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In view of this Court 's decision in Ibrahim 's Case (1) it will be proper to hold that Rule 13,4 ,was made in exercise of the powers under section 68. Ratio |
Accordingly, the order of the Regional Transport Authority fixing the new bus stand and discontinuing the old should be held to have been made under a rule made under section 68 and thus liable to revision under section 64 A. Ratio |
The learned Attorney General stressed the fact that in lbrahim 's case this Court did not in so many words say that such an order. Ratio |
fixing or altering a bus stand cannot be made under section 76 of the Act and contended that that case is no authority for holding that the order was not made under section 76. Ratio |
Assuming for the sake of argument that that was so and that the order could also be made under section 76 that would not affect or weaken the authority of Ibrahim 's Case in so far as it decided that a rule empowering the Transport Authority to fix or alter bus stands can be made under section 68 (2) (r) of the Act. Ra... |
In that position there will be no escape from the conclusion that the Regional Transport Authority 's order in the present case would be liable to revision under s 64 A. (1) ; 387 It appears clear to us however that Ibrahim 's case is also authority for the proposition that an order fixing or altering a bus stand canno... |
From the summary of 'what was discussed and decided in that case as has been given above, it appears that the Division Bench of the Madras High Court gave a categorical decision in the earlier writ petition that section 76 did not authorise the Transport Authority to close the bus stand. Ratio |
It appears to us clear that this view was approved by this Court. Ratio |
Indeed, the reasoning which this Court adopted for deciding that section 68 (2) (r) of the Act contemplates the fixation or alteration of a bus stand would become considerably weakened and would not have been accepted by this Court if it thought that section 76 itself authorised the Transport Authority to fix or close ... |
We may make it clear that even if this binding authority in lbrahim 's Case had not been present we would have had no hesitation in holding that the fixation or alteration of a bus stand is made under a rule made under section 68 of the and cannot be made under section 76. Ratio |
In our opinion, Chapter VI which deals with the question of " 'Control of traffic" in general has nothing to do with the fixation or alteration of bus stands. Ratio |
Section 76 has no doubt used the words " 'places at which motor vehicles may stand" and the learned Attorney General tried to persuade us that this includes the fixation of what is known as bus stands. Ratio |
While the word "bus stand" has not been defined in the Act, we have no hesitation in accepting the contention of the respondents that a bus stand means a place where bus services commence or terminate. Ratio |
It is the place where the buses stand for commencing its transport service or where they stand after terminating their service, that is popularly known as a bus stand. Ratio |
We do not think the words "places at which the motor vehicles may stand either indefinitely 388 or for a specified period of time" can be reasonably interpreted to include a bus stand in the above sense. Ratio |
When it is remembered that Chapter VI in which section 76 occurs, is intended to deal with the control of ,traffic it becomes clear that the determination of places at which the Motor Vehicles may stand either indefinitely or for a specified period of time means the "determination of parking places" while the determina... |
It is well worth noticing that while the determination of such places for stoppage, in the latter portion of the section can be in respect of public service vehicles only the determination of places of standing in the first part of the section is in respect of motor vehicles in general. Ratio |
All things considered, it appears to us clear that section 76 has nothing to do with the provision for bus stands. Ratio |
Section 91 (2) (e) which empowers the State Government to make rules for "the maintenance and management of parking places and stands" does not refer, in our opinion, to bus stands but to " 'stands" for motor vehicles which are in the nature of parking places determined under section 76. Ratio |
It is equally clear to us that the "control of transport vehicles" with which Chapter IV purports to deal should reasonably be expected to contain provisions for fixation of places where the transport vehicles may commence their journey or terminate their journey, that is, the fixation of bus stands. Ratio |
When therefore we find in section 68 (2),(r) the specific clause about "prohibiting the picking up and setting down of passengers. . at places other than duly notified stands," it is reasonable to think that the word "stand" was used there to mean "bus stands" in the sense of places where services 389 terminate or comm... |
The scheme of the sub section clearly shows that bus stands have first to be notified and regulatory orders can, and have to be issued thereafter. Ratio |
In the nature of things, the power to issue the necessary notification is implied in the provision. Ratio |
The conclusion that necessarily follows from this is that the State Government has been given authority under this clause to make rules for the fixation of bus stands by duly notifying the same. Ratio |
Rule 134 in so far as it empowers the Regional Transport Authority to fix or alter bus stands is thus a rule made under the rule making authority under section 68. Ratio |
Even apart from the authority of lbrahim 's Case (1) therefore we are of opinion that the order of the Regional Transport Authority was made in pursuance of powers conferred on it by a rule made under section 68 (2) (r) of the and therefore liable to revision under section 64A. Ratio |
This brings us to the question of limitation. Ratio |
Section 64 A provides that State Transport Authority shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of the Regional Transport Authority unless the application is made within 30 days from the date of the order. Ratio |
According to the appellant, the impugned order was made by the Regional Transport Authority on December 4, 1959, and consequently the application for revision made by the respondents on April 13, 1960, was barred. Ratio |
It was suggested that in fact the respondents who moved the revision application on April 13, 1960, were aware of the order made by the Regional Transport Authority on December 4, 1959; but assuming that they had no such knowledge, the question of knowledge, it was urged, was totally irrelevant. Ratio |
The section has provided that no application shall bib entertained unless it is made within 30 days from the date of (1) ; 390 the order and the courts cannot read it as within 30 days from the date of the knowledge of the order. Ratio |
In this connection the learned Attorney General has drawn our attention to the decisions of the Privy Council in Nagendranath vs Suresh, (1) and General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation Limited vs Jarmohomnad Abdul Rahim (2) where it has been emphasised that in interpreting the provisions of limitation, " 'eq... |
There can be no doubt that this principle has always been acted upon by the courts. Ratio |
This principle has recently been re affirmed by this Court in Boota Mal.v.The Union of India (3). Ratio |
We agree therefore that the words " date of the order" should not be read ""as from the date of knowledge of the order" in the absence of clear indication to that effect. Ratio |
In this connection the learned Attorney General has drawn our attention to several sections of the to show that where the legislature in prescribing the period of limitation intended that time should run from some other date than the date when the order was made clear indication of such intention was given. Ratio |
Thus section 13 in providing for an appeal from an order made refusing or revoking a driving licence says that an aggrieved person may appeal "within 30 days of the service on him of the order". Ratio |
Section 15 which provides for an appeal from an order of the licencing authority disqualifying a person from holding a driving licence lays down that an aggrieved person may appeal " 'within 30 days of the receipt of the order". Ratio |
Section 16 which provides for an appeal against certain orders of the Regional Transport Authority says that the aggrieved person may appeal "within 30 days of the receipt of intimation of such order". Ratio |
Section 35 which is another section providing for appeal says that the (1) A.I.R. (1932) P.C. 165 (2) , (3) ; 391 appeal may be made "within 30 days of the date of receipt of notice of the order". Ratio |
There is considerable force therefore in the argument that if the legislature had intended that an application for revision under section 64A may be made within 30 days from the date of intimation or knowledge of the order to the aggrieved person it would have said so; and in the absence of any such thing the court is ... |
This still leaves open for investigation the problem as to what is the date of the order. Ratio |
According to the appellant the date when the Regional Transport Authority passed the resolution is the date of the order. Ratio |
Against this it is urged on behalf of the bus operators that it is the date when that resolution was brought into effect by the publication of the notification which should be considered to be the date of the order. Ratio |
In our opinion, the respondents ' contention should be accepted. Ratio |
For, it is a fallacy to think that the date when the Regional Transport Authority passed the resolution was the date on which the fixation of the new bus stand or the discontinuance of the old bus stand was ordered. Ratio |
It has to be remembered in this connection that Rule 134 itself contemplates that the fixation or alteration of bus stands would be made by a notification. Ratio |
It is only on such notification that a notified bus stand comes into existence. Ratio |
So long as the notification is not made there is in law no effective fixation of a new bus stand or discontinuance of the old bus stand. Ratio |
The matter may be considered from another aspect. Ratio |
Section 64A provides for an application for revision by a person aggrieved by an order. STA |
It is the making of the order which gives rise to the grievance. Ratio |
In this case it is the fixation of the new bus stand and the discontinuance of the old bus stand by which the bus operators claim to have been aggrieved, 392 It is easy to see that there is no real cause for grievance till such fixation and discontinuance of 'bus stands have been made by a notified order. Ratio |
In other words, the order has not been "made" till the notification has been published. Ratio |
Before that it is only an intention to make an order that has been expressed. Ratio |
That this distinction between the making of an order fixing or discontinuing a bus stand and the expression of an intention to make such an order was present in the mind of the Regional Transport Authority is abundantly clear from the language used by it. Ratio |
The resolution that Was Passed on December 4, 1959 which according to the appellant was the date on which the impugned order was made says : "The bus stand for Pushkar will be the plot of land at the junction of the Hallows Road with Ganera Road near the Police Station and ; Kalkaji 's Temple. Ratio |
The present bus ' stand on the northern Patri between Hanumangarhi Temple and Brahamanandji 's Baghichi will cease to be a bus stand and will be a bus stop, only. Ratio |
The buses will not pass through the city;. Ratio |
They will go back from the bus stop to the new stand. Ratio |
The Municipal Board will provide the, necessary facilities. Ratio |
The buses will shift to the new stand after such facilities are provided. Ratio |
" The Transport Authority did not follow this up on that date by a formal order. Ratio |
It is reasonable therefore to consider the passing of the, resolution as the preliminary stage of the making of the order and the notification by which it was published as the final making of the order. Ratio |
Our conclusion therefore is that the order; fixing a new bus stand at Pushkar and discontinuing the old bus stand was in effect made not on December 4. 1959, but on June 28, 1960, when. Ratio |
the notification about the fixation of a new bus stand was published, 393 It is this order, made on June 28, 1960, that was liable to revision and as the application for revision was made before that date in anticipation of the notification the plea of limitation raised on behalf of the appellant was rightly rejected b... |
There remains for consideration the last contention raised on behalf of the appellant that inasmuch as the State Transport Authority rejected by its order dated February 18, 1960, the first application, for revision of the Regional Transport Authority 's order fixing or altering the bus stand, the Regional Transport Au... |
In Collector of Customs ' Calcutta vs The, East India Commercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta, (1)this Court held that where once an order of original authority is taken in appeal to the appellate authority it is the order of the latter authority which is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of whether the appellate ... |
In Madan Gopal Rungta vs Secretary to the Govt.of (2) Orissa this Court applied this principle of merger to orders passed by way of review and an order of the Central Government in effect rejecting the application of the appellant for the grant of a mining lease to him and confirming the rejection of the application of... |
It has been urged Son the authority of these cases that the principle of merger should be applied to the cases of revision also where the revising authority reverses the order or modifies it or merely dismisses the revision application thereby confirming the order. Ratio |
In our opinion, there is no scope for the application of the principle of merger to the facts of the present case. Ratio |
As we have pointed out above the order fixing a new bus stand and discontinuing the old bus stand was in effect, and in law, made not on December 4, 1959, but on June 28, 1960. Ratio |
The position therefore was that neither on the date when the first application for revision was made nor when the State Transport Authority disposed of that application, had any order of the Regional Transport Authority fixing the new bus stand and discontinuing the old bus stand, come into existence. Ratio |
The question of merger could only arise if the revision was of an order that had come into existence. Ratio |
If even though an application for revision was made before the notification but the State Transport Authority had considered and disposed of the matter after the notification was made it would be possible and indeed reasonable to say that the application for revision should be deemed, at the time when the State Transpo... |
As, however, the revising authority 's order was also made before the notification had been published there was no operative order even by the State Transport Authority 's order made on February 18, 1960. Ratio |
The contention that the second revision was incompetent, must therefore be rejected. Ratio |
Two points which emerged during arguments at the Bar however require consideration. Ratio |
The first 395 is that the application which the respondents busoperators made on April 13, 1960, was also not for a revision of a complete order. Ratio |
As it was only this application for revision which has been dealt with by the State Transport Authority by its order of January 6, 1961, the question arises whether that fact itself makes the order of the State Transport Authority bad and entitles the appellant to a direction quashing this order. Ratio |
It has to be noticed that the position in law that there was no complete order of fixation of a new bus stand and alteration of the old bus stand at Pushkar till the notification was made on June 28, 1960, was not present in the minds of either the applicants or the appellant, Municipal, Board, which appeared to oppose... |
It was not the appellant 's case in the writ petition that the State Transport Authority 's order of January 6, 1961, should be quashed, because it purported to revise an order which had no existence in the eye of law. Ratio |
On a consideration of all the circumstances, we do not think that the appellant can now claim an order for quashing the State Transport Authority 's decision on this ground. Ratio |
In our opinion, it would be proper, in the special circumstances of the case, to hold that the State Transport Authority could, immediately after June 28, 1960, when the order was completed by the notification treat the application for revision made on April 13, 1960, pending before it on the date of the notification, ... |
The other point which was brought to our notice during the arguments at the Bar is that 396 the order of the State Transport Authority dated January 6, 1961, was made without compliance with the second proviso to section 64 A. That proviso is in these words: "Provided further that the State Transport Authority shall no... |
" This appears to us to make it necessary that before making any revisional order under section 64A the State Transport Authority has to see that a person likely to be affected by that revisional order receives notice of the matter and is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Ratio |
The requirement of this proviso was admittedly not complied with before the State Transport Authority made the order on January 6, 1961, in the present case. Ratio |
If the High Court 's attention had been drawn to this failure on the part of the State Transport Authority to comply with this statutory requirement, we have no doubt that the High Court would have felt compelled to quash the revisional order made. Ratio |
Now, that we find that this statutory requirement was not complied with before the revisional order was made, we do not think it will be proper for us to ignore this infirmity in the order. Ratio |
It is true that the learned Attorney General contended that as soon as the Court accepts the plea that the revisional order challenged by the appellant by their writ petition is invalid for the reason that the appellate authority did not comply with the provisions of section 64A, the writ petition ought to be allowed a... |
We are not impressed by this argument. Ratio |
We are satisfied that in the circumstances of this case, we ought to exercise our powers under article 142 of the Constitution and 397 send the matter back to the revisional authority to be dealt with in accordance with law, because there is no doubt that by adopting this course full justice will be done between the pa... |
Accordingly, we allow the appeal and quash the State Transport Authority 's order made on January 6, 1961, and direct that the application for revision of the Regional Transport Authority 's order as notified on June, 28, 1961, be disposed of by the State Transport Authority in accordance with law after giving public n... |
In the circumstances of the case, we order that the parties will bear their own costs. Ratio |
SARKAR,J I have come to the conclusion that this appeal should be allowed. Ratio |
The appellant is the Municipal Board of Pushkar in the State of Rajasthan. Ratio |
It passed a resolution sometime in 1958 that the bus stand near the Pushkar lake should be shifted to what it considered a more suitable place. Ratio |
Now the power to fix bus stands was given to the Regional Transport Authorities by r. 134 of the Rules framed by the Rajasthan Government under the . Ratio |
That rule provides as follows : Rule 134. Ratio |
"A Regional Transport Authority, by notifications in the Rajasthan Gazette, or by the erection of traffic signs which are permitted for the purpose under sub section (1) of section 75 of the Act, or both, may, in respect of the taking up or setting down of passengers or both, by public service vehicles or by any specif... |
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