Datasets:
JonWen
/
digital_twin

Dataset card Data Studio Files
xet
 Community
1
label
int64
0
4
sentence
stringlengths
9
665
author
stringclasses
5 values
word_count
int64
5
99
mean_word_length
float64
1
12.6
stop_words_ratio
float64
0
100
stop_words_count
int64
0
84
ADJ_count
int64
0
23
ADV_count
int64
0
18
ADP_count
int64
0
25
AUX_count
int64
0
18
DET_count
int64
0
25
NUM_count
int64
0
40
X_count
int64
0
16
INTJ_count
int64
0
6
CONJ_count
int64
0
0
CCONJ_count
int64
0
20
SCONJ_count
int64
0
13
PROPN_count
int64
0
61
NOUN_count
int64
0
48
PRON_count
int64
0
22
PART_count
int64
0
11
VERB_count
int64
0
25
0
In the latter case it is not merely the purposiveness of nature in the form of the thing that is represented, but this its product is represented as a natural purpose.--Although our concept of a subjective purposiveness of nature in its forms according to empirical laws is not a concept of the Object, but only a princi...
Kant
92
4.68
59.78
55
6
3
18
5
19
1
0
0
0
3
2
3
20
4
2
6
0
Thus we can regard natural beauty as the presentation of the concept of the formal purposiveness, and natural purposes as the presentation of the concept of a real purposiveness.
Kant
29
5.14
55.17
16
4
1
4
0
6
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
8
1
0
2
0
The former of these we judge of by Taste, the latter by Understanding and Reason.
Kant
15
4.4
73.33
11
2
0
4
0
3
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
1
1
0
1
0
On this is based the division of the Critique of Judgement into the Critique of aesthetical and of teleological Judgement.
Kant
20
5.1
60
12
2
0
6
1
4
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
3
0
0
1
0
By the first we understand the faculty of judging of the formal purposiveness of Nature by means of the feeling of pleasure or pain; by the second the faculty of judging its real purposiveness by means of Understanding and Reason.
Kant
40
4.75
55
22
4
0
11
0
7
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
12
1
0
2
0
In a Critique of Judgement the part containing the aesthetical Judgement is essential, because this alone contains a principle which the Judgement places quite a priori at the basis of its reflection upon nature; viz., the principle of a formal purposiveness of nature, according to its particular laws, for our cognitiv...
Kant
62
5.35
56.45
35
5
1
10
1
17
0
0
0
0
0
2
3
15
1
1
6
0
But the transcendental principle which represents a purposiveness of nature in the form of a thing as a principle by which we judge of nature, leaves it quite undetermined where and in what cases I have to judge of a product according to a principle of purposiveness, and not rather according to universal natural laws.
Kant
55
4.8
60
33
4
3
10
1
10
0
0
0
0
3
1
1
11
3
2
6
0
It leaves it to the aesthetical Judgement to decide by taste the harmony of this product with our cognitive faculty.
Kant
20
4.8
55
11
2
0
4
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
2
1
3
0
On the other hand, the Judgement teleologically employed furnishes conditions determinately under which something is to be judged according to the Idea of a purpose of nature; but it can adduce no fundamental proposition from the concept of nature as an object of experience authorising it to ascribe to nature a priori ...
Kant
68
5.21
55.88
38
5
3
12
2
10
0
2
0
0
2
1
1
14
3
3
10
0
The reason of this is that we must have many particular experiences, and consider them under the unity of their principle, in order to be able to cognise, even empirically, objective purposiveness in a certain object.--The aesthetical Judgement is therefore a special faculty for judging of things according to a rule, b...
Kant
56
5.21
57.14
32
6
3
9
4
7
0
0
0
0
2
1
3
11
2
3
5
0
The teleological Judgement is not a special faculty, but only the reflective Judgement in general, so far as it proceeds, as it always does in theoretical cognition, according to concepts; but in respect of certain objects of nature according to special principles, viz., of a merely reflective Judgement, and not of a J...
Kant
56
5.29
51.79
29
8
5
9
2
6
0
0
0
0
3
2
1
11
2
2
5
0
Thus as regards its application it belongs to the theoretical part of Philosophy; and on account of its special principles which are not determinant, as they must be in Doctrine, it must constitute a special part of the Critique.
Kant
39
4.87
66.67
26
4
1
6
2
6
0
0
0
0
1
2
2
6
3
1
5
0
On the other hand, the aesthetical Judgement contributes nothing towards the knowledge of its objects, and thus must be reckoned as belonging to the criticism of the judging subject and its cognitive faculties, only so far as they are susceptible of a priori principles, of whatever other use they may be.
Kant
51
4.98
64.71
33
6
4
7
3
9
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
9
3
0
6
0
This is the propaedeutic of all Philosophy.
Kant
7
5.14
71.43
5
0
0
1
1
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
The Understanding legislates a priori for nature as an Object of sense--for a theoretical knowledge of it in a possible experience.
Kant
21
5.24
52.38
11
2
0
5
0
5
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
5
1
0
1
0
Reason legislates a priori for freedom and its peculiar casuality; as the supersensible in the subject, for an unconditioned practical knowledge.
Kant
21
5.9
47.62
10
3
0
3
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
5
0
0
1
0
The realm of the natural concept under the one legislation and that of the concept of freedom under the other are entirely removed from all mutual influence which they might have on one another by the great gulf that separates the supersensible from phenomena.
Kant
44
4.91
65.91
29
4
1
9
2
12
1
0
0
0
1
0
2
8
1
0
3
0
The concept of freedom determines nothing in respect of the theoretical cognition of nature; and the natural concept determines nothing in respect of the practical laws of freedom.
Kant
28
5.43
50
14
3
0
7
0
4
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
9
2
0
2
0
So far then it is not possible to throw a bridge from the one realm to the other.
Kant
18
3.5
72.22
13
2
3
2
1
3
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
2
1
0
But although the determining grounds of causality according to the concept of freedom are not resident in nature, and the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject, yet this is possible conversely.
Kant
33
5.48
57.58
19
3
1
5
2
6
0
0
0
0
3
1
0
7
0
2
4
0
This in fact is involved in the concept of a causality through freedom, the effect of which is to take place in the world according to its formal laws.
Kant
29
4.21
62.07
18
1
0
7
2
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
0
1
3
0
The word cause, of course, when used of the supersensible only signifies the ground which determines the causality of natural things to an effect in accordance with their proper natural laws, although harmoniously with the formal principle of the laws of Reason.
Kant
42
5.24
52.38
22
5
2
9
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
13
0
0
3
0
Although the possibility of this cannot be comprehended, yet the objection of a contradiction alleged to be found in it can be sufficiently answered.
Kant
24
5.21
66.67
16
0
1
3
3
4
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
3
1
2
6
0
--The effect in accordance with the concept of freedom is the final purpose which ought to exist; and the condition of the possibility of this is presupposed in nature.
Kant
29
4.79
58.62
17
2
0
6
2
6
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
8
0
1
2
0
The Judgement presupposes this a priori and without reference to the practical; and thus furnishes the mediating concept between the concepts of nature and that of freedom.
Kant
27
5.37
59.26
16
1
1
5
0
6
0
2
0
0
3
0
1
5
0
0
3
0
It makes possible the transition from the conformity to law in accordance with the former to the final purpose in accordance with the latter, and this by the concept of a purposiveness of nature.
Kant
34
4.74
64.71
22
4
0
10
0
8
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
9
1
0
1
0
For thus is cognised the possibility of the final purpose which alone can be actualised in nature in harmony with its laws.
Kant
22
4.59
63.64
14
1
2
5
2
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
3
0
The Understanding by the possibility of its a priori laws for nature, gives a proof that nature is only cognised by us as phenomenon; and implies at the same time that it has a supersensible substrate, though it leaves this quite undetermined.
Kant
42
4.79
61.9
26
4
2
5
2
9
0
0
0
0
1
3
0
9
3
0
4
0
The Judgement by its a priori principle for the judging of nature according to its possible particular laws, makes the supersensible substrate determinable by means of the intellectual faculty.
Kant
29
5.66
44.83
13
6
0
6
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
7
0
0
2
0
But the Reason by its practical a priori law determines it; and thus the Judgement makes possible the transition from the realm of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.
Kant
34
4.5
58.82
20
3
1
7
0
9
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
8
1
0
2
0
As regards the faculties of the soul in general, in their higher aspect, as containing an autonomy; the Understanding is that which contains the constitutive principles a priori for the cognitive faculty.
Kant
32
5.38
53.12
17
4
0
4
1
9
0
1
0
0
0
3
0
7
0
0
3
0
For the feeling of pleasure and pain there is the Judgement, independently of concepts and sensations which relate to the determination of the faculty of desire and can thus be immediately practical.
Kant
32
5.22
59.38
19
1
3
6
2
5
0
0
0
0
3
0
1
8
1
0
2
0
For the faculty of desire there is the Reason which is practical without the mediation of any pleasure whatever.
Kant
19
4.89
68.42
13
1
0
4
2
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
1
0
0
0
It determines for the faculty of desire, as a superior faculty, the final purpose which carries with it the pure intellectual satisfaction in the Object.--The concept formed by Judgement of a purposiveness of nature belongs to natural concepts, but only as a regulative principle of the cognitive faculty; although the a...
Kant
71
5.42
50.7
36
10
1
12
1
13
0
0
0
0
2
4
2
18
3
0
5
0
The spontaneity in the play of the cognitive faculties, the harmony of which contains the ground of this pleasure, makes the above concept fit to be the mediating link between the realm of the natural concept and that of the concept of freedom in its effects; whilst at the same time it promotes the sensibility of the m...
Kant
77
4.88
54.55
42
8
0
14
1
21
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
20
1
1
8
0
All the faculties of the mind Cognitive faculties.
Kant
8
5.25
50
4
1
0
1
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
Feeling of pleasure and pain.
Kant
5
4.8
40
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
1
0
A priori principles Conformity to law.
Kant
6
5.33
33.33
2
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
The judgement of taste is aesthetical In order to decide whether anything is beautiful or not, we refer the representation, not by the Understanding to the Object for cognition but, by the Imagination to the subject, and its feeling of pleasure or pain.
Kant
43
4.88
62.79
27
2
0
8
2
7
0
0
0
0
4
1
1
11
2
3
2
0
The judgement of taste is therefore not a judgement of cognition, and is consequently not logical but aesthetical, by which we understand that whose determining ground can be no other than subjective.
Kant
32
5.25
65.62
21
4
2
3
3
5
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
5
1
2
3
0
Every reference of representations, even that of sensations, may be objective; save only the reference to the feeling of pleasure and pain, by which nothing in the Object is signified, but through which there is a feeling in the subject, as it is affected by the representation.
Kant
47
4.91
68.09
32
2
2
9
4
10
0
0
0
0
2
1
1
10
3
0
3
0
To apprehend a regular, purposive building by means of ones cognitive faculty is something quite different from being conscious of this representation as connected with the sensation of satisfaction.
Kant
29
5.86
51.72
15
5
1
6
2
3
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
7
1
1
2
0
Here the representation is altogether referred to the subject and to its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure or pain.
Kant
25
4.6
64
16
0
2
6
1
5
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
8
0
0
1
0
This establishes a quite separate faculty of distinction and of judgement, adding nothing to cognition, but only comparing the given representation in the subject with the whole faculty of representations, of which the mind is conscious in the feeling of its state.
Kant
42
5.31
59.52
25
3
2
9
1
9
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
11
1
0
4
0
Given representations in a judgement can be empirical; but the judgement which is formed by means of them is logical, provided they are referred in the judgement to the Object.
Kant
30
4.87
60
18
2
0
5
4
5
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
6
2
0
5
0
Conversely, if the given representations are rational, but are referred in a judgement simply to the subject, the judgement is so far always aesthetical.
Kant
24
5.38
54.17
13
2
5
2
3
4
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
4
0
0
2
0
The satisfaction which determines the judgement of taste is disinterested The satisfaction which we combine with the representation of the existence of an object is called interest.
Kant
27
5.7
55.56
15
0
0
4
2
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
1
0
4
0
Such satisfaction always has reference to the faculty of desire, either as its determining ground or as necessarily connected with its determining ground.
Kant
23
5.7
56.52
13
1
3
3
1
3
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
8
0
0
1
0
Now when the question is if a thing is beautiful, we do not want to know whether anything depends or can depend on the existence of the thing either for myself or for any one else, but how we judge it by mere observation.
Kant
44
4.02
72.73
32
2
4
5
3
5
0
0
0
0
4
2
0
6
5
2
6
0
If any one asks me if I find that palace beautiful which I see before me, I may answer: I do not like things of that kind which are made merely to be stared at.
Kant
35
3.57
71.43
25
1
1
3
3
4
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
4
6
2
8
0
Or I can answer like that Iroquois sachem who was pleased in Paris by nothing more than by the cook-shops.
Kant
20
4.3
65
13
2
0
3
1
2
0
0
0
0
1
2
2
3
3
0
2
0
Or again after the manner of Rousseau I may rebuke the vanity of the great who waste the sweat of the people on such superfluous things.
Kant
26
4.23
61.54
16
3
1
5
0
5
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
5
2
0
3
0
In fine I could easily convince myself that if I found myself on an uninhabited island without the hope of ever again coming among men, and could conjure up just such a splendid building by my mere wish, I should not even give myself the trouble if I had a sufficiently comfortable hut.
Kant
53
4.4
66.04
35
4
6
7
1
7
0
0
0
0
1
3
0
8
7
1
8
0
This may all be admitted and approved; but we are not now talking of this.
Kant
15
3.93
80
12
0
1
1
2
3
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
1
4
0
We wish only to know if this mere representation of the object is accompanied in me with satisfaction, however indifferent I may be as regards the existence of the object of this representation.
Kant
33
4.88
63.64
21
2
2
5
2
5
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
6
3
1
5
0
We easily see that in saying it is beautiful and in showing that I have taste, I am concerned, not with that in which I depend on the existence of the object, but with that which I make out of this representation in myself.
Kant
44
4.07
77.27
34
1
1
9
3
8
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
4
7
1
6
0
Every one must admit that a judgement about beauty, in which the least interest mingles, is very partial and is not a pure judgement of taste.
Kant
26
4.46
65.38
17
3
1
3
2
5
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
5
1
1
3
0
We must not be in the least prejudiced in favour of the existence of the things, but be quite indifferent in this respect, in order to play the judge in things of taste.
Kant
33
4.12
66.67
22
3
1
8
2
5
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
8
1
2
2
0
We cannot, however, better elucidate this proposition, which is of capital importance, than by contrasting the pure disinterested satisfaction in judgements of taste, with that which is bound up with an interest, especially if we can at the same time be certain that there are no other kinds of interest than those which...
Kant
58
4.95
67.24
39
5
4
9
6
10
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
10
3
2
6
0
The satisfaction in the is bound up with interest That which pleases the senses in sensation is.
Kant
17
4.65
64.71
11
0
0
4
2
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
2
0
Here the opportunity presents itself of censuring a very common confusion of the double sense which the word sensation can have, and of calling attention to it.
Kant
27
4.93
59.26
16
2
2
4
1
5
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
6
2
0
4
0
All satisfaction is itself sensation.
Kant
5
6.4
60
3
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
Consequently everything that pleases is pleasant because it pleases.
Kant
9
6.56
55.56
5
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
2
0
But if this be admitted, then impressions of Sense which determine the inclination, fundamental propositions of Reason which determine the Will, mere reflective forms of intuition which determine the Judgement, are quite the same, as regards the effect upon the feeling of pleasure.
Kant
43
5.56
55.81
24
4
2
4
2
10
0
0
0
0
1
3
2
10
0
0
5
0
For this would be pleasantness in the sensation of ones state, and since in the end all the operations of our faculties must issue in the practical and unite in it as their goal, we could suppose no other way of estimating things and their worth than that which consists in the gratification that they promise.
Kant
56
4.54
66.07
37
2
0
9
1
14
0
0
0
0
3
3
0
12
3
0
9
0
It is of no consequence at all how this is attained, and since then the choice of means alone could make a difference, men could indeed blame one another for stupidity and indiscretion, but never for baseness and wickedness.
Kant
39
4.74
71.79
28
0
7
4
2
5
1
0
0
0
4
1
0
9
1
0
5
0
For all, each according to his own way of seeing things, seek one goal, that is, gratification.
Kant
17
4.59
58.82
10
1
2
3
0
3
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
3
0
If a determination of the feeling of pleasure or pain is called sensation, this expression signifies something quite different from what I mean when I call the representation of a thing sensation.
Kant
32
5.12
59.38
19
1
2
4
1
5
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
9
4
0
4
0
For in the latter case the representation is referred to the Object, in the former simply to the subject, and is available for no cognition whatever, not even for that by which the subject cognises itself.
Kant
36
4.69
72.22
26
2
2
8
2
10
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
6
1
1
2
0
In the above elucidation we understand by the word sensation, an objective representation of sense; and in order to avoid misinterpretation, we shall call that, which must always remain merely subjective and can constitute absolutely no representation of an object, by the ordinary term feeling. The green colour of the ...
Kant
91
5.24
53.85
49
7
3
16
2
19
0
1
0
0
2
2
0
24
2
1
12
0
Now that a judgement about an object, by which I describe it as pleasant, expresses an interest in it, is plain from the fact that by sensation it excites a desire for objects of that kind; consequently the satisfaction presupposes not the mere judgement about it, but the relation of its existence to my state, so far a...
Kant
65
4.49
63.08
41
3
5
11
2
15
0
0
0
0
1
3
1
13
5
1
5
0
Hence we do not merely say of the pleasant, it pleases; but, it gratifies.
Kant
14
4.29
71.43
10
1
2
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
3
1
3
0
I give to it no mere approval, but inclination is aroused by it; and in the case of what is pleasant in the most lively fashion, there is no judgement at all upon the character of the Object, for those who always lay themselves out only for enjoyment would fain dispense with all judgement.
Kant
54
4.37
70.37
38
3
5
10
3
8
0
0
0
0
2
1
1
8
7
0
6
0
The satisfaction in the is bound up with interest Whatever by means of Reason pleases through the mere concept is
Kant
20
4.7
60
12
1
0
6
2
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
2
0
That which pleases only as a means we call good for something; but that which pleases for itself is good in itself.
Kant
22
4.23
77.27
17
2
1
3
1
4
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
1
4
0
3
0
In both there is always involved the concept of a purpose, and consequently the relation of Reason to the volition, and thus a satisfaction in the presence of an Object or an action, i.e. some kind of interest.
Kant
38
4.47
63.16
24
0
3
7
1
10
0
1
0
0
3
0
0
11
1
0
1
0
In order to find anything good, I must always know what sort of a thing the object ought to be, i.e. I must have a concept of it.
Kant
28
3.54
64.29
18
1
1
3
2
3
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
5
5
2
5
0
But there is no need of this, to find a thing beautiful.
Kant
12
3.67
66.67
8
1
0
1
1
3
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
1
1
1
0
Flowers, free delineations, outlines intertwined with one another without design and called foliage, have no meaning, depend on no definite concept, and yet they please.
Kant
25
5.76
52
13
2
1
3
1
3
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
8
1
0
4
0
The satisfaction in the beautiful must depend on the reflection upon an object, leading to any concept; and it is thus distinguished from the pleasant which rests entirely upon sensation.
Kant
30
5.23
60
18
2
2
4
1
7
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
5
1
0
5
0
It is true, the Pleasant seems in many cases to be the same as the Good.
Kant
16
3.5
75
12
3
0
1
2
3
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
1
1
1
1
0
Thus people are accustomed to say that all gratification is good in itself; which is very much the same as to say that lasting pleasure and the good are the same.
Kant
31
4.23
77.42
24
5
3
1
4
5
0
0
0
0
1
3
0
3
1
2
3
0
But we can soon see that this is merely a confusion of words; for the concepts which properly belong to these expressions can in no way be interchanged.
Kant
28
4.43
64.29
18
0
3
4
2
6
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
5
1
0
5
0
The pleasant, which, as such, represents the object simply in relation to Sense, must first be brought by the concept of a purpose under principles of Reason, in order to call it good, as an object of the Will.
Kant
39
4.38
64.1
25
3
2
8
1
7
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
9
1
1
4
0
But that there is a quite different relation to satisfaction in calling that which gratifies at the same time good, may be seen from the fact that in the case of the good the question always is, whether it is mediately or immediately good; but on the contrary in the case of the pleasant there can be no question about t...
Kant
72
4.53
68.06
49
6
8
11
5
15
0
0
0
0
3
3
0
10
4
0
7
0
Even in common speech men distinguish the Pleasant from the Good.
Kant
11
4.91
45.45
5
1
1
2
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
0
0
1
0
Of a dish which stimulates the taste by spices and other condiments we say unhesitatingly that it is pleasant, though it is at the same time admitted not to be good; for though it immediately delights the senses, yet mediately, i.e. considered by Reason which looks to the after results, it displeases.
Kant
52
4.77
61.54
32
4
3
7
3
7
0
1
0
0
2
3
0
8
5
2
7
0
Even in the judging of health we may notice this distinction.
Kant
11
4.55
63.64
7
0
1
2
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
1
0
2
0
It is immediately pleasant to every one possessing it.
Kant
9
5
66.67
6
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
1
0
But in order to say that it is good, it must be considered by Reason with reference to purposes; viz.
Kant
20
4.05
65
13
1
0
4
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
4
2
1
4
0
that it is a state which makes us fit for all our business.
Kant
13
3.54
69.23
9
0
0
1
1
4
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
2
0
2
0
Finally in respect of happiness every one believes himself entitled to describe the greatest sum of the pleasantnesses of life as a true, even as the highest, good.
Kant
28
4.86
53.57
15
4
2
4
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
6
1
1
3
0
However Reason is opposed to this.
Kant
6
4.67
66.67
4
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
And if we were concerned with this alone, it would be foolish to be scrupulous as regards the means which procure it for us, or whether it is obtained passively by the bounty of nature or by our own activity and work.
Kant
42
4.17
71.43
30
3
2
5
4
5
0
0
0
0
4
3
0
5
5
1
5
0
But Reason can never be persuaded that the existence of a man who merely lives for enjoyment, has a worth in itself; even if he at the same time is conducive as a means to the best enjoyment of others, and shares in all their gratifications by sympathy.
Kant
48
4.27
66.67
32
3
3
8
3
8
0
0
0
0
2
3
0
12
3
0
3
0
Only what he does, without reference to enjoyment, in full freedom and independently of what nature can procure for him passively, gives an worth to his being, as the existence of a person; and happiness, with the whole abundance of its pleasures, is far from being an unconditioned good.
Kant
49
4.88
65.31
32
3
4
10
3
8
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
12
3
0
3
0
However, notwithstanding all this difference between the pleasant and the good, they both agree in this that they are always bound up with an interest in their object.
Kant
28
4.96
71.43
20
2
2
6
1
8
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
3
2
0
2
0
not only of the pleasant, and the mediate good which is pleasing as a means towards pleasantness somewhere, but also of that which is good absolutely and in every aspect, viz.
Kant
31
4.65
67.74
21
4
4
4
2
7
0
0
0
0
3
1
0
5
0
1
0
0
moral good, which brings with it the highest interest.
Kant
9
5
44.44
4
2
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
For the good is the Object of will.
Kant
8
3.38
75
6
0
0
2
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0