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Another instance of similar 721 legislation is to be found in section 17 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 195 1, which after stating that any proceeding before the competent officer or the appellate officer shall be judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 of the Indian Penal Code ... |
The uses exactly similar words in section 26. Ratio |
That section first confers on every officer appointed under the Act the same powers in respect of certain specified matter, , for the purpose of making any enquiry or hearing any appeal under the Act as are vested in a Civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure and then proceeds thus "any proceeding before any such ... |
" Similarly, the after providing in sub section (3) of section 11 that every enquiry or investigation by a Board, Court, Labour Court. Ratio |
Tribunal or National Tribunal, shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 of the Indian Penal Code adds in sub section (8) of the same section the provision that "every Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of ... |
" This sub section was added in 1950. Ratio |
In clear contrast with these are the statutes which after saying that certain proceedings shall be judicial proceeding refrain from adding that the authority will be deemed to be a court. Ratio |
One such statute is the , which in section 171A(4) lays down that every enquiry under that section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 of the Indian Penal Code and stops there. Ratio |
A somewhat similar provision, though in different phraseology, appears in section 51 of the Administra tor General 's Act, (111 of 1913) which runs thus:134 159 S.C. 46 722 "Whoever, during any examination authorised by this Act, makes upon oath a statement which is false and which he either knows or believes to be fal... |
The learned Solicitor General, who appealed before us on behalf of the appellant, strongly urged that if the inten tion of the legislature had ever been that the Income tax Officer or other authorities mentioned in section 37 should be deemed to be a court for the purpose of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedur... |
In any case, argues learned counsel, when in 1956 the old section 37 was wholly recast the Parliament which at least then had before it a well established pattern of legislative forms in the numerous statutes mentioned above for expressing an intention that an authority shall be deemed to be a court for the purpose of ... |
In our opinion, there is considerable force in this argument. Ratio |
On behalf of the accused respondent Mr. Desai suggets that the words actually used, viz., "that proceeding before the authority shall be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 of the Indian Penal Code" were by themselves sufficient to give effect to an intention that authority shall als... |
For this proposition we can find no support either in principle or authority. Ratio |
It seems clear to us on the contrary ;that proceedings before tribunals which are quasi judicial and not a court may well be considered to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. Ratio |
Though the words "judicial proceeding" have been used in numerous sections of the Indian 723 Penal Code, it has not defined the words, though the words court of justice" as also the words "a judge" have been de fined. Ratio |
The Code of Criminal Procedure in which also the phrase "judicial proceeding" occurs in several sections has ,defined it in section 4(m) thus: "Judicial proceeding includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath". Ratio |
This definition of judicial pro ceeding was included in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, from the very beginning. Ratio |
The fact that for all these years since 1898 Parliament has not thought fit to give any definition of the words "judicial proceeding" in the Indian Penal Code is some justification for thinking that the words "judicial proceeding" in the Indian Penal Code may reason ably be held to have the same meaning as in the Code ... |
In other words, it would be reasonable to think that in the Indian Penal Code also the word "judicial proceeding" has been used to include "any pro ceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. Ratio |
" That would bring within the meaning of the words "judicial proceeding before many quasi judicial authorities which are not courts, e.g., a ,Customs Officer or a Sales Tax Officer. Ratio |
It is unnecessary for our present purpose to attempt an exact definition of the words "judicial proceeding" as used in section 193 or in any other section of the Indian Penal Code. Ratio |
Even without any such definition however it appears clear that the phrase "judicial proceeding ' is wide enough to include not only proceedings before courts but proceedings before certain other tribunals. Ratio |
It is pertinent to point out that if a proceeding before any other authority except a court could not be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, it would not have been necessary for Parliament in the Evacuee Property Act, 1950, in the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1950, an... |
It is especially interesting to note in this connection the provisions of section 11(3) and section 11(8) of the to which we have already referred. Ratio |
Under section 11(3) as originally enacted every enquiry or investigation by a Board, Court or Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Ratio |
When Parliament added to this section sub section (8) what was enacted was that every tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose of section 480 and section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. Ratio |
After the amendment by the Act 36 of 1956 the concluding portion of section 11 (3) ran thus : "Every enquiry or investigation by a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 of the Indian Penal Code. STA |
" The same Act substituted in section 8 the words "Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal" for the words "Tribunal". Ratio |
In spite of the fact however that every enquiry or investigation by a Board has to be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 of the Indian Penal Code Parliament refrained from saying that a Board shall also be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose of section 480 and se... |
This emphasises the fact that the legislature did not think that the necessary effect of legislating that a proceeding before an authority shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 of the Indian Penal Code would be that authority shall also be deemed to be a court. Ra... |
To say now that the legislature in providing in section 37(4) of the Indian Income tax Act that a proceeding before the specified authorities shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, intended also to say that such authority shall be deemed t... |
Learned counsel for the accused respondent then drew our attention to the use of the words "judicial proceeding" in section 476 and section 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 725 and argued that in these sections the words "judicial pro ceeding" have been used as equivalent to proceeding in a court. Ratio |
That may well be so. Ratio |
Section 476 lays down proce ure in cases mentioned in section 195(1)(b) and (c) of offences that appear to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in a court. Ratio |
It was quite correct therefore to refer to such proceeding in a later part of the section as judicial proceeding. Ratio |
Section 479A lays down the procedure in certain cases of offences of giving false evidence in civil, revenue or criminal courts and necessarily speaks of the proceeding before those courts as judicial proceeding. Ratio |
It is difficult to see how the use of the words "judicial proceeding" in these sections support the contention that "judicial proceeding" can only be a proceeding before a court. Ratio |
There can be no doubt that every proceeding before a court is a "judicial proceeding". Ratio |
It does not follow however that every judicial proceeding is a proceeding before a court. Ratio |
Mr. Desai drew a grim picture of what would happen if the authority a proceeding before which was deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 228 of the Indian Penal Code was not at the same time considered a court within the meaning of section 195. Ratio |
He rightly points out that one consequence will be that if any person offers any insult or causes any obstruction to a public servant when he is sitting in any such judicial proceeding and thus commits an offence under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code it will be possible for persons other than the public servants t... |
This, says the learned counsel, would be a very undesirable thing. Ratio |
We fail to see why this should be considered to be undesirable. Ratio |
But assuming this is so, that is not to our mind a consideration which should compel us to give the words "judicial proceeding" a meaning which they do not bear. Ratio |
It may be mentioned here, as already stated, that under section 171A(4) of the Sea Customs Act, 1874, every enquiry before a Custom Officer "shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 of the 726 Indian Penal Code". Ratio |
In spite of this, the Constitution Bench of this Court held in its recent decision in Indo China Steam Navigation, Co. Ltd. vs The Additional Collector of customs(1) that a Customs Officer is not even a Tribunal. Ratio |
After discussig several previous decisions of this Court Gajendragadkar C.J., speaking for the Court observed thus: "The result therefore is that it is no longer open to doubt that the Customs Officer is not a court ' or tribunal. Ratio |
" It is difficult to see how if the presence of the words "shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 of the Indian Penal Code" in section 171A(4) have not the effect of making a Customs Officer a court or a tribunal, the presence of similar words in section 37(4) in t... |
In our opinion, the words used in section 37(4) of the Income tax Act furnish no reason to alter the legal position that is inescapable on a consideration of the functions of the Income tax Officer that he is not a court within the meaning of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Ratio |
We would therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and direct that the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, should now dispose of the case in accordance with law. RPC |
ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, this appeal fails and is dismissed. RPC |
Appeal No. 19 of 1964. FAC |
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 29, 1963, of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal No. 214 of 1962. FAC |
section Mohan Kumar amagalam, M. N. Rangachari, R. K. Garg, M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant. FAC |
R. Ganapathy Iyer, for respondents Nos. 2 and 3. FAC |
A. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for respondent No. 4. FAC |
M. C. Setalvad, N. C. Krishna Iyengar and 0. FAC |
C. Mathur, for Intervener. FAC |
March 5, 1964. FAC |
The judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J. FAC |
The short but important point of law which has been raised for our decision in this appeal by special leave is whether G.O. No. 1298 issued by the Gov ernment of Madras on April 28, 1956 in exercise of its powers conferred by section 43A of the (Central Act IV of 1939) (hereinafter called the Act) inserted by the Madra... |
Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam who appears for the appellant contends that the impugned Government order is invalid for the simple reason that it is outside the purview of section 43A. FAC |
The impugned order was issued as early as 1956 and since then, its validity 3 has never been impeached in judicial proceedings. FAC |
Litigation in regard to the grant of permits under the relevant provisions of the Act has figured prominently in the Madras High Court in the form of writ petitions invoking the said High Court 's jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution and several aspects of the impugned order have come to be examined. Rati... |
The echoes of such litigation have frequently been heard in this Court and this Court has had occasion to deal with the impugned order, its character, its scope and its effect , but on no occasion in the past, the validity of the order appears to have been questioned. Ratio |
The legislative and judicial background of the order and the course of judicial decisions in regards to the points raised in the enforcement of this order would prima facie and at the first blush suggest that the attack against the validity of the order may not be wellfounded and that would tend to make the initial jud... |
But Mr. Kumaramangalam contends that section 43A under which the order purports to have been passed would clearly show that the said order is outside the purview of the authority conferred on the State Government and is therefore invalid. ARG |
It is obvious that if this contention is upheld, its impact on the administration of the system adopted in the State of Madras for granting permits under the Act would be very great and so though the question lies within a narrow compass, it needs to be very carefully examined. Ratio |
The facts which lead to the present appeal conform to the usual pattern of the permit litigation in which the grant or refusal to grant a permit is chal lenged under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226. FAC |
The appellant B. Rajagopala Naidu is a bus operator in the State of Madras and he runs a number of buses on various routes. FAC |
On June 26, 1956, the State Transport Authority by a notification invited applications for the grant of two stage carriage permits on the route Madras to Krishnagiri. FAC |
The buses on this route were to be run as express service. FAC |
The appellant and 117 bus operators including respondents 2 and 3 D. Rajabahar Mudaliar, proprietor of Sri Sambandamoorthy Bus Service and K. H. Hanumantha Rao, proprietor of Jeevajyoti Bus Service respectively, submitted applications for the two permits in question. FAC |
The State Transport Authority considered the said applications on the merits. FAC |
In doing so, it proceeded to award marks in accordance with the principles prescribed by the impugned order and came to the conclusion that the appellant satisfied the requirements enunciated by the State Transport Authority for running an efficient bus service on this long route, and so, it granted the two permits to ... |
L/P(D)1SCI 1(a) 4 Against this decision, 18 appeals were preferred by the unsuccessful applicants including respondents 2 and 3. FAC |
All these appeals were heard together by the State Transport Ap pellate Tribunal, Madras in June 1959. FAC |
It appears that before the appeals were thus heard, the State Government had superseded the principles enunciated in the order in so far as they related to the grant of stage carriage permits and had issued another direction under section 43A known as G.O. 2265 on August 9, 1958. FAC |
Incidentally, it may be added that by this order, different criteria had been prescribed for selection and a different marking system had been devised. FAC |
The Appellate Tribunal considered the claims of the rival bus operators and allotted marks in accordance with the principles laid down by the earlier order. FAC |
As a result, respondents 2 and 3 secured the highest marks and their appeals were allowed, the order under appeal was set aside and two permits were granted to them. FAC |
This order was passed on July 4, 1959. FAC |
The appellant then invoked the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court under article 226 of the Constitution by this writ petition No. 692 of 1959. FAC |
In his writ petition the ap pellant challenged the validity of the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal on several grounds. FAC |
One of them was that the impugned order on which the decision of the Appellate Tribunal was based, was invalid. FAC |
This plea along with the other contentions raised by the appellant failed and the learned Single Judge who heard his writ petition dismissed the petition, on October 18, 1962. RLC |
The appellant then challenged the correctness of this decision by a Letters Patent Appeal No. 214 of 1962 before a Division Bench of the said High Court. FAC |
The Division Bench, however, agreed with the view taken by the Single Judge and dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the appellant. RLC |
The appellant then moved the said High Court for leave, but failed to secure it, and that brought him here with an application for special leave which was granted on November 14, 1963. FAC |
It is with this special leave that the appellant has brought this appeal before us for final disposal. FAC |
Before dealing with the points raised by the appellant, it is necessary to consider the background of the impugned order, and that takes us to the decision of the Madras High Court in Sri Rama Vilas Service Ltd. vs The Road Traffic Board, Madras, by its Secretary(1). Ratio |
In that case, the appellant had challenged the validity of a Government order No. 3898 which had been issued by the Madras Government on December 9, 1946. Ratio |
This order purported to direct the transport authorities to issue only temporary permits as the Government intended to nationalise motor transport. Ratio |
Accordingly, instruction No. 2 in the said order had provided that when (1) 5 applications were made for new routes or new timings in existing routes, then small units should be preferred to old ones. Ratio |
In accordance with this instruction, when the application for permit made by the appellant, Sri Rama Vilas Service was rejected, the order stated that it so rejected in the interests of the public generally under section 47(1)(a) of the Act. Ratio |
The appellant preferred , in ' appeal against the order to the Central Board namely the Provincial Transport Authority which had been constituted by the Government under section 44 of the Act. Ratio |
His appeal failed and so, he moved the Madras High Court under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act for an order directing the respondent the Road Traffic Board, Madras to consider the application of the appellant in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder for renewal of the permit for ... |
The High Court held that G. O. No. 3898 was in direct conflict with the proviso to section 58 sub section Ratio |
(2) of the Act, and so, was invalid. Ratio |
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