license: cc-by-nc-4.0
task_categories:
- tabular-classification
- time-series-forecasting
tags:
- cybersecurity
- adversarial-machine-learning
- ai-security
- adversarial-attacks
- evasion-attacks
- apt
- synthetic-data
- ml-security
- model-robustness
- mlops-security
pretty_name: CYB011 — Synthetic AI Evasion Attack Trajectories (Sample)
size_categories:
- 10K<n<100K
CYB011 — Synthetic AI Evasion Attack Trajectory Dataset (Sample)
XpertSystems.ai Synthetic Data Platform · SKU: CYB011-SAMPLE · Version 1.0.0
This is a free preview of the full CYB011 — Synthetic AI Evasion Attack Trajectory Dataset product. It contains roughly ~4% of the full dataset at identical schema, attacker-tier distribution, and statistical fingerprint, so you can evaluate fit before licensing the full product.
🤖 Trained baseline + leakage diagnostic available: xpertsystems/cyb011-baseline-classifier — XGBoost + PyTorch MLP for 7-class adversarial attack phase classification (the dataset's headline target), group-aware split by
campaign_id, multi-seed evaluation (acc 0.867 ± 0.010, ROC-AUC 0.977 ± 0.002). Includes a comprehensiveleakage_diagnostic.jsondocumenting 6 oracle paths discovered across the dataset's targets, 4 README-suggested headline targets that are unlearnable on the sample after honest leak removal, and the missingnation_stateattacker tier. Buyers planning adversarial ML research should read the diagnostic first.
| File | Rows (sample) | Rows (full) | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
network_topology.csv |
~200 | ~2,800 | Network segment / defender registry |
campaign_summary.csv |
~200 | ~5,500 | Per-campaign aggregate outcomes |
campaign_events.csv |
~13,310 | ~55,000 | Discrete campaign event log |
attack_trajectories.csv |
~14,000 | ~320,000 | Per-timestep adversarial trajectories |
Dataset Summary
CYB011 simulates end-to-end adversarial AI evasion attack campaigns
against ML-based security detection systems, modeled as a 6-phase
adversarial state machine (data has 7 phases — adds idle_dwell):
- 6 adversarial phases: reconnaissance → feature_space_probe → perturbation_craft → evasion_attempt → feedback_adaptation → campaign_consolidation
- 4 attacker capability tiers: script_kiddie, opportunistic, advanced_persistent_threat (APT), nation_state — with per-tier ε-budgets (L∞ perturbation), query budgets (50 → 5,000), base evasion rates, and stealth weights
- 8 defender detection architectures with per-architecture detection_strength (e.g. ensemble_layered 0.91, gradient_boosted 0.78, neural_network 0.74, isolation_forest 0.62)
- L∞ perturbation budget modeling — calibrated mean ε ≈ 0.185 representing realistic imperceptibility constraints
- Query budget tracking — black-box vs white-box attack distinction
- Concept drift injection — adversarial data poisoning of training distributions, ~8% injection rate
- Retraining trigger modeling — defender model refresh after drift detection (~14% trigger rate)
- Transfer attack modeling — perturbations crafted on surrogate models, 31% transfer success rate
- Honeypot density — deception model coverage (5% baseline)
- Coordinated multi-attacker campaigns with 12% coordination rate
- MLOps security signals — gradient access patterns, feature-space probing, lateral pivoting between models
Trained Baseline + Leakage Audit Available
A working baseline classifier + comprehensive leakage diagnostic is published at xpertsystems/cyb011-baseline-classifier.
| Component | Detail |
|---|---|
| Primary task | 7-class attack_phase classification (the dataset's headline target) |
| Secondary artifact | leakage_diagnostic.json — 6 oracle paths + 4 unlearnable targets + missing tier note |
| Models | XGBoost (model_xgb.json) + PyTorch MLP (model_mlp.safetensors) |
| Features | 37 (after one-hot encoding); pipeline included as feature_engineering.py |
| Split | Group-aware (GroupShuffleSplit on campaign_id) — 200 campaigns, ~30 in test fold |
| Validation | Single seed + multi-seed aggregate across 10 seeds |
| Demo | inference_example.ipynb — end-to-end copy-paste |
| Headline metrics | XGBoost: accuracy 0.867 ± 0.010, macro ROC-AUC 0.977 ± 0.002 (multi-seed) |
Important findings for buyers planning CYB011 ML work (full detail
in
leakage_diagnostic.json):
Missing nation_state attacker tier: README lists 4 tiers; sample
contains only 3 (script_kiddie 50%, opportunistic 40%, APT 10%).
Nation_state events are entirely absent. Models trained on this
sample cannot generalize to nation_state actors.
6 oracle paths documented across the dataset's targets:
Phase target oracles (3 paths — must be dropped):
detection_outcome(!= suppressed_alert→ 100%evasion_attempt)detector_confidence_score(threshold-derived fromdetection_outcome)evasion_budget_consumed(== 0→ 100% one of 3 early phases)
Other documented leaks (for transparency):
4. stealth_score near-deterministic per attacker_capability_tier (inflates per-campaign tier prediction from honest ~0.50 to 0.94)
5. Topology fingerprint — 7 segment-level features uniquely identify each defender_architecture (makes 8-class defender prediction trivially 100%, collapses to 0.13 when fingerprint dropped)
6. timestep partial oracle for 3 phases — KEPT in the published model as legitimate campaign-progress observable
7 phases in data, README claims 6: The data adds idle_dwell as
a phase (17.5% of events). The published baseline trains on all 7.
4 README-suggested headline targets unlearnable after honest leak removal:
campaign_success_flagbinary (acc 0.51 vs majority 0.61)campaign_type8-class (acc 0.11 vs majority 0.17)coordinated_attack_flagbinary (acc 0.83 vs majority 0.90, only 20 positives)defender_architecture8-class (collapses when topology fingerprint dropped)
Only viable headline target: attack_phase 7-class — acc 0.867,
ROC-AUC 0.977 with group-aware split. All 7 classes earn nonzero F1
(range 0.49-1.00).
Calibrated Benchmark Targets
The full product is calibrated to 12 benchmark validation tests drawn from authoritative adversarial ML research (MITRE ATLAS, NIST AI 100-2 Adversarial ML Taxonomy, OWASP ML Top 10, USENIX Security adversarial ML papers, IEEE SaTML, Microsoft Counterfit, IBM Adversarial Robustness Toolbox, Anthropic / OpenAI red team reports).
Sample benchmark results:
| Test | Target | Observed | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| evasion_success_rate_apt | 0.1430 | 0.1764 | ✓ PASS |
| detection_rate_ensemble | 0.9100 | 0.9100 | ✓ PASS |
| alert_suppression_rate | 0.0720 | 0.0720 | ✓ PASS |
| perturbation_budget_mean | 0.1850 | 0.1891 | ✓ PASS |
| query_volume_rate | 0.1450 | 0.1250 | ✓ PASS |
| concept_drift_injection_rate | 0.0800 | 0.0600 | ✓ PASS |
| stealth_score_apt | 0.7200 | 0.7200 | ✓ PASS |
| retrain_trigger_rate | 0.1400 | 0.1250 | ✓ PASS |
| campaign_success_rate | 0.3800 | 0.3950 | ✓ PASS |
| lateral_pivot_rate | 0.0950 | 0.0950 | ✓ PASS |
| transfer_attack_success_rate | 0.3100 | 0.3100 | ✓ PASS |
| attribution_risk_score | 0.2800 | 0.3201 | ✓ PASS |
Every CYB011 benchmark in the sample lands within the same calibrated tolerance as the full product. The sample uses 200 campaigns (vs 5,500 at full scale); APT-tier conditional benchmarks (≈ 22% of campaigns) have ~44 samples for robust convergence.
Schema Highlights
attack_trajectories.csv (primary file, per-timestep)
| Column | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| campaign_id | string | Unique adversarial campaign ID |
| attacker_id | string | Attacker ID |
| timestep | int | Step in 6-phase lifecycle (0–69) |
| adversarial_phase | string | 1 of 6 phases |
| attacker_tier | string | script_kiddie / opportunistic / apt / nation_state |
| defender_architecture | string | ensemble / gradient_boosted / nn / isolation_forest / etc. |
| segment_id | string | FK to network_topology.csv |
| perturbation_linf | float | L∞ perturbation magnitude (ε) |
| perturbation_l2 | float | L2 perturbation magnitude |
| queries_used | int | Cumulative model queries |
| query_budget_remaining | int | Tier-cap minus queries_used |
| gradient_access | int | Boolean — white-box gradient access |
| evasion_attempted | int | Boolean — evasion submitted at this step |
| evasion_succeeded | int | Boolean — evasion bypassed detection |
| defender_detection_strength | float | Per-architecture detection strength (0–1) |
| concept_drift_injected | int | Boolean — drift injection at this step |
| transfer_attack_used | int | Boolean — perturbation from surrogate model |
| stealth_score | float | Cumulative stealth (0–1) |
| feature_space_dim | int | Target model feature dimensionality |
campaign_summary.csv (per-campaign outcome)
| Column | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| campaign_id, attacker_id | string | Identifiers |
| attacker_tier | string | Tier classification target |
| defender_architecture | string | Defender model classification target |
| campaign_outcome | string | success / detected / aborted / blocked |
| evasion_success_flag | int | Boolean — evasion ever succeeded |
| total_queries_used | int | Cumulative query count |
| perturbation_budget_mean | float | Mean ε across campaign |
| concept_drift_injected_flag | int | Boolean — drift injection used |
| retrain_triggered_flag | int | Boolean — defender retraining triggered |
| transfer_attack_success_flag | int | Boolean — transfer attack succeeded |
| lateral_pivot_flag | int | Boolean — pivot to second model |
| stealth_score_final | float | Final stealth score |
| attribution_risk_score | float | Likelihood of attribution (0–1) |
See campaign_events.csv and network_topology.csv for the discrete event
log and segment/defender registry schemas respectively.
Suggested Use Cases
- Training adversarial example detectors — distinguish clean vs perturbed inputs from feature-space telemetry
- Attack phase classification (the baseline ships this) — predict the 7-phase position of a trajectory event — worked example available
- Attacker tier attribution — 4-class classification of evasion campaigns by capability tier (see leakage diagnostic — nation_state tier MISSING from sample; per-campaign prediction inflated by stealth_score leakage)
- Defender architecture vulnerability assessment — predict which defender architectures are most evadable (see leakage diagnostic — trivially leaky via topology fingerprint; unlearnable when dropped)
- L∞ / L2 perturbation budget detection — calibrate ε-thresholds
- Query budget exhaustion attacks — model black-box query patterns
- Concept drift poisoning detection — distinguish natural drift from adversarial injection
- Transfer attack detection — identify perturbations crafted on surrogate models
- MLOps adversarial robustness benchmarking — evaluate model hardening before deployment
- Honeypot effectiveness analysis — deception model coverage tuning
- Adversarial ML threat modeling — MITRE ATLAS tactic coverage
- Anthropic / OpenAI-style red team simulation — synthetic jailbreak/evasion training data
Loading the Data
import pandas as pd
trajectories = pd.read_csv("attack_trajectories.csv")
summaries = pd.read_csv("campaign_summary.csv")
events = pd.read_csv("campaign_events.csv")
topology = pd.read_csv("network_topology.csv")
# Join trajectory data with topology (segment-level features)
enriched = trajectories.merge(topology, left_on="target_segment_id",
right_on="segment_id", how="left")
# 7-class attack_phase target (the baseline ships this)
y_phase = trajectories["attack_phase"]
# Multi-class attacker tier (3 values in sample; see leakage diagnostic)
y_tier = trajectories["attacker_capability_tier"]
# Binary evasion success target (see leakage diagnostic — unlearnable)
y_evasion = summaries["campaign_success_flag"]
# Multi-class defender architecture target (see leakage diagnostic —
# trivially leaky via topology fingerprint)
y_defender = topology["defender_architecture"]
For a worked end-to-end example with attack_phase 7-class
classification, group-aware splitting, feature engineering, and the
full 6-oracle-path leakage audit, see the
baseline classifier repo.
License
This sample is released under CC-BY-NC-4.0 (free for non-commercial research and evaluation). The full production dataset is licensed commercially — contact XpertSystems.ai for licensing terms.
Full Product
The full CYB011 dataset includes ~383,000 rows across all four files, with calibrated benchmark validation against 12 metrics drawn from authoritative adversarial ML research sources (MITRE ATLAS, NIST AI 100-2, OWASP ML Top 10).
📧 pradeep@xpertsystems.ai 🌐 https://xpertsystems.ai
Citation
@dataset{xpertsystems_cyb011_sample_2026,
title = {CYB011: Synthetic AI Evasion Attack Trajectory Dataset (Sample)},
author = {XpertSystems.ai},
year = {2026},
url = {https://huggingface.co/datasets/xpertsystems/cyb011-sample}
}
Generation Details
- Generator version : 1.0.0
- Random seed : 42
- Generated : 2026-05-16 14:56:19 UTC
- Adversarial model : 6-phase evasion campaign state machine
- Overall benchmark : 100.0 / 100 (grade A+)