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It was then found that one side had the original seals of Wadibun dar while the other side had the seals of Buxar. Ratio
On checking the wagon, 27 bales were found intact, covering of one bale was torn and one bale was found loose and slack. Ratio
This evidence asto what happened between Mughalsarai and Buxar thus makes it probable that there was theft in the running train between Mughalsarai and Buxar and that may account for the loss of part of the consignment. Ratio
It is however contended on behalf of the respondent that no evidence was produced from Mughalsarai asto what happened while the wagon was in the marshalling yard and that the seal book which is kept at every railway station containing entries of resealing when a wagon is resealed was not produced from Mughalsarai and a...
We are however of opinion that the evidence of the guard to the effect that the seals were intact when he left Mughalsarai with the train is sufficient to show that the wagon was in tact with the original seals when it left Mughalsarai and there fore it is not possible to draw any adverse inference from the non product...
It would have been a different matter if the respondent had asked for the production of the seal book as well as the evidence of the watch and ward staff. Ratio
But the respondent contented itself merely with the suggestion that a theft might have taken place at Mughalsarai which was denied by the guard and did not ask the court to order the railway to produce this evidence. Ratio
In these circumstances in the face of the evidence of the guard and the fact that one seal on the southernside of the door was of the original station. Ratio
we do not think that it is possible to draw an adverse inference against the railway on the ground that the evidence of the watch and ward staff and the seal book at Mughalsarai were not produced. Ratio
The seal book would have been of value only if the wagon had been resealed at Mughalsarai but there is in our opinion no reason to think that the wagon had been resealed at Mughalsarai after the evidence of the guard that he found the seals and rivets intact when he left Mughalsarai with the train. Ratio
On a careful consideration of the evidence therefore we are of opinion that a fair inference cannot be drawn from the evidence of the railway that there was misconduct by the railway or its servants at Mughalsarai during the time when the wagon was there. Ratio
If the evidence of the guard is accepted, and we do accept it, there can be no doubt that the loss of the goods took place be case of theft in the running train between Mughalsarai and 160 Buxar. Ratio
There is no evidence on behalf of the respondent to prove misconduct and as misconduct cannot fairly be inferred from the evidence produced on behalf of the railway, the suit must fail. Ratio
We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore that of the Additional Subordinate Judge. RPC
In the circumstances of this case we order parties to bear their own costs throughout. RPC
Appeal allowed. RPC
One Lakshminarayana Iyer, a Hindu Brahmin, who owned considerable properties in the Tirunelveli district, died on 13th December, 1924, leaving him surviving a widow Ranganayaki, and a married daughter Ramalakshmi FAC
Ramalakshmi had married the plaintiff and had a number of children from him FAC
They were all alive in December, 1924, when Lakshminarayana died FAC
Before his death he executed a will on 16th November, 1924, the construction of which is in controversy in this appeal Ratio
By this will he gave the following directions -- "After my lifetime, you, the aforesaid Ranganayaki Amminal, my wife, shall till your lifetime, enjoy the aforesaid entire properties, the outstandings due to me, the debts payable by me, and the chit amounts payable by me FAC
After your lifetime Ramalakshmi Ammal, our daughter and wife of Rama Ayyar Avergal of Melagaram village, and her heirs shall enjoy them with absolute rights and powers of alienation such as gift, exchange, and sale from son to grandson and so on for generations FAC
As regards the payment of maintenance to be made to Chinnanmal alias Lakshmi Ammal, wife of my late son Hariharamayyan, my wife Ranganayaki Ammal shall pay the same as she pleases, and obtain a release deed FAC
Ranganayaki entered into possession of the properties on the death of her husband FAC
On 21st February, 1928, she settled the maintenance claim of Lakshmi Ammal and obtained a deed of release from her by paying her a sum of Rs FAC
3,350 in cash and by executing in her favour an agreement stipulating to pay her a sum of Rs FAC
240 per annum FAC
Ramalakshmi died on 25th April, 1938 during the lifetime of the widow FAC
None of her children survived her FAC
On the 24th July, 1945, the widow describing herself as an absolute owner of the properties of her husband sold one of the items of the property to the 2nd defendant for Rs. 500 FAC
On the 18th September, 1945, the suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by the plaintiff, the husband and the sole heir of Ramalakshmi, for a declaration that the said sale would not be binding on him beyond the lifetime of the widow FAC
A prayer was made that the widow be restrained from alienating the other properties in her possession FAC
On the 19th September, 1945, an ad interim injunction was issued by the High Court restraining the widow from alienating the properties in her possession and forming part of her husband's estate, Inspite of this injunction, on the 27th September, 1945, she executed two deeds of settlement in favour of the other defenda...
The plaintiff was allowed to amend his plaint and include therein a prayer for a declaration in respect of the invalidity of these alienations as well FAC
It was averred in the plaint that Ramalakshmi obtained a vested interest in the suit -properties under the will of her father and plaintiff was thus entitled to maintain the suit FAC
The defendants pleaded that the plaintiff had no title to maintain the suit, that the widow was entitled under the will to an absolute estate or at least to an estate analogous to and not less than a widow's estate, that the estate given to Ramalakshmi under the will was but a contingent one and she having predeceased ...
The main issue in the suit was whether- the widow took under the will an absolute estate or an estate like the Hindu widow's estate and whether the daughter's interest therein was in the nature of a contingent remainder, or whether she got in the properties a vested interest FAC
The subordinate judge held that the widow took under the will a limited life, interest, and not an absolute estate or even a widow's estate under Hindu law, and that the daughter got there under a vested interest in the properties to which the plaintiff succeeded on her death RLC
In view of this finding he granted the plaintiff a declaratory decree to the effect that the first defendant had only an estate for life in the suit properties and that the alienations made by her would not endure beyond her lifetime RLC
The question as to the validity of the alienations was left undetermined FAC
The unsuccessful defendants preferred an appeal against this decree to the High Court of Judicature at Madras FAC
During the pendency of the appeal the widow died on 14th February, 1948 FAC
The High Court by its judgment under appeal affirmed the decision of the trial judge and maintained his view on the construction of the will FAC
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was granted and the appeal was admitted on the 27th November, 1951 FAC
The substantial question to decide in the appeal is whether the estate granted by the testator to his widow was a fall woman's estate under Hindu law or merely a limited life estate in the English sense of that expression Ratio
It was not contested before us that a Hindu can by will create a life estate, or successive life estates, or any other estate for a limited term, provided the donee or the persons taking under it are capable of taking under a deed or will Ratio
The decision of the appeal thus turns upon the question whether the testator's intention was to give to his widow ail ordinary life, estate or an estate analogous to that of a Hindu widow Ratio
At one time it was a moot point whether a Hindu widow's estate could be created by will, it being an estate created by law, but it is now settled that a Hindu can confer by means of a will oil his widow the same estate which she would get by inheritance Ratio
The widow in such a case takes as a demise and not as an heir Ratio
The court's primary duty in such cases is to ascertain from the language employed by the testator "what were his intentions", keeping in view the surrounding circumstances, his ordinary notions as a Hindu in respect to devolution of his property, his family relationships etc Ratio
in other words, to ascertain his wishes by putting itself, so to say, in his armchair Ratio
Considering the will in the light of these principles,it seems to us that Lakshminarayan Iyer intended by his will to direct that his entire properties should be enjoyed by his widow during her lifetime but her interest in these properties should come to an end on her death, that all these properties in their entirety ...
He wished to make his daughter a fresh stock of descent so that her issue, male or female, may have the benefit of his property Ratio
They were the real persons whom he earmarked with certainty as the ultimate recipients of his bounty Ratio
In express terms he conferred on his daughter powers of alienation byway of gift, exchange, sale, but in sharp contrast to this, on his widow he conferred no such powers Ratio
The direction to her was that she should enjoy the entire properties including the outstandings etc Ratio
and these shall thereafter pass to her daughters Ratio
Though no restraint in express terms was put on her powers of alienation in case of necessity, even that limited power was not given to her in express terms Ratio
If the testator had before his mind's eye his daughter and her heirs as the ultimate beneficiaries of his bounty, that intention could only be achieved by giving to the widow a limited estate, because by conferring a full Hindu widow's estate on her the daughter will, only have a mere spes successions under the Hindu l...
It is significant that the testator did not say in the will that the daughter will enjoy only the properties left indisposed of by the widow Ratio
The extent of the grant, so far as the properties mentioned in the schedule are concerned, to the daughter and the widow is the same Ratio
Just as the widow was directed to enjoy tile entire properties mentioned in the schedule during her lifetime in like manner the daughter and her heirs were also directed to enjoy the same properties with absolute rights from generation to generation Ratio
They could not enjoy the same properties in the manner directed if the widow had a full Hindu widow's estate and had the power for any purpose to dispose of them and did so Ratio
If that was the intention, the testator would clearly have said that the daughter would only take the properties remaining after the death of the widow Ratio
The widow cannot be held to have been given a full Hindu widow's estate under the will unless it can be said that under its terms she was given the power of alienation for necessary purposes, whether in express terms or by necessary implication Ratio
As above pointed out, admittedly power of alienation in express terms was not conferred on her Ratio
It was argued that such a power was implicit within the acts she was authorized to do, that is to say, when she was directed to pay the debts and settle the maintenance of Ramalakshmi it was implicit within these directions that for these purposes, if necessity arose, she could alienate the properties ARG
This suggestion in the surrounding circumstances attending the execution of this will cannot be sustained RPC
The properties disposed of by the will and mentioned in the schedule were considerable in extent and it seems that they fetched sufficient income to enable the widow to fulfil the obligations under the will Ratio
Indeed we find that within four years of the death of the testator the widow was able to pay a lump sum of Rs Ratio
3,350 in cash to the daughter-in-law without alienating any part of the immovable properties and presumably by this time she had discharged all the debts Ratio
It is not shown that she alienated a single item of immovable property till the year 1945, a period of over 21 years after the death of her husband, excepting one, which she alienated in the year 1937 to raise a sum of Rs Ratio
1,000 in order to buy some land Ratio
By this transaction she substituted one property by another Ratio
For the purpose of her maintenance, for payment of debts etc., and for settling the claim of the daughter-in-law she does not appear to have felt any necessity to make any alienation of any part of the estate mentioned in the schedule and the testator in all likelihood knew that she could fulfil these obligations witho...
In this situation the inference that the testator must have of necessity intended to confer on the widow power of alienation for those limited purposes cannot be raised Ratio
In our opinion, even if that suggestion is accepted that for the limited purposes mentioned in the will the widow could alienate, this power would fall far short of the powers that a Hindu widow enjoys under Hindu law Ratio
Under that law she has the power to alienate the estate for the benefit of the soul of the husband, for pilgrimage and for the benefit of the estate and for other authorized purposes Ratio
It cannot be said that a Hindu widow can only alienate her husband's estate for payment of debts, to meet maintenance charges and for her own maintenance Ratio
She represents the estate in all respects and enjoys very wide power except that she cannot alienate except for necessity and her necessities have to be judged on a variety of considerations Ratio
We therefore hold that the estate conferred on Ranganayaki Ammal was more like the limited estate in the English sense of the term than like a full Hindu widow's estate in spite of the directions above- mentioned RPC
She had complete control over the income of the property during her lifetime Ratio
but she had no power to deal with the corpus of the estate Ratio
and it had to be kept intact for the enjoyment of the daughter Ratio
Though the daughter was not entitled to immediate possession of the property it was indicated with certainty that she should get the entire estate at the proper time Ratio
and she thus got an interest in it on the testator's death Ratio
She was given a present right of future enjoyment in the property Ratio
According to Jarman (Jarman on Wills), the law leans in favour of vesting of estates and the property disposed of belongs to the object of the gift when the will takes effect and we think the daughter got under this will a vested interest in the testator's properties on his death Ratio
It was strenuously argued by Mr. K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar that Lakshminarayana Iyer was a Brahmin gentleman presumably versed in the sastras, living in a village in the southernmost part of the Madras State, that his idea of a restricted estate was more likely to be one analogous to a Hindu woman's estate than a life...
The learned counsel in support of his contention drew our attention to a number of decisions of different High Courts and contended that the words of this will should be construed in the manner as more or less similar words were construed by the courts in the wills dealt with in those decisions ARG
This rule of construction by analogy is a dangerous one to follow in construing wills differently worded and executed in different surroundings Ratio
Vide Sasiman v. Shib Narain 491 Ratio
A. 2 5 Ratio
However, out of respect for learned counsel on both sides who adopted the same method of approach we proceed to examine some of the important cases referred to by them Ratio
Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar sought to derive the greatest support for his contention from the decision in Ram Bahadur v. Jager PRE
Nath Prasad 3 Pat PRE
L. J. 199 PRE
The will there recited that if a daughter or son was born to the testator during his lifetime, such son or daughter would be the owner of all his properties but if there was no son or daughter, his niece S. would get a bequest of a lakh of rupees, and the rest of the movable and immovable properties would remain in pos...
The remainder was disposed of in the following words: - "If on the death of my wife and my niece there be living a son and a daughter born of the womb of my said brother's daughter, then two-thirds of the movable property will belong to the son and one-third to the daughter PRE
But as regards the immovable property none shall have the lest right of alienation PRE