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0 | The purposiveness of nature is therefore a particular concept, a priori, which has its origin solely in the reflective Judgement. | Kant | 20 | 5.45 | 55 | 11 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
0 | For we cannot ascribe to natural products anything like a reference of nature in them to purposes; we can only use this concept to reflect upon such products in respect of the connexion of phenomena which is given in nature according to empirical laws. | Kant | 44 | 4.73 | 56.82 | 25 | 3 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 11 | 4 | 2 | 7 |
0 | This concept is also quite different from practical purposiveness, though it is certainly thought according to the analogy of these last. | Kant | 21 | 5.52 | 61.9 | 13 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
0 | A transcendental principle is one by means of which is represented, a priori, the universal condition under which alone things can be in general Objects of our cognition. | Kant | 28 | 5.07 | 60.71 | 17 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
0 | On the other hand, a principle is called metaphysical if it represents the a priori condition under which alone Objects, whose concept must be empirically given, can be further determined a priori. | Kant | 32 | 5.16 | 59.38 | 19 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 6 |
0 | Thus the principle of the cognition of bodies as substances, and as changeable substances, is transcendental, if thereby it is asserted that their changes must have a cause; it is metaphysical if it asserts that their changes must have an external cause. | Kant | 42 | 5.05 | 64.29 | 27 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 4 |
0 | For in the former case bodies need only be thought by means of ontological predicates, e.g. substance, in order to cognise the proposition a priori; but in the latter case the empirical concept of a body must lie at the basis of the proposition, although once this basis has been laid down, it may be seen completely a p... | Kant | 82 | 4.8 | 57.32 | 47 | 6 | 4 | 13 | 5 | 13 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 11 |
0 | For the concept of Objects, so far as they are thought as standing under this principle, is only the pure concept of objects of possible empirical cognition in general and contains nothing empirical. | Kant | 33 | 5.03 | 54.55 | 18 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
0 | On the other hand, the principle of practical purposiveness, which must be thought in the Idea of the determination of a free will, is a metaphysical principle; because the concept of a faculty of desire as a will must be given empirically. | Kant | 42 | 4.71 | 64.29 | 27 | 4 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
0 | Both principles are, however, not empirical, but a priori; because for the combination of the predicate with the empirical concept of the subject of their judgements no further experience is needed, but it can be apprehended completely a priori. | Kant | 39 | 5.28 | 64.1 | 25 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
0 | That the concept of a purposiveness of nature belongs to transcendental principles can be sufficiently seen from the maxims of the Judgement, which lie at the basis of the investigation of nature a priori, and yet do not go further than the possibility of experience, and consequently of the cognition of nature--not ind... | Kant | 66 | 5.14 | 59.09 | 39 | 3 | 5 | 14 | 2 | 10 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 16 | 0 | 2 | 6 |
0 | These maxims present themselves in the course of this science often enough, though in a scattered way, as sentences of metaphysical wisdom, whose necessity we cannot demonstrate from concepts. | Kant | 29 | 5.62 | 58.62 | 17 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
0 | Nature takes the shortest way; at the same time it makes no leaps, either in the course of its changes or in the juxtaposition of specifically different forms; its great variety in empirical laws is yet unity under a few principles, etc. | Kant | 42 | 4.64 | 52.38 | 22 | 6 | 2 | 7 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
0 | If we propose to set forth the origin of these fundamental propositions and try to do so by the psychological method, we violate their sense. | Kant | 25 | 4.64 | 56 | 14 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
0 | For they do not tell us what happens, i.e. by what rule our cognitive powers actually operate, and how we judge, but how we ought to judge; and this logical objective necessity does not emerge if the principles are merely empirical. | Kant | 41 | 4.61 | 56.1 | 23 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 8 |
0 | Hence that purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculties and their use, which is plainly apparent from them, is a transcendental principle of judgements, and needs therefore also a Transcendental Deduction, by means of which the ground for so judging must be sought in the sources of cognition a priori. | Kant | 50 | 5.18 | 60 | 30 | 3 | 5 | 9 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 12 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
0 | We find in the grounds of the possibility of an experience in the very first place something necessary, viz. | Kant | 19 | 4.68 | 63.16 | 12 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
0 | the universal laws without which nature in general cannot be thought; and these rest upon the Categories, applied to the formal conditions of all intuition possible for us, so far as it is also given a priori. | Kant | 37 | 4.65 | 59.46 | 22 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
0 | Now under these laws the Judgement is determinant, for it has nothing to do but to subsume under given laws. | Kant | 20 | 4.4 | 70 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
0 | For example, the Understanding says that every change has its cause; the transcendental Judgement has nothing further to do than to supply a priori the condition of subsumption under the concept of the Understanding placed before it, i.e. the succession of the determinations of one and the same thing. | Kant | 49 | 5.12 | 63.27 | 31 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 11 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 12 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
0 | For nature in general that law is cognised as absolutely necessary.--But now the objects of empirical cognition are determined in many other ways than by that formal time-condition, or, at least as far as we can judge a priori, are determinable. | Kant | 41 | 4.95 | 58.54 | 24 | 8 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
0 | Hence specifically different natures can be causes in an infinite variety of ways, as well as in virtue of what they have in common as belonging to nature in general; and each of these modes must have its rule, which is a law and therefore brings necessity with it, although we do not at all comprehend this necessity, i... | Kant | 70 | 4.66 | 65.71 | 46 | 5 | 7 | 12 | 5 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 15 | 4 | 1 | 5 |
0 | We must therefore think in nature, in respect of its merely empirical laws, a possibility of infinitely various empirical laws, which are, as far as our insight goes, contingent, and in respect of which we judge nature, according to empirical laws and the possibility of the unity of experience, to be contingent. | Kant | 52 | 5.02 | 53.85 | 28 | 5 | 5 | 9 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 13 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
0 | But such a unity must be necessarily presupposed and assumed, for otherwise there would be no thoroughgoing connexion of empirical cognitions in a whole of experience. | Kant | 26 | 5.42 | 65.38 | 17 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
0 | The universal laws of nature no doubt furnish such a connexion of things according to their kind as things of nature in general, but not specifically, as such particular beings of nature. | Kant | 32 | 4.84 | 50 | 16 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
0 | Hence the Judgement must assume for its special use this principle a priori, that what in the particular laws of nature is from the human point of view contingent, yet contains a unity of law in the combination of its manifold into an experience possible in itself--a unity not indeed to be fathomed by us, but yet think... | Kant | 58 | 4.6 | 58.62 | 34 | 5 | 3 | 11 | 2 | 10 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 13 | 3 | 2 | 4 |
0 | Consequently as the unity of law in a combination, which we cognise as contingent in itself, although in conformity with a necessary design of Understanding, is represented as the purposiveness of Objects; so must the Judgement, which in respect of things under possible empirical laws is merely reflection, think of nat... | Kant | 77 | 5.22 | 58.44 | 45 | 6 | 4 | 18 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 17 | 2 | 0 | 6 |
0 | This transcendental concept of a purposiveness of nature is neither a natural concept nor a concept of freedom, because it ascribes nothing to the Object, but only represents the peculiar way in which we must proceed in reflection upon the objects of nature in reference to a thoroughly connected experience, and is cons... | Kant | 59 | 5.25 | 57.63 | 34 | 4 | 3 | 10 | 2 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 14 | 3 | 0 | 5 |
0 | Hence, as if it were a lucky chance favouring our design, we are rejoiced, if we meet with such systematic unity under merely empirical laws; although we must necessarily assume that there is such a unity without our comprehending it or being able to prove it. | Kant | 46 | 4.65 | 63.04 | 29 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 7 | 1 | 7 |
0 | In order to convince ourselves of the correctness of this Deduction of the concept before us, and the necessity of assuming it as a transcendental principle of cognition, just consider the magnitude of the problem. | Kant | 35 | 5.11 | 62.86 | 22 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
0 | The problem, which lies a priori in our Understanding, is to make a connected experience out of given perceptions of a nature containing at all events an infinite variety of empirical laws. | Kant | 32 | 4.91 | 53.12 | 17 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
0 | The Understanding is, no doubt, in possession a priori of universal laws of nature, without which nature could not be an object of experience; but it needs in addition a certain order of nature in its particular rules, which can only be empirically known and which are, as regards the Understanding, contingent. | Kant | 52 | 4.98 | 57.69 | 30 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
0 | These rules, without which we could not proceed from the universal analogy of a possible experience in general to the particular, must be thought by it as laws, for otherwise they would not constitute an order of nature; although their necessity can never be cognised or comprehended by it. | Kant | 49 | 4.92 | 67.35 | 33 | 4 | 2 | 9 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 9 |
0 | Although, therefore, the Understanding can determine nothing a priori in respect of Objects, it must, in order to trace out these empirical so-called laws, place at the basis of all reflection upon Objects an a priori principle, viz. | Kant | 38 | 5.13 | 55.26 | 21 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
0 | that a cognisable order of nature is possible in accordance with these laws. | Kant | 13 | 4.85 | 53.85 | 7 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
0 | The following propositions express some such principle. | Kant | 7 | 6.86 | 42.86 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
0 | There is in nature a subordination of genera and species comprehensible by us. | Kant | 13 | 5 | 61.54 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
0 | Each one approximates to some other according to a common principle, so that a transition from one to another and so on to a higher genus may be possible. | Kant | 29 | 4.31 | 72.41 | 21 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
0 | Though it seems at the outset unavoidable for our Understanding to assume different kinds of causality for the specific differences of natural operations, yet these different kinds may stand under a small number of principles, with the investigation of which we have to busy ourselves. | Kant | 45 | 5.33 | 57.78 | 26 | 6 | 0 | 9 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3 | 2 | 5 |
0 | This harmony of nature with our cognitive faculty is presupposed a priori by the Judgement, on behalf of its reflection upon nature in accordance with its empirical laws; whilst the Understanding at the same time cognises it objectively as contingent, and it is only the Judgement that ascribes it to nature as a trancen... | Kant | 55 | 5.2 | 56.36 | 31 | 3 | 2 | 9 | 2 | 11 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 13 | 3 | 0 | 3 |
0 | For without this presupposition we should have no order of nature in accordance with empirical laws, and consequently no guiding thread for an experience ordered by these in all their variety, or for an investigation of them. | Kant | 37 | 5.08 | 64.86 | 24 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
0 | The Judgement has therefore also in itself a principle a priori of the possibility of nature, but only in a subjective aspect; by which it prescribes, not to nature, but to itself a law for its reflection upon nature. | Kant | 39 | 4.56 | 69.23 | 27 | 1 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
0 | This we might call the law of the specification of nature in respect of its empirical laws. | Kant | 17 | 4.35 | 64.71 | 11 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
0 | The Judgement does not cognise this a priori in nature, but assumes it on behalf of a natural order cognisable by our Understanding in the division which it makes of the universal laws of nature when it wishes to subordinate to these the variety of particular laws. | Kant | 47 | 4.64 | 57.45 | 27 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 1 | 10 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 5 |
0 | If then we say that nature specifies its universal laws according to the principles of purposiveness for our cognitive faculty, i.e. in accordance with the necessary business of the human Understanding of finding the universal for the particular which perception offers it, and again of finding connexion for the diverse... | Kant | 72 | 5.04 | 58.33 | 42 | 6 | 3 | 14 | 1 | 13 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 13 | 4 | 1 | 9 |
0 | For it is not a principle of the determinant but merely of the reflective Judgement. | Kant | 15 | 4.6 | 66.67 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
0 | We only require that, be nature disposed as it may as regards its universal laws, investigation into its empirical laws may be carried on in accordance with that principle and the maxims founded thereon, because it is only so far as that holds that we can make any progress with the use of our Understanding in experienc... | Kant | 60 | 4.68 | 61.67 | 37 | 2 | 4 | 7 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 13 | 4 | 0 | 11 |
0 | The thought harmony of nature in the variety of its particular laws with our need of finding universality of principles for it, must be judged as contingent in respect of our insight, but yet at the same time as indispensable for the needs of our Understanding, and consequently as a purposiveness by which nature is har... | Kant | 67 | 4.85 | 62.69 | 42 | 4 | 3 | 15 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 19 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
0 | The universal laws of the Understanding, which are at the same time laws of nature, are just as necessary as the material laws of motion. | Kant | 25 | 4.48 | 60 | 15 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
0 | Their production presupposes no design on the part of our cognitive faculty, because it is only by means of them that we, in the first place, attain a concept of what the cognition of things is, and attribute them necessarily to nature as Object of our cognition in general. | Kant | 49 | 4.59 | 65.31 | 32 | 3 | 2 | 9 | 2 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 12 | 5 | 1 | 3 |
0 | But, so far as we can see, it is contingent that the order of nature according to its particular laws, in all its variety and heterogeneity possibly at least transcending our comprehension, should be actually conformable to these. | Kant | 38 | 5.05 | 63.16 | 24 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 5 |
0 | The discovery of this is the business of the Understanding which is designedly borne towards a necessary purpose, viz. | Kant | 19 | 5.21 | 57.89 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
0 | the bringing of unity of principles into nature, which purpose then the Judgement must ascribe to nature, because the Understanding cannot here prescribe any law to it. | Kant | 27 | 5.22 | 59.26 | 16 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
0 | The attainment of that design is bound up with the feeling of pleasure, and since the condition of this attainment is a representation a priori,--as here a principle for the reflective Judgement in general,--therefore the feeling of pleasure is determined by a ground a priori and valid for every man, and that merely by... | Kant | 78 | 4.96 | 60.26 | 47 | 4 | 3 | 16 | 3 | 19 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 19 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
0 | It is thus quite distinguished from all practical purposiveness of nature. | Kant | 11 | 5.73 | 63.64 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
0 | In fact, although from the agreement of perceptions with laws in accordance with universal natural concepts, we do not and cannot find in ourselves the slightest effect upon the feeling of pleasure, because the Understanding necessarily proceeds according to its nature without any design; yet, on the other hand, the di... | Kant | 98 | 5.12 | 64.29 | 63 | 8 | 7 | 17 | 5 | 14 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 21 | 5 | 3 | 9 |
0 | We no longer find, it is true, any marked pleasure in the comprehensibility of nature and in the unity of its divisions into genera and species, whereby are possible all empirical concepts, through which we cognise it according to its particular laws. | Kant | 42 | 4.98 | 57.14 | 24 | 5 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 4 | 0 | 3 |
0 | But this pleasure has certainly been present at one time, and it is only because the commonest experience would be impossible without it that it is gradually confounded with mere cognition and no longer arrests particular attention. | Kant | 37 | 5.27 | 59.46 | 22 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 3 |
0 | There is then something in our judgements upon nature which makes us attentive to its purposiveness for our Understanding--an endeavour to bring, where possible, its dissimilar laws under higher ones, though still always empirical--and thus, if successful, makes us feel pleasure in that harmony of these with our cognit... | Kant | 57 | 5.63 | 56.14 | 32 | 8 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 11 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
0 | On the other hand, a representation of nature would altogether displease, by which it should be foretold to us that in the smallest investigation beyond the commonest experience we should meet with a heterogeneity of its laws, which would make the union of its particular laws under universal empirical laws impossible f... | Kant | 54 | 5.31 | 61.11 | 33 | 8 | 1 | 11 | 1 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 11 | 3 | 0 | 7 |
0 | For this would contradict the principle of the subjectively-purposive specification of nature in its genera, and also of our reflective Judgement in respect of such principle. | Kant | 26 | 5.73 | 61.54 | 16 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
0 | This presupposition of the Judgement is, however, at the same time so indeterminate as to how far that ideal purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculty should be extended, that if we were told that a deeper or wider knowledge of nature derived from observation must lead at last to a variety of laws, which no hum... | Kant | 68 | 4.79 | 61.76 | 42 | 8 | 5 | 12 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 12 | 2 | 0 | 9 |
0 | But still we more gladly listen to one who offers hope that the more we know nature internally, and can compare it with external members now unknown to us, the more simple shall we find it in its principles, and that the further our experience reaches the more uniform shall we find it amid the apparent heterogeneity of... | Kant | 61 | 4.57 | 59.02 | 36 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 9 | 0 | 10 |
0 | For it is a mandate of our Judgement to proceed according to the principle of the harmony of nature with our cognitive faculty so far as that reaches, without deciding whether or not it is bounded anywhere. | Kant | 37 | 4.57 | 64.86 | 24 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 5 |
0 | For although in respect of the rational use of our cognitive faculty we can determine such bounds, this is not possible in the empirical field. | Kant | 25 | 4.72 | 60 | 15 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
0 | That which in the representation of an Object is merely subjective, i.e. which decides its reference to the subject, not to the object, is its aesthetical character; but that which serves or can be used for the determination of the object, is its logical validity. | Kant | 45 | 4.82 | 64.44 | 29 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 12 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
0 | In the cognition of an object of sense both references present themselves. | Kant | 12 | 5.17 | 58.33 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
0 | In the sense-representation of external things the quality of space wherein we intuite them is the merely subjective of my representation, on account of which reference the object is thought thereby merely as phenomenon. | Kant | 34 | 5.47 | 55.88 | 19 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
0 | But space, notwithstanding its merely subjective quality, is at the same time an ingredient in the cognition of things as phenomena. | Kant | 21 | 5.29 | 52.38 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
0 | Sensation, again, expresses the merely subjective of our representations of external things, but it is also the proper material of them, just as space is the mere form a priori of the possibility of their intuition. | Kant | 36 | 4.97 | 58.33 | 21 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
0 | Nevertheless, however, sensation is also employed in the cognition of external Objects. | Kant | 12 | 6.25 | 58.33 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
0 | But the subjective in a representation which cannot be an ingredient of cognition, is the pleasure or pain which is bound up with it; for through it I cognise nothing in the object of the representation, although it may be the effect of some cognition. | Kant | 45 | 4.6 | 73.33 | 33 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 4 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 5 | 1 | 4 |
0 | Now the purposiveness of a thing, so far as it is represented in perception, is no characteristic of the Object itself, although it may be inferred from a cognition of things. | Kant | 31 | 4.65 | 67.74 | 21 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 3 |
0 | The purposiveness, therefore, which precedes the cognition of an Object, and which, even without our wishing to use the representation of it for cognition, is, at the same time, immediately bound up with it, is that subjective which cannot be an ingredient in cognition. | Kant | 44 | 5.14 | 68.18 | 30 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 5 |
0 | Hence the object is only called purposive, when its representation is immediately combined with the feeling of pleasure; and this very representation is an aesthetical representation of purposiveness.--The only question is whether there is, in general, such a representation of purposiveness. | Kant | 41 | 6.1 | 60.98 | 25 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
0 | If pleasure is bound up with the mere apprehension of the form of an object of intuition, without reference to a concept for a definite cognition, then the representation is thereby not referred to the Object, but simply to the subject; and the pleasure can express nothing else than its harmony with the cognitive facul... | Kant | 83 | 4.81 | 61.45 | 51 | 6 | 8 | 15 | 3 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 7 |
0 | For that apprehension of forms in the Imagination can never take place without the reflective Judgement, though undesignedly, at least comparing them with its faculty of referring intuitions to concepts. | Kant | 30 | 5.77 | 60 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
0 | If now in this comparison the Imagination is placed by means of a given representation undesignedly in agreement with the Understanding, as the faculty of concepts, and thus a feeling of pleasure is aroused, the object must then be regarded as purposive for the reflective Judgement. | Kant | 46 | 5.15 | 58.7 | 27 | 1 | 4 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
0 | Such a judgement is an aesthetical judgement upon the purposiveness of the Object, which does not base itself upon any present concept of the object, nor does it furnish any such. | Kant | 31 | 4.77 | 67.74 | 21 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
0 | In the case of an object whose form, in the mere reflection upon it, is judged as the ground of a pleasure in the representation of such an Object, this pleasure is judged as bound up with the representation necessarily; and, consequently, not only for the subject which apprehends this form, but for every judging being... | Kant | 58 | 4.72 | 63.79 | 37 | 2 | 3 | 11 | 3 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
0 | The object is then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging by means of such a pleasure is called Taste. | Kant | 20 | 4.4 | 55 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
0 | For since the ground of the pleasure is placed merely in the form of the object for reflection in general--and, consequently, in no sensation of the object, and also without reference to any concept which anywhere involves design--it is only the conformity to law in the empirical use of the Judgement in general in the ... | Kant | 73 | 5.14 | 58.9 | 43 | 4 | 6 | 18 | 3 | 16 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 17 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
0 | And since this harmony of the object with the faculties of the subject is contingent, it brings about the representation of its purposiveness in respect of the cognitive faculties of the subject. | Kant | 32 | 5.09 | 62.5 | 20 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
0 | Here now is a pleasure, which, like all pleasure or pain that is not produced through the concept of freedom, can never be comprehended from concepts, as necessarily bound up with the representation of an object. | Kant | 36 | 4.89 | 63.89 | 23 | 0 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
0 | It must always be cognised as combined with this only by means of reflective perception; and, consequently, like all empirical judgements, it can declare no objective necessity and lay claim to no a priori validity. | Kant | 35 | 5.14 | 54.29 | 19 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 6 |
0 | But the judgement of taste also claims, as every other empirical judgement does, to be valid for every one; and in spite of its inner contingency this is always possible. | Kant | 30 | 4.67 | 66.67 | 20 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
0 | The strange and irregular thing is that it is not an empirical concept, but a feeling of pleasure, which by the judgement of taste is attributed to every one,--just as if it were a predicate bound up with the cognition of the Object--and which is connected with the representation thereof. | Kant | 50 | 4.78 | 64 | 32 | 3 | 1 | 8 | 5 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
0 | A singular judgement of experience, e.g., when we perceive a moveable drop of water in an ice-crystal, may justly claim that every one else should find it the same; because we have formed this judgement, according to the universal conditions of the determinant faculty of Judgement, under the laws of a possible experien... | Kant | 55 | 5.04 | 56.36 | 31 | 6 | 4 | 9 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 12 | 3 | 0 | 7 |
0 | Just in the same way he who feels pleasure in the mere reflection upon the form of an object without respect to any concept, although this judgement be empirical and singular, justly claims the agreement of every one; because the ground of this pleasure is found in the universal, although subjective, condition of refle... | Kant | 79 | 5.22 | 55.7 | 44 | 11 | 2 | 13 | 3 | 18 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 20 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
0 | The pleasure, therefore, in the judgement of taste is dependent on an empirical representation, and cannot be bound up a priori with any concept. | Kant | 24 | 5.04 | 62.5 | 15 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
0 | But the pleasure is the determining ground of this judgement only because we are conscious that it rests merely on reflection and on the universal though only subjective conditions of the harmony of that reflection with the cognition of Objects in general, for which the form of the Object is purposive. | Kant | 51 | 4.94 | 62.75 | 32 | 5 | 2 | 10 | 3 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
0 | Thus the reason why judgements of taste according to their possibility are subjected to a Critique is that they presuppose a principle a priori, although this principle is neither one of cognition for the Understanding nor of practice for the Will, and therefore is not in any way determinant a priori. | Kant | 51 | 4.92 | 66.67 | 34 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 10 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
0 | Susceptibility to pleasure from reflection upon the forms of things, indicates not only a purposiveness of the Objects in relation to the reflective Judgement, conformably to the concept of nature in the subject; but also conversely a purposiveness of the subject in respect of the objects according to their form or eve... | Kant | 61 | 5.2 | 57.38 | 35 | 2 | 5 | 15 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 18 | 0 | 2 | 3 |
0 | Hence the aesthetical judgement is not only related as a judgement of taste to the beautiful, but also as springing from a spiritual feeling is related to the sublime; and thus the Critique of the aesthetical Judgement must be divided into two corresponding sections. | Kant | 44 | 5.07 | 61.36 | 27 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 5 |
0 | Purposiveness may be represented in an object given in experience on a merely subjective ground, as the harmony of its form,--in the apprehension of it prior to any concept,--with the cognitive faculties, in order to unite the intuition with concepts for a cognition generally. | Kant | 44 | 5.3 | 52.27 | 23 | 2 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
0 | Or it may be represented objectively as the harmony of the form of the object with the possibility of the thing itself, according to a concept of it which precedes and contains the ground of this form. | Kant | 37 | 4.43 | 64.86 | 24 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 5 |
0 | We have seen that the representation of purposiveness of the first kind rests on the immediate pleasure in the form of the object in the mere reflection upon it. | Kant | 29 | 4.55 | 62.07 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
0 | But the representation of purposiveness of the second kind, since it refers the form of the Object, not to the cognitive faculties of the subject in the apprehension of it, but to a definite cognition of the object under a given concept, has nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure in things, but only with the Understa... | Kant | 63 | 4.6 | 66.67 | 42 | 3 | 1 | 15 | 2 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 14 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
0 | If the concept of an object is given, the business of the Judgement in the use of the concept for cognition consists in presentation, i.e. in setting a corresponding intuition beside the concept. | Kant | 33 | 4.85 | 54.55 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
0 | This may take place either through our own Imagination, as in Art when we realise a preconceived concept of an object which is a purpose of ours; or through Nature in its Technic when we supply to it our concept of its purpose in order to judge of its products. | Kant | 50 | 4.22 | 68 | 34 | 2 | 2 | 10 | 1 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 4 | 1 | 5 |
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