source stringclasses 1
value | protocol stringclasses 17
values | title stringlengths 4 24 | severity_raw stringclasses 8
values | severity stringclasses 8
values | description stringlengths 198 2k | vulnerable_code stringlengths 0 2k | fixed_code stringlengths 0 2k | recommendation stringclasses 1
value | category stringclasses 12
values | report_url stringlengths 71 98 | collected_at stringlengths 32 32 | source_hash stringlengths 64 64 | code_block_count int64 0 10 | solidity_block_count int64 0 10 | total_code_chars int64 0 1.73k | github_ref_count int64 0 26 | vulnerable_code_is_url bool 2
classes | fixed_code_is_url bool 2
classes | has_code_in_description bool 2
classes | has_recommendation bool 1
class | quality_estimate stringclasses 2
values | primary_code stringlengths 0 1.72k | primary_code_language stringclasses 19
values | primary_code_char_count int64 0 1.72k | all_code_blocks stringlengths 0 1.87k | all_code_blocks_count int64 0 10 | has_diff_blocks bool 2
classes | diff_code stringclasses 71
values | solidity_code stringlengths 0 1.68k | github_refs_formatted stringlengths 0 562 | github_files_list stringlengths 0 203 | github_refs_count int64 0 26 | vulnerable_code_actual stringlengths 0 2k | has_vulnerable_code_snippet bool 2
classes | fixed_code_actual stringlengths 0 2k | has_fixed_code_snippet bool 2
classes | has_vuln_fix_pair bool 2
classes | content_richness_score float64 2.4 15 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
c4 | 01-salty | kinda_very_good Analysis | High | high |
### [H-1] The first user to deposit could set a bad ratio
**Description:** Depositing and collateral addition does not rely on price returned by aggregator meaning the first depositer would determine the price ratio of the pool
**Impact:** The protocol would be griefed
**Recommended Mitigation:** The initial a... | if ( (_absoluteDifference(priceA, priceB) * 100000) / averagePrice > maximumPriceFeedPercentDifferenceTimes1000 )
if the two prices are exactly the same their absolute difference would be zero
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/kinda_very_good-Analysis.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:48.923794+00:00 | 36bc8bca8e52a544bd7c8f8f882c6d1f7f585a3b7691f3dce4cf7e8e91e9a210 | 1 | 0 | 194 | 0 | false | true | true | false | medium | if ( (_absoluteDifference(priceA, priceB) * 100000) / averagePrice > maximumPriceFeedPercentDifferenceTimes1000 )
if the two prices are exactly the same their absolute difference would be zero | unknown | 194 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
if ( (_absoluteDifference(priceA, priceB) * 100000) / averagePrice > maximumPriceFeedPercentDifferenceTimes1000 )
if the two prices are exactly the same their absolute difference would be zero | 1 | false | 0 | if ( (_absoluteDifference(priceA, priceB) * 100000) / averagePrice > maximumPriceFeedPercentDifferenceTimes1000 )
if the two prices are exactly the same their absolute difference would be zero
| true | false | false | 4.74 | |||||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | Secureverse G | Low | low | ### [Gas-01] ```onlyOwner``` functions Should make as ```payable```, Those function which reverts when called by normal user should make as payable
*Instances(10)*
```solidity
File: SmartAccount.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#... | File: SmartAccount.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L449-L453
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L455-L458
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-0... | File: paymasters/BasePaymaster.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/paymasters/BasePaymaster.sol#L67
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/paymasters/BasePaymaster.sol#L75
https://githu... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/Secureverse-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:20.181690+00:00 | 36bfe3d8a4dd6bf1c369653ceafeeb39a32bc524e828fec12b806f9760191e79 | 4 | 3 | 1,503 | 11 | false | false | true | false | high | File: SmartAccount.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L449-L453
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L455-L458
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-0... | solidity | 673 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: SmartAccount.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L449-L453
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L455-L458
https://... | 4 | false | File: SmartAccount.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L449-L453
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L455-L458
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-0... | SmartAccount.sol#L449-L453, SmartAccount.sol#L455-L458, SmartAccount.sol#L460-L463, SmartAccount.sol#L465-L473, SmartAccount.sol#L536-L538, BasePaymaster.sol#L67, BasePaymaster.sol#L75, BasePaymaster.sol#L90, BasePaymaster.sol#L99, VerifyingSingletonPaymaster.sol#L65, ModuleManager.sol#L124 | ModuleManager.sol, SmartAccount.sol, VerifyingSingletonPaymaster.sol, BasePaymaster.sol | 11 | File: SmartAccount.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L449-L453
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L455-L458
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-0... | true | File: paymasters/BasePaymaster.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/paymasters/BasePaymaster.sol#L67
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/paymasters/BasePaymaster.sol#L75
https://githu... | true | true | 10 | ||
c4 | 07-amphora | adeolu Q | Low | low | # no need for "<= 0" check on uint256 value
**Explanation**
since value is uint256, its lowest value by default is 0, so the check should be "== 0" not "<= 0"
**Proof Of Concept**
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora/blob/daae020331404647c661ab534d20093c875483e1/core/solidity/contracts/governance/AmphoraProt... | constructor(
address _account,
uint256 _initialSupply
) ERC20('Amphora Protocol', 'AMPH') ERC20Permit('Amphora Protocol') {
if (_account == address(0)) revert AmphoraProtocolToken_InvalidAddress();
if (_initialSupply <= 0) revert AmphoraProtocolToken_InvalidSupply();
_mint(_account, _initialSup... | constructor(
address _account,
uint256 _initialSupply
) ERC20('Amphora Protocol', 'AMPH') ERC20Permit('Amphora Protocol') {
if (_account == address(0)) revert AmphoraProtocolToken_InvalidAddress();
if (_initialSupply == 0) revert AmphoraProtocolToken_InvalidSupply();
_mint(_account, _initialSup... | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/adeolu-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:39.914545+00:00 | 36ec84cba9694c1305591cd2aa4781f0367d68874fe74a312214a2a4c5c41db8 | 2 | 0 | 654 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | constructor(
address _account,
uint256 _initialSupply
) ERC20('Amphora Protocol', 'AMPH') ERC20Permit('Amphora Protocol') {
if (_account == address(0)) revert AmphoraProtocolToken_InvalidAddress();
if (_initialSupply <= 0) revert AmphoraProtocolToken_InvalidSupply();
_mint(_account, _initialSuppl... | unknown | 327 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
constructor(
address _account,
uint256 _initialSupply
) ERC20('Amphora Protocol', 'AMPH') ERC20Permit('Amphora Protocol') {
if (_account == address(0)) revert AmphoraProtocolToken_InvalidAddress();
if (_initialSupply <= 0) revert AmphoraProtocolToken_InvalidSupply();
_m... | 2 | false | AmphoraProtocolToken.sol#L14 | AmphoraProtocolToken.sol | 1 | constructor(
address _account,
uint256 _initialSupply
) ERC20('Amphora Protocol', 'AMPH') ERC20Permit('Amphora Protocol') {
if (_account == address(0)) revert AmphoraProtocolToken_InvalidAddress();
if (_initialSupply <= 0) revert AmphoraProtocolToken_InvalidSupply();
_mint(_account, _initialSup... | true | constructor(
address _account,
uint256 _initialSupply
) ERC20('Amphora Protocol', 'AMPH') ERC20Permit('Amphora Protocol') {
if (_account == address(0)) revert AmphoraProtocolToken_InvalidAddress();
if (_initialSupply == 0) revert AmphoraProtocolToken_InvalidSupply();
_mint(_account, _initialSup... | true | true | 7.12 | |||
c4 | 11-kelp | PENGUN Q | Low | low | ## sETH2 does not have a chainlink price feed.
The new token sETH2 supported by EigenLayer does not have a chainlink price feed and therefore cannot be used in the current implementation.
> Eigenlayer supports stETH, rETH and cbETH as of today. But it intends to add more LSTs in the future through its governance. Kel... | function _setContract(bytes32 key, address val) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(val);
if (contractMap[key] == val) {
revert ValueAlreadyInUse();
}
contractMap[key] = val;
emit SetContract(key, val);
}
| /// @dev Triggers stopped state. Contract must not be paused.
function pause() external onlyLRTManager { //@audit pause nothing
_pause();
}
| reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/PENGUN-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:33.600324+00:00 | 36fef2cb9927225d44ec46b94c8b779f4bceb105924cf6f81dd6287af4e532a5 | 2 | 2 | 417 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function _setContract(bytes32 key, address val) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(val);
if (contractMap[key] == val) {
revert ValueAlreadyInUse();
}
contractMap[key] = val;
emit SetContract(key, val);
} | solidity | 262 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function _setContract(bytes32 key, address val) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(val);
if (contractMap[key] == val) {
revert ValueAlreadyInUse();
}
contractMap[key] = val;
emit SetContract(key, val);
}
// Code block 2 (solidity):
... | 2 | false | function _setContract(bytes32 key, address val) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(val);
if (contractMap[key] == val) {
revert ValueAlreadyInUse();
}
contractMap[key] = val;
emit SetContract(key, val);
}
/// @dev Triggers stopped state. Contract must not be pa... | 0 | function _setContract(bytes32 key, address val) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(val);
if (contractMap[key] == val) {
revert ValueAlreadyInUse();
}
contractMap[key] = val;
emit SetContract(key, val);
}
| true | /// @dev Triggers stopped state. Contract must not be paused.
function pause() external onlyLRTManager { //@audit pause nothing
_pause();
}
| true | true | 7 | ||||
c4 | 07-amphora | ybansal2403 G | High | high | | Number | Optimization Details | Instances |
| :----: | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------... | File: core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol
112: if (address(_oldVaultController) != address(0)) _migrateCollateralsFrom(_oldVaultController, _tokenAddresses); | File: core/solidity/contracts/core/Vault.sol
207: if (address(_amphClaimer) != address(0)) {
269: if (address(_amphClaimer) != address(0)) { | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/ybansal2403-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:05.823328+00:00 | 379f43baf7de330b4eba3eb598a725c98cccba38bd6dcac9f04d5f7dd0bf7c3e | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol
112: if (address(_oldVaultController) != address(0)) _migrateCollateralsFrom(_oldVaultController, _tokenAddresses); | true | File: core/solidity/contracts/core/Vault.sol
207: if (address(_amphClaimer) != address(0)) {
269: if (address(_amphClaimer) != address(0)) { | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | Shubham Q | Critical | critical | ## Non-Critical
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [N-1](#N-1) | 10 ** 18 can be changed to 1e18 for better readability | 20 |
| [N-2](#N-2) | Unlocked compiler version | 4 |
## [N-1] 10 ** 18 can be changed to 1e18 for better readability
10 ** 18 can be changed to 1e18 to avoid unnecessary arithmetic operation, b... | File: 2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
173: uint256 minOut = ((((rethPerEth * msg.value) / 10 ** 18) *
174: ((10 ** 18 - maxSlippage))) / 10 ** 18);
214: RocketTokenRETHInterface(rethAddress()).getEthValue(10 ** 18);
215: else return (poolPrice() * 10 *... | File: 2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/SfrxEth.sol
74: uint256 minOut = (((ethPerDerivative(_amount) * _amount) / 10 ** 18) *
75: (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18;
113: 10 ** 18
115: return ((10 ** 18 * frxAmount) / | slippage | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Shubham-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:34.621892+00:00 | 38189b2037bab721916ef2a8eb5612574ad226a9a8276d8411d862c159a7646e | 4 | 4 | 1,194 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File: 2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
173: uint256 minOut = ((((rethPerEth * msg.value) / 10 ** 18) *
174: ((10 ** 18 - maxSlippage))) / 10 ** 18);
214: RocketTokenRETHInterface(rethAddress()).getEthValue(10 ** 18);
215: else return (poolPrice() * 10 *... | solidity | 339 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: 2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
173: uint256 minOut = ((((rethPerEth * msg.value) / 10 ** 18) *
174: ((10 ** 18 - maxSlippage))) / 10 ** 18);
214: RocketTokenRETHInterface(rethAddress()).getEthValue(10 ** 18);
215: els... | 4 | false | File: 2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
173: uint256 minOut = ((((rethPerEth * msg.value) / 10 ** 18) *
174: ((10 ** 18 - maxSlippage))) / 10 ** 18);
214: RocketTokenRETHInterface(rethAddress()).getEthValue(10 ** 18);
215: else return (poolPrice() * 10 *... | Reth.sol#L2 | Reth.sol | 1 | File: 2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
173: uint256 minOut = ((((rethPerEth * msg.value) / 10 ** 18) *
174: ((10 ** 18 - maxSlippage))) / 10 ** 18);
214: RocketTokenRETHInterface(rethAddress()).getEthValue(10 ** 18);
215: else return (poolPrice() * 10 *... | true | File: 2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/SfrxEth.sol
74: uint256 minOut = (((ethPerDerivative(_amount) * _amount) / 10 ** 18) *
75: (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18;
113: 10 ** 18
115: return ((10 ** 18 * frxAmount) / | true | true | 10 | ||
c4 | 10-badger | DavidGiladi Q | Critical | critical |
### Low Issues
|Title|Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
|[L-1] Require Should Used Instead of Assert | [Require Should Used Instead of Assert](#require-should-used-instead-of-assert) | 1 |
|[L-2] Burn functions must be protected with a modifier | [Burn functions must be protected with a modifier](#burn-functions-must-be-pro... | File: contracts/LiquidationLibrary.sol
564 assert(toLiquidator < _totalColToSend) | File: contracts/EBTCToken.sol
95 function burn(address _account, uint256 _amount) external override | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/DavidGiladi-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:31.861040+00:00 | 3818def9dcc7193b01cbd75f7c5be8982b9ad52b791c78fc313e7ba83ba142cb | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: contracts/LiquidationLibrary.sol
564 assert(toLiquidator < _totalColToSend) | true | File: contracts/EBTCToken.sol
95 function burn(address _account, uint256 _amount) external override | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 11-kelp | Raihan Q | Low | low | ## [L-01] _safeMint() should be used rather than _mint() wherever possible
_mint() is [discouraged](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/d4d8d2ed9798cc3383912a23b5e8d5cb602f7d4b/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#L271) in favor of _safeMint() which ensures that the recipient is either an EOA or im... | File: src/RSETH.sol
48 _mint(to, amount); | File: src/LRTDepositPool.sol
194 if (!IERC20(asset).transfer(nodeDelegator, amount)) { | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/Raihan-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:35.398005+00:00 | 3891f5d3da73faf3bc82e12d1779189349f195e7baffc6b4679e53f48f962b71 | 3 | 3 | 223 | 5 | false | false | true | false | high | File: src/RSETH.sol
48 _mint(to, amount); | solidity | 47 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: src/RSETH.sol
48 _mint(to, amount);
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: src/LRTDepositPool.sol
194 if (!IERC20(asset).transfer(nodeDelegator, amount)) {
// Code block 3 (solidity):
File: src/NodeDelegator.sol
86 if (!IERC20(asset).transfer(lrtDepositPool, amount)) { | 3 | false | File: src/RSETH.sol
48 _mint(to, amount);
File: src/LRTDepositPool.sol
194 if (!IERC20(asset).transfer(nodeDelegator, amount)) {
File: src/NodeDelegator.sol
86 if (!IERC20(asset).transfer(lrtDepositPool, amount)) { | ERC721.sol#L271, ERC721.sol#L238-L250, ERC721.sol#L180, RSETH.sol#L48, LRTDepositPool.sol#L194 | ERC721.sol, RSETH.sol, LRTDepositPool.sol | 5 | File: src/RSETH.sol
48 _mint(to, amount); | true | File: src/LRTDepositPool.sol
194 if (!IERC20(asset).transfer(nodeDelegator, amount)) { | true | true | 9 | ||
c4 | 08-dopex | ABAIKUNANBAEV Q | Low | low | ## Finding Summary
| ID | Severity | Description |
| - | - | :-: |
| [L-01](#l-01-Missing-checks-for-zero-amount-transfers-in-univ3liquidityamo.sol) | Low | Missing checks for zero amount transfers in `UniV2LiquidityAmo.sol` and `UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol`
| [L-02](#l-02-Typo-in-the-comments) | Low | Typo in the comments... | IERC20WithBurn(addresses.tokenA).safeTransfer(
addresses.rdpxV2Core,
tokenABalance
);
IERC20WithBurn(addresses.tokenB).safeTransfer(
addresses.rdpxV2Core,
tokenBBalance
); | require(tokenABalance > 0)
require(tokenBBalance > 0) | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/ABAIKUNANBAEV-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:27.704220+00:00 | 38b29c629334bef11651e24bc1cd42b621a1f4225ad76baae01dd55917f96962 | 1 | 0 | 207 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | IERC20WithBurn(addresses.tokenA).safeTransfer(
addresses.rdpxV2Core,
tokenABalance
);
IERC20WithBurn(addresses.tokenB).safeTransfer(
addresses.rdpxV2Core,
tokenBBalance
); | unknown | 207 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
IERC20WithBurn(addresses.tokenA).safeTransfer(
addresses.rdpxV2Core,
tokenABalance
);
IERC20WithBurn(addresses.tokenB).safeTransfer(
addresses.rdpxV2Core,
tokenBBalance
); | 1 | false | UniV2LiquidityAmo.sol#L168-L175 | UniV2LiquidityAmo.sol | 1 | IERC20WithBurn(addresses.tokenA).safeTransfer(
addresses.rdpxV2Core,
tokenABalance
);
IERC20WithBurn(addresses.tokenB).safeTransfer(
addresses.rdpxV2Core,
tokenBBalance
); | true | require(tokenABalance > 0)
require(tokenBBalance > 0) | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 01-salty | dharma09 G | High | high | SALTY GAS OPTIMIZATIONS
--
INTRODUCTION
--
Highlighted below are optimizations exclusively targeting state-mutating functions and view/pure functions invoked by state-mutating functions. In the discussion that follows, only runtime gas is emphasized, given its inevitable dominance over deployment gas costs throughout t... | File: src/staking/StakingRewards.sol
57: function _increaseUserShare( address wallet, bytes32 poolID, uint256 increaseShareAmount, bool useCooldown ) internal
{
require( poolsConfig.isWhitelisted( poolID ), "Invalid pool" );
require( increaseShareAmount != 0, "Cannot increase zero share" );
UserShareInfo stora... | ### [G-02] Directly modifies the value in the storage location without reading the current value first
**Details:**
using pre-increment `(++i)` instead of the addition assignment `(i += 1)` can sometimes result in more efficient code. By doing this we can avoid state variable read as a result we can save gas.
**Proof ... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/dharma09-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:38.122870+00:00 | 38d672b8a34cbf8da95e02e92cfa303a74f2453dff08499c9c8cb878dc415c74 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | AccessManager.sol#L40-L1 | AccessManager.sol | 1 | File: src/staking/StakingRewards.sol
57: function _increaseUserShare( address wallet, bytes32 poolID, uint256 increaseShareAmount, bool useCooldown ) internal
{
require( poolsConfig.isWhitelisted( poolID ), "Invalid pool" );
require( increaseShareAmount != 0, "Cannot increase zero share" );
UserShareInfo stora... | true | ### [G-02] Directly modifies the value in the storage location without reading the current value first
**Details:**
using pre-increment `(++i)` instead of the addition assignment `(i += 1)` can sometimes result in more efficient code. By doing this we can avoid state variable read as a result we can save gas.
**Proof ... | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 06-lybra | No12Samurai Q | High | high | # QA Report
## Summary
This QA report highlights two issues related to event parameter inconsistency and incorrect order in the Lybra protocol contracts. The first issue involves the `ClaimReward` event emission in the `ProtocolRewardsPool.sol` contract, where incorrect parameters are used. The second issue is about ... | ClaimReward(msg.sender, EUSD.getMintedEUSDByShares(eUSDShare), address(0), 0, block.timestamp); | event ClaimReward(address indexed user, uint256 eUSDAmount, address token, uint256 tokenAmount, uint256 time); | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/No12Samurai-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:22:31.941309+00:00 | 38dabb919e4ee82d6f02a504c6d107b2dd90c702ff7ba33c377da466b3cf2c9e | 2 | 2 | 205 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | ClaimReward(msg.sender, EUSD.getMintedEUSDByShares(eUSDShare), address(0), 0, block.timestamp); | solidity | 95 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
ClaimReward(msg.sender, EUSD.getMintedEUSDByShares(eUSDShare), address(0), 0, block.timestamp);
// Code block 2 (solidity):
event ClaimReward(address indexed user, uint256 eUSDAmount, address token, uint256 tokenAmount, uint256 time); | 2 | false | ClaimReward(msg.sender, EUSD.getMintedEUSDByShares(eUSDShare), address(0), 0, block.timestamp);
event ClaimReward(address indexed user, uint256 eUSDAmount, address token, uint256 tokenAmount, uint256 time); | ProtocolRewardsPool.sol#L190-L218, ProtocolRewardsPool.sol#L214, ProtocolRewardsPool.sol#L46 | ProtocolRewardsPool.sol | 3 | ClaimReward(msg.sender, EUSD.getMintedEUSDByShares(eUSDShare), address(0), 0, block.timestamp); | true | event ClaimReward(address indexed user, uint256 eUSDAmount, address token, uint256 tokenAmount, uint256 time); | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 06-lybra | Musaka Q | Low | low | # Table of findings
| | |
|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **L-01** | `executeFlashloan` does not check if funds are bigger or equal after the execution |
| **L... | **[LOW-02]** EUSD can be transferred even when paused.
In the [comments](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra/blob/main/contracts/lybra/token/EUSD.sol#L222), the developers state that a transfers and increase or decrease on allowances should not be possible if the contract is paused. However, the [function](ht... | flash-loan | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/Musaka-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:22:31.067165+00:00 | 39387925ea12994314ca3ba332622b3dc9848098a804e615581a2642e74fc5b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | PeUSDMainnetStableVision.sol, PeUSDMainnetStableVision.sol#L129-L139, EUSD.sol#L222, EUSD.sol#L226 | PeUSDMainnetStableVision.sol, EUSD.sol | 4 | **[LOW-02]** EUSD can be transferred even when paused.
In the [comments](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra/blob/main/contracts/lybra/token/EUSD.sol#L222), the developers state that a transfers and increase or decrease on allowances should not be possible if the contract is paused. However, the [function](ht... | true | false | false | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 02-ethos | Breeje Q | Critical | critical | # QA Report
## Low Risk Issues
| Count | Explanation | Instances |
|:--:|:-------|:--:|
| [L-01] | `pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2` Used is deprecated | 1 |
| [L-02] | Upgradeable contract is missing a `__gap[50]` storage variable to allow for new storage variables in later versions | 1 |
| [L-03] | Use of `ecrecove... | File: DistributionTypes.sol
2: pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;
| File: ReaperBaseStrategyv4.sol
14: abstract contract ReaperBaseStrategyv4 is
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/Breeje-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:01.299591+00:00 | 39526e1d729f8f2c3ac4be9c2310442a1dfe615465c5bf274d34e2d159799bb1 | 1 | 1 | 68 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File: DistributionTypes.sol
2: pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2; | solidity | 68 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: DistributionTypes.sol
2: pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2; | 1 | false | File: DistributionTypes.sol
2: pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2; | DistributionTypes.sol#L2 | DistributionTypes.sol | 1 | File: DistributionTypes.sol
2: pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;
| true | File: ReaperBaseStrategyv4.sol
14: abstract contract ReaperBaseStrategyv4 is
| true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | 0xweb3boy Q | Medium | medium | # [L-1] - ClaimNRN will revert when everybody send their 100% points to the Merging Pool
```solidity
function claimNRN() external {
require(numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender] < roundId, "Already claimed NRNs for this period");
uint256 claimableNRN = 0;
uint256 nrnDistribution;
uint32 lowerBou... | function claimNRN() external {
require(numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender] < roundId, "Already claimed NRNs for this period");
uint256 claimableNRN = 0;
uint256 nrnDistribution;
uint32 lowerBound = numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender];
for (uint32 currentRound = lowerBound; currentRound < round... | if (battleResult == 0) {
/// If the user won the match
/// If the user has no NRNs at risk, then they can earn points
if (stakeAtRisk == 0) {
points = stakingFactor[tokenId] * eloFactor;
}
/// Divert a portion of the points to the merging poo... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/0xweb3boy-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:10.993368+00:00 | 3978a1cc51e99fbcab02f0df0e2bbb9bd5d503727b386cdff171ae6a9d1ebc39 | 2 | 2 | 1,348 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function claimNRN() external {
require(numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender] < roundId, "Already claimed NRNs for this period");
uint256 claimableNRN = 0;
uint256 nrnDistribution;
uint32 lowerBound = numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender];
for (uint32 currentRound = lowerBound; currentRound < round... | solidity | 853 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function claimNRN() external {
require(numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender] < roundId, "Already claimed NRNs for this period");
uint256 claimableNRN = 0;
uint256 nrnDistribution;
uint32 lowerBound = numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender];
for (uint32 currentRound = lowe... | 2 | false | function claimNRN() external {
require(numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender] < roundId, "Already claimed NRNs for this period");
uint256 claimableNRN = 0;
uint256 nrnDistribution;
uint32 lowerBound = numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender];
for (uint32 currentRound = lowerBound; currentRound < round... | 0 | function claimNRN() external {
require(numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender] < roundId, "Already claimed NRNs for this period");
uint256 claimableNRN = 0;
uint256 nrnDistribution;
uint32 lowerBound = numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender];
for (uint32 currentRound = lowerBound; currentRound < round... | true | if (battleResult == 0) {
/// If the user won the match
/// If the user has no NRNs at risk, then they can earn points
if (stakeAtRisk == 0) {
points = stakingFactor[tokenId] * eloFactor;
}
/// Divert a portion of the points to the merging poo... | true | true | 7 | ||||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | Lucyan99 Q | Gas | gas | ### [GAS-1] Duplicate execution of the same code
You shouldn't call `addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities)` in the constructor on line 45, because you add the attribute probabilities manually on line 49:
*Instances (1)*:
```solidity
File: src/AiArenaHelper.sol.sol
41: constructor(uint8[][] memory probabil... | File: src/AiArenaHelper.sol.sol
41: constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) {
42: _ownerAddress = msg.sender;
43:
44: // Initialize the probabilities for each attribute
45: addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);
46:
47: uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
48: f... | 131: function addAttributeProbabilities(uint256 generation, uint8[][] memory probabilities) public {
132: require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress);
133: require(probabilities.length == 6, "Invalid number of attribute arrays");
134:
135: uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
136: for (... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/Lucyan99-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:32.263878+00:00 | 39b855097459eb231d48d705023bed1c42acafc60aad3d730c624e14852aebc4 | 2 | 2 | 1,016 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File: src/AiArenaHelper.sol.sol
41: constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) {
42: _ownerAddress = msg.sender;
43:
44: // Initialize the probabilities for each attribute
45: addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);
46:
47: uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
48: f... | solidity | 545 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: src/AiArenaHelper.sol.sol
41: constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) {
42: _ownerAddress = msg.sender;
43:
44: // Initialize the probabilities for each attribute
45: addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);
46:
47: uint256 attributesLength = att... | 2 | false | File: src/AiArenaHelper.sol.sol
41: constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) {
42: _ownerAddress = msg.sender;
43:
44: // Initialize the probabilities for each attribute
45: addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);
46:
47: uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
48: f... | AiArenaHelper.sol | AiArenaHelper.sol | 1 | File: src/AiArenaHelper.sol.sol
41: constructor(uint8[][] memory probabilities) {
42: _ownerAddress = msg.sender;
43:
44: // Initialize the probabilities for each attribute
45: addAttributeProbabilities(0, probabilities);
46:
47: uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
48: f... | true | 131: function addAttributeProbabilities(uint256 generation, uint8[][] memory probabilities) public {
132: require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress);
133: require(probabilities.length == 6, "Invalid number of attribute arrays");
134:
135: uint256 attributesLength = attributes.length;
136: for (... | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 02-ethos | dontonka Q | Low | low | Some reported issues here are just added as a comment, but most have been applied the suggested corrections already, you can see all the final diffs. Take note that the code compile and all test pass with those too.
```diff
diff --git a/Ethos-Core/contracts/ActivePool.sol b/Ethos-Core/contracts/ActivePool.sol
index 77... | ```diff
diff --git a/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol b/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
index 6ee5c75..ecc605b 100644
--- a/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
+++ b/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ contract BorrowerOperations is LiquityBase, Ownable, CheckC... | ```diff
diff --git a/Ethos-Core/contracts/LQTY/CommunityIssuance.sol b/Ethos-Core/contracts/LQTY/CommunityIssuance.sol
index c79adfe..39f7ac8 100644
--- a/Ethos-Core/contracts/LQTY/CommunityIssuance.sol
+++ b/Ethos-Core/contracts/LQTY/CommunityIssuance.sol
@@ -2,17 +2,18 @@
pragma solidity 0.6.11;
import "../Depe... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/dontonka-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:06.931833+00:00 | 39baf5c46aa866efacd82ce3fee8bc44daaa79f6daf0474b3be1fe57edcb96af | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | ```diff
diff --git a/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol b/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
index 6ee5c75..ecc605b 100644
--- a/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
+++ b/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ contract BorrowerOperations is LiquityBase, Ownable, CheckC... | true | ```diff
diff --git a/Ethos-Core/contracts/LQTY/CommunityIssuance.sol b/Ethos-Core/contracts/LQTY/CommunityIssuance.sol
index c79adfe..39f7ac8 100644
--- a/Ethos-Core/contracts/LQTY/CommunityIssuance.sol
+++ b/Ethos-Core/contracts/LQTY/CommunityIssuance.sol
@@ -2,17 +2,18 @@
pragma solidity 0.6.11;
import "../Depe... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 02-ethos | kaden G | Medium | medium | #### Pack Config into single storage slot
##### Severity: Gas Optimization
##### Context:
- https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/73687f32b934c9d697b97745356cdf8a1f264955/Ethos-Core/contracts/CollateralConfig.sol#L27
##### Description
The current `Config` struct in `CollateralConfig` requires 4 storage ... | struct Config {
bool allowed;
uint256 decimals;
uint256 MCR;
uint256 CCR;
} | // ReaperBaseStrategyV4.sol:L128
repayment -= uint256(-roi); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/kaden-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:19.925142+00:00 | 39bfd1ab752b810e88ec68f2f063636a2d5022998c6e9b351719b4243d5aa78e | 3 | 0 | 165 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | struct Config {
bool allowed;
uint256 decimals;
uint256 MCR;
uint256 CCR;
} | unknown | 79 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
struct Config {
bool allowed;
uint256 decimals;
uint256 MCR;
uint256 CCR;
}
// Code block 2 (unknown):
// ReaperBaseStrategyV4.sol:L128
repayment -= uint256(-roi);
// Code block 3 (unknown):
repayment += uint256(roi); | 3 | false | CollateralConfig.sol#L27, ReaperBaseStrategyv4.sol#L128 | ReaperBaseStrategyv4.sol, CollateralConfig.sol | 2 | struct Config {
bool allowed;
uint256 decimals;
uint256 MCR;
uint256 CCR;
} | true | // ReaperBaseStrategyV4.sol:L128
repayment -= uint256(-roi); | true | true | 9 | |||
c4 | 04-caviar | Bason Q | Critical | critical | ## Low and Non-Critical Issues Summary
| Number |Issues Details |
|:--:|:-------|
|[NC-01]| Use stable pragma statement
|[NC-02]| Add more indexed fields to Events for better traceability
|[L-01]| Missing events for important parameter changes
|[L-02]| Possible to pass address 0 in functions that pass ownership
|[L-03]... | event Create(address indexed privatePool, uint256[] tokenIds, uint256 baseTokenAmount); | event Create(address indexed privatePool, indexed uint256[] tokenIds, uint256 baseTokenAmount); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/Bason-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:30.714686+00:00 | 39c1289438f75d42fb61b5a270dc7962734453ab11c9024608cb3d917c273a2a | 2 | 0 | 182 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | event Create(address indexed privatePool, uint256[] tokenIds, uint256 baseTokenAmount); | unknown | 87 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
event Create(address indexed privatePool, uint256[] tokenIds, uint256 baseTokenAmount);
// Code block 2 (unknown):
event Create(address indexed privatePool, indexed uint256[] tokenIds, uint256 baseTokenAmount); | 2 | false | 0 | event Create(address indexed privatePool, uint256[] tokenIds, uint256 baseTokenAmount); | true | event Create(address indexed privatePool, indexed uint256[] tokenIds, uint256 baseTokenAmount); | true | true | 7 | |||||
c4 | 06-lybra | Musaka G | Low | low | # Table of findings
| | |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------|
| **G-01** | Make a modifier to check for collateral ratio |
# Findings
**[G-01]** Make a modifier to check for collateral ratio
Collateral ratio is checked in a couple of fun... | You can use it in [`rigidRedemption`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra/blob/main/contracts/lybra/pools/base/LybraPeUSDVaultBase.sol#L157-L168) as: | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/Musaka-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:22:30.562668+00:00 | 3a768be5dbfb73650955b9bd22c4f66d185530930b6b5c35b528b9844a839d10 | 2 | 0 | 330 | 3 | false | true | true | false | medium | modifier checkColl(address who, uint coll) {
uint256 providerCollateralRatio = (depositedAsset[who] * assetPrice * 100) / borrowed[who];
require(providerCollateralRatio >= coll, "Inseficient collateral ration");
} | jsx | 221 | // Code block 1 (jsx):
modifier checkColl(address who, uint coll) {
uint256 providerCollateralRatio = (depositedAsset[who] * assetPrice * 100) / borrowed[who];
require(providerCollateralRatio >= coll, "Inseficient collateral ration");
}
// Code block 2 (jsx):
function rigidRedemption(address provider, uint256 ... | 2 | false | LybraPeUSDVaultBase.sol, LybraEUSDVaultBase.sol, LybraPeUSDVaultBase.sol#L157-L168 | LybraEUSDVaultBase.sol, LybraPeUSDVaultBase.sol | 3 | You can use it in [`rigidRedemption`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra/blob/main/contracts/lybra/pools/base/LybraPeUSDVaultBase.sol#L157-L168) as: | true | false | false | 6.35 | |||||
c4 | 01-salty | jokopoppo Q | Unknown | unknown | | Number | Issues | Instances |
| ------ | ------- | --------- |
| [N-01] | Whitelist array can exceed maximumWhitelistedPools state | 1 |
### [N-01] - Whitelist array can exceed maximumWhitelistedPools state
#### Line References
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/53516c2cdfdfacb662cdea6417c5... | However, there is no validation check on the whitelist array length when changing the `maximumWhitelistedPools` state, resulting in a potential conflict between the `maximumWhitelistedPools` state and the whitelist array.
#### Recommended Mitigation Steps
Adding a validation check on the whitelist array length before ... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/jokopoppo-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:47.581470+00:00 | 3a8e1d817d94e1f1859e96d683c68cdba13741e0ce91f87e6a6c93616801c4d7 | 1 | 0 | 379 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | However, there is no validation check on the whitelist array length when changing the `maximumWhitelistedPools` state, resulting in a potential conflict between the `maximumWhitelistedPools` state and the whitelist array.
#### Recommended Mitigation Steps
Adding a validation check on the whitelist array length before ... | unknown | 379 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
However, there is no validation check on the whitelist array length when changing the `maximumWhitelistedPools` state, resulting in a potential conflict between the `maximumWhitelistedPools` state and the whitelist array.
#### Recommended Mitigation Steps
Adding a validation check on the whi... | 1 | false | PoolsConfig.sol#L77-L91 | PoolsConfig.sol | 1 | However, there is no validation check on the whitelist array length when changing the `maximumWhitelistedPools` state, resulting in a potential conflict between the `maximumWhitelistedPools` state and the whitelist array.
#### Recommended Mitigation Steps
Adding a validation check on the whitelist array length before ... | true | false | false | 6 | |||||
c4 | 03-revert-lend | MSaptarshi Q | Low | low | # [L-01] Unsafe Casting
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend/blob/435b054f9ad2404173f36f0f74a5096c894b12b7/src/V3Oracle.sol#L342C24-L342C30
There are also other instances where it is casted from uint to int
## Recomendation
Use OZ safeCasting while casting
# [L-02] Natspec comment might not be giving o... | if (!operators[msg.sender] && !vaults[msg.sender]) {
revert Unauthorized();
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/blob/main/data/MSaptarshi-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:03:01.495221+00:00 | 3a90dc560cc4bc632ee098efeb5e3220aab3da73f6425d761c83fe40c307d873 | 1 | 0 | 97 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | if (!operators[msg.sender] && !vaults[msg.sender]) {
revert Unauthorized();
} | unknown | 97 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
if (!operators[msg.sender] && !vaults[msg.sender]) {
revert Unauthorized();
} | 1 | false | V3Oracle.sol#L342-L24 | V3Oracle.sol | 1 | if (!operators[msg.sender] && !vaults[msg.sender]) {
revert Unauthorized();
} | true | false | false | 4.48 | |||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | Bloqarl Q | High | high | ## QA Report
# [L-01] Use Ownable2StepUpgradeable instead of OwnableUpgradeable contract
In four contracts the `transferOwnership` is used in the `initialize()` function in order to use to change Ownership. It is, however, imported from `OwnableUpgradeable`. There is another Openzeppelin Ownable contract (Ownable2Step... | address public constant UNISWAP_ROUTER =
0x68b3465833fb72A70ecDF485E0e4C7bD8665Fc45;
address public constant UNI_V3_FACTORY =
0x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea31F984; | uint256 minOut = (((ethPerDerivative(_amount) * _amount) / 10 ** 18) *
(10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Bloqarl-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:55.265052+00:00 | 3aa2454508f4cac9aa4106d6ff70aa57341dfe2567e53f0051bc0a1a487e8ddd | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | SafEth.sol#L18, Reth.sol#L19, SfrxEth.sol#L13, WstEth.sol#L12, WstEth.sol#L34, SfrxEth.sol#L37, Reth.sol#L43, SafEth.sol#L53 | SfrxEth.sol, Reth.sol, WstEth.sol, SafEth.sol | 8 | address public constant UNISWAP_ROUTER =
0x68b3465833fb72A70ecDF485E0e4C7bD8665Fc45;
address public constant UNI_V3_FACTORY =
0x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea31F984; | true | uint256 minOut = (((ethPerDerivative(_amount) * _amount) / 10 ** 18) *
(10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 01-salty | codeslide Q | Critical | critical | ## <a id="summary"></a>Summary
### <a id="summary-low-risk-issues"></a>Low Risk Issues
There are 73 instances over 8 issues.
| ID | Description | Count |
| :-----------: | :-----------------------------------------------------------... | File: src/ExchangeConfig.sol
/// @audit state variables: dao, upkeep, initialDistribution, airdrop, teamVestingWallet, daoVestingWallet
48: function setContracts( IDAO _dao, IUpkeep _upkeep, IInitialDistribution _initialDistribution, IAirdrop _airdrop, VestingWallet _teamVestingWallet, VestingWallet _daoVestingWallet... | File: src/pools/Pools.sol
/// @audit state variables: dao, collateralAndLiquidity
60: function setContracts( IDAO _dao, ICollateralAndLiquidity _collateralAndLiquidity ) external onlyOwner
61: { | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/codeslide-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:36.783948+00:00 | 3adc433fd6880060588ef9e04f33c3f6bcd691392fcffadf324f03d1f81aab0d | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: src/ExchangeConfig.sol
/// @audit state variables: dao, upkeep, initialDistribution, airdrop, teamVestingWallet, daoVestingWallet
48: function setContracts( IDAO _dao, IUpkeep _upkeep, IInitialDistribution _initialDistribution, IAirdrop _airdrop, VestingWallet _teamVestingWallet, VestingWallet _daoVestingWallet... | true | File: src/pools/Pools.sol
/// @audit state variables: dao, collateralAndLiquidity
60: function setContracts( IDAO _dao, ICollateralAndLiquidity _collateralAndLiquidity ) external onlyOwner
61: { | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | 0x6020c0 Q | Low | low | [N-01] In `SafEthStorage.sol` line 17. Misspelling in the comment should be `bool public pauseUnstaking; // true if unstaking is paused`
[N-02] In `Reth.sol` lines 197-201. To be consistent with naming convention in `SafEth.sol` change to
```
uint256 rethBalanceBefore = rocketTokenRETH.balanceOf(address(this));
... | uint256 rethBalanceBefore = rocketTokenRETH.balanceOf(address(this));
rocketDepositPool.deposit{value: msg.value}();
uint256 rethBalanceAfter = rocketTokenRETH.balanceOf(address(this));
require(rethBalanceAfter > rethBalanceBefore, "No rETH was minted");
uint256 rethMinted = rethBalanceAfter - ... | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/0x6020c0-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:32.792697+00:00 | 3ae6fdf17a1326054efb789ebcab1d3f76bb989c51e9119131cdccc016b04b18 | 1 | 0 | 333 | 0 | false | true | true | false | medium | uint256 rethBalanceBefore = rocketTokenRETH.balanceOf(address(this));
rocketDepositPool.deposit{value: msg.value}();
uint256 rethBalanceAfter = rocketTokenRETH.balanceOf(address(this));
require(rethBalanceAfter > rethBalanceBefore, "No rETH was minted");
uint256 rethMinted = rethBalanceAfter - rethB... | unknown | 333 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
uint256 rethBalanceBefore = rocketTokenRETH.balanceOf(address(this));
rocketDepositPool.deposit{value: msg.value}();
uint256 rethBalanceAfter = rocketTokenRETH.balanceOf(address(this));
require(rethBalanceAfter > rethBalanceBefore, "No rETH was minted");
uint256 rethMinted... | 1 | false | 0 | uint256 rethBalanceBefore = rocketTokenRETH.balanceOf(address(this));
rocketDepositPool.deposit{value: msg.value}();
uint256 rethBalanceAfter = rocketTokenRETH.balanceOf(address(this));
require(rethBalanceAfter > rethBalanceBefore, "No rETH was minted");
uint256 rethMinted = rethBalanceAfter - ... | true | false | false | 3.64 | |||||||
c4 | 06-lybra | Arz Q | High | high | ## Issue 1 - getExchangeRatio() function does not exist
Contract: LybraRETHVault.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra/blob/7b73ef2fbb542b569e182d9abf79be643ca883ee/contracts/lybra/pools/LybraRETHVault.sol#L47
In LybraRETHVault.sol getExchangeRatio() function is used when calculating the asset price.
Howev... | function getAssetPrice() public override returns (uint256) {
return (_etherPrice() * IRETH(address(collateralAsset)).getExchangeRate()) / 1e18;
}
| function burn(address onBehalfOf, uint256 amount) external {
require(amount > 0, "ZERO_BURN");
require(onBehalfOf != address(0), "BURN_TO_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS");
_repay(msg.sender, onBehalfOf, amount);
} | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/Arz-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:22:11.723652+00:00 | 3aefd12d73be7298a1da429a1b3cb4b2dbb9938b27a7c37f47ab615d480f993f | 2 | 2 | 377 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | function getAssetPrice() public override returns (uint256) {
return (_etherPrice() * IRETH(address(collateralAsset)).getExchangeRate()) / 1e18;
} | solidity | 150 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function getAssetPrice() public override returns (uint256) {
return (_etherPrice() * IRETH(address(collateralAsset)).getExchangeRate()) / 1e18;
}
// Code block 2 (solidity):
function burn(address onBehalfOf, uint256 amount) external {
require(amount > 0, "ZERO_BURN");
r... | 2 | false | function getAssetPrice() public override returns (uint256) {
return (_etherPrice() * IRETH(address(collateralAsset)).getExchangeRate()) / 1e18;
}
function burn(address onBehalfOf, uint256 amount) external {
require(amount > 0, "ZERO_BURN");
require(onBehalfOf != address(0), "BURN_TO_THE_ZERO_ADDRE... | LybraRETHVault.sol#L47, LybraEUSDVaultBase.sol#L140 | LybraEUSDVaultBase.sol, LybraRETHVault.sol | 2 | function getAssetPrice() public override returns (uint256) {
return (_etherPrice() * IRETH(address(collateralAsset)).getExchangeRate()) / 1e18;
}
| true | function burn(address onBehalfOf, uint256 amount) external {
require(amount > 0, "ZERO_BURN");
require(onBehalfOf != address(0), "BURN_TO_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS");
_repay(msg.sender, onBehalfOf, amount);
} | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 02-ethos | cyberinn G | Gas | gas | ## [G-1] Use elementary types or a user-defined type instead of a struct that has only one member
### Impact
Use elementary types or a user-defined type instead of a struct that has only one member.
### Findings
Total:1
[Ethos-Core/contracts/StabilityPool.sol#L174-L176](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/... | 174: struct Deposit {
175: uint initialValue;
176: } | 352: require(
353: !stabilityPools[_recipient] &&
354: !troveManagers[_recipient] &&
355: !borrowerOperations[_recipient],
356: "LUSD: Cannot transfer tokens directly to the StabilityPool, TroveManager or BorrowerOps"
357: ); | upgrade | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/cyberinn-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:01.999710+00:00 | 3af487fde5e10924373fbe89ac8988c70145540cd270070f7ae4360d6df3d82e | 3 | 3 | 538 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | 174: struct Deposit {
175: uint initialValue;
176: } | solidity | 65 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
174: struct Deposit {
175: uint initialValue;
176: }
// Code block 2 (solidity):
352: require(
353: !stabilityPools[_recipient] &&
354: !troveManagers[_recipient] &&
355: !borrowerOperations[_recipient],
356: "LUSD: Cannot transfer tokens dire... | 3 | false | 174: struct Deposit {
175: uint initialValue;
176: }
352: require(
353: !stabilityPools[_recipient] &&
354: !troveManagers[_recipient] &&
355: !borrowerOperations[_recipient],
356: "LUSD: Cannot transfer tokens directly to the StabilityPool, TroveManager or BorrowerOps"
... | StabilityPool.sol#L174-L176, LUSDToken.sol#L352-L357, LUSDToken.sol#L347-L351, BorrowerOperations.sol#L653-L654 | LUSDToken.sol, BorrowerOperations.sol, StabilityPool.sol | 4 | 174: struct Deposit {
175: uint initialValue;
176: } | true | 352: require(
353: !stabilityPools[_recipient] &&
354: !troveManagers[_recipient] &&
355: !borrowerOperations[_recipient],
356: "LUSD: Cannot transfer tokens directly to the StabilityPool, TroveManager or BorrowerOps"
357: ); | true | true | 9 | ||
c4 | 11-kelp | orion Q | Low | low | NodeDelegator.depositAssetIntoStrategy does not check if strategy address (lrtConfig.assetStrategy(asset)) is not address(0), since user when calling this function will transfer his funds via
```
IEigenStrategyManager(eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress).depositIntoStrategy(IStrategy(strategy), token, balance);
```
whi... | IEigenStrategyManager(eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress).depositIntoStrategy(IStrategy(strategy), token, balance); | function depositIntoStrategy(IStrategy strategy, IERC20 token, uint256 amount) external returns (uint256 shares) {
token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(strategy), amount); | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/orion-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:28:20.065610+00:00 | 3b1a468ca995d52b7fabb9e6ccb50f64109749d1b570932961f429fba54aa3ed | 2 | 0 | 294 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | IEigenStrategyManager(eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress).depositIntoStrategy(IStrategy(strategy), token, balance); | unknown | 113 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
IEigenStrategyManager(eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress).depositIntoStrategy(IStrategy(strategy), token, balance);
// Code block 2 (unknown):
function depositIntoStrategy(IStrategy strategy, IERC20 token, uint256 amount) external returns (uint256 shares) {
token.transferFrom(msg.sende... | 2 | false | 0 | IEigenStrategyManager(eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress).depositIntoStrategy(IStrategy(strategy), token, balance); | true | function depositIntoStrategy(IStrategy strategy, IERC20 token, uint256 amount) external returns (uint256 shares) {
token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(strategy), amount); | true | true | 5.74 | |||||
c4 | 02-ethos | Madalad G | High | high | # Gas Report
## `abi.encodePacked` is more gas efficient than `abi.encode`
`abi.encode` pads all elementary types to 32 bytes, whereas `abi.encodePacked` will only use the minimal required memory to encode the data. See [here](https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.11/abi-spec.html?highlight=encodepacked#non-standard-... | assembly {
if iszero(_addr) {
mstore(0x00, "zero address")
revert(0x00, 0x20)
}
} | function solidityHash(uint256 a, uint256 b) public view {
//unoptimized
keccak256(abi.encodePacked(a, b));
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/Madalad-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:20.257489+00:00 | 3b67ad2f3e7ffbab98b2b316b4ffd022160fae232d155671b79f1239dee5d76a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | LUSDToken.sol#L284, LUSDToken.sol#L305, CollateralConfig.sol#L47, CollateralConfig.sol#L86, BorrowerOperations.sol#L110, ActivePool.sol#L71 | LUSDToken.sol, BorrowerOperations.sol, CollateralConfig.sol, ActivePool.sol | 6 | assembly {
if iszero(_addr) {
mstore(0x00, "zero address")
revert(0x00, 0x20)
}
} | true | function solidityHash(uint256 a, uint256 b) public view {
//unoptimized
keccak256(abi.encodePacked(a, b));
} | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | Proxy G | Low | low | ### Gas Optimizations List
| Number | Optimization Details | Instances |
| :----: | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :-------: |
| [G-01] | Mark functions as payable (with discretion) ... | function assemblyOwnerNotZero(address _addr) public pure {
assembly {
if iszero(_addr) {
mstore(0x00, "zero address")
revert(0x00, 0x20)
}
}
} | contract ExampleContract {
address owner = 0xb4c79daB8f259C7Aee6E5b2Aa729821864227e84;
function assemblyUpdateOwner(address newOwner) public {
assembly {
sstore(owner.slot, newOwner)
}
}
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/Proxy-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:58.777659+00:00 | 3b6c84f07464d8d5e5a58cb7489ed2584151a231519f02e1e6e1fff61749fc34 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | PrivatePool.sol#L157, PrivatePool.sol#L301, PrivatePool.sol#L514 | PrivatePool.sol | 3 | function assemblyOwnerNotZero(address _addr) public pure {
assembly {
if iszero(_addr) {
mstore(0x00, "zero address")
revert(0x00, 0x20)
}
}
} | true | contract ExampleContract {
address owner = 0xb4c79daB8f259C7Aee6E5b2Aa729821864227e84;
function assemblyUpdateOwner(address newOwner) public {
assembly {
sstore(owner.slot, newOwner)
}
}
} | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 01-ondo | rbserver Q | Critical | critical | ## [01] USERS ARE UNABLE TO CALL `KYCRegistry.addKYCAddressViaSignature` FUNCTION WITH VALID SIGNATURES, WHICH HAVE `v` BEING 0 OR 1, THAT ARE SIGNED BY USING `web3.eth.sign`
The following `KYCRegistry.addKYCAddressViaSignature` function checks if the `v` input is 27 or 28; if not, calling it will revert. However, a va... | function addKYCAddressViaSignature(
uint256 kycRequirementGroup,
address user,
uint256 deadline,
uint8 v,
bytes32 r,
bytes32 s
) external {
require(v == 27 || v == 28, "KYCRegistry: invalid v value in signature");
...
} | if (v <= 1) {
v += 27;
}
require(v == 27 || v == 28, "KYCRegistry: invalid v value in signature"); | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/rbserver-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:30.017112+00:00 | 3b9543947b51173da5131fbbc0529c1c8dbe51775eaf6f92aa44fd5911ad9208 | 2 | 2 | 369 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | function addKYCAddressViaSignature(
uint256 kycRequirementGroup,
address user,
uint256 deadline,
uint8 v,
bytes32 r,
bytes32 s
) external {
require(v == 27 || v == 28, "KYCRegistry: invalid v value in signature");
...
} | solidity | 255 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function addKYCAddressViaSignature(
uint256 kycRequirementGroup,
address user,
uint256 deadline,
uint8 v,
bytes32 r,
bytes32 s
) external {
require(v == 27 || v == 28, "KYCRegistry: invalid v value in signature");
...
}
// Code block 2 (solidity):
if (v <... | 2 | false | function addKYCAddressViaSignature(
uint256 kycRequirementGroup,
address user,
uint256 deadline,
uint8 v,
bytes32 r,
bytes32 s
) external {
require(v == 27 || v == 28, "KYCRegistry: invalid v value in signature");
...
}
if (v <= 1) {
v += 27;
}
require(v == 27 || v =... | KYCRegistry.sol#L79-L112, KYCRegistry.sol#L87 | KYCRegistry.sol | 2 | function addKYCAddressViaSignature(
uint256 kycRequirementGroup,
address user,
uint256 deadline,
uint8 v,
bytes32 r,
bytes32 s
) external {
require(v == 27 || v == 28, "KYCRegistry: invalid v value in signature");
...
} | true | if (v <= 1) {
v += 27;
}
require(v == 27 || v == 28, "KYCRegistry: invalid v value in signature"); | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 01-salty | lsaudit G | High | high | # [G-01] Claiming airdrops in `Airdrop.sol` can be fully rewritten and optimized
`Airdrop.sol` utilizes mapping `claimed` to check if user has already claimed some token:
[File: Airdrop.sol](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/53516c2cdfdfacb662cdea6417c52f23c94d5b5b/src/launch/Airdrop.sol#L29)
```
// T... | // Those users who have already claimed
mapping(address=>bool) public claimed; | function claimAirdrop() external nonReentrant
{
require( claimingAllowed, "Claiming is not allowed yet" );
require( isAuthorized(msg.sender), "Wallet is not authorized for airdrop" );
require( ! claimed[msg.sender], "Wallet already claimed the airdrop" );
// Have the Airdrop contract stake a spec... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/lsaudit-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:51.625109+00:00 | 3c4ac9f99262e4e611a0d55a33af600fad35689a99903f714b093e729f417964 | 2 | 0 | 623 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | // Those users who have already claimed
mapping(address=>bool) public claimed; | unknown | 79 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
// Those users who have already claimed
mapping(address=>bool) public claimed;
// Code block 2 (unknown):
function claimAirdrop() external nonReentrant
{
require( claimingAllowed, "Claiming is not allowed yet" );
require( isAuthorized(msg.sender), "Wallet is not authorized fo... | 2 | false | Airdrop.sol#L29, Airdrop.sol#L74 | Airdrop.sol | 2 | // Those users who have already claimed
mapping(address=>bool) public claimed; | true | function claimAirdrop() external nonReentrant
{
require( claimingAllowed, "Claiming is not allowed yet" );
require( isAuthorized(msg.sender), "Wallet is not authorized for airdrop" );
require( ! claimed[msg.sender], "Wallet already claimed the airdrop" );
// Have the Airdrop contract stake a spec... | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 05-ajna | Sathish9098 G | Medium | medium | ## GAS OPTIMIZATIONS
Gas usage is determined by EVM opcodes and Remix sample tests, improving the overall user experience and reducing transaction fees for users
##
| Gas Count| Issues| Instances| Gas Saved|
|-------|-----|--------|--------|
| [G-1] | Using bools for storage incurs overhead | 3 | 60000 |
| [G-2] |... | // Booleans are more expensive than uint256 or any type that takes up a full
// word because each write operation emits an extra SLOAD to first read the
// slot's contents, replace the bits taken up by the boolean, and then write
// back. This is the compiler's defense against contract upgrades and
... | FILE: 2023-05-ajna/ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
70: mapping(uint256 => mapping(uint256 => bool)) public override isEpochClaimed;
| reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/Sathish9098-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:12.380767+00:00 | 3c51364b598a710d1a9dc147aaa9686a7ea850840511edee2c8b9a14f70fc7d1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | // Booleans are more expensive than uint256 or any type that takes up a full
// word because each write operation emits an extra SLOAD to first read the
// slot's contents, replace the bits taken up by the boolean, and then write
// back. This is the compiler's defense against contract upgrades and
... | true | FILE: 2023-05-ajna/ajna-core/src/RewardsManager.sol
70: mapping(uint256 => mapping(uint256 => bool)) public override isEpochClaimed;
| true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-revert-lend | 0xepley Analysis | Critical | critical | # 🛠️ Revert Lend
**A lending protocol specifically designed for liquidity providers on Uniswap v3.**
## Conceptual overview of the project:
The Revert Lend project is a sophisticated DeFi ecosystem designed to optimize and automate liquidity management on Uniswap V3, provide innovative borrowing and lending solution... | function setValues(
uint256 baseRatePerYearX96,
uint256 multiplierPerYearX96,
uint256 jumpMultiplierPerYearX96,
uint256 _kinkX96
) public onlyOwner {
...
} | mapping(address => bool) public operators;
function setOperator(address _operator, bool _active) public onlyOwner {
...
} | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/blob/main/data/0xepley-Analysis.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:55.228395+00:00 | 3cae353daa4469b7824a940f32f547da466adc6ef6f4141463774eb30a52a244 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | function setValues(
uint256 baseRatePerYearX96,
uint256 multiplierPerYearX96,
uint256 jumpMultiplierPerYearX96,
uint256 _kinkX96
) public onlyOwner {
...
} | true | mapping(address => bool) public operators;
function setOperator(address _operator, bool _active) public onlyOwner {
...
} | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | fs0c Q | QA | qa | ## [QA-01] `msg.value` in loop
The change function in EthRouter is using `msg.value` in loop. Which means user has to send msg.value once and if there are ETHs in the contract they would be used instead.
```solidity
for (uint256 i = 0; i < changes.length; i++) {
//...
PrivatePool(_change.pool... | for (uint256 i = 0; i < changes.length; i++) {
//...
PrivatePool(_change.pool).change{value: msg.value}(
_change.inputTokenIds,
_change.inputTokenWeights,
_change.inputProof,
_change.stolenNftProofs,
_change.outputT... | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/fs0c-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:31.883586+00:00 | 3cbc631528e3b04cef2eccd3982c452ac977d7880f130d23d00a812580330550 | 1 | 1 | 742 | 0 | false | true | true | false | medium | for (uint256 i = 0; i < changes.length; i++) {
//...
PrivatePool(_change.pool).change{value: msg.value}(
_change.inputTokenIds,
_change.inputTokenWeights,
_change.inputProof,
_change.stolenNftProofs,
_change.outputT... | solidity | 742 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
for (uint256 i = 0; i < changes.length; i++) {
//...
PrivatePool(_change.pool).change{value: msg.value}(
_change.inputTokenIds,
_change.inputTokenWeights,
_change.inputProof,
_change.stolenNftProofs,
... | 1 | false | for (uint256 i = 0; i < changes.length; i++) {
//...
PrivatePool(_change.pool).change{value: msg.value}(
_change.inputTokenIds,
_change.inputTokenWeights,
_change.inputProof,
_change.stolenNftProofs,
_change.outputT... | 0 | for (uint256 i = 0; i < changes.length; i++) {
//...
PrivatePool(_change.pool).change{value: msg.value}(
_change.inputTokenIds,
_change.inputTokenWeights,
_change.inputProof,
_change.stolenNftProofs,
_change.outputT... | true | false | false | 3.93 | ||||||
c4 | 08-dopex | 0x6980 G | High | high | # Report
## Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Instances|Gas Saved|
|-|:-|:-:|-|
| [G-01](#G-01) | Use `assembly` to check for `address(0)` | 8 | 48
| [G-02](#G-02) | `++i`/`i++` should be `unchecked{++i}`/`unchecked{i++}` when it is not possible for them to overflow, as is the case when used in `for`- and `while`-loops | 8... | File: contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol
490: require(_owner != address(0), "APPROVE_FROM_ZERO_ADDRESS");
491: require(_spender != address(0), "APPROVE_TO_ZERO_ADDRESS");
519: require(_sender != address(0), "TRANSFER_FROM_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS");
520: require(_recipient != address(0), "TRANSFER_TO_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS... | File: contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
134: for (uint256 i = 0; i < thresholds.length; ++i) {
160: for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) {
264: for (uint256 i = 0; i < amounts.length; ++i) {
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/0x6980-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:12.338362+00:00 | 3cda9aa3204317c06f50541356c1f5b33d1bad4de98a5046439f688f36d8a378 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol
490: require(_owner != address(0), "APPROVE_FROM_ZERO_ADDRESS");
491: require(_spender != address(0), "APPROVE_TO_ZERO_ADDRESS");
519: require(_sender != address(0), "TRANSFER_FROM_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS");
520: require(_recipient != address(0), "TRANSFER_TO_THE_ZERO_ADDRESS... | true | File: contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
134: for (uint256 i = 0; i < thresholds.length; ++i) {
160: for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) {
264: for (uint256 i = 0; i < amounts.length; ++i) {
| true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 09-ondo | jeffy G | Low | low | ## [G-01] use if + revert instead of require/assert to save gas
Consider using custom errors instead of revert strings. Can save gas when the revert condition has been met during runtime.
Here are some examples of where this optimization could be used:
```solidity
File: contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol
168: requ... | File: contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol
168: require(success, "Call Failed");
File: contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
405: require(y == 0 || (z = x * y) / y == x);
File: contracts/usdy/rUSDYFactory.sol
100: assert(rUSDYProxyAdmin.owner() == guardian);
134: require(success, "Call Failed");
... | File: contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
134: for (uint256 i = 0; i < thresholds.length; ++i) {
160: for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) {
264: for (uint256 i = 0; i < amounts.length; ++i) {
File: contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol
79: bytes memory payload = abi.encode(VERSION, msg.sender, amount, nonc... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/jeffy-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:00.089905+00:00 | 3ce7d48aafac4ec8f19ac10cffe70a83cf459d7f0ba1f23484493a57cb59ec79 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol
168: require(success, "Call Failed");
File: contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol
405: require(y == 0 || (z = x * y) / y == x);
File: contracts/usdy/rUSDYFactory.sol
100: assert(rUSDYProxyAdmin.owner() == guardian);
134: require(success, "Call Failed");
... | true | File: contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
134: for (uint256 i = 0; i < thresholds.length; ++i) {
160: for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) {
264: for (uint256 i = 0; i < amounts.length; ++i) {
File: contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol
79: bytes memory payload = abi.encode(VERSION, msg.sender, amount, nonc... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | MiniGlome G | High | high | ## Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [GAS-01] | Structs can be packed into fewer storage slots | 2 |
| [GAS-02] | Functions guaranteed to revert when called by normal users can be marked `payable` | 11 |
| [GAS-03] | Setting the `constructor` to `payable` | 3 |
| [GAS-04] | Usage of uint/int smaller ... | File: src/EthRouter.sol
48: struct Buy {
address payable pool;
address nft;
uint256[] tokenIds;
uint256[] tokenWeights;
PrivatePool.MerkleMultiProof proof;
uint256 baseTokenAmount;
bool isPublicPool;
}
58: struct Sell {
address payable pool;
... | struct Buy {
address payable pool;
address nft;
bool isPublicPool;
uint256[] tokenIds;
uint256[] tokenWeights;
PrivatePool.MerkleMultiProof proof;
uint256 baseTokenAmount;
}
struct Sell {
address payable pool;
address nft;
... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/MiniGlome-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:52.732797+00:00 | 3d124710d42d9f5e93a87ed71ca663fa982fe39fff467cfc13d9f4dda16f5ca0 | 2 | 2 | 1,110 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | File: src/EthRouter.sol
48: struct Buy {
address payable pool;
address nft;
uint256[] tokenIds;
uint256[] tokenWeights;
PrivatePool.MerkleMultiProof proof;
uint256 baseTokenAmount;
bool isPublicPool;
}
58: struct Sell {
address payable pool;
... | solidity | 564 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: src/EthRouter.sol
48: struct Buy {
address payable pool;
address nft;
uint256[] tokenIds;
uint256[] tokenWeights;
PrivatePool.MerkleMultiProof proof;
uint256 baseTokenAmount;
bool isPublicPool;
}
58: struct Sell {
... | 2 | false | File: src/EthRouter.sol
48: struct Buy {
address payable pool;
address nft;
uint256[] tokenIds;
uint256[] tokenWeights;
PrivatePool.MerkleMultiProof proof;
uint256 baseTokenAmount;
bool isPublicPool;
}
58: struct Sell {
address payable pool;
... | 0 | File: src/EthRouter.sol
48: struct Buy {
address payable pool;
address nft;
uint256[] tokenIds;
uint256[] tokenWeights;
PrivatePool.MerkleMultiProof proof;
uint256 baseTokenAmount;
bool isPublicPool;
}
58: struct Sell {
address payable pool;
... | true | struct Buy {
address payable pool;
address nft;
bool isPublicPool;
uint256[] tokenIds;
uint256[] tokenWeights;
PrivatePool.MerkleMultiProof proof;
uint256 baseTokenAmount;
}
struct Sell {
address payable pool;
address nft;
... | true | true | 7 | ||||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | 0xCiphky Q | High | high | # NRN total supply can never equal the max
# Relevant GitHub Links:
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/cd1a0e6d1b40168657d1aaee8223dc050e15f8cc/src/Neuron.sol#L155
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/cd1a0e6d1b40168657d1aaee8223dc050e15f8cc/src/Neuron.sol#L43
# Vulnerability details... | /// @notice Maximum supply of NRN tokens.
uint256 public constant MAX_SUPPLY = 10**18 * 10**9; | function mint(address to, uint256 amount) public virtual {
require(totalSupply() + amount < MAX_SUPPLY, "Trying to mint more than the max supply");
require(hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, msg.sender), "ERC20: must have minter role to mint");
_mint(to, amount);
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/0xCiphky-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:00.626944+00:00 | 3d1d71fc9aa33b3e76464bfb59a0f325e8b848c09d2983c46ab7be07fd123be4 | 2 | 2 | 373 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | /// @notice Maximum supply of NRN tokens.
uint256 public constant MAX_SUPPLY = 10**18 * 10**9; | solidity | 94 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
/// @notice Maximum supply of NRN tokens.
uint256 public constant MAX_SUPPLY = 10**18 * 10**9;
// Code block 2 (solidity):
function mint(address to, uint256 amount) public virtual {
require(totalSupply() + amount < MAX_SUPPLY, "Trying to mint more than the max supply");
requ... | 2 | false | /// @notice Maximum supply of NRN tokens.
uint256 public constant MAX_SUPPLY = 10**18 * 10**9;
function mint(address to, uint256 amount) public virtual {
require(totalSupply() + amount < MAX_SUPPLY, "Trying to mint more than the max supply");
require(hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, msg.sender), "ERC20: must have ... | Neuron.sol#L155, Neuron.sol#L43 | Neuron.sol | 2 | /// @notice Maximum supply of NRN tokens.
uint256 public constant MAX_SUPPLY = 10**18 * 10**9; | true | function mint(address to, uint256 amount) public virtual {
require(totalSupply() + amount < MAX_SUPPLY, "Trying to mint more than the max supply");
require(hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, msg.sender), "ERC20: must have minter role to mint");
_mint(to, amount);
} | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 08-dopex | Inspex G | Low | low | ## Gas Issues
| Number | Issues | Instances |
| ------ | ------- | --------- |
| [G-01] | Calculate strike and timetoExpiry only if putOptionsRequired value is true | 1 |
### [G-01] Calculate strike and timetoExpiry only if putOptionsRequired value is true
#### Line References
https://github.com/code-423n... | #### Recommended Mitigation Steps
We suggest computing the `strike` and `timeToExpiry` only if `putOptionsRequired` value is `true`. For example:
**RdpxV2Core.sol**
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex/blob/main/contracts/core/RdpxV2Core.sol#L1189-L1198
| rounding | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/Inspex-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:40.227811+00:00 | 3d400fb291344576f5b71dea950bc8b65fe54522c4478bbeb8fc9c37c885e930 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | RdpxV2Core.sol#L1189-L1198, RdpxV2Core.sol#L1156-L1199 | RdpxV2Core.sol | 2 | #### Recommended Mitigation Steps
We suggest computing the `strike` and `timeToExpiry` only if `putOptionsRequired` value is `true`. For example:
**RdpxV2Core.sol**
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex/blob/main/contracts/core/RdpxV2Core.sol#L1189-L1198
| true | false | false | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | Shubham Q | Critical | critical | ## Low Risk Issues
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [L-01](#L-01) | Update codes to avoid Compile Errors | 8 |
| [L-02](#L-02) | In the constructor, there is no return of incorrect address identification | 8 |
*Total 2 issues.*
## Non-Critical Issues
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [NC-1](#NC-1) | Lines too long |... | warning[2519]: Warning: This declaration shadows an existing declaration.
--> test/EthRouter/Change.t.sol:36:9:
|
36 | EthRouter.Change[] memory changes = new EthRouter.Change[](1);
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Note: The shadowed declaration is here:
--> test/EthRouter/Change.t.sol:9:5:
... | File: main/src/EthRouter.sol
L:90 constructor(address _royaltyRegistry) {
L:91 royaltyRegistry = _royaltyRegistry;
L:92 } | oracle | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/Shubham-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:07.639217+00:00 | 3d550667a50c008f9e512d661c6a1dfe141a86d00f2b53756dc7d81007210643 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | warning[2519]: Warning: This declaration shadows an existing declaration.
--> test/EthRouter/Change.t.sol:36:9:
|
36 | EthRouter.Change[] memory changes = new EthRouter.Change[](1);
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Note: The shadowed declaration is here:
--> test/EthRouter/Change.t.sol:9:5:
... | true | File: main/src/EthRouter.sol
L:90 constructor(address _royaltyRegistry) {
L:91 royaltyRegistry = _royaltyRegistry;
L:92 } | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 02-ethos | 0xnev Q | Critical | critical | ### Issues Template
| Letter | Name | Description |
|:--:|:-------:|:-------:|
| L | Low risk | Potential risk |
| NC | Non-critical | Non risky findings |
| R | Refactor | Code changes |
| O | Ordinary | Commonly found issues |
| Total Found Issues | 19 |
|:--:|:--:|
### Non-Critical Template
| Count | Title | In... | 4 results - 1 file
/TroveManager.sol
1076: function applyPendingRewards(address _borrower, address _collateral) external override {
1077: _requireCallerIsBorrowerOperationsOrRedemptionHelper();
1078: return _applyPendingRewards(activePool, defaultPool, _borrower, _collateral);
1079: }
1111: fun... | 4 results - 2 files
/TroveManager.sol
357: function _liquidateRecoveryMode(
358: IActivePool _activePool,
359: IDefaultPool _defaultPool,
360: address _collateral,
361: address _borrower,
362: uint _ICR,
363: uint _LUSDInStabPool,
364: uint _TCR,
365: uint _pr... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/0xnev-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:53.210096+00:00 | 3d5e26a04bd66d23ba45e5209dc457d54c04012990f663385d99750acc6a9377 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | 4 results - 1 file
/TroveManager.sol
1076: function applyPendingRewards(address _borrower, address _collateral) external override {
1077: _requireCallerIsBorrowerOperationsOrRedemptionHelper();
1078: return _applyPendingRewards(activePool, defaultPool, _borrower, _collateral);
1079: }
1111: fun... | true | 4 results - 2 files
/TroveManager.sol
357: function _liquidateRecoveryMode(
358: IActivePool _activePool,
359: IDefaultPool _defaultPool,
360: address _collateral,
361: address _borrower,
362: uint _ICR,
363: uint _LUSDInStabPool,
364: uint _TCR,
365: uint _pr... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | 0xnev G | Low | low | ### Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Instances|Total Gas Saved|
|:-:|:-|:-:|:-:|
| [G-01] | `<x> += <y>` costs more gas than `<x> = <x> + <y>` for state variables (same for -=) | 4 | 452 |
| [G-02] | Use nested `if` statements to avoid multiple check combinations using `&&` | 9 | 54 |
| [G-03] | Structs can be packed in t... | 4 result - 1 file
/PrivatePool.sol
230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
323: virtualBaseTokenReserves -= uint128(netOutputAmount + protocolFeeAmount + feeAmount);
324: virtualNftReserves +... | 9 results - 2 files
/EthRouter.sol
101: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0)
154: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0)
228: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0)
256: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/0xnev-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:24.850250+00:00 | 3d942e8ab357bdf632c4a2c93d2face05f3b909f85d07d8bbf277e7d75212923 | 1 | 1 | 341 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | 4 result - 1 file
/PrivatePool.sol
230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
323: virtualBaseTokenReserves -= uint128(netOutputAmount + protocolFeeAmount + feeAmount);
324: virtualNftReserves +... | solidity | 341 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
4 result - 1 file
/PrivatePool.sol
230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
323: virtualBaseTokenReserves -= uint128(netOutputAmount + protocolFeeAmount + feeAmount);
324:... | 1 | false | 4 result - 1 file
/PrivatePool.sol
230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
323: virtualBaseTokenReserves -= uint128(netOutputAmount + protocolFeeAmount + feeAmount);
324: virtualNftReserves +... | PrivatePool.sol#L230-L231, PrivatePool.sol#L323-L324, EthRouter.sol#L101, EthRouter.sol#L154 | EthRouter.sol, PrivatePool.sol | 4 | 4 result - 1 file
/PrivatePool.sol
230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
323: virtualBaseTokenReserves -= uint128(netOutputAmount + protocolFeeAmount + feeAmount);
324: virtualNftReserves +... | true | 9 results - 2 files
/EthRouter.sol
101: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0)
154: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0)
228: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0)
256: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | inmarelibero Q | Low | low | \==============================================================================================================
\# 1
\==============================================================================================================
# Abstract
At line #194 the wrong `index` is included in the event.
```
File: contracts/S... | File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
182: function addDerivative(
183: address _contractAddress,
184: uint256 _weight
185: ) external onlyOwner {
186: derivatives[derivativeCount] = IDerivative(_contractAddress);
187: weights[derivativeCount] = _weight;
188: derivativeCount+... | event DerivativeAdded(
address indexed contractAddress,
uint weight,
uint index
); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/inmarelibero-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:13.341631+00:00 | 3da2096f8bb74f210bfd07f6a39c998e2b782989051fcbb3d3ec4dfc5e5f0d93 | 3 | 0 | 791 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
182: function addDerivative(
183: address _contractAddress,
184: uint256 _weight
185: ) external onlyOwner {
186: derivatives[derivativeCount] = IDerivative(_contractAddress);
187: weights[derivativeCount] = _weight;
188: derivativeCount+... | unknown | 613 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
182: function addDerivative(
183: address _contractAddress,
184: uint256 _weight
185: ) external onlyOwner {
186: derivatives[derivativeCount] = IDerivative(_contractAddress);
187: weights[derivativeCount] = _weight;
18... | 3 | false | SafEth.sol#L170 | SafEth.sol | 1 | File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
182: function addDerivative(
183: address _contractAddress,
184: uint256 _weight
185: ) external onlyOwner {
186: derivatives[derivativeCount] = IDerivative(_contractAddress);
187: weights[derivativeCount] = _weight;
188: derivativeCount+... | true | event DerivativeAdded(
address indexed contractAddress,
uint weight,
uint index
); | true | true | 9 | |||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | PNS G | Low | low | [G-1] Don’t compare boolean expressions to boolean literals
====================
`if (<x> == true) => if (<x>), if (<x> == false) => if (!<x>).`
```solidity
File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
64: require(pauseStaking == false, "staking is paused");
```
```solidity
File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
109: ... | File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
64: require(pauseStaking == false, "staking is paused"); | File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
109: require(pauseUnstaking == false, "unstaking is paused"); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/PNS-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:23.845918+00:00 | 3dbb801b4b5be62ab942bca5f384f8b93e444422b6df394be1f2937c9021cd1a | 10 | 10 | 1,125 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
64: require(pauseStaking == false, "staking is paused"); | solidity | 98 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
64: require(pauseStaking == false, "staking is paused");
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
109: require(pauseUnstaking == false, "unstaking is paused");
// Code block 3 (solidity):
File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.s... | 10 | false | File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
64: require(pauseStaking == false, "staking is paused");
File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
109: require(pauseUnstaking == false, "unstaking is paused");
File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
71: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
File: contracts/SafEth/Sa... | 0 | File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
64: require(pauseStaking == false, "staking is paused"); | true | File: contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
109: require(pauseUnstaking == false, "unstaking is paused"); | true | true | 15 | ||||
c4 | 02-ethos | Bough G | High | high | # [G-01] ++i costs less gas than i++, especially when it’s used in for-loops (--i/i-- too)
##description
++i costs less gas compared to i++ or i += 1 (same for --i vs i-- or i -= 1).
it Saves 5 gas per loop
## Codes
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/ActivePool.sol#L108
``` ... | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol#L608 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol#L690 | oracle | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/Bough-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:00.384391+00:00 | 3dc63e649fcb01ed306288f05a1605d3cf0bc5838c737b61cb43fc48c5cd93ca | 9 | 0 | 876 | 11 | true | true | true | false | medium | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol#L608 | unknown | 96 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol#L608
// Code block 2 (unknown):
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol#L690
// Code block 3 (unknown):
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos... | 9 | false | ActivePool.sol#L108, TroveManager.sol#L608, TroveManager.sol#L690, TroveManager.sol#L808, TroveManager.sol#L882, CollateralConfig.sol#L56, HintHelpers.sol#L191, PriceFeed.sol#L113, RedemptionHelper.sol#L154, HintHelpers.sol#L120, ReaperVaultERC4626.sol#L273 | TroveManager.sol, PriceFeed.sol, ActivePool.sol, ReaperVaultERC4626.sol, RedemptionHelper.sol, CollateralConfig.sol, HintHelpers.sol | 11 | false | false | false | 13 | |||||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | Blank_Space G | Gas | gas | #[G-01] The `transferOwnership` function does not make the owner an admin
The `transferOwnership` function updates the owner of the contract, but does not give the owner admin functionality, even though the owner is only address that can call `adjustAdminAccess`. This means that there is no reason for an owner to not ... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/Blank_Space-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:18.877415+00:00 | 3dd75d4d7f39bd7f957068a0b94384d8dab1e09c0d8aa82fce082f75d98d1bfe | 1 | 1 | 191 | 3 | true | true | true | false | medium | function transferOwnership(address newOwnerAddress) external {
require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress);
++ isAdmin[newOwnerAddress] = true;
_ownerAddress = newOwnerAddress;
} | diff | 191 | // Code block 1 (diff):
function transferOwnership(address newOwnerAddress) external {
require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress);
++ isAdmin[newOwnerAddress] = true;
_ownerAddress = newOwnerAddress;
} | 1 | true | function transferOwnership(address newOwnerAddress) external {
require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress);
++ isAdmin[newOwnerAddress] = true;
_ownerAddress = newOwnerAddress;
} | AiArenaHelper.sol#L45, Neuron.sol#L85-L88, AiArenaHelper.sol#L50 | Neuron.sol, AiArenaHelper.sol | 3 | false | false | false | 7 | ||||||
c4 | 09-ondo | SovaSlava Q | Unknown | unknown | Q1 - Different token name.
Factory emit event with wrong token name, when deploy new token contract.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/usdy/rUSDYFactory.sol#L105
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/cont... | emit TransferShares(address(0), msg.sender, _USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR); | oracle | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/SovaSlava-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:41.273651+00:00 | 3de5cc6c570203925ad92ad3cccd1e68923e7dfe755884ae1d6e01432909b51c | 1 | 0 | 75 | 6 | false | true | true | false | medium | emit TransferShares(address(0), msg.sender, _USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR); | unknown | 75 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
emit TransferShares(address(0), msg.sender, _USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR); | 1 | false | rUSDYFactory.sol#L105, rUSDY.sol#L195, rUSDY.sol#L439, RWADynamicOracle.sol#L282-L18, rUSDY.sol#L227, DestinationBridge.sol#L197 | rUSDYFactory.sol, rUSDY.sol, RWADynamicOracle.sol, DestinationBridge.sol | 6 | emit TransferShares(address(0), msg.sender, _USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR); | true | false | false | 6 | |||||
c4 | 10-badger | alexzoid Q | Low | low | ## Summary
### Low Issues
Total of **1 issue**:
|ID|Issue|
|:--:|:---|
| [L-01] | Missing Zero Address Check for `_authorityAddress` in `EBTCToken` Constructor |
---
## Low Issues
### [L-01] - Missing Zero Address Check for `_authorityAddress` in `EBTCToken` Constructor
- https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-bad... | invariant authNoOwnerInitializedAndAddressSetInConstructor() ghostAuthorityInitialized == (ghostAuthority != 0)
filtered { f -> f.selector == 0 } {
preserved {
require(false);
}
} | require(_authorityAddress != address(0), "EBTCToken: zero authority!");
_initializeAuthority(_authorityAddress); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/alexzoid-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:41.494368+00:00 | 3dfff656b108c887a488717822cac51c26d19c1a6bd9161cab534d3c9309808c | 1 | 0 | 200 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | invariant authNoOwnerInitializedAndAddressSetInConstructor() ghostAuthorityInitialized == (ghostAuthority != 0)
filtered { f -> f.selector == 0 } {
preserved {
require(false);
}
} | unknown | 200 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
invariant authNoOwnerInitializedAndAddressSetInConstructor() ghostAuthorityInitialized == (ghostAuthority != 0)
filtered { f -> f.selector == 0 } {
preserved {
require(false);
}
} | 1 | false | EBTCToken.sol#L66, AuthNoOwner.sol#L55-L63 | EBTCToken.sol, AuthNoOwner.sol | 2 | invariant authNoOwnerInitializedAndAddressSetInConstructor() ghostAuthorityInitialized == (ghostAuthority != 0)
filtered { f -> f.selector == 0 } {
preserved {
require(false);
}
} | true | require(_authorityAddress != address(0), "EBTCToken: zero authority!");
_initializeAuthority(_authorityAddress); | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | DeFiHackLabs Q | Critical | critical | ## [L-01] Lack of access control
fighterCreatedEmitter() is public, allowing anyone to arbitrarily modify the data storing the new Fighter NFT.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/main/src/FighterOps.sol#L53
```
/// @notice Emits a FighterCreated event.
function fighterCreatedEmitter(
u... | /// @notice Emits a FighterCreated event.
function fighterCreatedEmitter(
uint256 id,
uint256 weight,
uint256 element,
uint8 generation
)
public
{
emit FighterCreated(id, weight, element, generation);
} | ownerVoltage[spender] -= voltageSpent; | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/DeFiHackLabs-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:23.194519+00:00 | 3e1bee034a6a4b3fdd1ca3095a1dcb90c8927c16d77639d3e2f214884e92659a | 4 | 0 | 502 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | /// @notice Emits a FighterCreated event.
function fighterCreatedEmitter(
uint256 id,
uint256 weight,
uint256 element,
uint8 generation
)
public
{
emit FighterCreated(id, weight, element, generation);
} | unknown | 268 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
/// @notice Emits a FighterCreated event.
function fighterCreatedEmitter(
uint256 id,
uint256 weight,
uint256 element,
uint8 generation
)
public
{
emit FighterCreated(id, weight, element, generation);
}
// Code block 2 (unknow... | 4 | false | FighterOps.sol#L53, VoltageManager.sol#L110, VoltageManager.sol#L94, GameItems.sol#L194 | VoltageManager.sol, GameItems.sol, FighterOps.sol | 4 | /// @notice Emits a FighterCreated event.
function fighterCreatedEmitter(
uint256 id,
uint256 weight,
uint256 element,
uint8 generation
)
public
{
emit FighterCreated(id, weight, element, generation);
} | true | ownerVoltage[spender] -= voltageSpent; | true | true | 10 | |||
c4 | 01-salty | klau5 Q | Unknown | unknown | # proposeCallContract: Incorrectly stores the description
## Links to affected code
[https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/aab6bbc6fe49d4dd37becc7bbd0c847ec4a7c1e6/src/dao/Proposals.sol#L218](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/aab6bbc6fe49d4dd37becc7bbd0c847ec4a7c1e6/src/dao/Proposals.sol#L21... | function proposeCallContract( address contractAddress, uint256 number, string calldata description ) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 ballotID)
{
require( contractAddress != address(0), "Contract address cannot be address(0)" );
string memory ballotName = string.concat("callContract:", Strings.toHexStrin... | # withdraw - Can leave less than DUST
## Links to affected code
[https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/aab6bbc6fe49d4dd37becc7bbd0c847ec4a7c1e6/src/pools/Pools.sol#L222-L224](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/aab6bbc6fe49d4dd37becc7bbd0c847ec4a7c1e6/src/pools/Pools.sol#L222-L224)
## Impact
... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/klau5-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:49.823387+00:00 | 3e2b3c6b97a1614fc58e2a7ca45ac0ea4bd96211fc29c2c0f929fbecae578e81 | 2 | 2 | 1,058 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | function proposeCallContract( address contractAddress, uint256 number, string calldata description ) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 ballotID)
{
require( contractAddress != address(0), "Contract address cannot be address(0)" );
string memory ballotName = string.concat("callContract:", Strings.toHexStrin... | solidity | 470 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function proposeCallContract( address contractAddress, uint256 number, string calldata description ) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 ballotID)
{
require( contractAddress != address(0), "Contract address cannot be address(0)" );
string memory ballotName = string.concat("callCo... | 2 | true | function proposeCallContract( address contractAddress, uint256 number, string calldata description ) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 ballotID)
{
require( contractAddress != address(0), "Contract address cannot be address(0)" );
string memory ballotName = string.concat("callContract:", Strings.toHexStrin... | function proposeCallContract( address contractAddress, uint256 number, string calldata description ) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 ballotID)
{
require( contractAddress != address(0), "Contract address cannot be address(0)" );
string memory ballotName = string.concat("callContract:", Strings.toHexStrin... | Proposals.sol#L218, Pools.sol#L222-L224 | Proposals.sol, Pools.sol | 2 | function proposeCallContract( address contractAddress, uint256 number, string calldata description ) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 ballotID)
{
require( contractAddress != address(0), "Contract address cannot be address(0)" );
string memory ballotName = string.concat("callContract:", Strings.toHexStrin... | true | # withdraw - Can leave less than DUST
## Links to affected code
[https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/aab6bbc6fe49d4dd37becc7bbd0c847ec4a7c1e6/src/pools/Pools.sol#L222-L224](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/aab6bbc6fe49d4dd37becc7bbd0c847ec4a7c1e6/src/pools/Pools.sol#L222-L224)
## Impact
... | true | true | 10 | |
c4 | 08-dopex | 0xMango Q | Unknown | unknown | ## Removing the last element of ```reserveAsset``` via the ```addAssetTotokenReserves()``` function does not properly update the ```reserveIndex``` mapping.
As mentioned in the #dopex-aug21 chat, further assets will be added to this array. ("BTC", "CRV")
The core contract makes much use of reserveIndes["TOKEN_NAME"] a... | reserveIndex["RDPX"] will be 2
reserveIndex["CRV"] will be 4. | [ZERO, WETH, RDPX, DPXETH, BTC] | slippage | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/0xMango-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:17.720748+00:00 | 3e50e25d601091e344391dfff081c77e4da3e89a7700b91c7986d8b90af73390 | 2 | 0 | 92 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | reserveIndex["RDPX"] will be 2
reserveIndex["CRV"] will be 4. | unknown | 61 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
reserveIndex["RDPX"] will be 2
reserveIndex["CRV"] will be 4.
// Code block 2 (unknown):
[ZERO, WETH, RDPX, DPXETH, BTC] | 2 | false | 0 | reserveIndex["RDPX"] will be 2
reserveIndex["CRV"] will be 4. | true | [ZERO, WETH, RDPX, DPXETH, BTC] | true | true | 7 | |||||
c4 | 05-ajna | T1MOH Q | High | high | # [L-01] Keep maximum length line at 120 according to solidity style guide
Description
Maximum line length is 120. Described in docs https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.19/style-guide.html#maximum-line-length
You exceed this limit here:
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/main/ajna-grants/src/grants/Gr... | function _getMinimumThresholdPercentage() internal view returns (uint256) {
// default minimum threshold is 50
if (_fundedExtraordinaryProposals.length == 0) {
return 0.5 * 1e18;
}
// minimum threshold increases according to the number of funded EFM proposals
else... | function _getMinimumThresholdPercentage() internal view returns (uint256) {
// default minimum threshold is 50
// minimum threshold increases according to the number of funded EFM proposals
return 0.5 * 1e18 + (_fundedExtraordinaryProposals.length * (0.05 * 1e18));
} | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/T1MOH-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:15.372561+00:00 | 3e71d937b09caa432ed6fc3c711b590cc8affa81ec510d7aef6e1c5700b68def | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | GrantFund.sol#L50, ExtraordinaryFunding.sol#L62, ExtraordinaryFunding.sol#L70, ExtraordinaryFunding.sol#L92, ExtraordinaryFunding.sol#L105, Funding.sol#L110, StandardFunding.sol#L310, StandardFunding.sol#L349, StandardFunding.sol#L355, StandardFunding.sol#L372, StandardFunding.sol#L421, StandardFunding.sol#L438, Standa... | StandardFunding.sol, Funding.sol, ExtraordinaryFunding.sol, GrantFund.sol | 16 | function _getMinimumThresholdPercentage() internal view returns (uint256) {
// default minimum threshold is 50
if (_fundedExtraordinaryProposals.length == 0) {
return 0.5 * 1e18;
}
// minimum threshold increases according to the number of funded EFM proposals
else... | true | function _getMinimumThresholdPercentage() internal view returns (uint256) {
// default minimum threshold is 50
// minimum threshold increases according to the number of funded EFM proposals
return 0.5 * 1e18 + (_fundedExtraordinaryProposals.length * (0.05 * 1e18));
} | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | catellatech Q | Critical | critical | `Dear Caviar Team, as we have gone through each contract within the scope, we have noticed good practices that have been implemented. However, we have identified some inconsistencies that we recommend addressing. We understand that every team has a different level of good practices, but we believe that at least 90% of ... | main/src/Factory.sol
141: function setProtocolFeeRate(uint16 _protocolFeeRate) public onlyOwner | ## [L-03] MISSING EVENTS FOR ONLY FUNCTIONS THAT CHANGE CRITICAL PARAMETERS
The afunctions that change critical parameters should emit events. Events allow capturing the changed parameters so that off-chain tools/interfaces can register such changes with timelocks that allow users to evaluate them and consider if they ... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/catellatech-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:21.197454+00:00 | 3e7f274061adf136c25dbe40a594a119520bf1ab7c0cfb50dfefe22665bf46c5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | main/src/Factory.sol
141: function setProtocolFeeRate(uint16 _protocolFeeRate) public onlyOwner | true | ## [L-03] MISSING EVENTS FOR ONLY FUNCTIONS THAT CHANGE CRITICAL PARAMETERS
The afunctions that change critical parameters should emit events. Events allow capturing the changed parameters so that off-chain tools/interfaces can register such changes with timelocks that allow users to evaluate them and consider if they ... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 10-badger | leegh Q | High | high | ## [N-01] Function names should be camelCase.
```solidity
File: packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
824: function _requireCdpisActive(ICdpManager _cdpManager, bytes32 _cdpId) internal view {
```
[[L824](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/main/packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOpera... | File: packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
824: function _requireCdpisActive(ICdpManager _cdpManager, bytes32 _cdpId) internal view { | File: packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
826: require(status == 1, "BorrowerOperations: Cdp does not exist or is closed");
831: require(status == 0, "BorrowerOperations: Cdp is active or has been previously closed"); | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/leegh-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:54.713581+00:00 | 3ef0009d5c0cd92091a64d5bbbb56f317588d96b65a02d70323657322a6098f3 | 2 | 2 | 401 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | File: packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
824: function _requireCdpisActive(ICdpManager _cdpManager, bytes32 _cdpId) internal view { | solidity | 152 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
824: function _requireCdpisActive(ICdpManager _cdpManager, bytes32 _cdpId) internal view {
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
826: require(status == 1, "BorrowerOperation... | 2 | false | File: packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
824: function _requireCdpisActive(ICdpManager _cdpManager, bytes32 _cdpId) internal view {
File: packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
826: require(status == 1, "BorrowerOperations: Cdp does not exist or is closed");
831: requi... | BorrowerOperations.sol#L824, BorrowerOperations.sol#L826, BorrowerOperations.sol#L831 | BorrowerOperations.sol | 3 | File: packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
824: function _requireCdpisActive(ICdpManager _cdpManager, bytes32 _cdpId) internal view { | true | File: packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
826: require(status == 1, "BorrowerOperations: Cdp does not exist or is closed");
831: require(status == 0, "BorrowerOperations: Cdp is active or has been previously closed"); | true | true | 6.98 | ||
c4 | 01-salty | JCK G | High | high |
| Number | Issue | Instances |
|--------|--------|-----------|
|[G-01]| Cache external calls outside of loop to avoid re-calling function on each iteration | 1 |
|[G-02]| Use assembly to validate msg.sender | 43 |
|[G-03]| State variables should be cached in stack variables rather than re-reading them from storage ... | file: blob/main/src/stable/CollateralAndLiquidity.sol
321 for ( uint256 i = startIndex; i <= endIndex; i++ )
{
address wallet = _walletsWithBorrowedUSDS.at(i);
// Determine the minCollateralValue a user needs to have based on their borrowedUSDS
uint256 minCollateralValue = (usdsBorrowedByUsers[walle... | file: blob/main/src/dao/Proposals.sol
86 if ( msg.sender != address(exchangeConfig.dao() ) )
98 require( ! _userHasActiveProposal[msg.sender], "Users can only have one active proposal at a time" );
124 require( msg.sender == address(exchangeConfig.dao()), "Only the DAO can create a confirmation proposal" );
... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/JCK-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:20.143058+00:00 | 3f64099654582ba47fa5e5581d83fb1106948572abbf795f08b564b432e6467a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | file: blob/main/src/stable/CollateralAndLiquidity.sol
321 for ( uint256 i = startIndex; i <= endIndex; i++ )
{
address wallet = _walletsWithBorrowedUSDS.at(i);
// Determine the minCollateralValue a user needs to have based on their borrowedUSDS
uint256 minCollateralValue = (usdsBorrowedByUsers[walle... | true | file: blob/main/src/dao/Proposals.sol
86 if ( msg.sender != address(exchangeConfig.dao() ) )
98 require( ! _userHasActiveProposal[msg.sender], "Users can only have one active proposal at a time" );
124 require( msg.sender == address(exchangeConfig.dao()), "Only the DAO can create a confirmation proposal" );
... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 11-kelp | Aamir Q | Medium | medium | ## Summary
| severity | Issues | Instances |
| -------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------- |
| [[L-0](#low0... | File: 2023-11-kelp/src/LRTDepositPool.sol
if (nodeDelegatorQueue.length + length > maxNodeDelegatorCount) {
revert MaximumNodeDelegatorCountReached();
} | ---
### [L-1] `LRTConfig::updateAssetDepositLimit(...)` should not let asset deposit limit to set below the current deposit amount <a id="low1"></a>
`LRTConfig::updateAssetDepositLimit(...)` does not check if the current asset Deposit limit is less than the current deposits for the asset. Because of this, the new lim... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/Aamir-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:19.604253+00:00 | 3f6af30af36743faed6b86516f46ce1187e54a75433ef43bf3e88e47ab7588bf | 1 | 0 | 181 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | File: 2023-11-kelp/src/LRTDepositPool.sol
if (nodeDelegatorQueue.length + length > maxNodeDelegatorCount) {
revert MaximumNodeDelegatorCountReached();
} | Javascript | 181 | // Code block 1 (Javascript):
File: 2023-11-kelp/src/LRTDepositPool.sol
if (nodeDelegatorQueue.length + length > maxNodeDelegatorCount) {
revert MaximumNodeDelegatorCountReached();
} | 1 | false | LRTDepositPool.sol#L164-L1, LRTDepositPoolTest.t.sol#L530, LRTDepositPoolTest.t.sol#L228-L5 | LRTDepositPoolTest.t.sol, LRTDepositPool.sol | 3 | File: 2023-11-kelp/src/LRTDepositPool.sol
if (nodeDelegatorQueue.length + length > maxNodeDelegatorCount) {
revert MaximumNodeDelegatorCountReached();
} | true | ---
### [L-1] `LRTConfig::updateAssetDepositLimit(...)` should not let asset deposit limit to set below the current deposit amount <a id="low1"></a>
`LRTConfig::updateAssetDepositLimit(...)` does not check if the current asset Deposit limit is less than the current deposits for the asset. Because of this, the new lim... | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 11-kelp | foxb868 Analysis | Critical | critical | ## Overview
Kelp is a DAO-governed protocol that allows restaking of liquid staked assets like Lido's stETH to further compound yields. The key components are:
- **LRTConfig** - stores protocol configuration and contract addresses
- **LRTDepositPool** - allows users to deposit assets
- **NodeDelegator** - delegates ... | function setContract(bytes32 contractKey, address contractAddress) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
_setContract(contractKey, contractAddress);
} | function addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) external onlyRole(LRTConstants.MANAGER) {
_addNewSupportedAsset(asset, depositLimit);
} | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/foxb868-Analysis.md | 2026-01-02T18:28:02.342478+00:00 | 3f8134be5a1eb008dbb56a239bbf89b6194c8e3ce98dc51445b4aab394cda65e | 1 | 1 | 164 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | function setContract(bytes32 contractKey, address contractAddress) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
_setContract(contractKey, contractAddress);
} | solidity | 164 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function setContract(bytes32 contractKey, address contractAddress) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
_setContract(contractKey, contractAddress);
} | 1 | false | function setContract(bytes32 contractKey, address contractAddress) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
_setContract(contractKey, contractAddress);
} | LRTConfig.sol#L165-L167, LRTConfig.sol#L73-L75 | LRTConfig.sol | 2 | function setContract(bytes32 contractKey, address contractAddress) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
_setContract(contractKey, contractAddress);
} | true | function addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) external onlyRole(LRTConstants.MANAGER) {
_addNewSupportedAsset(asset, depositLimit);
} | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 03-revert-lend | Giorgio Q | Unknown | unknown | ## Ineffective deadline on decreaseLiquidity()
##Links
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend/blob/435b054f9ad2404173f36f0f74a5096c894b12b7/src/V3Vault.sol#L1072-L1076
## Vulnerability details
Using block.timestamp as the deadline argument when interacting with the Uniswap NFT Position Manager renders t... | if (liquidity > 0) {
nonfungiblePositionManager.decreaseLiquidity(
INonfungiblePositionManager.DecreaseLiquidityParams(tokenId, liquidity, 0, 0, block.timestamp)
);
} | if (updatedAt + feedConfig.maxFeedAge < block.timestamp || answer < 0) { | oracle | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/blob/main/data/Giorgio-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:58.801114+00:00 | 3faa364f48a234f35b447bbb2066b7f2e0e739eb4b48998ba17e621c17ec81be | 2 | 1 | 287 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | if (liquidity > 0) {
nonfungiblePositionManager.decreaseLiquidity(
INonfungiblePositionManager.DecreaseLiquidityParams(tokenId, liquidity, 0, 0, block.timestamp)
);
} | solidity | 215 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
if (liquidity > 0) {
nonfungiblePositionManager.decreaseLiquidity(
INonfungiblePositionManager.DecreaseLiquidityParams(tokenId, liquidity, 0, 0, block.timestamp)
);
}
// Code block 2 (unknown):
if (updatedAt + feedConfig.maxFeedAge < block.ti... | 2 | false | if (liquidity > 0) {
nonfungiblePositionManager.decreaseLiquidity(
INonfungiblePositionManager.DecreaseLiquidityParams(tokenId, liquidity, 0, 0, block.timestamp)
);
} | V3Vault.sol#L1072-L1076, V3Oracle.sol#L338 | V3Vault.sol, V3Oracle.sol | 2 | if (liquidity > 0) {
nonfungiblePositionManager.decreaseLiquidity(
INonfungiblePositionManager.DecreaseLiquidityParams(tokenId, liquidity, 0, 0, block.timestamp)
);
} | true | if (updatedAt + feedConfig.maxFeedAge < block.timestamp || answer < 0) { | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 01-ondo | arialblack14 Q | Medium | medium | # QA REPORT
## [L-1] Use of `block.timestamp`
### Description
Block timestamps have historically been used for a variety of applications, such as entropy for random numbers (see the *[Entropy Illusion](https://hacken.io/discover/most-common-smart-contract-vulnerabilities/#Entropy_Illusion)* for further details), lock... | 175: block.timestamp -
176: (block.timestamp % epochDuration);
577: uint256 epochDifference = (block.timestamp - currentEpochStartTimestamp) /
584: block.timestamp -
585: (block.timestamp % epochDuration); | 92: require(block.timestamp <= deadline, "KYCRegistry: signature expired"); | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/arialblack14-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:55.145519+00:00 | 3fb352c68bc95353d9545087b3fc2f061e98ea520986c7552118a6e827377769 | 3 | 3 | 346 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | 175: block.timestamp -
176: (block.timestamp % epochDuration);
577: uint256 epochDifference = (block.timestamp - currentEpochStartTimestamp) /
584: block.timestamp -
585: (block.timestamp % epochDuration); | solidity | 205 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
175: block.timestamp -
176: (block.timestamp % epochDuration);
577: uint256 epochDifference = (block.timestamp - currentEpochStartTimestamp) /
584: block.timestamp -
585: (block.timestamp % epochDuration);
// Code block 2 (solidity):
92: require(block.timestamp <= deadline, "KYCRegistry: si... | 3 | false | 175: block.timestamp -
176: (block.timestamp % epochDuration);
577: uint256 epochDifference = (block.timestamp - currentEpochStartTimestamp) /
584: block.timestamp -
585: (block.timestamp % epochDuration);
92: require(block.timestamp <= deadline, "KYCRegistry: signature expired");
294: (updatedAt >= block.timestamp -... | CashManager.sol#L175, KYCRegistry.sol#L92, OndoPriceOracleV2.sol#L294 | CashManager.sol, OndoPriceOracleV2.sol, KYCRegistry.sol | 3 | 175: block.timestamp -
176: (block.timestamp % epochDuration);
577: uint256 epochDifference = (block.timestamp - currentEpochStartTimestamp) /
584: block.timestamp -
585: (block.timestamp % epochDuration); | true | 92: require(block.timestamp <= deadline, "KYCRegistry: signature expired"); | true | true | 9 | ||
c4 | 01-ondo | tnevler G | Low | low | # Report
## Gas Optimizations ##
### [G-1]: The increment in for loop post condition can be made unchecked
**Context:**
1. ```for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length; ++i) {``` [L127](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/main/contracts/cash/factory/CashFactory.sol#L127)
1. ```for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCa... | for (uint256 i = 0; i < orders.length; ++i) {
// Do the thing
} | for (uint256 i = 0; i < orders.length;) {
// Do the thing
unchecked { ++i; }
} | overflow | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/tnevler-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:36.273567+00:00 | 3fc921f521e384881b92a044283a16e381548744578ec8a800066f56a06dac7f | 2 | 0 | 150 | 9 | false | false | true | false | high | for (uint256 i = 0; i < orders.length; ++i) {
// Do the thing
} | unknown | 66 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
for (uint256 i = 0; i < orders.length; ++i) {
// Do the thing
}
// Code block 2 (unknown):
for (uint256 i = 0; i < orders.length;) {
// Do the thing
unchecked { ++i; }
} | 2 | false | CashFactory.sol#L127, CashKYCSenderFactory.sol#L137, CashKYCSenderReceiverFactory.sol#L137, KYCRegistry.sol#L163, KYCRegistry.sol#L180, CashManager.sol#L750, CashManager.sol#L786, CashManager.sol#L933, CashManager.sol#L961 | CashManager.sol, CashKYCSenderFactory.sol, CashFactory.sol, KYCRegistry.sol, CashKYCSenderReceiverFactory.sol | 9 | for (uint256 i = 0; i < orders.length; ++i) {
// Do the thing
} | true | for (uint256 i = 0; i < orders.length;) {
// Do the thing
unchecked { ++i; }
} | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 08-dopex | 0xmystery Q | High | high | ## Unusable native transfer logic in RdpxDecayingBonds.emergencyWithdraw
The `RdpxDecayingBonds` contract is not inherently designed to accept native tokens, highlighted by the absence of a `receive` or `fallback` function. This makes the native transfer logic of `emergencyWithdraw` function unusable unless in the rare... | /**
* @notice Transfers all funds to msg.sender
* @dev Can only be called by the owner
* @param tokens The list of erc20 tokens to withdraw
* @param transferNative Whether should transfer the native currency
* @param to The address to transfer the funds to
* @param amount The amount to transf... | /// @notice Precision used for prices, percentages and other calculations
uint256 public constant DEFAULT_PRECISION = 1e8;
/// @notice rDPX Ratio required when bonding
uint256 public constant RDPX_RATIO_PERCENTAGE = 25 * DEFAULT_PRECISION; | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/0xmystery-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:25.868451+00:00 | 3fe33a4c61cb87b42b5286c4c61d352e1451e3ea8736d48d85f9839bd8f9c934 | 1 | 1 | 936 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | /**
* @notice Transfers all funds to msg.sender
* @dev Can only be called by the owner
* @param tokens The list of erc20 tokens to withdraw
* @param transferNative Whether should transfer the native currency
* @param to The address to transfer the funds to
* @param amount The amount to transfer... | solidity | 936 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
/**
* @notice Transfers all funds to msg.sender
* @dev Can only be called by the owner
* @param tokens The list of erc20 tokens to withdraw
* @param transferNative Whether should transfer the native currency
* @param to The address to transfer the funds to
* @param a... | 1 | false | /**
* @notice Transfers all funds to msg.sender
* @dev Can only be called by the owner
* @param tokens The list of erc20 tokens to withdraw
* @param transferNative Whether should transfer the native currency
* @param to The address to transfer the funds to
* @param amount The amount to transfer... | RdpxDecayingBonds.sol#L80-L107 | RdpxDecayingBonds.sol | 1 | /**
* @notice Transfers all funds to msg.sender
* @dev Can only be called by the owner
* @param tokens The list of erc20 tokens to withdraw
* @param transferNative Whether should transfer the native currency
* @param to The address to transfer the funds to
* @param amount The amount to transf... | true | /// @notice Precision used for prices, percentages and other calculations
uint256 public constant DEFAULT_PRECISION = 1e8;
/// @notice rDPX Ratio required when bonding
uint256 public constant RDPX_RATIO_PERCENTAGE = 25 * DEFAULT_PRECISION; | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 01-biconomy | tsvetanovv Q | Medium | medium | ## [QA-01] Use latest Solidity version
Solidity pragma versioning should be upgraded to latest available version. Currently the solidity version in contracts is 0.8.12 which was found to possess some bugs.
***
## [QA-02] Use stable pragma statement
Using a floating pragma `^0.8.12` statement is discouraged as code ... | import "@account-abstraction/contracts/interfaces/IAccount.sol";
import "@account-abstraction/contracts/interfaces/IEntryPoint.sol";
import "./common/Enum.sol"; | import "./libs/LibAddress.sol";
import "./BaseSmartAccount.sol";
import "./common/Singleton.sol";
import "./base/ModuleManager.sol";
import "./base/FallbackManager.sol";
import "./common/SignatureDecoder.sol";
import "./common/SecuredTokenTransfer.sol";
import "./interfaces/ISignatureValidator.sol";
import "./interface... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/tsvetanovv-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:14.564906+00:00 | 3fed306ee19118bbdc2ee17c23e8d51b01e4d2453ec6a06f63663f17c3ebad6d | 8 | 0 | 1,125 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | import "@account-abstraction/contracts/interfaces/IAccount.sol";
import "@account-abstraction/contracts/interfaces/IEntryPoint.sol";
import "./common/Enum.sol"; | unknown | 160 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
import "@account-abstraction/contracts/interfaces/IAccount.sol";
import "@account-abstraction/contracts/interfaces/IEntryPoint.sol";
import "./common/Enum.sol";
// Code block 2 (unknown):
import "./libs/LibAddress.sol";
import "./BaseSmartAccount.sol";
import "./common/Singleton.sol";
import... | 8 | false | 0 | import "@account-abstraction/contracts/interfaces/IAccount.sol";
import "@account-abstraction/contracts/interfaces/IEntryPoint.sol";
import "./common/Enum.sol"; | true | import "./libs/LibAddress.sol";
import "./BaseSmartAccount.sol";
import "./common/Singleton.sol";
import "./base/ModuleManager.sol";
import "./base/FallbackManager.sol";
import "./common/SignatureDecoder.sol";
import "./common/SecuredTokenTransfer.sol";
import "./interfaces/ISignatureValidator.sol";
import "./interface... | true | true | 13 | |||||
c4 | 02-ethos | LethL G | Medium | medium | ## Findings Summary
| | Issue | Instances |
|---|---|---|
| Gas-1 | `<x> += <y>` costs more gas than `<x> = <x> + <y>` for state variables | 9 |
| Gas-2 | Use of Named Returns for Local Variables Saves Gas | 35 |
| Gas-3 | Using a ternary operator instead of an "if-else" statement | 5 |
| Gas-4 | Expressions for cons... | File: Ethos-Vault/contracts/ReaperVaultV2.sol
168: totalAllocBPS += _allocBPS;
194: totalAllocBPS -= strategies[_strategy].allocBPS;
196: totalAllocBPS += _allocBPS;
214: totalAllocBPS -= strategies[_strategy].allocBPS;
396: totalAllocated -= actualWithdrawn;
445: ... | File: Ethos-Vault/contracts/ReaperStrategyGranarySupplyOnly.sol
230: function balanceOfPool() public view returns (uint256 supply) {
231: (supply, , , , , , , , ) = IAaveProtocolDataProvider(DATA_PROVIDER).getUserReserveData(
232: address(want),
233: address(this)
234: );
235: } | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/LethL-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:19.348395+00:00 | 405b892bb2d80cee3524c8755a4499f10a2ea1c4c396069153a64c05cbaf7491 | 2 | 0 | 808 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File: Ethos-Vault/contracts/ReaperVaultV2.sol
168: totalAllocBPS += _allocBPS;
194: totalAllocBPS -= strategies[_strategy].allocBPS;
196: totalAllocBPS += _allocBPS;
214: totalAllocBPS -= strategies[_strategy].allocBPS;
396: totalAllocated -= actualWithdrawn;
445: ... | unknown | 494 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
File: Ethos-Vault/contracts/ReaperVaultV2.sol
168: totalAllocBPS += _allocBPS;
194: totalAllocBPS -= strategies[_strategy].allocBPS;
196: totalAllocBPS += _allocBPS;
214: totalAllocBPS -= strategies[_strategy].allocBPS;
396: totalAllocated -= ac... | 2 | false | ReaperVaultV2.sol | ReaperVaultV2.sol | 1 | File: Ethos-Vault/contracts/ReaperVaultV2.sol
168: totalAllocBPS += _allocBPS;
194: totalAllocBPS -= strategies[_strategy].allocBPS;
196: totalAllocBPS += _allocBPS;
214: totalAllocBPS -= strategies[_strategy].allocBPS;
396: totalAllocated -= actualWithdrawn;
445: ... | true | File: Ethos-Vault/contracts/ReaperStrategyGranarySupplyOnly.sol
230: function balanceOfPool() public view returns (uint256 supply) {
231: (supply, , , , , , , , ) = IAaveProtocolDataProvider(DATA_PROVIDER).getUserReserveData(
232: address(want),
233: address(this)
234: );
235: } | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 01-salty | Jean_Pierre_Polnaref G | High | high | # c4udit Report
## Files analyzed
- 2024-01-salty/src/AccessManager.sol
- 2024-01-salty/src/ExchangeConfig.sol
- 2024-01-salty/src/ManagedWallet.sol
- 2024-01-salty/src/Salt.sol
- 2024-01-salty/src/SigningTools.sol
- 2024-01-salty/src/Upkeep.sol
- 2024-01-salty/src/arbitrage/ArbitrageSearch.sol
- 2024-01-salty/src/dao... | 2024-01-salty/src/arbitrage/ArbitrageSearch.sol::115 => for( uint256 i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
2024-01-salty/src/dao/Proposals.sol::421 => uint256 bestID = 0;
2024-01-salty/src/dao/Proposals.sol::422 => uint256 mostYes = 0;
2024-01-salty/src/dao/Proposals.sol::423 => for( uint256 i = 0; i < _openBallotsForTokenWhitelisting.l... | 2024-01-salty/src/SigningTools.sol::13 => require( signature.length == 65, "Invalid signature length" );
2024-01-salty/src/dao/Proposals.sol::167 => require( _openBallotsForTokenWhitelisting.length() < daoConfig.maxPendingTokensForWhitelisting(), "The maximum number of token whitelisting proposals are already pending" ... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/Jean_Pierre_Polnaref-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:21.027507+00:00 | 40c765f877ff1efd6bc1384bb145fbdc595d4dc8b47f1d22a1ff2ccdbe21949e | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | 2024-01-salty/src/arbitrage/ArbitrageSearch.sol::115 => for( uint256 i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
2024-01-salty/src/dao/Proposals.sol::421 => uint256 bestID = 0;
2024-01-salty/src/dao/Proposals.sol::422 => uint256 mostYes = 0;
2024-01-salty/src/dao/Proposals.sol::423 => for( uint256 i = 0; i < _openBallotsForTokenWhitelisting.l... | true | 2024-01-salty/src/SigningTools.sol::13 => require( signature.length == 65, "Invalid signature length" );
2024-01-salty/src/dao/Proposals.sol::167 => require( _openBallotsForTokenWhitelisting.length() < daoConfig.maxPendingTokensForWhitelisting(), "The maximum number of token whitelisting proposals are already pending" ... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 11-kelp | desaperh Q | Critical | critical |
Audit report markdown format
============================
# Report
Audit report for REPO_GITHUB generated by *Dowsers*<br>
## Summary
### Low issues
Total **32 instances** over **3 issues**<br>
|ID|Issue|Instances|
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|SWC-107|Reentrancy|13|
|SWC-120|Weak sources of randomness from chain ... | File: /packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
range(211, 225): withdraws `_stEthBalanceDecrease` amount of collateral from the specified Cdp
/// @dev If caller is different from Cdp owner, it will need approval from Cdp owner for this call
/// @notice Successful execution is conditional on whether ... | File: /packages/contracts/contracts/Interfaces/IBorrowerOperations.sol
range(41, 86): withdrawColl(
bytes32 _cdpId,
uint256 _stEthBalanceDecrease,
bytes32 _upperHint,
bytes32 _lowerHint
) external;
function withdrawDebt(
bytes32 _cdpId,
uint256 _amount,
b... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/desaperh-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:58.744996+00:00 | 41374db5e861a6269135b71c21091cbe00fa7c0f40e139b3fe102789c8abd7b7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: /packages/contracts/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
range(211, 225): withdraws `_stEthBalanceDecrease` amount of collateral from the specified Cdp
/// @dev If caller is different from Cdp owner, it will need approval from Cdp owner for this call
/// @notice Successful execution is conditional on whether ... | true | File: /packages/contracts/contracts/Interfaces/IBorrowerOperations.sol
range(41, 86): withdrawColl(
bytes32 _cdpId,
uint256 _stEthBalanceDecrease,
bytes32 _upperHint,
bytes32 _lowerHint
) external;
function withdrawDebt(
bytes32 _cdpId,
uint256 _amount,
b... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | MSaptarshi G | Low | low | ## G-01 Loading from the memory cost less gas than loading from the storage
1.https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/cd1a0e6d1b40168657d1aaee8223dc050e15f8cc/src/Neuron.sol#L130
2.https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/cd1a0e6d1b40168657d1aaee8223dc050e15f8cc/src/Neuron.sol#L196
### Recomme... | + uint256 recipientsLength = recipients.length;
- require(recipients.length == amounts.length);
+ require(recipientsLength == amounts.length);
- uint256 recipientsLength = recipients.length;
for (uint32 i = 0; i < recipientsLength; i++) | + uint256 getAllowance = allowance(account, msg.sender) ;
+ require(getAllowance >= amount, "ERC20: burn amount exceeds allowance");
- require( allowance(account, msg.sender) >= amount,
"ERC20: burn amount exceeds allowance");
+ uint256 decreasedAllowance = getAllowance - amo... | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/MSaptarshi-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:32.725427+00:00 | 414496404193eadf2206791f982c17677ce7805d3c61f4f95bd19a2390109440 | 2 | 0 | 646 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | + uint256 recipientsLength = recipients.length;
- require(recipients.length == amounts.length);
+ require(recipientsLength == amounts.length);
- uint256 recipientsLength = recipients.length;
for (uint32 i = 0; i < recipientsLength; i++) | unknown | 244 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
+ uint256 recipientsLength = recipients.length;
- require(recipients.length == amounts.length);
+ require(recipientsLength == amounts.length);
- uint256 recipientsLength = recipients.length;
for (uint32 i = 0; i < recipientsLength; i++)
// Code block 2 (unknown):
+ uint256 getAllowan... | 2 | false | Neuron.sol#L130, Neuron.sol#L196 | Neuron.sol | 2 | + uint256 recipientsLength = recipients.length;
- require(recipients.length == amounts.length);
+ require(recipientsLength == amounts.length);
- uint256 recipientsLength = recipients.length;
for (uint32 i = 0; i < recipientsLength; i++) | true | + uint256 getAllowance = allowance(account, msg.sender) ;
+ require(getAllowance >= amount, "ERC20: burn amount exceeds allowance");
- require( allowance(account, msg.sender) >= amount,
"ERC20: burn amount exceeds allowance");
+ uint256 decreasedAllowance = getAllowance - amo... | true | true | 7.05 | |||
c4 | 02-ethos | mgf15 Q | Critical | critical |
Low Risk and Non-Critical Issues .
[L-01] Using vulnerable dependency of OpenZeppelin
The package.json configuration file says that the project is using 3.3.0 of OZ which has a not last update version.
```
"devDependencies": {
"@openzeppelin/contracts": "^3.3.0",
```
ref
https://security.snyk.io/package/npm/@ope... | "devDependencies": {
"@openzeppelin/contracts": "^3.3.0", | function fund(uint amount) external onlyOwner {
require(amount != 0, "cannot fund 0");
OathToken.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/mgf15-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:24.432492+00:00 | 417888a320ceaf422c11b9579053ef08edb80f71e41f501894a9776aa2f99bf8 | 5 | 0 | 750 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | "devDependencies": {
"@openzeppelin/contracts": "^3.3.0", | unknown | 61 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
"devDependencies": {
"@openzeppelin/contracts": "^3.3.0",
// Code block 2 (unknown):
function fund(uint amount) external onlyOwner {
require(amount != 0, "cannot fund 0");
OathToken.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
// Code block 3 (unknown):
OathToken.tra... | 5 | false | CommunityIssuance.sol#L103, CommunityIssuance.sol#L127, BorrowerOperations.sol | BorrowerOperations.sol, CommunityIssuance.sol | 3 | "devDependencies": {
"@openzeppelin/contracts": "^3.3.0", | true | function fund(uint amount) external onlyOwner {
require(amount != 0, "cannot fund 0");
OathToken.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount); | true | true | 11 | |||
c4 | 11-kelp | ak1 Q | Low | low | Low - 1
Incorrect check for `_setToken` and `_setContract` which overwrite the existing key's value
`LRTConfig` contract has the following logic to check and update the new token and contract.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/f751d7594051c0766c7ecd1e68daeb0661e43ee3/src/LRTConfig.sol#L156-L163
```sol... | function _setToken(bytes32 key, address val) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(val);
if (tokenMap[key] == val) { --------------->>>audit - not sufficient. lead to overwriting existing key
revert ValueAlreadyInUse();
}
tokenMap[key] = val;
emit SetToken(key, va... | function _setContract(bytes32 key, address val) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(val);
if (contractMap[key] == val) { --------------------->> audit - not sufficient. lead to overwriting existing key
revert ValueAlreadyInUse();
}
contractMap[key] = val;
emit S... | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/ak1-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:47.960707+00:00 | 41b69a17a517c8d955731f861d5127e2518b4074d3a2dc2ac369657376d5bdbd | 3 | 3 | 1,027 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | function _setToken(bytes32 key, address val) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(val);
if (tokenMap[key] == val) { --------------->>>audit - not sufficient. lead to overwriting existing key
revert ValueAlreadyInUse();
}
tokenMap[key] = val;
emit SetToken(key, val);
... | solidity | 325 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function _setToken(bytes32 key, address val) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(val);
if (tokenMap[key] == val) { --------------->>>audit - not sufficient. lead to overwriting existing key
revert ValueAlreadyInUse();
}
tokenMap[key] = val;
... | 3 | false | function _setToken(bytes32 key, address val) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(val);
if (tokenMap[key] == val) { --------------->>>audit - not sufficient. lead to overwriting existing key
revert ValueAlreadyInUse();
}
tokenMap[key] = val;
emit SetToken(key, val);
... | LRTConfig.sol#L156-L163, LRTConfig.sol#L172-L179 | LRTConfig.sol | 2 | function _setToken(bytes32 key, address val) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(val);
if (tokenMap[key] == val) { --------------->>>audit - not sufficient. lead to overwriting existing key
revert ValueAlreadyInUse();
}
tokenMap[key] = val;
emit SetToken(key, va... | true | function _setContract(bytes32 key, address val) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(val);
if (contractMap[key] == val) { --------------------->> audit - not sufficient. lead to overwriting existing key
revert ValueAlreadyInUse();
}
contractMap[key] = val;
emit S... | true | true | 9 | ||
c4 | 11-kelp | Cryptor Q | Low | low | ## L-01 No check on whether existing strategy has funds before changing them
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/f751d7594051c0766c7ecd1e68daeb0661e43ee3/src/LRTConfig.sol#L109-L122
Protocol does not check whether a strategy has funds in them before changing it. This could present some issues when withdr... | if (depositAmount > getAssetCurrentLimit(asset)) {
revert MaximumDepositLimitReached();
} | lrtConfig.depositLimitByAsset(asset) - getTotalAssetDeposits(asset) | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/Cryptor-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:24.190915+00:00 | 41e7e95fff0bb8ca52df199bb33b66d0c2de6263ac46fab06a22ee6e986f6a73 | 1 | 0 | 109 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | if (depositAmount > getAssetCurrentLimit(asset)) {
revert MaximumDepositLimitReached();
} | unknown | 109 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
if (depositAmount > getAssetCurrentLimit(asset)) {
revert MaximumDepositLimitReached();
} | 1 | false | LRTConfig.sol#L109-L122, LRTOracle.sol#L31, AccessControlUpgradeable.sol#L186-L190, LRTDepositPool.sol#L132-L133 | LRTConfig.sol, LRTOracle.sol, LRTDepositPool.sol, AccessControlUpgradeable.sol | 4 | if (depositAmount > getAssetCurrentLimit(asset)) {
revert MaximumDepositLimitReached();
} | true | lrtConfig.depositLimitByAsset(asset) - getTotalAssetDeposits(asset) | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 11-kelp | GREY HAWK REACH Q | High | high | # [L-01] The max amount for a single deposit into EigenLayer strategy can't be reached.
# Lines of code
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/main/src/LRTDepositPool.sol#L132-L134
## Impact
Before users can deposit funds into the ```LRTDepositPool.sol``` contract via the ```depositAsset()``` function, a che... | /// The maximum deposit (in underlyingToken) that this strategy will accept per deposit
uint256 public maxPerDeposit; | /// The maximum deposits (in underlyingToken) that this strategy will hold
uint256 public maxTotalDeposits; | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/GREY-HAWK-REACH-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:28.212065+00:00 | 420b91fc2bfa28ca1783944cf8b393040f3d06df05bb6ca301960a78dea23a2c | 2 | 0 | 232 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | /// The maximum deposit (in underlyingToken) that this strategy will accept per deposit
uint256 public maxPerDeposit; | unknown | 121 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
/// The maximum deposit (in underlyingToken) that this strategy will accept per deposit
uint256 public maxPerDeposit;
// Code block 2 (unknown):
/// The maximum deposits (in underlyingToken) that this strategy will hold
uint256 public maxTotalDeposits; | 2 | false | LRTDepositPool.sol#L132-L134, StrategyBaseTVLLimits.sol | LRTDepositPool.sol, StrategyBaseTVLLimits.sol | 2 | /// The maximum deposit (in underlyingToken) that this strategy will accept per deposit
uint256 public maxPerDeposit; | true | /// The maximum deposits (in underlyingToken) that this strategy will hold
uint256 public maxTotalDeposits; | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 01-ondo | lukris02 G | Low | low | # Gas Optimizations Report for Ondo Finance contest
## Overview
During the audit, 2 gas issues were found.
Total savings ~525.
№ | Title | Instance Count | Saved
--- | --- | --- | ---
G-1 | Use unchecked blocks for incrementing i | 9 | 315
G-2 | Use unchecked blocks for subtractions where underflow is impossible | 6 ... | for (uint256 i; i < n; ++i) {
// ...
} | for (uint256 i; i < n;) {
// ...
unchecked { ++i; }
} | overflow | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/lukris02-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:16.549634+00:00 | 422882470e64ca888e92a36f4f7f3ac84c3b8284c466becd46a74503719e4f39 | 2 | 0 | 95 | 9 | false | false | true | false | high | for (uint256 i; i < n; ++i) {
// ...
} | unknown | 39 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
for (uint256 i; i < n; ++i) {
// ...
}
// Code block 2 (unknown):
for (uint256 i; i < n;) {
// ...
unchecked { ++i; }
} | 2 | false | CashFactory.sol#L127, CashKYCSenderFactory.sol#L137, CashKYCSenderReceiverFactory.sol#L137, KYCRegistry.sol#L163, KYCRegistry.sol#L180, CashManager.sol#L750, CashManager.sol#L786, CashManager.sol#L933, CashManager.sol#L961 | CashManager.sol, CashKYCSenderFactory.sol, CashFactory.sol, KYCRegistry.sol, CashKYCSenderReceiverFactory.sol | 9 | for (uint256 i; i < n; ++i) {
// ...
} | true | for (uint256 i; i < n;) {
// ...
unchecked { ++i; }
} | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 06-lybra | niser93 G | Low | low | ## Gas Optimizations
| |Issue |Instances|Total Gas Saved|
|:-----:|:-----:|:-------:|:-------------:|
|GO-01|```>=``` is cheaper than ```>``` (and ```<=``` is cheaper than ```<```)|2|6|
|GO-02|Use alternative formulation in order to avoid NOT using AND instead of OR or vice versa|3|9|
|GO-03|Multiplication/divis... | ```diff
- for (uint256 i = 100; i > count + 10; i--) {
+ for (uint256 i = 100; i >= count + 11; i--) { | File: EUSDMiningIncentives.sol
189 return (stakedLBRLpValue(user) * 10000) / stakedOf(user) < 500;
| other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/niser93-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:13.139475+00:00 | 4265e80f7fbb27526a77bbcbd4f9ced51a9b0e47103d71f90f8499640c649b5c | 4 | 2 | 372 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | - for (uint256 i = 0; i < count + 10; i++) {
+ for (uint256 i = 0; i <= count + 9; i++) { | diff | 89 | // Code block 1 (diff):
- for (uint256 i = 0; i < count + 10; i++) {
+ for (uint256 i = 0; i <= count + 9; i++) {
// Code block 2 (diff):
- for (uint256 i = 100; i > count + 10; i--) {
+ for (uint256 i = 100; i >= count + 11; i--) {
// Code block 3 (unknown):
File: EUSDMiningIncentives.sol
189 return (s... | 4 | true | - for (uint256 i = 0; i < count + 10; i++) {
+ for (uint256 i = 0; i <= count + 9; i++) {
- for (uint256 i = 100; i > count + 10; i--) {
+ for (uint256 i = 100; i >= count + 11; i--) { | EUSDMiningIncentives.sol#L189, LybraConfigurator.sol#L254 | EUSDMiningIncentives.sol, LybraConfigurator.sol | 2 | ```diff
- for (uint256 i = 100; i > count + 10; i--) {
+ for (uint256 i = 100; i >= count + 11; i--) { | true | File: EUSDMiningIncentives.sol
189 return (stakedLBRLpValue(user) * 10000) / stakedOf(user) < 500;
| true | true | 12 | ||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | MiksuJak G | High | high | # Report by MiksuJak
## Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [GAS-1](#GAS-1) | Store balance calls return values in `memory` instead of calling them multiple times in one function | 2 |
| [GAS-2](#GAS-2) | Store derivative address in `memory` whenever it is read from storage more than once | 3 |
| [GAS-... | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivatives[i].balance()) /
10 ** 18; | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
uint256 derivativeBalance = derivatives[i].balance();
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivativeBalance) *
derivativeBalance) /
10 ** 18;
} | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/MiksuJak-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:20.711851+00:00 | 428dd0c89de9f0459864cc99ae090f684b4cc04500ba286556aa0f7bc917ce45 | 4 | 4 | 690 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivatives[i].balance()) /
10 ** 18; | solidity | 168 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivatives[i].balance()) /
10 ** 18;
// Code block 2 (solidity):
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
uint256 derivativeBalance = derivatives[i].balan... | 4 | false | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivatives[i].balance()) /
10 ** 18;
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
uint256 derivativeBalance = derivatives[i].balance();
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDeriva... | 0 | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivatives[i].balance()) /
10 ** 18; | true | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
uint256 derivativeBalance = derivatives[i].balance();
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivativeBalance) *
derivativeBalance) /
10 ** 18;
} | true | true | 9 | ||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | Kaysoft Q | Critical | critical | ## [L-01] Remove unused input/unnamed parameter
File: VerifyingSingletonPaymaster, line: 97
- [VerifyingSingletonPaymaster.sol#L97](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/paymasters/verifying/singleton/VerifyingSingletonPaymaster.sol#L97)
The `/*userOpHa... | function validatePaymasterUserOp(UserOperation calldata userOp, bytes32 /*userOpHash*/, uint256 requiredPreFund)
external view override returns (bytes memory context, uint256 deadline) {
(requiredPreFund);
bytes32 hash = getHash(userOp);
PaymasterData memory paymasterData = userOp.decodePay... | const config: HardhatUserConfig = {
// defaultNetwork: "ganache",
solidity: {
compilers: [
{
version: "0.8.12",
settings: {
optimizer: { enabled: true, runs: 200 },
},
},
{
version: "0.8.4",
settings: {
optimizer: { enabled: true, run... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/Kaysoft-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:08.922906+00:00 | 42f56c37905a0f6cc8cffbf5f16b6bac73066827153a97b56bc1cc3c50157d70 | 1 | 0 | 1,047 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | function validatePaymasterUserOp(UserOperation calldata userOp, bytes32 /*userOpHash*/, uint256 requiredPreFund)
external view override returns (bytes memory context, uint256 deadline) {
(requiredPreFund);
bytes32 hash = getHash(userOp);
PaymasterData memory paymasterData = userOp.decodePay... | unknown | 1,047 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function validatePaymasterUserOp(UserOperation calldata userOp, bytes32 /*userOpHash*/, uint256 requiredPreFund)
external view override returns (bytes memory context, uint256 deadline) {
(requiredPreFund);
bytes32 hash = getHash(userOp);
PaymasterData memory payma... | 1 | false | VerifyingSingletonPaymaster.sol#L97 | VerifyingSingletonPaymaster.sol | 1 | function validatePaymasterUserOp(UserOperation calldata userOp, bytes32 /*userOpHash*/, uint256 requiredPreFund)
external view override returns (bytes memory context, uint256 deadline) {
(requiredPreFund);
bytes32 hash = getHash(userOp);
PaymasterData memory paymasterData = userOp.decodePay... | true | const config: HardhatUserConfig = {
// defaultNetwork: "ganache",
solidity: {
compilers: [
{
version: "0.8.12",
settings: {
optimizer: { enabled: true, runs: 200 },
},
},
{
version: "0.8.4",
settings: {
optimizer: { enabled: true, run... | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 05-ajna | Audit_Avengers Q | Critical | critical | A. LOW/MEDIUM RISK: Large(r) loan based griefing attack:
Although the protocol already protects against griefing attacks using dust loans, there is currently no protection in place for when larger loans are used to execute griefing attacks.
Impact:
An attacker could take out one or more large loans from depositors and... | File: /ajna-grants/src/grants/base/ExtraordinaryFunding.sol
78: treasury -= tokensRequested;
// execute proposal's calldata
_execute(proposalId_, targets_, values_, calldatas_);
| File: /ajna-core/src/PositionManager.sol
120: erc20PoolFactory = erc20Factory_;
erc721PoolFactory = erc721Factory_;
}
| reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/Audit_Avengers-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:53.674365+00:00 | 42f6cf20e8e662317921e9767083469b034bc5026ddea4ef57d9650e3d017b26 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: /ajna-grants/src/grants/base/ExtraordinaryFunding.sol
78: treasury -= tokensRequested;
// execute proposal's calldata
_execute(proposalId_, targets_, values_, calldatas_);
| true | File: /ajna-core/src/PositionManager.sol
120: erc20PoolFactory = erc20Factory_;
erc721PoolFactory = erc721Factory_;
}
| true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 02-ethos | 0xAgro Q | Critical | critical | # QA Report
## Finding Summary
[**Low Severity**](#Low-Severity)
1. [**Unchecked Cast May Overflow**](#1-Unchecked-Cast-May-Overflow)
2. [**Consider a More Recent Solidity Version**](#2-Consider-a-More-Recent-Solidity-Version)
3. [**Code Function Does Not Match Comment**](#3-Code-Function-Does-Not-Match-Comment)
4. [*... | 1329: index = uint128(TroveOwners[_collateral].length.sub(1)); | 277: vars.netAssetMovement = int256(vars.toDeposit) - int256(vars.toWithdraw) - int256(vars.profit); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/0xAgro-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:44.221810+00:00 | 4375e28673039b44fdcc2765ba33337aac84c16f22180a3bdadb4d9fe54de6e5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | 1329: index = uint128(TroveOwners[_collateral].length.sub(1)); | true | 277: vars.netAssetMovement = int256(vars.toDeposit) - int256(vars.toWithdraw) - int256(vars.profit); | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 11-kelp | dharma09 G | Gas | gas | ### [G-01] Cache multiple accesses of a mapping/array
Consider using a local `storage` or `calldata` variable when accessing a mapping/array value multiple times.
This can be useful to avoid recalculating the mapping hash and/or the array offsets.
- https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/main/src/NodeDelega... | File: src/NodeDelegator.sol
109: for (uint256 i = 0; i < strategiesLength;) {
assets[i] = address(IStrategy(strategies[i]).underlyingToken()); //@audit cache variable
assetBalances[i] = IStrategy(strategies[i]).userUnderlyingView(address(this));
unchecked {
++i;
... | File: src/LRTOracle.sol
66: for (uint16 asset_idx; asset_idx < supportedAssetCount;) {
address asset = supportedAssets[asset_idx]; //@audit make variable outside loop
uint256 assetER = getAssetPrice(asset);
uint256 totalAssetAmt = ILRTDepositPool(lrtDepositPoolAddr).getTotalAssetDep... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/dharma09-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:28:00.098381+00:00 | 437ec2a6208af53c44ecad0772b04009ee4782b7573d87d1ed046ef7930e6b76 | 2 | 2 | 804 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | File: src/NodeDelegator.sol
109: for (uint256 i = 0; i < strategiesLength;) {
assets[i] = address(IStrategy(strategies[i]).underlyingToken()); //@audit cache variable
assetBalances[i] = IStrategy(strategies[i]).userUnderlyingView(address(this));
unchecked {
++i;
... | solidity | 338 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: src/NodeDelegator.sol
109: for (uint256 i = 0; i < strategiesLength;) {
assets[i] = address(IStrategy(strategies[i]).underlyingToken()); //@audit cache variable
assetBalances[i] = IStrategy(strategies[i]).userUnderlyingView(address(this));
unchecked ... | 2 | false | File: src/NodeDelegator.sol
109: for (uint256 i = 0; i < strategiesLength;) {
assets[i] = address(IStrategy(strategies[i]).underlyingToken()); //@audit cache variable
assetBalances[i] = IStrategy(strategies[i]).userUnderlyingView(address(this));
unchecked {
++i;
... | NodeDelegator.sol#L109, LRTOracle.sol#L66 | NodeDelegator.sol, LRTOracle.sol | 2 | File: src/NodeDelegator.sol
109: for (uint256 i = 0; i < strategiesLength;) {
assets[i] = address(IStrategy(strategies[i]).underlyingToken()); //@audit cache variable
assetBalances[i] = IStrategy(strategies[i]).userUnderlyingView(address(this));
unchecked {
++i;
... | true | File: src/LRTOracle.sol
66: for (uint16 asset_idx; asset_idx < supportedAssetCount;) {
address asset = supportedAssets[asset_idx]; //@audit make variable outside loop
uint256 assetER = getAssetPrice(asset);
uint256 totalAssetAmt = ILRTDepositPool(lrtDepositPoolAddr).getTotalAssetDep... | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 06-lybra | koo Analysis | Low | low | I think the EUSD and PEUSD are too centralization.
```solidity
function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) public returns (bool) {
address spender = _msgSender();
if (!configurator.mintVault(spender)) {
_spendAllowance(from, spender, amount);
}
_transf... | function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) public returns (bool) {
address spender = _msgSender();
if (!configurator.mintVault(spender)) {
_spendAllowance(from, spender, amount);
}
_transfer(from, to, amount);
return true;
} | function rigidRedemption(address provider, uint256 peusdAmount) external virtual {
require(configurator.isRedemptionProvider(provider), "provider is not a RedemptionProvider");
require(borrowed[provider] >= peusdAmount, "peusdAmount cannot surpass providers debt");
uint256 assetPrice = getAs... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/koo-Analysis.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:03.769967+00:00 | 43a266f2ff6c908bc27a6ff9a47d6fe8a9a229fbe5b4ee5676831c8075326eda | 2 | 2 | 1,245 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) public returns (bool) {
address spender = _msgSender();
if (!configurator.mintVault(spender)) {
_spendAllowance(from, spender, amount);
}
_transfer(from, to, amount);
return true;
} | solidity | 301 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) public returns (bool) {
address spender = _msgSender();
if (!configurator.mintVault(spender)) {
_spendAllowance(from, spender, amount);
}
_transfer(from, to, amount);
return tr... | 2 | false | function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) public returns (bool) {
address spender = _msgSender();
if (!configurator.mintVault(spender)) {
_spendAllowance(from, spender, amount);
}
_transfer(from, to, amount);
return true;
}
function rigidRed... | 0 | function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 amount) public returns (bool) {
address spender = _msgSender();
if (!configurator.mintVault(spender)) {
_spendAllowance(from, spender, amount);
}
_transfer(from, to, amount);
return true;
} | true | function rigidRedemption(address provider, uint256 peusdAmount) external virtual {
require(configurator.isRedemptionProvider(provider), "provider is not a RedemptionProvider");
require(borrowed[provider] >= peusdAmount, "peusdAmount cannot surpass providers debt");
uint256 assetPrice = getAs... | true | true | 7 | ||||
c4 | 06-lybra | XDZIBECX Q | Unknown | unknown | The `stakingToken.transferFrom` and `stakingToken.transfer` calls in the `stake` and `withdraw` functions, and the `rewardsToken.mint` call in the `getReward` function are not checked for their return value. Although it's not mandatory in ERC20 standard to return a boolean for these functions, some tokens do.
- here ... | if (stakingToken.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount) == false) {
revert("Transfer failed");
}
if (stakingToken.transfer(msg.sender, _amount) == false) {
revert("Transfer failed");
}
if (rewardsToken.mint(msg.sender, _amount) == false) {
revert("Mint failed");
} | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/XDZIBECX-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:22:49.845874+00:00 | 43fa3af7a2d863ff8626c32da19c03cfc52a6147993518cd45984b3d48f2eaca | 1 | 1 | 288 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | if (stakingToken.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount) == false) {
revert("Transfer failed");
}
if (stakingToken.transfer(msg.sender, _amount) == false) {
revert("Transfer failed");
}
if (rewardsToken.mint(msg.sender, _amount) == false) {
revert("Mint failed");
} | solidity | 288 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
if (stakingToken.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount) == false) {
revert("Transfer failed");
}
if (stakingToken.transfer(msg.sender, _amount) == false) {
revert("Transfer failed");
}
if (rewardsToken.mint(msg.sender, _amount) == false) {
revert("Mint failed");
} | 1 | false | if (stakingToken.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount) == false) {
revert("Transfer failed");
}
if (stakingToken.transfer(msg.sender, _amount) == false) {
revert("Transfer failed");
}
if (rewardsToken.mint(msg.sender, _amount) == false) {
revert("Mint failed");
} | stakerewardV2pool.sol#L1 | stakerewardV2pool.sol | 1 | if (stakingToken.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount) == false) {
revert("Transfer failed");
}
if (stakingToken.transfer(msg.sender, _amount) == false) {
revert("Transfer failed");
}
if (rewardsToken.mint(msg.sender, _amount) == false) {
revert("Mint failed");
} | true | false | false | 4.74 | ||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | seeu Q | High | high | ## Compiler version Pragma is non-specific
### Description
For non-library contracts, floating pragmas may be a security risk for application implementations, since a known vulnerable compiler version may accidentally be selected or security tools might fallback to an older compiler version ending up checking a diffe... | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/paymasters/BasePaymaster.sol#L2 => pragma solidity ^0.8.12;
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/EntryPoint.sol#L6 => pragma solidity ^0.8... | upgrade | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/seeu-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:09.184451+00:00 | 44b624d95d66ba432cad37cb244047c74907156e89fad3ae12e6ee7f74428f38 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | BasePaymaster.sol#L2, EntryPoint.sol#L6, IAccount.sol#L2, IAggregatedAccount.sol#L2, IEntryPoint.sol#L6, IPaymaster.sol#L2, IStakeManager.sol#L2, SenderCreator.sol#L2, StakeManager.sol#L2, UserOperation.sol#L2 | SenderCreator.sol, IEntryPoint.sol, IAggregatedAccount.sol, IStakeManager.sol, BasePaymaster.sol, IPaymaster.sol, IAccount.sol, EntryPoint.sol, UserOperation.sol, StakeManager.sol | 10 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/paymasters/BasePaymaster.sol#L2 => pragma solidity ^0.8.12;
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/main/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/EntryPoint.sol#L6 => pragma solidity ^0.8... | true | false | false | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 05-ajna | wonjun Q | Low | low | [L-1] events are missing an important parameter
The callers of these important functions are not published in emits.
Instances (3):
```
emit FundTreasury(fundingAmount\_, treasury);
```
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/main/ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol#L64
```
emit QuarterlyDistributionStarted(
... | emit FundTreasury(fundingAmount\_, treasury); | emit QuarterlyDistributionStarted(
newDistributionId\_,
startBlock,
endBlock
); | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/wonjun-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:52.115444+00:00 | 44c2609a4e99761417cf411532245e7536e4cd7efc82ba49e87a71a2fa5da2c5 | 3 | 0 | 198 | 9 | false | false | true | false | high | emit FundTreasury(fundingAmount\_, treasury); | unknown | 45 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
emit FundTreasury(fundingAmount\_, treasury);
// Code block 2 (unknown):
emit QuarterlyDistributionStarted(
newDistributionId\_,
startBlock,
endBlock
);
// Code block 3 (unknown):
emit MoveStakedLiquidity(tokenId*, fromBuckets*, toBuckets\_); | 3 | false | GrantFund.sol#L64, StandardFunding.sol#L159, RewardsManager.sol#L187, IStandardFunding.sol#L16, PositionManager.sol#L54, IStandardFunding.sol#L263, StandardFunding.sol#L30, IStandardFunding.sol#L325, IStandardFunding.sol#L327 | GrantFund.sol, IStandardFunding.sol, PositionManager.sol, StandardFunding.sol, RewardsManager.sol | 9 | emit FundTreasury(fundingAmount\_, treasury); | true | emit QuarterlyDistributionStarted(
newDistributionId\_,
startBlock,
endBlock
); | true | true | 9 | |||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | Raihan G | Critical | critical | # GAS OPTIMIZATION
# SUMMARY
| | issue | instance |
|------|---------|------------|
|[G‑01]|Most important: avoid zero to one storage writes where possible|10|
|[G‑02]|Using mappings instead of arrays to avoid length checks|2|
|[G‑03]|Use storage pointers instead of memory where appropriate|1|
|[G‑04]|Use ass... | File: src/GameItems.sol
64 uint256 _itemCount = 0; | File: src/MergingPool.sol
29 uint256 public roundId = 0;
32 uint256 public totalPoints = 0; | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/Raihan-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:40.254491+00:00 | 4516d9ae18ed13bc5b6a2d2cf35a3a5f8bd27cd9b97cb03971a5327bd80318a6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: src/GameItems.sol
64 uint256 _itemCount = 0; | true | File: src/MergingPool.sol
29 uint256 public roundId = 0;
32 uint256 public totalPoints = 0; | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 02-ethos | eye Q | Low | low | # Summary
The **setCollateralParams** function in the **CollateralConfig** contract in the **Ethos-Core** repository lacks input validation, which could allow an attacker to manipulate collateral parameters for a given asset.
# Description
The **CollateralConfig** contract in the **Ethos-Core** repository is used to... | function setCollateralParams(
address collateralType,
uint256 liquidationDiscount,
uint256 liquidationRatio,
bool borrowingEnabled
) external onlyOwner {
require(collateralType != address(0), "CollateralConfig: invalid collateral type");
collateralTypes[collateralType].liquidationDiscount =... | function setCollateralParams(
address collateralType,
uint256 liquidationDiscount,
uint256 liquidationRatio,
bool borrowingEnabled
) external onlyOwner {
require(collateralType != address(0), "CollateralConfig: invalid collateral type");
// Validate the liquidation discount value
require(li... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/eye-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:09.627682+00:00 | 452a7cb0fc3dc7d366723ac8c97978c62ba00a1e1f1aeb66cfae83bc84e530b1 | 1 | 0 | 489 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function setCollateralParams(
address collateralType,
uint256 liquidationDiscount,
uint256 liquidationRatio,
bool borrowingEnabled
) external onlyOwner {
require(collateralType != address(0), "CollateralConfig: invalid collateral type");
collateralTypes[collateralType].liquidationDiscount =... | unknown | 489 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function setCollateralParams(
address collateralType,
uint256 liquidationDiscount,
uint256 liquidationRatio,
bool borrowingEnabled
) external onlyOwner {
require(collateralType != address(0), "CollateralConfig: invalid collateral type");
collateralTypes[collateral... | 1 | false | 0 | function setCollateralParams(
address collateralType,
uint256 liquidationDiscount,
uint256 liquidationRatio,
bool borrowingEnabled
) external onlyOwner {
require(collateralType != address(0), "CollateralConfig: invalid collateral type");
collateralTypes[collateralType].liquidationDiscount =... | true | function setCollateralParams(
address collateralType,
uint256 liquidationDiscount,
uint256 liquidationRatio,
bool borrowingEnabled
) external onlyOwner {
require(collateralType != address(0), "CollateralConfig: invalid collateral type");
// Validate the liquidation discount value
require(li... | true | true | 6 | |||||
c4 | 09-ondo | peanuts Analysis | Medium | medium | ### 1. Any comments for the judge to contextualize your findings
- Focused on the rUSDY and Destination Bridge contract, and followed through with all the test files for those contracts
### 2. Approach taken in evaluating the codebase
- Understood the relation between USDY,rUSDY and shares first, then check all the fu... | function getRUSDYByShares(uint256 _shares) public view returns (uint256) {
return (_shares * oracle.getPrice()) / (1e18 * BPS_DENOMINATOR);
} | _checkAndUpdateInstantMintLimit(txn.amount); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/peanuts-Analysis.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:12.209390+00:00 | 45537265694106f7140ea24a426223d9ec844d19932b73e7fdfea7edcfc73b03 | 2 | 0 | 191 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function getRUSDYByShares(uint256 _shares) public view returns (uint256) {
return (_shares * oracle.getPrice()) / (1e18 * BPS_DENOMINATOR);
} | unknown | 147 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function getRUSDYByShares(uint256 _shares) public view returns (uint256) {
return (_shares * oracle.getPrice()) / (1e18 * BPS_DENOMINATOR);
}
// Code block 2 (unknown):
_checkAndUpdateInstantMintLimit(txn.amount); | 2 | false | 0 | function getRUSDYByShares(uint256 _shares) public view returns (uint256) {
return (_shares * oracle.getPrice()) / (1e18 * BPS_DENOMINATOR);
} | true | _checkAndUpdateInstantMintLimit(txn.amount); | true | true | 7 | |||||
c4 | 02-ethos | Rolezn G | High | high | ## Summary<a name="Summary">
### Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Contexts|Estimated Gas Saved|
|-|:-|:-|:-:|
| [GAS‑1](#GAS‑1) | `abi.encode()` is less efficient than `abi.encodepacked()` | 2 | 200 |
| [GAS‑2](#GAS‑2) | Setting the `constructor` to `payable` | 4 | 52 |
| [GAS‑3](#GAS ... | 284: domainSeparator(), keccak256(abi.encode( | 305: return keccak256(abi.encode(typeHash, name, version, _chainID(), address(this))); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/Rolezn-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:35.096743+00:00 | 4597f047cd94c3a9b8ed958b9794a2dd7c9e08138d754b7c01d4bea13b4ee671 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | 284: domainSeparator(), keccak256(abi.encode( | true | 305: return keccak256(abi.encode(typeHash, name, version, _chainID(), address(this))); | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | ABA Q | Critical | critical | # QA Report for Caviar Private Pools contest
## Overview
During the audit, 3 low, 6 refactoring and 1 non-critical issues were found.
### Low Risk Issues
Total: 10 instances over 3 issues
|#|Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [L-01] | Input is not checked when setting sensitive addresses across protocol | 4 |
| [L-02] |... | /// @notice Sets private pool metadata contract.
/// @param _privatePoolMetadata The private pool metadata contract.
function setPrivatePoolMetadata(address _privatePoolMetadata) public onlyOwner {
privatePoolMetadata = _privatePoolMetadata;
} | function buy(Buy[] calldata buys, uint256 deadline, bool payRoyalties) public payable {
// check that the deadline has not passed (if any)
if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
revert DeadlinePassed();
}
// loop through and execute the the buys
for ... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/ABA-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:25.769874+00:00 | 465eb3283ee04b12e3e3392e356e80ba86264aac4943d215fc82a914327e1b9d | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | Factory.sol#L127-L137 | Factory.sol | 1 | /// @notice Sets private pool metadata contract.
/// @param _privatePoolMetadata The private pool metadata contract.
function setPrivatePoolMetadata(address _privatePoolMetadata) public onlyOwner {
privatePoolMetadata = _privatePoolMetadata;
} | true | function buy(Buy[] calldata buys, uint256 deadline, bool payRoyalties) public payable {
// check that the deadline has not passed (if any)
if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
revert DeadlinePassed();
}
// loop through and execute the the buys
for ... | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | Rickard Q | Critical | critical | # [L-01] Use `safeTransferOwnership` instead of `_transferOwnership` function
## Lines of code
[https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol#L34](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol#L34)
[https://gith... | contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
function withdraw(uint256 amount) external onlyOwner {
RocketTokenRETHInterface(rethAddress()).burn(amount);
// solhint-disable-next-line
(bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: address(this).balance}(
""
);
require(se... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.13;
contract ReEntrancyGuard {
bool internal locked;
modifier noReentrant() {
require(!locked, "No re-entrancy");
locked = true;
_;
locked = false;
}
} | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Rickard-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:29.223782+00:00 | 467d62f847f672990781b9d5fab6993d6e12f9fd92831a74b7b31e38df29ecc2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | WstEth.sol#L34, SafEth.sol#L53, Reth.sol#L43, SfrxEth.sol#L37, Ownable2Step.sol, Reth.sol#L93-L94 | SfrxEth.sol, Reth.sol, WstEth.sol, SafEth.sol, Ownable2Step.sol | 6 | contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol
function withdraw(uint256 amount) external onlyOwner {
RocketTokenRETHInterface(rethAddress()).burn(amount);
// solhint-disable-next-line
(bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: address(this).balance}(
""
);
require(se... | true | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.13;
contract ReEntrancyGuard {
bool internal locked;
modifier noReentrant() {
require(!locked, "No re-entrancy");
locked = true;
_;
locked = false;
}
} | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 02-ethos | 2997ms G | Gas | gas | ## [G-01] Remove the `initializer` modifier
If we can just ensure that the `initialize()` function could only be called from within the constructor, we shouldn’t need to worry about it getting called again.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/34ba1e7dd2d259f06f9d5fa13f5d96be7829ff34/Ethos-Vault/contracts... | function initialize(
address _vault,
address[] memory _strategists,
address[] memory _multisigRoles,
IAToken _gWant
) public initializer {
+ require(address(this).code.length == 0, 'not in constructor'); | upgrade | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/2997ms-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:54.563574+00:00 | 468bfd1aeae3fe184d460e9e0f1d5f37e3a52f645c626e4285e5459af6e89693 | 1 | 0 | 250 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | function initialize(
address _vault,
address[] memory _strategists,
address[] memory _multisigRoles,
IAToken _gWant
) public initializer {
+ require(address(this).code.length == 0, 'not in constructor'); | unknown | 250 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function initialize(
address _vault,
address[] memory _strategists,
address[] memory _multisigRoles,
IAToken _gWant
) public initializer {
+ require(address(this).code.length == 0, 'not in constructor'); | 1 | false | ReaperStrategyGranarySupplyOnly.sol#L63 | ReaperStrategyGranarySupplyOnly.sol | 1 | function initialize(
address _vault,
address[] memory _strategists,
address[] memory _multisigRoles,
IAToken _gWant
) public initializer {
+ require(address(this).code.length == 0, 'not in constructor'); | true | false | false | 6 | |||||
c4 | 02-ethos | favelanky G | High | high | ## Summary
### Gas Optimizations
| | Issue | Instances | Total Gas Saved |
| ------------- |:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |:---------:|:---------------:|
... | File: contracts/CollateralConfig.sol
66: require(_MCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_MCR, "MCR below allowed minimum");
69: require(_CCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_CCR, "CCR below allowed minimum");
94: require(_MCR >= MIN_ALLOWED_MCR, "MCR below allowed minimum");
97: require(_CCR >= MI... | File: contracts/ActivePool.sol
93: require(_treasuryAddress != address(0), "Treasury cannot be 0 address");
107: require(numCollaterals == _erc4626vaults.length, "Vaults array length must match number of collaterals");
111: require(IERC4626(vault).asset() == collateral, "Vault asset must be collateral");
... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/favelanky-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:11.414959+00:00 | 469e3e55d43d514359b957524b6fadb751c167c822dae3f5b8ba6f62ae454b3d | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: contracts/CollateralConfig.sol
66: require(_MCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_MCR, "MCR below allowed minimum");
69: require(_CCRs[i] >= MIN_ALLOWED_CCR, "CCR below allowed minimum");
94: require(_MCR >= MIN_ALLOWED_MCR, "MCR below allowed minimum");
97: require(_CCR >= MI... | true | File: contracts/ActivePool.sol
93: require(_treasuryAddress != address(0), "Treasury cannot be 0 address");
107: require(numCollaterals == _erc4626vaults.length, "Vaults array length must match number of collaterals");
111: require(IERC4626(vault).asset() == collateral, "Vault asset must be collateral");
... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | debo Q | Medium | medium | ## [L-01]
SWC-115 Authorization through tx.origin
File
```
/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol
```
URL
```
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/53c8c3823175aeb26dee5529eeefa81240a406ba/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L257
```
Transaction origin
```
Use of ... | /contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/53c8c3823175aeb26dee5529eeefa81240a406ba/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L257 | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/debo-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:41.861379+00:00 | 46e23736b1095a357c6a4b76d5ae8bfb1a386f468e7abc468341d29c22700d8a | 9 | 0 | 1,459 | 2 | false | true | true | false | medium | /contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol | unknown | 49 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol
// Code block 2 (unknown):
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/53c8c3823175aeb26dee5529eeefa81240a406ba/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L257
// Code block 3 (unknown):
Use of tx.origin: "tx.orig... | 9 | false | SmartAccount.sol#L257, SmartAccount.sol#L281 | SmartAccount.sol | 2 | /contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol | true | false | false | 14 | ||||
c4 | 04-caviar | MatricksDeCoder G | Low | low | #### Gas-1 Make constructor payable to save on deployment costs
Gas savings can be achieved by making constructors payable can cut out about 10 opcodes which allow for the check if(msg.value != 0) revert();
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/cd8a92667bcb6657f70657183769c244d04c015c/src/EthRouter.sol#L... | virtualBaseTokenReserves = virtualBaseTokenReserves + uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount); | virtualBaseTokenReserves = virtualBaseTokenReserves + uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
virtualNftReserves = virtualNftReserves - uint128(weightSum); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/MatricksDeCoder-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:51.645307+00:00 | 46f3f1004cd5e7cd26a40be1d904efcf992bf7fcf5c0db61565833b3a8f864b8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | EthRouter.sol#L90, Factory.sol#L53, PrivatePool.sol#L143, EthRouter.sol#L86, PrivatePool.sol#L119, PrivatePool.sol#L122, PrivatePool.sol#L125, EthRouter.sol#L99, EthRouter.sol#L152, EthRouter.sol#L219, EthRouter.sol#L254, EthRouter.sol#L301 | EthRouter.sol, Factory.sol, PrivatePool.sol | 12 | virtualBaseTokenReserves = virtualBaseTokenReserves + uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount); | true | virtualBaseTokenReserves = virtualBaseTokenReserves + uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
virtualNftReserves = virtualNftReserves - uint128(weightSum); | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 09-ondo | debo Q | Medium | medium | ## [L-01] Block values as a proxy for time
Description
Contracts often need access to time values to perform certain types of functionality. Values such as block.timestamp, and block.number can give you a sense of the current time or a time delta, however, they are not safe to use for most purposes.
In the case of blo... | Remediation
Developers should write smart contracts with the notion that block values are not precise, and the use of them can lead to unexpected effects. Alternatively, they may make use oracles.
## [L-02] Unsafe erc20 operations
Description
ERC20 operations can be unsafe due to different implementations and vulnerab... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/debo-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:53.818868+00:00 | 46f7e1c58b9ce3dbb7ad2d6b804c0375430d73ad696f257dd8fa036b92bf16d1 | 1 | 0 | 518 | 2 | false | true | true | false | medium | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol#L64
timestamp = block.timestamp;
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol#L79-L83
if (ra... | txt | 518 | // Code block 1 (txt):
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.sol#L64
timestamp = block.timestamp;
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/rwaOracles/RWADynamicOracle.s... | 1 | false | RWADynamicOracle.sol#L64, RWADynamicOracle.sol#L79-L83 | RWADynamicOracle.sol | 2 | Remediation
Developers should write smart contracts with the notion that block values are not precise, and the use of them can lead to unexpected effects. Alternatively, they may make use oracles.
## [L-02] Unsafe erc20 operations
Description
ERC20 operations can be unsafe due to different implementations and vulnerab... | true | false | false | 6 | |||||
c4 | 09-ondo | zhaojie Q | Low | low | ## DestinationBridge.approve without checking txnHash exists
DestinationBridge.approve without checking txnHash exists leads to skip _checkThresholdMet permission check.
This does not cause any problems at present, but errors may be introduced during the subsequent upgrade. Therefore, advised to check whether txnHas... | function _approve(bytes32 txnHash) internal {
// Check that the approver has not already approved
TxnThreshold storage t = txnToThresholdSet[txnHash];
if (t.approvers.length > 0) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) {
if (t.approvers[i] == msg.sender) {
revert Already... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/zhaojie-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:22.950080+00:00 | 4730116ab4821c2efcb6b91250e6609519dee296ee6fb458c4d54d2899d76fcc | 2 | 0 | 776 | 0 | false | true | true | false | medium | function _approve(bytes32 txnHash) internal {
// Check that the approver has not already approved
TxnThreshold storage t = txnToThresholdSet[txnHash];
if (t.approvers.length > 0) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) {
if (t.approvers[i] == msg.sender) {
revert AlreadyAp... | unknown | 450 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function _approve(bytes32 txnHash) internal {
// Check that the approver has not already approved
TxnThreshold storage t = txnToThresholdSet[txnHash];
if (t.approvers.length > 0) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) {
if (t.approvers[i] == msg.sender) {... | 2 | false | 0 | function _approve(bytes32 txnHash) internal {
// Check that the approver has not already approved
TxnThreshold storage t = txnToThresholdSet[txnHash];
if (t.approvers.length > 0) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < t.approvers.length; ++i) {
if (t.approvers[i] == msg.sender) {
revert Already... | true | false | false | 6 | |||||||
c4 | 03-revert-lend | befree3x Q | Critical | critical | # QA reports
## Low
### [L-1] Missing checks on `V3Vault::setEmergencyAdmin` allowing owner to set the emergency admin as himself
**Vulnerability Details**
An emergency is defined by the protocol to be able to execute certain critical operations without timelock, for example:
- Set an oracle mode
- Set different ... | function setEmergencyAdmin(address admin) external onlyOwner {
@> emergencyAdmin = admin; // missing check here
emit SetEmergencyAdmin(admin);
}
| The following test case can be added to the files `V3Vault.t.sol` and `V3Oracle.t.sol` as well:
- On `V3Vault.t.sol`, add this test:
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/blob/main/data/befree3x-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:03:07.316187+00:00 | 4733778b9a9c696c0ef963edb3b122823d450f9fb86bb05841ebea0163aa377e | 4 | 1 | 683 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function setEmergencyAdmin(address admin) external onlyOwner {
@> emergencyAdmin = admin; // missing check here
emit SetEmergencyAdmin(admin);
} | javascript | 159 | // Code block 1 (javascript):
function setEmergencyAdmin(address admin) external onlyOwner {
@> emergencyAdmin = admin; // missing check here
emit SetEmergencyAdmin(admin);
}
// Code block 2 (diff):
function setEmergencyAdmin(address admin) external onlyOwner {
+ if(admin == owner()) {
+ ... | 4 | true | function setEmergencyAdmin(address admin) external onlyOwner {
+ if(admin == owner()) {
+ revert Unauthorized();
+ }
emergencyAdmin = admin;
emit SetEmergencyAdmin(admin);
} | 0 | function setEmergencyAdmin(address admin) external onlyOwner {
@> emergencyAdmin = admin; // missing check here
emit SetEmergencyAdmin(admin);
}
| true | The following test case can be added to the files `V3Vault.t.sol` and `V3Oracle.t.sol` as well:
- On `V3Vault.t.sol`, add this test:
| true | true | 11 | ||||
c4 | 09-ondo | matrix_0wl G | High | high | ## Gas Optimizations
| | Issue |
| ------ | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| GAS-1 | `ABI.ENCODE()` IS LESS ... | File: contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
99: if (chainToApprovedSender[srcChain] != keccak256(abi.encode(srcAddr))) {
238: chainToApprovedSender[srcChain] = keccak256(abi.encode(srcContractAddress));
| File: contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol
79: bytes memory payload = abi.encode(VERSION, msg.sender, amount, nonce++);
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/matrix_0wl-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:05.467657+00:00 | 4778e0a416c28b69b79daa86f2798ad448ca9f3e39c384a05e06134c4adbe08e | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol
99: if (chainToApprovedSender[srcChain] != keccak256(abi.encode(srcAddr))) {
238: chainToApprovedSender[srcChain] = keccak256(abi.encode(srcContractAddress));
| true | File: contracts/bridge/SourceBridge.sol
79: bytes memory payload = abi.encode(VERSION, msg.sender, amount, nonce++);
| true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 01-ondo | mahdirostami G | Low | low | 1. COMPOUND ASSIGNMENT OPERATOR COSTS EXTRA GAS FOR STATE VARIABLES
<X += Y> uses more gas than <X = X + Y>
<X -= Y> uses more gas than <X = X - Y>
Affected source code:
- [CashManager.sol#L221](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/f3426e5b6b4561e09460b2e6471eb694efdd6c70/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol#L2... | modifier onlyGuardian() {
require(msg.sender == guardian, "CashFactory: You are not the Guardian");
_;
} | overflow | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/mahdirostami-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:18.777868+00:00 | 47df370155b7148ef0e294045e88048d94ba38402a0dffc11edc5d21a5db4666 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | CashManager.sol#L221, CashManager.sol#L582, CashManager.sol#L630, CashManager.sol#L649, CashManager.sol#L792, CashManager.sol#L750, CashManager.sol#L786, CashManager.sol#L933, CashManager.sol#L961, CashFactory.sol#L127 | CashManager.sol, CashFactory.sol | 10 | modifier onlyGuardian() {
require(msg.sender == guardian, "CashFactory: You are not the Guardian");
_;
} | true | false | false | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | ernestognw G | Low | low | ## Reorder `SafEthStorage` variables for lesser storage accesses
Considering that `stake()` is reasonably expected to be the most-called function, it currently accesses 5 storage slots while reading the following variables:
* `pauseStaking`
* `derivativeCount`
* `totalWeight`
* `minAmount`
* `maxAmount`
However, bot... | contract SafEthStorage {
bool public pauseStaking; // true if staking is paused
bool public pauseUnstaking; // true if unstaking is pause
uint120 public derivativeCount; // amount of derivatives added to contract
uint120 public totalWeight; // total weight of all derivatives (used to calculate percentag... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/ernestognw-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:05.684009+00:00 | 481a9687240deb7edacd990e4ef24fcefd3ff824b57aae905bbdc9c8161888a6 | 1 | 1 | 460 | 0 | false | true | true | false | high | contract SafEthStorage {
bool public pauseStaking; // true if staking is paused
bool public pauseUnstaking; // true if unstaking is pause
uint120 public derivativeCount; // amount of derivatives added to contract
uint120 public totalWeight; // total weight of all derivatives (used to calculate percentag... | solidity | 460 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
contract SafEthStorage {
bool public pauseStaking; // true if staking is paused
bool public pauseUnstaking; // true if unstaking is pause
uint120 public derivativeCount; // amount of derivatives added to contract
uint120 public totalWeight; // total weight of all derivatives ... | 1 | false | contract SafEthStorage {
bool public pauseStaking; // true if staking is paused
bool public pauseUnstaking; // true if unstaking is pause
uint120 public derivativeCount; // amount of derivatives added to contract
uint120 public totalWeight; // total weight of all derivatives (used to calculate percentag... | 0 | contract SafEthStorage {
bool public pauseStaking; // true if staking is paused
bool public pauseUnstaking; // true if unstaking is pause
uint120 public derivativeCount; // amount of derivatives added to contract
uint120 public totalWeight; // total weight of all derivatives (used to calculate percentag... | true | false | false | 4.22 | ||||||
c4 | 02-ethos | matrix_0wl G | High | high | # Summary
## Gas Optimizations
| | Issue |
| ------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------... | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/LUSDToken.sol
305: return keccak256(abi.encode(typeHash, name, version, _chainID(), address(this)));
| File: Ethos-Core/contracts/StabilityPool.sol
197: uint public constant SCALE_FACTOR = 1e9;
| reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/matrix_0wl-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:23.514732+00:00 | 48287a309acb49b24a0044db09dabb5fa5626f3bd2d230f6b7182bec588d89b0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/LUSDToken.sol
305: return keccak256(abi.encode(typeHash, name, version, _chainID(), address(this)));
| true | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/StabilityPool.sol
197: uint public constant SCALE_FACTOR = 1e9;
| true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | BClabs Q | Unknown | unknown | 1. **Function duplicate**:
There are 2 functions that implmenet the same logic- They both accept batchId and return nonces[batchId].
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/53c8c3823175aeb26dee5529eeefa81240a406ba/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol#L155-L159
https://github.com/... | contract Attack {
constructor(address contractAddress) {
VerifyingSingletonPaymaster(contractAddress).depositFor{value: 1}(address(this));
}
} | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/BClabs-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:12:55.821928+00:00 | 482fd115ec09d596d3a348a36fc65c10a62a0b74b98a6fa45ea38dc0d434d562 | 1 | 0 | 158 | 5 | false | true | true | false | medium | contract Attack {
constructor(address contractAddress) {
VerifyingSingletonPaymaster(contractAddress).depositFor{value: 1}(address(this));
}
} | unknown | 158 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
contract Attack {
constructor(address contractAddress) {
VerifyingSingletonPaymaster(contractAddress).depositFor{value: 1}(address(this));
}
} | 1 | false | SmartAccount.sol#L155-L159, SmartAccount.sol#L97-L99, SmartAccount.sol#L171, VerifyingSingletonPaymaster.sol#L49, StakeManager.sol#L13 | SmartAccount.sol, StakeManager.sol, VerifyingSingletonPaymaster.sol | 5 | contract Attack {
constructor(address contractAddress) {
VerifyingSingletonPaymaster(contractAddress).depositFor{value: 1}(address(this));
}
} | true | false | false | 6 | |||||
c4 | 05-ajna | Bason Q | Medium | medium | ## QA Findings
| Number | Issues Details |
|:-------:|:---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [QA-01] | Emit event after proposal is executed and not before ... | function _execute(
uint256 proposalId_,
address[] memory targets_,
uint256[] memory values_,
bytes[] memory calldatas_
) internal {
// use common event name to maintain consistency with tally
emit ProposalExecuted(proposalId_);
string memory errorMessage = "... | function executeStandard(
address[] memory targets_,
uint256[] memory values_,
bytes[] memory calldatas_,
bytes32 descriptionHash_
) external nonReentrant override returns (uint256 proposalId_) {
//Hash proposal generates a uint256 based on the values
...
if (... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/Bason-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:56.550579+00:00 | 4963a949d7f82d82d8b8b201ca77e538921589e2fe1a26fdaed2c207356a8c52 | 1 | 1 | 611 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function _execute(
uint256 proposalId_,
address[] memory targets_,
uint256[] memory values_,
bytes[] memory calldatas_
) internal {
// use common event name to maintain consistency with tally
emit ProposalExecuted(proposalId_);
string memory errorMessage = "G... | solidity | 611 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function _execute(
uint256 proposalId_,
address[] memory targets_,
uint256[] memory values_,
bytes[] memory calldatas_
) internal {
// use common event name to maintain consistency with tally
emit ProposalExecuted(proposalId_);
str... | 1 | false | function _execute(
uint256 proposalId_,
address[] memory targets_,
uint256[] memory values_,
bytes[] memory calldatas_
) internal {
// use common event name to maintain consistency with tally
emit ProposalExecuted(proposalId_);
string memory errorMessage = "G... | 0 | function _execute(
uint256 proposalId_,
address[] memory targets_,
uint256[] memory values_,
bytes[] memory calldatas_
) internal {
// use common event name to maintain consistency with tally
emit ProposalExecuted(proposalId_);
string memory errorMessage = "... | true | function executeStandard(
address[] memory targets_,
uint256[] memory values_,
bytes[] memory calldatas_,
bytes32 descriptionHash_
) external nonReentrant override returns (uint256 proposalId_) {
//Hash proposal generates a uint256 based on the values
...
if (... | true | true | 6 |
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