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It is true that the first investigation was not in accordance with law, but it is no sense non est. Ratio
Investigation, as held by this Court in section N. Bose vs State of Bihar(1), includes the laying of trap. Ratio
That part of the investigation was, admittedly done by the Dy. Ratio
The statements recorded by the Dy. Ratio
S.P. in the course of his investigation ' though the investigation in question was illegal, (see, H . PRE
N. Rishbud vs the State of Delhi(2), are still statements recorded by a police officer in the course of investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure and consequently they fall within the scope of sections 161 and 162 of the said Code. PRE
Neither in Rishbud 's case(2) nor in section N. Bose 's case(), where investigations had been carried on in contravention of section 5 A of the Prevention Corruption Act, this Court considered those investigations as non est. STA
Both the trial court and the High Court have accepted the evidence of Ramanlal and Dahyabhai in preference to that of Madhukanta that the first appellant was in possession of the postcard in question on February 18, 1963. Ratio
This is essentially a finding of fact. Ratio
In our judgment in coming to that conclusion those courts did not ignore any legal principle. Ratio
It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants were convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of Ramanlal, the Dy.S.P. Erulker and Santramji, who, according to him, are all interested witnesses and their evidence not having been corroborated by any independent evidence, the sam...
Before examining this contention it may be mentioned that so far as Dahyabhai was concerned, he appeared to have turned hostile to the prosecution at the trial. Ratio
He supported the evidence of Ramanlal in some respects; but in most important respects he did not support the prosecution case. Ratio
He admitted (1) Cr.A.109/1967,decided on March26,1968. Ratio
(2) 11955] 1 S.C.R. 1150. Ratio
28 to have accompanied Ramanlal both in the morning and on the evening of the 18th. Ratio
He also admitted that he and Ramanlal met a police Sub Inspector in the police station who showed them the postcard written by Ramanlal to Madhukanta. Ratio
He also corroborated Ramanlal about the talk that Ramanlal had with that Sub Inspector, in connection with the payment of bribe. Ratio
But when it came to the question of identifying that Sub Inspector, he denied that it was the first appellant. Ratio
He also did not identify the second appellant. Ratio
It was obvious that the had been gained over. Ratio
So far as Sanghvi is concerned, he admitted that a police constable in uniform came to his shop on the evening of the 18th and changed a ten rupee corrency note. Ratio
But he stated that he was not able to say whether that constable was the second appellant. Ratio
Sendhalal deposed that a person came to him on the evening of the 18th and changed three 'ten rupee currency notes. Ratio
He also stated that he was unable to say whether it was the second appellant who changed those notes; he went a step further and stated that the person who came to his shop was not in uniform. Ratio
But the fact remains that the currency notes seized from the shops of Sanghvi and Sendhalal are the very notes whose numbers had been earlier noted by the Dy. Ratio
S.P. and further treated with anthracene. Ratio
There is the evidence of constable Santramji to establish that the notes in question were changed at the shops of Sanghvi and Sendhalal by the second appellant. Ratio
The trial court as well as the High Court accepted the evidence of Dahyabhai, Sanghvi and Sendhalal to the extent it supported the prosecution case and rejected the rest. Ratio
It was open for those courts to do so. Ratio
Now coming back to the contention that the appellants could not have been convicted solely on the basis of the evidence of Ramanlal and the police witnesses, we are of opinion that it is an untenable contention. Ratio
The utmost that can be said against Ramanlal, the Dy.S.P., Erulker and Santramji is that they are partisan witnesses as they were interested in the success of the trap laid by them. Ratio
It cannot be said and it was not said that they were accomplices. Ratio
Therefore, the law does not require that their evidence should be corroborated before being accepted as sufficient to found a conviction. Ratio
This position is placed beyond controversy by the decision of this Court in the State of Bihar vs Basawan Singh(1), wherein this Court laid down, overruling the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh vs State of Vindhya Pra desh (2) that where the witnesses are not accomplices but are merely partisan or interested witnesse...
We are unable to agree that any different rule was laid down in Major E. G. Barsay vs The State of Bombay(1). PRE
It must be remembered that the decision in Basawan Singh 's case(1) was given by a Bench of Five Judges and that decision was binding on the Bench that decided Major Barasay 's case(1). Ratio
Some of the observations in Major Barasay 's case(1) no doubt support the contention of the appellants. Ratio
But those observations must be confined to the peculiar facts of that case. Ratio
It is now well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that while in the case of evidence of an accomplice, no conviction can be based on his evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars but as regards the evidence of a partisan witness it is open to a court to convict an accused person solely on t...
But it may in appropriate case look for corroboration. Ratio
In the instant case, the trial court and the High Court have fully accepted the evidence of Ramanlal, the Dy. Ratio
S.P., Erulker and Santramji. Ratio
That being so, it was open to them to convict the appellants solely on the basis of their evidence. Ratio
That apart, their evidence is substantially corroborated by the evidence of Dahyabhai, Sanghvi and Sendhalal. Ratio
in the case of partisan witnesses, the corroboration that may be looked for is corroboration in a general way and not material corroboration as in the case of the evidence of accomplices. Ratio
It was next contended that even if we accept the prosecution case in full, no offence can be said to have been made out under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. ARG
We are unable to accept that contention. Ratio
To establish the offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code all that prosecution had to establish was that the appellants were public servants and that they had obtained illegal gratification for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of their official functions, favour or disfavour to Ramanlal. Ratio
If he had used his official position to extract illegal gratification the requirements of the law is satisfied. Ratio
This position is made clear by the decision of this Court in Mahesh Prasad vs The State of U.P. (3) and Dhaneshwar Narain Saxena vs The Delhi Administration (4). Ratio
Lastly we come to the question whether the prosecution was barred by section 161 (1) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 (Bombay Act 22 of 1951), which, to the extent material for our present purpose, says that in any case of alleged offences by a police officer or of a wrong alleged to have been done by such officer by any...
(2) ; (3) ; (4) ; 30 act done under colour or in excess of any such duty or authority as mentioned in that Act, the prosecution shall not be entertained or shall be dismissed if instituted, more than six months of the act complained of. Ratio
Admittedly, the prosecution in this case was instituted more than six months after February 18, 1963, the day on which illegal gratification was obtained. Ratio
In support of the contention that the prosecution is barred by limitation, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur vs The State of Mysore(1). PRE
Therein a head constable was charged under section 218 of the Indian Penal Code. PRE
The prosecution case was that on February 23, 1954 on receipt of some information that some persons were smuggling ganja, the headconstable arrested a person with a bundle containing 13 packets of ganja and seized them, and in the panchnama he incorrectly showed the seizure of nine packets of ganja, and that on the nex...
The allegation against the head constable was that the prepared a false report with the dishonest intention of saving the person concerned from whom the ganja was seized and who had been actually caught with ganja, from legal punishment. PRE
This Court held that under section 161 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, the words "under colour of duty" have been used to include acts done under the cloak of duty, even though not by virtue of the duty; that when the head constable prepared a false report he was using the existence of his legal duty as a cloak for his...
The rule laid down in that decision is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. Ratio
He by taking advantage of_that duty pre pared a false panchnama and false report and therefore it was held that what he did was under the colour of duty. Ratio
In the present case the appellants cannot be said to have received the bribe under the colour of their duty. Ratio
There was no connection between the duties to be performed by them and the receipt of the bribe in question. Ratio
The facts of the present case bear some similarity to the facts in the State of Andhra Pradesh vs N. Venugapol(2) and the rule laid down therein bears on the question under discussion. Ratio
This cannot be said to have been done under (1) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 6.(2) ; 31 colour of duty. Ratio
The charge against the second appellant is that he aided the first appellant in his illegal activity. Ratio
For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. RPC
The appellants who are on bail shall surrender forthwith to serve the remaining portion of the sentences imposed on them. RPC
Y.P. Appeal dismissed. RPC
Appeal No. 1630 of 1967. FAC
Appeal by special leave from the award dated April 28, 1967, of the Industrial Tribunal, Madras in Industrial Dispute No. 78 of 1966 and Civil Appeal No. 1721 of 1967. FAC
Appeal by special leave from the order dated July 14, 1967 of the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Mysore in A.I.D. No. 29 of 1966. FAC
E.C. Agarwala and Santosh Gupta, for the appellants (in C.A. No. 1630 of 1967). FAC
C.K. Daphtary, Attorney General, G. B. Pai, section K. Dholkia, and O. C. Mathur, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 1721 of 1967). FAC
M. K. Ramamurthi and M. V. Goswami, for respondent No. 1. FAC
(in C.A. No. 1630 of 1967). FAC
H. R. Gokhale, M. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for the respondents (in C.A. No. 1721 of 1967). FAC
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J. FAC
In Civil Appeal No. 1630 of 1967, workmen engaged by certain chilies and kirana shops in Madras and who were members of the respondent Union made a demand on December 13, 1965 for bonus for the year 1964 65 equivalent to four months ' wages. FAC
Conciliation proceedings having failed, the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras. FAC
In Civil Appeal No. 1721 of 1967, the appellant company is admittedly an establishment in public sector to which sec. FAC
20 of the , 21 of 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) does not apply. FAC
In both these cases, the Tribunals held that though the Act did not apply, in the first case by reason of sec.1(3) and in the other by reason of sec.32(x), the employees were entitled to claim bonus and awarded their claims in C.A. No. 1630 of 1967. FAC
The appeals by special leave challenge the correctness of the view taken by the Tribunals as to the scope and nature of the Act. FAC
The question for decision in both the appeals is whether in view of the non applicability of the Act to establishments, not being factories and which employ less than 20 persons therein as the appellants in appeal No. 1630 of 1967 are, and the exemption of employees in an establishment in public sector though employing...
The question depends upon the true view of certain provisions and the scope of the Act. Ratio
But before we take upon ourselves the burden of construing these, provisions, it is necessary to refer briefly to the history of the question of bonus, the back ground and the circumstances in which the Act was passed. Ratio
This Is Permissible for the limited purpose of appreciating the mischief Parliament had in mind and the remedy which it wanted to provide for preventing that mischief,and not for the purpose of aiding us in construing the provisions of the Act. Ratio
370 As early as 1584, in Heydao 's case(1) it was said that "for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general" four things are to be considered: (i) What was the common law before the making of the Act, (ii) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide, (iii) What remedy the ...
In Bengal Immunity Company Limited vs The State of Bihar(2) this Court approved the rule in Heydon 's case(1) and in construing article 2865 of the Constitution observed at p. 633 as follows : In order to properly interpret the provisions of that Article it is, therefore, necessary to consider how the matter stood imme...
In the Corporation of the City of Nagpur vs Its Employee(3) the question was as to the meaning of the word "industry" in sec 2(14) of the C.P. & Berar Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Act (23 of 1947). PRE
This Court said that "if the word were to be construed in its ordinary sense every calling, service, employment of an employee or any business, trade or calling of an employer would be an industry. PRE
But such a wide meaning appears to overreach the object for which the Act was passed". PRE
The Court, therefore, found it necessary to limit the scope of the said word having regard to the aim, scope and the object of the Act. PRE
Relying on the four tests laid down in Heydon 's case(1) the Court considered the fundamental basis of the definition of industry, viz. relationship between employees and employers, the long title and the, preamble of the Act showing the object of passing the Act the historical background for passing it and held that "...
Similarly in R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla vs The Union of India (4), the question arose whether looking to the general words used in sec 2(d) of the Prize Competitions Act, 42 of 1955 the words 'prize competition ' included not merely competitions of a gambling nature but also those in which success depended to a substanti...
In construing the said definition, the Court gave a restricted meaning to the words "prize competition" as meaning only competitions as were of a gambling` nature. Ratio
In doing so, the Court approved the principles of construction stated in the case of the Bengal Immunity Ltd.(1) and held that "in interpreting an enactment the Court should ascertain the intention of the legislature not merely from a literal meaning of the words used but also from such matters as the history of the le...
For considering the intention of Parliament not merely from the literal meaning of the definition in sec.2(d) but also from the history of the legislation the Court looked into the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competitions Control and Tax Act, 1948, how it could be and was evaded by the promoters of lotteries by shifting...
Having done that, the Court observed at p. 938 "Having regard to the circumstances under which the resolutions came to be passed, there cannot be any reasonable doubt that the, law which the State legislatures moved Parliament to enact under article 252(1) was one to control and regulate prize competitions of a gamblin...