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On December 3/4, 1959, the Regional Transport Authority passed a resolution accepting the appellant Municipality 's proposal and providing that the bus stand would be shifted to the place suggested by the appellant Municipality and the old bus stand would cease to be used as such but would only be used as a bus stop. R...
The resolution further provided that the appellant Municipality would provide certain facilities and the new bus stand would start functioning after the facilities had been provided. Ratio
Now section 64A of the provides as follows: section 64A. "The State Transport Authority may, either on its own motion or on an application made to it, call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport A...
While this application was pending disposal by the State Transport Authority, the Regional Transport Authority issued a notification dated June 28, 1960, finally declaring and notifying to the public the fixing of the new bus stand. Ratio
This notification was published in the Rajasthan Gazette of July 14, 1960. Ratio
It appears that there wasthis delay in issuing the notification of the Regional Transport Authority 's notification of December 3/4, 1959, because in the meantime two other persons had moved the State Transport Authority under section 64A to quash that resolution and also because the facilities which the appellant Muni...
That earlier petition under section 64A was dismissed by the State Transport Authority on February 18, 1960, and thereafter the facilities required had been provided by the appellant Municipality. Ratio
It is after all this that the notification of June 28, 1960, had been issued. Ratio
The respon dent 's petition under section 64A was allowed by the State Transport Authority by an order made on January 6, 1961. Ratio
By that order the State Transport Authority directed that "the decision passed by the R. T. A. dated 3/4 December 1959 and upheld by the STA on 18. Ratio
1960 be set aside and cancelled and the old Bus stand shall continue to be recognised as Official Bus stand for the Pushkar Town. Ratio
" 400 On February 10, 1961, the appellant Municipality filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Rajasthan for a writ quashing the order of the State Transport Authority of January 6, 1961. Ratio
This petition was dismissed by the High Court. Ratio
The appellant has now appealed to this Court against the decision of the High Court. Ratio
There were various points taken in support of this appeal, but I think that one of them must succeed and I propose in this judgment to discuss that point only. Ratio
It was said on behalf of the appellant Municipality that there was an error apparent on the face of the record because the respondents ' petition to the State Transport Authority under section 64A had been filed after the period of thirty days limited for that purpose by the proviso to that section. Ratio
It was contended on behalf of the respondents that this was not so for under section 64 A the period of thirty days had to be counted not from the date of the order in this case the resolution of December 3/4, 1959 but from the date when the respondents had the knowledge of that order. ARG
It was contended that if the period was counted from such date, then the petition was within time. ARG
I do not think that under section 64 A the period of thirty days has to be counted from the date that the party wishing to move under that section comes to have knowledge of the 'order sought to be set aside. Ratio
My learned brother Das Gupta, J., has in the judgment just delivered by him discussed this question and with his view on that point I am in entire agreement. FAC
It is unnecessary for me to discuss this question further. Ratio
Therefore, it would appear that the respondents ' petition under section 64A to set aside the order of December 3/4, 1959, was out of time and should have been dismissed. Ratio
The State Transport Authority 's decision that it was not out of time because the period of thirty days has to be counted from the date of the knowledge of the order was 401 patently erroneous and therefore the appellant should have been held entitled to the writ by the High Court of Rajasthan. Ratio
But it was then said that the date of the order of the Regional Transport Authority was not december 3/4, 1959, but June 28, 1960. ' This was presumably put on the ground that the order could and r. 134, earlier set out, be made by notification and in this case the notification was made on June 28, 1960. Ratio
Under that rule a bus stand could be fixed by the erection of traffic signs also but I will leave this method out of consideration as it was not followed in this case. Ratio
I have some doubt whether the contention that the order mentioned in section 64 A, is for the purpose of the present case, the order contained in the notification, is 'right, but I will assume that to be so. Ratio
If the Regional Transport Authority 's order was made, only on June 28, 1960, as the respondents contend, then their application under section 644 was not barred by limitation for in fact it was made before that date. Ratio
But that gives the respondents no advantage. Ratio
They had by their petition under section 64A asked that the Regional Transport Authority 's order of December 3/4, 1959, be quashed. Ratio
Now, on the respondents own argument, that order was not an order under section 64 A at all and could not be set aside under that section. Ratio
Therefore, again the order of the State Transport Authority setting aside the Regional Transport Authority 's resolution of December 3/4 1959, was incompetent on the face of it. Ratio
That resolution was exhypothesi not art order liable to be revised under section 64A. Ratio
The State Transport Authority 's order of January 6, 1961, was even off this basis patently erroneous and without jurisdiction and so liable to be set aside,.by a writ. Ratio
Then it was said that it was in the power of ,the State Transport Authority to treat the petition 402 under section 64A filed on April 13,1960, and pending on June 28, 1960, the date of the notification, as an application to set aside the order contained in that notification. Ratio
Now I do not think the State Transport Authority suo motu could do so. Ratio
It is for thepetitioner to decide what relief he would ask in his application under section 64A. Ratio
The State Transport Authority could not against the wish of the petitioner alter his prayer. Ratio
Here therespondents never asked, that their application under s.64A should be treated as an application to set aside the order contained in theNotification of June 28, 1960. Ratio
However that may be, even if the State Transport Authority could treat the petition of April 13, 1960, as asking, for quashing of the Regional Transport Authority 's order of June 28, 60, it did not in fact do so. Ratio
This is evident from the State Transport Authority 's order of January 6, 1961, where in considering the question of limitation it proceeds on the basis that the period of thirty days provided in section 64A is to be counted , from the date of The knowledge of the.order which would be insensible if it had treated the p...
Nowhere in its judgment, of January 6, 1961, does the State Transport Authority refer to the notification of june 28, 1960. Ratio
In the operative part of its order which I have earlier set out. Ratio
it expressly set aside and cancelled the Regional Transport Authorities resolution of December 3/4, 1959, and it is only as consequential thereto that it stated that " 'the old Bus stand shall continue. Ratio
" Even in their affidavit in opposition to the petition under article 226 the respondents themselves did, not make the case that the State Transport Authority had treated their application under section 64A as ;In application to set aside the order contained in the notification of June 28 1960. Ratio
In that affidavit they Stated, that the revision filed by; the respondents before the S.T.A. was within the prescribed time as the same was filed within about a week of 'the respondents knowledge of the R.T.A. 's 403 order. Ratio
" They clearly even then proceeded on the basis that their application under section 64A had been an application to set aside the resolution of December 3/4, 1959,. Ratio
No doubt the High Court did not accept the view that the period of thirty days provided by section 64A has to be counted from the date of the knowledge of the order sought to be impugned. Ratio
It said that it was the notification which was the source of the respondents ' grievance and, therefore, their petition under section, 64A was, not out of time. FAC
The High Court wholly omitted. Ratio
to notice that the petition asked nothing concerning the notification of June 28, 1960. Ratio
Therefore, it seems to me that it is to no purpose to consider whether the State Transport Authority could treat the respondents petition under section 64A as having been filed on or after June 28, 1960, to cancel the order contained in the notification of that date. Ratio
In fact, it did not do so. Ratio
It was neither for the High Court nor it is for this Court now to amend the application under section 64A and treat it as one for sett ing aside the Regional Transport Authority 's order contained in the notification of June 28, 1960. Ratio
That application was never before either of these Courts. Ratio
If the respondents themselves had made an application for such a amendment, then the application would have been dismissed if on its date, thirty days from the date of the notification had passed. Ratio
Now on the dates when the State Transport Authority and the High Court passed their orders, the period of thirty days so counted had passed. Ratio
On those dates the respondents could not successfully ask for an amendment of their application under section 64A. Ratio
It, therefore, seems to me that if the order of the Regional Transport Authority is to be taken as having been, made, on June 28, 1960, then the respondents ' petition under section 64A was incompetent because it sought anorder for setting aside the Regional Transport Authority 's resolution of December 3/4, 1959 404 a...
my view, the appellant municipality was clearly entitled to a writ quashing "I order of the; State Transport Authority of January 6, 1961. Ratio
I would, therefore; allow the appeal with cost. Ratio
By COURT By majority judgment the appeals are allowed and the matter sent back for disposal in accordance with law. RPC
Parties to bear their own Costs. RPC
Appeal No. 226 of 1960. FAC
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated February 2, 1956, of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 158 of 1954. FAC
M.C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India, Veda Vyasa, R. K. Garg, section C. Agarwal, Shiv Sastri and K. K. Jain, for the appellant. FAC
S.T. Desai, K. section Hajela and C. P. Lal, for respondent No. 1. FAC
C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor General for India, Radhy Lal Agarwal and P. C. Agarwal, for respondent No. 2. FAC
764 1962. FAC
December 6. FAC
The Judgment of Das, Kapur, Sarkar and Hidayatullah, was a delivered by Hidayatullah, J., Dayal, J., delivered a separate judgment. FAC
HIDAYATULLAH.J., This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Allahabad under Article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution against its judgment and order dated February 2, 1956. FAC
By the judgment, under appeal, which was passed in a Letters Patent Appeal, the Divisional Bench confirmed the order of a learned single judge dismissing the petition of the appellant under article 226 of the Constitution. FAC
Seth Banarsi Das, the appellant before us, was the petitioner in the High Court and the two respondents before us, namely, the Cane Commissioner, U. P., Lucknow, and the Cane Marketing Society Ltd., Bijnor, were the opposite parties. FAC
The petition asked for a number of writs in the alternative, but its purport was to seek to prohibit the two respondents from continuing certain proceedings pending before the Cane Commissioner under rule 23 of the United Provinces Sugar Factories Control Rules, 1938. FAC
That rule provides for arbitration in disputes touching agreements entered into by sugar cane factories and cane growers for supply of sugar cane as laid down by the United Provinces Sugar Factories Control Act, 1938. FAC
The facts of the case are as follows: The appellant was at the material time the lessee and "Occupier" of Shiva Prasad Banarsi Das Sugar Mills, Bijnor, for five years from the crushing season 1946 47 to 1950 51. FAC
The second respondent is the Cane Marketing Society Ltd., Bijnor, which is a society registered under the Uttar Pradesh Co operative Societies Act, and one of its objects is to supply sugar cane grown by its members to the sugar mills. FAC
Before the control of 765 sugar cane, cane growers, whether they belonged to a co operative society or not, sold sugar cane directly to the factories and made Supplies from any area as it suited them. FAC
The United Provinces Sugar Factories Control Act was passed for the purpose of licensing of sugar factories and for regulating the supply of sugar cane intended for use in such factories and the price at which it may be purchased and for such other matters as may be incidental thereto. FAC
The broad outline of the Act and the rules framed thereunder may be given here. FAC
Under the Act the control of sugar cane grown in the State was vested in an officer known as the cane Commissioner and Advisory Committees and Sugar Control Board were to be appointed to advise upon and effectuate control of sugar and sugar cane. FAC
There was a scheme for licensing of factories with which we are not concerned in this case. FAC
Chapter IV of the Act made provision for regulating the purchase of sugar cane. STA
Under section 14, the State Government could require the "Occupier ' of any factory to submit to 'the Cane Commissioner an estimate in the prescribed form and manner of the quantity of sugar cane which would be required in his factory during a crushing season. STA
This estimate was examined by the Cane Commissioner who, after consulting the Advisory Committee in that area, published it with such modifications, if any, as he. STA
thought fit to make. STA
Under section 15 the Cane Commissioner, in consultation with the Advisory Committee (if any) and the ,Occupier ' of the factory, could issue an order declaring an area to be 'a reserved area ' for the purpose of supply of sugar 'cane to a particular factory. STA
Section 18 then provided as follows "18.Purchase of cane in reserved area. (1) A cane grower or a Cane growers ' Co operative Society in a reserved area may offer, in the form and by the date prescribed, to supply to 766 the occupier of the factory for which the area is reserved cane grown by the cane grower or by the ...
(2)The Occupier or manager of a factory for which an area is reserved shall enter into an agreement, in such form, by such date and on such terms and conditions as may by prescribed, to purchase the cane offered in accordance with sub section (1) : Provided that, he shall not enter into an agreement to purchase cane fr...
(3)Except with the permission of the Provincial Government, cane grown in a reserved area shall not be purchased in such area by a purchasing agent, or by any person other than occupier of the factory for which such area has been reserved. STA
(4)Cane grown in a reserved area shall not be sold by any person other than a cane grower or a Cane growers ' Co operative Society: Provided that a cane grower or a Cane growers ' Co operative Society may deliver cane intended for use in a factory through another cane grower or through a carrier. STA
(5)During the crushing season the Provincial Government may, if it is satisfied that there is likely to be in the area reserved for a factory any quantity of cane available for sale to the occupier of the factory in excess of the quantity 767 for which he is required to enter into agree ments, direct that cane shall no...
The factory was authorised to take its supplies also from the assigned area. Ratio
The important difference between the two areas was that the factory was bound to enter into agreements with cane growers or cane growers ' co operative societies in an area reserved for the factory for the prescribed quantity of sugar cane but in an assigned area, the Factory could enter into an agreement for a specifi...
In other words, in a reserved area if sugar cane of the prescribed quality was offered by the cane grower or cane growers ' society, the factory was bound to purchase that cane up to the prescribed quantity but in an assigned area the factory was at liberty to purchase cane, as it needed, subject to its entering into a...
In addition to the reserved and assigned areas there was a third category, namely, areas which were neither reserved nor assigned. Ratio
We are not concerned with such areas or the provisions dealing with the purchase of sugar cane from such areas. Ratio
Section 27 provided for certain penalties. STA
Sub section 3 (b) provided as follows: "(3) If the occupier or manager of a factory x x x x 768 (b) intentionally fails to enter into agree ments as required by section (2) of section 18. he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees" Section 30 gave power to the Government to make rules. STA
The material portions of section 30 for our purpose are as follows: "30 Power to make rules (1) The Provincial Government may make rules to carry out the provisions of this Act. STA