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The appellants article 10 contention is not one that appears to have been advanced before Irwin J at first instance (certainly there is no mention of article 10 in his judgment). Ratio
Article 10 was, however, invoked in the Court of Appeal, indeed by both sides. Ratio
The BBC submitted that disclosure of the Report (and any other information held for the purposes of journalism) would have a chilling effect upon their right to freedom of expression; the appellant submitted that, subject only to narrow exceptions (none being applicable here), article 10 gives him a right of access to ...
The Court of Appeal, however, derived no assistance from article 10 either way, Moses LJ (at para 77) finding it impossible to identify within the jurisprudence any pointer for or against the rival contentions. ARG
Before this Court Mr Eicke QC has vigorously returned to article 10 and advances what is essentially a two stage argument. ARG
First, he contends, in reliance principally upon a trilogy of Strasbourg decisions Matky v Czech Republic (Application No 19101/03) (unreported) 10 July 2006, (Matky), Tarsasag A Szabadsagjogokert v Hungary (2009) 53 EHRR 130 (14 April 2009) (Tarsasag), and Kenedi v Hungary (Application No 31475/05) (unreported) 26 Aug...
Secondly he submits that such interference is not necessary in a democratic society so as to be justified under article 10(2). ARG
He not only disputes that the release of the Report would have a chilling effect on freedom of expression but submits that only the need to protect journalistic sources or perhaps, indeed, more narrowly still, the need to protect sources who might otherwise be deterred from assisting journalists would constitute an ove...
Before turning to the trilogy of decisions upon which the appellant mainly relies it is helpful first to note the well-established body of Strasbourg jurisprudence which is recognised to define, generally speaking, the nature and extent of the right under article 10(1) to receive . . . Ratio
information and ideas without interference by public authority. Ratio
It is sufficient for present purposes to cite a short passage from the unanimous Grand Chamber decision in Roche v United Kingdom (2005) 42 EHRR 599 at para 172: The Court reiterates its conclusion in Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433 and in Gaskin v United Kingdom (1989) 12 EHRR 36 and, more recently, confirmed in Gu...
disseminate information of its own motion. Ratio
It is right to observe, before moving on, that the circumstances of those particular cases were that the applicants were attempting to obtain information respectively about their being regarded as a security risk (Leander), about their childhood (Gaskin), about a chemical factory (Guerra) and about long-past Porton Dow...
I come then to the first of the trilogy of cases on which the appellant so strongly relies: Matky. Ratio
The complainant there was seeking, against the background of a general right to information under the Czech legal system, access to documentation concerning the construction of a new nuclear power station and in particular was challenging a requirement of the domestic legislation (article 133 of the Building Act) that ...
The Court accepted that the rejection of his request constituted an interference with the complainants right to receive information. Ratio
But it held that the decision could not be considered arbitrary, recognised that Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in this area and unanimously rejected the complaint as manifestly ill-founded. Ratio
Matky seems accordingly an unpromising foundation upon which to build any significant departure from what may be called the Roche approach to the freedom to receive information protected by article 10. Ratio
Nevertheless, in Tarsasag (the second in the appellants trilogy of cases) it was to Matky that the Second Section of the Court referred as (the sole) authority for the proposition that, the Leander line of authority notwithstanding, the Court has recently advanced towards a broader interpretation of the notion of freed...
In Tarsasag the court upheld a complaint by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union that a refusal by the Constitutional Court to grant them access to an MPs pending complaint as to the constitutionality of certain proposed amendments to the Criminal Code breached its article 10 right to receive information. Ratio
The Government having accepted that there had been an interference with the applicants article 10 rights, Mr Eicke relies in particular upon the following passage in the Courts judgment: [The Court] considers that the present case essentially concerns an interference by virtue of the censorial power of an information m...
Moreover, the states obligations in matters of freedom of the press include the elimination of barriers to the exercise of press functions where, in issues of public interest, such barriers exist solely because of an information monopoly held by the authorities. Ratio
(para 36) Ratio
Kenedi, the third in the trilogy of cases, was decided just four months after Tarsasag, also by the Second Section of the Court (including six of the same seven judges who had decided Tarsasag). Ratio
The applicant there was a historian specialising in the functioning of the secret services of dictatorships. Ratio
Although a succession of domestic court judgments had held him to be entitled to access to various documents for research purposes, the Ministry had refused to disclose them. Ratio
Once again, hardly surprisingly in this case, the government conceded that there had been an interference with the applicants article 10 rights. Ratio
The Court had no difficulty in finding in the result a violation of article 10: the Court cannot but conclude that the obstinate reluctance of the respondent States authorities to comply with the execution orders was in defiance of domestic law and tantamount to arbitrariness. Ratio
In my judgment these three cases fall far short of establishing that an individuals article 10(1) freedom to receive information is interfered with whenever, as in the present case, a public authority, acting consistently with the domestic legislation governing the nature and extent of its obligations to disclose infor...
Of course, every public authority has in one sense the censorial power of an information monopoly in respect of its own internal documents. Ratio
But that consideration alone cannot give rise to a prima facie interference with article 10 rights whenever the disclosure of such documents is refused. Ratio
Such a view would conflict squarely with the Roche approach. Ratio
The appellants difficulty here is not that Mr Sugar was not exercising the functions of a social watchdog, like the press. Ratio
(Perhaps he was.) The Jewish Chronicle would be in no different or better position. Ratio
The appellants difficulty to my mind is rather that article 10 creates no general right to freedom of information and where, as here, the legislation expressly limits such right to information held otherwise than for the purposes of journalism, it is not interfered with when access is refused to documents which are hel...
True it is, as Lord Judge CJ noted when giving the judgment of the Court in Independent News and Media Ltd v A [2010] 1 WLR 2262 (para 42), that the Venice Commission has described Tarsasag as a landmark decision on the relation between freedom of information and the . . . Ratio
Convention. Ratio
Whatever else might be said about Mr Eickes trilogy of cases, however, they cannot to my mind be said to support his first proposition having regard to the particular relationship between the parties in this case. Ratio
I should perhaps add for the sake of completeness that there is absolutely nothing in Independent News and Media Ltd v A, still less in R (Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (No 2) [2011] QB 218, to support Mr Eickes reliance on article 10 in the present context. Ratio
It follows that for my part I would hold that the appellants article 10 case fails at the first stage. Ratio
There was no interference here with Mr Sugars freedom to receive information. Ratio
The Act not having conferred upon him any relevant right of access to information, he had no such freedom. Ratio
Even were that not so, however, I would reject the second stage of Mr Eickes argument too. Ratio
Even were one to start with the supposition that any refusal by a public authority to disclose information involves a prima facie interference with a persons freedom to receive that information, it seems to me open to the State to legislate, as here, a blanket exclusion of any requirement to disclose information held (...
The appellants contrary argument fixes in particular upon a line of Strasbourg cases concerned essentially with journalistic sources: Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123, Nordisk Film and TV A/S v Denmark (Application No 40485/02) (8 December 2005) and Sanoma Uitgevers BV v The Netherlands (Application No 38224...
What must be recognised, however, is that in each of these cases it was the journalists who were the complainants, that what they were complaining about were domestic court orders requiring disclosure of their sources or research material, and that the starting point for the Strasbourg Courts consideration of these com...
The applicant in Goodwin succeeded on the basis that he had been ordered to reveal the identity of a person who had provided him with information on an unattributable basis. PRE
The applicant in Nordisk failed because on the particular facts of that case (which it is not here necessary to rehearse) the applicant was not being ordered to disclose its journalistic source of information but rather part of its research material and that, even though the latter may have a chilling effect on the exe...
The applicant company in Sanoma succeeded because there was an order for the compulsory surrender of journalistic material containing information capable of identifying journalistic sources, an interference with its article 10 rights which the Court there held was not prescribed by law: the quality of the law was defic...
(para 100) PRE
Helpful though these cases may be, however, in explaining the limitations placed upon a journalists prima facie right to protect both his sources and his research material from compulsory court orders for their disclosure, they say little if anything about what other interests and concerns may properly be invoked by jo...
To my mind it stands to reason that the disclosure of a document such as the Report would be likely to affect the candour of any similar future report. Ratio
As the Information Tribunal itself found in the present case (at para 116): Self-critical review and analysis of output is a necessary part of safeguarding and enhancing quality. Ratio
The necessary frankness of such internal analysis would be damaged if it were to be written in an anodyne fashion, as would be likely to be the case if it were potentially disclosable to a rival broadcaster. Ratio
(Or, one may add, to anyone else.) In short I would reject also the second stage of the appellants argument: the contention that section 3 of the Human Rights Act should be invoked here to limit the information stipulated by the Act to be undisclosable through being held for the purposes of journalism merely to that he...
I turn then briefly to the question whether, in a case where information is held partly for journalistic and partly for non-journalistic purposes, it is necessary to ask which purpose is predominant and to disclose any information held predominantly for non-journalistic purposes. Ratio
I conclude, in common with Lord Phillips and Lord Walker (and, indeed, with the Court of Appeal), but in respectful disagreement with Lord Wilson, that the answer is No. My reasons being essentially the same as those given by both Lord Phillips and Lord Walker (although perhaps more particularly those of Lord Walker), ...
Really it comes to this. Ratio
With regard both to the BBC (together with the three other listed broadcasters) and the Bank of England, Parliament, for differing but in each case compelling reasons of national interest, was concerned not to subject these institutions to the operation of the Act including, for example, the need to resort to Part II o...
In the case of the BBC and other broadcasters it is only in respect of information held for purposes other than those of journalism, art or literature. Ratio
In the event that information is held to any significant degree (and we are all agreed that the de minimis principle would otherwise apply) for the purposes of journalism, then to my mind it would seem artificial and impermissible to construe the Act as applying to that information. Ratio
Quite simply, it remains information held for the purposes of journalism and therefore constitutes (within the meaning of section 7) other information than information held for purposes other than those of journalism. Ratio
The mere fact that it may be held (even perhaps to a predominant extent) also for purposes other than those of journalism cannot sensibly serve to enlarge the basic category of information in respect of which the BBC is listed and with regard to which, therefore, the Act is not disapplied by section 7. Ratio
In short, like Lord Walker, I find that the natural construction of the Act, and Parliaments evident concern to ensure that the interests of free expression trump without more those of freedom of information, supports the BBCs case on this issue. RPC
As for the point at which information will cease to be held to any significant degree for the purposes of journalism and become held instead, say, solely for archival purposes, that necessarily will depend on the facts of any particular case and involve a question of judgment. RPC
I too agree with Lord Walker that the central question to be asked in such a context will be, not which purpose is predominant, but rather whether there remains any sufficiently direct link between the BBCs continuing holding of the information and the achievement of its journalistic purposes. RPC
I too would dismiss this appeal. RPC
The question on this appeal is whether the Balen Report commissioned by the BBC in relation to its Middle Eastern coverage and completed in July 2004 constituted information held for purposes other than those of journalism, art or literature (within Part VI of Schedule 1 to the Freedom of Information Act 2000). Ratio
The appeal falls to be approached on the basis that the Report was at the material time held predominantly for journalistic but partly also for other purposes. Ratio
The material time was in 2005, when Mr Sugar first requested disclosure of the Report. Ratio
I agree with the other members of the Court that this appeal should be dismissed. Ratio
However, there is a difference in the basis upon which different members of the Court would dismiss it. Ratio
Lord Wilson would only dismiss it on the basis that the critical test is whether the BBC held the Report predominantly for the purposes of journalism. Ratio
Were this not the test, he would have regarded the existence of other not insignificant purposes as sufficient to mean that the Report was held for purposes other than those of journalism, art or literature, and so disclosable. Ratio
The other members of the Court take an opposite view: once it is established that the BBC held the Report for purposes of journalism, art or literature, the Report was exempt from disclosure, and would have been even had these not been the predominant purposes for which it was held. Ratio
The rival arguments on this point are finely balanced, and its resolution in the present appeal on the basis of sparse facts causes me a certain concern. Ratio
However, after some hesitation, I have come to the conclusion that the test applied by Lords Phillips, Walker and Brown is to be preferred. Ratio
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 reflects the value to be attached to transparency and openness in the workings of public authorities in modern society, and its provisions should be construed in as liberal a manner as possible: Common Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner [2008] UKHL 47, [2008] 1 WLR 1...
But, as Lord Walker notes (para 77), Lord Hope went on to add that that proposition must not be applied too widely, and special considerations may lead to restrictions. Ratio
In the present case, the special consideration to which the legislator gave effect was the freedom of the BBC as a public service broadcaster in relation to its journalistic, artistic and literary output. Ratio
Information held for any such purposes of journalism, art or literature was absolutely exempt from disclosure. Ratio
The legislator was not content with the more qualified protection from disclosure, often depending on a balancing exercise or evaluation, which would anyway have been available under section 2, read with sections 28, 29, 36, 41 and 43. Ratio
To read into the words information held for purposes other than those of journalism, art or literature a need to evaluate whether such purposes were dominant seems to me unjustified. Ratio
I share Lord Walkers view (para 79) that the real emphasis of the words is on what is not disclosable, so that the exemption applies, without more, if the information is held for any journalistic, artistic or literary purpose. Ratio
That conclusion is to my mind also fortified by consideration of the exemption relating to certain functions of the Bank of England. Ratio
Lord Phillips discusses the position regarding archived material. Ratio
We were not given any clear picture when or on what basis archiving might occur. Ratio
I assume that the reference is to material not envisaged as having any current purpose, but stored for historical purposes or against the possibility of some unforeseen need to revisit, or produce evidence of, past events. Ratio
A library maintained for current reference would in contrast contain material held for the purposes of journalism, art or literature. Ratio
I agree with Lord Browns analysis of the current state of Strasbourg authority, and also with Lord Wilsons comment in para 59 on the decisions (or dicta) in Ullah and Al-Skeini. RPC
Nothing in the Strasbourg jurisprudence calls us to do anything but give effect in this case to what we consider to be the proper construction of the 2000 Act under ordinary domestic principles. RPC
It is unnecessary to say more, or to add to recent debate about the nature of the Convention rights in the United Kingdom or the domestic courts role in interpreting and applying them taking into account any relevant Strasbourg case-law. RPC
I agree with Lord Browns analysis of the current state of Strasbourg authority, and also with Lord Wilsons comment in para 59 on the decisions (or dicta) in Ullah and Al-Skeini. RPC
Nothing in the Strasbourg jurisprudence calls us to do anything but give effect in this case to what we consider to be the proper construction of the 2000 Act under ordinary domestic principles. RPC
It is unnecessary to say more, or to add to recent debate about the nature of the Convention rights in the United Kingdom or the domestic courts role in interpreting and applying them taking into account any relevant Strasbourg case-law. RPC
On 29 January 1981 Mr Jivraj and Mr Hashwani entered into a joint venture agreement (the JVA), containing an arbitration clause which provided that, in the event of a dispute between them which they were unable to resolve, that dispute should be resolved by arbitration before three arbitrators, each of whom should be a...
The principal question in this appeal is whether that arbitration agreement became void with effect from 2 December 2003 under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/1660) (the Regulations) on the ground that it constituted an unlawful arrangement to discriminate on grounds of religion w...
The JVA FAC
The JVA was established to make investments in real estate around the world. FAC
By article 9 it is expressly governed by English law. FAC