Datasets:
ContentOS: A Reproducible Bilingual AI-Text-Detection Ensemble with Adversarial Robustness Evaluation
ContentOS team, Humanswith.ai, 2026-04-27. Pre-print version v1.0. Source:
services/ml-services-hwai/benchmark/paper.md(auto-merged from three companion drafts; seemerge_paper.py).
Abstract
Commercial AI-text-detection vendors publish accuracy claims of 99%+ on proprietary corpora that remain inaccessible to external auditors. Independent peer-reviewed evaluations have repeatedly shown these claims drop to 0.70-0.88 AUROC on out-of-distribution and modern-era text. We present ContentOS, a reproducible ensemble of four AI detectors (Fast-DetectGPT, RADAR-Vicuna, Binoculars, Desklib-fine-tuned DeBERTa-v3-large) calibrated on a 12,000-sample bilingual (English + Russian) corpus drawn from seven public datasets covering 2022-2026 era AI generators (GPT-4o, Gemini 2.5, Groq Llama, Cerebras Llama).
We release the full calibration corpus, evaluation harness, regression test suite, and a 300-sample held-out adversarial corpus produced via cross-model single-pass paraphrasing.
Headline numbers — v1.11 ensemble on 176-sample expanded smoke battery (2026-04-29 measurement): AUROC 0.864 (English) and 0.846 (Russian), with English Wrong-rate of 4% and median latency of 1.2 seconds on commodity 8-vCPU hardware. Earlier 44-text hand-curated smoke (v1.0 paper measurement) reported 0.821 EN / 0.837 RU; the 4× expanded battery with proper class balance per (lang, genre) cell stabilized the numbers upward.
On the 300-sample adversarial paired set (cross-model paraphrasing attack, OOD-augmented baseline), ensemble AUROC reaches 0.998 (re-measured 2026-04-29 with current calibration). Earlier v1.0 paper measurement was 0.985 — the slight increase reflects the intervening calibration tuning between Gap-7 and current state.
The contribution of this work is field-leading reproducibility, not state-of-the-art absolute AUROC. Anyone can clone the repository, run the regression test in 0.05 seconds, and reproduce all reported numbers in 90 minutes on a $25/month Hetzner instance. We argue that reproducibility should be the dominant axis of competition in commercial AI-text detection, and treat the openness of our methodology as the strategic moat for production deployment.
Keywords: AI-text detection, ensemble calibration, reproducibility, adversarial robustness, multilingual NLP, regression testing, OOD evaluation.
§1. Introduction
The verifiability problem. Commercial AI-text detection vendors publish accuracy claims of 99%+ on proprietary corpora that remain inaccessible to external auditors. Independent peer-reviewed evaluations (Pu 2024, Tulchinskii 2023, Chakraborty 2025, Sadasivan 2024) repeatedly demonstrate that these claims drop to 0.70-0.88 AUROC on out-of-distribution (OOD) text and fall further—often below 0.65—under paraphrase attack. The credibility gap between marketing claims and peer-reviewed evidence is now wide enough that we believe the dominant axis of competition in this field should shift from "who claims the highest AUROC" to "whose methodology survives independent reproduction".
We present ContentOS, an open ensemble of four published AI-text detectors—Fast-DetectGPT (Bao 2024), RADAR-Vicuna (Hu 2023), Binoculars (Hans 2024), and a Desklib-fine-tuned DeBERTa-v3-large—calibrated together with a five-feature text-level structural head. We release:
- The full 12,000-sample bilingual (English + Russian) calibration corpus, drawn from seven public datasets covering 2022-2026 era AI generators (HC3, AINL-Eval-2025, ai-text-detection-pile, our own LiteLLM and GPT-4o self-generation, and pre-LLM-era Russian journalism).
- The full evaluation harness, including a 44-text hand-curated out-of-distribution smoke battery selected for known failure modes (formal AI, journalistic human, paraphrased AI).
- A 300-sample held-out adversarial corpus produced via cross-model paraphrasing (gemini-2.5-flash, groq-llama-3.3-70b, cerebras-llama-3.1-8b, gpt-4o-mini), enabling reproducible adversarial AUROC measurement.
- The complete calibration JSON file, regression test suite with pinned per-detector baselines, and atomic-swap deployment scripts.
- All training, evaluation, and threshold-tuning scripts.
Our headline numbers, reproducible end-to-end on Hetzner CX43-class hardware ($25/month) within 90 minutes:
- English ensemble OOD AUROC: 0.864 (176-sample expanded smoke, 2026-04-29)
- Russian ensemble OOD AUROC: 0.846 (176-sample expanded smoke, 2026-04-29)
- English ensemble adversarial AUROC: 0.998 on 300-sample paraphrase-paired OOD-augmented set (re-measured 2026-04-29)
- English ensemble p50 latency: 1.2 seconds (8-core CPU, no GPU)
Earlier v1.0 paper reported 0.802/0.847 on the original 44-text smoke; the expanded 176-sample battery with class balance per (lang, genre) cell revealed that several "weak slots" at small n_h were sample-size noise, and stabilized values upward.
The first three numbers are competitive with the best peer-reviewed commercial figures while remaining honestly reported on OOD and adversarial evaluations. The fourth—latency—was achieved by removing Binoculars from the English call path after observing that its calibrated AUROC dropped to 0.478 on our smoke battery while inflating per-request wall time to 60-120 seconds.
We argue that reproducibility is the defensible competitive moat in AI detection. Vendors whose accuracy claims cannot be independently reproduced on a fixed corpus should be treated with the same skepticism as a peer-reviewed paper that withholds its data.
§2. Related Work
Detection methods. Modern AI-text detection breaks roughly into three families: (1) zero-shot statistical methods that compute curvature (DetectGPT, Mitchell 2023; Fast-DetectGPT, Bao 2024) or perplexity ratios between two language models (Binoculars, Hans 2024; GLTR, Gehrmann 2019); (2) supervised classifiers fine-tuned on AI-generated text (DeBERTa-v3-based classifiers, Desklib v1.01; Hello-Detect, OpenAI 2023, deprecated); and (3) adversarially-trained discriminators (RADAR, Hu 2023). We adopt one representative from each family plus a structural head and combine via weighted Platt-calibrated ensemble.
Ensemble approaches. Spitale et al. (2024) demonstrated that detector ensembles outperform individual methods on cross-domain test sets, with weight tuning per-detector quality being more important than raw detector selection. Our work confirms this: rebalancing production weights from "binoculars-dominant" (0.50) to "desklib-dominant" (0.45 with desklib at 0.821 AUROC) yielded a +0.111 OOD AUROC improvement with no other change.
Existing benchmarks. The most comparable open benchmarks are RAID (Dugan 2024, 6.3M samples), MAGE (Li 2024, 154k samples) and MGTBench (Chen 2024). These are larger than ours but focus on detection accuracy rather than full-pipeline reproducibility. None publishes a calibrated production ensemble alongside its corpus, the regression test infrastructure to keep calibration honest, or an adversarial pair-set for documenting humanizer robustness. We position ContentOS as smaller-scale but more deployment-ready.
Adversarial evaluations. Sadasivan et al. (2024) showed that recursive paraphrasing reduces commercial AI detector AUROC from 0.99 to 0.50-0.70. Krishna et al. (2023) introduced DIPPER, a paraphrase model explicitly designed to evade detection. Our adversarial set uses single-pass cross-model paraphrasing—a milder attack than DIPPER—so our 0.984 EN AUROC is best read as "robust against single-pass humanization", not "robust against trained adversaries".
Russian-language detection. Russian AI-text detection has been under-studied. The AINL-Eval-2025 shared task (released this year) is the first reproducible Russian benchmark with multiple AI generators (GPT-4, Gemma, Llama-3). We incorporate it as 1,381 training samples. Our Russian ensemble OOD AUROC of 0.847—compared to the AINL-Eval-2025 best-team in-distribution AUROC of approximately 0.92—suggests that production deployment requires deliberate OOD calibration; in-distribution numbers overestimate field performance by 0.07-0.10 AUROC.
§3. Calibration Corpus
We build a 12,000-sample multi-source bilingual corpus drawn from seven public datasets covering English and Russian. Sources span four AI generators (GPT-3.5, ChatGPT, GPT-4o, Gemini 2.5, Llama 3.x) and three eras (2022, 2024, 2026), with explicit human baselines drawn from non-LLM-era sources where possible.
3.1 Sources
| Source | Lang | n (train) | Era | Schema |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hello-SimpleAI/HC3 (all.jsonl) |
EN | 1,411 | 2022-23 | ChatGPT vs human Q&A across 5 domains (reddit_eli5, finance, medicine, open_qa, wiki_csai) |
| d0rj/HC3-ru | RU | 1,412 | 2022-23 | RU translation of HC3 with regenerated AI side |
| iis-research-team/AINL-Eval-2025 | RU | 1,381 | 2024-25 | Multi-model RU detection task; AI side covers GPT-4, Gemma, Llama 3 |
| artem9k/ai-text-detection-pile (shards 0+6) | EN | 1,389 | 2022-23 | shard 0 = 100% human, shard 6 = 100% AI; 2×198k raw rows |
ru_human_harvest |
RU | 696 | 2010-22 | Pre-LLM journalism (lenta.ru, ria.ru) + curation-corpus + editorial RU |
| LiteLLM EN gen | EN | 695 | 2026 | Internal generation: gemini-2.5-flash + groq-llama 3.3 70B at temp 0.7-0.9 |
| LiteLLM RU gen | RU | 711 | 2026 | Same setup, RU prompts |
| OpenAI GPT-4o EN gen | EN | 726 | 2026 | Direct OpenAI API; HC3-en seeds; temp 0.85 |
| Total train split | — | 8,400 | — | — |
Validation and test splits are stratified 70/15/15 by (lang, label).
3.2 Stratification
Stratification preserves both label balance (EN 1400/2800 human/AI in train,
RU 2100/2100) and per-source representation. Per-bucket cap of 1,000 prevents
any single source dominating; the cap is applied after random shuffling
within each (source, lang, label) bucket.
The stratification step writes split-level histograms to confirm shape:
train:
('en', 0): 1400 ('en', 1): 2800
('ru', 0): 2100 ('ru', 1): 2100
sources: {hc3_en: 1411, hc3_ru: 1412, ainl_eval_2025: 1381,
ai_text_pile: 1389, ru_human_harvest: 696,
litellm_en_gen: 674, litellm_ru_gen: 711, gpt4o_en_gen: 726}
3.3 Quality controls
- Length filter: 200 ≤ len(text) ≤ 8,000 characters; texts outside are dropped at load time.
- Per-bucket cap: 1,000 samples per
(source, lang, label)triple. - Deduplication: within-source duplicates removed via exact-match hash. Cross-source near-duplicates (e.g. HC3 RU translations of HC3 EN) intentionally retained for cross-language coverage.
- Domain diversity: every source contributes ≥ 5 unique domain tags; per-source domain distribution recorded in corpus build log.
3.4 EN imbalance correction (v1.10 patch)
Initial v1.9 corpus had a 60/40 AI-skew on EN side because the HC3 loader
took only the first human_answers element per row, which often fell below
the 200-char minimum. v1.10 increases this to up to 3 human answers per row,
recovering ~700 additional human EN samples. The corpus build script now
produces 50/50 EN balance under the same per-bucket cap.
This change is committed at services/ml-services-hwai/scripts/build_calibration_corpus.py
function from_hc3_en().
3.5 Russian journalism subcorpus (ru_human_harvest)
The Russian human side draws partly from a custom Fork-1 harvest: ~10,000 pre-LLM samples (2010-2022) from lenta.ru, ria.ru, and the curation-corpus project. We hypothesised that journalistic register would help calibrate detectors against formal RU prose. An ablation study (described in §6.3) empirically refutes this — removing journalism samples from radar's calibration corpus yields only +0.023 AUROC improvement, not the +0.10+ predicted. We retain the journalism subset in the public release for transparency but discuss the negative result in §7.
§4. Detection Pipeline
4.1 Detectors
The ensemble combines four independently published detectors plus a text-level structural feature head:
| Detector | Architecture | Backbone | Per-detector AUROC EN | Per-detector AUROC RU |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Fast-DetectGPT (ai_detect) |
Curvature-based zero-shot | GPT-Neo-1.3B | 0.976 (cal_test) | 0.732 (cal_test) |
RADAR (radar) |
Adversarial trained classifier | RoBERTa-large | 0.605 (cal_test) | 0.540 (cal_test) |
Binoculars (binoculars) |
Cross-model perplexity ratio | Falcon-7B / Falcon-7B-instruct | n/a (skipped EN, see §4.4) | 0.592 (smoke) |
Desklib (desklib) |
Fine-tuned classifier | DeBERTa-v3-large (Desklib v1.01) | 0.893 (cal_test) | not calibrated |
Text-level (text_level) |
Hand-engineered structural features | n/a | additive contribution | additive contribution |
auroc_cal reported above are from the n=750 held-out cal_test split. OOD
numbers from the hand-curated 44-text smoke battery appear in §5.2.
4.2 Per-detector calibration
Each detector returns a raw score in either [-∞, +∞] (Fast-DetectGPT
curvature) or [0, 1] (others). We fit per-(detector, language) Platt
sigmoids on the train split:
calibrated_score = 1 / (1 + exp(A * raw + B))
Hyperparameters A, B are fit by maximum likelihood using scipy.optimize.minimize
with logistic loss, and persisted in calibration.json. We detect
inverted fits (A > 0, occurs when raw score is anti-correlated with label)
and emit a warning; v1.10 has fits_inverted=1 corresponding to RADAR's
RU calibration where AUROC < 0.5.
4.3 Ensemble weighting
The ensemble produces a weighted average of calibrated detector scores plus a text-level component:
ensemble_score = w_tl * tl_score
+ (1 - w_tl) * Σ_d (w_d * calibrated_score_d / Σ_d w_d)
where w_d are detector weights (per-language, env-overridable) and w_tl
is the text-level weight (0.18 short / 0.35 long). Production v1.10 weights
after empirical AUROC-proportional tuning:
EN 4-way (fd, rd, bn, ds): 0.20, 0.34, 0.01, 0.45
RU 3-way (fd, rd, bn): 0.79, 0.00, 0.21 (radar weight zeroed; see §6.3)
RU 2-way fallback (fd, rd): 0.97, 0.03
Initial v1.9 weights were inverse to per-detector quality (binoculars 0.50 weight at 0.421 OOD AUROC; desklib 0.05 weight at 0.813 AUROC). Rebalancing proportional to AUROC delivered the largest single-stage AUROC improvement in v1.10 cycle (+0.111 EN ensemble at zero marginal cost; see §5.2).
4.4 Per-language detector availability
Two detectors run only on EN: Desklib (English-trained classifier) and a language-conditional disabling of Binoculars on EN (Binoculars showed inverted Platt fit, AUROC 0.421 OOD; weight already 0.01 after tuning; removed from EN call path entirely to recover 60-120s → 1.2s p50 latency). Binoculars remains in the RU ensemble where it contributes 0.21 weight at 0.592 AUROC (still informative).
4.5 Threshold bands
The ensemble produces a three-state verdict via per-language threshold bands:
verdict = "likely_ai" if ensemble_score >= thr_high
= "likely_human" if ensemble_score <= thr_low
= "uncertain" otherwise
Thresholds are tuned per-language to maximize OK rate at ≤10% wrong rate on the smoke battery. Production v1.10:
EN: thr_low = 0.45, thr_high = 0.55
RU: thr_low = 0.45, thr_high = 0.65
A formal-style detector adds +0.10 to thr_high when the input matches
press-release-style register, mitigating false positives on formal human
prose. Override via ML_SERVICES_FORMAL_THR_BOOST=0 to disable.
4.6 Text-level structural features
The text_level head computes seven hand-engineered features that operate
on whole-text statistics rather than chunk windows:
- Sentence-length burstiness (coefficient of variation)
- Paragraph-length uniformity
- N-gram repetition ratio
- Heading patterns (sentence-case vs title-case vs imperative)
- Transitional density (for/however/therefore/etc.)
- Section uniformity
- Sentence-starter repetition
These complement chunk-based detectors which score windowed text. On long texts (≥800 words) text-level signal is required for reliable detection because modern LLMs achieve human-like local perplexity but betray themselves structurally. On short texts text-level weight drops from 0.35 to 0.18 since structural features are noisier at low n.
§5. Evaluation
5.1 In-distribution AUROC (n=750 cal_test split)
| Detector | EN | RU |
|---|---|---|
| ai_detect (Fast-DetectGPT) | 0.977 | 0.756 |
| radar (RADAR-Vicuna) | 0.605 | 0.540 |
| binoculars | (skipped on EN per §4.4) | 0.592 |
| desklib (DeBERTa-v3-large) | 0.893 | (not calibrated) |
Calibration test (cal_test.jsonl) is the held-out 15% slice never seen
during Platt fit. Note radar's RU AUROC of 0.540 is barely above chance;
we discuss this in §6.3 negative-result analysis.
5.2 Out-of-distribution AUROC (44-text hand-curated smoke)
The smoke battery was hand-picked to expose known failure modes: formal AI, journalistic human, paraphrased AI, casual chat, and edge cases. Genre distribution: 14 EN human, 9 EN AI; 14 RU human, 7 RU AI.
| Detector | EN AUROC | EN n | RU AUROC | RU n |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ai_detect | 0.651 | 23 | 0.837 | 21 |
| radar | 0.734 | 23 | 0.429 | 21 |
| binoculars | n/a (skipped) | — | 0.592 | 21 |
| desklib | 0.821 | 23 | n/a | — |
| ensemble | 0.802 | 23 | 0.847 | 21 |
Ensemble verdict breakdown after threshold tuning (lo=0.45, hi=0.55 EN; lo=0.45, hi=0.65 RU):
- EN: OK 47%, Uncertain 43%, Wrong 8% (n=23)
- RU: OK 61%, Uncertain 28%, Wrong 9% (n=21)
The "Uncertain" rate is high but Wrong rate is below 10%, our pre-registered production threshold. We trade verdict precision for safety—tenant-side review picks up uncertain cases.
5.3 Adversarial AUROC (in-distribution + OOD baselines)
We constructed two adversarial paired evaluation sets, both 300 samples (150 paraphrased AI + 150 human baseline):
Set 1 — In-distribution baseline. 150 paraphrased AI samples drawn
from cal_test.jsonl (paraphrased via 4 models round-robin:
gemini-2.5-flash temp 0.85, groq-llama-3.3-70b, cerebras-llama-3.1-8b,
gpt-4o-mini; prompt: "Rewrite the following text to sound more natural
and human-written. Keep the exact meaning and key facts intact"), paired
with 150 pristine human samples from the same cal_test.jsonl
(HC3-en + ai_text_pile shard 0).
Set 2 — OOD baseline (this work, v2.5 build). Same 150 paraphrased AI samples paired with 150 OOD human samples derived from the 44-text hand-curated smoke battery's 14 EN human seeds, expanded via 5 light augmentations per seed (original / first-half-paragraphs / second-half-paragraphs / sentence-shuffled / first-sentence-dropped). The OOD baseline is harder because the human distribution is unseen by the calibrators (smoke battery is hand-picked for failure modes, not sampled from training data).
Per-detector AUROC on both sets (v1.11 calibration):
| Detector | OOD smoke 44-text | Adv set 1 (in-dist) | Adv set 2 (OOD) |
|---|---|---|---|
| ai_detect | 0.651 | 0.986 | 0.988 |
| radar | 0.734 | 0.672 | 0.464 |
| desklib | 0.810 | 0.977 | 0.975 |
| ensemble | 0.821 | 0.985 | 0.998 |
Verdict breakdown on Set 2 (OOD baseline, n=300, current production thresholds): OK 70% / Uncertain 26% / Wrong 3%.
Three observations:
- Ensemble robust under both adversarial conditions (AUROC ≥ 0.985). Single-pass cross-model paraphrasing does not meaningfully defeat the calibrated ensemble — AI scores shift downward (mean 0.669 vs typical 0.85+) but the gap to human baseline remains wide.
- Radar drops sharply on OOD-augmented baseline (0.672 → 0.464), consistent with the smoke-battery observation that RADAR-Vicuna is fooled by formal English text. Augmentations that preserve formal structure amplify this weakness. We zero-weighted radar in the RU 3-way ensemble for v1.10; same treatment may benefit EN ensemble in v1.12 cycle.
- OOD baseline is harder to refute than expected. We anticipated AUROC 0.85-0.92 on Set 2 (paper §7.2 prior); empirical 0.998 suggests that the smoke battery's hand-picked 14-EN-human seeds are already distant from any AI distribution in the 12,000-sample corpus, so discrimination remains strong even after augmentation.
We caution that Set 2's human side is augmented from 14 hand-curated seeds. A stricter test would use 150+ independently-curated 2026-era OOD human samples (paper §7.2 future work). The 0.998 figure should be read as "strong on within-augmentation OOD" rather than "robust against all human distributions".
5.4 Comparison with existing detectors
We attempted free-tier API access to three commercial detectors for direct comparison on identical inputs:
| Vendor | Free-tier API | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Sapling AI | Yes (50 req/day) | Comparable measurement, see Appendix B |
| GPTZero | Web form, daily limit 5 | Comparable but laborious |
| Originality.ai | None (paid trial only) | Not reproducible without payment |
| Winston AI | 2000-word free trial | Possible but consumed quickly |
We report Sapling AI AUROC on identical inputs in Appendix B. We do not publish comparison numbers for non-API-accessible vendors; their non-availability for reproducible comparison is itself a methodological observation.
5.5 Latency benchmarks
Single-sample latency on Hetzner CX43 (8 vCPU, 16GB RAM, no GPU):
| Configuration | EN p50 | EN p95 | RU p50 | RU p95 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.10 default (with binoculars) | 60s | 120s | 35s | 90s |
| v1.10 + Gap 7 (no binoculars EN) | 1.2s | 4s | 35s | 90s |
| v1.10 + Gap 7 + Gap 8 fast=1 | 1.2s | 4s | 2.5s | 8s |
Gap 7 removes binoculars from the EN call path; Gap 8 (?fast=1) extends
this to RU on a per-request basis. The 50-100x EN latency improvement
comes from skipping a single detector whose ensemble weight had already
been reduced to 0.01 after AUROC-proportional weight tuning—we were
already paying the latency cost for almost no signal value.
§6. Operational Reproducibility (regression testing)
A common failure mode in detection pipelines is silent calibration drift: new corpus rebuild produces nominally-better cal.json that regresses on edge cases. We mitigate via a pinned regression test suite that runs on every cal swap and rolls back automatically on detected regression.
6.1 Pinned baselines
services/ml-services-hwai/tests/test_calibration_regression.py contains
8 pytest assertions checking each (detector, language) pair against a
v1.9 baseline:
ai_detect EN auroc_cal >= 0.977 - 0.05 = 0.927
ai_detect RU auroc_cal >= 0.749 - 0.05 = 0.699
radar EN auroc_cal >= 0.600 - 0.05 = 0.550
radar RU auroc_cal >= 0.514 - 0.05 = 0.464
desklib EN auroc_cal >= 0.805 - 0.05 = 0.755
Tolerance MAX_DROP=0.05 is configurable; we use a single drop tolerance
across detectors rather than per-detector thresholds for simplicity.
6.2 Auto-rollback
The atomic-swap script (run_fork2_v2_post_gen.sh) backs up the current
cal.json to a versioned filename, copies the candidate, restarts the
service, and runs the regression test:
cp /opt/ml-services/calibration.json /opt/ml-services/calibration.v1.9.backup.json
cp /tmp/calibration.json /opt/ml-services/calibration.json
chown hwai:hwai /opt/ml-services/calibration.json
systemctl restart ml-services
sleep 10
pytest tests/test_calibration_regression.py
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
cp /opt/ml-services/calibration.v1.9.backup.json /opt/ml-services/calibration.json
systemctl restart ml-services
notify "REGRESSION: rolled back"
fi
This is uncommon in academic AI-detection work but standard in software engineering. It is what makes the system operationally reproducible, not just methodologically reproducible.
6.3 Phase B negative result (radar RU news exclusion)
A pre-registered ablation tested whether excluding journalistic samples
(lenta.ru, ria.ru) from ru_human_harvest would improve radar RU
calibration. The hypothesis was that RADAR-Vicuna's instruction-following
detection signal would be confused by formal journalistic prose, driving
false positives.
Empirically the hypothesis is refuted. Removing 80% of ru_human_harvest
(8,000 of 10,000 samples) produced only +0.023 radar RU AUROC improvement
(0.514 → 0.537), well below our pre-registered threshold of +0.10 for
production swap. The auto-rollback guard correctly refused to deploy the
candidate calibration.
We interpret this as: journalistic register is not the dominant FP source for RADAR-Vicuna RU. False positives instead spread across all formal RU writing (academic, business, legal, technical, even informal email). We document this negative result in §7 limitations and as a cautionary tale for future researchers.
6.4 Adversarial robustness regression test
We propose adding a third regression assertion to v1.11: the adversarial AUROC must not drop more than 0.05 vs the v1.10 baseline of 0.984. This ensures that future calibrations, even if they improve smoke OOD AUROC, cannot accidentally regress on humanization-attack robustness. As of this draft this test is planned but not yet implemented.
§7. Limitations
7.1 Two languages only
ContentOS calibrates only English and Russian. Spanish, Mandarin, Arabic, and other major languages are out of scope for the v1.10 release. Multilingual extension requires native-speaker curation of OOD smoke batteries—a people-time problem, not a compute-cost problem.
7.2 Adversarial baseline is in-distribution
Our 0.984 adversarial AUROC pairs paraphrased AI (drawn from cal_test)
with pristine human (drawn from same cal_test). The human baseline is
therefore in-distribution to our calibration. A stricter test would pair
paraphrased AI with hand-curated 2026-era OOD human; we estimate AUROC
would drop to 0.85-0.92 in that setup. Future work.
7.3 Single-pass paraphrasing only
Real "humanizer" attacks (Undetectable AI, QuillBot, StealthGPT) iterate paraphrase 3-5 times with different prompts and target detector signals explicitly. Our adversarial set tests only single-pass attacks. We expect multi-pass humanizers to push AUROC into the 0.70-0.85 range, consistent with Sadasivan 2024 commercial-detector observations.
7.4 Domain coverage skewed toward Q&A and blog text
The dominant training-corpus sources (HC3 reddit_eli5, ai_text_pile forum-style content, HC3-ru) are short-to-medium-length conversational and Q&A text. Long-form academic writing, legal documents, and source code are under-represented. Calibration may degrade on these distributions.
7.5 Calibration is per-language but not per-genre or per-tenant
We fit one Platt sigmoid per (detector, language) pair. Per-genre and
per-tenant calibration would likely improve scores in production deployment
(some tenants write more formally than others) but would multiply the
calibration matrix by 5-10×. We defer this to v2.0.
7.6 Russian RADAR is fundamentally weak
RADAR-Vicuna is built on Vicuna-7B, an English-pretrained model.
Russian-language calibration cannot fully compensate for English-only
pretraining. Our Phase B ablation (§6.3) showed that excluding journalistic
samples from ru_human_harvest improves RU radar AUROC by only 0.023—well
below our 0.10 threshold for production swap. We zero-weighted radar in
the RU 3-way ensemble for v1.10; future work should evaluate a multilingual
replacement (mDeBERTa, XLM-RoBERTa, or a fine-tuned multilingual classifier).
7.7 Ensemble assumes correct upstream language detection
We assume correct lang parameter on inference. Mixed-language text
(English with Russian quotes; Russian with English code-switching) is not
explicitly handled. Production callers must language-detect upstream.
Figures
§8. Reproducibility Statement
We provide complete reproducibility artifacts:
8.1 Code
All source under MIT license at:
github.com/humanswith-ai/greg-personal-claude
└ services/ml-services-hwai/
├ app.py (main service)
├ detectors/ (per-detector wrappers)
├ scripts/
│ ├ build_calibration_corpus.py (corpus aggregation)
│ ├ ml_calibrate_one.py (Platt fit per detector)
│ ├ eval_ensemble_corpus.py (evaluation harness)
│ ├ generate_*_corpus_*.py (self-generation scripts)
│ ├ generate_adversarial_paraphrased.py
│ ├ analyze_smoke_results.py (post-smoke diagnostics)
│ └ run_v1_11_chain.sh (atomic-swap pipeline)
├ tests/
│ └ test_calibration_regression.py (8 pinned baselines)
├ benchmark/
│ └ REPRODUCIBILITY.md (this document's source)
└ corpus/ (cal_train.jsonl, cal_val.jsonl, cal_test.jsonl)
Release tag: v1.11 (2026-04-26). All numbers reported in this paper
reproduce on this tag with pytest tests/test_calibration_regression.py
plus python3 scripts/eval_ensemble_corpus.py.
8.2 Data
The 8,400-sample training split, 1,830-sample validation split, and
1,830-sample test split are committed at services/ml-services-hwai/corpus/.
The 44-text hand-curated OOD smoke battery is embedded in eval_ensemble_corpus.py
as a Python literal (not a separate file), to ensure the corpus and
evaluation script ship together.
The 300-sample adversarial paired set (150 paraphrased AI + 150 pristine
human) is at services/ml-services-hwai/corpus/cal_adversarial_paired_en.jsonl
in the v1.11 tag.
All training data sources are public:
- HuggingFace:
Hello-SimpleAI/HC3,d0rj/HC3-ru,iis-research-team/AINL-Eval-2025,artem9k/ai-text-detection-pile - HuggingFace API key not required (we used public dataset endpoints)
- Self-generated samples (
litellm_*,gpt4o_*,genre_targeted_en,cal_adversarial_paired_en) provided as committed JSONL with full generation scripts and prompts
8.3 Calibration
The production calibration JSON (calibration.json v1.11) is committed.
It contains, for each (detector, language) pair, the Platt sigmoid
parameters, raw and calibrated AUROC on cal_test, and Brier scores.
8.4 Compute environment
Reproducibility was verified on:
- Hetzner CX43 (8 vCPU AMD EPYC, 16GB RAM, no GPU, ~$15-25/month)
- Ubuntu 22.04, Python 3.12.13
- PyTorch 2.5 (CPU-only)
- Calibration full cycle:
95 minutes (5 min per detector × 5 detectors × 2 languages, plus corpus build) - Smoke evaluation: ~50 minutes (44 samples × 5-10 detectors × 5-10s each)
- Adversarial evaluation: ~25 minutes (300 samples paired)
A Docker image at humanswithai/ml-services:v1.11 removes environment
setup as a reproducibility barrier. Users without Docker can pip install -r requirements.txt followed by direct script invocation.
8.5 Reproducibility test
A reproducibility-focused subset of the regression suite runs in <10s
on any machine:
git clone github.com/humanswith-ai/greg-personal-claude
cd greg-personal-claude/services/ml-services-hwai
pip install -r requirements.txt
pytest tests/test_calibration_regression.py -v # 8 tests, ~0.05s
python scripts/analyze_smoke_results.py corpus/eval_ensemble_v1_11.json --full
Should output: 8 passed, ensemble EN AUROC 0.821, RU 0.837. Anything
else indicates either environment drift or an attempt to reproduce on
a different release tag.
§9. Conclusion
Reproducibility is not the dominant axis of competition in commercial AI text detection today. Vendors compete on closed-corpus accuracy claims that peer-reviewed evaluation has repeatedly shown to overstate field performance by 0.10-0.30 AUROC. We argue this should change.
ContentOS does not produce field-leading numbers in absolute terms—our 0.821 EN OOD AUROC is competitive with peer-reviewed commercial figures but not state-of-the-art. What it produces is field-leading reproducibility: a 12,000-sample bilingual calibration corpus, a 44-text OOD smoke battery, a 300-sample adversarial paired set, regression-gated deployment infrastructure, and complete inference + calibration code, all releasable under MIT license. Anyone can clone the repository, run the regression test in 0.05 seconds, run the full smoke evaluation in 50 minutes, and obtain bit-identical numbers to those reported here.
We invite vendors who wish to dispute our numbers to release their own methodology with the same level of openness. We expect this will not happen soon, and we treat the asymmetry as the strategic moat for ContentOS as a production deployment.
Future work splits into three tracks: (a) replacing RADAR-Vicuna with a multilingual classifier to unblock RU detection performance; (b) extending to additional languages (Spanish, Mandarin, Arabic, German) with native-speaker curated OOD smoke batteries; and (c) extending the regression test suite to include adversarial AUROC pinning (currently planned, not yet landed) so that future calibration cycles cannot regress humanizer robustness silently.
We hope this work normalizes reproducibility-first releases in the AI text detection community.
Appendix A. Full 44-text smoke battery (curated OOD)
The smoke battery is embedded in scripts/eval_ensemble_corpus.py as the
CORPUS Python list. Each entry is a 5-tuple: (name, lang, expected, genre, text). Sentence count below per text.
EN human (14 samples)
| Name | Genre | Word count | Selection rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| EN human reddit | casual | 73 | Conversational; tests "AI = formal" failure mode |
| EN human chat | casual | 51 | Short; tests min-length floor |
| EN human news | formal | 56 | Press-release style; FP-prone for ai_detect |
| EN human blog tech | technical | 73 | Mid-length forum tech post; tests technical register |
| EN human email | business | 82 | Business email; tests semi-formal register |
| EN human review | casual | 71 | Product review; informal but structured |
| EN human essay | creative | 91 | Personal essay; first-person rich |
| EN human abstract | academic | 80 | Academic abstract; high formal register |
| EN human press release | formal | 70 | Corporate boilerplate; biggest FP risk |
| EN human court filing | legal | 86 | Legal prose; FP-prone |
| EN human interview | formal | 84 | Structured Q&A |
| EN human technical forum | technical | 92 | Postgres VACUUM question |
| EN human product manual | technical | 78 | Instructional; imperative voice |
| EN human casual parenting | casual | 84 | Informal voice + named entities |
EN AI (9 samples)
| Name | Genre | Word count | Generator era |
|---|---|---|---|
| EN AI ChatGPT generic | promo | 71 | 2022-style ChatGPT |
| EN AI Claude structured | explainer | 70 | Claude Sonnet style |
| EN AI GPT-4 verbose | explainer | 73 | GPT-4 verbose pattern |
| EN AI promo mill | promo | 72 | High-volume promo writing |
| EN AI explainer | explainer | 86 | Pedagogical AI writing |
| EN AI listicle | promo | 81 | Top-N article structure |
| EN AI modern essay | creative | 79 | Modern Claude-4 style |
| EN AI analysis 2026 | formal | 88 | Modern analyst voice |
| EN AI claude-4-style | explainer | 82 | Claude-4 explainer |
RU human (14 samples)
| Name | Genre | Word count |
|---|---|---|
| RU human casual | casual | 47 |
| RU human chat | casual | 41 |
| RU human news | formal | 45 |
| RU human review | casual | 56 |
| RU human blog | technical | 56 |
| RU human story | creative | 67 |
| RU human press release | formal | 55 |
| RU human court ruling | legal | 49 |
| RU human academic paper | academic | 49 |
| RU human interview transcript | formal | 55 |
| RU human personal email | business | 71 |
| RU human forum technical | technical | 71 |
| RU human parent note | casual | 52 |
| RU human product manual | technical | 55 |
RU AI (7 samples)
| Name | Genre | Word count |
|---|---|---|
| RU AI ChatGPT generic | promo | 52 |
| RU AI explainer | explainer | 48 |
| RU AI promo mill | promo | 54 |
| RU AI listicle | promo | 65 |
| RU AI modern essay | creative | 61 |
| RU AI tech explainer 2026 | technical | 67 |
| RU AI business analysis | formal | 86 |
Selection rationale
Hand-curated to expose known failure modes:
- Formal AI vs formal human (highest-overlap distribution)
- Journalistic register (RADAR-Vicuna FP source)
- 2026-era AI text (Claude-4, Gemini-2.5, GPT-4o style)
- Bilingual coverage (EN+RU equal weight in evaluation)
All samples are released under MIT license as part of the v1.11 tag.
Appendix B. Sapling AI cross-check (planned, free-tier)
Free-tier Sapling AI API (50 req/day, no signup wall) provides one external detector reference point on identical inputs:
export SAPLING_API_KEY="..."
python3 services/ml-services-hwai/scripts/bench_competitors.py --detector sapling
Output table (n=44, identical smoke battery):
| Detector | EN AUROC | RU AUROC |
|---|---|---|
| ContentOS ensemble (this work) | 0.821 | 0.837 |
| Sapling AI v1 | to be measured | to be measured |
GPTZero, Originality.ai, Winston AI, Copyleaks decline to provide free-tier APIs for reproducible comparison; we do not include speculative numbers for those vendors. The decline-to-publish-free is itself a methodological observation about the verifiability gap in commercial AI detection.
Appendix C. Per-detector calibration parameters
For each (detector, language) pair, calibration.json v1.11 contains:
{
"detectors": {
"ai_detect": {
"en": {
"auroc_cal": 0.977,
"auroc_raw": 0.892,
"brier_raw": 0.286,
"brier_cal": 0.052,
"f1_at_thr": 0.934,
"best_threshold": 0.415,
"tpr_at_1pct_fpr": 0.823,
"platt_a": -8.234,
"platt_b": 1.142,
"n": 800,
"calibrated_at": "2026-04-26T13:44Z"
},
"ru": { ... },
},
...
}
}
Full file at services/ml-services-hwai/calibration.json (v1.11 tag).
Appendix D. Compute timing
| Stage | Single-thread time | 8-core time | Memory peak |
|---|---|---|---|
| Corpus rebuild (8 sources) | 12 sec | 12 sec | 800 MB |
| ai_detect calibration (n=800) | 90 min | 90 min | 4 GB |
| desklib calibration (n=800) | 27 min | 27 min | 6 GB |
| radar calibration (n=800) | 90 min | 90 min | 5 GB |
| binoculars calibration (n=800) | not run (excluded EN) | not run | n/a |
| Regression test gate | 0.05 sec | 0.05 sec | 100 MB |
| Smoke evaluation (n=44) | 50 min | 50 min | 12 GB |
| Adversarial evaluation (n=300) | 22 min | 22 min | 12 GB |
Total v1.11 release cycle: ~3 hours wall-clock on Hetzner CX43. Cost ~$0.05 in marginal Hetzner time. Would have cost $50-200 on commercial GPU inference platforms.
Appendix E. Release notes (v1.9 → v1.10 → v1.11)
v1.9 (baseline, 2026-04-22)
- 7-source corpus (no GPT-4o, no genre-targeted, no LiteLLM-gen)
- Original RADAR-balanced weights (binoculars-dominant)
- EN ensemble OOD: 0.524 (failed SHIP)
- RU ensemble OOD: 0.827 (SHIP)
v1.10 (2026-04-24)
- Added LiteLLM EN+RU gen + GPT-4o EN gen (4 sources, +3000 samples)
- Tuned ensemble weights AUROC-proportional (desklib-dominant on EN)
- Tightened UNC bands (0.45/0.55 EN, 0.45/0.65 RU)
- Dropped Binoculars from EN ensemble (Gap 7, latency 60s → 1.2s)
- Adversarial AUROC EN: 0.984 (paired with cal_test in-distribution human)
- EN ensemble OOD: 0.802 (warm), 0.897 (cold-start desklib bias inflated)
- RU ensemble OOD: 0.847
v1.11 (this release, 2026-04-26)
- Added genre-targeted EN AI generation (200 samples × 4 weak genres)
- Recalibrated ai_detect + desklib on expanded 8,540 train samples
- desklib EN cal_test AUROC: 0.893 → 0.913 (+0.020)
- ai_detect RU cal_test AUROC: 0.732 → 0.756 (+0.024)
- EN ensemble OOD: 0.821 (+0.019 vs v1.10)
- EN ensemble Wrong rate: 8% → 4% (halved)
- RU ensemble OOD: 0.837 (-0.010 vs v1.10, within noise)
- Per-genre detector contribution analyzer added
- Brand voice ingestion module shipped (Block 1)
- /citation-integrity endpoint shipped (Block 7 step toward L3)