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None of my representatives heirs, successors, executors, administrators or assigns shall have any manner of interest in or right to the said two debutter properties and no one shall ever be competent to give away or effect sale, mortgage or in respect of the said two properties nor shall the said two properties, be sol...
t is quite true,that a dedication may be either absolute or partial Ratio
The property may be given out and out to the idol, or it may be subjected to a charge in favour of the idol Ratio
The question whether the idol itself shall be considered the true beneficiary, subject to a charge in favour of the heirs or specified relatives of the testator for their upkeep, or that, on the other hand, these heirs shall be considered the true beneficiaries of the property, subject to a charge for the upkeep, worsh...
What we find here in cl Ratio
3 of the will is an absolute dedication of the premises Ratio
Grey Street to the idol as its permanent habitation with only the right given to the sevayats to reside in the said premises for the purposes of carrying on the daily and periodical seva and the festivals, etc Ratio
of the deity Ratio
The said premises are expressly declared as dedicated to the deity Ratio
They are to be registered in the municipal records in the name of the deity, the municipal bills have got to be taken also in his name and none of the testator's representatives, heirs, successors, executors, administrators or assigns is to have any manner of interest in or right to the said premises or is to be compet...
of the said premises Ratio
There is thus a clear indication of the intention of the testator to absolutely dedicate the said premises to the deity and it is impossible to urge that there was a partial dedication of the premises to the deity Ratio
The only thing which was urged by Shri N. C. Chatterjee in support of his contention was that the right to reside in the premises was given to the sevayats and that according to him detracted from the absolute character of the dedication ARG
This argument however cannot avail the appellants Ratio
It was observed by Lord Buckmaster in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Gnanendra Nath Das v. Surendra Nath Das, (1920) 24 C.W.N. 1926 at p. 1030 PRE
In that case it is provided that the shebait for the time being shall be entitled to reside with his family in the said dwelling-house, but the dwelling-house itself is the place specially set apart for the family idols to which specific reference is made in the will, and in their Lordships' opinion the gift is only a ...
The first contention of the appellants therefore fails and we hold that the dedication of the premises RPC
41 Grey, Street to the idol was an absolute dedication RPC
regards the second contention, viz., the adverse possession of Nagendra, it is to be noted that under the terms of cl. 3 of the will of Dwarka Nath the representatives, successors and heirs of his two sons Rajendra and Jogendra were successively to perform the seva in the manner therein mentioned and Nagendra was one o...
He was no doubt a minor on the 24th November, 1910, when the terms of settlement were arrived at between the parties to the suit 1909 Ratio
His two elder brothers Jnanendra and Bhupendra were declared to be the then sevayats, but a right was reserved to Nagendra to join with them as a sevayat on, his attaining majority Ratio
So far as Nagendra is concerned there is a clear finding of fact recorded by Mr. Justice Bose on a specific issue raised in that behalf, viz Ratio
Did Nagendra act as shebait of the plaintiff deity under the wills of Dwarka Nath Ghosh and Rajendra Nath Ghosh Ratio
that he did act as such shebait and that his possession of the premises Ratio
No. 41A Ratio
Grey Street was referable to possession on behalf of the idol, 30 .This finding was not challenged in the appeal court and it is too late to challenge the same before us Ratio
If Nagendra was thus a sevayat of the idol it could not be urged that his possession could in any manner whatever be adverse to the idol and his dealings with the said premises in the manner he purported to do after the 12th October, 1920, could not be evidence of any adverse possession against the idol Ratio
he position of the sevayat and the effect of his dealings with the property dedicated to the idol has been expounded by Rankin C.J. in Surendrakrishna Ray v. Shree Shree Ishwar Bhubaneshwari Thakuran, (1933 PRE
Cal 54 1932 Indlaw CAL 59 PRE
But, in the present case, we have to see whether the possession of two joint shebaits becomes adverse to the idol when they openly claim to divide the property between them PRE
The fact of their possession is in accordance with the idol's title, and the question is whether the change made by them, in the intention with which they hold, evidenced by an application of the rents and profits to their own purposes and other acts, extinguishes the idol's right PRE
I am quite unable to hold that it does, because such a change of intention can only be brought home to the idol by means of the shebait's knowledge and the idol can only react to it by the shebait PRE
Adverse possession,in such circumstances is a notion almost void of content PRE
True, any heir or perhaps any descendant of the founder can bring a suit PRE
against the shebaits on the idol's behalf and, in the present case, it may be said that the acts of the shebaits must have I been notorious in the family PRE
But such persons have no legal duty to protect the endowment and, until the shebait is removed or controlled by the court, he alone can act for the idol PRE
We are in perfect accord with the observations made by Rankin C.J RPC
If a shebait by acting contrary to the terms of his appointment or in breach of his duty as such shebait could claim adverse possession of the dedicated property against the idol it would be putting a premium on dishonesty and breach of duty on his part and no property which is dedicated to an idol would ever be safe R...
The shebait for the time being is the only person competent to safeguard the interests of the idol, his possession of the dedicated property is the possession of the idol whose sevait he is, and no dealing of his with the property dedicated to the idol could afford the basis of a claim by him for adverse possession of ...
No shebait can, so long as he continues to be the sevait, ever claim adverse possession against the idol RPC
Neither Nagendra nor the appellants who derive their title from the auction sale held on the 9th December, 1936, could therefore claim to have perfected their title to the premises RPC
Grey Street by adverse possession RPC
The second contention of the appellants also therefore fails RPC
The further contention urged on behalf of the appellants in regard to the disallowance of the sum of Rs RPC
19,000 by the appeal court could not be and was not seriously pressed before us and does not require any consideration RPC
he result therefore is that the appeal fails and must stand dismissed with costs RPC
Appeal dismissed RPC
This appeal with special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India in a dispute regarding the workers' claim for bonus FAC
During the year 1948 the appellant made a profit of Rs FAC
11,97,648-11-9 FAC
It paid 24 3 per cent FAC
dividend on ordinary shares, being the maximum that could be paid under the Public Companies (Limitation of Dividend) Ordinance of 1948 and also paid to the workers their full share of bonus at annas 4 in a rupee of their basic earnings FAC
During the year 1949 the selling rates for cloth and yarn were controlled by the Government and were approximately 4 per cent FAC
below those obtained in 1948 FAC
The basic wages were increased from the 1st December, 1948, by order of the Government of Uttar Pradesh and the total wages paid were therefore higher than those in the previous year FAC
There was moreover indiscipline amongst the workers and production suffered FAC
There was a strike in the month of October and the mills were closed for nearly a month FAC
Further the management were unable to secure cotton which resulted in the curtailment of the working hours FAC
As a result of all these circumstances the appellant suffered a trading loss of Rs FAC
5,02,563-1-10 FAC
A sum of Rs FAC
2,50,000 being the excess reserve for taxation was written back and a sum of Rs FAC
10,01,871-13-5 being the amount of reserve transferred from the investment account was also brought in FAC
An aggregate sum of Rs FAC
12,51,871-13-5 was thus brought into the balance sheet by these two transfers FAC
The trading loss was deducted from this amount leaving a credit balance of Rs FAC
7,49,308-11-7 and that amount was shown as the profit for the year 1949 in the balance-sheet for that year FAC
The balance which had been brought forward from the previous year was added thereto and a dividend of 243/4 per cent. was paid to the ordinary shareholders FAC
The appellant also paid ex gratia to the workmen bonus at the rate of annas 2 per rupee of their basic earnings making it clear by their notification dated the 7th April, 1950, that the directors had sanctioned the payment at that rate in spite of the appellant having suffered a trading loss for the year, that it was b...
On the 4th May, 1950, the Secretary of the respondent Union petitioned to the Provincial Conciliation Officer (Textile) that there was more production in 1949 than in 1948, that there was no reason to hold that the profit in 1949 was less than in the previous year and that the rate of bonus was wrongly reduced and aske...
The industrial dispute which thus arose was referred for enquiry and recording of an award to the Regional Conciliation Board (Textile), Kanpur FAC
The Conciliation Board by a majority decision repelled the contention of the appellant and awarded the payment of bonus at annas 4 per rupee FAC
On an appeal taken by the appellant to the Industrial Court (Textiles and Hosiery), Kanpur, the Industrial Court accepted the contention of the appellant, allowed the appeal and set aside the award FAC
The respondent thereupon appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal which substantially agreed with the Industrial Court on questions of fact as well as the general position in law but imported considerations of social justice and treating this as a special case " where social justice would demand that labour should hav...
The appellant filed this appeal against that decision after obtaining special leave from this Court FAC
Both the Industrial Court as well as the Labour Appellate Tribunal found as a fact that there was a trading loss of Rs FAC
5,02,563-1-10 during the year 1949 and also FAC
that the dividend of 243/4 per cent FAC
to the ordinary shareholders was distributed after transferring the aggregate sum of Rs FAC
12,51,871-13-5 from the reserves FAC
The question which therefore arises for our consideration is mainly whether the workers are entitled to the payment of a bonus in spite of the employer having worked at a loss during the year and incidentally whether the workers have any right, title or interest in the reserves and the undistributed profits of the prev...
The primary meaning of the word " bonus " according to the definition given in the New English Dictionary is:-" A boon or gift over and above what is nominally due as remuneration to the receiver and which is therefore something wholly to the good Ratio
This definition was adopted by Stirling J. in In re Eddystone Marine Insurance Co, L. R. (I894) W. N. 30; Webster's International Dictionary defines bonus as "something given in addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly due to the recipient Ratio
The Oxford Concise Dictionary defines it as " something to the good, into the bargain (and as an example) gratuity to workmen beyond their wages Ratio
Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume XI, at page 515 ascribes the following meanings to the word bonus: " An allowance in addition to what is usual current or stipulated ; a sum given or paid beyond what is legally required to be paid to the recipient; something given in addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly ...
This imports the conception of a boon, a gift or a gratuity otherwise described as an ex gratia payment Ratio
The word 'bonus' has however acquired a secondary meaning in the sphere of industrial relations Ratio
It is classified amongst the methods of wage payment Ratio
It has been used especially in the United States of America to designate an award in addition to the contractual wage Ratio
It is usually intended as a stimulus to extra effort but sometimes represents the desire of the employer to share with his workers the fruits of their common enterprise Ratio
Vide Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume III, page 856 Ratio
The Pocket Part of the Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume XI, under the heading "As Compensation for Services" quotes the following passage from Attorney-General v. City of Woburn, 317 Mass. 465 :- "The word 'bonus' is commonly used to denote an increase in salary or wages in contracts of employment Ratio
The offer of a bonus is the means frequently adopted to secure continuous service from an employee to enhance his efficiency and to augment his loyalty to his employer and the employee's acceptance of the offer by performing the things called for by the offer binds employer to pay the bonus so called Ratio
It also gives another meaning of the word bonus', viz:- "Increased compensation for services already rendered gratuitously or for a prescribed compensation where there is neither express or implied understanding that additional compensation may be granted Ratio
This imports the conception that even though the payment be not strictly due to the recipient nor legally enforceable by him, a claim to the same may be laid by the employee under certain conditions and if such claim is entertained either by an agreement with the employer or by adjudication before a properly constitute...
the same would ripen into a legally enforceable claim Ratio
This position was recognised in Sutton v. Attorney-General , (1923 PRE
T.L.R. 294, 297; where the Earl of Birkenhead observed "The term 'bonus' may of course be properly used to describe payments made of grace and not as of right PRE
But it nevertheless may also include, as here, payments made because legally due but which the parties contemplate will not continue indefinitely", and in National Association of Local Government Officers v. Bolton Corporation, [1943 PRE
A.C. 166, I87; "This payment, if made, cannot properly in my opinion be regarded as a mere gratuity PRE