: contracts/reLP/ReLPContract function reLP(uint256 _amount) external onlyRole(RDPXV2CORE_ROLE) { // get the pool reserves (address tokenASorted, address tokenBSorted) = UniswapV2Library.sortTokens( addresses.tokenA, addresses.tokenB ); (uint256 reserveA, uint256 reserveB) = Uniswap...
ReLPContract.sol#L202-L212
ReLPContract.sol
1
File: contracts/reLP/ReLPContract function reLP(uint256 _amount) external onlyRole(RDPXV2CORE_ROLE) { // get the pool reserves (address tokenASorted, address tokenBSorted) = UniswapV2Library.sortTokens( addresses.tokenA, addresses.tokenB ); (uint256 reserveA, uint256 reserveB) = Uniswap...
true
File: UniswapV2Library.sol function getReserves( address factory, address tokenA, address tokenB ) internal view returns (uint256 reserveA, uint256 reserveB) { (address token0, ) = sortTokens(tokenA, tokenB); --------> Sorting already happens here (uint256 reserve0, uint25...
true
true
8
c4
03-asymmetry
alejandrocovrr Q
Low
low
# Withdraw function on WstEth can be improved On [/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol#L56](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol#L56) there are some refactors that can be applied to improve both code quality and security. The current code is: ``` fu...
function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner { IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount); uint256 stEthBal = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this)); IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, stEthBal); uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; IStEthEthPool(LIDO_CRV_P...
function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner { require(_amount > 0 && _amount <= address(this).balance, "Invalid amount"); IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount); uint256 stEthBal = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this)); IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, stEthBal); uint256 minOut ...
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/alejandrocovrr-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:18:45.888499+00:00
57409842db257f33eb6c42a58f3ea16624afcd6a73ec1b96817f8b66d4566775
2
0
1,058
1
false
false
true
false
high
function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner { IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount); uint256 stEthBal = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this)); IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, stEthBal); uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; IStEthEthPool(LIDO_CRV_P...
unknown
528
// Code block 1 (unknown): function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner { IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount); uint256 stEthBal = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this)); IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, stEthBal); uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; ...
2
false
WstEth.sol#L56
WstEth.sol
1
function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner { IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount); uint256 stEthBal = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this)); IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, stEthBal); uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; IStEthEthPool(LIDO_CRV_P...
true
function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner { require(_amount > 0 && _amount <= address(this).balance, "Invalid amount"); IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount); uint256 stEthBal = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this)); IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, stEthBal); uint256 minOut ...
true
true
8
c4
01-salty
LinKenji Analysis
Critical
critical
## Project Summary Salty.IO is building a decentralized exchange that aims to offer zero fee swaps, yield generation from automatic arbitrage, and a native stablecoin called USDS collateralized by WBTC/WETH. The system is governed by a DAO where SALT token holders vote on parameters and upgrades. No special admin acc...
function setPriceFeed(uint id, IPriceFeed feed) onlyOwner external { // Set manipulated feed }
function swap( IERC20 tokenIn, IERC20 tokenOut, uint amountIn ) external { // Place user swap uint arbitrageProfit = _attemptArbitrage( tokenIn, tokenOut, amountIn ); } function _attemptArbitrage( IERC20 tokenIn, IERC20 tokenOut, uint amountIn ) internal returns (uint profit) { ...
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/LinKenji-Analysis.md
2026-01-02T19:01:24.647048+00:00
574df277a74b69b6f590d54af6a572b29b9bfb8e83d1237777c27dbd1fc4a38d
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
function setPriceFeed(uint id, IPriceFeed feed) onlyOwner external { // Set manipulated feed }
true
function swap( IERC20 tokenIn, IERC20 tokenOut, uint amountIn ) external { // Place user swap uint arbitrageProfit = _attemptArbitrage( tokenIn, tokenOut, amountIn ); } function _attemptArbitrage( IERC20 tokenIn, IERC20 tokenOut, uint amountIn ) internal returns (uint profit) { ...
true
true
5
c4
10-badger
niroh Q
High
high
# _fallbackIsFrozen makes a call to fallbackCaller.fallbackTimeout() without checking that fallbackCaller is non-zero ## Github Links https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/f2f2e2cf9965a1020661d179af46cb49e993cb7e/packages/contracts/contracts/PriceFeed.sol#L490 ## Description if the PriceFeed contract fun...
if (address(fallbackCaller) == address(0)) { return true; } return _fallbackResponse.timestamp > 0 && _responseTimeout(_fallbackResponse.timestamp, fallbackCaller.fallbackTimeout());
function closeCdp(bytes32 _cdpId) external override nonReentrantSelfAndCdpM {
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/niroh-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:26:57.381529+00:00
5753df0711da03f69af4b380968eec3725b71ed8865226f2af97adc5c799ef6e
0
0
0
2
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
PriceFeed.sol#L490, PriceFeed.sol#L224
PriceFeed.sol
2
if (address(fallbackCaller) == address(0)) { return true; } return _fallbackResponse.timestamp > 0 && _responseTimeout(_fallbackResponse.timestamp, fallbackCaller.fallbackTimeout());
true
function closeCdp(bytes32 _cdpId) external override nonReentrantSelfAndCdpM {
true
true
6
c4
01-biconomy
report
Critical
critical
--- sponsor: "Biconomy" slug: "2023-01-biconomy" date: "2023-03-03" title: "Biconomy - Smart Contract Wallet contest" findings: "https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/issues" contest: 200 --- # Overview ## About C4 Code4rena (C4) is an open organization consisting of security researchers, auditors,...
contract Destructor { fallback() external { selfdestruct(payable(0)); } }
So, in the deploy script there is no enforce that the `SmartAccount` contract implementation was initialized. The same situation in `scw-contracts/scripts/wallet-factory.deploy.ts` script. Please note, that in case only the possibility of initialization of the `SmartAccount` implementation will be banned it will be p...
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/report.md
2026-01-02T18:14:17.356014+00:00
575bcc1e981e80af73921c46f79f8a568355d4c7e8f9c8c77a3416ebcc4e9ec0
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
contract Destructor { fallback() external { selfdestruct(payable(0)); } }
true
So, in the deploy script there is no enforce that the `SmartAccount` contract implementation was initialized. The same situation in `scw-contracts/scripts/wallet-factory.deploy.ts` script. Please note, that in case only the possibility of initialization of the `SmartAccount` implementation will be banned it will be p...
true
true
5
c4
01-salty
memforvik Q
Medium
medium
The function _withdrawLiquidityAndClaim not followed Checks effects interactions, may lead to a read-only reentrancy attacks ``` src/staking/Liquidity.sol // Withdraw specified liquidity, decrease the user's liquidity share and claim any pending rewards. function _withdrawLiquidityAndClaim( IERC20 tokenA, IERC20...
src/staking/Liquidity.sol // Withdraw specified liquidity, decrease the user's liquidity share and claim any pending rewards. function _withdrawLiquidityAndClaim( IERC20 tokenA, IERC20 tokenB, uint256 liquidityToWithdraw, uint256 minReclaimedA, uint256 minReclaimedB ) internal returns (uint256 reclaimedA, uint256...
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/memforvik-Q.md
2026-01-02T19:01:52.517719+00:00
57d4f4aa2c9b305e762b24dc22478c71d32041c544b5051cedf2b7ca730f8477
1
0
1,451
1
false
true
true
false
medium
src/staking/Liquidity.sol // Withdraw specified liquidity, decrease the user's liquidity share and claim any pending rewards. function _withdrawLiquidityAndClaim( IERC20 tokenA, IERC20 tokenB, uint256 liquidityToWithdraw, uint256 minReclaimedA, uint256 minReclaimedB ) internal returns (uint256 reclaimedA, uint256...
unknown
1,451
// Code block 1 (unknown): src/staking/Liquidity.sol // Withdraw specified liquidity, decrease the user's liquidity share and claim any pending rewards. function _withdrawLiquidityAndClaim( IERC20 tokenA, IERC20 tokenB, uint256 liquidityToWithdraw, uint256 minReclaimedA, uint256 minReclaimedB ) internal returns (...
1
false
Liquidity.sol#L137
Liquidity.sol
1
src/staking/Liquidity.sol // Withdraw specified liquidity, decrease the user's liquidity share and claim any pending rewards. function _withdrawLiquidityAndClaim( IERC20 tokenA, IERC20 tokenB, uint256 liquidityToWithdraw, uint256 minReclaimedA, uint256 minReclaimedB ) internal returns (uint256 reclaimedA, uint256...
true
false
false
6
c4
03-asymmetry
0xkazim Q
Medium
medium
# Findings Summary | ID | Title | Severity | | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | | [L-01] | Gas griefing/theft is possible on unsafe external call | low | | [L-02] | event missed in `setMa...
file: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol // solhint-disable-next-line (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: ethAmountToWithdraw}( "" ); require(sent, "Failed to send Ether");
file: contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: address(this).balance}( "" ); require(sent, "Failed to send Ether");
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/0xkazim-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:17:43.598345+00:00
57fd685fce8fce1ab2be8eb329d27e1761e7008f06878842ff1a6796a06550fd
3
3
631
3
false
false
true
false
high
file: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol // solhint-disable-next-line (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: ethAmountToWithdraw}( "" ); require(sent, "Failed to send Ether");
solidity
215
// Code block 1 (solidity): file: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol // solhint-disable-next-line (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: ethAmountToWithdraw}( "" ); require(sent, "Failed to send Ether"); // Code block 2 (solidity): file: contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol (...
3
false
file: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol // solhint-disable-next-line (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: ethAmountToWithdraw}( "" ); require(sent, "Failed to send Ether"); file: contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: address(t...
SafEth.sol#L123-L127, Reth.sol#L110-L112, SfrxEth.sol#L84-L87
SfrxEth.sol, Reth.sol, SafEth.sol
3
file: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol // solhint-disable-next-line (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: ethAmountToWithdraw}( "" ); require(sent, "Failed to send Ether");
true
file: contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: address(this).balance}( "" ); require(sent, "Failed to send Ether");
true
true
9
c4
01-biconomy
Tomio G
Informational
informational
1. Title: Using bytes constant is more gas efficient Reference: [Here](https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/3795/why-do-solidity-examples-use-bytes32-type-instead-of-string) Proof of Concept: [DefaultCallbackHandler.sol#L12-L13](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/...
function getChainId() public view returns (uint256 id) { //@audit-info: set here
require(module != address(0), "BSA101"); require(module != SENTINEL_MODULES, "BSA101");
other
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/Tomio-G.md
2026-01-02T18:13:23.312362+00:00
585ae434a7d040767448fdf4ae5ecd53d1b5bc40082b3a6312c516c67405f044
0
0
0
6
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
DefaultCallbackHandler.sol#L12-L13, SmartAccountFactory.sol#L11, SmartAccount.sol#L36, PaymasterHelpers.sol#L13-L16, SmartAccount.sol#L77, SmartAccount.sol#L110
DefaultCallbackHandler.sol, SmartAccount.sol, PaymasterHelpers.sol, SmartAccountFactory.sol
6
function getChainId() public view returns (uint256 id) { //@audit-info: set here
true
require(module != address(0), "BSA101"); require(module != SENTINEL_MODULES, "BSA101");
true
true
6
c4
02-ethos
2997ms Q
Critical
critical
## Summary ## Low Risk Issues ## [LOW-01] Better to set a up limit for ```totalLQTYStaked``` ``` if (totalLQTYStaked > 0) {LUSDFeePerLQTYStaked = _LUSDFee.mul(DECIMAL_PRECISION).div(totalLQTYStaked);} ``` totalLQTYStaked is divided in multiple places but there is no up limit for this value. If this value becomes r...
``` if (totalLQTYStaked > 0) {LUSDFeePerLQTYStaked = _LUSDFee.mul(DECIMAL_PRECISION).div(totalLQTYStaked);}
**Proof Of Concept**
dos
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/2997ms-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:15:54.998839+00:00
586cee458d5dcf2ce5836e34424c5a3de1dc1ab730293e24dbe87167f4cf7d93
2
0
1,126
6
false
false
true
false
high
totalLQTYStaked is divided in multiple places but there is no up limit for this value. If this value becomes really large one day, all the divisions will become meaningless because all the results will be 0. https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/891252b407033489140de63ea502b053d5dc860c/Ethos-Core/contracts/...
unknown
1,106
// Code block 1 (unknown): totalLQTYStaked is divided in multiple places but there is no up limit for this value. If this value becomes really large one day, all the divisions will become meaningless because all the results will be 0. https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/891252b407033489140de63ea502b053d5d...
2
false
LQTYStaking.sol#L191, LQTYStaking.sol#L181, StabilityPool.sol#L335, StabilityPool.sol#L380, ReaperVaultERC4626.sol#L3, ActivePool.sol#L3
LQTYStaking.sol, ActivePool.sol, ReaperVaultERC4626.sol, StabilityPool.sol
6
``` if (totalLQTYStaked > 0) {LUSDFeePerLQTYStaked = _LUSDFee.mul(DECIMAL_PRECISION).div(totalLQTYStaked);}
true
**Proof Of Concept**
true
true
8
c4
01-biconomy
juancito Q
Critical
critical
# QA Report ## Summary ### Low Issues | | Issue | Instances | | ----- | :-------------------------------------------------- | :-------: | | [L-1] | Missing checks for `address(0)` in withdraw methods | 7 | | [L-2] | Unresolved `TODO` and `review` comments ...
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol 537: entryPoint().withdrawTo(withdrawAddress, amount);
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/paymasters/BasePaymaster.sol 68: entryPoint.withdrawTo(withdrawAddress, amount); 100: entryPoint.withdrawStake(withdrawAddress);
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/juancito-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:13:52.192014+00:00
588618f1e30d25b382975a423dc7d88b56336df2d509eb7aab7ef19ecdd85a68
2
2
288
2
false
false
true
false
high
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol 537: entryPoint().withdrawTo(withdrawAddress, amount);
solidity
113
// Code block 1 (solidity): File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol 537: entryPoint().withdrawTo(withdrawAddress, amount); // Code block 2 (solidity): File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/paymasters/BasePaymaster.sol 68: entryPoint.withdrawTo(withdrawAddress, amount); 100: entryPoint.withd...
2
false
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol 537: entryPoint().withdrawTo(withdrawAddress, amount); File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/paymasters/BasePaymaster.sol 68: entryPoint.withdrawTo(withdrawAddress, amount); 100: entryPoint.withdrawStake(withdrawAddress);
SmartAccount.sol, BasePaymaster.sol
SmartAccount.sol, BasePaymaster.sol
2
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol 537: entryPoint().withdrawTo(withdrawAddress, amount);
true
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/paymasters/BasePaymaster.sol 68: entryPoint.withdrawTo(withdrawAddress, amount); 100: entryPoint.withdrawStake(withdrawAddress);
true
true
8
c4
01-biconomy
MalfurionWhitehat G
Unknown
unknown
# 1. Remove duplicate validation of address zero in `SmartAccount.init` ```diff diff --git a/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol b/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol index c4f69a8..cc30425 100644 --- a/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol...
# 2. Remove unnecessary owner validation on `SmartAccount.execute` and `SmartAccount.executeBatch` as these functions are already behind an `onlyOwner` modifier
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/MalfurionWhitehat-G.md
2026-01-02T18:13:10.725624+00:00
58bb80ffb36a21b6d202d38897c9fa69be32ecc40a7194876fafc4f5bbdcb7d7
1
1
962
0
false
true
true
false
medium
diff --git a/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol b/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol index c4f69a8..cc30425 100644 --- a/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol +++ b/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol @@ -168,10 ...
diff
962
// Code block 1 (diff): diff --git a/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol b/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol index c4f69a8..cc30425 100644 --- a/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol +++ b/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/Smar...
1
true
diff --git a/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol b/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol index c4f69a8..cc30425 100644 --- a/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol +++ b/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol @@ -168,10 ...
0
# 2. Remove unnecessary owner validation on `SmartAccount.execute` and `SmartAccount.executeBatch` as these functions are already behind an `onlyOwner` modifier
true
false
false
7
c4
09-ondo
debo G
Low
low
## [G-01] Do not initialize variables with default value Description Uninitialized variables are assigned with the types default value. Explicitly initializing a variable with it's default value costs unnecessary gas. ```txt 2023-09-ondo/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol::134 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < thresholds...
## [G-02] Cache array length outside of loop Description Caching the array length outside a loop saves reading it on each iteration, as long as the array's length is not changed during the loop.
## [G-03] Use not equal to 0 instead of Greater than 0 for unsigned integer comparison Description When dealing with unsigned integer types, comparisons with != 0 are cheaper than with > 0.
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/debo-G.md
2026-01-02T18:25:53.380464+00:00
590f169f48e76901fb827c493a7dec6f9b4de3d58319cd1084d1795b659bafda
1
0
844
0
false
false
true
false
high
2023-09-ondo/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol::134 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < thresholds.length; ++i) { 2023-09-ondo/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol::160 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) { 2023-09-ondo/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol::264 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < amounts.length;...
txt
844
// Code block 1 (txt): 2023-09-ondo/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol::134 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < thresholds.length; ++i) { 2023-09-ondo/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol::160 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) { 2023-09-ondo/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol::264 => for (uint256 i =...
1
false
0
## [G-02] Cache array length outside of loop Description Caching the array length outside a loop saves reading it on each iteration, as long as the array's length is not changed during the loop.
true
## [G-03] Use not equal to 0 instead of Greater than 0 for unsigned integer comparison Description When dealing with unsigned integer types, comparisons with != 0 are cheaper than with > 0.
true
true
6
c4
01-ondo
dharma09 G
Medium
medium
### [G-01] Use Immutable instead of constant for `keccak256` Constant expressions are [re-calculated each time it is in use]([https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/issues/9232](https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/issues/9232)), costing an extra `97` gas than a constant every time they are called. Instances include: ...
/CashManager.sol 122: bytes32 public constant MANAGER_ADMIN = keccak256("MANAGER_ADMIN"); 123: bytes32 public constant PAUSER_ADMIN = keccak256("PAUSER_ADMIN"); 124: bytes32 public constant SETTER_ADMIN = keccak256("SETTER_ADMIN"); /[KYCRegistry.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/main/contracts/cas...
/CashManager.sol 58: uint256 public minimumDepositAmount = 10_000; 68: uint256 public exchangeRateDeltaLimit = 100; /OndoPriceOracleV2.sol 77: uint256 public maxChainlinkOracleTimeDelay = 90000;
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/dharma09-G.md
2026-01-02T18:15:06.527749+00:00
5919bd2418a6983724e92c95c21030c03a26bff8e69b329811877b690c74e402
1
1
1,340
1
false
false
true
false
high
/CashManager.sol 122: bytes32 public constant MANAGER_ADMIN = keccak256("MANAGER_ADMIN"); 123: bytes32 public constant PAUSER_ADMIN = keccak256("PAUSER_ADMIN"); 124: bytes32 public constant SETTER_ADMIN = keccak256("SETTER_ADMIN"); /[KYCRegistry.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/main/contracts/cas...
solidity
1,340
// Code block 1 (solidity): /CashManager.sol 122: bytes32 public constant MANAGER_ADMIN = keccak256("MANAGER_ADMIN"); 123: bytes32 public constant PAUSER_ADMIN = keccak256("PAUSER_ADMIN"); 124: bytes32 public constant SETTER_ADMIN = keccak256("SETTER_ADMIN"); /[KYCRegistry.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-...
1
false
/CashManager.sol 122: bytes32 public constant MANAGER_ADMIN = keccak256("MANAGER_ADMIN"); 123: bytes32 public constant PAUSER_ADMIN = keccak256("PAUSER_ADMIN"); 124: bytes32 public constant SETTER_ADMIN = keccak256("SETTER_ADMIN"); /[KYCRegistry.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/main/contracts/cas...
KYCRegistry.sol#L31
KYCRegistry.sol
1
/CashManager.sol 122: bytes32 public constant MANAGER_ADMIN = keccak256("MANAGER_ADMIN"); 123: bytes32 public constant PAUSER_ADMIN = keccak256("PAUSER_ADMIN"); 124: bytes32 public constant SETTER_ADMIN = keccak256("SETTER_ADMIN"); /[KYCRegistry.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/main/contracts/cas...
true
/CashManager.sol 58: uint256 public minimumDepositAmount = 10_000; 68: uint256 public exchangeRateDeltaLimit = 100; /OndoPriceOracleV2.sol 77: uint256 public maxChainlinkOracleTimeDelay = 90000;
true
true
7
c4
01-ondo
descharre Q
Critical
critical
# Summary ## Low Risk |ID | Finding| Instances | |:----: | :--- | :----: | |1 | Other contract addresses can only be set once | 1 | |2 | Everyone can call initialize() function| 4 | |3 | type(uint).max is not equal to -1 | 1 | ## Non critical |ID | Finding| Instances | |:--...
L163: collateral = IERC20(_collateral); L164: cash = Cash(_cash);
/* Fail if repayAmount = -1 */ if (repayAmount == type(uint).max) { revert LiquidateCloseAmountIsUintMax(); }
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/descharre-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:15:06.054555+00:00
594b1260755e54ce9aed18bfc90be94959802be768deb1004bd88c85072ceae2
1
1
69
4
false
false
true
false
high
L163: collateral = IERC20(_collateral); L164: cash = Cash(_cash);
solidity
69
// Code block 1 (solidity): L163: collateral = IERC20(_collateral); L164: cash = Cash(_cash);
1
false
L163: collateral = IERC20(_collateral); L164: cash = Cash(_cash);
CashManager.sol#L163-L164, CashKYCSender.sol, CashKYCSenderReceiver.sol, CCash.sol
CashManager.sol, CashKYCSenderReceiver.sol, CCash.sol, CashKYCSender.sol
4
L163: collateral = IERC20(_collateral); L164: cash = Cash(_cash);
true
/* Fail if repayAmount = -1 */ if (repayAmount == type(uint).max) { revert LiquidateCloseAmountIsUintMax(); }
true
true
7
c4
07-amphora
sm stack G
Medium
medium
## Gas Optimizations ### [G-1] Expand the range of unchecked in `VaultController::getCollateralInfo` Apply the following git diff: ```diff diff --git a/core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol b/core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol index 95e3009..be6fa2b 100644 --- a/core/solidity/contracts/core/...
### [G-2] Add unchecked to `Vault::modifyLiability` Apply the following git diff:
other
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/sm-stack-G.md
2026-01-02T18:24:02.664880+00:00
595f15cd700ef98a575fff0d0c303489e37535ce06c862fbc8b3975c5e0cbf3b
2
2
1,469
0
false
true
true
false
high
diff --git a/core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol b/core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol index 95e3009..be6fa2b 100644 --- a/core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol +++ b/core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol @@ -235,12 +235,13 @@ contract VaultController is Pausable, IVaultC...
diff
913
// Code block 1 (diff): diff --git a/core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol b/core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol index 95e3009..be6fa2b 100644 --- a/core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol +++ b/core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol @@ -235,12 +235,13 @@ contract VaultControl...
2
true
diff --git a/core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol b/core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol index 95e3009..be6fa2b 100644 --- a/core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol +++ b/core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol @@ -235,12 +235,13 @@ contract VaultController is Pausable, IVaultC...
0
### [G-2] Add unchecked to `Vault::modifyLiability` Apply the following git diff:
true
false
false
8
c4
04-caviar
btk Q
Critical
critical
# Protocol Overview The Caviar Private Pools protocol is a decentralized platform on Ethereum that allows users to create and join private investment pools. The smart contract manages the funds within the pool, ensures compliance with the specified rules, and distributes rewards to members. The protocol democratizes i...
function transferOwnership(address newOwner) public virtual onlyOwner { owner = newOwner; emit OwnershipTransferred(msg.sender, newOwner); }
/** * @dev This empty reserved space is put in place to allow future versions to add new * variables without shifting down storage in the inheritance chain. * See https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/4.x/upgradeable#storage_gaps */ uint256[50] private __gap;
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/btk-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:20:19.686906+00:00
5967f13f5809a6ed87cb0fdade08ecaef3db28647929fc8e64dd23ca2a411fc2
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
function transferOwnership(address newOwner) public virtual onlyOwner { owner = newOwner; emit OwnershipTransferred(msg.sender, newOwner); }
true
/** * @dev This empty reserved space is put in place to allow future versions to add new * variables without shifting down storage in the inheritance chain. * See https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/4.x/upgradeable#storage_gaps */ uint256[50] private __gap;
true
true
5
c4
07-amphora
erebus G
Low
low
# First [Here](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/daae020331404647c661ab534d20093c875483e1/core/solidity/contracts/core/USDA.sol#L259) the function `donation` makes the math to share the donation between all the `USDA` holders. However, if it get to be more than `MAX_SUPPLY`, the `_totalSupply` is set t...
pragma solidity ^0.8.13; import "forge-std/Test.sol"; contract POC is Test { uint256 private a; function setUp() public { a = 0; } function testA() public { a++; } function testB() public { a += 1; } function testC() public { ++a; } }
access-control
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/erebus-G.md
2026-01-02T18:23:45.248788+00:00
596e25b2b2a83135ff1e518adc294d936f7c925d859e02430e3c8f419fe43005
1
0
308
3
false
true
true
false
medium
pragma solidity ^0.8.13; import "forge-std/Test.sol"; contract POC is Test { uint256 private a; function setUp() public { a = 0; } function testA() public { a++; } function testB() public { a += 1; } function testC() public { ++a; } }
unknown
308
// Code block 1 (unknown): pragma solidity ^0.8.13; import "forge-std/Test.sol"; contract POC is Test { uint256 private a; function setUp() public { a = 0; } function testA() public { a++; } function testB() public { a += 1; } function testC() public { ...
1
false
USDA.sol#L259, UFragments.sol#L70-L18, UFragments.sol#L76
UFragments.sol, USDA.sol
3
pragma solidity ^0.8.13; import "forge-std/Test.sol"; contract POC is Test { uint256 private a; function setUp() public { a = 0; } function testA() public { a++; } function testB() public { a += 1; } function testC() public { ++a; } }
true
false
false
6
c4
01-ondo
IllIllI Q
Critical
critical
## Summary ### Low Risk Issues | |Issue|Instances| |-|:-|:-:| | [L&#x2011;01] | Upgradeable contract not initialized | 1 | | [L&#x2011;02] | Loss of precision | 1 | | [L&#x2011;03] | Owner can renounce while system is paused | 1 | | [L&#x2011;04] | `require()` should be used instead of `assert()` | 3 | Total: 6 ...
File: contracts/cash/token/Cash.sol /// @audit missing __ERC20PresetMinterPauser_init() 21: contract Cash is ERC20PresetMinterPauserUpgradeable {
File: contracts/cash/CashManager.sol 755 uint256 collateralAmountDue = (amountToDist * cashAmountReturned) / 756: quantityBurned;
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/IllIllI-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:14:38.688697+00:00
596fa13e3119206f20db51bdf016621b63262ab35d50a56c7574f962da416d0d
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
File: contracts/cash/token/Cash.sol /// @audit missing __ERC20PresetMinterPauser_init() 21: contract Cash is ERC20PresetMinterPauserUpgradeable {
true
File: contracts/cash/CashManager.sol 755 uint256 collateralAmountDue = (amountToDist * cashAmountReturned) / 756: quantityBurned;
true
true
5
c4
03-revert-lend
0xbrett8571 Analysis
Critical
critical
Executive Summary ----------------- This report presents the findings from an in-depth security review of the Revert Lend smart contracts. The goal was to evaluate the codebase for potential vulnerabilities, centralization risks, architecture issues, and overall code quality that could negatively impact the protocol a...
function transform(uint256 tokenId, address transformer, bytes calldata data) external override returns (uint256 newTokenId) { if (tokenId == 0 || !transformerAllowList[transformer]) { revert TransformNotAllowed(); } // ... (bool success,) = transformer.call(data); // ... }
function setTokenConfig( address token, AggregatorV3Interface feed, uint32 maxFeedAge, IUniswapV3Pool pool, uint32 twapSeconds, Mode mode, uint16 maxDifference ) external onlyOwner { // ... feedConfigs[token] = config; // ... }
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/blob/main/data/0xbrett8571-Analysis.md
2026-01-02T19:02:54.794442+00:00
5974f2ef457008dbe9b279e41020abb8a95fd7a04ec2cce02eb1864b94ff0e35
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
function transform(uint256 tokenId, address transformer, bytes calldata data) external override returns (uint256 newTokenId) { if (tokenId == 0 || !transformerAllowList[transformer]) { revert TransformNotAllowed(); } // ... (bool success,) = transformer.call(data); // ... }
true
function setTokenConfig( address token, AggregatorV3Interface feed, uint32 maxFeedAge, IUniswapV3Pool pool, uint32 twapSeconds, Mode mode, uint16 maxDifference ) external onlyOwner { // ... feedConfigs[token] = config; // ... }
true
true
5
c4
04-caviar
0xWagmi Q
Critical
critical
| Letter | Name | Description | |:--:|:-------:|:-------:| | L | Low risk | Potential risk | | NC | Non-critical | Non risky findings | | R | Refactor | Changing the code | | O | Ordinary | Often found issues | ### Low Risk | Count | Explanation | Instances | |:--:|:-------|:--:| | [L-01] | If a user sends ETH ...
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT pragma solidity ^0.8.19; import "./Fixture.sol"; contract Fake is ERC721 {     constructor() ERC721("FAKE", "FK") {}     function mint(address to, uint256 id) public {         _mint(to, id);     }     function tokenURI(         uint256     ) public view virtual override return...
### [L-2]   Allowing anyOne to reenter the `function create` in factory.sol may be problamatic In function create we have ,
reentrancy
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/0xWagmi-Q.md
2026-01-02T18:19:20.783337+00:00
5987a60451c1af9242ee7cc7db04a63a226706bc34c159fe7778c5431d4f405b
0
0
0
0
false
false
false
false
medium
0
0
false
0
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT pragma solidity ^0.8.19; import "./Fixture.sol"; contract Fake is ERC721 {     constructor() ERC721("FAKE", "FK") {}     function mint(address to, uint256 id) public {         _mint(to, id);     }     function tokenURI(         uint256     ) public view virtual override return...
true
### [L-2]   Allowing anyOne to reenter the `function create` in factory.sol may be problamatic In function create we have ,
true
true
5