text stringlengths 5 5.67k |
|---|
This is necessary to exclude the likelihood of any innocent having been picked up and branded as culprit and then the gravity of the offence arousing human sympathy persuading the mind to be carried away by doubtful or dubious circumstances treating them as of 'beyond doubt' evidentiary value Ratio |
The appeals are allowed RPC |
Conviction of the accused-appellant under Sections 302 and 376(2)(f) of Indian Penal Code is set aside RPC |
He is acquitted of the charges framed against him RPC |
He shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required to be detained in connection with any other offence RPC |
Appeals allowed RPC |
These two appeals involve identical questions and, therefore, are disposed of by this common judgment after noticing the factual position, so far as they are relevant FAC |
The appellants question correctness of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court which held that the withdrawal of benefits extended to the appellants as subsidy was in order FAC |
The appellants questioned legality or the G.O.Ms No. 989 dated 1.9.1988 directing discontinuance of purchase tax exemption in case of mills which exceeded the ceiling of Rs FAC |
300 lakes during the period of five years, and Government letter dated 28.12.1988 which made the aforesaid G.O FAC |
Ms. No. 989 of 1.9.1988 operative retrospectively from 1.4.1988 FAC |
Initially the writ petitions were filed before the High Court, but after constitution of the Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the 'Tribunal') the writ petitions were transferred to the Tribunal which held that on application of the principles of promissory estoppel and legitimate expecta... |
The State questioned correctness of the judgment before the High Court which, as noted above, held the G.O.Ms, and the Govt FAC |
letter to be valid, reversing the conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal FAC |
The judgment forms subject matter of challenge in these appeals FAC |
In support of the appeals the primary stands raised by the appellants are FAC |
The doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation were applicable to the facts of the case ARG |
There was no material to show existence of any overriding public interest to rule out application of the aforesaid doctrine there was no scope for retrospective withdrawal ARG |
In any event, before withdrawal of the benefits, no opportunity of hearing was granted ARG |
The High Court erroneously came to hold that the State Government had not filed any counter FAC |
The materials which were produced before the High Court and on the basis of which it is decided that the decision of the Government is in order were not even pleaded in the pleadings and during arguments FAC |
The appellants were taken by surprise by production of materials which were not even disclosed to the appellants FAC |
The contents of the files which were produced before the High Court and on which reliance was placed to hold against the appellants are not known to the appellants FAC |
In other words, there was clear violation of the principles of natural justice FAC |
The Government's letter dated 28.12.1988 refers to some decision, but in the absence of any authentication as required under Article 166 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution') the same is ineffective FAC |
In any event, the retrospective withdrawal of the benefit on the basis of an executive decision is impermissible FAC |
In response, learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted that the appellants have failed to adduce any evidence or material to show that were in any way induced by any governmental action to set up industries ARG |
In fact, the Government of Tamil Nadu vide G.O.Ms ARG |
No ARG |
1294 dated 24.10.1975 granted exemption from purchase tax on sugarcane in favour of sugar mills established in "co-operative and public sectors" in the form of annual subsidy equivalent to purchase tax on sugarcane ARG |
There was no scope for any mis-understanding that it applied to any private sector participation in the sphere of sugar manufacturing ARG |
The commercial productions were started in case of appellants in C.A. No ARG |
8606/2002 i.e. Ponni Sugars (Erode) Ltd. v. Govt ARG |
of Tamil Nadu & Ors., on 27.1.1984 and in C.A ARG |
8605/2002 i.e. Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd v. Commercial Tax Officer ARG |
Ors ARG |
on 22.1.1986 ARG |
The appellants only made representation to Government subsequently claiming exemption at par with the cooperative and public sector mills ARG |
As there was no inducement or assurance, the question of any promissory estoppel did not arise FAC |
So far as legitimate expectation aspect is concerned, it is too well known that the benefit extended can be withdrawn and with this knowledge if the units are set up, the principle of legitimate expectation does not apply FAC |
The High Court recorded the following findings on the factual aspects FAC |
The respondents have established their units prior to the Government orders granting the subsidy and they have no vested right to claim exemption FAC |
No inducement was made in the Government orders to establish the units FAC |
The respondents have not acted on the basis of the Government Orders for establishing the units FAC |
The grant of subsidy is a concession and the Government has got good reasons for modifying the scheme in public interest FAC |
No prejudice is caused to the respondents since the scheme was interested to make the units viable and the modified scheme provides for safeguards to that extent FAC |
The Order granting subsidy can be withdrawn in public interest FAC |
The Government has exercised their right to modify the scheme in the interest of public revenue FAC |
The stand taken by the present appellants before the Tribunal and the High Court was rejected FAC |
With reference to the files produced, certain factual conclusions were arrived at, the correctness of those form the core challenge in these appeals FAC |
Estoppel is a rule of equity which has gained new dismensions in recent years FAC |
A new class of estoppel has come to be recognized by the courts in this country as well as in England FAC |
The doctrine of 'promissory estoppel' has assumed importance in recent years though it was dimly noticed in some of the earlier cases FAC |
The leading case on the subject is Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., [1947] 1 K.B. 130 PRE |
The rule laid down in High Trees case (supra), again came up for consideration before the King's Bench in Combe v. Bombe, [1951] 2 K.B. 215 PRE |
Therein the court ruled that the principle stated in High Trees's case (supra), is that, where one party has, by his words or conduct, made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his wo... |
But that principle does not create any cause of action, which did not exist before; so that, where a promise is made which is not supported by any consideration, the promise cannot bring an action on the basis of that promise PRE |
The principle enunciated in the High Trees case (supra), was also recognized by the House of Lords in Tool Metal Manufacturing Co. Ltd PRE |
v. Tungsten Electric Co. Ltd., [1955 PRE |
All E.R. 657 PRE |
1955] 1 W.L.R. 761 PRE |
That principle was adopted by this Court in Union of India v. Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd., AIR (1968 PRE |
SC 718 1967 Indlaw SC 411 and Turner Morrison and Co. Ltd. v. Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd., [1972] 1 SCC 857 1972 Indlaw SC 190 PRE |
Doctrine of "Promissory Estoppel" has been envolved by the courts, on the principles of equity, to avoid injustice PRE |
Promissory Estoppel" is defined in Black's Law Distionary as "an estoppel which arises when there is a promise which promissor should reasonable expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of promisee, and which does include such action or forbearance, and such promise is ... |
So far as this Court is concerned, it invoked the doctrine in Indo Afghan Agencies's case 1967 Indlaw SC 411 (supra) in which is was, inter alia, laid down that even though the case would not fall within the terms of Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act') which enacts the rule of est... |
See Century Spinning Co. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, AIR (1971 PRE |
SC 1021 1970 Indlaw SC 341, Radhakrishna v. State of Bihar, AIR (1977 PRE |
SC 1496 1977 Indlaw SC 282, Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., [1979] 2 SCC 409 1978 Indlaw SC 56, Union of India v. Godfrey Philips Indian Ltd., [1985] 4 SCC 369 1985 Indlaw SC 275 and Dr. Ashok Kumar Maheshwari v. State of U.P. & Another, (1998) 2 Supreme 100 1998 Indlaw SC 1376 PRE |
In the backdrop, let us travel a little distance into the past to understand the evolution of the doctrine of "promissory estoppel PRE |
Dixon, J. an Australian Jurists, in Grundt v. Great Boulder Gold Mines Prorietary Ltd., [1939] 59 CLR 641 (Aust) laid down as under: "It is often said simply that the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment PRE |
Although substantially such a statement is correct and leads to no misunderstanding, it does not bring out clearly the basal purpose of the doctrine PRE |
That purpose is to avoid or prevent a detriment to the party asserting the estoppel by compelling the opposite party to adhere to the assumption upon which the former acted or abstained from acting PRE |
This means that the real detriment or harm from which the law seeks to give protection is that which would flow from the change of position if the assumptions were deserted that led to it PRE |
The principle, set out above, was reiterated by Lord Denning in High Trees's case (supra PRE |
This principle has been evolved by equity to avoid injustice PRE |
It is nether in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel PRE |
Its object is to interpose equity shorn of its form to mitigate the rigour of strict law, as noted in Anglo Afghan Aencies's case1967 Indlaw SC 411 (supra) and Sharma Transport Represented by D.P. Sharma v. Government of A.P. and Others, [2002] 2 SCC 188 2001 Indlaw SC 19917 PRE |
No vested right as to tax holding is acquired by a person who is granted concession Ratio |
If any concession has been given it can be withdrawn at any time and no time limit should be insisted upon before it was withdrawn Ratio |
The rule of promissory estoppel can be invoked only if on the basis of representation made by the Government, the industry was established to avail benefit if of exemption Ratio |
In Kasinka Trading and Anr PRE |
v. Union of India and Anr PRE |
1995] 1 SCC 274 1994 Indlaw SC 2183 PRE |
it was held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice PRE |
A person may have a 'legitimate expectation' of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment Ratio |
The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice Ratio |
The doctrine of legitimate expectation has an important place in the developing law of judicial review Ratio |
It is, however, not necessary to explore the doctrine in this case, it is enough merely to note that a legitimate expectation can provide a sufficient interest to enable one who cannot point to the existence of a substantive right to obtain the leave of the court to apply for judicial review Ratio |
It is generally agreed that 'legitimate expectation' gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation to be confined mostly to right to a fair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise or withdrawing an undertaking is taken Ratio |
The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightway from the administrative authorities as no crystallized right as such involved Ratio |
The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise Ratio |
In other words, where a person's legitimate expectation in not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then decision maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest Ratio |
See Union of India and Others Ratio |
v. Hindustan Development Corporation and Others, AIR (1994 Ratio |
SC 9981993 Indlaw SC 1085 Ratio |
While the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the executive power, when not trammelled by any statute or rule is wide enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior... |
The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of every State action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone irrespective of the field of activity of the State is an accepted tenet Ratio |
The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heart beat of fair play Ratio |
Actions are amenable, in the panorama of judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validity for discernible reasons, not whimsically for any ulterior purpose Ratio |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.