source stringclasses 1
value | protocol stringclasses 17
values | title stringlengths 4 24 | severity_raw stringclasses 8
values | severity stringclasses 8
values | description stringlengths 198 2k | vulnerable_code stringlengths 0 2k | fixed_code stringlengths 0 2k | recommendation stringclasses 1
value | category stringclasses 12
values | report_url stringlengths 71 98 | collected_at stringlengths 32 32 | source_hash stringlengths 64 64 | code_block_count int64 0 10 | solidity_block_count int64 0 10 | total_code_chars int64 0 1.73k | github_ref_count int64 0 26 | vulnerable_code_is_url bool 2
classes | fixed_code_is_url bool 2
classes | has_code_in_description bool 2
classes | has_recommendation bool 1
class | quality_estimate stringclasses 2
values | primary_code stringlengths 0 1.72k | primary_code_language stringclasses 19
values | primary_code_char_count int64 0 1.72k | all_code_blocks stringlengths 0 1.87k | all_code_blocks_count int64 0 10 | has_diff_blocks bool 2
classes | diff_code stringclasses 71
values | solidity_code stringlengths 0 1.68k | github_refs_formatted stringlengths 0 562 | github_files_list stringlengths 0 203 | github_refs_count int64 0 26 | vulnerable_code_actual stringlengths 0 2k | has_vulnerable_code_snippet bool 2
classes | fixed_code_actual stringlengths 0 2k | has_fixed_code_snippet bool 2
classes | has_vuln_fix_pair bool 2
classes | content_richness_score float64 2.4 15 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
c4 | 09-ondo | bin2chen Q | Low | low |
L-01: _mintIfThresholdMet() A malicious ALLOWLIST can duplicate mint
`_mintIfThresholdMet` does not follow the `Checks Effects Interactions` principle
If ALLOWLIST is a malicious contract, it is possible to repeat the mint token
It is recommended to clear before executing mint
```solidity
function _mintIfThreshold... | function _mintIfThresholdMet(bytes32 txnHash) internal {
bool thresholdMet = _checkThresholdMet(txnHash);
Transaction memory txn = txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
if (thresholdMet) {
+ delete txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
_checkAndUpdateInstantMintLimit(txn.amount);
if (!ALLOWLIST.isAl... | L-04: BURNER_ROLE can't burn off blacklisted user's token
Administrators with `BURNER_ROLE` privileges can execute `burn()` to burn a user's `shares` and transfer `usdy` to themselves.
Currently execute `burn()` -> `_burnShares()` -> `_beforeTokenTransfer()` -> `_isBlocked()` -> `blocklist.isBlocked()`
This way, if ... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/bin2chen-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:48.451265+00:00 | a04032100baa1c77998e4c045e6df953d767718118ff3c129ecd4ee98993c3f1 | 1 | 1 | 620 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function _mintIfThresholdMet(bytes32 txnHash) internal {
bool thresholdMet = _checkThresholdMet(txnHash);
Transaction memory txn = txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
if (thresholdMet) {
+ delete txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
_checkAndUpdateInstantMintLimit(txn.amount);
if (!ALLOWLIST.isAllo... | solidity | 620 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function _mintIfThresholdMet(bytes32 txnHash) internal {
bool thresholdMet = _checkThresholdMet(txnHash);
Transaction memory txn = txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
if (thresholdMet) {
+ delete txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
_checkAndUpdateInstantMintLimit(txn.amount);... | 1 | false | function _mintIfThresholdMet(bytes32 txnHash) internal {
bool thresholdMet = _checkThresholdMet(txnHash);
Transaction memory txn = txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
if (thresholdMet) {
+ delete txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
_checkAndUpdateInstantMintLimit(txn.amount);
if (!ALLOWLIST.isAllo... | 0 | function _mintIfThresholdMet(bytes32 txnHash) internal {
bool thresholdMet = _checkThresholdMet(txnHash);
Transaction memory txn = txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
if (thresholdMet) {
+ delete txnHashToTransaction[txnHash];
_checkAndUpdateInstantMintLimit(txn.amount);
if (!ALLOWLIST.isAl... | true | L-04: BURNER_ROLE can't burn off blacklisted user's token
Administrators with `BURNER_ROLE` privileges can execute `burn()` to burn a user's `shares` and transfer `usdy` to themselves.
Currently execute `burn()` -> `_burnShares()` -> `_beforeTokenTransfer()` -> `_isBlocked()` -> `blocklist.isBlocked()`
This way, if ... | true | true | 6 | ||||
c4 | 06-lybra | matrix_0wl G | Medium | medium | ## Gas Optimizations
| | Issue |
| ------ | :-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------... | File: contracts/lybra/configuration/LybraConfigurator.sol
99: if (address(EUSD) == address(0)) EUSD = IEUSD(_eusd);
100: if (address(peUSD) == address(0)) peUSD = IEUSD(_peusd);
| File: contracts/lybra/miner/EUSDMiningIncentives.sol
76: if (_account != address(0)) {
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/matrix_0wl-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:08.229234+00:00 | a04e35a3c6ce0ee08648567cbad5d45398f706d5c8325bbea6f5ba05a0a6dc71 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: contracts/lybra/configuration/LybraConfigurator.sol
99: if (address(EUSD) == address(0)) EUSD = IEUSD(_eusd);
100: if (address(peUSD) == address(0)) peUSD = IEUSD(_peusd);
| true | File: contracts/lybra/miner/EUSDMiningIncentives.sol
76: if (_account != address(0)) {
| true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 10-badger | codeslide G | High | high | ### <a id="summary-gas-optimizations"></a> Gas Optimizations
There are 759 instances over 27 issues.
| ID | Description | Count | Gas Per Instance | Gas Savings |
| :... | File: packages/contracts/contracts/Governor.sol
46: for (uint256 i = 0; i < users.length(); i++) {
57: for (uint256 i = 0; i < _usrs.length; i++) {
76: for (uint8 i = 0; i < type(uint8).max; i++) {
84: for (uint8 i = 0; i < type(uint8).max; i++) {
98: for (uint8 i = ... | File: packages/contracts/contracts/SortedCdps.sol
432: for (uint256 i = 0; i < _len; ++i) {
449: for (uint i = 0; i < _len; ++i) { | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/codeslide-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:45.098583+00:00 | a051b06bdb93fb4f59d34c5d8d8b44c340fd5a6378ce0dff19a61715c70e2419 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: packages/contracts/contracts/Governor.sol
46: for (uint256 i = 0; i < users.length(); i++) {
57: for (uint256 i = 0; i < _usrs.length; i++) {
76: for (uint8 i = 0; i < type(uint8).max; i++) {
84: for (uint8 i = 0; i < type(uint8).max; i++) {
98: for (uint8 i = ... | true | File: packages/contracts/contracts/SortedCdps.sol
432: for (uint256 i = 0; i < _len; ++i) {
449: for (uint i = 0; i < _len; ++i) { | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | privateconstant G | Medium | medium | # Gas Optimizations
## Summary
In total, `5` gas optimizations are found. Please also noted that the following do not inclue those included in the C4Audit output [here](https://gist.github.com/Picodes/0a53b4abfc71e0b9998e8b09aa283fb3).
## [G-01] USE REQUIRE INSTEAD OF ASSERT FOR ERROR HANDLING
The `assert()` and `... | [Link to code](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/53c8c3823175aeb26dee5529eeefa81240a406ba/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/common/Singleton.sol#L13)
| [Link to code](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/53c8c3823175aeb26dee5529eeefa81240a406ba/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/Proxy.sol#L16)
## [G-02] USE CALLDATA INSTEAD OF MEMORY IN `innerHandleOp()`
Using the `memory` keyword instead of `calldata` in the `innerHandleOp()` function in `... | upgrade | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/privateconstant-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:04.301100+00:00 | a082d04bf36df85c821b904271a725f7b4f45af541d5f9cfbbaa66a41425e6b3 | 2 | 2 | 551 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | file: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/common/Singleton.sol, line 13
+ require(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1));
- assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1)); | diff | 281 | // Code block 1 (diff):
file: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/common/Singleton.sol, line 13
+ require(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1));
- assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1));
// Code block... | 2 | true | file: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/common/Singleton.sol, line 13
+ require(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1));
- assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1));
file: contracts/smart-contract-wallet... | Singleton.sol#L13, Proxy.sol#L16 | Proxy.sol, Singleton.sol | 2 | [Link to code](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/53c8c3823175aeb26dee5529eeefa81240a406ba/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/common/Singleton.sol#L13)
| true | [Link to code](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/53c8c3823175aeb26dee5529eeefa81240a406ba/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/Proxy.sol#L16)
## [G-02] USE CALLDATA INSTEAD OF MEMORY IN `innerHandleOp()`
Using the `memory` keyword instead of `calldata` in the `innerHandleOp()` function in `... | true | true | 10 | ||
c4 | 05-ajna | teawaterwire Q | Unknown | unknown | In the `claimDelegateReward` function there is this line
```
// Check if Challenge Period is still active
if(block.number < _getChallengeStageEndBlock(currentDistribution.endBlock)) revert ChallengePeriodNotEnded();
```
After discussing with one of the sponsors it appears to be not quite right as it should be checked... | // Check if Challenge Period is still active
if(block.number < _getChallengeStageEndBlock(currentDistribution.endBlock)) revert ChallengePeriodNotEnded(); | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/teawaterwire-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:49.233915+00:00 | a0b1f3fa1a77b2d63adb3fe71643fabc0b3b7865f39d134617451ad4932cfafe | 1 | 0 | 154 | 0 | false | true | true | false | medium | // Check if Challenge Period is still active
if(block.number < _getChallengeStageEndBlock(currentDistribution.endBlock)) revert ChallengePeriodNotEnded(); | unknown | 154 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
// Check if Challenge Period is still active
if(block.number < _getChallengeStageEndBlock(currentDistribution.endBlock)) revert ChallengePeriodNotEnded(); | 1 | false | 0 | // Check if Challenge Period is still active
if(block.number < _getChallengeStageEndBlock(currentDistribution.endBlock)) revert ChallengePeriodNotEnded(); | true | false | false | 2.86 | |||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | Ignite G | Medium | medium |
### Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Instances|Average Gas Saved|
|---|---|---|---|
| Gas-1 | `<x> += <y>` costs more gas than `<x> = <x> + <y>` for state variables | 4 | - |
| Gas-2 | Setting the constructor to payable | 2 | 26 |
| Gas-3 | Optimize function names to save gas | All Contracts |- |
| Gas-4 | Using a ternary o... | 230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
323: virtualBaseTokenReserves -= uint128(netOutputAmount + protocolFeeAmount + feeAmount);
324: virtualNftReserves += uint128(weightSum); | 53: constructor() ERC721("Caviar Private Pools", "POOL") Owned(msg.sender) {} | oracle | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/Ignite-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:42.452382+00:00 | a0e7982fbb2f839c5e071a77cb48d5b5d3224b31b88a0c4e821cce6ef22e1950 | 4 | 4 | 485 | 7 | false | false | true | false | high | 230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
323: virtualBaseTokenReserves -= uint128(netOutputAmount + protocolFeeAmount + feeAmount);
324: virtualNftReserves += uint128(weightSum); | solidity | 277 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
323: virtualBaseTokenReserves -= uint128(netOutputAmount + protocolFeeAmount + feeAmount);
324: virtualNftReserves += uint128(weightSum);
// Code block... | 4 | false | 230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
323: virtualBaseTokenReserves -= uint128(netOutputAmount + protocolFeeAmount + feeAmount);
324: virtualNftReserves += uint128(weightSum);
53: constructor() ERC721("Caviar Private ... | PrivatePool.sol#L230, PrivatePool.sol#L231, PrivatePool.sol#L323, PrivatePool.sol#L324, PrivatePool.sol#L143, EthRouter.sol#L90, Factory.sol#L53 | EthRouter.sol, PrivatePool.sol, Factory.sol | 7 | 230: virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
231: virtualNftReserves -= uint128(weightSum);
323: virtualBaseTokenReserves -= uint128(netOutputAmount + protocolFeeAmount + feeAmount);
324: virtualNftReserves += uint128(weightSum); | true | 53: constructor() ERC721("Caviar Private Pools", "POOL") Owned(msg.sender) {} | true | true | 10 | ||
c4 | 05-ajna | bytes032 Q | Medium | medium |
## QA REPORT
| | Issue |
| ---- |:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------... | /**
* @inheritdoc IRewardsManagerOwnerActions
* @dev === Revert on ===
* @dev not owner `NotOwnerOfDeposit()`
* @dev already claimed `AlreadyClaimed()`
* @dev === Emit events ===
* @dev - `ClaimRewards`
*/
function claimRewards(
uint256 tokenId_,
... | function stake(
uint256 tokenId_
) external override {
address ajnaPool = PositionManager(address(positionManager)).poolKey(tokenId_);
// check that msg.sender is owner of tokenId
if (IERC721(address(positionManager)).ownerOf(tokenId_) != msg.sender) revert NotOwnerOfDeposit();
... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/bytes032-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:23.007477+00:00 | a19e3787cd97af2107284d45fd63a1af6159c1a2f8685189082eb17ff6a49c94 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | /**
* @inheritdoc IRewardsManagerOwnerActions
* @dev === Revert on ===
* @dev not owner `NotOwnerOfDeposit()`
* @dev already claimed `AlreadyClaimed()`
* @dev === Emit events ===
* @dev - `ClaimRewards`
*/
function claimRewards(
uint256 tokenId_,
... | true | function stake(
uint256 tokenId_
) external override {
address ajnaPool = PositionManager(address(positionManager)).poolKey(tokenId_);
// check that msg.sender is owner of tokenId
if (IERC721(address(positionManager)).ownerOf(tokenId_) != msg.sender) revert NotOwnerOfDeposit();
... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 10-badger | cheatc0d3 G | Medium | medium | ## Gas Optimization Report Badger eBTC
### Minimize State Variable Storage
Using smaller integer types for state variables can significantly reduce gas costs. In `ActivePool.sol`, the state variables `systemCollShares` and `feeRecipientCollShares` are declared as `uint256`. If the range of these variables permits, ch... | File: https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/main/packages/contracts/contracts/ActivePool.sol#L31
uint256 internal systemCollShares;
uint256 internal feeRecipientCollShares; | uint128 internal systemCollShares;
uint128 internal feeRecipientCollShares; | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/cheatc0d3-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:44.170953+00:00 | a1f7647e0f2e2c0bc3c0886c0950851b8845fc05cbc0aa1c8a5ab44ad8435e1b | 6 | 4 | 846 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | File: https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/main/packages/contracts/contracts/ActivePool.sol#L31
uint256 internal systemCollShares;
uint256 internal feeRecipientCollShares; | solidity | 185 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/main/packages/contracts/contracts/ActivePool.sol#L31
uint256 internal systemCollShares;
uint256 internal feeRecipientCollShares;
// Code block 2 (solidity):
uint128 internal systemCollShares;
uint128 internal feeRecipientCollShares;
... | 6 | false | File: https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/main/packages/contracts/contracts/ActivePool.sol#L31
uint256 internal systemCollShares;
uint256 internal feeRecipientCollShares;
uint128 internal systemCollShares;
uint128 internal feeRecipientCollShares;
uint256 cachedResult = collateral.getPooledEthByShares(D... | ActivePool.sol#L31, ActivePool.sol#L104 | ActivePool.sol | 2 | File: https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/main/packages/contracts/contracts/ActivePool.sol#L31
uint256 internal systemCollShares;
uint256 internal feeRecipientCollShares; | true | uint128 internal systemCollShares;
uint128 internal feeRecipientCollShares; | true | true | 12 | ||
c4 | 01-ondo | Josiah Q | High | high | ## DESCRIPTIVE TIME UNITS
As denoted in the link below:
https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.14/units-and-global-variables.html
"Suffixes like seconds, minutes, hours, days and weeks after literal numbers can be used to specify units of time where seconds are the base unit ..."
It is recommended adopting the above ... | uint256 public maxChainlinkOracleTimeDelay = 90000; // 25 hours | uint256 public maxChainlinkOracleTimeDelay = 25 hours | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/Josiah-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:40.022597+00:00 | a1faae4c4ebd117c98720441ef231a85947df2478fdd5a6dd2e6938dc5b612ff | 2 | 0 | 116 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | uint256 public maxChainlinkOracleTimeDelay = 90000; // 25 hours | unknown | 63 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
uint256 public maxChainlinkOracleTimeDelay = 90000; // 25 hours
// Code block 2 (unknown):
uint256 public maxChainlinkOracleTimeDelay = 25 hours | 2 | false | OndoPriceOracleV2.sol#L77, CashKYCSenderReceiverFactory.sol#L133-L143, CashFactory.sol#L123-L134, CashKYCSenderFactory.sol#L133-L144 | CashFactory.sol, OndoPriceOracleV2.sol, CashKYCSenderReceiverFactory.sol, CashKYCSenderFactory.sol | 4 | uint256 public maxChainlinkOracleTimeDelay = 90000; // 25 hours | true | uint256 public maxChainlinkOracleTimeDelay = 25 hours | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 01-ondo | gzeon G | Unknown | unknown | ## Uncheckable math
epochDuration != 0 and (block.timestamp % epochDuration) always less than block.timestamp
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo/blob/f3426e5b6b4561e09460b2e6471eb694efdd6c70/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol#L583-L585
```solidity
currentEpochStartTimestamp =
block.timestamp -
... | currentEpochStartTimestamp =
block.timestamp -
(block.timestamp % epochDuration); | uint256 size = redeemers.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) { | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/gzeon-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:11.581701+00:00 | a218558b832c394c8934ccc0dd70ec259db2eaf4d853258a3ebd9b483218967e | 2 | 2 | 170 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | currentEpochStartTimestamp =
block.timestamp -
(block.timestamp % epochDuration); | solidity | 97 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
currentEpochStartTimestamp =
block.timestamp -
(block.timestamp % epochDuration);
// Code block 2 (solidity):
uint256 size = redeemers.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) { | 2 | false | currentEpochStartTimestamp =
block.timestamp -
(block.timestamp % epochDuration);
uint256 size = redeemers.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) { | CashManager.sol#L583-L585, CashManager.sol#L749-L750 | CashManager.sol | 2 | currentEpochStartTimestamp =
block.timestamp -
(block.timestamp % epochDuration); | true | uint256 size = redeemers.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) { | true | true | 6.4 | ||
c4 | 01-ondo | oyc_109 G | High | high | ## [G-01] Don't Initialize Variables with Default Value
Uninitialized variables are assigned with the types default value. Explicitly initializing a variable with it's default value costs unnecesary gas.
```
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::750 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contract... | 2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::750 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::786 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::933 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::961 => f... | 2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::961 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/factory/CashFactory.sol::127 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/factory/CashKYCSenderFactory.sol::137 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.leng... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/oyc_109-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:25.942033+00:00 | a22a54d1bd42a7763c4efc0ac021071f27823826f16d7164869d7921b65bd17e | 1 | 0 | 1,399 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | 2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::750 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::786 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::933 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::961 => f... | unknown | 1,399 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::750 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::786 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::933 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cas... | 1 | false | 0 | 2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::750 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::786 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::933 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::961 => f... | true | 2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/CashManager.sol::961 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/factory/CashFactory.sol::127 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.length; ++i) {
2023-01-ondo/contracts/cash/factory/CashKYCSenderFactory.sol::137 => for (uint256 i = 0; i < exCallData.leng... | true | true | 6 | |||||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | 0xMosh Q | High | high | # L-01 :Users will loss batteries even if voltage replenish time is over if `useVoltageBattery` is called !
## Impact
Users will loss batteries even if voltage replenish time is over if `useVoltageBattery` is called !
## Proof of Concept
```solidity
function useVoltageBattery() public {
require(ownerVol... | function useVoltageBattery() public {
require(ownerVoltage[msg.sender] < 100);
require(_gameItemsContractInstance.balanceOf(msg.sender, 0) > 0);
_gameItemsContractInstance.burn(msg.sender, 0, 1);
ownerVoltage[msg.sender] = 100;
emit VoltageRemaining(msg.sender, ownerVoltage[ms... | function useVoltageBattery() public {
require(ownerVoltage[msg.sender] < 100);
if (ownerVoltageReplenishTime[spender] <= block.timestamp) {
_replenishVoltage(spender);
}else {
require(_gameItemsContractInstance.balanceOf(msg.sender, 0) > 0);
_gameItemsContrac... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/0xMosh-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:03.760541+00:00 | a22ceaf776b89c2ea5d6a896ed7672be2476cabf79296c7f3b31b1f05647e0ac | 2 | 0 | 705 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function `useVoltageBattery` is for using battery to replenish Voltage . but it doesnot check if voltage replenish time is over or not . Because of this , even if voltage replenishTime is over , it will cost battery to user .
From a game logical perspective , this is not a fair scenario . Voltage should be replenished... | unknown | 522 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function `useVoltageBattery` is for using battery to replenish Voltage . but it doesnot check if voltage replenish time is over or not . Because of this , even if voltage replenishTime is over , it will cost battery to user .
From a game logical perspective , this is not a fair scenario . Vo... | 2 | false | 0 | function useVoltageBattery() public {
require(ownerVoltage[msg.sender] < 100);
require(_gameItemsContractInstance.balanceOf(msg.sender, 0) > 0);
_gameItemsContractInstance.burn(msg.sender, 0, 1);
ownerVoltage[msg.sender] = 100;
emit VoltageRemaining(msg.sender, ownerVoltage[ms... | true | function useVoltageBattery() public {
require(ownerVoltage[msg.sender] < 100);
if (ownerVoltageReplenishTime[spender] <= block.timestamp) {
_replenishVoltage(spender);
}else {
require(_gameItemsContractInstance.balanceOf(msg.sender, 0) > 0);
_gameItemsContrac... | true | true | 7 | |||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | a3yip6 G | Gas | gas | ## [G-01] Updating weight through adding new weight and subtracting old weight to save gas
Rather than loading storage `weights` repeatedly, updating weight directly by adding new weight and subtracting old weight can save gas. There are two instances in `adjustWeight` and `addDerivative` functions.
```
File: /contract... | File: /contracts/SafEth.sol
// Before
function adjustWeight(
uint256 _derivativeIndex,
uint256 _weight
) external onlyOwner {
weights[_derivativeIndex] = _weight;
uint256 localTotalWeight = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
localTotalWeight += weights[i];
totalWeight = l... | // Before
function addDerivative(
address _contractAddress,
uint256 _weight
) external onlyOwner {
derivatives[derivativeCount] = IDerivative(_contractAddress);
weights[derivativeCount] = _weight;
derivativeCount++;
uint256 localTotalWeight = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/a3yip6-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:41.844652+00:00 | a24119c75558f5d3d236474e61ad2eb9e793cb0ffa2066b89dbfcf94c701fa51 | 2 | 0 | 1,509 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | File: /contracts/SafEth.sol
// Before
function adjustWeight(
uint256 _derivativeIndex,
uint256 _weight
) external onlyOwner {
weights[_derivativeIndex] = _weight;
uint256 localTotalWeight = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
localTotalWeight += weights[i];
totalWeight = l... | unknown | 691 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
File: /contracts/SafEth.sol
// Before
function adjustWeight(
uint256 _derivativeIndex,
uint256 _weight
) external onlyOwner {
weights[_derivativeIndex] = _weight;
uint256 localTotalWeight = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
localTotalWeight += weig... | 2 | false | 0 | File: /contracts/SafEth.sol
// Before
function adjustWeight(
uint256 _derivativeIndex,
uint256 _weight
) external onlyOwner {
weights[_derivativeIndex] = _weight;
uint256 localTotalWeight = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
localTotalWeight += weights[i];
totalWeight = l... | true | // Before
function addDerivative(
address _contractAddress,
uint256 _weight
) external onlyOwner {
derivatives[derivativeCount] = IDerivative(_contractAddress);
weights[derivativeCount] = _weight;
derivativeCount++;
uint256 localTotalWeight = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)... | true | true | 7 | |||||
c4 | 02-ethos | NoamYakov Q | Medium | medium | ## Summary
### Low Risk Issues
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [L‑01] | Wrong emission of events | 3 |
| [L‑02] | Privileged addresses can accidentally set system parameters with illegal values, leading to denial-of-service (and potential gas drainage) | 2 |
## Low Risk Issues
### [L‑01] Wron... | 94 emit TotalOATHIssuedUpdated(totalOATHIssued); | 94 emit LQTYTokenAddressSet(_lusdTokenAddress); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/NoamYakov-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:24.348287+00:00 | a241b3b9d63f6ae5d669f5f79a6c0498606227b40ae6ebaa60b5a0e6ec8f5543 | 3 | 3 | 207 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | 94 emit TotalOATHIssuedUpdated(totalOATHIssued); | solidity | 57 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
94 emit TotalOATHIssuedUpdated(totalOATHIssued);
// Code block 2 (solidity):
94 emit LQTYTokenAddressSet(_lusdTokenAddress);
// Code block 3 (solidity):
131 emit StakingGainsWithdrawn(msg.sender, LUSDGain, collGainAssets, collGainAmounts); | 3 | false | 94 emit TotalOATHIssuedUpdated(totalOATHIssued);
94 emit LQTYTokenAddressSet(_lusdTokenAddress);
131 emit StakingGainsWithdrawn(msg.sender, LUSDGain, collGainAssets, collGainAmounts); | CommunityIssuance.sol#L94, LQTYStaking.sol#L94, LQTYStaking.sol#L131 | LQTYStaking.sol, CommunityIssuance.sol | 3 | 94 emit TotalOATHIssuedUpdated(totalOATHIssued); | true | 94 emit LQTYTokenAddressSet(_lusdTokenAddress); | true | true | 9 | ||
c4 | 04-caviar | cyberinn G | High | high | # Gas Optimizations Report
## [G-1] x += y or x -= y costs more gas than x = x + y or x = x - y for state variables
### Impact
Using the addition operator instead of plus-equals saves 113 gas. Usually does not work with struct and mappings.
### Findings
Total:5
[src/PrivatePool.sol#L247-L678](https://github.com/cod... | 247: royaltyFeeAmount += royaltyFee;
252: netInputAmount += royaltyFeeAmount;
341: royaltyFeeAmount += royaltyFee;
355: netOutputAmount -= royaltyFeeAmount;
678: sum += tokenWeights[i]; | 106: for (uint256 i = 0; i < buys.length; i++) {
116: for (uint256 j = 0; j < buys[i].tokenIds.length; j++) {
134: for (uint256 j = 0; j < buys[i].tokenIds.length; j++) {
159: for (uint256 i = 0; i < sells.length; i++) {
161: for (uint256 j = 0; j < sells[i].tokenIds.length; j++) {
183: for (uint... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/cyberinn-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:27.191456+00:00 | a260c1025b5f7e78e90bdeeafdb8645140b3d18c536b8eb5759c6b67d6586d3f | 2 | 2 | 757 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | 247: royaltyFeeAmount += royaltyFee;
252: netInputAmount += royaltyFeeAmount;
341: royaltyFeeAmount += royaltyFee;
355: netOutputAmount -= royaltyFeeAmount;
678: sum += tokenWeights[i]; | solidity | 204 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
247: royaltyFeeAmount += royaltyFee;
252: netInputAmount += royaltyFeeAmount;
341: royaltyFeeAmount += royaltyFee;
355: netOutputAmount -= royaltyFeeAmount;
678: sum += tokenWeights[i];
// Code block 2 (solidity):
106: for (uint256 i = 0; i < buys.length; i++) {
116: ... | 2 | false | 247: royaltyFeeAmount += royaltyFee;
252: netInputAmount += royaltyFeeAmount;
341: royaltyFeeAmount += royaltyFee;
355: netOutputAmount -= royaltyFeeAmount;
678: sum += tokenWeights[i];
106: for (uint256 i = 0; i < buys.length; i++) {
116: for (uint256 j = 0; j < buys[i].tokenIds.length; j++)... | PrivatePool.sol#L247-L678, EthRouter.sol#L284, PrivatePool.sol#L238-L446 | EthRouter.sol, PrivatePool.sol | 3 | 247: royaltyFeeAmount += royaltyFee;
252: netInputAmount += royaltyFeeAmount;
341: royaltyFeeAmount += royaltyFee;
355: netOutputAmount -= royaltyFeeAmount;
678: sum += tokenWeights[i]; | true | 106: for (uint256 i = 0; i < buys.length; i++) {
116: for (uint256 j = 0; j < buys[i].tokenIds.length; j++) {
134: for (uint256 j = 0; j < buys[i].tokenIds.length; j++) {
159: for (uint256 i = 0; i < sells.length; i++) {
161: for (uint256 j = 0; j < sells[i].tokenIds.length; j++) {
183: for (uint... | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 06-lybra | mgf15 G | High | high |
## Summary
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [GAS-1](#GAS-1) | Use assembly to check for `address(0)` | 23 |
| [GAS-2](#GAS-2) | Functions guaranteed to revert when called by normal users can be marked payable | 25 |
| [GAS-3](#GAS-3) | `keccak256()` EXPRESSIONS WHICH ARE FIXED, CAN BE PRECALCULATED AND ASSIGNED TO TH... | File:2023-06-lybra/contracts/lybra/token/PeUSD.sol
46: if (_from != address(this) && _from != spender) | File:2023-06-lybra/contracts/lybra/token/LBR.sol
64: if (_from != address(this) && _from != spender) | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/mgf15-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:09.548457+00:00 | a2834142ad381ac0df25d3d9ad27162e0b19a952f2ac482529688ef2dcb42c92 | 1 | 1 | 109 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File:2023-06-lybra/contracts/lybra/token/PeUSD.sol
46: if (_from != address(this) && _from != spender) | solidity | 109 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File:2023-06-lybra/contracts/lybra/token/PeUSD.sol
46: if (_from != address(this) && _from != spender) | 1 | false | File:2023-06-lybra/contracts/lybra/token/PeUSD.sol
46: if (_from != address(this) && _from != spender) | PeUSD.sol#L46 | PeUSD.sol | 1 | File:2023-06-lybra/contracts/lybra/token/PeUSD.sol
46: if (_from != address(this) && _from != spender) | true | File:2023-06-lybra/contracts/lybra/token/LBR.sol
64: if (_from != address(this) && _from != spender) | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | Nyxaris Q | Low | low | ## Title:
Lack of Event Emission on Ownership Transfer
## Description:
The [`transferOwnership`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/main/src/AiArenaHelper.sol#L61) function in the `AiArenaHelper` contract allows the current owner to transfer ownership to a new address. However, the function does no... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/Nyxaris-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:37.158811+00:00 | a2994a9e7e007f2541b8c7872462148f9bf324466757cc5decf723bc61b25487 | 1 | 1 | 337 | 1 | true | true | true | false | medium | + event OwnershipTransferred(address indexed previousOwner, address indexed newOwner);
function transferOwnership(address newOwnerAddress) external {
require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress, "Only the owner can transfer ownership");
+ emit OwnershipTransferred(_ownerAddress, newOwnerAddress);
_ownerAddress = n... | diff | 337 | // Code block 1 (diff):
+ event OwnershipTransferred(address indexed previousOwner, address indexed newOwner);
function transferOwnership(address newOwnerAddress) external {
require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress, "Only the owner can transfer ownership");
+ emit OwnershipTransferred(_ownerAddress, newOwnerAddress... | 1 | true | + event OwnershipTransferred(address indexed previousOwner, address indexed newOwner);
function transferOwnership(address newOwnerAddress) external {
require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress, "Only the owner can transfer ownership");
+ emit OwnershipTransferred(_ownerAddress, newOwnerAddress);
_ownerAddress = n... | AiArenaHelper.sol#L61 | AiArenaHelper.sol | 1 | false | false | false | 6.95 | ||||||
c4 | 11-kelp | 0xMosh Q | High | high | # L-01 : `shares ` are not returned !
While depositing into strategy , `eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress` contracts returns the amount of shares minted for that particular deposit . However catching that return value got skipped here in this line :
```solidity
IEigenStrategyManager(eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddre... | IEigenStrategyManager(eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress).depositIntoStrategy(IStrategy(strategy), token, balance); | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/0xMosh-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:10.953968+00:00 | a2d8f9b74a779f6948910e39b7cb3d2d1b912761fcd887dee91eb670247cd9b2 | 1 | 0 | 189 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/main/src/NodeDelegator.sol#L67
## recommendation :
I recommend to catch the returned amount and return to the user for better transparency . | unknown | 189 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/main/src/NodeDelegator.sol#L67
## recommendation :
I recommend to catch the returned amount and return to the user for better transparency . | 1 | false | NodeDelegator.sol#L67 | NodeDelegator.sol | 1 | IEigenStrategyManager(eigenlayerStrategyManagerAddress).depositIntoStrategy(IStrategy(strategy), token, balance); | true | false | false | 5.11 | |||||
c4 | 02-ethos | RaymondFam G | High | high | ## Unneeded `assert()`
The following assertion of `vars.compositeDebt != 0` is unnecessary. Even if `_LUSDAmount` has accidentally been inputted as `0` making `vars.LUSDFee == 0` too, [`_getCompositeDebt()`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/Dependencies/LiquityBase.sol#L41-L43)... | Similarly, asserting `MIN_NET_DEBT` greater than zero in `setAddresses()` of BorrowerOperations.sol is unnecessary since the constant has been assigned [90e18](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/Dependencies/LiquityBase.sol#L25) in LiquityBase.sol:
[File: BorrowerOperations.sol#... | ## Use smaller uint128 or smaller type and pack structs variables to use lesser amount of storage slots
As the solidity EVM works with 32 bytes, most variables work fine with less than 32 bytes and may be packed inside a struct when sitting next to each other so that they can be stored in the same slot, this saves gas ... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/RaymondFam-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:32.840243+00:00 | a33aaf73358160008ae3ccf8aefc8e7fcd5b4a431485cd20d4dca8821e71a976 | 2 | 2 | 74 | 5 | false | false | true | false | high | - assert(vars.compositeDebt > 0); | diff | 40 | // Code block 1 (diff):
- assert(vars.compositeDebt > 0);
// Code block 2 (diff):
- assert(MIN_NET_DEBT > 0); | 2 | true | - assert(vars.compositeDebt > 0);
- assert(MIN_NET_DEBT > 0); | LiquityBase.sol#L41-L43, BorrowerOperations.sol#L197, LiquityBase.sol#L25, BorrowerOperations.sol#L128, TroveManager.sol#L129-L138 | TroveManager.sol, BorrowerOperations.sol, LiquityBase.sol | 5 | Similarly, asserting `MIN_NET_DEBT` greater than zero in `setAddresses()` of BorrowerOperations.sol is unnecessary since the constant has been assigned [90e18](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/Dependencies/LiquityBase.sol#L25) in LiquityBase.sol:
[File: BorrowerOperations.sol#... | true | ## Use smaller uint128 or smaller type and pack structs variables to use lesser amount of storage slots
As the solidity EVM works with 32 bytes, most variables work fine with less than 32 bytes and may be packed inside a struct when sitting next to each other so that they can be stored in the same slot, this saves gas ... | true | true | 10 | ||
c4 | 02-ethos | Morraez Q | Medium | medium | ## Low Risk
ERC20 operations can be unsafe due to different implementations and vulnerabilities in the standard. To account for this, either use OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library or wrap each operation in a require statement.
Additionally, ERC20's approve functions have a known race-condition vulnerabil... | IERC20(token).transfer(msg.sender, amount);
```
#### OpenZeppelin SafeTransfer
```js
import {SafeERC20} from "openzeppelin/token/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
//--snip--
IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
```
#... | ### Gas Report | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/Morraez-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:23.445548+00:00 | a3e90ac4d837156f8e6b554597eedaf42c7a67906815bfee3e72cfe1a1d6baee | 5 | 0 | 189 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | IERC20(token).transfer(msg.sender, amount); | js | 43 | // Code block 1 (js):
IERC20(token).transfer(msg.sender, amount);
// Code block 2 (unknown):
#### Safe Transfer with require statement.
// Code block 3 (unknown):
#### Unsafe TransferFrom
// Code block 4 (unknown):
#### OpenZeppelin SafeTransferFrom
// Code block 5 (unknown):
#### Safe TransferFrom with require sta... | 5 | false | 0 | IERC20(token).transfer(msg.sender, amount);
```
#### OpenZeppelin SafeTransfer
```js
import {SafeERC20} from "openzeppelin/token/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
//--snip--
IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
```
#... | true | ### Gas Report | true | true | 10 | |||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | fyvgsk Q | High | high | ## Impact
Slippage is the difference between a trade's expected or requested price and the price at which the trade is effectively executed. It typically occurs in markets experiencing high volatility or low liquidity.
In this protocol, users cannot control the splippage when staking or unstaking derivatives. This val... | function unstake(uint256 _safEthAmount) external {
[...]
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
// withdraw a percentage of each asset based on the amount of safETH
uint256 derivativeAmount = (derivatives[i].balance() *
_safEthAmount) / safEthTotalSupply;
... | function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner {
IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount);
uint256 stEthBal = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this));
IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, stEthBal);
uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18;
IStE... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/fyvgsk-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:08.417948+00:00 | a441a8c4f96848aca40888250bfb306519dc2dbea29fb04558aed82095389192 | 3 | 0 | 1,128 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function unstake(uint256 _safEthAmount) external {
[...]
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
// withdraw a percentage of each asset based on the amount of safETH
uint256 derivativeAmount = (derivatives[i].balance() *
_safEthAmount) / safEthTotalSupply;
... | unknown | 452 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function unstake(uint256 _safEthAmount) external {
[...]
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
// withdraw a percentage of each asset based on the amount of safETH
uint256 derivativeAmount = (derivatives[i].balance() *
_safEthAmount) /... | 3 | false | 0 | function unstake(uint256 _safEthAmount) external {
[...]
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
// withdraw a percentage of each asset based on the amount of safETH
uint256 derivativeAmount = (derivatives[i].balance() *
_safEthAmount) / safEthTotalSupply;
... | true | function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner {
IWStETH(WST_ETH).unwrap(_amount);
uint256 stEthBal = IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).balanceOf(address(this));
IERC20(STETH_TOKEN).approve(LIDO_CRV_POOL, stEthBal);
uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18;
IStE... | true | true | 8 | |||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | chaduke Q | Low | low | QA1. The protocol lacks the method ``removeDerivative()``. Setting the weight for a derivative contract to ZERO will not do it since a user can still unstake from a derivative contract with zero weight.
Mitigation: 1) Call ``rebalanceToWeights()`` after any weight of the derivative contract is adjusted.
In this way, ... | uint256 underlyingValue = 0;
// Getting underlying value in terms of ETH for each derivative
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivatives[i].balance()) /
... | preDepositPrice = (10 ** 18 * underlyingValue) / totalSupply; | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/chaduke-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:57.136472+00:00 | a441d39679341e858a960c2bf2c199fcce2c8c4a0015b2243577c8a1bbd05a2f | 3 | 0 | 466 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | uint256 underlyingValue = 0;
// Getting underlying value in terms of ETH for each derivative
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivatives[i].balance()) /
... | javascript | 334 | // Code block 1 (javascript):
uint256 underlyingValue = 0;
// Getting underlying value in terms of ETH for each derivative
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivativ... | 3 | false | SafEth.sol#L63-L101 | SafEth.sol | 1 | uint256 underlyingValue = 0;
// Getting underlying value in terms of ETH for each derivative
for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivatives[i].balance()) /
... | true | preDepositPrice = (10 ** 18 * underlyingValue) / totalSupply; | true | true | 9 | |||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | 0xSmartContract Analysis | Critical | critical | # 🛠️ Analysis - AI Arena Audit
### Summary
| List |Head |Details|
|:--|:----------------|:------|
|a) |The approach I followed when reviewing the code | Stages in my code review and analysis |
|b) |Analysis of the code base | What is unique? How are the existing patterns used? "Solidity-metrics" was used |
|c) |Test... | /// @notice Returns the URI where the contract metadata is stored.
/// @return URI where the contract metadata is stored.
function contractURI() public pure returns (string memory) {
return "ipfs://bafybeih3witscmml3padf4qxbea5jh4rl2xp67aydqvqsxmyuzipwtpnii";
}
function return value;
{
"name": "... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/0xSmartContract-Analysis.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:05.123813+00:00 | a44726b1bbcfd55b637050d2b5da2131f2336739738f10ebfef9903a4be8f5a4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | /// @notice Returns the URI where the contract metadata is stored.
/// @return URI where the contract metadata is stored.
function contractURI() public pure returns (string memory) {
return "ipfs://bafybeih3witscmml3padf4qxbea5jh4rl2xp67aydqvqsxmyuzipwtpnii";
}
function return value;
{
"name": "... | true | false | false | 4 | ||||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | MatricksDeCoder G | Critical | critical | #### Gas-1 Use Assembly for Simple Getter and Setter functions
It may be possible to save on gas costs by using Yul assembly. Although generally this can be applied to all functions. This is not ideal as it can hinder readability, auditability of code, introduce errors or harm code as Yul Assembly will lack in-build ... | function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
maxSlippage = _slippage;
}
Can be rewritten
function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
assembly {
sstore(maxSlippage.slot,_slippage);
}
} | keccak256(abi.encodePacked("contract.address", "rocketTokenRETH"))
Can be saved as e.g ->
bytes32 private constant ROCKET_TOKEN_ETH = 0xe3744443225bff7cc22028be036b80de58057d65a3fdca0a3df329f525e31ccc;
So that part were used is
RocketStorageInterface(ROCKET_STORAGE_ADDRESS).getAddress(ROCKET_TOKEN_ETH) | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/MatricksDeCoder-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:19.807095+00:00 | a461eb86285dc5d12cff8890101c9e5b5cf13cbe1ddb05ac3d305008c8b580a1 | 1 | 0 | 262 | 5 | false | false | true | false | high | function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
maxSlippage = _slippage;
}
Can be rewritten
function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
assembly {
sstore(maxSlippage.slot,_slippage);
}
} | unknown | 262 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
maxSlippage = _slippage;
}
Can be rewritten
function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
assembly {
sstore(maxSlippage.slot,_slippage);
}
} | 1 | false | Reth.sol#L44, Reth.sol#L59, SfrxEth.sol#L38, SfrxEth.sol#L52, WstEth.sol#L49 | SfrxEth.sol, Reth.sol, WstEth.sol | 5 | function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
maxSlippage = _slippage;
}
Can be rewritten
function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
assembly {
sstore(maxSlippage.slot,_slippage);
}
} | true | keccak256(abi.encodePacked("contract.address", "rocketTokenRETH"))
Can be saved as e.g ->
bytes32 private constant ROCKET_TOKEN_ETH = 0xe3744443225bff7cc22028be036b80de58057d65a3fdca0a3df329f525e31ccc;
So that part were used is
RocketStorageInterface(ROCKET_STORAGE_ADDRESS).getAddress(ROCKET_TOKEN_ETH) | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | PoeAudits Q | Low | low | # Low Issues:
## Approve Function Race-Condition in Neuron.sol
Issue Type: Error
Link: https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/main/src/Neuron.sol#L171-177
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/main/src/Neuron.sol#L184-190
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/main/s... | * @dev Atomically increases the allowance granted to `spender` by the caller.
*
* This is an alternative to {approve} that can be used as a mitigation for
* problems described in {IERC20-approve}.
```
#### Tools Used
Manual Review
#### Recommended Mitigation Steps
Use increaseAllowance/d... | ```
Logs:
[PASS] testMintGameItem() (gas: 204574)
Logs:
Total Battery Allowance: 10
Remaining Allowance After Mint: 8
Remaining Allowance Next Day: 8
Remaining Allowance After Zero Mint: 10
Owner Balance Before Zero Mint: 3998000000000000000000
Owner Balance After Zero Mint: 3998000000000000000000 | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/PoeAudits-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:39.368049+00:00 | a4ab1da910e5090bde64a30c9880c60d844092c37b41db76c52951671f9f52cc | 1 | 0 | 211 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | * @dev Atomically increases the allowance granted to `spender` by the caller.
*
* This is an alternative to {approve} that can be used as a mitigation for
* problems described in {IERC20-approve}. | unknown | 211 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
* @dev Atomically increases the allowance granted to `spender` by the caller.
*
* This is an alternative to {approve} that can be used as a mitigation for
* problems described in {IERC20-approve}. | 1 | false | Neuron.sol#L171-L177, Neuron.sol#L184-L190, Neuron.sol#L196-L204, GameItems.sol#L165 | GameItems.sol, Neuron.sol | 4 | * @dev Atomically increases the allowance granted to `spender` by the caller.
*
* This is an alternative to {approve} that can be used as a mitigation for
* problems described in {IERC20-approve}.
```
#### Tools Used
Manual Review
#### Recommended Mitigation Steps
Use increaseAllowance/d... | true | ```
Logs:
[PASS] testMintGameItem() (gas: 204574)
Logs:
Total Battery Allowance: 10
Remaining Allowance After Mint: 8
Remaining Allowance Next Day: 8
Remaining Allowance After Zero Mint: 10
Owner Balance Before Zero Mint: 3998000000000000000000
Owner Balance After Zero Mint: 3998000000000000000000 | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 08-dopex | 0xhacksmithh G | High | high | ### [Gas-01] 'constant` should be a value rather than a expression
Value should directly assign to constant state variable, and a comment mentioned how that value calculated from expression
```solidity
- bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = keccak256("MINTER_ROLE");
+ bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = 0x9f2df... | - bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = keccak256("MINTER_ROLE");
+ bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = 0x9f2df0fed2c77648de5860a4cc508cd0818c85b8b8a1ab4ceeef8d981c8956a6 // keccak256("MINTER_ROLE") | // Create a new role identifier for the minter role
bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = keccak256("MINTER_ROLE");
// Create a new role identifier for the Rdpx v2 core role
bytes32 public constant RDPXV2CORE_ROLE = keccak256("RDPXV2CORE_ROLE"); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/0xhacksmithh-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:24.504203+00:00 | a4ae070c401c740633e78e3f72ff8e5795c3f4387a5413ca63f0349b5b0ad1dd | 7 | 4 | 1,504 | 7 | false | false | true | false | high | - bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = keccak256("MINTER_ROLE");
+ bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = 0x9f2df0fed2c77648de5860a4cc508cd0818c85b8b8a1ab4ceeef8d981c8956a6 // keccak256("MINTER_ROLE") | solidity | 205 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
- bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = keccak256("MINTER_ROLE");
+ bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = 0x9f2df0fed2c77648de5860a4cc508cd0818c85b8b8a1ab4ceeef8d981c8956a6 // keccak256("MINTER_ROLE")
// Code block 2 (solidity):
// Create a new role identifier for the minter role
byt... | 7 | false | - bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = keccak256("MINTER_ROLE");
+ bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = 0x9f2df0fed2c77648de5860a4cc508cd0818c85b8b8a1ab4ceeef8d981c8956a6 // keccak256("MINTER_ROLE")
// Create a new role identifier for the minter role
bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = keccak256("MINTER_ROL... | RdpxV2Bond.sol#L22, RdpxDecayingBonds.sol#L31, RdpxDecayingBonds.sol#L34, DpxEthToken.sol#L19, DpxEthToken.sol#L20, DpxEthToken.sol#L21, RdpxV2Core.sol#L88 | DpxEthToken.sol, RdpxV2Core.sol, RdpxV2Bond.sol, RdpxDecayingBonds.sol | 7 | - bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = keccak256("MINTER_ROLE");
+ bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = 0x9f2df0fed2c77648de5860a4cc508cd0818c85b8b8a1ab4ceeef8d981c8956a6 // keccak256("MINTER_ROLE") | true | // Create a new role identifier for the minter role
bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = keccak256("MINTER_ROLE");
// Create a new role identifier for the Rdpx v2 core role
bytes32 public constant RDPXV2CORE_ROLE = keccak256("RDPXV2CORE_ROLE"); | true | true | 13 | ||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | anodaram G | Medium | medium | # Dynamic updating of `totalWeight`
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/44b5cd94ebedc187a08884a7f685e950e987261c/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L169-L173
```
weights[_derivativeIndex] = _weight;
uint256 localTotalWeight = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
... | weights[_derivativeIndex] = _weight;
uint256 localTotalWeight = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
localTotalWeight += weights[i];
totalWeight = localTotalWeight; | weights[derivativeCount] = _weight;
derivativeCount++;
uint256 localTotalWeight = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
localTotalWeight += weights[i];
totalWeight = localTotalWeight; | slippage | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/anodaram-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:47.690309+00:00 | a4bbd299a3f7f2b558dd9ba485c495d52ecb2cf936f1d8fba49bf707a8a64cf3 | 4 | 0 | 1,108 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | weights[_derivativeIndex] = _weight;
uint256 localTotalWeight = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
localTotalWeight += weights[i];
totalWeight = localTotalWeight; | unknown | 212 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
weights[_derivativeIndex] = _weight;
uint256 localTotalWeight = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
localTotalWeight += weights[i];
totalWeight = localTotalWeight;
// Code block 2 (unknown):
weights[derivativeCount] = _weight;
derivati... | 4 | false | SafEth.sol#L169-L173, SafEth.sol#L187-L193, SafEth.sol#L147-L153 | SafEth.sol | 3 | weights[_derivativeIndex] = _weight;
uint256 localTotalWeight = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
localTotalWeight += weights[i];
totalWeight = localTotalWeight; | true | weights[derivativeCount] = _weight;
derivativeCount++;
uint256 localTotalWeight = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
localTotalWeight += weights[i];
totalWeight = localTotalWeight; | true | true | 10 | |||
c4 | 08-dopex | RED LOTUS REACH Analysis | Critical | critical | # Table Of Contents
- [Architectural Review and Feedback](#Architectural-Review-and-Feedback)
- [Attack Vectors to Depeg dpxETH-ETH](#Attack-Vectors-to-Depeg-dpxETH-ETH)
- [Discussion of Access Control & Centralization Risks](#Discussion-of-Access-Control-&-Centralization-Risks)
- [Market and Protocol Efficacy Risk Sc... | [L100] collateralSymbol = _collateralSymbol;
...
[L104] symbol = string.concat(_collateralSymbol, "-LP"); | constructor(
string memory _name,
string memory _symbol,
address _collateralToken,
uint256 _gensis
) ERC721(_name, _symbol) {
_validate(_collateralToken != address (0), 1);
collateralToken = IERC20WithBurn(_collateralToken);
underlyingSymbol = collateralToken.symbol();
collateralPrecision = 10 ** collateralTok... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/RED-LOTUS-REACH-Analysis.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:57.345085+00:00 | a4c12a060960f529c9391f1ffa61e7edd27faf8e3ffa1c6bc8927aec63b8ead4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | [L100] collateralSymbol = _collateralSymbol;
...
[L104] symbol = string.concat(_collateralSymbol, "-LP"); | true | constructor(
string memory _name,
string memory _symbol,
address _collateralToken,
uint256 _gensis
) ERC721(_name, _symbol) {
_validate(_collateralToken != address (0), 1);
collateralToken = IERC20WithBurn(_collateralToken);
underlyingSymbol = collateralToken.symbol();
collateralPrecision = 10 ** collateralTok... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | MatricksDeCoder Q | Critical | critical | #### L-1 Missing events for critical function and parameter updates especially admin/owner-controlled functions
Ownership transfer by the owner
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/cd1a0e6d1b40168657d1aaee8223dc050e15f8cc/src/AiArenaHelper.sol#L61
attributeDivisors by owner
https://github.com/code-4... | _safeMint(to, newId);
FighterOps.fighterCreatedEmitter(newId, weight, element, generation[fighterType]); | require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress);
or
require(isAdmin[msg.sender]); | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/MatricksDeCoder-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:33.609721+00:00 | a58fd3625eb6d96f5ebd1f40ccb525e159fac047a8a4c52090c4de380858e862 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | AiArenaHelper.sol#L61, AiArenaHelper.sol#L68, AiArenaHelper.sol#L131, AiArenaHelper.sol#L144, FighterFarm.sol#L120, FighterFarm.sol#L129, FighterFarm.sol#L139, FighterFarm.sol#L147, FighterFarm.sol#L155, FighterFarm.sol#L163, FighterFarm.sol#L171, FighterFarm.sol#L180 | AiArenaHelper.sol, FighterFarm.sol | 12 | _safeMint(to, newId);
FighterOps.fighterCreatedEmitter(newId, weight, element, generation[fighterType]); | true | require(msg.sender == _ownerAddress);
or
require(isAdmin[msg.sender]); | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 05-ajna | 14si2o_Flint Q | Critical | critical |
### Non-Critical Issues List
| Number |Issues Details|Context|
|:--:|:-------|:--:|
| [N-01]|Incorrect Error with Overflow | 1 |
| [N-02] |NatSpec Typo's |4|
| [N-03] |Wrong Natspec |1|
Total 3 issues
### [N-01] Incorrect Error with Overflow
An error specific to overflow should be used, not one for InsufficientV... | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/276942bc2f97488d07b887c8edceaaab7a5c3964/ajna-grants/src/grants/base/StandardFunding.sol#L657-L660
// and check that attempted votes cast doesn't overflow uint128
uint256 sumOfTheSquareOfVotesCast = _sumSquareOfVotesCast(votesCast);
if (sumOfTheSq... | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/276942bc2f97488d07b887c8edceaaab7a5c3964/ajna-grants/src/grants/base/StandardFunding.sol#L270
* @param currentDistribution_ Struct of the distribution period to calculat rewards for. | overflow | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/14si2o_Flint-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:52.181981+00:00 | a5a9b402a61649f370406b91b0f967f48e96f855e716e2fabe7e16c63bf8b485 | 4 | 4 | 1,209 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/276942bc2f97488d07b887c8edceaaab7a5c3964/ajna-grants/src/grants/base/StandardFunding.sol#L657-L660
// and check that attempted votes cast doesn't overflow uint128
uint256 sumOfTheSquareOfVotesCast = _sumSquareOfVotesCast(votesCast);
if (sumOfTheSq... | solidity | 479 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/276942bc2f97488d07b887c8edceaaab7a5c3964/ajna-grants/src/grants/base/StandardFunding.sol#L657-L660
// and check that attempted votes cast doesn't overflow uint128
uint256 sumOfTheSquareOfVotesCast = _sumSquareOfVotesCast(votesC... | 4 | false | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/276942bc2f97488d07b887c8edceaaab7a5c3964/ajna-grants/src/grants/base/StandardFunding.sol#L657-L660
// and check that attempted votes cast doesn't overflow uint128
uint256 sumOfTheSquareOfVotesCast = _sumSquareOfVotesCast(votesCast);
if (sumOfTheSq... | StandardFunding.sol#L657-L660, StandardFunding.sol#L270, StandardFunding.sol, IStandardFunding.sol#L175 | StandardFunding.sol, IStandardFunding.sol | 4 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/276942bc2f97488d07b887c8edceaaab7a5c3964/ajna-grants/src/grants/base/StandardFunding.sol#L657-L660
// and check that attempted votes cast doesn't overflow uint128
uint256 sumOfTheSquareOfVotesCast = _sumSquareOfVotesCast(votesCast);
if (sumOfTheSq... | true | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/276942bc2f97488d07b887c8edceaaab7a5c3964/ajna-grants/src/grants/base/StandardFunding.sol#L270
* @param currentDistribution_ Struct of the distribution period to calculat rewards for. | true | true | 10 | ||
c4 | 10-badger | jamshed G | High | high |
## \[G‑01\] Save gas by preventing zero amount in mint() and burn()[](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-maia/blob/main/src/token/ERC20hTokenRoot.sol#L57C4-L72C6)
```
function mint(address _account, uint256 _amount) external override {
_requireCallerIsBOorCdpMOrAuth();
_mint(_account, _amoun... | function mint(address _account, uint256 _amount) external override {
_requireCallerIsBOorCdpMOrAuth();
_mint(_account, _amount);
}
/// @notice Burn existing tokens
/// @dev Internal system function - only callable by BorrowerOperations or CDPManager
/// @dev Governance can also expand t... | collateral.transferFrom(address(receiver), address(this), amountWithFee); | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/jamshed-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:51.555688+00:00 | a5bf53ccf968d7b602a3dcc4ed5149f0f2c7d7a62475168bbaaf7119d480c8c4 | 2 | 0 | 1,152 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | function mint(address _account, uint256 _amount) external override {
_requireCallerIsBOorCdpMOrAuth();
_mint(_account, _amount);
}
/// @notice Burn existing tokens
/// @dev Internal system function - only callable by BorrowerOperations or CDPManager
/// @dev Governance can also expand t... | unknown | 1,079 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function mint(address _account, uint256 _amount) external override {
_requireCallerIsBOorCdpMOrAuth();
_mint(_account, _amount);
}
/// @notice Burn existing tokens
/// @dev Internal system function - only callable by BorrowerOperations or CDPManager
/// @dev G... | 2 | false | ERC20hTokenRoot.sol#L57-L4, EBTCToken.sol#L85-L3, VirtualAccount.sol#L61-L5 | EBTCToken.sol, ERC20hTokenRoot.sol, VirtualAccount.sol | 3 | function mint(address _account, uint256 _amount) external override {
_requireCallerIsBOorCdpMOrAuth();
_mint(_account, _amount);
}
/// @notice Burn existing tokens
/// @dev Internal system function - only callable by BorrowerOperations or CDPManager
/// @dev Governance can also expand t... | true | collateral.transferFrom(address(receiver), address(this), amountWithFee); | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 02-ethos | bitsurfer Q | Critical | critical | # No Maximum (or Minimum) on distribution period value
In `CommunityIssuance.sol`, the `distributionPeriod` is not being having a minimum and maximum value (or range limitation).
Recommendation is to have a range value (min - max) to ensure the distribution period is in valid and meaningful value.
```js
File: Comm... | File: CommunityIssuance.sol
120: function updateDistributionPeriod(uint256 _newDistributionPeriod) external onlyOwner {
121: distributionPeriod = _newDistributionPeriod;
122: } | File: LUSDToken.sol
262: function permit
263: (
264: address owner,
265: address spender,
266: uint amount,
267: uint deadline,
268: uint8 v,
269: bytes32 r,
270: bytes32 s
271: )
272: external
273: override
274: {
275: ... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/bitsurfer-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:52.174811+00:00 | a6009e0404ff157404832cec7bf9653f34053328032fd2b7bdf250fe01f6b472 | 1 | 0 | 192 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File: CommunityIssuance.sol
120: function updateDistributionPeriod(uint256 _newDistributionPeriod) external onlyOwner {
121: distributionPeriod = _newDistributionPeriod;
122: } | js | 192 | // Code block 1 (js):
File: CommunityIssuance.sol
120: function updateDistributionPeriod(uint256 _newDistributionPeriod) external onlyOwner {
121: distributionPeriod = _newDistributionPeriod;
122: } | 1 | false | ECDSA.sol | ECDSA.sol | 1 | File: CommunityIssuance.sol
120: function updateDistributionPeriod(uint256 _newDistributionPeriod) external onlyOwner {
121: distributionPeriod = _newDistributionPeriod;
122: } | true | File: LUSDToken.sol
262: function permit
263: (
264: address owner,
265: address spender,
266: uint amount,
267: uint deadline,
268: uint8 v,
269: bytes32 r,
270: bytes32 s
271: )
272: external
273: override
274: {
275: ... | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 07-amphora | SM3_SS Q | Critical | critical |
## Low Risk Issues
| NO |Issue | Instances |
|:----:|:-----:|:---------:|
| L-01 | External call recipient may consume all transaction gas | 1 |
| L-02 | Allowed fees/rates should be capped by smart contracts | 3 |
| L-03 | address shouldn't be hard-coded | 4 |
| L-04 | State variables no... | file: contracts/governance/GovernorCharlie.sol
350 (bool _success, /*bytes memory returnData*/ ) = _target.call{value: _value}(_callData);
| // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
contract LendingProtocol {
uint256 public constant MAX_FEE_PERCENT = 1; // 1% maximum fee allowed
function lend(uint256 amount) external payable {
uint256 fee = (amount * MAX_FEE_PERCENT) / 100;
require(msg.value >= fee, "Insufficient fee... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/SM3_SS-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:35.415387+00:00 | a679552d05ea9e8091d5d09519e90d8ab6f099cd0f6c8d8e25e093d2f40479ba | 1 | 1 | 143 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | file: contracts/governance/GovernorCharlie.sol
350 (bool _success, /*bytes memory returnData*/ ) = _target.call{value: _value}(_callData); | solidity | 143 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
file: contracts/governance/GovernorCharlie.sol
350 (bool _success, /*bytes memory returnData*/ ) = _target.call{value: _value}(_callData); | 1 | false | file: contracts/governance/GovernorCharlie.sol
350 (bool _success, /*bytes memory returnData*/ ) = _target.call{value: _value}(_callData); | GovernorCharlie.sol#L350 | GovernorCharlie.sol | 1 | file: contracts/governance/GovernorCharlie.sol
350 (bool _success, /*bytes memory returnData*/ ) = _target.call{value: _value}(_callData);
| true | // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
contract LendingProtocol {
uint256 public constant MAX_FEE_PERCENT = 1; // 1% maximum fee allowed
function lend(uint256 amount) external payable {
uint256 fee = (amount * MAX_FEE_PERCENT) / 100;
require(msg.value >= fee, "Insufficient fee... | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 04-caviar | catellatech G | High | high | # Summary
|ID | Optimization Details| Gas saved |Instances|
|:----: | :--- | :----: |:----: |
| [G-01] | DUPLICATED REQUIRE()/IF() CHECKS SHOULD BE REFACTORED TO A MODIFIER OR FUNCTION | 688 | 12 |
| [G-02] | <X> += <Y> COSTS MORE GAS THAN <X> = <X> + <Y> FOR STATE VARIABLES (-= TOO)| 1... | main/src/EthRouter.sol
// @audit Add a modifier
101: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
154: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
228: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
256: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) { | main/src/PrivatePool.sol
// @audit Add a modifier
225: if (baseToken != address(0) && msg.value > 0)
397: if (baseToken != address(0) && msg.value > 0)
254: if (baseToken != address(0)) {
278: if (baseToken != address(0)) {
345: if (baseToken != address(0)) {
421: if (baseToken != address(0)) {
500: if... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/catellatech-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:20.689805+00:00 | a6b3838e22c9fa4733d2f763a1841b69b1f3ce8671e6813f681e9560263a3b72 | 1 | 1 | 281 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | main/src/EthRouter.sol
// @audit Add a modifier
101: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
154: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
228: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
256: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) { | solidity | 281 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
main/src/EthRouter.sol
// @audit Add a modifier
101: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
154: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
228: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
256: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) { | 1 | false | main/src/EthRouter.sol
// @audit Add a modifier
101: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
154: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
228: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
256: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) { | EthRouter.sol#L101, EthRouter.sol#L154, EthRouter.sol#L228, EthRouter.sol#L256 | EthRouter.sol | 4 | main/src/EthRouter.sol
// @audit Add a modifier
101: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
154: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
228: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) {
256: if (block.timestamp > deadline && deadline != 0) { | true | main/src/PrivatePool.sol
// @audit Add a modifier
225: if (baseToken != address(0) && msg.value > 0)
397: if (baseToken != address(0) && msg.value > 0)
254: if (baseToken != address(0)) {
278: if (baseToken != address(0)) {
345: if (baseToken != address(0)) {
421: if (baseToken != address(0)) {
500: if... | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 01-salty | Giorgio Q | High | high | ## The minimum collateral value can be bypassed, no liquidation incentive for
small borrows
## Summary
`minimumCollateralValueForBorrowing` can be bypassed allowing for small position with small collateral.
## Details
A `minimumCollateralValueForBorrowing` is set at a base of 2500 usd.
The reason for this val... | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL 1.1
pragma solidity =0.8.22;
import "../../dev/Deployment.sol";
import "../../price_feed/tests/ForcedPriceFeed.sol";
contract TestCollateral is Deployment
{
// User wallets for testing
address public constant alice = address(0x1111);
address public constant bob = address(0x... | uint256 rewardedWBTC = (reclaimedWBTC * rewardPercent) / 100;
uint256 rewardedWETH = (reclaimedWETH * rewardPercent) / 100;
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/Giorgio-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:16.532206+00:00 | a6ce60950658bdec7ec3e88da8449526f8b9c56562e69eba0c136683ad22005c | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL 1.1
pragma solidity =0.8.22;
import "../../dev/Deployment.sol";
import "../../price_feed/tests/ForcedPriceFeed.sol";
contract TestCollateral is Deployment
{
// User wallets for testing
address public constant alice = address(0x1111);
address public constant bob = address(0x... | true | uint256 rewardedWBTC = (reclaimedWBTC * rewardPercent) / 100;
uint256 rewardedWETH = (reclaimedWETH * rewardPercent) / 100;
| true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | coryli Q | Low | low | ## Pragma version `^0.8.19` is too recent to be trusted.
Unexpected bugs may come up over time. It's better to choose a lower more battle-tested version. `0.8.10` is recommended.
### Instances
`PrivatePool.sol#L2` `Factory.sol#L2` `EthRouter.sol#L2` `IStolenNftOracle.sol#L2` `PrivatePoolMetadata.sol#L2`
## Use `safeT... | This does arguably give a lot of power to the owner though since they can basically drain the pool at any moment. Proceed with caution...
## Pool events missing parameters.
Contracts or web pages listening to events cannot react to users' activity since emit does not include the original sender of the transaction.
##... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/coryli-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:24.696673+00:00 | a715afe3fd179b81d7c8981a66f600fe4b4fdf501a9549f3bc18edd095587c85 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | This does arguably give a lot of power to the owner though since they can basically drain the pool at any moment. Proceed with caution...
## Pool events missing parameters.
Contracts or web pages listening to events cannot react to users' activity since emit does not include the original sender of the transaction.
##... | true | false | false | 4 | ||||||||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | __141345__ Q | Gas | gas | #### Unused/empty `receive()/fallback()` function
If the intention is for the Ether to be used, the function should call another function, otherwise it should revert (e.g. require(msg.sender == address(weth))). Having no access control on the function means that someone may send Ether to the contract, and have no way ... | File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol
550: receive() external payable {}
551: }
File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountNoAuth.sol
540: receive() external payable {}
541: }
File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/samples/SimpleAccount.... | File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/utils/GasEstimatorSmartAccount.sol
21: (success, result) = _actualWallet.call(_data);
22: gas = initialGas - gasleft(); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/__141345__-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:28.357899+00:00 | a760b36f52fb50fe35df9dbcc253302a1a08d5c03890d3985aa2bf4bd67c2676 | 2 | 2 | 540 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol
550: receive() external payable {}
551: }
File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountNoAuth.sol
540: receive() external payable {}
541: }
File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/samples/SimpleAccount.... | solidity | 361 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol
550: receive() external payable {}
551: }
File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountNoAuth.sol
540: receive() external payable {}
541: }
File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa... | 2 | false | File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol
550: receive() external payable {}
551: }
File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountNoAuth.sol
540: receive() external payable {}
541: }
File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/samples/SimpleAccount.... | 0 | File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol
550: receive() external payable {}
551: }
File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccountNoAuth.sol
540: receive() external payable {}
541: }
File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/samples/SimpleAccount.... | true | File: scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/utils/GasEstimatorSmartAccount.sol
21: (success, result) = _actualWallet.call(_data);
22: gas = initialGas - gasleft(); | true | true | 6.29 | ||||
c4 | 02-ethos | NoamYakov G | Low | low |
## Summary
### Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Instances|Total Gas Saved|
|-|:-|:-:|:-:|
| [G‑01] | Multiple `address`/ID mappings can be combined into a single `mapping` of an `address`/ID to a `struct`, where appropriate | 1 | 87,330 |
| [G‑02] | State variables can be packed into fewer storage slots | 2 ... | /// @audit can be a mapping of an address to a struct of 3 bools
62 mapping (address => bool) public troveManagers;
63 mapping (address => bool) public stabilityPools;
64 mapping (address => bool) public borrowerOperations; | /// @audit can be packed into 1 storage slot
37 bool public mintingPaused = false;
69 address public borrowerOperationsAddress; | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/NoamYakov-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:23.897120+00:00 | a773b41388956b615d3f1e9ee6546606a8ebf0dfc1dd6d5408c3314d9a09abad | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | LUSDToken.sol#L62-L64 | LUSDToken.sol | 1 | /// @audit can be a mapping of an address to a struct of 3 bools
62 mapping (address => bool) public troveManagers;
63 mapping (address => bool) public stabilityPools;
64 mapping (address => bool) public borrowerOperations; | true | /// @audit can be packed into 1 storage slot
37 bool public mintingPaused = false;
69 address public borrowerOperationsAddress; | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | McToady G | Medium | medium | ### [G-01] Structs in `FightersOps` can be better packed to save number of SSTOREs used when setting
The structs `FighterPhysicalAttributes` and `Fighter` can both be reorded and/or use smaller uint types to save users gas when these structs are saved in storage.
## FighterPhysicalAttributes
Currently when this struct... | struct Fighter {
uint8 weight;
uint8 element;
uint16 id;
uint8 generation;
uint8 iconsType;
bool dendroidBool;
FighterPhysicalAttributes physicalAttributes;
string modelHash;
string modelType;
} | ## [G-02] `RankedBattle::claimFighters` could use a struct for `nftsClaimed` to reduce the number of SSTORE's required
Currently it requires two SSTOREs to update the number of fighters & dendroids minted by a user.
However it would be possible to reduce this to one by creating a `FightersMinted` struct.
See the foll... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/McToady-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:34.502691+00:00 | a8712fc15816751804df7128a9100e4863bf36434575c8442a4f295817625afd | 1 | 1 | 270 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | struct Fighter {
uint8 weight;
uint8 element;
uint16 id;
uint8 generation;
uint8 iconsType;
bool dendroidBool;
FighterPhysicalAttributes physicalAttributes;
string modelHash;
string modelType;
} | solidity | 270 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
struct Fighter {
uint8 weight;
uint8 element;
uint16 id;
uint8 generation;
uint8 iconsType;
bool dendroidBool;
FighterPhysicalAttributes physicalAttributes;
string modelHash;
string modelType;
} | 1 | false | struct Fighter {
uint8 weight;
uint8 element;
uint16 id;
uint8 generation;
uint8 iconsType;
bool dendroidBool;
FighterPhysicalAttributes physicalAttributes;
string modelHash;
string modelType;
} | 0 | struct Fighter {
uint8 weight;
uint8 element;
uint16 id;
uint8 generation;
uint8 iconsType;
bool dendroidBool;
FighterPhysicalAttributes physicalAttributes;
string modelHash;
string modelType;
} | true | ## [G-02] `RankedBattle::claimFighters` could use a struct for `nftsClaimed` to reduce the number of SSTORE's required
Currently it requires two SSTOREs to update the number of fighters & dendroids minted by a user.
However it would be possible to reduce this to one by creating a `FightersMinted` struct.
See the foll... | true | true | 6 | ||||
c4 | 10-badger | hihen G | Critical | critical | # Gas Report
## Summary
Total **722 instances** over **46 issues**with **358776** gas saved:
|ID|Issue|Instances|Gas|
|:--:|:---|:--:|:--:|
| [[G‑01]](#g01-use-storage-instead-of-memory-for-structsarrays) | Use `storage` instead of `memory` for structs/arrays | 1 | 4200 |
| [[G‑02]](#g02-constructors-c... | 522: Node memory _node = data.nodes[_id]; | 46: constructor(
47: address _borrowerOperationsAddress,
48: address _cdpManagerAddress,
49: address _collTokenAddress,
50: address _collSurplusAddress,
51: address _feeRecipientAddress
52: ) { | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/hihen-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:49.642577+00:00 | a8c8a7c128932a71b966e67e6a2142d075ab8c9d38ea8203506d182b0bd2312f | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | 522: Node memory _node = data.nodes[_id]; | true | 46: constructor(
47: address _borrowerOperationsAddress,
48: address _cdpManagerAddress,
49: address _collTokenAddress,
50: address _collSurplusAddress,
51: address _feeRecipientAddress
52: ) { | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | Rolezn G | Medium | medium | ## Summary<a name="Summary">
### Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Contexts|Estimated Gas Saved|
|-|:-|:-|:-:|
| [GAS‑1](#GAS‑1) | Setting the `constructor` to `payable` | 4 | 52 |
| [GAS‑2](#GAS‑2) | Duplicated `require()`/`revert()` Checks Should Be Refactored To A Modifier Or Function | 2 | 56 ... | 38: constructor() | 33: constructor() | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Rolezn-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:29.667629+00:00 | a8cea345da14ddd296aa66f679d871d03575d7fc7f4bbf3cd8a996486a2f78e1 | 3 | 3 | 51 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | 38: constructor() | solidity | 17 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
38: constructor()
// Code block 2 (solidity):
33: constructor()
// Code block 3 (solidity):
27: constructor() | 3 | false | 38: constructor()
33: constructor()
27: constructor() | SafEth.sol#L38, Reth.sol#L33 | Reth.sol, SafEth.sol | 2 | 38: constructor() | true | 33: constructor() | true | true | 9 | ||
c4 | 01-biconomy | peanuts Q | Low | low | ### [L-01] Initializers can be frontrunnable
If the initializer is not executed in the same transaction as the constructor, a malicious user can front-run the initialize() call, forcing the contract to be redeployed.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/53c8c3823175aeb26dee5529eeefa81240a406ba/scw-con... | import {ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol"; | import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol"; | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/peanuts-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:14:01.596017+00:00 | a91231035b43f2d388f32e5d1cac386b5c9c8768ac28c398fed2441f6c5209e3 | 1 | 0 | 119 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | import {ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol"; | unknown | 119 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
import {ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol"; | 1 | false | SmartAccount.sol#L166-L176, SmartAccount.sol#L109-L125, SmartAccount.sol#L550, SmartAccount.sol#L347 | SmartAccount.sol | 4 | import {ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol"; | true | import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol"; | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | c3phas G | High | high | ### Table of Contents
- [FINDINGS](#findings)
- [Cache storage values in memory to minimize SLOADs](#cache-storage-values-in-memory-to-minimize-sloads)
- [SafEth.sol.stake(): derivativeCount being a storage variable should not be looped into as it's too costly,consider caching it](#safethsolstake-derivativecount-bein... | File: /contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
63: function stake() external payable {
70: // Getting underlying value in terms of ETH for each derivative
71: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
84: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) { | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/44b5cd94ebedc187a08884a7f685e950e987261c/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L108-L129
### SafEth.sol.unstake(): derivativeCount should be cached especially because it's being used in a for loop | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/c3phas-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:53.070934+00:00 | a9211afc7db9d148ef6448044ccda3a4d74fce7cb732409dd09bae928a2e38f1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | SafEth.sol#L108-L129 | SafEth.sol | 1 | File: /contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
63: function stake() external payable {
70: // Getting underlying value in terms of ETH for each derivative
71: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
84: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) { | true | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/44b5cd94ebedc187a08884a7f685e950e987261c/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L108-L129
### SafEth.sol.unstake(): derivativeCount should be cached especially because it's being used in a for loop | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 06-lybra | koxuan Q | Critical | critical | # Report
## Non Critical Issues
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [NC-1](#NC-1) | Expressions for constant values such as a call to keccak256(), should use immutable rather than constant | 7 |
| [NC-2](#NC-2) | Constants in comparisons should appear on the left side | 31 |
| [NC-3](#NC-3) | delete keyword can be use... | File: lybra/configuration/LybraConfigurator.sol
76: bytes32 public constant DAO = keccak256("DAO");
77: bytes32 public constant TIMELOCK = keccak256("TIMELOCK");
78: bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN");
| File: lybra/governance/GovernanceTimelock.sol
10: bytes32 public constant DAO = keccak256("DAO");
11: bytes32 public constant TIMELOCK = keccak256("TIMELOCK");
12: bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN");
13: bytes32 public constant GOV = keccak256("GOV");
| reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/koxuan-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:05.115719+00:00 | a9384a9c46944559f1e1412127db47593d9b824a33547f98f75885cad8683ed2 | 2 | 2 | 519 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | File: lybra/configuration/LybraConfigurator.sol
76: bytes32 public constant DAO = keccak256("DAO");
77: bytes32 public constant TIMELOCK = keccak256("TIMELOCK");
78: bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN"); | solidity | 232 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: lybra/configuration/LybraConfigurator.sol
76: bytes32 public constant DAO = keccak256("DAO");
77: bytes32 public constant TIMELOCK = keccak256("TIMELOCK");
78: bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN");
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: lybra/governance/Governa... | 2 | false | File: lybra/configuration/LybraConfigurator.sol
76: bytes32 public constant DAO = keccak256("DAO");
77: bytes32 public constant TIMELOCK = keccak256("TIMELOCK");
78: bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN");
File: lybra/governance/GovernanceTimelock.sol
10: bytes32 public constant DAO = k... | 0 | File: lybra/configuration/LybraConfigurator.sol
76: bytes32 public constant DAO = keccak256("DAO");
77: bytes32 public constant TIMELOCK = keccak256("TIMELOCK");
78: bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN");
| true | File: lybra/governance/GovernanceTimelock.sol
10: bytes32 public constant DAO = keccak256("DAO");
11: bytes32 public constant TIMELOCK = keccak256("TIMELOCK");
12: bytes32 public constant ADMIN = keccak256("ADMIN");
13: bytes32 public constant GOV = keccak256("GOV");
| true | true | 7 | ||||
c4 | 01-salty | TarunRao0 Q | Medium | medium | ## [L-6] Additional Instance of Division before Multiplication
**Description** :
Found another instance where multiplication is performed on the result of division in `PoolMath::_zapSwapAmount`
**Impact** :
Precision loss from rounding errors
**Proof of Code** :
```javascript
uint256 C = r0 * ( r1 * z0 - r0 * ... | uint256 C = r0 * ( r1 * z0 - r0 * z1 ) / ( r1 + z1 ); | rounding | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/TarunRao0-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:29.560297+00:00 | a99218b06b6fdc7a52dfaf6df2fcfd6952f2b91669ea5cde162ff5a93f2f7dd0 | 1 | 0 | 53 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | uint256 C = r0 * ( r1 * z0 - r0 * z1 ) / ( r1 + z1 ); | javascript | 53 | // Code block 1 (javascript):
uint256 C = r0 * ( r1 * z0 - r0 * z1 ) / ( r1 + z1 ); | 1 | false | PoolMath.sol#L192 | PoolMath.sol | 1 | uint256 C = r0 * ( r1 * z0 - r0 * z1 ) / ( r1 + z1 ); | true | false | false | 3.97 | |||||
c4 | 11-kelp | joaovwfreire Q | High | high | ## lo-01 LRTConfig doesn't remove supported assets
The contract only allows the manager to add new supported assets by calling addNewSupportedAsset, but there is not function to remove an asset.
## lo-02 No upper limits on the amount of supported assets can lead to DOS
[Reference](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11... | function _addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(asset);
if (isSupportedAsset[asset]) {
revert AssetAlreadySupported();
}
isSupportedAsset[asset] = true;
supportedAssetList.push(asset);
depositLimitB... | uint256 supportedAssetCount = supportedAssets.length;
for (uint16 asset_idx; asset_idx < supportedAssetCount;) {
address asset = supportedAssets[asset_idx];
uint256 assetER = getAssetPrice(asset);
uint256 totalAssetAmt = ILRTDepositPool(lrtDepositPoolAddr).getTotalAsse... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/joaovwfreire-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:28:11.344557+00:00 | aa1543fa81fdce0b4c896a46a318a03433d498bc3f098723848a9afa7ded18b7 | 2 | 2 | 872 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | function _addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(asset);
if (isSupportedAsset[asset]) {
revert AssetAlreadySupported();
}
isSupportedAsset[asset] = true;
supportedAssetList.push(asset);
depositLimitByAss... | solidity | 410 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function _addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(asset);
if (isSupportedAsset[asset]) {
revert AssetAlreadySupported();
}
isSupportedAsset[asset] = true;
supportedAssetList.push(asset... | 2 | false | function _addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(asset);
if (isSupportedAsset[asset]) {
revert AssetAlreadySupported();
}
isSupportedAsset[asset] = true;
supportedAssetList.push(asset);
depositLimitByAss... | LRTConfig.sol#L80-L89 | LRTConfig.sol | 1 | function _addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, uint256 depositLimit) private {
UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(asset);
if (isSupportedAsset[asset]) {
revert AssetAlreadySupported();
}
isSupportedAsset[asset] = true;
supportedAssetList.push(asset);
depositLimitB... | true | uint256 supportedAssetCount = supportedAssets.length;
for (uint16 asset_idx; asset_idx < supportedAssetCount;) {
address asset = supportedAssets[asset_idx];
uint256 assetER = getAssetPrice(asset);
uint256 totalAssetAmt = ILRTDepositPool(lrtDepositPoolAddr).getTotalAsse... | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 07-amphora | excalibor G | Low | low | # Gas Report
**All gas tables are gotten from the repositories tests, and they do not implement the general design changes unless stated otherwise**
## General Design
1. For loops we should always write them as such
```solidity
for(uint256 i; i<cachedLength;) {
// Logic
unchecked { ++i;}
}
```
for example [here](http... | for(uint256 i; i<cachedLength;) {
// Logic
unchecked { ++i;}
} | /// @dev Percentage of rewards taken in CVX (1e18 == 100%)
uint128 public cvxRewardFee;
/// @dev Percentage of rewards taken in CRV (1e18 == 100%)
uint128 public crvRewardFee; | oracle | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/excalibor-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:46.157072+00:00 | aa1c32709ff64049aa61c51c7211365efdd01fc4ca553c572fcb65e211fa4494 | 1 | 1 | 64 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | for(uint256 i; i<cachedLength;) {
// Logic
unchecked { ++i;}
} | solidity | 64 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
for(uint256 i; i<cachedLength;) {
// Logic
unchecked { ++i;}
} | 1 | false | for(uint256 i; i<cachedLength;) {
// Logic
unchecked { ++i;}
} | USDA.sol#L48-L4, USDA.sol#L21, VaultController.sol#L258-L8, VaultController.sol#L290-L2 | VaultController.sol, USDA.sol | 4 | for(uint256 i; i<cachedLength;) {
// Logic
unchecked { ++i;}
} | true | /// @dev Percentage of rewards taken in CVX (1e18 == 100%)
uint128 public cvxRewardFee;
/// @dev Percentage of rewards taken in CRV (1e18 == 100%)
uint128 public crvRewardFee; | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 09-ondo | wahedtalash77 G | Low | low | | |
| --- |
| \[G-01\] abi.encode() is less efficient than abi.encodePacked() |
| \[G-02\] Events are not indexed |
| \[G-03\] Make 3 event parameters indexed when possible |
| \[G-04\] Expressions for constant values such as a call to `keccak256()`, should use immutable rather than constant |
| \[G-05\] Do not cal... | bytes memory payload = abi.encode(VERSION, msg.sender, amount, nonce++); | event ApproverRemoved(address approver);
/**
* @notice event emitted when an address is added as an approver
*
* @param approver The address to add
*/
event ApproverAdded(address approver);
/**
* @notice event emitted when a new contract is whitelisted as an approved
* message passer.... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/wahedtalash77-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:21.148528+00:00 | aa389ca334d6169b3e7c2c6bfcfcbbb14b7faba749de496582b270284b1aa017 | 1 | 0 | 72 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | bytes memory payload = abi.encode(VERSION, msg.sender, amount, nonce++); | unknown | 72 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
bytes memory payload = abi.encode(VERSION, msg.sender, amount, nonce++); | 1 | false | SourceBridge.sol#L79 | SourceBridge.sol | 1 | bytes memory payload = abi.encode(VERSION, msg.sender, amount, nonce++); | true | event ApproverRemoved(address approver);
/**
* @notice event emitted when an address is added as an approver
*
* @param approver The address to add
*/
event ApproverAdded(address approver);
/**
* @notice event emitted when a new contract is whitelisted as an approved
* message passer.... | true | true | 7 | |||
c4 | 06-lybra | Kaysoft G | Gas | gas | ## [G-1] Refactor to avoid emitting already available data in the transaction - block.timestamp.
Refactor code to remove `block.timestamp` from the emitted events because it is already available in the transaction.
This would save loading data into memory (potentially avoiding memory expansion costs) and Glogdata (8 ... | emit DepositEther(msg.sender, address(collateralAsset), msg.value, balance - preBalance, block.timestamp); | function notifyRewardAmount(uint256 amount, uint256 tokenType) external {
require(msg.sender == address(configurator));
if (totalStaked() == 0) return;
require(amount > 0, "amount = 0"); //@audit require statement should be at the top
if (tokenType == 0) {
uint256 share = IEU... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/Kaysoft-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:22:25.067478+00:00 | aa39af7fe65a49ec6714ecfb9da2e5d31ae1623fe5fd20dcb165e21afe23699b | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | LybraRETHVault.sol#L38, LybraConfigurator.sol#L139, LybraConfigurator.sol#L149, ProtocolRewardsPool.sol#L106, ProtocolRewardsPool.sol#L97, ProtocolRewardsPool.sol#L146, ProtocolRewardsPool.sol#L214, LybraStETHVault.sol#L89, LybraWbETHVault.sol#L31, LybraWstETHVault.sol#L45 | LybraConfigurator.sol, LybraWstETHVault.sol, ProtocolRewardsPool.sol, LybraRETHVault.sol, LybraStETHVault.sol, LybraWbETHVault.sol | 10 | emit DepositEther(msg.sender, address(collateralAsset), msg.value, balance - preBalance, block.timestamp); | true | function notifyRewardAmount(uint256 amount, uint256 tokenType) external {
require(msg.sender == address(configurator));
if (totalStaked() == 0) return;
require(amount > 0, "amount = 0"); //@audit require statement should be at the top
if (tokenType == 0) {
uint256 share = IEU... | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | KrisApostolov G | Low | low | ## Low severity findings
## Table of contents
| | Issue | Instances |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [L-01] | mulDivUp always produces a more precise output than division | 1 |
| [L-02] | No 0 length check for tokenIds arrays leads to strange behavior | 9 |
## [L-01] **`mulDivUp`** always produces a more precise output than... | FixedPointMathLib.mulDivUp(inputAmount, virtualBaseTokenReserves, (virtualNftReserves+ inputAmount)); | EthRouter.sol
ERC721(nft).setApprovalForAll(privatePool, true); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/KrisApostolov-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:47.863475+00:00 | ab441d711ddcc26128395876117c8ae4ebe14dce4b8f5f8521ef297dd0ffc5e4 | 1 | 1 | 101 | 7 | false | false | true | false | high | FixedPointMathLib.mulDivUp(inputAmount, virtualBaseTokenReserves, (virtualNftReserves+ inputAmount)); | solidity | 101 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
FixedPointMathLib.mulDivUp(inputAmount, virtualBaseTokenReserves, (virtualNftReserves+ inputAmount)); | 1 | false | FixedPointMathLib.mulDivUp(inputAmount, virtualBaseTokenReserves, (virtualNftReserves+ inputAmount)); | PrivatePool.sol#L719, PrivatePool.sol#L211-L289, PrivatePool.sol#L301-L373, PrivatePool.sol#L385-L452, PrivatePool.sol#L484-L507, PrivatePool.sol#L514-L532, EthRouter.sol#L99-L144 | EthRouter.sol, PrivatePool.sol | 7 | FixedPointMathLib.mulDivUp(inputAmount, virtualBaseTokenReserves, (virtualNftReserves+ inputAmount)); | true | EthRouter.sol
ERC721(nft).setApprovalForAll(privatePool, true); | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 09-ondo | klau5 Q | Gas | gas | # `TransferShares` event parameter is not correct
## Links to affected code
[https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L439](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L439)
... | event TransferShares(
address indexed from,
address indexed to,
uint256 sharesValue
);
function wrap(uint256 _USDYAmount) external whenNotPaused {
require(_USDYAmount > 0, "rUSDY: can't wrap zero USDY tokens");
_mintShares(msg.sender, _USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR);
usdy.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(th... | # Remove useless inheritance
## Links to affected code
[https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L21](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L21)
[https://github.com/cod... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/klau5-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:02.318707+00:00 | ab64bc42adedec64d8182789e79f9350003485af813e438056dbfaf6a7a1428f | 2 | 2 | 928 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | event TransferShares(
address indexed from,
address indexed to,
uint256 sharesValue
);
function wrap(uint256 _USDYAmount) external whenNotPaused {
require(_USDYAmount > 0, "rUSDY: can't wrap zero USDY tokens");
_mintShares(msg.sender, _USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR);
usdy.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(th... | solidity | 472 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
event TransferShares(
address indexed from,
address indexed to,
uint256 sharesValue
);
function wrap(uint256 _USDYAmount) external whenNotPaused {
require(_USDYAmount > 0, "rUSDY: can't wrap zero USDY tokens");
_mintShares(msg.sender, _USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR);
usdy.transfe... | 2 | true | function wrap(uint256 _USDYAmount) external whenNotPaused {
require(_USDYAmount > 0, "rUSDY: can't wrap zero USDY tokens");
_mintShares(msg.sender, _USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR);
usdy.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _USDYAmount);
emit Transfer(address(0), msg.sender, getRUSDYByShares(_USDYAmount));
- e... | event TransferShares(
address indexed from,
address indexed to,
uint256 sharesValue
);
function wrap(uint256 _USDYAmount) external whenNotPaused {
require(_USDYAmount > 0, "rUSDY: can't wrap zero USDY tokens");
_mintShares(msg.sender, _USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR);
usdy.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(th... | rUSDY.sol#L439, rUSDY.sol#L21, rUSDY.sol#L59 | rUSDY.sol | 3 | event TransferShares(
address indexed from,
address indexed to,
uint256 sharesValue
);
function wrap(uint256 _USDYAmount) external whenNotPaused {
require(_USDYAmount > 0, "rUSDY: can't wrap zero USDY tokens");
_mintShares(msg.sender, _USDYAmount * BPS_DENOMINATOR);
usdy.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(th... | true | # Remove useless inheritance
## Links to affected code
[https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L21](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/usdy/rUSDY.sol#L21)
[https://github.com/cod... | true | true | 10 | |
c4 | 02-ethos | matrix_0wl Q | Critical | critical | # Summary
## Low Risk and Non-Critical Issues
## Non-Critical Issues
| | Issue |
| ----- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| NC-1 | ADD TO I... | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/ActivePool.sol
62: event ActivePoolLUSDDebtUpdated(address _collateral, uint _LUSDDebt);
| File: Ethos-Core/contracts/ActivePool.sol
71: function setAddresses(
125: function setYieldingPercentage(address _collateral, uint256 _bps) external onlyOwner {
132: function setYieldingPercentageDrift(uint256 _driftBps) external onlyOwner {
138: function setYieldClaimThreshold(address _collateral, ... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/matrix_0wl-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:23.990241+00:00 | ab82516c9bc30c8ebda0543493620887ea141d978336e565a27a946ce8521533 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/ActivePool.sol
62: event ActivePoolLUSDDebtUpdated(address _collateral, uint _LUSDDebt);
| true | File: Ethos-Core/contracts/ActivePool.sol
71: function setAddresses(
125: function setYieldingPercentage(address _collateral, uint256 _bps) external onlyOwner {
132: function setYieldingPercentageDrift(uint256 _driftBps) external onlyOwner {
138: function setYieldClaimThreshold(address _collateral, ... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 05-ajna | MohammedRizwan Q | Critical | critical | ## Summary
### Low Risk Issues
|Number|Issue|Instances| |
|-|:-|:-:|:-:|
| [L‑01] | GrantFund.fundTreasury( ) function does not check sender token balance | 1 |
| [L‑02] | For immutable variables, Zero address checks are missing in constructor | 2 |
| [L‑03] | In PositionManager.sol, modifier mayI... | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
58 function fundTreasury(uint256 fundingAmount_) external override {
59 IERC20 token = IERC20(ajnaTokenAddress);
60
61 // update treasury accounting
62 treasury += fundingAmount_;
63
64 emit FundTreasury(fundingAmount_, treasury);
65
66 /... | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
function fundTreasury(uint256 fundingAmount_) external override {
+ require(fundingAmount_ > 0, "Funding amount must be greater than 0");
IERC20 token = IERC20(ajnaTokenAddress);
+ require(token.balanceOf(msg.sender) >= fundingAmount_, "Insufficient t... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/MohammedRizwan-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:06.576807+00:00 | ab85eb0794fbd514e3432ce486acde4f65471647cd8746a394630c137c682486 | 1 | 1 | 443 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
58 function fundTreasury(uint256 fundingAmount_) external override {
59 IERC20 token = IERC20(ajnaTokenAddress);
60
61 // update treasury accounting
62 treasury += fundingAmount_;
63
64 emit FundTreasury(fundingAmount_, treasury);
65
66 /... | solidity | 443 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
58 function fundTreasury(uint256 fundingAmount_) external override {
59 IERC20 token = IERC20(ajnaTokenAddress);
60
61 // update treasury accounting
62 treasury += fundingAmount_;
63
64 emit FundTreasury(fundingAmount... | 1 | false | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
58 function fundTreasury(uint256 fundingAmount_) external override {
59 IERC20 token = IERC20(ajnaTokenAddress);
60
61 // update treasury accounting
62 treasury += fundingAmount_;
63
64 emit FundTreasury(fundingAmount_, treasury);
65
66 /... | GrantFund.sol#L58-L68 | GrantFund.sol | 1 | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
58 function fundTreasury(uint256 fundingAmount_) external override {
59 IERC20 token = IERC20(ajnaTokenAddress);
60
61 // update treasury accounting
62 treasury += fundingAmount_;
63
64 emit FundTreasury(fundingAmount_, treasury);
65
66 /... | true | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/GrantFund.sol
function fundTreasury(uint256 fundingAmount_) external override {
+ require(fundingAmount_ > 0, "Funding amount must be greater than 0");
IERC20 token = IERC20(ajnaTokenAddress);
+ require(token.balanceOf(msg.sender) >= fundingAmount_, "Insufficient t... | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 06-lybra | matrix_0wl Q | Critical | critical | ## Non Critical Issues
| | Issue |
| ----- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| NC-1 | Be explicit declaring types ... | File: contracts/lybra/miner/EUSDMiningIncentives.sol
94: for (uint i = 0; i < _pools.length; i++) {
138: for (uint i = 0; i < pools.length; i++) {
140: uint borrowed = pool.getBorrowedOf(user);
153: uint256 etherInLp = (IEUSD(0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2).balanceOf(... | File: contracts/lybra/miner/ProtocolRewardsPool.sol
31: uint public rewardPerTokenStored;
33: mapping(address => uint) public userRewardPerTokenPaid;
35: mapping(address => uint) public rewards;
36: mapping(address => uint) public time2fullRedemption;
37: mapping(address => uint) public unstake... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/matrix_0wl-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:08.672431+00:00 | ab9318d2b8c78b21ecdbf5cf88654602f34df0fd1f8d3c2ff543a712c757716d | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: contracts/lybra/miner/EUSDMiningIncentives.sol
94: for (uint i = 0; i < _pools.length; i++) {
138: for (uint i = 0; i < pools.length; i++) {
140: uint borrowed = pool.getBorrowedOf(user);
153: uint256 etherInLp = (IEUSD(0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2).balanceOf(... | true | File: contracts/lybra/miner/ProtocolRewardsPool.sol
31: uint public rewardPerTokenStored;
33: mapping(address => uint) public userRewardPerTokenPaid;
35: mapping(address => uint) public rewards;
36: mapping(address => uint) public time2fullRedemption;
37: mapping(address => uint) public unstake... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 08-dopex | JrNet Q | Low | low | # [L-01] `removeLiquidity()` always emit 0 for tokenId
```solidity
FILE: 2023-08-dopex/contracts/amo/UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol
263: delete positions_mapping[pos.token_id];
265: // send tokens to rdpxV2Core
266: _sendTokensToRdpxV2Core(tokenA, tokenB);
268: emit log(positions_array.length);
2... | FILE: 2023-08-dopex/contracts/amo/UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol
263: delete positions_mapping[pos.token_id];
265: // send tokens to rdpxV2Core
266: _sendTokensToRdpxV2Core(tokenA, tokenB);
268: emit log(positions_array.length);
269: emit log(positions_mapping[pos.token_id].token_id); // @audit em... | FILE: 2023-08-dopex/contracts/decaying-bonds/RdpxDecayingBonds.sol
118: ) external onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE) {
119: _whenNotPaused();
120: require(hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, msg.sender), "Caller is not a minter"); | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/JrNet-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:45.253405+00:00 | abc2bc42ba6c6a2c5502389d0901086633ea72c2c41736171e64a9082f1efa3f | 2 | 2 | 555 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | FILE: 2023-08-dopex/contracts/amo/UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol
263: delete positions_mapping[pos.token_id];
265: // send tokens to rdpxV2Core
266: _sendTokensToRdpxV2Core(tokenA, tokenB);
268: emit log(positions_array.length);
269: emit log(positions_mapping[pos.token_id].token_id); // @audit emitti... | solidity | 344 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
FILE: 2023-08-dopex/contracts/amo/UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol
263: delete positions_mapping[pos.token_id];
265: // send tokens to rdpxV2Core
266: _sendTokensToRdpxV2Core(tokenA, tokenB);
268: emit log(positions_array.length);
269: emit log(positions_mapping[pos.token_id]... | 2 | false | FILE: 2023-08-dopex/contracts/amo/UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol
263: delete positions_mapping[pos.token_id];
265: // send tokens to rdpxV2Core
266: _sendTokensToRdpxV2Core(tokenA, tokenB);
268: emit log(positions_array.length);
269: emit log(positions_mapping[pos.token_id].token_id); // @audit emitti... | UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol#L263-L269, RdpxDecayingBonds.sol#L118-L120 | UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol, RdpxDecayingBonds.sol | 2 | FILE: 2023-08-dopex/contracts/amo/UniV3LiquidityAmo.sol
263: delete positions_mapping[pos.token_id];
265: // send tokens to rdpxV2Core
266: _sendTokensToRdpxV2Core(tokenA, tokenB);
268: emit log(positions_array.length);
269: emit log(positions_mapping[pos.token_id].token_id); // @audit em... | true | FILE: 2023-08-dopex/contracts/decaying-bonds/RdpxDecayingBonds.sol
118: ) external onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE) {
119: _whenNotPaused();
120: require(hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, msg.sender), "Caller is not a minter"); | true | true | 7.1 | ||
c4 | 09-ondo | castle_chain Analysis | Critical | critical | # bridge overview
## Architecture improvments
## 1) implement a minimum limit to amount of token burnt on the source chain .
the protocol use a bridge between two chains , source and destination chain .
On the destination chain, there is a limit for the amount of tokens that can be minted over a specified duration, ... | These relayer services are a free, operational convenience Axelar provides , anyone can create his own relayer | currentPrice = (Range.dailyInterestRate ** (Days Elapsed + 1)) * Range.lastSetPrice | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/castle_chain-Analysis.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:49.787476+00:00 | ac1d1327b56582ebf394c64e5f75bd77cdbce644b5ee859db170b35161d5417d | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | These relayer services are a free, operational convenience Axelar provides , anyone can create his own relayer | true | currentPrice = (Range.dailyInterestRate ** (Days Elapsed + 1)) * Range.lastSetPrice | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | Sathish9098 Q | Critical | critical | # LOW FINDINGS
## LOW
| | Issues| Instances|
|---------|-----|--------|
| [L-1] | UNUSED RECEIVE() functions | 4|
| [L-2] | Imports can be grouped together | 3|
| [L-3] | Sanity/Threshold/Limit Checks | 6|
| [L-4] | LOSS OF PRECISION DUE TO ROUNDING | 9|
| [L-5] | A single point of failure | 17|
|... | 97: receive() external payable {} | 126: receive() external payable {} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Sathish9098-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:33.714726+00:00 | ac847b7747d88bffb48a813f013280ce9a259f84aecfbe1ce6354d8e7ff49acb | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | 97: receive() external payable {} | true | 126: receive() external payable {} | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | 0x1f8b G | Medium | medium | - [Gas](#gas)
- [**1. Remove unnecessary variables**](#1-remove-unnecessary-variables)
- [**2. Optimize internalIncrementDeposit**](#2-optimize-internalincrementdeposit)
- [**3. Optimize unlockStake**](#3-optimize-unlockstake)
- [**4. Reorder structure layout**](#4-reorder-structure-layout)
- [**5. ... | **Gas diff:**
In red the old version, in green with the applied changes:
| **Affected source code:**
- [StakeManager.sol:38-43](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/53c8c3823175aeb26dee5529eeefa81240a406ba/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/StakeManager.sol#L38-L43)
## **3. Optimize `unlockStake`**
You can use `withdrawTime != 0` as a `staked` flag, s... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/0x1f8b-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:12:44.978418+00:00 | aca45e84416e5b8c8915aa1120101761901cfb601e93f68df16959a6c4415553 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | VerifyingSingletonPaymaster.sol#L99, BasePaymaster.sol#L50, VerifyingSingletonPaymaster.sol#L124, StakeManager.sol#L38-L43, StakeManager.sol#L86 | VerifyingSingletonPaymaster.sol, StakeManager.sol, BasePaymaster.sol | 5 | **Gas diff:**
In red the old version, in green with the applied changes:
| true | **Affected source code:**
- [StakeManager.sol:38-43](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy/blob/53c8c3823175aeb26dee5529eeefa81240a406ba/scw-contracts/contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/StakeManager.sol#L38-L43)
## **3. Optimize `unlockStake`**
You can use `withdrawTime != 0` as a `staked` flag, s... | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 11-kelp | owadez Q | Low | low | From the `LRTDepositPool` contract , the amount sent should be checked and revert early if not enough.
```
function transferAssetToNodeDelegator(
uint256 ndcIndex,
address asset,
uint256 amount
)
external
nonReentrant
onlyLRTManager
onlySupportedAsset(asse... | function transferAssetToNodeDelegator(
uint256 ndcIndex,
address asset,
uint256 amount
)
external
nonReentrant
onlyLRTManager
onlySupportedAsset(asset)
{
address nodeDelegator = nodeDelegatorQueue[ndcIndex];
if (!IERC20(asset).transfer(... | require(IERC20(asset).balanceOf(address(this) > 0),"error") | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/owadez-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:28:21.197521+00:00 | acac068b3510be553001bacb3a9505f384dd7d0d630621bef01b0d8e73b357a9 | 2 | 0 | 458 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function transferAssetToNodeDelegator(
uint256 ndcIndex,
address asset,
uint256 amount
)
external
nonReentrant
onlyLRTManager
onlySupportedAsset(asset)
{
address nodeDelegator = nodeDelegatorQueue[ndcIndex];
if (!IERC20(asset).transfer(node... | unknown | 399 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function transferAssetToNodeDelegator(
uint256 ndcIndex,
address asset,
uint256 amount
)
external
nonReentrant
onlyLRTManager
onlySupportedAsset(asset)
{
address nodeDelegator = nodeDelegatorQueue[ndcIndex];
if (!... | 2 | false | 0 | function transferAssetToNodeDelegator(
uint256 ndcIndex,
address asset,
uint256 amount
)
external
nonReentrant
onlyLRTManager
onlySupportedAsset(asset)
{
address nodeDelegator = nodeDelegatorQueue[ndcIndex];
if (!IERC20(asset).transfer(... | true | require(IERC20(asset).balanceOf(address(this) > 0),"error") | true | true | 5.26 | |||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | ck Q | Low | low | ## Pausing functionality can be done with just one function
There are currently separate functions for pausing and unpausing
```solidity
function setPauseStaking(bool _pause) external onlyOwner {
pauseStaking = _pause;
emit StakingPaused(pauseStaking);
}
/**
@notice - Owner only fu... | function setPauseStaking(bool _pause) external onlyOwner {
pauseStaking = _pause;
emit StakingPaused(pauseStaking);
}
/**
@notice - Owner only function that enables/disables the unstake function
@param _pause - true disables unstaking / false enables unstaking
*/
func... | function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
maxSlippage = _slippage;
} | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/ck-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:59.372737+00:00 | acb41e620367dae86190cf787d1843f3dfd33090bc450440279f7ce0768e715a | 3 | 2 | 948 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function setPauseStaking(bool _pause) external onlyOwner {
pauseStaking = _pause;
emit StakingPaused(pauseStaking);
}
/**
@notice - Owner only function that enables/disables the unstake function
@param _pause - true disables unstaking / false enables unstaking
*/
functio... | solidity | 458 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
function setPauseStaking(bool _pause) external onlyOwner {
pauseStaking = _pause;
emit StakingPaused(pauseStaking);
}
/**
@notice - Owner only function that enables/disables the unstake function
@param _pause - true disables unstaking / false enables ... | 3 | false | function setPauseStaking(bool _pause) external onlyOwner {
pauseStaking = _pause;
emit StakingPaused(pauseStaking);
}
/**
@notice - Owner only function that enables/disables the unstake function
@param _pause - true disables unstaking / false enables unstaking
*/
functio... | 0 | function setPauseStaking(bool _pause) external onlyOwner {
pauseStaking = _pause;
emit StakingPaused(pauseStaking);
}
/**
@notice - Owner only function that enables/disables the unstake function
@param _pause - true disables unstaking / false enables unstaking
*/
func... | true | function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
maxSlippage = _slippage;
} | true | true | 8 | ||||
c4 | 04-caviar | nemveer G | Gas | gas | ## 1. Can set the owner in the state itself instead of calling the external function every time
The current implementation of PrivatePool retrieves the owner by calling the Factory.ownerOf(address(PrivatePool))
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/cd8a92667bcb6657f70657183769c244d04c015c/src/PrivatePool.so... | modifier onlyOwner() virtual {
if (msg.sender != Factory(factory).ownerOf(uint160(address(this)))) {
revert Unauthorized();
}
_;
} | for (uint256 i = 0; i < tokenIds.length; i++) {
// transfer each nft from the caller
ERC721(nft).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), tokenIds[i]);
if (payRoyalties) {
// calculate the sale price (assume it's the same for each NFT even if weights diff... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/nemveer-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:44.423696+00:00 | acb610a97d70da8c01f02123a924284bfe9d13f67c6d5ef21e1c7150dd732806 | 2 | 0 | 1,272 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | modifier onlyOwner() virtual {
if (msg.sender != Factory(factory).ownerOf(uint160(address(this)))) {
revert Unauthorized();
}
_;
} | unknown | 170 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
modifier onlyOwner() virtual {
if (msg.sender != Factory(factory).ownerOf(uint160(address(this)))) {
revert Unauthorized();
}
_;
}
// Code block 2 (unknown):
for (uint256 i = 0; i < tokenIds.length; i++) {
// transfer each nft from the call... | 2 | false | PrivatePool.sol#L127-L132, PrivatePool.sol#L329-L352 | PrivatePool.sol | 2 | modifier onlyOwner() virtual {
if (msg.sender != Factory(factory).ownerOf(uint160(address(this)))) {
revert Unauthorized();
}
_;
} | true | for (uint256 i = 0; i < tokenIds.length; i++) {
// transfer each nft from the caller
ERC721(nft).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), tokenIds[i]);
if (payRoyalties) {
// calculate the sale price (assume it's the same for each NFT even if weights diff... | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | EvanW G | Gas | gas | [G-01] Merge the two for-loop as one in stake()
In SafEth.sol, the stake() method is running the same for-loop twice which is unecessary. Do all the things in 1 loop could save 132 gas.
```solidity
contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
71: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
underlyingValue +=
... | contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
71: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivatives[i].balance()) /
10 ** 18;
84: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
u... | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivatives[i].balance()) /
10 ** 18;
uint256 weight = weights[i];
IDerivative derivative = derivatives[i];... | slippage | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/EvanW-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:04.271615+00:00 | acbdb361395ee82550493e55b0847d7668d53eec6354a2d059cd7a66c0a8bb4a | 2 | 2 | 1,677 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
71: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivatives[i].balance()) /
10 ** 18;
84: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
u... | solidity | 874 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
71: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivatives[i].balance()) /
10 ** 18;
84: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativ... | 2 | false | contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
71: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivatives[i].balance()) /
10 ** 18;
84: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
u... | 0 | contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol
71: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivatives[i].balance()) /
10 ** 18;
84: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
u... | true | for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++) {
underlyingValue +=
(derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
derivatives[i].balance()) /
10 ** 18;
uint256 weight = weights[i];
IDerivative derivative = derivatives[i];... | true | true | 7 | ||||
c4 | 05-ajna | DadeKuma Q | Critical | critical |
## Summary
---
### Low Risk Issues
|Id|Title|Instances|
|:--:|:-------|:--:|
|[L-01]| Revert by undeflow when extraordinary proposals exceeds the maximum amount | 1 |
|[L-02]| Wasteful/redundant operations when calculating the votes squared | 1 |
|[L-03]| Anyone can `memorialize` other users' position if the owner a... | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/ExtraordinaryFunding.sol
105: if (uint256(totalTokensRequested) > _getSliceOfTreasury(Maths.WAD - _getMinimumThresholdPercentage())) revert InvalidProposal();
| File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/StandardFunding.sol
849: votesCastSumSquared_ += Maths.wpow(SafeCast.toUint256(Maths.abs(votesCast_[i].votesUsed)), 2);
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/DadeKuma-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:57.964604+00:00 | ad3109cf1b3f617de75572bc8001dd04c7e66b579facfdee73439917aa3955ee | 2 | 2 | 371 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/ExtraordinaryFunding.sol
105: if (uint256(totalTokensRequested) > _getSliceOfTreasury(Maths.WAD - _getMinimumThresholdPercentage())) revert InvalidProposal(); | solidity | 203 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/ExtraordinaryFunding.sol
105: if (uint256(totalTokensRequested) > _getSliceOfTreasury(Maths.WAD - _getMinimumThresholdPercentage())) revert InvalidProposal();
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/StandardFunding.sol
849:... | 2 | false | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/ExtraordinaryFunding.sol
105: if (uint256(totalTokensRequested) > _getSliceOfTreasury(Maths.WAD - _getMinimumThresholdPercentage())) revert InvalidProposal();
File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/StandardFunding.sol
849: votesCastSumSquared_ += Maths.wpow(SafeCa... | ExtraordinaryFunding.sol#L105 | ExtraordinaryFunding.sol | 1 | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/ExtraordinaryFunding.sol
105: if (uint256(totalTokensRequested) > _getSliceOfTreasury(Maths.WAD - _getMinimumThresholdPercentage())) revert InvalidProposal();
| true | File: ajna-grants/src/grants/base/StandardFunding.sol
849: votesCastSumSquared_ += Maths.wpow(SafeCast.toUint256(Maths.abs(votesCast_[i].votesUsed)), 2);
| true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 01-biconomy | Diana G | Medium | medium |
## G-01 Increments can be unchecked
In Solidity 0.8+, there’s a default overflow check on unsigned integers. It’s possible to uncheck this in for-loops and save some gas at each iteration, but at the cost of some code readability, as this uncheck cannot be made inline
Prior to Solidity 0.8.0, arithmetic operations w... | File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/EntryPoint.sol
100: for (uint256 i = 0; i < opasLen; i++) {
107: for (uint256 a = 0; a < opasLen; a++) {
112: for (uint256 i = 0; i < opslen; i++) {
128: for (uint256 a = 0; a < opasLen; a++) {
134: for (uint256 i = 0; i < opslen; i++) { | File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/EntryPoint.sol
81: collected += _executeUserOp(i, ops[i], opInfos[i]);
101: totalOps += opsPerAggregator[i].userOps.length;
135: collected += _executeUserOp(opIndex, ops[i], opInfos[opIndex]);
468: actualGas += preGas - gasleft(); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/Diana-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:02.651029+00:00 | ad4c1f304396a26b11ab09ac3b72e6a0408c3d741c3b52063f5423e9dfd97296 | 2 | 0 | 571 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/EntryPoint.sol
100: for (uint256 i = 0; i < opasLen; i++) {
107: for (uint256 a = 0; a < opasLen; a++) {
112: for (uint256 i = 0; i < opslen; i++) {
128: for (uint256 a = 0; a < opasLen; a++) {
134: for (uint256 i = 0; i < opslen; i++) { | unknown | 289 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/EntryPoint.sol
100: for (uint256 i = 0; i < opasLen; i++) {
107: for (uint256 a = 0; a < opasLen; a++) {
112: for (uint256 i = 0; i < opslen; i++) {
128: for (uint256 a = 0; a < opasLen; a++) {
134: for (uint256 i = 0; i < opslen; i++) {
//... | 2 | false | EntryPoint.sol | EntryPoint.sol | 1 | File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/EntryPoint.sol
100: for (uint256 i = 0; i < opasLen; i++) {
107: for (uint256 a = 0; a < opasLen; a++) {
112: for (uint256 i = 0; i < opslen; i++) {
128: for (uint256 a = 0; a < opasLen; a++) {
134: for (uint256 i = 0; i < opslen; i++) { | true | File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/aa-4337/core/EntryPoint.sol
81: collected += _executeUserOp(i, ops[i], opInfos[i]);
101: totalOps += opsPerAggregator[i].userOps.length;
135: collected += _executeUserOp(opIndex, ops[i], opInfos[opIndex]);
468: actualGas += preGas - gasleft(); | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 01-salty | hunter_w3b G | High | high | ## [G-01] Add unchecked{} for subtraction where the operands can't underflow becasue of previous IF-STATEMENT
**Issue Description**\
The subtraction operation `uint256 remainingSALT = claimedSALT - amountToSendToTeam;` does not have an unchecked block, even though underflow is not possible due to the previous check `i... | unchecked {
uint256 remainingSALT = claimedSALT - amountToSendToTeam;
} | File: src/dao/DAO.sol
337 if ( claimedSALT == 0 ) // @audit Because of this check can't overflow remainingSALT
345 uint256 remainingSALT = claimedSALT - amountToSendToTeam; | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/hunter_w3b-G.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:43.554576+00:00 | ad5d8318f24eaa9e9eb7f73951ed72d6476c23290a453e3999b0b5c17c8a909a | 5 | 5 | 696 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | unchecked {
uint256 remainingSALT = claimedSALT - amountToSendToTeam;
} | solidity | 73 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
unchecked {
uint256 remainingSALT = claimedSALT - amountToSendToTeam;
}
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: src/dao/DAO.sol
337 if ( claimedSALT == 0 ) // @audit Because of this check can't overflow remainingSALT
345 uint256 remainingSALT = claimedSALT - amountToSendToTeam;
// Code ... | 5 | false | unchecked {
uint256 remainingSALT = claimedSALT - amountToSendToTeam;
}
File: src/dao/DAO.sol
337 if ( claimedSALT == 0 ) // @audit Because of this check can't overflow remainingSALT
345 uint256 remainingSALT = claimedSALT - amountToSendToTeam;
File: src/staking/Liquidity.sol
110 if ( addedAmountA < maxAmo... | DAO.sol#L337, Liquidity.sol#L110, PoolMath.sol#L161, PriceAggregator.sol#L101 | PoolMath.sol, Liquidity.sol, PriceAggregator.sol, DAO.sol | 4 | unchecked {
uint256 remainingSALT = claimedSALT - amountToSendToTeam;
} | true | File: src/dao/DAO.sol
337 if ( claimedSALT == 0 ) // @audit Because of this check can't overflow remainingSALT
345 uint256 remainingSALT = claimedSALT - amountToSendToTeam; | true | true | 11 | ||
c4 | 10-badger | Shahen Q | Critical | critical | ## Make only the _borrower or _positionManager to call the `permitPositionManagerApproval()` function.
- So in the `permitPositionManagerApproval()` function, It's to grant approval for a positionManager, Suppose the (_borrower,_positionManager) calls the `permitPositionManagerApproval()` function with the parameters,... | require(msg.sender == _borrower); // or _positionManager | front-running | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/Shahen-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:37.889650+00:00 | ad6033b9c8e9c857b4c646584adeb995f56c71a1d530d0320a64e982eeedfe7c | 1 | 0 | 56 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | require(msg.sender == _borrower); // or _positionManager | unknown | 56 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
require(msg.sender == _borrower); // or _positionManager | 1 | false | BorrowerOperations.sol#L706 | BorrowerOperations.sol | 1 | require(msg.sender == _borrower); // or _positionManager | true | false | false | 5.38 | |||||
c4 | 03-revert-lend | popeye Analysis | Critical | critical | | Serial No. | Topic |
|------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| 01 | Overview of Revert Lend |
| 02 | Scope |
| 03 | Architecture view (Sequence Diagram) ... | # Protocol Roles:
Revert Lend protocol involves several key roles/actors, each with specific responsibilities and interactions within the system.
**Liquidity Providers (LPs):**
- LPs are Uniswap v3 liquidity providers who supply liquidity to Uniswap v3 pools and receive LP position NFTs in return.
- In the cont... | **Key function's functionality:**
a. `create(uint256 tokenId, address recipient)`:
This function creates a new collateralized position by transferring an approved Uniswap V3 LP position (NFT) to the vault. The `tokenId` represents the LP position, and the `recipient` is the address that will receive the position in th... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend-findings/blob/main/data/popeye-Analysis.md | 2026-01-02T19:03:15.905648+00:00 | ae666b296eb25b6e8c99061fa842bc973deeefd580c28a88c882aa0f8ecf7020 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | # Protocol Roles:
Revert Lend protocol involves several key roles/actors, each with specific responsibilities and interactions within the system.
**Liquidity Providers (LPs):**
- LPs are Uniswap v3 liquidity providers who supply liquidity to Uniswap v3 pools and receive LP position NFTs in return.
- In the cont... | true | **Key function's functionality:**
a. `create(uint256 tokenId, address recipient)`:
This function creates a new collateralized position by transferring an approved Uniswap V3 LP position (NFT) to the vault. The `tokenId` represents the LP position, and the `recipient` is the address that will receive the position in th... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | 8olidity Q | Low | low | ## The maxSlippage should be limited
The administrator can set the value of `maxSlippage` through the `setMaxSlippage()` function, but there is no validation here. If `maxSlippage` is greater than `10 ** 18`, it will cause an overflow and make it impossible to `withdraw()`. This problem exists in several contracts.
... | uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18;
| contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol:
57 */
58: function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
59 maxSlippage = _slippage;
contracts/SafEth/derivatives/SfrxEth.sol:
50 */
51: function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
52 maxSlippage... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/8olidity-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:17:48.570668+00:00 | aecc2fb1bd94cfb216a592d1f75103aca6ba2d419c1a75d3f948b47b199373c8 | 4 | 0 | 760 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18; | unknown | 66 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18;
// Code block 2 (unknown):
contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol:
57 */
58: function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
59 maxSlippage = _slippage;
contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Sfr... | 4 | false | 0 | uint256 minOut = (stEthBal * (10 ** 18 - maxSlippage)) / 10 ** 18;
| true | contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol:
57 */
58: function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
59 maxSlippage = _slippage;
contracts/SafEth/derivatives/SfrxEth.sol:
50 */
51: function setMaxSlippage(uint256 _slippage) external onlyOwner {
52 maxSlippage... | true | true | 9 | |||||
c4 | 11-kelp | supersizer0x Q | High | high | ###### An attacker can grief users with large amounts of funds
An attacker can grief hard by depositing funds before a call is made making the
example:
price = 100 eth = 50 rseth
attacker deposits 25 eth
price =100 eth = 35 rseth
There is no slippage check so it can harm users.
```solidity
rsethAmountToMint = (... | rsethAmountToMint = (amount * lrtOracle.getAssetPrice(asset)) / lrtOracle.getRSETHPrice(); | uint256 ndcsCount = nodeDelegatorQueue.length;
for (uint256 i; i < ndcsCount;) {
assetLyingInNDCs += IERC20(asset).balanceOf(nodeDelegatorQueue[i]);
assetStakedInEigenLayer += INodeDelegator(nodeDelegatorQueue[i]).getAssetBalance(asset); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/supersizer0x-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:28:29.806304+00:00 | aeec760f5a6cc101c989264cb9e698cdc5731791455e0b1f5f088bde238baa49 | 3 | 3 | 632 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | rsethAmountToMint = (amount * lrtOracle.getAssetPrice(asset)) / lrtOracle.getRSETHPrice(); | solidity | 90 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
rsethAmountToMint = (amount * lrtOracle.getAssetPrice(asset)) / lrtOracle.getRSETHPrice();
// Code block 2 (solidity):
uint256 ndcsCount = nodeDelegatorQueue.length;
for (uint256 i; i < ndcsCount;) {
assetLyingInNDCs += IERC20(asset).balanceOf(nodeDelegatorQueue[i]);
... | 3 | false | rsethAmountToMint = (amount * lrtOracle.getAssetPrice(asset)) / lrtOracle.getRSETHPrice();
uint256 ndcsCount = nodeDelegatorQueue.length;
for (uint256 i; i < ndcsCount;) {
assetLyingInNDCs += IERC20(asset).balanceOf(nodeDelegatorQueue[i]);
assetStakedInEigenLayer += INodeDelegator(nodeD... | LRTDepositPool.sol#L81-L5, LRTDepositPool.sol#L160 | LRTDepositPool.sol | 2 | rsethAmountToMint = (amount * lrtOracle.getAssetPrice(asset)) / lrtOracle.getRSETHPrice(); | true | uint256 ndcsCount = nodeDelegatorQueue.length;
for (uint256 i; i < ndcsCount;) {
assetLyingInNDCs += IERC20(asset).balanceOf(nodeDelegatorQueue[i]);
assetStakedInEigenLayer += INodeDelegator(nodeDelegatorQueue[i]).getAssetBalance(asset); | true | true | 9 | ||
c4 | 02-ethos | Kaysoft Q | Critical | critical | ## [L-01] REMOVE UNSED IMPORT `./Dependencies/console.sol` in `BorrowerOperations.sol`
console.sol is imported in `BorrowerOperations.sol` and it is not used.
File:
- [Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol#L15](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/73687f32b934c9d697b97745356cdf8a1f264955/Ethos-Core/co... | /** @type import('hardhat/config').HardhatUserConfig */
module.exports = {
solidity: {
compilers: [
{
version: "0.8.11",
settings: {
optimizer: {
enabled: true,
runs: 200,
},
},
},
],
},
| /**
* @dev Starts the ownership transfer of the contract to a new account. Replaces the pending transfer if there is one.
* Can only be called by the current owner.
*/
function transferOwnership(address newOwner) public virtual override onlyOwner {
_pendingOwner = newOwner;
emit Owne... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/Kaysoft-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:18.451952+00:00 | aeecf776c3f89ed30c8a0cd4b6ffc0b7046147e63605e0e2c8457c31fb293be8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | BorrowerOperations.sol#L15, StabilityPool.sol#L384, StabilityPool.sol#L339 | BorrowerOperations.sol, StabilityPool.sol | 3 | /** @type import('hardhat/config').HardhatUserConfig */
module.exports = {
solidity: {
compilers: [
{
version: "0.8.11",
settings: {
optimizer: {
enabled: true,
runs: 200,
},
},
},
],
},
| true | /**
* @dev Starts the ownership transfer of the contract to a new account. Replaces the pending transfer if there is one.
* Can only be called by the current owner.
*/
function transferOwnership(address newOwner) public virtual override onlyOwner {
_pendingOwner = newOwner;
emit Owne... | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | RaymondFam G | High | high | ## Combining for loops in `buy()` of PrivatePool
Like it has been implemented in [`sell()`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/PrivatePool.sol#L328-L351), consider combining the two [for loops](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/PrivatePool.sol#L242) involving [`if (payRo... | ## Unneeded `flashFeeToken()`
`baseToken` is already evidently used in [line 635](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/PrivatePool.sol#L635) and [line 651](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/PrivatePool.sol#L651) of `flashLoan()`. Additionally, `baseToken` comes with a free... | ## += and -= cost more gas
`+=` and `-=` generally cost 22 more gas than writing out the assigned equation explicitly. The amount of gas wasted can be quite sizable when repeatedly operated in a loop.
For example, the `+=` instance below may be refactored as follows:
[File: PrivatePool.sol#L247](https://github.com/co... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/RaymondFam-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:00.392098+00:00 | aef0b9e2c584ccf46e4827a25bed50be584bb925cd0283e782c5a164a047ac1b | 1 | 1 | 670 | 11 | false | false | true | false | high | + trimmedNetInputAmount = netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount;
// update the virtual reserves
- virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
+ virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(trimmedNetInputAmount);
virtualNftReserves -= uint12... | diff | 670 | // Code block 1 (diff):
+ trimmedNetInputAmount = netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount;
// update the virtual reserves
- virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
+ virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(trimmedNetInputAmount);
virt... | 1 | true | + trimmedNetInputAmount = netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount;
// update the virtual reserves
- virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(netInputAmount - feeAmount - protocolFeeAmount);
+ virtualBaseTokenReserves += uint128(trimmedNetInputAmount);
virtualNftReserves -= uint12... | PrivatePool.sol#L328-L351, PrivatePool.sol#L242, PrivatePool.sol#L271, PrivatePool.sol#L211-L289, PrivatePool.sol#L229-L237, PrivatePool.sol#L635, PrivatePool.sol#L651, PrivatePool.sol#L82, PrivatePool.sol#L754-L757, PrivatePool.sol#L742-L746, PrivatePool.sol#L247 | PrivatePool.sol | 11 | ## Unneeded `flashFeeToken()`
`baseToken` is already evidently used in [line 635](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/PrivatePool.sol#L635) and [line 651](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/PrivatePool.sol#L651) of `flashLoan()`. Additionally, `baseToken` comes with a free... | true | ## += and -= cost more gas
`+=` and `-=` generally cost 22 more gas than writing out the assigned equation explicitly. The amount of gas wasted can be quite sizable when repeatedly operated in a loop.
For example, the `+=` instance below may be refactored as follows:
[File: PrivatePool.sol#L247](https://github.com/co... | true | true | 9 | ||
c4 | 09-ondo | castle_chain G | Low | low | # Gas optimization report
# DestinationBridge
## 1) unnecessary check inside the for loop that waste gas can be optimized .
the function `setThresholds()` uses for loop to assign the thresholds to the amounts , the for loop always check
```
for (uint256 i = 0; i < amounts.length; ++i) {
if (i == 0) {
... | for (uint256 i = 0; i < amounts.length; ++i) {
if (i == 0) {
chainToThresholds[srcChain].push(
Threshold(amounts[i], numOfApprovers[i])
);
} | **code snippet**
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L255-L279
## 2) read from the storage and make a copy of the struct to the memory before the check will waste gas in case the check did not pass .
the function `_mintIfTh... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/castle_chain-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:50.238268+00:00 | aef439cbf1207dac617a22adc238e8e07b3b687e57e6f889df62332d5dc0bc9f | 2 | 1 | 1,104 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | for (uint256 i = 0; i < amounts.length; ++i) {
if (i == 0) {
chainToThresholds[srcChain].push(
Threshold(amounts[i], numOfApprovers[i])
);
} | unknown | 178 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
for (uint256 i = 0; i < amounts.length; ++i) {
if (i == 0) {
chainToThresholds[srcChain].push(
Threshold(amounts[i], numOfApprovers[i])
);
}
// Code block 2 (diff):
function setThresholds(
string calldata srcChain,
uint256[] calldata amounts,
... | 2 | true | function setThresholds(
string calldata srcChain,
uint256[] calldata amounts,
uint256[] calldata numOfApprovers
) external onlyOwner {
if (amounts.length != numOfApprovers.length) {
revert ArrayLengthMismatch();
}
delete chainToThresholds[srcChain];
- for (uint256 i = 0; i < amounts.le... | DestinationBridge.sol#L255-L279 | DestinationBridge.sol | 1 | for (uint256 i = 0; i < amounts.length; ++i) {
if (i == 0) {
chainToThresholds[srcChain].push(
Threshold(amounts[i], numOfApprovers[i])
);
} | true | **code snippet**
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/47d34d6d4a5303af5f46e907ac2292e6a7745f6c/contracts/bridge/DestinationBridge.sol#L255-L279
## 2) read from the storage and make a copy of the struct to the memory before the check will waste gas in case the check did not pass .
the function `_mintIfTh... | true | true | 10 | ||
c4 | 01-salty | lanyi2023 Q | Unknown | unknown | ```
function vote( bool voteStartExchangeYes, bytes calldata signature ) external nonReentrant
```
After block.timestamp >= completionTimestamp, you can continue to call the vote function to vote
| function vote( bool voteStartExchangeYes, bytes calldata signature ) external nonReentrant | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/blob/main/data/lanyi2023-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:01:50.264372+00:00 | aef858bddff77f2378d9753c7460e0f51609ed8e06845bc31489ca2a7c9136b6 | 1 | 0 | 90 | 0 | false | true | true | false | medium | function vote( bool voteStartExchangeYes, bytes calldata signature ) external nonReentrant | unknown | 90 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function vote( bool voteStartExchangeYes, bytes calldata signature ) external nonReentrant | 1 | false | 0 | function vote( bool voteStartExchangeYes, bytes calldata signature ) external nonReentrant | true | false | false | 2.4 | |||||||
c4 | 11-kelp | 0xVolcano G | High | high | # Gas report
## Table of Contents
- [Gas report](#gas-report)
- [Table of Contents](#table-of-contents)
- [Avoid zero to none zero storage writes](#avoid-zero-to-none-zero-storage-writes)
- [We can optimize the function `updateLRTConfig()`](#we-can-optimize-the-function-updatelrtconfig)
- [Emit local variable... | File: /src/LRTDepositPool.sol
19:contract LRTDepositPool is ILRTDepositPool, LRTConfigRoleChecker, PausableUpgradeable, ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable {
20: uint256 public maxNodeDelegatorCount;
29: /// @dev Initializes the contract
30: /// @param lrtConfigAddr LRT config address
31: function initialize(addres... | ## We can optimize the function `updateLRTConfig()`
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/f751d7594051c0766c7ecd1e68daeb0661e43ee3/src/utils/LRTConfigRoleChecker.sol#L47-L51 | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/0xVolcano-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:27:11.851827+00:00 | af3d46e27b5b3c42d97638d0099c4f9878391e8a84dc81733f961083da69cfe7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | LRTDepositPool.sol#L19-L38, LRTConfigRoleChecker.sol#L47-L51 | LRTDepositPool.sol, LRTConfigRoleChecker.sol | 2 | File: /src/LRTDepositPool.sol
19:contract LRTDepositPool is ILRTDepositPool, LRTConfigRoleChecker, PausableUpgradeable, ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable {
20: uint256 public maxNodeDelegatorCount;
29: /// @dev Initializes the contract
30: /// @param lrtConfigAddr LRT config address
31: function initialize(addres... | true | ## We can optimize the function `updateLRTConfig()`
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp/blob/f751d7594051c0766c7ecd1e68daeb0661e43ee3/src/utils/LRTConfigRoleChecker.sol#L47-L51 | true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | SleepingBugs Q | Critical | critical |
## Single-step process for critical ownership transfer/renounce is risky
### Impact
Given that `BasePaymaster.sol` is derived from `Ownable`, the ownership management of this contract defaults to `Ownable` ’s `transferOwnership()` and `renounceOwnership()` methods which are not overridden here.
Such critical address... | contract SmartAccount is
Singleton,
BaseSmartAccount,
IERC165,
ModuleManager,
SignatureDecoder,
SecuredTokenTransfer,
ISignatureValidatorConstants,
FallbackManager,
Initializable,
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable
{ | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/SleepingBugs-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:21.077606+00:00 | af621b6ebd536a9502569e1f12ff5611557f60c9eb15b508dbaa6bb79ff86d1d | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | BasePaymaster.sol#L16, Ownable2Step.sol | Ownable2Step.sol, BasePaymaster.sol | 2 | contract SmartAccount is
Singleton,
BaseSmartAccount,
IERC165,
ModuleManager,
SignatureDecoder,
SecuredTokenTransfer,
ISignatureValidatorConstants,
FallbackManager,
Initializable,
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable
{ | true | false | false | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 02-ethos | 0xm1ck G | High | high | ## Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [GAS-1](#GAS-1) | Bytes constants are more efficient than string constants | 8 |
| [GAS-2](#GAS-2) | Incrementing with a smaller type than `uint256` incurs overhead | 3 |
| [GAS-3](#GAS-3) | Use `storage` instead of `memory` for structs/arrays | 16 |
| [GAS-4](#GA... | File: ActivePool.sol
30: string constant public NAME = "ActivePool";
| File: BorrowerOperations.sol
21: string constant public NAME = "BorrowerOperations";
| reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/0xm1ck-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:15:51.849032+00:00 | af9f8f6f4c2af374009b8024129d44aa871c0b25ce94645edc97ec76f24f67de | 4 | 4 | 334 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | File: ActivePool.sol
30: string constant public NAME = "ActivePool"; | solidity | 73 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: ActivePool.sol
30: string constant public NAME = "ActivePool";
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: BorrowerOperations.sol
21: string constant public NAME = "BorrowerOperations";
// Code block 3 (solidity):
File: LQTY/CommunityIssuance.sol
19: string constant public NAME ... | 4 | false | File: ActivePool.sol
30: string constant public NAME = "ActivePool";
File: BorrowerOperations.sol
21: string constant public NAME = "BorrowerOperations";
File: LQTY/CommunityIssuance.sol
19: string constant public NAME = "CommunityIssuance";
File: LQTY/LQTYStaking.sol
23: string constant public N... | 0 | File: ActivePool.sol
30: string constant public NAME = "ActivePool";
| true | File: BorrowerOperations.sol
21: string constant public NAME = "BorrowerOperations";
| true | true | 9 | ||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | giovannidisiena G | Low | low | ### **Gas Optimisations**
#### **[G-01] Variable Assignment in Event**
5 gas can be saved by assigning `owner` within the event. This also follows checks-effects-interactions due to right-to-left evaluation.
*There is 1 instance of this issue:*
```
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol
function ... | File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol
function setOwner(address _newOwner) external mixedAuth {
require(_newOwner != address(0), "Smart Account:: new Signatory address cannot be zero");
address oldOwner = owner;
owner = _newOwner;
emit EOAChanged(address(this), oldO... | File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/libs/LibAddress.sol
/**
* @notice Will return true if provided address is a contract
* @param account Address to verify if contract or not
* @dev This contract will return false if called within the constructor of
* a contract's deployment, as the code... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/giovannidisiena-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:45.903063+00:00 | afa445caf45881a8f25f30c440cfdc5026a9961cfa06b0f4fd72873760939c6b | 3 | 0 | 1,186 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol
function setOwner(address _newOwner) external mixedAuth {
require(_newOwner != address(0), "Smart Account:: new Signatory address cannot be zero");
address oldOwner = owner;
owner = _newOwner;
emit EOAChanged(address(this), oldO... | unknown | 343 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol
function setOwner(address _newOwner) external mixedAuth {
require(_newOwner != address(0), "Smart Account:: new Signatory address cannot be zero");
address oldOwner = owner;
owner = _newOwner;
emit EOA... | 3 | false | SmartAccount.sol#L109-L114, LibAddress.sol | LibAddress.sol, SmartAccount.sol | 2 | File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/SmartAccount.sol
function setOwner(address _newOwner) external mixedAuth {
require(_newOwner != address(0), "Smart Account:: new Signatory address cannot be zero");
address oldOwner = owner;
owner = _newOwner;
emit EOAChanged(address(this), oldO... | true | File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/libs/LibAddress.sol
/**
* @notice Will return true if provided address is a contract
* @param account Address to verify if contract or not
* @dev This contract will return false if called within the constructor of
* a contract's deployment, as the code... | true | true | 9 | |||
c4 | 02-ethos | Brenzee Q | Gas | gas | ## Use `require()` instead of `assert()`
BorrowerOperations.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol#L128
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol#L197
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/m... | ### Recommendation
Change `assert()` to `require()`
## Inconsistent `uint` and `uint256` usage
TroveManager.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol#L129-L138
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol#L146-L158
B... | ## Avoid setting time variables with integer values
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol#L48
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/Brenzee-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:02.188340+00:00 | afc51554367b27fc0848c18b4357b3225d1c1060010f31fac0e2530ecccf0028 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | BorrowerOperations.sol#L128, BorrowerOperations.sol#L197, BorrowerOperations.sol#L301, BorrowerOperations.sol#L331, LUSDToken.sol#L312-L313, LUSDToken.sol#L321, LUSDToken.sol#L329, LUSDToken.sol#L337-L338, StabilityPool.sol#L526, StabilityPool.sol#L551, StabilityPool.sol#L591, TroveManager.sol#L417, TroveManager.sol#L1... | StabilityPool.sol, TroveManager.sol, BorrowerOperations.sol, ReaperVaultV2.sol, LUSDToken.sol | 22 | ### Recommendation
Change `assert()` to `require()`
## Inconsistent `uint` and `uint256` usage
TroveManager.sol
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol#L129-L138
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol#L146-L158
B... | true | ## Avoid setting time variables with integer values
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos/blob/main/Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol#L48
| true | true | 6 | ||||||
c4 | 02-ethos | UdarTeam Q | Critical | critical | ### Issues Template
| Letter | Name | Description |
|:--:|:-------:|:-------:|
| L | Low risk | Potential risk |
| NC | Non-critical | Non risky findings |
| R | Refactor | Changing the code |
| O | Ordinary | Often found issues |
| Total Found Issues | 16 |
|:--:|:--:|
### Non-Critical Issues Template
| Count | ... | Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
28: address stabilityPoolAddress;
30: address gasPoolAddress;
32: ICollSurplusPool collSurplusPool; | Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol
31: address gasPoolAddress;
33: ICollSurplusPool collSurplusPool; | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/UdarTeam-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:41.863567+00:00 | aff3b75370fd142de7105b904e11c4a6488cc68904062751e7022fb2430668af | 2 | 2 | 248 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
28: address stabilityPoolAddress;
30: address gasPoolAddress;
32: ICollSurplusPool collSurplusPool; | solidity | 144 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
28: address stabilityPoolAddress;
30: address gasPoolAddress;
32: ICollSurplusPool collSurplusPool;
// Code block 2 (solidity):
Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol
31: address gasPoolAddress;
33: ICollSurplusPool collSurplusPool; | 2 | false | Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
28: address stabilityPoolAddress;
30: address gasPoolAddress;
32: ICollSurplusPool collSurplusPool;
Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol
31: address gasPoolAddress;
33: ICollSurplusPool collSurplusPool; | 0 | Ethos-Core/contracts/BorrowerOperations.sol
28: address stabilityPoolAddress;
30: address gasPoolAddress;
32: ICollSurplusPool collSurplusPool; | true | Ethos-Core/contracts/TroveManager.sol
31: address gasPoolAddress;
33: ICollSurplusPool collSurplusPool; | true | true | 7 | ||||
c4 | 07-amphora | koxuan Q | Medium | medium | ### [L‑1] ERC20 tokens that do not implement optional decimals method cannot be used
Underlying token that does not implement optional decimals method cannot be used
> [EIP-20](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20#decimals) OPTIONAL - This method can be used to improve usability, but interfaces and other con... | File: /core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol
341: uint8 _tokenDecimals = IERC20Metadata(_tokenAddress).decimals();
| File: /core/solidity/contracts/periphery/oracles/CTokenOracle.sol
25: uint256 _underlyingDecimals = cETH_ADDRESS == _cToken ? 18 : IERC20Metadata(cToken.underlying()).decimals();
28: div = 10 ** (18 + _underlyingDecimals - cToken.decimals());
| oracle | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/koxuan-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:53.258188+00:00 | affb42bd182f64ff0cd2eb863471c75fdd659c6ee4b3b22e5b634370bc36de7d | 5 | 5 | 836 | 5 | false | false | true | false | high | File: /core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol
341: uint8 _tokenDecimals = IERC20Metadata(_tokenAddress).decimals(); | solidity | 129 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: /core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol
341: uint8 _tokenDecimals = IERC20Metadata(_tokenAddress).decimals();
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: /core/solidity/contracts/periphery/oracles/CTokenOracle.sol
25: uint256 _underlyingDecimals = cETH_ADDRESS == _cToken ? 18 ... | 5 | false | File: /core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol
341: uint8 _tokenDecimals = IERC20Metadata(_tokenAddress).decimals();
File: /core/solidity/contracts/periphery/oracles/CTokenOracle.sol
25: uint256 _underlyingDecimals = cETH_ADDRESS == _cToken ? 18 : IERC20Metadata(cToken.underlying()).decimals();
28: ... | VaultController.sol#L341, CTokenOracle.sol#L25, UniswapV3OracleRelay.sol#L50, MintableToken.sol#L20, ICToken.sol#L9 | UniswapV3OracleRelay.sol, ICToken.sol, VaultController.sol, MintableToken.sol, CTokenOracle.sol | 5 | File: /core/solidity/contracts/core/VaultController.sol
341: uint8 _tokenDecimals = IERC20Metadata(_tokenAddress).decimals();
| true | File: /core/solidity/contracts/periphery/oracles/CTokenOracle.sol
25: uint256 _underlyingDecimals = cETH_ADDRESS == _cToken ? 18 : IERC20Metadata(cToken.underlying()).decimals();
28: div = 10 ** (18 + _underlyingDecimals - cToken.decimals());
| true | true | 11 | ||
c4 | 02-ethos | Go Langer Q | Low | low | ### No revert messages in TroveManager.sol
In TroveManager there are no revert messages within the require statements.
1530: function _requireCallerIsBorrowerOperationsOrRedemptionHelper() internal view {
require(msg.sender == borrowerOperationsAddress || msg.sender == address(redemptionHelper));
}
Rev... | function _requireCallerIsBorrowerOperationsOrRedemptionHelper() internal view {
require(msg.sender == borrowerOperationsAddress || msg.sender == address(redemptionHelper), "Only borrowerOperationsAddress or redemptionHelper can call this function");
} | function __ReaperBaseStrategy_init(
address _vault,
address _want,
address[] memory _strategists,
address[] memory _multisigRoles
) internal onlyInitializing {
__UUPSUpgradeable_init();
__AccessControlEnumerable_init();
vault = _vault;
want = _wan... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-02-ethos-findings/blob/main/data/Go-Langer-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:16:13.434108+00:00 | b0495228fe9625a6f78bc95a5ab03516939a9e1b910abb7afe989fc87a35e47e | 1 | 0 | 255 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | function _requireCallerIsBorrowerOperationsOrRedemptionHelper() internal view {
require(msg.sender == borrowerOperationsAddress || msg.sender == address(redemptionHelper), "Only borrowerOperationsAddress or redemptionHelper can call this function");
} | unknown | 255 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
function _requireCallerIsBorrowerOperationsOrRedemptionHelper() internal view {
require(msg.sender == borrowerOperationsAddress || msg.sender == address(redemptionHelper), "Only borrowerOperationsAddress or redemptionHelper can call this function");
} | 1 | false | 0 | function _requireCallerIsBorrowerOperationsOrRedemptionHelper() internal view {
require(msg.sender == borrowerOperationsAddress || msg.sender == address(redemptionHelper), "Only borrowerOperationsAddress or redemptionHelper can call this function");
} | true | function __ReaperBaseStrategy_init(
address _vault,
address _want,
address[] memory _strategists,
address[] memory _multisigRoles
) internal onlyInitializing {
__UUPSUpgradeable_init();
__AccessControlEnumerable_init();
vault = _vault;
want = _wan... | true | true | 6 | |||||
c4 | 06-lybra | Sathish9098 Analysis | Critical | critical | # Lybra Finance - Analysis
|Head |Details|
|:----------------|:------|
| Approach taken in evaluating the codebase | What is unique? How are the existing patterns used? |
|Codebase quality analysis| its structure, readability, maintainability, and adherence to best practices|
|Centralization risks| power, control, or... | FILE: 2023-06-lybra/contracts/lybra/miner/EUSDMiningIncentives.sol
84: function setToken(address _lbr, address _eslbr) external onlyOwner {
89: function setLBROracle(address _lbrOracle) external onlyOwner {
93: function setPools(address[] memory _pools) external onlyOwner {
100:function setBiddingCost(uint256 _bidding... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-06-lybra-findings/blob/main/data/Sathish9098-Analysis.md | 2026-01-02T18:22:43.557207+00:00 | b05a716897f633d046e4fa3b51117f153c1e8a19cc69a8469f0ad257cb7cd572 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | FILE: 2023-06-lybra/contracts/lybra/miner/EUSDMiningIncentives.sol
84: function setToken(address _lbr, address _eslbr) external onlyOwner {
89: function setLBROracle(address _lbrOracle) external onlyOwner {
93: function setPools(address[] memory _pools) external onlyOwner {
100:function setBiddingCost(uint256 _bidding... | true | false | false | 4 | ||||||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | mgf15 G | High | high |
## Gas Optimizations
| |Issue|Instances|
|-|:-|:-:|
| [GAS-1](#GAS-1) | Using bools for storage incurs overhead | 3 |
| [GAS-2](#GAS-2) | Cache array length outside of loop | 19 |
| [GAS-3](#GAS-3) | Don't initialize variables with default value | 21 |
| [GAS-4](#GAS-4) | Functions guaranteed to revert when called b... | File: 2023-04-caviar/src/PrivatePool.sol
94: bool public initialized;
97: bool public payRoyalties;
100: bool public useStolenNftOracle;
| File: 2023-04-caviar/src/EthRouter.sol
106: for (uint256 i = 0; i < buys.length; i++) {
116: for (uint256 j = 0; j < buys[i].tokenIds.length; j++) {
134: for (uint256 j = 0; j < buys[i].tokenIds.length; j++) {
159: for (uint256 i = 0; i < sells.length; i++) {
161: ... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/mgf15-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:43.010225+00:00 | b0718b1c551c5d251b72558cc62daeb353d0f4dcea1f90923ffadd4decd3720f | 1 | 1 | 151 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | File: 2023-04-caviar/src/PrivatePool.sol
94: bool public initialized;
97: bool public payRoyalties;
100: bool public useStolenNftOracle; | solidity | 151 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
File: 2023-04-caviar/src/PrivatePool.sol
94: bool public initialized;
97: bool public payRoyalties;
100: bool public useStolenNftOracle; | 1 | false | File: 2023-04-caviar/src/PrivatePool.sol
94: bool public initialized;
97: bool public payRoyalties;
100: bool public useStolenNftOracle; | ReentrancyGuard.sol#L23-L27 | ReentrancyGuard.sol | 1 | File: 2023-04-caviar/src/PrivatePool.sol
94: bool public initialized;
97: bool public payRoyalties;
100: bool public useStolenNftOracle;
| true | File: 2023-04-caviar/src/EthRouter.sol
106: for (uint256 i = 0; i < buys.length; i++) {
116: for (uint256 j = 0; j < buys[i].tokenIds.length; j++) {
134: for (uint256 j = 0; j < buys[i].tokenIds.length; j++) {
159: for (uint256 i = 0; i < sells.length; i++) {
161: ... | true | true | 7 | ||
c4 | 08-dopex | 0xWagmi Q | Critical | critical | ### Q/A Report
| Letter | Name | Description |
|:--:|:-------:|:-------:|
| L | Low risk | Potential risk |
| NC | Non-critical | Non risky findings |
| R | Refactor | Changing the code |
| O | Ordinary | Often found issues |
| Total Found Issues | 3 |
|:--:|:--:|
---
## Low[0] `calculateFunding()` function... | function _isEligibleSender() internal view {
// the below condition checks whether the caller is a contract or not
if (msg.sender != tx.origin) {
require(whitelistedContracts[msg.sender], "Contract must be whitelisted");
}
} | function test_strike_bypass_checks() public {
uint256[] memory strikes = new uint256[](0);
uint256 fundingAccrued = vault.calculateFunding(strikes);
}
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-08-dopex-findings/blob/main/data/0xWagmi-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:20.451580+00:00 | b07ba779aa78f5e436a2300ab50462d86ef3a032770392e8247dccd3872484c2 | 2 | 0 | 422 | 1 | false | false | true | false | high | function _isEligibleSender() internal view {
// the below condition checks whether the caller is a contract or not
if (msg.sender != tx.origin) {
require(whitelistedContracts[msg.sender], "Contract must be whitelisted");
}
} | js | 264 | // Code block 1 (js):
function _isEligibleSender() internal view {
// the below condition checks whether the caller is a contract or not
if (msg.sender != tx.origin) {
require(whitelistedContracts[msg.sender], "Contract must be whitelisted");
}
}
// Code block 2 (js):
function t... | 2 | false | PerpetualAtlanticVault.sol#L405 | PerpetualAtlanticVault.sol | 1 | function _isEligibleSender() internal view {
// the below condition checks whether the caller is a contract or not
if (msg.sender != tx.origin) {
require(whitelistedContracts[msg.sender], "Contract must be whitelisted");
}
} | true | function test_strike_bypass_checks() public {
uint256[] memory strikes = new uint256[](0);
uint256 fundingAccrued = vault.calculateFunding(strikes);
}
| true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 04-caviar | hunter_w3b G | High | high | # Gas Optimization
# Summary
| Number | Optimization Details | Context |
| :----: | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :-----: |
| [G-01] | FUNCTIONS GUARANTEED TO REVERT WHEN CALLED BY ... | File: /src/Factory.sol
129 function setPrivatePoolMetadata(address _privatePoolMetadata) public onlyOwner {
135 function setPrivatePoolImplementation(address _privatePoolImplementation) public onlyOwner {
141 function setProtocolFeeRate(uint16 _protocolFeeRate) public onlyOwner {
148 function withdraw(a... | File: /src/PrivatePool.sol
514 function withdraw(address _nft, uint256[] calldata tokenIds, address token, uint256 tokenAmount) public onlyOwner {
538 function setVirtualReserves(uint128 newVirtualBaseTokenReserves, uint128 newVirtualNftReserves) public onlyOwner {
550 function setMerkleRoot(bytes32 newMerk... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/hunter_w3b-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:35.021069+00:00 | b08e11584a75c260181121befbd32c0c75d579a99548f2aecfcbb085148f689b | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | File: /src/Factory.sol
129 function setPrivatePoolMetadata(address _privatePoolMetadata) public onlyOwner {
135 function setPrivatePoolImplementation(address _privatePoolImplementation) public onlyOwner {
141 function setProtocolFeeRate(uint16 _protocolFeeRate) public onlyOwner {
148 function withdraw(a... | true | File: /src/PrivatePool.sol
514 function withdraw(address _nft, uint256[] calldata tokenIds, address token, uint256 tokenAmount) public onlyOwner {
538 function setVirtualReserves(uint128 newVirtualBaseTokenReserves, uint128 newVirtualNftReserves) public onlyOwner {
550 function setMerkleRoot(bytes32 newMerk... | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | Haipls G | Low | low | ## Derivative never deleting
Even when the weight for the `derivative` was set to 0, it still affects the price of transactions
*Instances:*
```
contracts\SafEth\derivatives\SafEth.sol
71: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
72: underlyingValue +=
73: (derivatives[i].ethPerDe... | contracts\SafEth\derivatives\SafEth.sol
71: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
72: underlyingValue +=
73: (derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
74: derivatives[i].balance()) /
75: 10 ** 18;
84: for (uint i =... | contracts\SafEth\derivatives\Reth.sol
121: address rocketDepositPoolAddress = RocketStorageInterface(
122: ROCKET_STORAGE_ADDRESS
123: ).getAddress(
124: keccak256(
125: abi.encodePacked("contract.address", "rocketDepositPool")
126: )
127:... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Haipls-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:06.541737+00:00 | b0a9664a9beafb5fdde459f60c53d53e7f7c56c8c4d14e661947178b4c20195e | 1 | 0 | 917 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | contracts\SafEth\derivatives\SafEth.sol
71: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
72: underlyingValue +=
73: (derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
74: derivatives[i].balance()) /
75: 10 ** 18;
84: for (uint i =... | unknown | 917 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
contracts\SafEth\derivatives\SafEth.sol
71: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
72: underlyingValue +=
73: (derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
74: derivatives[i].balance()) /
75: 10 ** 18;... | 1 | false | 0 | contracts\SafEth\derivatives\SafEth.sol
71: for (uint i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
72: underlyingValue +=
73: (derivatives[i].ethPerDerivative(derivatives[i].balance()) *
74: derivatives[i].balance()) /
75: 10 ** 18;
84: for (uint i =... | true | contracts\SafEth\derivatives\Reth.sol
121: address rocketDepositPoolAddress = RocketStorageInterface(
122: ROCKET_STORAGE_ADDRESS
123: ).getAddress(
124: keccak256(
125: abi.encodePacked("contract.address", "rocketDepositPool")
126: )
127:... | true | true | 6 | |||||
c4 | 02-ai-arena | 0xKowalski Q | High | high | [L-1] Potential DoS from High `roundId`/`winnerAddresses` in [`MergingPool::claimRewards`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena/blob/cd1a0e6d1b40168657d1aaee8223dc050e15f8cc/src/MergingPool.sol#L134-L167)
With increased round counts and/or `winnerAddresses`, users might face a DoS scenario when claiming larg... | uint32 lowerBound = numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender];
for (uint32 currentRound = lowerBound; currentRound < roundId; currentRound++) {
numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender] += 1;
winnersLength = winnerAddresses[currentRound].length;
for (uint32 j = 0; j < winnersLength; j++) {
... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-02-ai-arena-findings/blob/main/data/0xKowalski-Q.md | 2026-01-02T19:02:02.876433+00:00 | b0b18b470c855ab82854f2ad54aa75101b1f20bf82bff30c2797aa56e9bbcf18 | 1 | 0 | 726 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | uint32 lowerBound = numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender];
for (uint32 currentRound = lowerBound; currentRound < roundId; currentRound++) {
numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender] += 1;
winnersLength = winnerAddresses[currentRound].length;
for (uint32 j = 0; j < winnersLength; j++) {
... | unknown | 726 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
uint32 lowerBound = numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender];
for (uint32 currentRound = lowerBound; currentRound < roundId; currentRound++) {
numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender] += 1;
winnersLength = winnerAddresses[currentRound].length;
for (uint32 j = 0; j < winner... | 1 | false | MergingPool.sol#L134-L167 | MergingPool.sol | 1 | uint32 lowerBound = numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender];
for (uint32 currentRound = lowerBound; currentRound < roundId; currentRound++) {
numRoundsClaimed[msg.sender] += 1;
winnersLength = winnerAddresses[currentRound].length;
for (uint32 j = 0; j < winnersLength; j++) {
... | true | false | false | 6 | |||||
c4 | 10-badger | jasonxiale Q | Low | low | # [L-01] `ActivePool.feeRecipientAddress` lacks of check that `feeRecipientAddress` should be greater than address(0)
File:
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/f2f2e2cf9965a1020661d179af46cb49e993cb7e/packages/contracts/contracts/ActivePool.sol#L57
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger/blob/f2f2e2c... | 881 if (_isRecoveryMode) {
882 _requireNoStEthBalanceDecrease(_stEthBalanceDecrease);
883 if (_isDebtIncrease) {
884 _requireICRisNotBelowCCR(_vars.newICR); <<<--------- here
885 _requireNoDecreaseOfICR(_vars.newICR, _vars.oldICR);
886 ... | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-badger-findings/blob/main/data/jasonxiale-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:26:52.450019+00:00 | b0c908eebf7960d9d841b06da94f1134843af7df1099002d76d450c5f99a8cc6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | ActivePool.sol#L57, ActivePool.sol#L286-L2, ActivePool.sol#L362, ActivePool.sol#L381, BorrowerOperations.sol#L463, BorrowerOperations.sol#L454, BorrowerOperations.sol#L865 | BorrowerOperations.sol, ActivePool.sol | 7 | 881 if (_isRecoveryMode) {
882 _requireNoStEthBalanceDecrease(_stEthBalanceDecrease);
883 if (_isDebtIncrease) {
884 _requireICRisNotBelowCCR(_vars.newICR); <<<--------- here
885 _requireNoDecreaseOfICR(_vars.newICR, _vars.oldICR);
886 ... | true | false | false | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | favelanky G | Low | low |
## [G-01] Setting the `constructor` to `payable` can save gas
Setting constructor to payable will save ~13 gas per instance.
There are 3 instance of this issue:
```diff
constructor() {
_disableInitializers();
}
```
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivati... | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol#L24-L26
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L38-L40
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol#L33-L35
https://github.c... | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L186-L194
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L72-L75
## [G-03] Using bools for storage incurs overhead
Booleans are more expensive than uint256 or any type that takes up a full word... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/favelanky-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:19:07.503180+00:00 | b0faced1ac3b4453cf0490097333d8a29ae9617ed10f47b6059b1ecb57f8eac2 | 2 | 2 | 735 | 6 | false | false | true | false | high | constructor() {
_disableInitializers();
} | diff | 53 | // Code block 1 (diff):
constructor() {
_disableInitializers();
}
// Code block 2 (solidity):
File: SafEth.sol
// derivativeCount can be saved in memory
{
derivatives[derivativeCount] = IDerivative(_contractAddress);
weights[derivativeCount] = _weight;
derivativeCount++;
u... | 2 | true | constructor() {
_disableInitializers();
} | File: SafEth.sol
// derivativeCount can be saved in memory
{
derivatives[derivativeCount] = IDerivative(_contractAddress);
weights[derivativeCount] = _weight;
derivativeCount++;
uint256 localTotalWeight = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < derivativeCount; i++)
localTotalWe... | WstEth.sol#L24-L26, SafEth.sol#L38-L40, Reth.sol#L33-L35, SfrxEth.sol#L27-L29, SafEth.sol#L186-L194, SafEth.sol#L72-L75 | SfrxEth.sol, Reth.sol, WstEth.sol, SafEth.sol | 6 | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/WstEth.sol#L24-L26
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L38-L40
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol#L33-L35
https://github.c... | true | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L186-L194
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/main/contracts/SafEth/SafEth.sol#L72-L75
## [G-03] Using bools for storage incurs overhead
Booleans are more expensive than uint256 or any type that takes up a full word... | true | true | 10 | |
c4 | 07-amphora | SY_S G | Low | low | ## Summary
### Gas Optimization
no | Issue |Instances||
|-|:-|:-:|:-:|
| [G-01] | Use nested if and, avoid multiple check combinations | 6 |
| [G-02] | Use assembly to write address storage values | 4 |
| [G-03] |Use hardcode address instead of address(this) | 9 |
| [G-04] | Expressions for constant values such as... | file: /contracts/core/Vault.sol
158 if (_poolId != 0 && balances[_token] != 0 && !isTokenStaked[_token]) _canStake = true;
| file: /contracts/core/VaultController.sol
1018 if (_increase && (_collateral.totalDeposited + _amount) > _collateral.cap) revert VaultController_CapReached();
| access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/SY_S-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:23:35.872217+00:00 | b1dd7708219a1f478f91998b0c2f5d4c248ea60b4e21b291ba84ceda70622f90 | 2 | 2 | 288 | 2 | false | false | true | false | high | file: /contracts/core/Vault.sol
158 if (_poolId != 0 && balances[_token] != 0 && !isTokenStaked[_token]) _canStake = true; | solidity | 126 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
file: /contracts/core/Vault.sol
158 if (_poolId != 0 && balances[_token] != 0 && !isTokenStaked[_token]) _canStake = true;
// Code block 2 (solidity):
file: /contracts/core/VaultController.sol
1018 if (_increase && (_collateral.totalDeposited + _amount) > _collateral.cap) revert Vau... | 2 | false | file: /contracts/core/Vault.sol
158 if (_poolId != 0 && balances[_token] != 0 && !isTokenStaked[_token]) _canStake = true;
file: /contracts/core/VaultController.sol
1018 if (_increase && (_collateral.totalDeposited + _amount) > _collateral.cap) revert VaultController_CapReached(); | Vault.sol#L158, VaultController.sol#L1018 | VaultController.sol, Vault.sol | 2 | file: /contracts/core/Vault.sol
158 if (_poolId != 0 && balances[_token] != 0 && !isTokenStaked[_token]) _canStake = true;
| true | file: /contracts/core/VaultController.sol
1018 if (_increase && (_collateral.totalDeposited + _amount) > _collateral.cap) revert VaultController_CapReached();
| true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | IgorZuk G | Low | low | ## Pack global storage variables of SafETH
The current storage takes 5 slots:
```solidity
bool public pauseStaking;
bool public pauseUnstaking;
uint256 public derivativeCount;
uint256 public totalWeight;
uint256 public minAmount;
uint256 public maxAmount;
```
This is excessive, the types can be much smaller:
- `deriv... | bool public pauseStaking;
bool public pauseUnstaking;
uint256 public derivativeCount;
uint256 public totalWeight;
uint256 public minAmount;
uint256 public maxAmount; | bool public pauseStaking;
bool public pauseUnstaking;
uint16 public derivativeCount;
uint32 public totalWeight;
uint96 public minAmount;
uint96 public maxAmount; | upgrade | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/IgorZuk-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:09.286766+00:00 | b1e7377e42fc7ef66b7611d3a4acc4dd23a29fced96afe58d8d9528b5eb5552c | 3 | 3 | 481 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | bool public pauseStaking;
bool public pauseUnstaking;
uint256 public derivativeCount;
uint256 public totalWeight;
uint256 public minAmount;
uint256 public maxAmount; | solidity | 165 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
bool public pauseStaking;
bool public pauseUnstaking;
uint256 public derivativeCount;
uint256 public totalWeight;
uint256 public minAmount;
uint256 public maxAmount;
// Code block 2 (solidity):
bool public pauseStaking;
bool public pauseUnstaking;
uint16 public derivativeCount;
uint32 publi... | 3 | false | bool public pauseStaking;
bool public pauseUnstaking;
uint256 public derivativeCount;
uint256 public totalWeight;
uint256 public minAmount;
uint256 public maxAmount;
bool public pauseStaking;
bool public pauseUnstaking;
uint16 public derivativeCount;
uint32 public totalWeight;
uint96 public minAmount;
uint96 public ma... | 0 | bool public pauseStaking;
bool public pauseUnstaking;
uint256 public derivativeCount;
uint256 public totalWeight;
uint256 public minAmount;
uint256 public maxAmount; | true | bool public pauseStaking;
bool public pauseUnstaking;
uint16 public derivativeCount;
uint32 public totalWeight;
uint96 public minAmount;
uint96 public maxAmount; | true | true | 8 | ||||
c4 | 05-ajna | Rageur G | High | high | ## GAS-1: 10 ** X can be changed to 1eX
### Affected file
* Maths.sol (Line: 30, 34, 38, 47)
## GAS-2: <X> += <Y> costs more gas than <X> = <X> + <Y> for state variables
### Description
Using the addition operator instead of plus-equals saves gas.
### Affected file
* ExtraordinaryFunding.sol (Line: 145)
* Positi... | ### Affected file
* GrantFund.sol (Line: 67)
* PositionManager.sol (Line: 213, 390)
## GAS-14: Use nested if and avoid multiple check combinations
### Description
Using nested is cheaper than using && multiple check combinations. There are more advantages, such as easier to read code and better coverage reports.
#... | overflow | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/Rageur-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:08.938949+00:00 | b1f685cd92f9e821fbffff063ef3cc93ad282c9ab6c6691e9f9f09a7e4131506 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | true | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | ### Affected file
* GrantFund.sol (Line: 67)
* PositionManager.sol (Line: 213, 390)
## GAS-14: Use nested if and avoid multiple check combinations
### Description
Using nested is cheaper than using && multiple check combinations. There are more advantages, such as easier to read code and better coverage reports.
#... | true | false | false | 4 | ||||||||||
c4 | 01-biconomy | Diana Q | Critical | critical |
## 01 require() should be used instead of assert()
Assert should not be used except for tests, `require` should be used
Prior to Solidity 0.8.0, pressing a confirm consumes the remainder of the process’s available gas instead of returning it, as request()/revert() did.
Assertion() should be avoided even after solid... | File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/Proxy.sol
16: assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1)); | File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/common/Singleton.sol
13: assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1)); | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-biconomy-findings/blob/main/data/Diana-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:13:03.104579+00:00 | b285cf067ce54e7c69c1db0778b947a4141c501a358dcfd3b3485629b5a97548 | 2 | 0 | 319 | 3 | false | false | true | false | high | File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/Proxy.sol
16: assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1)); | unknown | 154 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/Proxy.sol
16: assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1));
// Code block 2 (unknown):
File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/common/Singleton.sol
13: assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256... | 2 | false | Proxy.sol, Singleton.sol, SmartAccount.sol | SmartAccount.sol, Proxy.sol, Singleton.sol | 3 | File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/Proxy.sol
16: assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1)); | true | File: contracts/smart-contract-wallet/common/Singleton.sol
13: assert(_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT == bytes32(uint256(keccak256("biconomy.scw.proxy.implementation")) - 1)); | true | true | 8 | |||
c4 | 09-ondo | ast3ros Q | Low | low | # [L-1] PausableUpgradeable contract is not initialized
Contract that inherit from PausableUpgradeable should call the `__Pausable_init()` function in their initialize function. This is not done in the rUSDY contract.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo/blob/b88271d64112234b7a7273cd7f3cea73c350e6a7/contracts/... | oracle | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-ondo-findings/blob/main/data/ast3ros-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:25:47.557988+00:00 | b28742ca7a2e4e7b548d2c6873c23f664f0c01293da6f039c3199e5b099b4025 | 1 | 1 | 304 | 3 | true | true | true | false | medium | ) internal onlyInitializing {
__BlocklistClientInitializable_init(blocklist);
__AllowlistClientInitializable_init(allowlist);
__SanctionsListClientInitializable_init(sanctionsList);
__rUSDY_init_unchained(_usdy, guardian, _oracle);
+ __Pausable_init();
} | diff | 304 | // Code block 1 (diff):
) internal onlyInitializing {
__BlocklistClientInitializable_init(blocklist);
__AllowlistClientInitializable_init(allowlist);
__SanctionsListClientInitializable_init(sanctionsList);
__rUSDY_init_unchained(_usdy, guardian, _oracle);
+ __Pausable_init(); ... | 1 | true | ) internal onlyInitializing {
__BlocklistClientInitializable_init(blocklist);
__AllowlistClientInitializable_init(allowlist);
__SanctionsListClientInitializable_init(sanctionsList);
__rUSDY_init_unchained(_usdy, guardian, _oracle);
+ __Pausable_init();
} | rUSDY.sol#L128-L131, DestinationBridge.sol#L111, RWADynamicOracle.sol#L405-L407 | rUSDY.sol, RWADynamicOracle.sol, DestinationBridge.sol | 3 | false | false | false | 7 | ||||||
c4 | 04-caviar | ayden G | Gas | gas | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar/blob/main/src/PrivatePool.sol#L94#L100
Using bools for storage incurs overhead
Use uint256(1) and uint256(2) for true/false to avoid a Gwarmaccess (100 gas), and to avoid Gsset (20000 gas) when changing from ‘false’ to ‘true’, after having been ‘true’ in the past
use assemb... | error ZeroAddress();
function assembly_notZero(address toCheck) public pure returns(bool success) {
assembly {
if iszero(toCheck) {
let ptr := mload(0x40)
mstore(ptr, 0xd92e233d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000) // selector for `ZeroAddress()`
rever... | // ~~~ Checks ~~~ //
if((baseToken == address(0))){
//eth
if(msg.value != baseTokenAmount) revert InvalidEthAmount();
}else{
//erc20
if(msg.value > 0) revert InvalidEthAmount();
ERC20(baseToken).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(th... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-04-caviar-findings/blob/main/data/ayden-G.md | 2026-01-02T18:20:16.236967+00:00 | b29fce6861cd00a8fcf0bb33614beb47015d25d02ef621e808fa9fce3142f76e | 2 | 2 | 1,103 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | error ZeroAddress();
function assembly_notZero(address toCheck) public pure returns(bool success) {
assembly {
if iszero(toCheck) {
let ptr := mload(0x40)
mstore(ptr, 0xd92e233d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000) // selector for `ZeroAddress()`
rever... | solidity | 366 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
error ZeroAddress();
function assembly_notZero(address toCheck) public pure returns(bool success) {
assembly {
if iszero(toCheck) {
let ptr := mload(0x40)
mstore(ptr, 0xd92e233d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000) // selector for `Zero... | 2 | false | error ZeroAddress();
function assembly_notZero(address toCheck) public pure returns(bool success) {
assembly {
if iszero(toCheck) {
let ptr := mload(0x40)
mstore(ptr, 0xd92e233d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000) // selector for `ZeroAddress()`
rever... | PrivatePool.sol#L94, PrivatePool.sol#L484, PrivatePool.sol#L221, PrivatePool.sol#L306 | PrivatePool.sol | 4 | error ZeroAddress();
function assembly_notZero(address toCheck) public pure returns(bool success) {
assembly {
if iszero(toCheck) {
let ptr := mload(0x40)
mstore(ptr, 0xd92e233d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000) // selector for `ZeroAddress()`
rever... | true | // ~~~ Checks ~~~ //
if((baseToken == address(0))){
//eth
if(msg.value != baseTokenAmount) revert InvalidEthAmount();
}else{
//erc20
if(msg.value > 0) revert InvalidEthAmount();
ERC20(baseToken).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(th... | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 07-amphora | uzay Q | Low | low | # Some functions revert on failure even though they are expected to return false instead
In the `UFragments.sol` contract, the transfer and approval functions return `true` on success and `revert` on failure. However, according to the natspec comments written by the protocol developers, these functions are expected to... | /**
* @notice Transfer tokens to a specified address.
* @param _to The address to transfer to.
* @param _value The amount to be transferred.
* @return _success True on success, false otherwise. @audit function never returns false
*/
function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) external override validRecipient(_to) re... | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-amphora-findings/blob/main/data/uzay-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:24:04.463373+00:00 | b2b610e29cf36112fe9ca6cbb8f7e0a0a3a50586e71bc1fd753478f4fb4e1f48 | 1 | 0 | 572 | 0 | false | true | true | false | medium | /**
* @notice Transfer tokens to a specified address.
* @param _to The address to transfer to.
* @param _value The amount to be transferred.
* @return _success True on success, false otherwise. @audit function never returns false
*/
function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) external override validRecipient(_to) re... | javascript | 572 | // Code block 1 (javascript):
/**
* @notice Transfer tokens to a specified address.
* @param _to The address to transfer to.
* @param _value The amount to be transferred.
* @return _success True on success, false otherwise. @audit function never returns false
*/
function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) external o... | 1 | false | 0 | /**
* @notice Transfer tokens to a specified address.
* @param _to The address to transfer to.
* @param _value The amount to be transferred.
* @return _success True on success, false otherwise. @audit function never returns false
*/
function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) external override validRecipient(_to) re... | true | false | false | 4.69 | |||||||
c4 | 05-ajna | Jerry0x Q | Unknown | unknown | ## Impact
Calldata length must be greater than 68
## Proof of Concept
[mload(add(tokenDataWithSig, 68))](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna/blob/main/ajna-grants/src/grants/base/Funding.sol#L133)
```
require(tokenDataWithSig.length >68, "invalid calldata");
assembly {
tokensRequested := mload(add(tokenDataWi... | require(tokenDataWithSig.length >68, "invalid calldata");
assembly {
tokensRequested := mload(add(tokenDataWithSig, 68))
} | other | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-05-ajna-findings/blob/main/data/Jerry0x-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:21:00.814354+00:00 | b2da531fc5bda09a5c49eaa74d738c757bf0315a90604a32af77c1b13d14e0da | 1 | 0 | 124 | 1 | false | true | true | false | medium | require(tokenDataWithSig.length >68, "invalid calldata");
assembly {
tokensRequested := mload(add(tokenDataWithSig, 68))
} | unknown | 124 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
require(tokenDataWithSig.length >68, "invalid calldata");
assembly {
tokensRequested := mload(add(tokenDataWithSig, 68))
} | 1 | false | Funding.sol#L133 | Funding.sol | 1 | require(tokenDataWithSig.length >68, "invalid calldata");
assembly {
tokensRequested := mload(add(tokenDataWithSig, 68))
} | true | false | false | 3.67 | |||||
c4 | 03-asymmetry | Dug Q | Low | low | # `Unstaked` event data can be manipulated
When the `unstake()` function is called, `withdraw()` is called on each derivative. At the end of each, the derivative sends its full ether balance to the `SafEth` contract.
```solidity
(bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: address(this).balance}(
""
);
```
A... | (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: address(this).balance}(
""
); | emit Unstaked(msg.sender, ethAmountToWithdraw, _safEthAmount); | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings/blob/main/data/Dug-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:18:02.919845+00:00 | b30017538e6d3530d2840b1d79c984872658fdff18eaeec8221fa1602f090496 | 2 | 2 | 143 | 4 | false | false | true | false | high | (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: address(this).balance}(
""
); | solidity | 81 | // Code block 1 (solidity):
(bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: address(this).balance}(
""
);
// Code block 2 (solidity):
emit Unstaked(msg.sender, ethAmountToWithdraw, _safEthAmount); | 2 | false | (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: address(this).balance}(
""
);
emit Unstaked(msg.sender, ethAmountToWithdraw, _safEthAmount); | SafEth.sol#L108-L129, Reth.sol#L107-L114, SfrxEth.sol#L60-L88, WstEth.sol#L56-L67 | SfrxEth.sol, Reth.sol, WstEth.sol, SafEth.sol | 4 | (bool sent, ) = address(msg.sender).call{value: address(this).balance}(
""
); | true | emit Unstaked(msg.sender, ethAmountToWithdraw, _safEthAmount); | true | true | 8 | ||
c4 | 11-kelp | hunter_w3b Analysis | Critical | critical | # Analysis - Kelp DAO | rsETH Contest
## Description overview of Kelp DAO Contest
Kelp DAO aims to unlo... | modifier onlyLRTManager() {
if (!IAccessControl(address(lrtConfig)).hasRole(LRTConstants.MANAGER, msg.sender)) {
revert ILRTConfig.CallerNotLRTConfigManager();
}
_;
} | modifier onlyLRTAdmin() {
bytes32 DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE = 0x00;
if (!IAccessControl(address(lrtConfig)).hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, msg.sender)) {
revert ILRTConfig.CallerNotLRTConfigAdmin();
}
_;
} | reentrancy | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/hunter_w3b-Analysis.md | 2026-01-02T18:28:06.848947+00:00 | b304ab6db777c7485d45cf9cd8335bc85b1852c4e7a976971aa8d820c0731ef5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | false | medium | 0 | 0 | false | 0 | modifier onlyLRTManager() {
if (!IAccessControl(address(lrtConfig)).hasRole(LRTConstants.MANAGER, msg.sender)) {
revert ILRTConfig.CallerNotLRTConfigManager();
}
_;
} | true | modifier onlyLRTAdmin() {
bytes32 DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE = 0x00;
if (!IAccessControl(address(lrtConfig)).hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, msg.sender)) {
revert ILRTConfig.CallerNotLRTConfigAdmin();
}
_;
} | true | true | 5 | ||||||||
c4 | 11-kelp | mxuse Q | QA | qa | QA (4 in total)
1. GetAssetCurrentLimit
``` javascript
function getAssetCurrentLimit(address asset) public view override returns (uint256) {
return lrtConfig.depositLimitByAsset(asset) - getTotalAssetDeposits(asset);
}
```
This function can be viewed by everyone and returns the Currentlimit from an asset.
``` jav... | This function can be viewed by everyone and returns the Currentlimit from an asset.
| This section of the `depositAsset` function checks whether the deposit amount exceeds the current limit obtained from `getAssetCurrentLimit(asset)`. A malicious user could monitor the asset's limit using the public function and, as it approaches the limit, intentionally causes pending transactions from honest users to... | access-control | https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-11-kelp-findings/blob/main/data/mxuse-Q.md | 2026-01-02T18:28:17.193307+00:00 | b313059e69b18a1fae23c1111bd3920c623237d2aa611e5004ea1755692bb4bb | 2 | 0 | 1,554 | 0 | false | false | true | false | high | This function can be viewed by everyone and returns the Currentlimit from an asset. | unknown | 83 | // Code block 1 (unknown):
This function can be viewed by everyone and returns the Currentlimit from an asset.
// Code block 2 (unknown):
This section of the `depositAsset` function checks whether the deposit amount exceeds the current limit obtained from `getAssetCurrentLimit(asset)`. A malicious user could monitor ... | 2 | false | 0 | This function can be viewed by everyone and returns the Currentlimit from an asset.
| true | This section of the `depositAsset` function checks whether the deposit amount exceeds the current limit obtained from `getAssetCurrentLimit(asset)`. A malicious user could monitor the asset's limit using the public function and, as it approaches the limit, intentionally causes pending transactions from honest users to... | true | true | 7 |
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