>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Derrick Phillips\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-28\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1372\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nDERRICK PHILLIPS,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 03-CR-30019—Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 6, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 28, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and KANNE,\nCircuit Judges.\n WOOD, Chief Judge. In this appeal, Derrick Phillips is chal-\nlenging the district court’s decision to revoke his supervised\nrelease. He argues that the drug evidence used against him\nwas the fruit of an unconstitutional search and should have\nbeen excluded. Guided by the Supreme Court’s opinion in\nPennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357\n(1998), which held that the exclusionary rule does not apply\n\f2 No. 18-1372\n\nto state parole-revocation hearings, the district court ruled\nthat the exclusionary rule was similarly inappropriate for su-\npervised-release-revocation hearings. The court then re-\nviewed the evidence presented by the government and con-\ncluded that Phillips’s supervised release should be revoked\nand that he should be sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment.\nBefore this court, Phillips contests only the district court’s rul-\ning on the exclusionary rule issue. We affirm.\n In 2010 Phillips began serving an eight-year term of super-\nvised release stemming from a 2003 conviction for possession\nof cocaine base with intent to distribute. Phillips completed\nseven years of his term largely without incident. But on Octo-\nber 4, 2017, police officers in Quincy, Illinois, stopped him as\nhe drove his car out of the parking lot of the town’s Amtrak\nstation. After a dog alerted the officers that drugs might be\npresent in the car, they conducted a search, discovered a pack-\nage containing approximately 196 grams of heroin, and ar-\nrested Phillips for possession with intent to distribute. The\nnext month, Phillips’s probation officer filed a petition to re-\nvoke his supervised release based on his violation of the con-\ndition that he not commit any crimes while on release.\n In the district court, Phillips moved to suppress the evi-\ndence seized from his car. He alleged that the putative traffic\nviolation that served as the basis of the stop was not, in fact, a\nviolation of any traffic law at all. Accordingly, he argued, the\npolice lacked probable cause for the stop and the resulting ev-\nidence should be suppressed. The district court did not reach\nthe merits of this argument because it concluded that the rea-\nsoning in Scott left no room for the application of the exclu-\nsionary rule to supervised-release-revocation hearings. We\nagree with that ruling.\n\fNo. 18-1372 3\n\n As the district court noted, two of the Supreme Court’s ra-\ntionales for declining to extend the exclusionary rule to the\nparole context “equally appl[y] to hearings for the revocation\nof supervised release.” First, the Court expressed concern in\nScott that the exclusionary rule would “alter the traditionally\nflexible, administrative nature of parole revocation proceed-\nings.” 524 U.S. at 364. Phillips contends that certain features\nof hearings for the revocation of supervised release make\nthem more adversarial and trial-like than is true for parole\nhearings. These include the statutory right to counsel that de-\nfendants enjoy pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-\ndure 32.1 and the requirement that defendants make specific\nobjections in order to preserve them for appellate review, see\nUnited States v. Raney, 797 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 2015).\n We can assume that Phillips is correct to observe that the\nSupreme Court’s description of parole revocation hearings as\n“nonadversarial,” Scott, 524 U.S. at 366, is an imperfect fit for\nsupervised-release-revocation hearings (and for that matter,\nparole hearings). But the Court was well aware that the pa-\nrole-revocation procedures are a part of the overall criminal\njustice process. And there is no escaping the fact that a hear-\ning to determine whether supervised release should be re-\nvoked is substantially closer in form and substance to a hear-\ning focusing on parole revocation than it is to a criminal trial.\nThe Court emphasized in Scott that it has “repeatedly de-\nclined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other\nthan criminal trials.” 524 U.S. at 363. In other non-criminal-\ntrial procedural contexts that have adversarial qualities and\ncarry significant risks for defendants, the Court has found\nthat the exclusionary rule is not worth the “substantial social\ncosts” that would accompany it. Id., quoting United States v.\nLeon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984). See I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468\n\f4 No. 18-1372\n\nU.S. 1032 (1984) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to\ndeportation proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433\n(1976) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to civil tax\nproceedings). Unless and until the Supreme Court reconsid-\ners this line of cases, we are not free to extend the exclusionary\nrule to hearings for the revocation of supervised release.\n Second, the Scott Court expressed skepticism about the\nlikelihood that the exclusionary rule would provide any\nadded deterrence of unlawful police behavior if it were to be\navailable in parole-revocation hearings, “because application\nof the rule in the criminal trial already provides significant\ndeterrence of unconstitutional searches.” Scott, 524 U.S. at 364.\nPhillips suggests that this is not so in the supervised release\ncontext, given that the government has (and often uses) the\noption to pursue revocation in lieu of a new prosecution. Thus,\nhe argues, the underlying police conduct may go unchal-\nlenged in any forum. But the same option exists for parole-\nrevocation hearings. Statistics indicate that there are more\nthan 750,000 people on state parole, and another 137,000 on\nfederal supervised release. See Probation and Parole in the\nUnited States, 2016, Bureau of Justice Statistics,\nhttps://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus16.pdf (2016 state\nparole population of 760,392); Post-Conviction Supervision – Ju-\ndicial Business 2017, United States Courts,\nhttp://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/post-conviction-\nsupervision-judicial-business-2016 (2016 federal supervisee\npopulation of 137,410). In both instances, when the reason for\nrevocation is the commission of a new crime, the prosecuting\nauthority has the option to revoke a defendant’s parole or su-\npervised release rather than pursue a new case. If the Su-\npreme Court found the added deterrence benefits insufficient\nto justify the exclusionary rule in a parole hearing, logic\n\fNo. 18-1372 5\n\ncompels the conclusion that the same result must apply for\nsupervised release.\n That is enough to dispose of Phillips’s appeal. We add,\nhowever, that his position would require us seriously to un-\ndermine our own circuit precedent and to break from the uni-\nform consensus of our sister circuits. We have long held that\nthe exclusionary rule does not apply at sentencing. United\nStates v. Brimah, 214 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 2000). And the Supreme\nCourt has held that in the context of supervised release,\n“postrevocation penalties relate to the original offense,” Johnson\nv. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) (emphasis added). See\nalso United States v. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d 1163, 1171 (7th Cir.\n2015) (noting that “a revocation proceeding … focuses on the\nmodification of a sentence already imposed and implicates\nthe conditional (rather than absolute) liberty that the defend-\nant enjoys as a result of that sentence”). It is difficult to see\nhow we could continue to find the exclusionary rule inappro-\npriate at the imposition of the initial sentence and yet to apply\nthe rule in downstream hearings aimed at modifying that sen-\ntence.\n Phillips argues that as a practical reality, when judges de-\ncide whether to revoke supervised release and (if so) how\nmuch prison time to impose, they are more focused on the\nnew offense than on the underlying crime of conviction. But\nthey are entitled to take the entire record into account at the\ntime of revocation, not simply the facts as they existed at the\ntime of the original sentence. That appears to be what hap-\npened for Phillips when the judge mentioned the ongoing\n“heroin epidemic” as a justification for her sentence. And the\nfact remains that as a legal matter, the Supreme Court has\nmade crystal clear that revocation relates back to, and is a\n\f6 No. 18-1372\n\nfunction of, the sentence for the original offense. Ruling for\nPhillips would therefore call Brimah into question. As Phillips\nacknowledges, his position would also put us in direct con-\nflict with every other court of appeals to consider the ques-\ntion. See United States v. Hebert, 201 F.3d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir.\n2000) (holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to supervised\nrelease); United States v. Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 394 (4th Cir.\n1999) (same); see also United States v. Charles, 531 F.3d 637, 640\n(8th Cir. 2008) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to\nsupervised release in the absence of a showing of police har-\nassment); United States v. Montez, 952 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir.\n1992) (same). We decline to create such a split, nor need we\naddress the exceptions contemplated by the Fifth and Eighth\nCircuits, as there has been no showing of harassment in this\ncase.\n Phillips suggested at oral argument that the main purpose\nof this appeal was to preserve this issue for Supreme Court\nreview. That he has done. But until the Supreme Court ad-\ndresses the point, his arguments in this court are foreclosed.\nThe judgment of the district court is\n\n\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Derrick Phillips\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-28\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1372\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDERRICK PHILLIPS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 03-CR-30019—Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 6, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 28, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and KANNE,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. In this appeal, Derrick Phillips is chal-\\nlenging the district court’s decision to revoke his supervised\\nrelease. He argues that the drug evidence used against him\\nwas the fruit of an unconstitutional search and should have\\nbeen excluded. Guided by the Supreme Court’s opinion in\\nPennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357\\n(1998), which held that the exclusionary rule does not apply\\n\\f2 No. 18-1372\\n\\nto state parole-revocation hearings, the district court ruled\\nthat the exclusionary rule was similarly inappropriate for su-\\npervised-release-revocation hearings. The court then re-\\nviewed the evidence presented by the government and con-\\ncluded that Phillips’s supervised release should be revoked\\nand that he should be sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment.\\nBefore this court, Phillips contests only the district court’s rul-\\ning on the exclusionary rule issue. We affirm.\\n In 2010 Phillips began serving an eight-year term of super-\\nvised release stemming from a 2003 conviction for possession\\nof cocaine base with intent to distribute. Phillips completed\\nseven years of his term largely without incident. But on Octo-\\nber 4, 2017, police officers in Quincy, Illinois, stopped him as\\nhe drove his car out of the parking lot of the town’s Amtrak\\nstation. After a dog alerted the officers that drugs might be\\npresent in the car, they conducted a search, discovered a pack-\\nage containing approximately 196 grams of heroin, and ar-\\nrested Phillips for possession with intent to distribute. The\\nnext month, Phillips’s probation officer filed a petition to re-\\nvoke his supervised release based on his violation of the con-\\ndition that he not commit any crimes while on release.\\n In the district court, Phillips moved to suppress the evi-\\ndence seized from his car. He alleged that the putative traffic\\nviolation that served as the basis of the stop was not, in fact, a\\nviolation of any traffic law at all. Accordingly, he argued, the\\npolice lacked probable cause for the stop and the resulting ev-\\nidence should be suppressed. The district court did not reach\\nthe merits of this argument because it concluded that the rea-\\nsoning in Scott left no room for the application of the exclu-\\nsionary rule to supervised-release-revocation hearings. We\\nagree with that ruling.\\n\\fNo. 18-1372 3\\n\\n As the district court noted, two of the Supreme Court’s ra-\\ntionales for declining to extend the exclusionary rule to the\\nparole context “equally appl[y] to hearings for the revocation\\nof supervised release.” First, the Court expressed concern in\\nScott that the exclusionary rule would “alter the traditionally\\nflexible, administrative nature of parole revocation proceed-\\nings.” 524 U.S. at 364. Phillips contends that certain features\\nof hearings for the revocation of supervised release make\\nthem more adversarial and trial-like than is true for parole\\nhearings. These include the statutory right to counsel that de-\\nfendants enjoy pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-\\ndure 32.1 and the requirement that defendants make specific\\nobjections in order to preserve them for appellate review, see\\nUnited States v. Raney, 797 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n We can assume that Phillips is correct to observe that the\\nSupreme Court’s description of parole revocation hearings as\\n“nonadversarial,” Scott, 524 U.S. at 366, is an imperfect fit for\\nsupervised-release-revocation hearings (and for that matter,\\nparole hearings). But the Court was well aware that the pa-\\nrole-revocation procedures are a part of the overall criminal\\njustice process. And there is no escaping the fact that a hear-\\ning to determine whether supervised release should be re-\\nvoked is substantially closer in form and substance to a hear-\\ning focusing on parole revocation than it is to a criminal trial.\\nThe Court emphasized in Scott that it has “repeatedly de-\\nclined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other\\nthan criminal trials.” 524 U.S. at 363. In other non-criminal-\\ntrial procedural contexts that have adversarial qualities and\\ncarry significant risks for defendants, the Court has found\\nthat the exclusionary rule is not worth the “substantial social\\ncosts” that would accompany it. Id., quoting United States v.\\nLeon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984). See I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468\\n\\f4 No. 18-1372\\n\\nU.S. 1032 (1984) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to\\ndeportation proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433\\n(1976) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to civil tax\\nproceedings). Unless and until the Supreme Court reconsid-\\ners this line of cases, we are not free to extend the exclusionary\\nrule to hearings for the revocation of supervised release.\\n Second, the Scott Court expressed skepticism about the\\nlikelihood that the exclusionary rule would provide any\\nadded deterrence of unlawful police behavior if it were to be\\navailable in parole-revocation hearings, “because application\\nof the rule in the criminal trial already provides significant\\ndeterrence of unconstitutional searches.” Scott, 524 U.S. at 364.\\nPhillips suggests that this is not so in the supervised release\\ncontext, given that the government has (and often uses) the\\noption to pursue revocation in lieu of a new prosecution. Thus,\\nhe argues, the underlying police conduct may go unchal-\\nlenged in any forum. But the same option exists for parole-\\nrevocation hearings. Statistics indicate that there are more\\nthan 750,000 people on state parole, and another 137,000 on\\nfederal supervised release. See Probation and Parole in the\\nUnited States, 2016, Bureau of Justice Statistics,\\nhttps://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus16.pdf (2016 state\\nparole population of 760,392); Post-Conviction Supervision – Ju-\\ndicial Business 2017, United States Courts,\\nhttp://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/post-conviction-\\nsupervision-judicial-business-2016 (2016 federal supervisee\\npopulation of 137,410). In both instances, when the reason for\\nrevocation is the commission of a new crime, the prosecuting\\nauthority has the option to revoke a defendant’s parole or su-\\npervised release rather than pursue a new case. If the Su-\\npreme Court found the added deterrence benefits insufficient\\nto justify the exclusionary rule in a parole hearing, logic\\n\\fNo. 18-1372 5\\n\\ncompels the conclusion that the same result must apply for\\nsupervised release.\\n That is enough to dispose of Phillips’s appeal. We add,\\nhowever, that his position would require us seriously to un-\\ndermine our own circuit precedent and to break from the uni-\\nform consensus of our sister circuits. We have long held that\\nthe exclusionary rule does not apply at sentencing. United\\nStates v. Brimah, 214 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 2000). And the Supreme\\nCourt has held that in the context of supervised release,\\n“postrevocation penalties relate to the original offense,” Johnson\\nv. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) (emphasis added). See\\nalso United States v. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d 1163, 1171 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (noting that “a revocation proceeding … focuses on the\\nmodification of a sentence already imposed and implicates\\nthe conditional (rather than absolute) liberty that the defend-\\nant enjoys as a result of that sentence”). It is difficult to see\\nhow we could continue to find the exclusionary rule inappro-\\npriate at the imposition of the initial sentence and yet to apply\\nthe rule in downstream hearings aimed at modifying that sen-\\ntence.\\n Phillips argues that as a practical reality, when judges de-\\ncide whether to revoke supervised release and (if so) how\\nmuch prison time to impose, they are more focused on the\\nnew offense than on the underlying crime of conviction. But\\nthey are entitled to take the entire record into account at the\\ntime of revocation, not simply the facts as they existed at the\\ntime of the original sentence. That appears to be what hap-\\npened for Phillips when the judge mentioned the ongoing\\n“heroin epidemic” as a justification for her sentence. And the\\nfact remains that as a legal matter, the Supreme Court has\\nmade crystal clear that revocation relates back to, and is a\\n\\f6 No. 18-1372\\n\\nfunction of, the sentence for the original offense. Ruling for\\nPhillips would therefore call Brimah into question. As Phillips\\nacknowledges, his position would also put us in direct con-\\nflict with every other court of appeals to consider the ques-\\ntion. See United States v. Hebert, 201 F.3d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir.\\n2000) (holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to supervised\\nrelease); United States v. Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 394 (4th Cir.\\n1999) (same); see also United States v. Charles, 531 F.3d 637, 640\\n(8th Cir. 2008) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to\\nsupervised release in the absence of a showing of police har-\\nassment); United States v. Montez, 952 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir.\\n1992) (same). We decline to create such a split, nor need we\\naddress the exceptions contemplated by the Fifth and Eighth\\nCircuits, as there has been no showing of harassment in this\\ncase.\\n Phillips suggested at oral argument that the main purpose\\nof this appeal was to preserve this issue for Supreme Court\\nreview. That he has done. But until the Supreme Court ad-\\ndresses the point, his arguments in this court are foreclosed.\\nThe judgment of the district court is\\n\\n\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":264,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4585416,"string":"4,585,416"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Juan Cervantes v. Ardagh Group"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3536"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐3536 \\nJUAN CERVANTES, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nARDAGH GROUP, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:16‐cv‐11080 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and BARRETT, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Juan Cervantes brought this action \\nagainst his employer, Ardagh Group (“Ardagh”), alleging \\nviolations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 \\nU.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 \\nILCS 5/1‐101 et seq. (“IHRA”). The complaint asserted that \\nArdagh had refused to promote him, had issued him per‐\\nformance warnings, and had demoted him because of his \\n\\f2 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nrace and national origin and in retaliation for previous com‐\\nplaints about discrimination and harassment. The district \\ncourt granted summary judgment in favor of Ardagh. \\n The district court’s decision is correct. Mr. Cervantes did \\nnot exhaust his administrative remedies for his discrimina‐\\ntion claims. His retaliation claim also must fail because there \\nis no evidence of a causal connection between any protected \\nactivity by Mr. Cervantes and an adverse employment action \\nby Ardagh. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the dis‐\\ntrict court. \\n I \\n BACKGROUND \\n Mr. Cervantes began his career at Ardagh in 1991 as a \\npallet loader. He was promoted to fork lift driver in 1998 \\nand to electro‐mechanic in 2000. His complaint followed an \\nincident that took place in 2015. Taking the facts in the light \\n 1\\nmost favorable to Mr. Cervantes, on June 20, 2015, after \\ncompleting his shift, he remained at the Ardagh facility to \\nassist his father, a fellow Ardagh employee, with fixing a \\nmachine. During this second shift, supervisor Katina Stewart \\nattempted to call Mr. Cervantes on his radio, but could not \\nreach him. When Stewart located Mr. Cervantes in the facili‐\\nty, he explained that he had not responded to the radio calls \\nbecause he was not working a second shift; he was only stay‐\\n \\n1 The relevant facts are contested. On review of the district court’s grant \\n\\nof summary judgment for Ardagh, we resolve any disputed facts in fa‐\\nvor of the non‐moving party, Mr. Cervantes, and “draw[] all reasonable \\ninferences from the facts in his favor.” Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, \\n627 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 3\\n\\ning past his shift to help his father. Stewart informed \\nMr. Cervantes that if he was not accepting assignments for \\nthe second shift, he must leave the facility. He eventually \\ncomplied. Stewart reported the incident, and Mr. Cervantes \\nwas written up for insubordination and temporarily sus‐\\npended. Following an investigation, Ardagh demoted \\nMr. Cervantes from electro‐mechanic to forklift driver. \\n On September 3, 2015, Mr. Cervantes filed a charge with \\nthe Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”). In the \\nsection of the form titled “Discrimination Based On,” Mr. \\nCervantes checked only the box for “Retaliation.”2 He did \\nnot check the box for race, national origin, or any other basis \\nof discrimination. The IDHR commenced an investigation \\ninto his allegations, seeking additional information from \\nMr. Cervantes and from Ardagh. By March 31, 2016, Mr. \\nCervantes had retained counsel, who sent a letter to IDHR \\non his behalf in response to the agency’s questions about the \\ncharge. On July 13, 2016, the IDHR dismissed Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes’s charge, finding a lack of substantial evidence to support \\nhis allegations. \\n On December 5, 2016, Mr. Cervantes filed a complaint in \\nthe district court. He alleged that Ardagh had violated Title \\nVII and the IHRA by failing to promote him, issuing him \\nperformance warnings, and demoting him based on his race \\nand national origin and in retaliation for his previous com‐\\nplaints about harassment and discrimination. Ardagh \\n\\n\\n\\n \\n2 See R.32 at 4 (Mr. Cervantes’s IDHR Charge (Sept. 3, 2015)). \\n\\f4 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nmoved for summary judgment on all claims, and the district \\ncourt granted that motion.3 \\n The district court first determined that Mr. Cervantes \\ncould not proceed on his claims for race and national origin \\ndiscrimination because he had failed to exhaust his adminis‐\\ntrative remedies and because these allegations were not rea‐\\nsonably related to his retaliation charge. The district court \\nthen concluded that Mr. Cervantes had failed to state a claim \\nfor retaliation because he had not established that he en‐\\ngaged in protected activity. He also failed to offer any evi‐\\ndence that his supervisors were aware of any complaints he \\nraised and therefore did not demonstrate a causal connec‐\\ntion between any protected activity and an adverse em‐\\nployment action. The district court entered judgment in fa‐\\nvor of Ardagh on November 14, 2017, and Mr. Cervantes \\ntimely appealed. \\n II \\n DISCUSSION \\n We review the district court’s grant of summary judg‐\\nment de novo. Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 \\n(7th Cir. 1996). “We will not resolve factual disputes or \\nweigh conflicting evidence,” but “will only determine \\nwhether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial.” Id. \\n 4\\nAs we noted earlier, this inquiry requires that we “view the \\n \\n3 In his complaint, Mr. Cervantes also asserted a claim under Illinois \\n\\nstate law for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court \\ngranted summary judgment for Ardagh on that claim, and Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes does not challenge that ruling in this appeal. \\n4 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 5\\n\\nevidence and draw all inferences in a way most favorable to \\nthe nonmoving party.” Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to \\nestablish the existence of an element essential to his case, one \\non which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, sum‐\\nmary judgment must be granted to the moving party.” Id. \\n A. \\n Mr. Cervantes first submits that the district court erred \\nwhen it determined that he had not exhausted his adminis‐\\ntrative remedies for his claims of discrimination based on \\nrace and national origin. We cannot accept this argument. \\n In general, a plaintiff can only bring claims under Title \\nVII or the IHRA that he has included in the original charge \\nfiled with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission \\n(“EEOC”) or the IDHR.5 Sitar v. Indiana Dep’t of Transp., 344 \\nF.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2003). This limitation serves two pur‐\\nposes. It affords the employer some notice of the conduct \\nunderlying the employee’s allegation. It also “affords the \\nagency and the employer an opportunity to attempt concilia‐\\ntion without resort to the courts.” Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., \\n966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992). \\n Here, Mr. Cervantes initially filed a charge with the \\nIDHR and checked only the box for discrimination based on \\nretaliation. He did not check the box for discrimination \\nbased on race, national origin, or any other protected charac‐\\nteristic. He described the “particulars” of his charge as fol‐\\nlows: \\n \\n5 The EEOC and the IDHR “have a work sharing arrangement providing \\n\\nthat a charge filed with one is deemed cross‐filed with the other.” \\nMcQueen v. City of Chi., 803 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902–03 (N.D. Ill. 2011). \\n\\f6 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\n I began my employment with Respondent \\n [Ardagh] in or around May 1991. My current \\n position is Forklift Driver. A family member \\n filed EEOC Charge No. 210‐1998‐00397 against \\n Respondent. During my employment, I have \\n been subjected to discipline, harassment, and I \\n have been demoted. \\n I believe I have been discriminated against in \\n retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil \\n Rights Act of 1964, as amended.6 \\n In his complaint, by contrast, he alleged that Ardagh had \\nfailed to promote him, had issued him performance warn‐\\nings, and had demoted him based on his race and national \\norigin. He further asserted that, after completing a four‐year \\napprenticeship and working as a “rotating shift mechanic” \\nfor several years, “because of his race, the decision makers at \\nthe company refused to promote him.”7 He alleged that he \\n“had previously complained to his superiors of discrimina‐\\ntion and harassment” based on his Hispanic background, \\nwhich “led to his superiors issuing poor job performance \\nwarnings, about which Cervantes filed grievances with the \\nunion because these warnings were retaliatory.”8 He added \\nthat “[t]hese superiors were Tom Jones, Maintenance Super‐\\nvisor, and Don Spells, Shift Supervisor.”9 \\n\\n \\n6 R.32 at 4. \\n\\n7 R.39‐4 ¶ 6. \\n\\n8 Id. ¶ 10. \\n\\n9 Id. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 7\\n\\n The district court concluded that the claims of discrimi‐\\nnation in Mr. Cervantes’s court complaint were outside the \\nscope of his retaliation charge filed with the IDHR. Mr. Cer‐\\nvantes contends, however, that his discrimination claims sat‐\\nisfy a recognized exception for “claims that are ‘like or rea‐\\nsonably related’ to the EEOC charge, and can be reasonably \\nexpected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the charg‐\\nes.” Sitar, 344 F.3d at 726 (quoting Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. \\nHosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc)). As \\na general matter, we do not consider a retaliation charge to \\nbe reasonably related to a discrimination claim. Id. The \\ncharge and the complaint may be reasonably related if, “at a \\nminimum,” they “describe the same circumstances and par‐\\nticipants.” Conner v. Illinois Dep’t of Natural Res., 413 F.3d 675, \\n680 (7th Cir. 2005). \\n Mr. Cervantes believes that his discrimination claims in \\nthis action are reasonably related to his retaliation charge \\nfiled with the IDHR because both involve the same entity \\n(Ardagh), the same conduct (his discipline and demotion), \\nand the same time frame (his tenure at Ardagh). These simi‐\\nlarities occur, however, at far too high a level of generality. \\nA simple comparison of his administrative retaliation charge \\nand his court discrimination complaint starkly reveals that \\nthey arise out of very different conduct in very different time \\nperiods. His administrative retaliation charge focuses on \\nconduct stemming from the 1998 EEOC charge filed by his \\nbrother. Mr. Cervantes’s discrimination complaint alleges \\nthat the adverse employment conduct was based on his race \\nand his own internal complaints about race and national \\norigin discrimination. The allegations in his complaint de‐\\nscribe different hostilities that arose at different times, e.g., \\nfollowing his apprenticeship, and that involved different in‐\\n\\f8 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\ndividuals, namely Jones and Spells. These allegations never \\nwere mentioned in the charge. The administrative retaliation \\ncharge therefore never gave Ardagh reasonable notice of \\nMr. Cervantes’s discrimination claims, nor did it provide \\nArdagh and the agency an opportunity to resolve his con‐\\ncerns before they ripened into this suit. \\n Mr. Cervantes further submits that the March 31, 2016 \\nletter from his attorney to the IDHR in response to an in‐\\nquiry from the agency expanded the scope of his charge. In \\nthe final section of the letter, titled “On the Basis of Retalia‐\\ntion,” his counsel wrote that, “After completing his 4 year \\napprenticeship program and working for several years as a \\nrotating shift mechanic,” Mr. Cervantes “desired to be \\nplaced on a straight day shift. Yet, because of his race, the \\ndecision makers at the company refused to promote him.”10 \\nHe added that Mr. Cervantes’s “family is of Hispanic back‐\\nground, and he felt that this was the reason he was not being \\npromoted at [Ardagh], despite being as qualified—or more \\nso—than those who were in fact being promoted.”11 \\n Even if we were to assume that this letter should have \\nalerted the agency investigators to the possibility of discrim‐\\nination, we must remember that his counsel submitted the \\nletter to the IDHR ex parte; it therefore did not provide \\nArdagh with any notice of Mr. Cervantes’s potential dis‐\\ncrimination claims. See O’Rourke v. Continental Cas. Co., 983 \\nF.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a follow‐up memo‐\\nrandum submitted by plaintiff to the EEOC did not enlarge \\n \\n10 R.39‐12 ¶ ZZ1. \\n\\n11 Id. ¶ ZZ4. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 9\\n\\nthe scope of his charge of discrimination to include a claim \\nfor retaliation because, even if his submission “should have \\nalerted the EEOC, [it] did nothing to alert the employer”). \\nFurthermore, the letter indicates that Mr. Cervantes’s attor‐\\nney understood these allegations to be part of a theory of \\ndiscrimination based on retaliation, as alleged in the IDHR \\ncharge, not a separate theory of discrimination based on race \\nand national origin. Where, as here, a plaintiff is assisted by \\ncounsel, it is “not unreasonable to require some additional \\nspecificity or detail as a condition precedent for permitting” \\nthe plaintiff to assert a claim that was not originally included \\nin the administrative charge. Rush, 966 F.2d at 1112. \\n Accordingly, we must conclude that Mr. Cervantes’s dis‐\\ncrimination claims were not within the scope of his retalia‐\\ntion charge, and that the district court properly granted \\nsummary judgment for Ardagh on those claims. \\n B. \\n We turn next to Mr. Cervantes’s retaliation claim. To \\nstate a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must \\n“present evidence of (1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a \\nmaterially adverse action taken by the employer; and (3) a \\ncausal connection between the two.” Volling v. Kurtz Para‐\\nmedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting \\nTurner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2010)). \\n Mr. Cervantes contends that he presented sufficient evi‐\\ndence to state a claim for retaliation. He alleged that he \\ncomplained internally at Ardagh about race and national \\norigin discrimination and that his supervisors subsequently \\ndisciplined and demoted him for those complaints. Howev‐\\ner, his deposition testimony clarified that he made his com‐\\n\\f10 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nplaints not to anyone at Ardagh but to the union president \\nand that he did not know whether the union president ever \\nbrought his concerns to the attention of anyone at Ardagh.12 \\nThe district court thus correctly concluded that Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law because he did \\nnot allege that he engaged in any protected activity. See, e.g., \\nGleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1147 (7th Cir. \\n1997) (holding that plaintiff did not engage in statutorily \\nprotected activity given that “she did not raise the subject of \\nsexual harassment to anyone in authority”). \\n Moreover, even if Mr. Cervantes has alleged that he en‐\\ngaged in protected activity, his retaliation claim still fails be‐\\ncause he conceded that none of his supervisors at Ardagh \\nwere aware of his complaints. Therefore, there is no “causal \\nconnection” between any protected activity and his disci‐\\npline and demotion. See, e.g., King v. Ford Motor Co., 872 F.2d \\n833, 842 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that plaintiff had “no \\nsupport for a claim of retaliation” because she failed to \\n“show[] that whoever was responsible for” her reassign‐\\nments and denials of overtime “was aware of her protected \\nactivity or was involved in the later actions”). \\n Finally, Mr. Cervantes maintains that disputed facts, \\nsuch as whether he agreed to work the second shift on June \\n20, 2015, and whether Ardagh properly trained him, pre‐\\nclude summary judgment on his retaliation claim. Because \\nany such issues are irrelevant to the undisputed facts that \\nMr. Cervantes did not complain about discrimination to an‐\\nyone at Ardagh and that his supervisors were not aware of \\n\\n \\n12 See R.44 at 8. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 11\\n\\nany complaints he may have made to the union, the district \\ncourt properly granted summary judgment for Ardagh. \\n Conclusion \\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the \\ndistrict court. \\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4362669/\", \"author_raw\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585416/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Juan Cervantes v. Ardagh Group\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐3536 \nJUAN CERVANTES, \n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \n v. \n\nARDAGH GROUP, \n Defendant‐Appellee. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \n No. 1:16‐cv‐11080 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and BARRETT, \nCircuit Judges. \n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Juan Cervantes brought this action \nagainst his employer, Ardagh Group (“Ardagh”), alleging \nviolations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 \nU.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 \nILCS 5/1‐101 et seq. (“IHRA”). The complaint asserted that \nArdagh had refused to promote him, had issued him per‐\nformance warnings, and had demoted him because of his \n\f2 No. 17‐3536 \n\nrace and national origin and in retaliation for previous com‐\nplaints about discrimination and harassment. The district \ncourt granted summary judgment in favor of Ardagh. \n The district court’s decision is correct. Mr. Cervantes did \nnot exhaust his administrative remedies for his discrimina‐\ntion claims. His retaliation claim also must fail because there \nis no evidence of a causal connection between any protected \nactivity by Mr. Cervantes and an adverse employment action \nby Ardagh. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the dis‐\ntrict court. \n I \n BACKGROUND \n Mr. Cervantes began his career at Ardagh in 1991 as a \npallet loader. He was promoted to fork lift driver in 1998 \nand to electro‐mechanic in 2000. His complaint followed an \nincident that took place in 2015. Taking the facts in the light \n 1\nmost favorable to Mr. Cervantes, on June 20, 2015, after \ncompleting his shift, he remained at the Ardagh facility to \nassist his father, a fellow Ardagh employee, with fixing a \nmachine. During this second shift, supervisor Katina Stewart \nattempted to call Mr. Cervantes on his radio, but could not \nreach him. When Stewart located Mr. Cervantes in the facili‐\nty, he explained that he had not responded to the radio calls \nbecause he was not working a second shift; he was only stay‐\n \n1 The relevant facts are contested. On review of the district court’s grant \n\nof summary judgment for Ardagh, we resolve any disputed facts in fa‐\nvor of the non‐moving party, Mr. Cervantes, and “draw[] all reasonable \ninferences from the facts in his favor.” Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, \n627 (7th Cir. 2016). \n\fNo. 17‐3536 3\n\ning past his shift to help his father. Stewart informed \nMr. Cervantes that if he was not accepting assignments for \nthe second shift, he must leave the facility. He eventually \ncomplied. Stewart reported the incident, and Mr. Cervantes \nwas written up for insubordination and temporarily sus‐\npended. Following an investigation, Ardagh demoted \nMr. Cervantes from electro‐mechanic to forklift driver. \n On September 3, 2015, Mr. Cervantes filed a charge with \nthe Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”). In the \nsection of the form titled “Discrimination Based On,” Mr. \nCervantes checked only the box for “Retaliation.”2 He did \nnot check the box for race, national origin, or any other basis \nof discrimination. The IDHR commenced an investigation \ninto his allegations, seeking additional information from \nMr. Cervantes and from Ardagh. By March 31, 2016, Mr. \nCervantes had retained counsel, who sent a letter to IDHR \non his behalf in response to the agency’s questions about the \ncharge. On July 13, 2016, the IDHR dismissed Mr. Cervan‐\ntes’s charge, finding a lack of substantial evidence to support \nhis allegations. \n On December 5, 2016, Mr. Cervantes filed a complaint in \nthe district court. He alleged that Ardagh had violated Title \nVII and the IHRA by failing to promote him, issuing him \nperformance warnings, and demoting him based on his race \nand national origin and in retaliation for his previous com‐\nplaints about harassment and discrimination. Ardagh \n\n\n\n \n2 See R.32 at 4 (Mr. Cervantes’s IDHR Charge (Sept. 3, 2015)). \n\f4 No. 17‐3536 \n\nmoved for summary judgment on all claims, and the district \ncourt granted that motion.3 \n The district court first determined that Mr. Cervantes \ncould not proceed on his claims for race and national origin \ndiscrimination because he had failed to exhaust his adminis‐\ntrative remedies and because these allegations were not rea‐\nsonably related to his retaliation charge. The district court \nthen concluded that Mr. Cervantes had failed to state a claim \nfor retaliation because he had not established that he en‐\ngaged in protected activity. He also failed to offer any evi‐\ndence that his supervisors were aware of any complaints he \nraised and therefore did not demonstrate a causal connec‐\ntion between any protected activity and an adverse em‐\nployment action. The district court entered judgment in fa‐\nvor of Ardagh on November 14, 2017, and Mr. Cervantes \ntimely appealed. \n II \n DISCUSSION \n We review the district court’s grant of summary judg‐\nment de novo. Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 \n(7th Cir. 1996). “We will not resolve factual disputes or \nweigh conflicting evidence,” but “will only determine \nwhether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial.” Id. \n 4\nAs we noted earlier, this inquiry requires that we “view the \n \n3 In his complaint, Mr. Cervantes also asserted a claim under Illinois \n\nstate law for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court \ngranted summary judgment for Ardagh on that claim, and Mr. Cervan‐\ntes does not challenge that ruling in this appeal. \n4 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. \n\fNo. 17‐3536 5\n\nevidence and draw all inferences in a way most favorable to \nthe nonmoving party.” Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to \nestablish the existence of an element essential to his case, one \non which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, sum‐\nmary judgment must be granted to the moving party.” Id. \n A. \n Mr. Cervantes first submits that the district court erred \nwhen it determined that he had not exhausted his adminis‐\ntrative remedies for his claims of discrimination based on \nrace and national origin. We cannot accept this argument. \n In general, a plaintiff can only bring claims under Title \nVII or the IHRA that he has included in the original charge \nfiled with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission \n(“EEOC”) or the IDHR.5 Sitar v. Indiana Dep’t of Transp., 344 \nF.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2003). This limitation serves two pur‐\nposes. It affords the employer some notice of the conduct \nunderlying the employee’s allegation. It also “affords the \nagency and the employer an opportunity to attempt concilia‐\ntion without resort to the courts.” Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., \n966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992). \n Here, Mr. Cervantes initially filed a charge with the \nIDHR and checked only the box for discrimination based on \nretaliation. He did not check the box for discrimination \nbased on race, national origin, or any other protected charac‐\nteristic. He described the “particulars” of his charge as fol‐\nlows: \n \n5 The EEOC and the IDHR “have a work sharing arrangement providing \n\nthat a charge filed with one is deemed cross‐filed with the other.” \nMcQueen v. City of Chi., 803 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902–03 (N.D. Ill. 2011). \n\f6 No. 17‐3536 \n\n I began my employment with Respondent \n [Ardagh] in or around May 1991. My current \n position is Forklift Driver. A family member \n filed EEOC Charge No. 210‐1998‐00397 against \n Respondent. During my employment, I have \n been subjected to discipline, harassment, and I \n have been demoted. \n I believe I have been discriminated against in \n retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil \n Rights Act of 1964, as amended.6 \n In his complaint, by contrast, he alleged that Ardagh had \nfailed to promote him, had issued him performance warn‐\nings, and had demoted him based on his race and national \norigin. He further asserted that, after completing a four‐year \napprenticeship and working as a “rotating shift mechanic” \nfor several years, “because of his race, the decision makers at \nthe company refused to promote him.”7 He alleged that he \n“had previously complained to his superiors of discrimina‐\ntion and harassment” based on his Hispanic background, \nwhich “led to his superiors issuing poor job performance \nwarnings, about which Cervantes filed grievances with the \nunion because these warnings were retaliatory.”8 He added \nthat “[t]hese superiors were Tom Jones, Maintenance Super‐\nvisor, and Don Spells, Shift Supervisor.”9 \n\n \n6 R.32 at 4. \n\n7 R.39‐4 ¶ 6. \n\n8 Id. ¶ 10. \n\n9 Id. \n\fNo. 17‐3536 7\n\n The district court concluded that the claims of discrimi‐\nnation in Mr. Cervantes’s court complaint were outside the \nscope of his retaliation charge filed with the IDHR. Mr. Cer‐\nvantes contends, however, that his discrimination claims sat‐\nisfy a recognized exception for “claims that are ‘like or rea‐\nsonably related’ to the EEOC charge, and can be reasonably \nexpected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the charg‐\nes.” Sitar, 344 F.3d at 726 (quoting Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. \nHosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc)). As \na general matter, we do not consider a retaliation charge to \nbe reasonably related to a discrimination claim. Id. The \ncharge and the complaint may be reasonably related if, “at a \nminimum,” they “describe the same circumstances and par‐\nticipants.” Conner v. Illinois Dep’t of Natural Res., 413 F.3d 675, \n680 (7th Cir. 2005). \n Mr. Cervantes believes that his discrimination claims in \nthis action are reasonably related to his retaliation charge \nfiled with the IDHR because both involve the same entity \n(Ardagh), the same conduct (his discipline and demotion), \nand the same time frame (his tenure at Ardagh). These simi‐\nlarities occur, however, at far too high a level of generality. \nA simple comparison of his administrative retaliation charge \nand his court discrimination complaint starkly reveals that \nthey arise out of very different conduct in very different time \nperiods. His administrative retaliation charge focuses on \nconduct stemming from the 1998 EEOC charge filed by his \nbrother. Mr. Cervantes’s discrimination complaint alleges \nthat the adverse employment conduct was based on his race \nand his own internal complaints about race and national \norigin discrimination. The allegations in his complaint de‐\nscribe different hostilities that arose at different times, e.g., \nfollowing his apprenticeship, and that involved different in‐\n\f8 No. 17‐3536 \n\ndividuals, namely Jones and Spells. These allegations never \nwere mentioned in the charge. The administrative retaliation \ncharge therefore never gave Ardagh reasonable notice of \nMr. Cervantes’s discrimination claims, nor did it provide \nArdagh and the agency an opportunity to resolve his con‐\ncerns before they ripened into this suit. \n Mr. Cervantes further submits that the March 31, 2016 \nletter from his attorney to the IDHR in response to an in‐\nquiry from the agency expanded the scope of his charge. In \nthe final section of the letter, titled “On the Basis of Retalia‐\ntion,” his counsel wrote that, “After completing his 4 year \napprenticeship program and working for several years as a \nrotating shift mechanic,” Mr. Cervantes “desired to be \nplaced on a straight day shift. Yet, because of his race, the \ndecision makers at the company refused to promote him.”10 \nHe added that Mr. Cervantes’s “family is of Hispanic back‐\nground, and he felt that this was the reason he was not being \npromoted at [Ardagh], despite being as qualified—or more \nso—than those who were in fact being promoted.”11 \n Even if we were to assume that this letter should have \nalerted the agency investigators to the possibility of discrim‐\nination, we must remember that his counsel submitted the \nletter to the IDHR ex parte; it therefore did not provide \nArdagh with any notice of Mr. Cervantes’s potential dis‐\ncrimination claims. See O’Rourke v. Continental Cas. Co., 983 \nF.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a follow‐up memo‐\nrandum submitted by plaintiff to the EEOC did not enlarge \n \n10 R.39‐12 ¶ ZZ1. \n\n11 Id. ¶ ZZ4. \n\fNo. 17‐3536 9\n\nthe scope of his charge of discrimination to include a claim \nfor retaliation because, even if his submission “should have \nalerted the EEOC, [it] did nothing to alert the employer”). \nFurthermore, the letter indicates that Mr. Cervantes’s attor‐\nney understood these allegations to be part of a theory of \ndiscrimination based on retaliation, as alleged in the IDHR \ncharge, not a separate theory of discrimination based on race \nand national origin. Where, as here, a plaintiff is assisted by \ncounsel, it is “not unreasonable to require some additional \nspecificity or detail as a condition precedent for permitting” \nthe plaintiff to assert a claim that was not originally included \nin the administrative charge. Rush, 966 F.2d at 1112. \n Accordingly, we must conclude that Mr. Cervantes’s dis‐\ncrimination claims were not within the scope of his retalia‐\ntion charge, and that the district court properly granted \nsummary judgment for Ardagh on those claims. \n B. \n We turn next to Mr. Cervantes’s retaliation claim. To \nstate a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must \n“present evidence of (1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a \nmaterially adverse action taken by the employer; and (3) a \ncausal connection between the two.” Volling v. Kurtz Para‐\nmedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting \nTurner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2010)). \n Mr. Cervantes contends that he presented sufficient evi‐\ndence to state a claim for retaliation. He alleged that he \ncomplained internally at Ardagh about race and national \norigin discrimination and that his supervisors subsequently \ndisciplined and demoted him for those complaints. Howev‐\ner, his deposition testimony clarified that he made his com‐\n\f10 No. 17‐3536 \n\nplaints not to anyone at Ardagh but to the union president \nand that he did not know whether the union president ever \nbrought his concerns to the attention of anyone at Ardagh.12 \nThe district court thus correctly concluded that Mr. Cervan‐\ntes’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law because he did \nnot allege that he engaged in any protected activity. See, e.g., \nGleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1147 (7th Cir. \n1997) (holding that plaintiff did not engage in statutorily \nprotected activity given that “she did not raise the subject of \nsexual harassment to anyone in authority”). \n Moreover, even if Mr. Cervantes has alleged that he en‐\ngaged in protected activity, his retaliation claim still fails be‐\ncause he conceded that none of his supervisors at Ardagh \nwere aware of his complaints. Therefore, there is no “causal \nconnection” between any protected activity and his disci‐\npline and demotion. See, e.g., King v. Ford Motor Co., 872 F.2d \n833, 842 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that plaintiff had “no \nsupport for a claim of retaliation” because she failed to \n“show[] that whoever was responsible for” her reassign‐\nments and denials of overtime “was aware of her protected \nactivity or was involved in the later actions”). \n Finally, Mr. Cervantes maintains that disputed facts, \nsuch as whether he agreed to work the second shift on June \n20, 2015, and whether Ardagh properly trained him, pre‐\nclude summary judgment on his retaliation claim. Because \nany such issues are irrelevant to the undisputed facts that \nMr. Cervantes did not complain about discrimination to an‐\nyone at Ardagh and that his supervisors were not aware of \n\n \n12 See R.44 at 8. \n\fNo. 17‐3536 11\n\nany complaints he may have made to the union, the district \ncourt properly granted summary judgment for Ardagh. \n Conclusion \n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the \ndistrict court. \n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Juan Cervantes v. Ardagh Group\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐3536 \\nJUAN CERVANTES, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nARDAGH GROUP, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:16‐cv‐11080 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and BARRETT, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Juan Cervantes brought this action \\nagainst his employer, Ardagh Group (“Ardagh”), alleging \\nviolations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 \\nU.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 \\nILCS 5/1‐101 et seq. (“IHRA”). The complaint asserted that \\nArdagh had refused to promote him, had issued him per‐\\nformance warnings, and had demoted him because of his \\n\\f2 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nrace and national origin and in retaliation for previous com‐\\nplaints about discrimination and harassment. The district \\ncourt granted summary judgment in favor of Ardagh. \\n The district court’s decision is correct. Mr. Cervantes did \\nnot exhaust his administrative remedies for his discrimina‐\\ntion claims. His retaliation claim also must fail because there \\nis no evidence of a causal connection between any protected \\nactivity by Mr. Cervantes and an adverse employment action \\nby Ardagh. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the dis‐\\ntrict court. \\n I \\n BACKGROUND \\n Mr. Cervantes began his career at Ardagh in 1991 as a \\npallet loader. He was promoted to fork lift driver in 1998 \\nand to electro‐mechanic in 2000. His complaint followed an \\nincident that took place in 2015. Taking the facts in the light \\n 1\\nmost favorable to Mr. Cervantes, on June 20, 2015, after \\ncompleting his shift, he remained at the Ardagh facility to \\nassist his father, a fellow Ardagh employee, with fixing a \\nmachine. During this second shift, supervisor Katina Stewart \\nattempted to call Mr. Cervantes on his radio, but could not \\nreach him. When Stewart located Mr. Cervantes in the facili‐\\nty, he explained that he had not responded to the radio calls \\nbecause he was not working a second shift; he was only stay‐\\n \\n1 The relevant facts are contested. On review of the district court’s grant \\n\\nof summary judgment for Ardagh, we resolve any disputed facts in fa‐\\nvor of the non‐moving party, Mr. Cervantes, and “draw[] all reasonable \\ninferences from the facts in his favor.” Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, \\n627 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 3\\n\\ning past his shift to help his father. Stewart informed \\nMr. Cervantes that if he was not accepting assignments for \\nthe second shift, he must leave the facility. He eventually \\ncomplied. Stewart reported the incident, and Mr. Cervantes \\nwas written up for insubordination and temporarily sus‐\\npended. Following an investigation, Ardagh demoted \\nMr. Cervantes from electro‐mechanic to forklift driver. \\n On September 3, 2015, Mr. Cervantes filed a charge with \\nthe Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”). In the \\nsection of the form titled “Discrimination Based On,” Mr. \\nCervantes checked only the box for “Retaliation.”2 He did \\nnot check the box for race, national origin, or any other basis \\nof discrimination. The IDHR commenced an investigation \\ninto his allegations, seeking additional information from \\nMr. Cervantes and from Ardagh. By March 31, 2016, Mr. \\nCervantes had retained counsel, who sent a letter to IDHR \\non his behalf in response to the agency’s questions about the \\ncharge. On July 13, 2016, the IDHR dismissed Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes’s charge, finding a lack of substantial evidence to support \\nhis allegations. \\n On December 5, 2016, Mr. Cervantes filed a complaint in \\nthe district court. He alleged that Ardagh had violated Title \\nVII and the IHRA by failing to promote him, issuing him \\nperformance warnings, and demoting him based on his race \\nand national origin and in retaliation for his previous com‐\\nplaints about harassment and discrimination. Ardagh \\n\\n\\n\\n \\n2 See R.32 at 4 (Mr. Cervantes’s IDHR Charge (Sept. 3, 2015)). \\n\\f4 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nmoved for summary judgment on all claims, and the district \\ncourt granted that motion.3 \\n The district court first determined that Mr. Cervantes \\ncould not proceed on his claims for race and national origin \\ndiscrimination because he had failed to exhaust his adminis‐\\ntrative remedies and because these allegations were not rea‐\\nsonably related to his retaliation charge. The district court \\nthen concluded that Mr. Cervantes had failed to state a claim \\nfor retaliation because he had not established that he en‐\\ngaged in protected activity. He also failed to offer any evi‐\\ndence that his supervisors were aware of any complaints he \\nraised and therefore did not demonstrate a causal connec‐\\ntion between any protected activity and an adverse em‐\\nployment action. The district court entered judgment in fa‐\\nvor of Ardagh on November 14, 2017, and Mr. Cervantes \\ntimely appealed. \\n II \\n DISCUSSION \\n We review the district court’s grant of summary judg‐\\nment de novo. Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 \\n(7th Cir. 1996). “We will not resolve factual disputes or \\nweigh conflicting evidence,” but “will only determine \\nwhether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial.” Id. \\n 4\\nAs we noted earlier, this inquiry requires that we “view the \\n \\n3 In his complaint, Mr. Cervantes also asserted a claim under Illinois \\n\\nstate law for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court \\ngranted summary judgment for Ardagh on that claim, and Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes does not challenge that ruling in this appeal. \\n4 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 5\\n\\nevidence and draw all inferences in a way most favorable to \\nthe nonmoving party.” Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to \\nestablish the existence of an element essential to his case, one \\non which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, sum‐\\nmary judgment must be granted to the moving party.” Id. \\n A. \\n Mr. Cervantes first submits that the district court erred \\nwhen it determined that he had not exhausted his adminis‐\\ntrative remedies for his claims of discrimination based on \\nrace and national origin. We cannot accept this argument. \\n In general, a plaintiff can only bring claims under Title \\nVII or the IHRA that he has included in the original charge \\nfiled with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission \\n(“EEOC”) or the IDHR.5 Sitar v. Indiana Dep’t of Transp., 344 \\nF.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2003). This limitation serves two pur‐\\nposes. It affords the employer some notice of the conduct \\nunderlying the employee’s allegation. It also “affords the \\nagency and the employer an opportunity to attempt concilia‐\\ntion without resort to the courts.” Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., \\n966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992). \\n Here, Mr. Cervantes initially filed a charge with the \\nIDHR and checked only the box for discrimination based on \\nretaliation. He did not check the box for discrimination \\nbased on race, national origin, or any other protected charac‐\\nteristic. He described the “particulars” of his charge as fol‐\\nlows: \\n \\n5 The EEOC and the IDHR “have a work sharing arrangement providing \\n\\nthat a charge filed with one is deemed cross‐filed with the other.” \\nMcQueen v. City of Chi., 803 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902–03 (N.D. Ill. 2011). \\n\\f6 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\n I began my employment with Respondent \\n [Ardagh] in or around May 1991. My current \\n position is Forklift Driver. A family member \\n filed EEOC Charge No. 210‐1998‐00397 against \\n Respondent. During my employment, I have \\n been subjected to discipline, harassment, and I \\n have been demoted. \\n I believe I have been discriminated against in \\n retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil \\n Rights Act of 1964, as amended.6 \\n In his complaint, by contrast, he alleged that Ardagh had \\nfailed to promote him, had issued him performance warn‐\\nings, and had demoted him based on his race and national \\norigin. He further asserted that, after completing a four‐year \\napprenticeship and working as a “rotating shift mechanic” \\nfor several years, “because of his race, the decision makers at \\nthe company refused to promote him.”7 He alleged that he \\n“had previously complained to his superiors of discrimina‐\\ntion and harassment” based on his Hispanic background, \\nwhich “led to his superiors issuing poor job performance \\nwarnings, about which Cervantes filed grievances with the \\nunion because these warnings were retaliatory.”8 He added \\nthat “[t]hese superiors were Tom Jones, Maintenance Super‐\\nvisor, and Don Spells, Shift Supervisor.”9 \\n\\n \\n6 R.32 at 4. \\n\\n7 R.39‐4 ¶ 6. \\n\\n8 Id. ¶ 10. \\n\\n9 Id. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 7\\n\\n The district court concluded that the claims of discrimi‐\\nnation in Mr. Cervantes’s court complaint were outside the \\nscope of his retaliation charge filed with the IDHR. Mr. Cer‐\\nvantes contends, however, that his discrimination claims sat‐\\nisfy a recognized exception for “claims that are ‘like or rea‐\\nsonably related’ to the EEOC charge, and can be reasonably \\nexpected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the charg‐\\nes.” Sitar, 344 F.3d at 726 (quoting Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. \\nHosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc)). As \\na general matter, we do not consider a retaliation charge to \\nbe reasonably related to a discrimination claim. Id. The \\ncharge and the complaint may be reasonably related if, “at a \\nminimum,” they “describe the same circumstances and par‐\\nticipants.” Conner v. Illinois Dep’t of Natural Res., 413 F.3d 675, \\n680 (7th Cir. 2005). \\n Mr. Cervantes believes that his discrimination claims in \\nthis action are reasonably related to his retaliation charge \\nfiled with the IDHR because both involve the same entity \\n(Ardagh), the same conduct (his discipline and demotion), \\nand the same time frame (his tenure at Ardagh). These simi‐\\nlarities occur, however, at far too high a level of generality. \\nA simple comparison of his administrative retaliation charge \\nand his court discrimination complaint starkly reveals that \\nthey arise out of very different conduct in very different time \\nperiods. His administrative retaliation charge focuses on \\nconduct stemming from the 1998 EEOC charge filed by his \\nbrother. Mr. Cervantes’s discrimination complaint alleges \\nthat the adverse employment conduct was based on his race \\nand his own internal complaints about race and national \\norigin discrimination. The allegations in his complaint de‐\\nscribe different hostilities that arose at different times, e.g., \\nfollowing his apprenticeship, and that involved different in‐\\n\\f8 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\ndividuals, namely Jones and Spells. These allegations never \\nwere mentioned in the charge. The administrative retaliation \\ncharge therefore never gave Ardagh reasonable notice of \\nMr. Cervantes’s discrimination claims, nor did it provide \\nArdagh and the agency an opportunity to resolve his con‐\\ncerns before they ripened into this suit. \\n Mr. Cervantes further submits that the March 31, 2016 \\nletter from his attorney to the IDHR in response to an in‐\\nquiry from the agency expanded the scope of his charge. In \\nthe final section of the letter, titled “On the Basis of Retalia‐\\ntion,” his counsel wrote that, “After completing his 4 year \\napprenticeship program and working for several years as a \\nrotating shift mechanic,” Mr. Cervantes “desired to be \\nplaced on a straight day shift. Yet, because of his race, the \\ndecision makers at the company refused to promote him.”10 \\nHe added that Mr. Cervantes’s “family is of Hispanic back‐\\nground, and he felt that this was the reason he was not being \\npromoted at [Ardagh], despite being as qualified—or more \\nso—than those who were in fact being promoted.”11 \\n Even if we were to assume that this letter should have \\nalerted the agency investigators to the possibility of discrim‐\\nination, we must remember that his counsel submitted the \\nletter to the IDHR ex parte; it therefore did not provide \\nArdagh with any notice of Mr. Cervantes’s potential dis‐\\ncrimination claims. See O’Rourke v. Continental Cas. Co., 983 \\nF.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a follow‐up memo‐\\nrandum submitted by plaintiff to the EEOC did not enlarge \\n \\n10 R.39‐12 ¶ ZZ1. \\n\\n11 Id. ¶ ZZ4. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 9\\n\\nthe scope of his charge of discrimination to include a claim \\nfor retaliation because, even if his submission “should have \\nalerted the EEOC, [it] did nothing to alert the employer”). \\nFurthermore, the letter indicates that Mr. Cervantes’s attor‐\\nney understood these allegations to be part of a theory of \\ndiscrimination based on retaliation, as alleged in the IDHR \\ncharge, not a separate theory of discrimination based on race \\nand national origin. Where, as here, a plaintiff is assisted by \\ncounsel, it is “not unreasonable to require some additional \\nspecificity or detail as a condition precedent for permitting” \\nthe plaintiff to assert a claim that was not originally included \\nin the administrative charge. Rush, 966 F.2d at 1112. \\n Accordingly, we must conclude that Mr. Cervantes’s dis‐\\ncrimination claims were not within the scope of his retalia‐\\ntion charge, and that the district court properly granted \\nsummary judgment for Ardagh on those claims. \\n B. \\n We turn next to Mr. Cervantes’s retaliation claim. To \\nstate a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must \\n“present evidence of (1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a \\nmaterially adverse action taken by the employer; and (3) a \\ncausal connection between the two.” Volling v. Kurtz Para‐\\nmedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting \\nTurner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2010)). \\n Mr. Cervantes contends that he presented sufficient evi‐\\ndence to state a claim for retaliation. He alleged that he \\ncomplained internally at Ardagh about race and national \\norigin discrimination and that his supervisors subsequently \\ndisciplined and demoted him for those complaints. Howev‐\\ner, his deposition testimony clarified that he made his com‐\\n\\f10 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nplaints not to anyone at Ardagh but to the union president \\nand that he did not know whether the union president ever \\nbrought his concerns to the attention of anyone at Ardagh.12 \\nThe district court thus correctly concluded that Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law because he did \\nnot allege that he engaged in any protected activity. See, e.g., \\nGleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1147 (7th Cir. \\n1997) (holding that plaintiff did not engage in statutorily \\nprotected activity given that “she did not raise the subject of \\nsexual harassment to anyone in authority”). \\n Moreover, even if Mr. Cervantes has alleged that he en‐\\ngaged in protected activity, his retaliation claim still fails be‐\\ncause he conceded that none of his supervisors at Ardagh \\nwere aware of his complaints. Therefore, there is no “causal \\nconnection” between any protected activity and his disci‐\\npline and demotion. See, e.g., King v. Ford Motor Co., 872 F.2d \\n833, 842 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that plaintiff had “no \\nsupport for a claim of retaliation” because she failed to \\n“show[] that whoever was responsible for” her reassign‐\\nments and denials of overtime “was aware of her protected \\nactivity or was involved in the later actions”). \\n Finally, Mr. Cervantes maintains that disputed facts, \\nsuch as whether he agreed to work the second shift on June \\n20, 2015, and whether Ardagh properly trained him, pre‐\\nclude summary judgment on his retaliation claim. Because \\nany such issues are irrelevant to the undisputed facts that \\nMr. Cervantes did not complain about discrimination to an‐\\nyone at Ardagh and that his supervisors were not aware of \\n\\n \\n12 See R.44 at 8. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 11\\n\\nany complaints he may have made to the union, the district \\ncourt properly granted summary judgment for Ardagh. \\n Conclusion \\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the \\ndistrict court. \\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":265,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4585455,"string":"4,585,455"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"TRUSTEES OF the SUBURBAN TEAMSTERS OF NORTHERN ILLINOIS PENSION FUND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. the E COMPANY, a Dissolved Illinois Corporation, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Trs. of the Suburban Teamsters of N. Ill. Pension Fund v. E Co."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2273"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Easterbrook, Barrett, Scudder\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2273\\nTRUSTEES OF THE SUBURBAN TEAMSTERS OF NORTHERN ILLINOIS\\nPENSION FUND,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nTHE E COMPANY, a dissolved Illinois Corporation, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-10323 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2019 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Under the terms of a collective\\nbargaining agreement, T&W Edmier Corporation regularly\\ncontributed on behalf of its employees to the Suburban\\nTeamsters of Northern Illinois Pension Fund. But in 2014\\nT&W ceased operations and cut off its pension contributions,\\nprompting the Pension Fund to assess withdrawal liability of\\n\\f2 No. 18-2273\\n\\n$640,900. The Pension Fund sought to collect payment by\\nmailing a notice of the withdrawal liability to T&W and\\nseveral affiliated entities, only to see their collection efforts\\nignored. The Trustees of the Pension Fund eventually sued to\\ncollect payment, and that action culminated in the district\\ncourt ordering T&W, along with several other individuals and\\nentities under common control, to pay the withdrawal\\nliability. Now seeking to vacate the district court’s judgment,\\nT&W and the other defendants argue that their due process\\nrights were violated when the Pension Fund initiated\\ncollection of the withdrawal liability by mailing notice to\\nsome but not all of them. Seeing no error, we affirm.\\n I\\n T&W Edmier Corporation operated a construction\\nbusiness in tandem with The E Company. T&W owned the\\nconstruction equipment while The E Company hired and\\nprovided employees. Brothers Thomas and William Edmier\\neach owned 50% of T&W. Kevin Edmier, William’s son,\\nowned and operated The E Company. Pursuant to the terms\\nof a collective bargaining agreement with its employees, T&W\\nparticipated in the Suburban Teamsters of Northern Illinois\\nmulti-employer pension plan, and, for its part, The E\\nCompany agreed to assume joint and several liability for\\nT&W’s obligations to the Pension Fund. In 2014, however,\\nT&W and The E Company ceased operations, dissolved, and\\nwithdrew from the plan.\\n The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments to the Em-\\nployee Retirement Income Security Act require a covered plan\\nto assess withdrawal liability against a withdrawing em-\\nployer. See 29 U.S.C. § 1396. Withdrawal liability, as its name\\nimplies, is designed to prevent shifting the financial burden\\n\\fNo. 18-2273 3\\n\\nof employees’ vested pension benefits to other employers in\\nthe multi-employer plan. We explained these principles at\\nsome length in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas\\nPension Fund v. Slotky, 956 F.2d 1369, 1371–72 (7th Cir. 1992).\\n Consistent with ERISA’s mandate, the Pension Fund\\nmailed a notice of withdrawal liability on April 30, 2015, a past\\ndue notice on August 17, 2015, and a default and acceleration\\nnotice on November 12, 2015. The notice went to T&W, The E\\nCompany, and the Edmier Corporation (another entity\\nwholly owned by Thomas Edmier). Even more specifically,\\nthe Pension Fund sent the notice to the attention of Thomas,\\nWilliam, and Kevin Edmier, as well as attorney George\\nGrumley, the registered agent of both T&W and The E\\nCompany. At their depositions, Thomas, William, and Kevin\\nEdmier acknowledged receiving the notice.\\n The Pension Fund’s notices went unanswered and, as a\\nresult, the Pension Fund’s Trustees initiated a lawsuit in the\\ndistrict court. Ignoring the Pension Fund’s requests for\\npayment had significant legal consequences for the\\ndefendants. Congress has required that all disputes over\\nwithdrawal liability be resolved through arbitration, see 29\\nU.S.C. § 1401(a)(1), and an employer’s failure to arbitrate\\nmeans “the plan can then immediately file suit to collect the\\nentire amount of withdrawal liability, and in that proceeding\\nthe employer will have forfeited any defenses it could have\\npresented to the arbitrator,” Nat’l Shopmen Pension Fund v.\\nDISA Industries, Inc., 653 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n Our case law has recognized a narrow exception to this\\ngeneral rule of forfeiture for a party who “had absolutely no\\nreason to believe that they might be deemed members of a\\ncontrolled group” but is nonetheless sued and alleged to be\\n\\f4 No. 18-2273\\n\\nliable for another party’s withdrawal liability based on\\nERISA’s “controlled group” provision. See Slotky, 956 F.2d at\\n1373. The controlled group provision imputes liability to all\\n“trades or businesses” under “common control” with another\\nparty who is liable for the withdrawal liability. See 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 1301(b)(1). And our decision in Slotky allows unsuspecting\\ndefendants who are sued in district court but had no idea they\\nmight be liable as members of a controlled group to litigate\\nthat question—membership in a controlled group. See 956\\nF.2d at 1373.\\n Relying on this framework, the district court concluded\\nthat T&W, The E Company, and the Edmier Corporation had\\nforfeited all defenses to liability, including the defense that\\nthey were not members of a controlled group, by failing to\\narbitrate after receiving the Pension Fund’s notice of with-\\ndrawal liability. This outcome reflected a straightforward ap-\\nplication of these defendants not complying with the clear ar-\\nbitration mandate in 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1).\\n As for each of the other defendants (Thomas, William, and\\nKevin Edmier; K. Edmier & Sons LLC; The William Edmier\\nTrust; Lake Street Realty, Inc.; and E&E Equipment & Leas-\\ning), the district court explained that they too had likely for-\\nfeited all defenses as they were not the type of unsuspecting\\ndefendant contemplated in Slotky. Put differently, the district\\ncourt reasoned that none of these defendants had such a cred-\\nible claim of surprise (at being a member of a controlled\\ngroup) to sidestep ERISA’s arbitration requirement. Regard-\\nless, the district court went further and determined as a fac-\\ntual matter that each of these defendants was a trade or busi-\\nness under common control with another party who received\\nthe notice of withdrawal liability. This reasoning finds strong\\n\\fNo. 18-2273 5\\n\\nsupport in the record and resulted in the district court con-\\ncluding that each of these defendants was liable under\\nERISA’s controlled group provision.\\n In the end, the district court entered summary judgment\\nfor the Pension Fund’s Trustees and ordered the defendants\\nto pay the full $640,900 of withdrawal liability, plus interest,\\nliquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. As members of\\na controlled group, each of the defendants became jointly and\\nseverally liable for payment. See Central States, Southeast and\\nSouthwest Areas Pension Fund v. Koder, 969 F.2d 451, 452 (7th\\nCir. 1992) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1)).\\n II\\n The defendants challenge the district court’s judgment by\\narguing that the Pension Fund’s notice of withdrawal liability\\nviolated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In their\\nview, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mullane v. Central\\nHanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) required the\\nPension Fund to serve the notice of withdrawal liability on\\neach of them and to explain the standard for controlled group\\nliability under ERISA in the notice. This contention misses the\\nmark.\\n The defendants’ reliance on Mullane is misplaced because\\nall parties agree that judicial proceedings commenced in the\\ndistrict court with proper service of process (notice of the\\ncomplaint) to each defendant. The due process standard an-\\nnounced in Mullane—a decision requiring sufficient notice of\\na pending judicial proceeding—was therefore satisfied. No\\nreading of Mullane, however, supports the view that ERISA’s\\ncontrolled group liability provisions and accompanying\\n\\f6 No. 18-2273\\n\\nprocedural framework (in which a defendant forfeits certain\\ndefenses by failing to arbitrate) violate due process.\\n A related observation is in order. The defendants colloqui-\\nally and imprecisely allege a violation of due process, time\\nand again citing Mullane. In no way, shape, or form did any\\ndue process violation occur here. The defendants who re-\\nceived—but chose to ignore—the notice of withdrawal liabil-\\nity had every opportunity to arbitrate and yet failed to do so,\\nresulting, by operation of ERISA, in a waiver of all defenses\\nto withdrawal liability. No unfairness inheres in that out-\\ncome. And, as for the defendants who did not receive the no-\\ntice of withdrawal liability but nonetheless found themselves\\nnamed in a federal lawsuit, the district court provided them a\\nfull and fair opportunity to litigate their liability as members\\nof a controlled group. Nothing about the path those defend-\\nants traveled offends due process.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4362708/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585455/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: TRUSTEES OF the SUBURBAN TEAMSTERS OF NORTHERN ILLINOIS PENSION FUND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. the E COMPANY, a Dissolved Illinois Corporation, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2273\nTRUSTEES OF THE SUBURBAN TEAMSTERS OF NORTHERN ILLINOIS\nPENSION FUND,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nTHE E COMPANY, a dissolved Illinois Corporation, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellants.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:15-cv-10323 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2019 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit\nJudges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Under the terms of a collective\nbargaining agreement, T&W Edmier Corporation regularly\ncontributed on behalf of its employees to the Suburban\nTeamsters of Northern Illinois Pension Fund. But in 2014\nT&W ceased operations and cut off its pension contributions,\nprompting the Pension Fund to assess withdrawal liability of\n\f2 No. 18-2273\n\n$640,900. The Pension Fund sought to collect payment by\nmailing a notice of the withdrawal liability to T&W and\nseveral affiliated entities, only to see their collection efforts\nignored. The Trustees of the Pension Fund eventually sued to\ncollect payment, and that action culminated in the district\ncourt ordering T&W, along with several other individuals and\nentities under common control, to pay the withdrawal\nliability. Now seeking to vacate the district court’s judgment,\nT&W and the other defendants argue that their due process\nrights were violated when the Pension Fund initiated\ncollection of the withdrawal liability by mailing notice to\nsome but not all of them. Seeing no error, we affirm.\n I\n T&W Edmier Corporation operated a construction\nbusiness in tandem with The E Company. T&W owned the\nconstruction equipment while The E Company hired and\nprovided employees. Brothers Thomas and William Edmier\neach owned 50% of T&W. Kevin Edmier, William’s son,\nowned and operated The E Company. Pursuant to the terms\nof a collective bargaining agreement with its employees, T&W\nparticipated in the Suburban Teamsters of Northern Illinois\nmulti-employer pension plan, and, for its part, The E\nCompany agreed to assume joint and several liability for\nT&W’s obligations to the Pension Fund. In 2014, however,\nT&W and The E Company ceased operations, dissolved, and\nwithdrew from the plan.\n The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments to the Em-\nployee Retirement Income Security Act require a covered plan\nto assess withdrawal liability against a withdrawing em-\nployer. See 29 U.S.C. § 1396. Withdrawal liability, as its name\nimplies, is designed to prevent shifting the financial burden\n\fNo. 18-2273 3\n\nof employees’ vested pension benefits to other employers in\nthe multi-employer plan. We explained these principles at\nsome length in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas\nPension Fund v. Slotky, 956 F.2d 1369, 1371–72 (7th Cir. 1992).\n Consistent with ERISA’s mandate, the Pension Fund\nmailed a notice of withdrawal liability on April 30, 2015, a past\ndue notice on August 17, 2015, and a default and acceleration\nnotice on November 12, 2015. The notice went to T&W, The E\nCompany, and the Edmier Corporation (another entity\nwholly owned by Thomas Edmier). Even more specifically,\nthe Pension Fund sent the notice to the attention of Thomas,\nWilliam, and Kevin Edmier, as well as attorney George\nGrumley, the registered agent of both T&W and The E\nCompany. At their depositions, Thomas, William, and Kevin\nEdmier acknowledged receiving the notice.\n The Pension Fund’s notices went unanswered and, as a\nresult, the Pension Fund’s Trustees initiated a lawsuit in the\ndistrict court. Ignoring the Pension Fund’s requests for\npayment had significant legal consequences for the\ndefendants. Congress has required that all disputes over\nwithdrawal liability be resolved through arbitration, see 29\nU.S.C. § 1401(a)(1), and an employer’s failure to arbitrate\nmeans “the plan can then immediately file suit to collect the\nentire amount of withdrawal liability, and in that proceeding\nthe employer will have forfeited any defenses it could have\npresented to the arbitrator,” Nat’l Shopmen Pension Fund v.\nDISA Industries, Inc., 653 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2011).\n Our case law has recognized a narrow exception to this\ngeneral rule of forfeiture for a party who “had absolutely no\nreason to believe that they might be deemed members of a\ncontrolled group” but is nonetheless sued and alleged to be\n\f4 No. 18-2273\n\nliable for another party’s withdrawal liability based on\nERISA’s “controlled group” provision. See Slotky, 956 F.2d at\n1373. The controlled group provision imputes liability to all\n“trades or businesses” under “common control” with another\nparty who is liable for the withdrawal liability. See 29 U.S.C.\n§ 1301(b)(1). And our decision in Slotky allows unsuspecting\ndefendants who are sued in district court but had no idea they\nmight be liable as members of a controlled group to litigate\nthat question—membership in a controlled group. See 956\nF.2d at 1373.\n Relying on this framework, the district court concluded\nthat T&W, The E Company, and the Edmier Corporation had\nforfeited all defenses to liability, including the defense that\nthey were not members of a controlled group, by failing to\narbitrate after receiving the Pension Fund’s notice of with-\ndrawal liability. This outcome reflected a straightforward ap-\nplication of these defendants not complying with the clear ar-\nbitration mandate in 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1).\n As for each of the other defendants (Thomas, William, and\nKevin Edmier; K. Edmier & Sons LLC; The William Edmier\nTrust; Lake Street Realty, Inc.; and E&E Equipment & Leas-\ning), the district court explained that they too had likely for-\nfeited all defenses as they were not the type of unsuspecting\ndefendant contemplated in Slotky. Put differently, the district\ncourt reasoned that none of these defendants had such a cred-\nible claim of surprise (at being a member of a controlled\ngroup) to sidestep ERISA’s arbitration requirement. Regard-\nless, the district court went further and determined as a fac-\ntual matter that each of these defendants was a trade or busi-\nness under common control with another party who received\nthe notice of withdrawal liability. This reasoning finds strong\n\fNo. 18-2273 5\n\nsupport in the record and resulted in the district court con-\ncluding that each of these defendants was liable under\nERISA’s controlled group provision.\n In the end, the district court entered summary judgment\nfor the Pension Fund’s Trustees and ordered the defendants\nto pay the full $640,900 of withdrawal liability, plus interest,\nliquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. As members of\na controlled group, each of the defendants became jointly and\nseverally liable for payment. See Central States, Southeast and\nSouthwest Areas Pension Fund v. Koder, 969 F.2d 451, 452 (7th\nCir. 1992) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1)).\n II\n The defendants challenge the district court’s judgment by\narguing that the Pension Fund’s notice of withdrawal liability\nviolated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In their\nview, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mullane v. Central\nHanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) required the\nPension Fund to serve the notice of withdrawal liability on\neach of them and to explain the standard for controlled group\nliability under ERISA in the notice. This contention misses the\nmark.\n The defendants’ reliance on Mullane is misplaced because\nall parties agree that judicial proceedings commenced in the\ndistrict court with proper service of process (notice of the\ncomplaint) to each defendant. The due process standard an-\nnounced in Mullane—a decision requiring sufficient notice of\na pending judicial proceeding—was therefore satisfied. No\nreading of Mullane, however, supports the view that ERISA’s\ncontrolled group liability provisions and accompanying\n\f6 No. 18-2273\n\nprocedural framework (in which a defendant forfeits certain\ndefenses by failing to arbitrate) violate due process.\n A related observation is in order. The defendants colloqui-\nally and imprecisely allege a violation of due process, time\nand again citing Mullane. In no way, shape, or form did any\ndue process violation occur here. The defendants who re-\nceived—but chose to ignore—the notice of withdrawal liabil-\nity had every opportunity to arbitrate and yet failed to do so,\nresulting, by operation of ERISA, in a waiver of all defenses\nto withdrawal liability. No unfairness inheres in that out-\ncome. And, as for the defendants who did not receive the no-\ntice of withdrawal liability but nonetheless found themselves\nnamed in a federal lawsuit, the district court provided them a\nfull and fair opportunity to litigate their liability as members\nof a controlled group. Nothing about the path those defend-\nants traveled offends due process.\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: TRUSTEES OF the SUBURBAN TEAMSTERS OF NORTHERN ILLINOIS PENSION FUND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. the E COMPANY, a Dissolved Illinois Corporation, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2273\\nTRUSTEES OF THE SUBURBAN TEAMSTERS OF NORTHERN ILLINOIS\\nPENSION FUND,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nTHE E COMPANY, a dissolved Illinois Corporation, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-10323 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2019 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Under the terms of a collective\\nbargaining agreement, T&W Edmier Corporation regularly\\ncontributed on behalf of its employees to the Suburban\\nTeamsters of Northern Illinois Pension Fund. But in 2014\\nT&W ceased operations and cut off its pension contributions,\\nprompting the Pension Fund to assess withdrawal liability of\\n\\f2 No. 18-2273\\n\\n$640,900. The Pension Fund sought to collect payment by\\nmailing a notice of the withdrawal liability to T&W and\\nseveral affiliated entities, only to see their collection efforts\\nignored. The Trustees of the Pension Fund eventually sued to\\ncollect payment, and that action culminated in the district\\ncourt ordering T&W, along with several other individuals and\\nentities under common control, to pay the withdrawal\\nliability. Now seeking to vacate the district court’s judgment,\\nT&W and the other defendants argue that their due process\\nrights were violated when the Pension Fund initiated\\ncollection of the withdrawal liability by mailing notice to\\nsome but not all of them. Seeing no error, we affirm.\\n I\\n T&W Edmier Corporation operated a construction\\nbusiness in tandem with The E Company. T&W owned the\\nconstruction equipment while The E Company hired and\\nprovided employees. Brothers Thomas and William Edmier\\neach owned 50% of T&W. Kevin Edmier, William’s son,\\nowned and operated The E Company. Pursuant to the terms\\nof a collective bargaining agreement with its employees, T&W\\nparticipated in the Suburban Teamsters of Northern Illinois\\nmulti-employer pension plan, and, for its part, The E\\nCompany agreed to assume joint and several liability for\\nT&W’s obligations to the Pension Fund. In 2014, however,\\nT&W and The E Company ceased operations, dissolved, and\\nwithdrew from the plan.\\n The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments to the Em-\\nployee Retirement Income Security Act require a covered plan\\nto assess withdrawal liability against a withdrawing em-\\nployer. See 29 U.S.C. § 1396. Withdrawal liability, as its name\\nimplies, is designed to prevent shifting the financial burden\\n\\fNo. 18-2273 3\\n\\nof employees’ vested pension benefits to other employers in\\nthe multi-employer plan. We explained these principles at\\nsome length in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas\\nPension Fund v. Slotky, 956 F.2d 1369, 1371–72 (7th Cir. 1992).\\n Consistent with ERISA’s mandate, the Pension Fund\\nmailed a notice of withdrawal liability on April 30, 2015, a past\\ndue notice on August 17, 2015, and a default and acceleration\\nnotice on November 12, 2015. The notice went to T&W, The E\\nCompany, and the Edmier Corporation (another entity\\nwholly owned by Thomas Edmier). Even more specifically,\\nthe Pension Fund sent the notice to the attention of Thomas,\\nWilliam, and Kevin Edmier, as well as attorney George\\nGrumley, the registered agent of both T&W and The E\\nCompany. At their depositions, Thomas, William, and Kevin\\nEdmier acknowledged receiving the notice.\\n The Pension Fund’s notices went unanswered and, as a\\nresult, the Pension Fund’s Trustees initiated a lawsuit in the\\ndistrict court. Ignoring the Pension Fund’s requests for\\npayment had significant legal consequences for the\\ndefendants. Congress has required that all disputes over\\nwithdrawal liability be resolved through arbitration, see 29\\nU.S.C. § 1401(a)(1), and an employer’s failure to arbitrate\\nmeans “the plan can then immediately file suit to collect the\\nentire amount of withdrawal liability, and in that proceeding\\nthe employer will have forfeited any defenses it could have\\npresented to the arbitrator,” Nat’l Shopmen Pension Fund v.\\nDISA Industries, Inc., 653 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n Our case law has recognized a narrow exception to this\\ngeneral rule of forfeiture for a party who “had absolutely no\\nreason to believe that they might be deemed members of a\\ncontrolled group” but is nonetheless sued and alleged to be\\n\\f4 No. 18-2273\\n\\nliable for another party’s withdrawal liability based on\\nERISA’s “controlled group” provision. See Slotky, 956 F.2d at\\n1373. The controlled group provision imputes liability to all\\n“trades or businesses” under “common control” with another\\nparty who is liable for the withdrawal liability. See 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 1301(b)(1). And our decision in Slotky allows unsuspecting\\ndefendants who are sued in district court but had no idea they\\nmight be liable as members of a controlled group to litigate\\nthat question—membership in a controlled group. See 956\\nF.2d at 1373.\\n Relying on this framework, the district court concluded\\nthat T&W, The E Company, and the Edmier Corporation had\\nforfeited all defenses to liability, including the defense that\\nthey were not members of a controlled group, by failing to\\narbitrate after receiving the Pension Fund’s notice of with-\\ndrawal liability. This outcome reflected a straightforward ap-\\nplication of these defendants not complying with the clear ar-\\nbitration mandate in 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1).\\n As for each of the other defendants (Thomas, William, and\\nKevin Edmier; K. Edmier & Sons LLC; The William Edmier\\nTrust; Lake Street Realty, Inc.; and E&E Equipment & Leas-\\ning), the district court explained that they too had likely for-\\nfeited all defenses as they were not the type of unsuspecting\\ndefendant contemplated in Slotky. Put differently, the district\\ncourt reasoned that none of these defendants had such a cred-\\nible claim of surprise (at being a member of a controlled\\ngroup) to sidestep ERISA’s arbitration requirement. Regard-\\nless, the district court went further and determined as a fac-\\ntual matter that each of these defendants was a trade or busi-\\nness under common control with another party who received\\nthe notice of withdrawal liability. This reasoning finds strong\\n\\fNo. 18-2273 5\\n\\nsupport in the record and resulted in the district court con-\\ncluding that each of these defendants was liable under\\nERISA’s controlled group provision.\\n In the end, the district court entered summary judgment\\nfor the Pension Fund’s Trustees and ordered the defendants\\nto pay the full $640,900 of withdrawal liability, plus interest,\\nliquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. As members of\\na controlled group, each of the defendants became jointly and\\nseverally liable for payment. See Central States, Southeast and\\nSouthwest Areas Pension Fund v. Koder, 969 F.2d 451, 452 (7th\\nCir. 1992) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1)).\\n II\\n The defendants challenge the district court’s judgment by\\narguing that the Pension Fund’s notice of withdrawal liability\\nviolated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In their\\nview, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mullane v. Central\\nHanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) required the\\nPension Fund to serve the notice of withdrawal liability on\\neach of them and to explain the standard for controlled group\\nliability under ERISA in the notice. This contention misses the\\nmark.\\n The defendants’ reliance on Mullane is misplaced because\\nall parties agree that judicial proceedings commenced in the\\ndistrict court with proper service of process (notice of the\\ncomplaint) to each defendant. The due process standard an-\\nnounced in Mullane—a decision requiring sufficient notice of\\na pending judicial proceeding—was therefore satisfied. No\\nreading of Mullane, however, supports the view that ERISA’s\\ncontrolled group liability provisions and accompanying\\n\\f6 No. 18-2273\\n\\nprocedural framework (in which a defendant forfeits certain\\ndefenses by failing to arbitrate) violate due process.\\n A related observation is in order. The defendants colloqui-\\nally and imprecisely allege a violation of due process, time\\nand again citing Mullane. In no way, shape, or form did any\\ndue process violation occur here. The defendants who re-\\nceived—but chose to ignore—the notice of withdrawal liabil-\\nity had every opportunity to arbitrate and yet failed to do so,\\nresulting, by operation of ERISA, in a waiver of all defenses\\nto withdrawal liability. No unfairness inheres in that out-\\ncome. And, as for the defendants who did not receive the no-\\ntice of withdrawal liability but nonetheless found themselves\\nnamed in a federal lawsuit, the district court provided them a\\nfull and fair opportunity to litigate their liability as members\\nof a controlled group. Nothing about the path those defend-\\nants traveled offends due process.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":266,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4585456,"string":"4,585,456"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Juan Cervantes v. Ardagh Group"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3536"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐3536 \\nJUAN CERVANTES, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nARDAGH GROUP, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:16‐cv‐11080 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and BARRETT, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Juan Cervantes brought this action \\nagainst his employer, Ardagh Group (“Ardagh”), alleging \\nviolations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 \\nU.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 \\nILCS 5/1‐101 et seq. (“IHRA”). The complaint asserted that \\nArdagh had refused to promote him, had issued him per‐\\nformance warnings, and had demoted him because of his \\n\\f2 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nrace and national origin and in retaliation for previous com‐\\nplaints about discrimination and harassment. The district \\ncourt granted summary judgment in favor of Ardagh. \\n The district court’s decision is correct. Mr. Cervantes did \\nnot exhaust his administrative remedies for his discrimina‐\\ntion claims. His retaliation claim also must fail because there \\nis no evidence of a causal connection between any protected \\nactivity by Mr. Cervantes and an adverse employment action \\nby Ardagh. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the dis‐\\ntrict court. \\n I \\n BACKGROUND \\n Mr. Cervantes began his career at Ardagh in 1991 as a \\npallet loader. He was promoted to fork lift driver in 1998 \\nand to electro‐mechanic in 2000. His complaint followed an \\nincident that took place in 2015. Taking the facts in the light \\n 1\\nmost favorable to Mr. Cervantes, on June 20, 2015, after \\ncompleting his shift, he remained at the Ardagh facility to \\nassist his father, a fellow Ardagh employee, with fixing a \\nmachine. During this second shift, supervisor Katina Stewart \\nattempted to call Mr. Cervantes on his radio, but could not \\nreach him. When Stewart located Mr. Cervantes in the facili‐\\nty, he explained that he had not responded to the radio calls \\nbecause he was not working a second shift; he was only stay‐\\n \\n1 The relevant facts are contested. On review of the district court’s grant \\n\\nof summary judgment for Ardagh, we resolve any disputed facts in fa‐\\nvor of the non‐moving party, Mr. Cervantes, and “draw[] all reasonable \\ninferences from the facts in his favor.” Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, \\n627 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 3\\n\\ning past his shift to help his father. Stewart informed \\nMr. Cervantes that if he was not accepting assignments for \\nthe second shift, he must leave the facility. He eventually \\ncomplied. Stewart reported the incident, and Mr. Cervantes \\nwas written up for insubordination and temporarily sus‐\\npended. Following an investigation, Ardagh demoted \\nMr. Cervantes from electro‐mechanic to forklift driver. \\n On September 3, 2015, Mr. Cervantes filed a charge with \\nthe Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”). In the \\nsection of the form titled “Discrimination Based On,” Mr. \\nCervantes checked only the box for “Retaliation.”2 He did \\nnot check the box for race, national origin, or any other basis \\nof discrimination. The IDHR commenced an investigation \\ninto his allegations, seeking additional information from \\nMr. Cervantes and from Ardagh. By March 31, 2016, Mr. \\nCervantes had retained counsel, who sent a letter to IDHR \\non his behalf in response to the agency’s questions about the \\ncharge. On July 13, 2016, the IDHR dismissed Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes’s charge, finding a lack of substantial evidence to support \\nhis allegations. \\n On December 5, 2016, Mr. Cervantes filed a complaint in \\nthe district court. He alleged that Ardagh had violated Title \\nVII and the IHRA by failing to promote him, issuing him \\nperformance warnings, and demoting him based on his race \\nand national origin and in retaliation for his previous com‐\\nplaints about harassment and discrimination. Ardagh \\n\\n\\n\\n \\n2 See R.32 at 4 (Mr. Cervantes’s IDHR Charge (Sept. 3, 2015)). \\n\\f4 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nmoved for summary judgment on all claims, and the district \\ncourt granted that motion.3 \\n The district court first determined that Mr. Cervantes \\ncould not proceed on his claims for race and national origin \\ndiscrimination because he had failed to exhaust his adminis‐\\ntrative remedies and because these allegations were not rea‐\\nsonably related to his retaliation charge. The district court \\nthen concluded that Mr. Cervantes had failed to state a claim \\nfor retaliation because he had not established that he en‐\\ngaged in protected activity. He also failed to offer any evi‐\\ndence that his supervisors were aware of any complaints he \\nraised and therefore did not demonstrate a causal connec‐\\ntion between any protected activity and an adverse em‐\\nployment action. The district court entered judgment in fa‐\\nvor of Ardagh on November 14, 2017, and Mr. Cervantes \\ntimely appealed. \\n II \\n DISCUSSION \\n We review the district court’s grant of summary judg‐\\nment de novo. Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 \\n(7th Cir. 1996). “We will not resolve factual disputes or \\nweigh conflicting evidence,” but “will only determine \\nwhether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial.” Id. \\n 4\\nAs we noted earlier, this inquiry requires that we “view the \\n \\n3 In his complaint, Mr. Cervantes also asserted a claim under Illinois \\n\\nstate law for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court \\ngranted summary judgment for Ardagh on that claim, and Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes does not challenge that ruling in this appeal. \\n4 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 5\\n\\nevidence and draw all inferences in a way most favorable to \\nthe nonmoving party.” Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to \\nestablish the existence of an element essential to his case, one \\non which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, sum‐\\nmary judgment must be granted to the moving party.” Id. \\n A. \\n Mr. Cervantes first submits that the district court erred \\nwhen it determined that he had not exhausted his adminis‐\\ntrative remedies for his claims of discrimination based on \\nrace and national origin. We cannot accept this argument. \\n In general, a plaintiff can only bring claims under Title \\nVII or the IHRA that he has included in the original charge \\nfiled with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission \\n(“EEOC”) or the IDHR.5 Sitar v. Indiana Dep’t of Transp., 344 \\nF.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2003). This limitation serves two pur‐\\nposes. It affords the employer some notice of the conduct \\nunderlying the employee’s allegation. It also “affords the \\nagency and the employer an opportunity to attempt concilia‐\\ntion without resort to the courts.” Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., \\n966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992). \\n Here, Mr. Cervantes initially filed a charge with the \\nIDHR and checked only the box for discrimination based on \\nretaliation. He did not check the box for discrimination \\nbased on race, national origin, or any other protected charac‐\\nteristic. He described the “particulars” of his charge as fol‐\\nlows: \\n \\n5 The EEOC and the IDHR “have a work sharing arrangement providing \\n\\nthat a charge filed with one is deemed cross‐filed with the other.” \\nMcQueen v. City of Chi., 803 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902–03 (N.D. Ill. 2011). \\n\\f6 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\n I began my employment with Respondent \\n [Ardagh] in or around May 1991. My current \\n position is Forklift Driver. A family member \\n filed EEOC Charge No. 210‐1998‐00397 against \\n Respondent. During my employment, I have \\n been subjected to discipline, harassment, and I \\n have been demoted. \\n I believe I have been discriminated against in \\n retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil \\n Rights Act of 1964, as amended.6 \\n In his complaint, by contrast, he alleged that Ardagh had \\nfailed to promote him, had issued him performance warn‐\\nings, and had demoted him based on his race and national \\norigin. He further asserted that, after completing a four‐year \\napprenticeship and working as a “rotating shift mechanic” \\nfor several years, “because of his race, the decision makers at \\nthe company refused to promote him.”7 He alleged that he \\n“had previously complained to his superiors of discrimina‐\\ntion and harassment” based on his Hispanic background, \\nwhich “led to his superiors issuing poor job performance \\nwarnings, about which Cervantes filed grievances with the \\nunion because these warnings were retaliatory.”8 He added \\nthat “[t]hese superiors were Tom Jones, Maintenance Super‐\\nvisor, and Don Spells, Shift Supervisor.”9 \\n\\n \\n6 R.32 at 4. \\n\\n7 R.39‐4 ¶ 6. \\n\\n8 Id. ¶ 10. \\n\\n9 Id. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 7\\n\\n The district court concluded that the claims of discrimi‐\\nnation in Mr. Cervantes’s court complaint were outside the \\nscope of his retaliation charge filed with the IDHR. Mr. Cer‐\\nvantes contends, however, that his discrimination claims sat‐\\nisfy a recognized exception for “claims that are ‘like or rea‐\\nsonably related’ to the EEOC charge, and can be reasonably \\nexpected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the charg‐\\nes.” Sitar, 344 F.3d at 726 (quoting Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. \\nHosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc)). As \\na general matter, we do not consider a retaliation charge to \\nbe reasonably related to a discrimination claim. Id. The \\ncharge and the complaint may be reasonably related if, “at a \\nminimum,” they “describe the same circumstances and par‐\\nticipants.” Conner v. Illinois Dep’t of Natural Res., 413 F.3d 675, \\n680 (7th Cir. 2005). \\n Mr. Cervantes believes that his discrimination claims in \\nthis action are reasonably related to his retaliation charge \\nfiled with the IDHR because both involve the same entity \\n(Ardagh), the same conduct (his discipline and demotion), \\nand the same time frame (his tenure at Ardagh). These simi‐\\nlarities occur, however, at far too high a level of generality. \\nA simple comparison of his administrative retaliation charge \\nand his court discrimination complaint starkly reveals that \\nthey arise out of very different conduct in very different time \\nperiods. His administrative retaliation charge focuses on \\nconduct stemming from the 1998 EEOC charge filed by his \\nbrother. Mr. Cervantes’s discrimination complaint alleges \\nthat the adverse employment conduct was based on his race \\nand his own internal complaints about race and national \\norigin discrimination. The allegations in his complaint de‐\\nscribe different hostilities that arose at different times, e.g., \\nfollowing his apprenticeship, and that involved different in‐\\n\\f8 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\ndividuals, namely Jones and Spells. These allegations never \\nwere mentioned in the charge. The administrative retaliation \\ncharge therefore never gave Ardagh reasonable notice of \\nMr. Cervantes’s discrimination claims, nor did it provide \\nArdagh and the agency an opportunity to resolve his con‐\\ncerns before they ripened into this suit. \\n Mr. Cervantes further submits that the March 31, 2016 \\nletter from his attorney to the IDHR in response to an in‐\\nquiry from the agency expanded the scope of his charge. In \\nthe final section of the letter, titled “On the Basis of Retalia‐\\ntion,” his counsel wrote that, “After completing his 4 year \\napprenticeship program and working for several years as a \\nrotating shift mechanic,” Mr. Cervantes “desired to be \\nplaced on a straight day shift. Yet, because of his race, the \\ndecision makers at the company refused to promote him.”10 \\nHe added that Mr. Cervantes’s “family is of Hispanic back‐\\nground, and he felt that this was the reason he was not being \\npromoted at [Ardagh], despite being as qualified—or more \\nso—than those who were in fact being promoted.”11 \\n Even if we were to assume that this letter should have \\nalerted the agency investigators to the possibility of discrim‐\\nination, we must remember that his counsel submitted the \\nletter to the IDHR ex parte; it therefore did not provide \\nArdagh with any notice of Mr. Cervantes’s potential dis‐\\ncrimination claims. See O’Rourke v. Continental Cas. Co., 983 \\nF.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a follow‐up memo‐\\nrandum submitted by plaintiff to the EEOC did not enlarge \\n \\n10 R.39‐12 ¶ ZZ1. \\n\\n11 Id. ¶ ZZ4. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 9\\n\\nthe scope of his charge of discrimination to include a claim \\nfor retaliation because, even if his submission “should have \\nalerted the EEOC, [it] did nothing to alert the employer”). \\nFurthermore, the letter indicates that Mr. Cervantes’s attor‐\\nney understood these allegations to be part of a theory of \\ndiscrimination based on retaliation, as alleged in the IDHR \\ncharge, not a separate theory of discrimination based on race \\nand national origin. Where, as here, a plaintiff is assisted by \\ncounsel, it is “not unreasonable to require some additional \\nspecificity or detail as a condition precedent for permitting” \\nthe plaintiff to assert a claim that was not originally included \\nin the administrative charge. Rush, 966 F.2d at 1112. \\n Accordingly, we must conclude that Mr. Cervantes’s dis‐\\ncrimination claims were not within the scope of his retalia‐\\ntion charge, and that the district court properly granted \\nsummary judgment for Ardagh on those claims. \\n B. \\n We turn next to Mr. Cervantes’s retaliation claim. To \\nstate a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must \\n“present evidence of (1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a \\nmaterially adverse action taken by the employer; and (3) a \\ncausal connection between the two.” Volling v. Kurtz Para‐\\nmedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting \\nTurner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2010)). \\n Mr. Cervantes contends that he presented sufficient evi‐\\ndence to state a claim for retaliation. He alleged that he \\ncomplained internally at Ardagh about race and national \\norigin discrimination and that his supervisors subsequently \\ndisciplined and demoted him for those complaints. Howev‐\\ner, his deposition testimony clarified that he made his com‐\\n\\f10 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nplaints not to anyone at Ardagh but to the union president \\nand that he did not know whether the union president ever \\nbrought his concerns to the attention of anyone at Ardagh.12 \\nThe district court thus correctly concluded that Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law because he did \\nnot allege that he engaged in any protected activity. See, e.g., \\nGleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1147 (7th Cir. \\n1997) (holding that plaintiff did not engage in statutorily \\nprotected activity given that “she did not raise the subject of \\nsexual harassment to anyone in authority”). \\n Moreover, even if Mr. Cervantes has alleged that he en‐\\ngaged in protected activity, his retaliation claim still fails be‐\\ncause he conceded that none of his supervisors at Ardagh \\nwere aware of his complaints. Therefore, there is no “causal \\nconnection” between any protected activity and his disci‐\\npline and demotion. See, e.g., King v. Ford Motor Co., 872 F.2d \\n833, 842 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that plaintiff had “no \\nsupport for a claim of retaliation” because she failed to \\n“show[] that whoever was responsible for” her reassign‐\\nments and denials of overtime “was aware of her protected \\nactivity or was involved in the later actions”). \\n Finally, Mr. Cervantes maintains that disputed facts, \\nsuch as whether he agreed to work the second shift on June \\n20, 2015, and whether Ardagh properly trained him, pre‐\\nclude summary judgment on his retaliation claim. Because \\nany such issues are irrelevant to the undisputed facts that \\nMr. Cervantes did not complain about discrimination to an‐\\nyone at Ardagh and that his supervisors were not aware of \\n\\n \\n12 See R.44 at 8. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 11\\n\\nany complaints he may have made to the union, the district \\ncourt properly granted summary judgment for Ardagh. \\n Conclusion \\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the \\ndistrict court. \\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4362709/\", \"author_raw\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585456/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Juan Cervantes v. Ardagh Group\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐3536 \nJUAN CERVANTES, \n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \n v. \n\nARDAGH GROUP, \n Defendant‐Appellee. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \n No. 1:16‐cv‐11080 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and BARRETT, \nCircuit Judges. \n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Juan Cervantes brought this action \nagainst his employer, Ardagh Group (“Ardagh”), alleging \nviolations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 \nU.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 \nILCS 5/1‐101 et seq. (“IHRA”). The complaint asserted that \nArdagh had refused to promote him, had issued him per‐\nformance warnings, and had demoted him because of his \n\f2 No. 17‐3536 \n\nrace and national origin and in retaliation for previous com‐\nplaints about discrimination and harassment. The district \ncourt granted summary judgment in favor of Ardagh. \n The district court’s decision is correct. Mr. Cervantes did \nnot exhaust his administrative remedies for his discrimina‐\ntion claims. His retaliation claim also must fail because there \nis no evidence of a causal connection between any protected \nactivity by Mr. Cervantes and an adverse employment action \nby Ardagh. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the dis‐\ntrict court. \n I \n BACKGROUND \n Mr. Cervantes began his career at Ardagh in 1991 as a \npallet loader. He was promoted to fork lift driver in 1998 \nand to electro‐mechanic in 2000. His complaint followed an \nincident that took place in 2015. Taking the facts in the light \n 1\nmost favorable to Mr. Cervantes, on June 20, 2015, after \ncompleting his shift, he remained at the Ardagh facility to \nassist his father, a fellow Ardagh employee, with fixing a \nmachine. During this second shift, supervisor Katina Stewart \nattempted to call Mr. Cervantes on his radio, but could not \nreach him. When Stewart located Mr. Cervantes in the facili‐\nty, he explained that he had not responded to the radio calls \nbecause he was not working a second shift; he was only stay‐\n \n1 The relevant facts are contested. On review of the district court’s grant \n\nof summary judgment for Ardagh, we resolve any disputed facts in fa‐\nvor of the non‐moving party, Mr. Cervantes, and “draw[] all reasonable \ninferences from the facts in his favor.” Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, \n627 (7th Cir. 2016). \n\fNo. 17‐3536 3\n\ning past his shift to help his father. Stewart informed \nMr. Cervantes that if he was not accepting assignments for \nthe second shift, he must leave the facility. He eventually \ncomplied. Stewart reported the incident, and Mr. Cervantes \nwas written up for insubordination and temporarily sus‐\npended. Following an investigation, Ardagh demoted \nMr. Cervantes from electro‐mechanic to forklift driver. \n On September 3, 2015, Mr. Cervantes filed a charge with \nthe Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”). In the \nsection of the form titled “Discrimination Based On,” Mr. \nCervantes checked only the box for “Retaliation.”2 He did \nnot check the box for race, national origin, or any other basis \nof discrimination. The IDHR commenced an investigation \ninto his allegations, seeking additional information from \nMr. Cervantes and from Ardagh. By March 31, 2016, Mr. \nCervantes had retained counsel, who sent a letter to IDHR \non his behalf in response to the agency’s questions about the \ncharge. On July 13, 2016, the IDHR dismissed Mr. Cervan‐\ntes’s charge, finding a lack of substantial evidence to support \nhis allegations. \n On December 5, 2016, Mr. Cervantes filed a complaint in \nthe district court. He alleged that Ardagh had violated Title \nVII and the IHRA by failing to promote him, issuing him \nperformance warnings, and demoting him based on his race \nand national origin and in retaliation for his previous com‐\nplaints about harassment and discrimination. Ardagh \n\n\n\n \n2 See R.32 at 4 (Mr. Cervantes’s IDHR Charge (Sept. 3, 2015)). \n\f4 No. 17‐3536 \n\nmoved for summary judgment on all claims, and the district \ncourt granted that motion.3 \n The district court first determined that Mr. Cervantes \ncould not proceed on his claims for race and national origin \ndiscrimination because he had failed to exhaust his adminis‐\ntrative remedies and because these allegations were not rea‐\nsonably related to his retaliation charge. The district court \nthen concluded that Mr. Cervantes had failed to state a claim \nfor retaliation because he had not established that he en‐\ngaged in protected activity. He also failed to offer any evi‐\ndence that his supervisors were aware of any complaints he \nraised and therefore did not demonstrate a causal connec‐\ntion between any protected activity and an adverse em‐\nployment action. The district court entered judgment in fa‐\nvor of Ardagh on November 14, 2017, and Mr. Cervantes \ntimely appealed. \n II \n DISCUSSION \n We review the district court’s grant of summary judg‐\nment de novo. Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 \n(7th Cir. 1996). “We will not resolve factual disputes or \nweigh conflicting evidence,” but “will only determine \nwhether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial.” Id. \n 4\nAs we noted earlier, this inquiry requires that we “view the \n \n3 In his complaint, Mr. Cervantes also asserted a claim under Illinois \n\nstate law for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court \ngranted summary judgment for Ardagh on that claim, and Mr. Cervan‐\ntes does not challenge that ruling in this appeal. \n4 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. \n\fNo. 17‐3536 5\n\nevidence and draw all inferences in a way most favorable to \nthe nonmoving party.” Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to \nestablish the existence of an element essential to his case, one \non which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, sum‐\nmary judgment must be granted to the moving party.” Id. \n A. \n Mr. Cervantes first submits that the district court erred \nwhen it determined that he had not exhausted his adminis‐\ntrative remedies for his claims of discrimination based on \nrace and national origin. We cannot accept this argument. \n In general, a plaintiff can only bring claims under Title \nVII or the IHRA that he has included in the original charge \nfiled with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission \n(“EEOC”) or the IDHR.5 Sitar v. Indiana Dep’t of Transp., 344 \nF.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2003). This limitation serves two pur‐\nposes. It affords the employer some notice of the conduct \nunderlying the employee’s allegation. It also “affords the \nagency and the employer an opportunity to attempt concilia‐\ntion without resort to the courts.” Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., \n966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992). \n Here, Mr. Cervantes initially filed a charge with the \nIDHR and checked only the box for discrimination based on \nretaliation. He did not check the box for discrimination \nbased on race, national origin, or any other protected charac‐\nteristic. He described the “particulars” of his charge as fol‐\nlows: \n \n5 The EEOC and the IDHR “have a work sharing arrangement providing \n\nthat a charge filed with one is deemed cross‐filed with the other.” \nMcQueen v. City of Chi., 803 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902–03 (N.D. Ill. 2011). \n\f6 No. 17‐3536 \n\n I began my employment with Respondent \n [Ardagh] in or around May 1991. My current \n position is Forklift Driver. A family member \n filed EEOC Charge No. 210‐1998‐00397 against \n Respondent. During my employment, I have \n been subjected to discipline, harassment, and I \n have been demoted. \n I believe I have been discriminated against in \n retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil \n Rights Act of 1964, as amended.6 \n In his complaint, by contrast, he alleged that Ardagh had \nfailed to promote him, had issued him performance warn‐\nings, and had demoted him based on his race and national \norigin. He further asserted that, after completing a four‐year \napprenticeship and working as a “rotating shift mechanic” \nfor several years, “because of his race, the decision makers at \nthe company refused to promote him.”7 He alleged that he \n“had previously complained to his superiors of discrimina‐\ntion and harassment” based on his Hispanic background, \nwhich “led to his superiors issuing poor job performance \nwarnings, about which Cervantes filed grievances with the \nunion because these warnings were retaliatory.”8 He added \nthat “[t]hese superiors were Tom Jones, Maintenance Super‐\nvisor, and Don Spells, Shift Supervisor.”9 \n\n \n6 R.32 at 4. \n\n7 R.39‐4 ¶ 6. \n\n8 Id. ¶ 10. \n\n9 Id. \n\fNo. 17‐3536 7\n\n The district court concluded that the claims of discrimi‐\nnation in Mr. Cervantes’s court complaint were outside the \nscope of his retaliation charge filed with the IDHR. Mr. Cer‐\nvantes contends, however, that his discrimination claims sat‐\nisfy a recognized exception for “claims that are ‘like or rea‐\nsonably related’ to the EEOC charge, and can be reasonably \nexpected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the charg‐\nes.” Sitar, 344 F.3d at 726 (quoting Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. \nHosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc)). As \na general matter, we do not consider a retaliation charge to \nbe reasonably related to a discrimination claim. Id. The \ncharge and the complaint may be reasonably related if, “at a \nminimum,” they “describe the same circumstances and par‐\nticipants.” Conner v. Illinois Dep’t of Natural Res., 413 F.3d 675, \n680 (7th Cir. 2005). \n Mr. Cervantes believes that his discrimination claims in \nthis action are reasonably related to his retaliation charge \nfiled with the IDHR because both involve the same entity \n(Ardagh), the same conduct (his discipline and demotion), \nand the same time frame (his tenure at Ardagh). These simi‐\nlarities occur, however, at far too high a level of generality. \nA simple comparison of his administrative retaliation charge \nand his court discrimination complaint starkly reveals that \nthey arise out of very different conduct in very different time \nperiods. His administrative retaliation charge focuses on \nconduct stemming from the 1998 EEOC charge filed by his \nbrother. Mr. Cervantes’s discrimination complaint alleges \nthat the adverse employment conduct was based on his race \nand his own internal complaints about race and national \norigin discrimination. The allegations in his complaint de‐\nscribe different hostilities that arose at different times, e.g., \nfollowing his apprenticeship, and that involved different in‐\n\f8 No. 17‐3536 \n\ndividuals, namely Jones and Spells. These allegations never \nwere mentioned in the charge. The administrative retaliation \ncharge therefore never gave Ardagh reasonable notice of \nMr. Cervantes’s discrimination claims, nor did it provide \nArdagh and the agency an opportunity to resolve his con‐\ncerns before they ripened into this suit. \n Mr. Cervantes further submits that the March 31, 2016 \nletter from his attorney to the IDHR in response to an in‐\nquiry from the agency expanded the scope of his charge. In \nthe final section of the letter, titled “On the Basis of Retalia‐\ntion,” his counsel wrote that, “After completing his 4 year \napprenticeship program and working for several years as a \nrotating shift mechanic,” Mr. Cervantes “desired to be \nplaced on a straight day shift. Yet, because of his race, the \ndecision makers at the company refused to promote him.”10 \nHe added that Mr. Cervantes’s “family is of Hispanic back‐\nground, and he felt that this was the reason he was not being \npromoted at [Ardagh], despite being as qualified—or more \nso—than those who were in fact being promoted.”11 \n Even if we were to assume that this letter should have \nalerted the agency investigators to the possibility of discrim‐\nination, we must remember that his counsel submitted the \nletter to the IDHR ex parte; it therefore did not provide \nArdagh with any notice of Mr. Cervantes’s potential dis‐\ncrimination claims. See O’Rourke v. Continental Cas. Co., 983 \nF.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a follow‐up memo‐\nrandum submitted by plaintiff to the EEOC did not enlarge \n \n10 R.39‐12 ¶ ZZ1. \n\n11 Id. ¶ ZZ4. \n\fNo. 17‐3536 9\n\nthe scope of his charge of discrimination to include a claim \nfor retaliation because, even if his submission “should have \nalerted the EEOC, [it] did nothing to alert the employer”). \nFurthermore, the letter indicates that Mr. Cervantes’s attor‐\nney understood these allegations to be part of a theory of \ndiscrimination based on retaliation, as alleged in the IDHR \ncharge, not a separate theory of discrimination based on race \nand national origin. Where, as here, a plaintiff is assisted by \ncounsel, it is “not unreasonable to require some additional \nspecificity or detail as a condition precedent for permitting” \nthe plaintiff to assert a claim that was not originally included \nin the administrative charge. Rush, 966 F.2d at 1112. \n Accordingly, we must conclude that Mr. Cervantes’s dis‐\ncrimination claims were not within the scope of his retalia‐\ntion charge, and that the district court properly granted \nsummary judgment for Ardagh on those claims. \n B. \n We turn next to Mr. Cervantes’s retaliation claim. To \nstate a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must \n“present evidence of (1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a \nmaterially adverse action taken by the employer; and (3) a \ncausal connection between the two.” Volling v. Kurtz Para‐\nmedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting \nTurner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2010)). \n Mr. Cervantes contends that he presented sufficient evi‐\ndence to state a claim for retaliation. He alleged that he \ncomplained internally at Ardagh about race and national \norigin discrimination and that his supervisors subsequently \ndisciplined and demoted him for those complaints. Howev‐\ner, his deposition testimony clarified that he made his com‐\n\f10 No. 17‐3536 \n\nplaints not to anyone at Ardagh but to the union president \nand that he did not know whether the union president ever \nbrought his concerns to the attention of anyone at Ardagh.12 \nThe district court thus correctly concluded that Mr. Cervan‐\ntes’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law because he did \nnot allege that he engaged in any protected activity. See, e.g., \nGleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1147 (7th Cir. \n1997) (holding that plaintiff did not engage in statutorily \nprotected activity given that “she did not raise the subject of \nsexual harassment to anyone in authority”). \n Moreover, even if Mr. Cervantes has alleged that he en‐\ngaged in protected activity, his retaliation claim still fails be‐\ncause he conceded that none of his supervisors at Ardagh \nwere aware of his complaints. Therefore, there is no “causal \nconnection” between any protected activity and his disci‐\npline and demotion. See, e.g., King v. Ford Motor Co., 872 F.2d \n833, 842 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that plaintiff had “no \nsupport for a claim of retaliation” because she failed to \n“show[] that whoever was responsible for” her reassign‐\nments and denials of overtime “was aware of her protected \nactivity or was involved in the later actions”). \n Finally, Mr. Cervantes maintains that disputed facts, \nsuch as whether he agreed to work the second shift on June \n20, 2015, and whether Ardagh properly trained him, pre‐\nclude summary judgment on his retaliation claim. Because \nany such issues are irrelevant to the undisputed facts that \nMr. Cervantes did not complain about discrimination to an‐\nyone at Ardagh and that his supervisors were not aware of \n\n \n12 See R.44 at 8. \n\fNo. 17‐3536 11\n\nany complaints he may have made to the union, the district \ncourt properly granted summary judgment for Ardagh. \n Conclusion \n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the \ndistrict court. \n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Juan Cervantes v. Ardagh Group\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐3536 \\nJUAN CERVANTES, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nARDAGH GROUP, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:16‐cv‐11080 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and BARRETT, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Juan Cervantes brought this action \\nagainst his employer, Ardagh Group (“Ardagh”), alleging \\nviolations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 \\nU.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 \\nILCS 5/1‐101 et seq. (“IHRA”). The complaint asserted that \\nArdagh had refused to promote him, had issued him per‐\\nformance warnings, and had demoted him because of his \\n\\f2 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nrace and national origin and in retaliation for previous com‐\\nplaints about discrimination and harassment. The district \\ncourt granted summary judgment in favor of Ardagh. \\n The district court’s decision is correct. Mr. Cervantes did \\nnot exhaust his administrative remedies for his discrimina‐\\ntion claims. His retaliation claim also must fail because there \\nis no evidence of a causal connection between any protected \\nactivity by Mr. Cervantes and an adverse employment action \\nby Ardagh. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the dis‐\\ntrict court. \\n I \\n BACKGROUND \\n Mr. Cervantes began his career at Ardagh in 1991 as a \\npallet loader. He was promoted to fork lift driver in 1998 \\nand to electro‐mechanic in 2000. His complaint followed an \\nincident that took place in 2015. Taking the facts in the light \\n 1\\nmost favorable to Mr. Cervantes, on June 20, 2015, after \\ncompleting his shift, he remained at the Ardagh facility to \\nassist his father, a fellow Ardagh employee, with fixing a \\nmachine. During this second shift, supervisor Katina Stewart \\nattempted to call Mr. Cervantes on his radio, but could not \\nreach him. When Stewart located Mr. Cervantes in the facili‐\\nty, he explained that he had not responded to the radio calls \\nbecause he was not working a second shift; he was only stay‐\\n \\n1 The relevant facts are contested. On review of the district court’s grant \\n\\nof summary judgment for Ardagh, we resolve any disputed facts in fa‐\\nvor of the non‐moving party, Mr. Cervantes, and “draw[] all reasonable \\ninferences from the facts in his favor.” Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, \\n627 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 3\\n\\ning past his shift to help his father. Stewart informed \\nMr. Cervantes that if he was not accepting assignments for \\nthe second shift, he must leave the facility. He eventually \\ncomplied. Stewart reported the incident, and Mr. Cervantes \\nwas written up for insubordination and temporarily sus‐\\npended. Following an investigation, Ardagh demoted \\nMr. Cervantes from electro‐mechanic to forklift driver. \\n On September 3, 2015, Mr. Cervantes filed a charge with \\nthe Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”). In the \\nsection of the form titled “Discrimination Based On,” Mr. \\nCervantes checked only the box for “Retaliation.”2 He did \\nnot check the box for race, national origin, or any other basis \\nof discrimination. The IDHR commenced an investigation \\ninto his allegations, seeking additional information from \\nMr. Cervantes and from Ardagh. By March 31, 2016, Mr. \\nCervantes had retained counsel, who sent a letter to IDHR \\non his behalf in response to the agency’s questions about the \\ncharge. On July 13, 2016, the IDHR dismissed Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes’s charge, finding a lack of substantial evidence to support \\nhis allegations. \\n On December 5, 2016, Mr. Cervantes filed a complaint in \\nthe district court. He alleged that Ardagh had violated Title \\nVII and the IHRA by failing to promote him, issuing him \\nperformance warnings, and demoting him based on his race \\nand national origin and in retaliation for his previous com‐\\nplaints about harassment and discrimination. Ardagh \\n\\n\\n\\n \\n2 See R.32 at 4 (Mr. Cervantes’s IDHR Charge (Sept. 3, 2015)). \\n\\f4 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nmoved for summary judgment on all claims, and the district \\ncourt granted that motion.3 \\n The district court first determined that Mr. Cervantes \\ncould not proceed on his claims for race and national origin \\ndiscrimination because he had failed to exhaust his adminis‐\\ntrative remedies and because these allegations were not rea‐\\nsonably related to his retaliation charge. The district court \\nthen concluded that Mr. Cervantes had failed to state a claim \\nfor retaliation because he had not established that he en‐\\ngaged in protected activity. He also failed to offer any evi‐\\ndence that his supervisors were aware of any complaints he \\nraised and therefore did not demonstrate a causal connec‐\\ntion between any protected activity and an adverse em‐\\nployment action. The district court entered judgment in fa‐\\nvor of Ardagh on November 14, 2017, and Mr. Cervantes \\ntimely appealed. \\n II \\n DISCUSSION \\n We review the district court’s grant of summary judg‐\\nment de novo. Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 \\n(7th Cir. 1996). “We will not resolve factual disputes or \\nweigh conflicting evidence,” but “will only determine \\nwhether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial.” Id. \\n 4\\nAs we noted earlier, this inquiry requires that we “view the \\n \\n3 In his complaint, Mr. Cervantes also asserted a claim under Illinois \\n\\nstate law for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court \\ngranted summary judgment for Ardagh on that claim, and Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes does not challenge that ruling in this appeal. \\n4 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 5\\n\\nevidence and draw all inferences in a way most favorable to \\nthe nonmoving party.” Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to \\nestablish the existence of an element essential to his case, one \\non which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, sum‐\\nmary judgment must be granted to the moving party.” Id. \\n A. \\n Mr. Cervantes first submits that the district court erred \\nwhen it determined that he had not exhausted his adminis‐\\ntrative remedies for his claims of discrimination based on \\nrace and national origin. We cannot accept this argument. \\n In general, a plaintiff can only bring claims under Title \\nVII or the IHRA that he has included in the original charge \\nfiled with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission \\n(“EEOC”) or the IDHR.5 Sitar v. Indiana Dep’t of Transp., 344 \\nF.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2003). This limitation serves two pur‐\\nposes. It affords the employer some notice of the conduct \\nunderlying the employee’s allegation. It also “affords the \\nagency and the employer an opportunity to attempt concilia‐\\ntion without resort to the courts.” Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., \\n966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992). \\n Here, Mr. Cervantes initially filed a charge with the \\nIDHR and checked only the box for discrimination based on \\nretaliation. He did not check the box for discrimination \\nbased on race, national origin, or any other protected charac‐\\nteristic. He described the “particulars” of his charge as fol‐\\nlows: \\n \\n5 The EEOC and the IDHR “have a work sharing arrangement providing \\n\\nthat a charge filed with one is deemed cross‐filed with the other.” \\nMcQueen v. City of Chi., 803 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902–03 (N.D. Ill. 2011). \\n\\f6 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\n I began my employment with Respondent \\n [Ardagh] in or around May 1991. My current \\n position is Forklift Driver. A family member \\n filed EEOC Charge No. 210‐1998‐00397 against \\n Respondent. During my employment, I have \\n been subjected to discipline, harassment, and I \\n have been demoted. \\n I believe I have been discriminated against in \\n retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil \\n Rights Act of 1964, as amended.6 \\n In his complaint, by contrast, he alleged that Ardagh had \\nfailed to promote him, had issued him performance warn‐\\nings, and had demoted him based on his race and national \\norigin. He further asserted that, after completing a four‐year \\napprenticeship and working as a “rotating shift mechanic” \\nfor several years, “because of his race, the decision makers at \\nthe company refused to promote him.”7 He alleged that he \\n“had previously complained to his superiors of discrimina‐\\ntion and harassment” based on his Hispanic background, \\nwhich “led to his superiors issuing poor job performance \\nwarnings, about which Cervantes filed grievances with the \\nunion because these warnings were retaliatory.”8 He added \\nthat “[t]hese superiors were Tom Jones, Maintenance Super‐\\nvisor, and Don Spells, Shift Supervisor.”9 \\n\\n \\n6 R.32 at 4. \\n\\n7 R.39‐4 ¶ 6. \\n\\n8 Id. ¶ 10. \\n\\n9 Id. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 7\\n\\n The district court concluded that the claims of discrimi‐\\nnation in Mr. Cervantes’s court complaint were outside the \\nscope of his retaliation charge filed with the IDHR. Mr. Cer‐\\nvantes contends, however, that his discrimination claims sat‐\\nisfy a recognized exception for “claims that are ‘like or rea‐\\nsonably related’ to the EEOC charge, and can be reasonably \\nexpected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the charg‐\\nes.” Sitar, 344 F.3d at 726 (quoting Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. \\nHosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc)). As \\na general matter, we do not consider a retaliation charge to \\nbe reasonably related to a discrimination claim. Id. The \\ncharge and the complaint may be reasonably related if, “at a \\nminimum,” they “describe the same circumstances and par‐\\nticipants.” Conner v. Illinois Dep’t of Natural Res., 413 F.3d 675, \\n680 (7th Cir. 2005). \\n Mr. Cervantes believes that his discrimination claims in \\nthis action are reasonably related to his retaliation charge \\nfiled with the IDHR because both involve the same entity \\n(Ardagh), the same conduct (his discipline and demotion), \\nand the same time frame (his tenure at Ardagh). These simi‐\\nlarities occur, however, at far too high a level of generality. \\nA simple comparison of his administrative retaliation charge \\nand his court discrimination complaint starkly reveals that \\nthey arise out of very different conduct in very different time \\nperiods. His administrative retaliation charge focuses on \\nconduct stemming from the 1998 EEOC charge filed by his \\nbrother. Mr. Cervantes’s discrimination complaint alleges \\nthat the adverse employment conduct was based on his race \\nand his own internal complaints about race and national \\norigin discrimination. The allegations in his complaint de‐\\nscribe different hostilities that arose at different times, e.g., \\nfollowing his apprenticeship, and that involved different in‐\\n\\f8 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\ndividuals, namely Jones and Spells. These allegations never \\nwere mentioned in the charge. The administrative retaliation \\ncharge therefore never gave Ardagh reasonable notice of \\nMr. Cervantes’s discrimination claims, nor did it provide \\nArdagh and the agency an opportunity to resolve his con‐\\ncerns before they ripened into this suit. \\n Mr. Cervantes further submits that the March 31, 2016 \\nletter from his attorney to the IDHR in response to an in‐\\nquiry from the agency expanded the scope of his charge. In \\nthe final section of the letter, titled “On the Basis of Retalia‐\\ntion,” his counsel wrote that, “After completing his 4 year \\napprenticeship program and working for several years as a \\nrotating shift mechanic,” Mr. Cervantes “desired to be \\nplaced on a straight day shift. Yet, because of his race, the \\ndecision makers at the company refused to promote him.”10 \\nHe added that Mr. Cervantes’s “family is of Hispanic back‐\\nground, and he felt that this was the reason he was not being \\npromoted at [Ardagh], despite being as qualified—or more \\nso—than those who were in fact being promoted.”11 \\n Even if we were to assume that this letter should have \\nalerted the agency investigators to the possibility of discrim‐\\nination, we must remember that his counsel submitted the \\nletter to the IDHR ex parte; it therefore did not provide \\nArdagh with any notice of Mr. Cervantes’s potential dis‐\\ncrimination claims. See O’Rourke v. Continental Cas. Co., 983 \\nF.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a follow‐up memo‐\\nrandum submitted by plaintiff to the EEOC did not enlarge \\n \\n10 R.39‐12 ¶ ZZ1. \\n\\n11 Id. ¶ ZZ4. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 9\\n\\nthe scope of his charge of discrimination to include a claim \\nfor retaliation because, even if his submission “should have \\nalerted the EEOC, [it] did nothing to alert the employer”). \\nFurthermore, the letter indicates that Mr. Cervantes’s attor‐\\nney understood these allegations to be part of a theory of \\ndiscrimination based on retaliation, as alleged in the IDHR \\ncharge, not a separate theory of discrimination based on race \\nand national origin. Where, as here, a plaintiff is assisted by \\ncounsel, it is “not unreasonable to require some additional \\nspecificity or detail as a condition precedent for permitting” \\nthe plaintiff to assert a claim that was not originally included \\nin the administrative charge. Rush, 966 F.2d at 1112. \\n Accordingly, we must conclude that Mr. Cervantes’s dis‐\\ncrimination claims were not within the scope of his retalia‐\\ntion charge, and that the district court properly granted \\nsummary judgment for Ardagh on those claims. \\n B. \\n We turn next to Mr. Cervantes’s retaliation claim. To \\nstate a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must \\n“present evidence of (1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a \\nmaterially adverse action taken by the employer; and (3) a \\ncausal connection between the two.” Volling v. Kurtz Para‐\\nmedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting \\nTurner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2010)). \\n Mr. Cervantes contends that he presented sufficient evi‐\\ndence to state a claim for retaliation. He alleged that he \\ncomplained internally at Ardagh about race and national \\norigin discrimination and that his supervisors subsequently \\ndisciplined and demoted him for those complaints. Howev‐\\ner, his deposition testimony clarified that he made his com‐\\n\\f10 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nplaints not to anyone at Ardagh but to the union president \\nand that he did not know whether the union president ever \\nbrought his concerns to the attention of anyone at Ardagh.12 \\nThe district court thus correctly concluded that Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law because he did \\nnot allege that he engaged in any protected activity. See, e.g., \\nGleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1147 (7th Cir. \\n1997) (holding that plaintiff did not engage in statutorily \\nprotected activity given that “she did not raise the subject of \\nsexual harassment to anyone in authority”). \\n Moreover, even if Mr. Cervantes has alleged that he en‐\\ngaged in protected activity, his retaliation claim still fails be‐\\ncause he conceded that none of his supervisors at Ardagh \\nwere aware of his complaints. Therefore, there is no “causal \\nconnection” between any protected activity and his disci‐\\npline and demotion. See, e.g., King v. Ford Motor Co., 872 F.2d \\n833, 842 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that plaintiff had “no \\nsupport for a claim of retaliation” because she failed to \\n“show[] that whoever was responsible for” her reassign‐\\nments and denials of overtime “was aware of her protected \\nactivity or was involved in the later actions”). \\n Finally, Mr. Cervantes maintains that disputed facts, \\nsuch as whether he agreed to work the second shift on June \\n20, 2015, and whether Ardagh properly trained him, pre‐\\nclude summary judgment on his retaliation claim. Because \\nany such issues are irrelevant to the undisputed facts that \\nMr. Cervantes did not complain about discrimination to an‐\\nyone at Ardagh and that his supervisors were not aware of \\n\\n \\n12 See R.44 at 8. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 11\\n\\nany complaints he may have made to the union, the district \\ncourt properly granted summary judgment for Ardagh. \\n Conclusion \\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the \\ndistrict court. \\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":267,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4585523,"string":"4,585,523"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Trustees of the Suburban Teams v. The E Company"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2273"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2273\\nTRUSTEES OF THE SUBURBAN TEAMSTERS OF NORTHERN ILLINOIS\\nPENSION FUND,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nTHE E COMPANY, a dissolved Illinois Corporation, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-10323 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2019 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Under the terms of a collective\\nbargaining agreement, T&W Edmier Corporation regularly\\ncontributed on behalf of its employees to the Suburban\\nTeamsters of Northern Illinois Pension Fund. But in 2014\\nT&W ceased operations and cut off its pension contributions,\\nprompting the Pension Fund to assess withdrawal liability of\\n\\f2 No. 18-2273\\n\\n$640,900. The Pension Fund sought to collect payment by\\nmailing a notice of the withdrawal liability to T&W and\\nseveral affiliated entities, only to see their collection efforts\\nignored. The Trustees of the Pension Fund eventually sued to\\ncollect payment, and that action culminated in the district\\ncourt ordering T&W, along with several other individuals and\\nentities under common control, to pay the withdrawal\\nliability. Now seeking to vacate the district court’s judgment,\\nT&W and the other defendants argue that their due process\\nrights were violated when the Pension Fund initiated\\ncollection of the withdrawal liability by mailing notice to\\nsome but not all of them. Seeing no error, we affirm.\\n I\\n T&W Edmier Corporation operated a construction\\nbusiness in tandem with The E Company. T&W owned the\\nconstruction equipment while The E Company hired and\\nprovided employees. Brothers Thomas and William Edmier\\neach owned 50% of T&W. Kevin Edmier, William’s son,\\nowned and operated The E Company. Pursuant to the terms\\nof a collective bargaining agreement with its employees, T&W\\nparticipated in the Suburban Teamsters of Northern Illinois\\nmulti-employer pension plan, and, for its part, The E\\nCompany agreed to assume joint and several liability for\\nT&W’s obligations to the Pension Fund. In 2014, however,\\nT&W and The E Company ceased operations, dissolved, and\\nwithdrew from the plan.\\n The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments to the Em-\\nployee Retirement Income Security Act require a covered plan\\nto assess withdrawal liability against a withdrawing em-\\nployer. See 29 U.S.C. § 1396. Withdrawal liability, as its name\\nimplies, is designed to prevent shifting the financial burden\\n\\fNo. 18-2273 3\\n\\nof employees’ vested pension benefits to other employers in\\nthe multi-employer plan. We explained these principles at\\nsome length in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas\\nPension Fund v. Slotky, 956 F.2d 1369, 1371–72 (7th Cir. 1992).\\n Consistent with ERISA’s mandate, the Pension Fund\\nmailed a notice of withdrawal liability on April 30, 2015, a past\\ndue notice on August 17, 2015, and a default and acceleration\\nnotice on November 12, 2015. The notice went to T&W, The E\\nCompany, and the Edmier Corporation (another entity\\nwholly owned by Thomas Edmier). Even more specifically,\\nthe Pension Fund sent the notice to the attention of Thomas,\\nWilliam, and Kevin Edmier, as well as attorney George\\nGrumley, the registered agent of both T&W and The E\\nCompany. At their depositions, Thomas, William, and Kevin\\nEdmier acknowledged receiving the notice.\\n The Pension Fund’s notices went unanswered and, as a\\nresult, the Pension Fund’s Trustees initiated a lawsuit in the\\ndistrict court. Ignoring the Pension Fund’s requests for\\npayment had significant legal consequences for the\\ndefendants. Congress has required that all disputes over\\nwithdrawal liability be resolved through arbitration, see 29\\nU.S.C. § 1401(a)(1), and an employer’s failure to arbitrate\\nmeans “the plan can then immediately file suit to collect the\\nentire amount of withdrawal liability, and in that proceeding\\nthe employer will have forfeited any defenses it could have\\npresented to the arbitrator,” Nat’l Shopmen Pension Fund v.\\nDISA Industries, Inc., 653 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n Our case law has recognized a narrow exception to this\\ngeneral rule of forfeiture for a party who “had absolutely no\\nreason to believe that they might be deemed members of a\\ncontrolled group” but is nonetheless sued and alleged to be\\n\\f4 No. 18-2273\\n\\nliable for another party’s withdrawal liability based on\\nERISA’s “controlled group” provision. See Slotky, 956 F.2d at\\n1373. The controlled group provision imputes liability to all\\n“trades or businesses” under “common control” with another\\nparty who is liable for the withdrawal liability. See 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 1301(b)(1). And our decision in Slotky allows unsuspecting\\ndefendants who are sued in district court but had no idea they\\nmight be liable as members of a controlled group to litigate\\nthat question—membership in a controlled group. See 956\\nF.2d at 1373.\\n Relying on this framework, the district court concluded\\nthat T&W, The E Company, and the Edmier Corporation had\\nforfeited all defenses to liability, including the defense that\\nthey were not members of a controlled group, by failing to\\narbitrate after receiving the Pension Fund’s notice of with-\\ndrawal liability. This outcome reflected a straightforward ap-\\nplication of these defendants not complying with the clear ar-\\nbitration mandate in 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1).\\n As for each of the other defendants (Thomas, William, and\\nKevin Edmier; K. Edmier & Sons LLC; The William Edmier\\nTrust; Lake Street Realty, Inc.; and E&E Equipment & Leas-\\ning), the district court explained that they too had likely for-\\nfeited all defenses as they were not the type of unsuspecting\\ndefendant contemplated in Slotky. Put differently, the district\\ncourt reasoned that none of these defendants had such a cred-\\nible claim of surprise (at being a member of a controlled\\ngroup) to sidestep ERISA’s arbitration requirement. Regard-\\nless, the district court went further and determined as a fac-\\ntual matter that each of these defendants was a trade or busi-\\nness under common control with another party who received\\nthe notice of withdrawal liability. This reasoning finds strong\\n\\fNo. 18-2273 5\\n\\nsupport in the record and resulted in the district court con-\\ncluding that each of these defendants was liable under\\nERISA’s controlled group provision.\\n In the end, the district court entered summary judgment\\nfor the Pension Fund’s Trustees and ordered the defendants\\nto pay the full $640,900 of withdrawal liability, plus interest,\\nliquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. As members of\\na controlled group, each of the defendants became jointly and\\nseverally liable for payment. See Central States, Southeast and\\nSouthwest Areas Pension Fund v. Koder, 969 F.2d 451, 452 (7th\\nCir. 1992) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1)).\\n II\\n The defendants challenge the district court’s judgment by\\narguing that the Pension Fund’s notice of withdrawal liability\\nviolated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In their\\nview, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mullane v. Central\\nHanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) required the\\nPension Fund to serve the notice of withdrawal liability on\\neach of them and to explain the standard for controlled group\\nliability under ERISA in the notice. This contention misses the\\nmark.\\n The defendants’ reliance on Mullane is misplaced because\\nall parties agree that judicial proceedings commenced in the\\ndistrict court with proper service of process (notice of the\\ncomplaint) to each defendant. The due process standard an-\\nnounced in Mullane—a decision requiring sufficient notice of\\na pending judicial proceeding—was therefore satisfied. No\\nreading of Mullane, however, supports the view that ERISA’s\\ncontrolled group liability provisions and accompanying\\n\\f6 No. 18-2273\\n\\nprocedural framework (in which a defendant forfeits certain\\ndefenses by failing to arbitrate) violate due process.\\n A related observation is in order. The defendants colloqui-\\nally and imprecisely allege a violation of due process, time\\nand again citing Mullane. In no way, shape, or form did any\\ndue process violation occur here. The defendants who re-\\nceived—but chose to ignore—the notice of withdrawal liabil-\\nity had every opportunity to arbitrate and yet failed to do so,\\nresulting, by operation of ERISA, in a waiver of all defenses\\nto withdrawal liability. No unfairness inheres in that out-\\ncome. And, as for the defendants who did not receive the no-\\ntice of withdrawal liability but nonetheless found themselves\\nnamed in a federal lawsuit, the district court provided them a\\nfull and fair opportunity to litigate their liability as members\\nof a controlled group. Nothing about the path those defend-\\nants traveled offends due process.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4362776/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585523/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Trustees of the Suburban Teams v. The E Company\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2273\nTRUSTEES OF THE SUBURBAN TEAMSTERS OF NORTHERN ILLINOIS\nPENSION FUND,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nTHE E COMPANY, a dissolved Illinois Corporation, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellants.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:15-cv-10323 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2019 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit\nJudges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Under the terms of a collective\nbargaining agreement, T&W Edmier Corporation regularly\ncontributed on behalf of its employees to the Suburban\nTeamsters of Northern Illinois Pension Fund. But in 2014\nT&W ceased operations and cut off its pension contributions,\nprompting the Pension Fund to assess withdrawal liability of\n\f2 No. 18-2273\n\n$640,900. The Pension Fund sought to collect payment by\nmailing a notice of the withdrawal liability to T&W and\nseveral affiliated entities, only to see their collection efforts\nignored. The Trustees of the Pension Fund eventually sued to\ncollect payment, and that action culminated in the district\ncourt ordering T&W, along with several other individuals and\nentities under common control, to pay the withdrawal\nliability. Now seeking to vacate the district court’s judgment,\nT&W and the other defendants argue that their due process\nrights were violated when the Pension Fund initiated\ncollection of the withdrawal liability by mailing notice to\nsome but not all of them. Seeing no error, we affirm.\n I\n T&W Edmier Corporation operated a construction\nbusiness in tandem with The E Company. T&W owned the\nconstruction equipment while The E Company hired and\nprovided employees. Brothers Thomas and William Edmier\neach owned 50% of T&W. Kevin Edmier, William’s son,\nowned and operated The E Company. Pursuant to the terms\nof a collective bargaining agreement with its employees, T&W\nparticipated in the Suburban Teamsters of Northern Illinois\nmulti-employer pension plan, and, for its part, The E\nCompany agreed to assume joint and several liability for\nT&W’s obligations to the Pension Fund. In 2014, however,\nT&W and The E Company ceased operations, dissolved, and\nwithdrew from the plan.\n The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments to the Em-\nployee Retirement Income Security Act require a covered plan\nto assess withdrawal liability against a withdrawing em-\nployer. See 29 U.S.C. § 1396. Withdrawal liability, as its name\nimplies, is designed to prevent shifting the financial burden\n\fNo. 18-2273 3\n\nof employees’ vested pension benefits to other employers in\nthe multi-employer plan. We explained these principles at\nsome length in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas\nPension Fund v. Slotky, 956 F.2d 1369, 1371–72 (7th Cir. 1992).\n Consistent with ERISA’s mandate, the Pension Fund\nmailed a notice of withdrawal liability on April 30, 2015, a past\ndue notice on August 17, 2015, and a default and acceleration\nnotice on November 12, 2015. The notice went to T&W, The E\nCompany, and the Edmier Corporation (another entity\nwholly owned by Thomas Edmier). Even more specifically,\nthe Pension Fund sent the notice to the attention of Thomas,\nWilliam, and Kevin Edmier, as well as attorney George\nGrumley, the registered agent of both T&W and The E\nCompany. At their depositions, Thomas, William, and Kevin\nEdmier acknowledged receiving the notice.\n The Pension Fund’s notices went unanswered and, as a\nresult, the Pension Fund’s Trustees initiated a lawsuit in the\ndistrict court. Ignoring the Pension Fund’s requests for\npayment had significant legal consequences for the\ndefendants. Congress has required that all disputes over\nwithdrawal liability be resolved through arbitration, see 29\nU.S.C. § 1401(a)(1), and an employer’s failure to arbitrate\nmeans “the plan can then immediately file suit to collect the\nentire amount of withdrawal liability, and in that proceeding\nthe employer will have forfeited any defenses it could have\npresented to the arbitrator,” Nat’l Shopmen Pension Fund v.\nDISA Industries, Inc., 653 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2011).\n Our case law has recognized a narrow exception to this\ngeneral rule of forfeiture for a party who “had absolutely no\nreason to believe that they might be deemed members of a\ncontrolled group” but is nonetheless sued and alleged to be\n\f4 No. 18-2273\n\nliable for another party’s withdrawal liability based on\nERISA’s “controlled group” provision. See Slotky, 956 F.2d at\n1373. The controlled group provision imputes liability to all\n“trades or businesses” under “common control” with another\nparty who is liable for the withdrawal liability. See 29 U.S.C.\n§ 1301(b)(1). And our decision in Slotky allows unsuspecting\ndefendants who are sued in district court but had no idea they\nmight be liable as members of a controlled group to litigate\nthat question—membership in a controlled group. See 956\nF.2d at 1373.\n Relying on this framework, the district court concluded\nthat T&W, The E Company, and the Edmier Corporation had\nforfeited all defenses to liability, including the defense that\nthey were not members of a controlled group, by failing to\narbitrate after receiving the Pension Fund’s notice of with-\ndrawal liability. This outcome reflected a straightforward ap-\nplication of these defendants not complying with the clear ar-\nbitration mandate in 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1).\n As for each of the other defendants (Thomas, William, and\nKevin Edmier; K. Edmier & Sons LLC; The William Edmier\nTrust; Lake Street Realty, Inc.; and E&E Equipment & Leas-\ning), the district court explained that they too had likely for-\nfeited all defenses as they were not the type of unsuspecting\ndefendant contemplated in Slotky. Put differently, the district\ncourt reasoned that none of these defendants had such a cred-\nible claim of surprise (at being a member of a controlled\ngroup) to sidestep ERISA’s arbitration requirement. Regard-\nless, the district court went further and determined as a fac-\ntual matter that each of these defendants was a trade or busi-\nness under common control with another party who received\nthe notice of withdrawal liability. This reasoning finds strong\n\fNo. 18-2273 5\n\nsupport in the record and resulted in the district court con-\ncluding that each of these defendants was liable under\nERISA’s controlled group provision.\n In the end, the district court entered summary judgment\nfor the Pension Fund’s Trustees and ordered the defendants\nto pay the full $640,900 of withdrawal liability, plus interest,\nliquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. As members of\na controlled group, each of the defendants became jointly and\nseverally liable for payment. See Central States, Southeast and\nSouthwest Areas Pension Fund v. Koder, 969 F.2d 451, 452 (7th\nCir. 1992) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1)).\n II\n The defendants challenge the district court’s judgment by\narguing that the Pension Fund’s notice of withdrawal liability\nviolated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In their\nview, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mullane v. Central\nHanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) required the\nPension Fund to serve the notice of withdrawal liability on\neach of them and to explain the standard for controlled group\nliability under ERISA in the notice. This contention misses the\nmark.\n The defendants’ reliance on Mullane is misplaced because\nall parties agree that judicial proceedings commenced in the\ndistrict court with proper service of process (notice of the\ncomplaint) to each defendant. The due process standard an-\nnounced in Mullane—a decision requiring sufficient notice of\na pending judicial proceeding—was therefore satisfied. No\nreading of Mullane, however, supports the view that ERISA’s\ncontrolled group liability provisions and accompanying\n\f6 No. 18-2273\n\nprocedural framework (in which a defendant forfeits certain\ndefenses by failing to arbitrate) violate due process.\n A related observation is in order. The defendants colloqui-\nally and imprecisely allege a violation of due process, time\nand again citing Mullane. In no way, shape, or form did any\ndue process violation occur here. The defendants who re-\nceived—but chose to ignore—the notice of withdrawal liabil-\nity had every opportunity to arbitrate and yet failed to do so,\nresulting, by operation of ERISA, in a waiver of all defenses\nto withdrawal liability. No unfairness inheres in that out-\ncome. And, as for the defendants who did not receive the no-\ntice of withdrawal liability but nonetheless found themselves\nnamed in a federal lawsuit, the district court provided them a\nfull and fair opportunity to litigate their liability as members\nof a controlled group. Nothing about the path those defend-\nants traveled offends due process.\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Trustees of the Suburban Teams v. The E Company\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2273\\nTRUSTEES OF THE SUBURBAN TEAMSTERS OF NORTHERN ILLINOIS\\nPENSION FUND,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nTHE E COMPANY, a dissolved Illinois Corporation, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-10323 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2019 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Under the terms of a collective\\nbargaining agreement, T&W Edmier Corporation regularly\\ncontributed on behalf of its employees to the Suburban\\nTeamsters of Northern Illinois Pension Fund. But in 2014\\nT&W ceased operations and cut off its pension contributions,\\nprompting the Pension Fund to assess withdrawal liability of\\n\\f2 No. 18-2273\\n\\n$640,900. The Pension Fund sought to collect payment by\\nmailing a notice of the withdrawal liability to T&W and\\nseveral affiliated entities, only to see their collection efforts\\nignored. The Trustees of the Pension Fund eventually sued to\\ncollect payment, and that action culminated in the district\\ncourt ordering T&W, along with several other individuals and\\nentities under common control, to pay the withdrawal\\nliability. Now seeking to vacate the district court’s judgment,\\nT&W and the other defendants argue that their due process\\nrights were violated when the Pension Fund initiated\\ncollection of the withdrawal liability by mailing notice to\\nsome but not all of them. Seeing no error, we affirm.\\n I\\n T&W Edmier Corporation operated a construction\\nbusiness in tandem with The E Company. T&W owned the\\nconstruction equipment while The E Company hired and\\nprovided employees. Brothers Thomas and William Edmier\\neach owned 50% of T&W. Kevin Edmier, William’s son,\\nowned and operated The E Company. Pursuant to the terms\\nof a collective bargaining agreement with its employees, T&W\\nparticipated in the Suburban Teamsters of Northern Illinois\\nmulti-employer pension plan, and, for its part, The E\\nCompany agreed to assume joint and several liability for\\nT&W’s obligations to the Pension Fund. In 2014, however,\\nT&W and The E Company ceased operations, dissolved, and\\nwithdrew from the plan.\\n The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments to the Em-\\nployee Retirement Income Security Act require a covered plan\\nto assess withdrawal liability against a withdrawing em-\\nployer. See 29 U.S.C. § 1396. Withdrawal liability, as its name\\nimplies, is designed to prevent shifting the financial burden\\n\\fNo. 18-2273 3\\n\\nof employees’ vested pension benefits to other employers in\\nthe multi-employer plan. We explained these principles at\\nsome length in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas\\nPension Fund v. Slotky, 956 F.2d 1369, 1371–72 (7th Cir. 1992).\\n Consistent with ERISA’s mandate, the Pension Fund\\nmailed a notice of withdrawal liability on April 30, 2015, a past\\ndue notice on August 17, 2015, and a default and acceleration\\nnotice on November 12, 2015. The notice went to T&W, The E\\nCompany, and the Edmier Corporation (another entity\\nwholly owned by Thomas Edmier). Even more specifically,\\nthe Pension Fund sent the notice to the attention of Thomas,\\nWilliam, and Kevin Edmier, as well as attorney George\\nGrumley, the registered agent of both T&W and The E\\nCompany. At their depositions, Thomas, William, and Kevin\\nEdmier acknowledged receiving the notice.\\n The Pension Fund’s notices went unanswered and, as a\\nresult, the Pension Fund’s Trustees initiated a lawsuit in the\\ndistrict court. Ignoring the Pension Fund’s requests for\\npayment had significant legal consequences for the\\ndefendants. Congress has required that all disputes over\\nwithdrawal liability be resolved through arbitration, see 29\\nU.S.C. § 1401(a)(1), and an employer’s failure to arbitrate\\nmeans “the plan can then immediately file suit to collect the\\nentire amount of withdrawal liability, and in that proceeding\\nthe employer will have forfeited any defenses it could have\\npresented to the arbitrator,” Nat’l Shopmen Pension Fund v.\\nDISA Industries, Inc., 653 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n Our case law has recognized a narrow exception to this\\ngeneral rule of forfeiture for a party who “had absolutely no\\nreason to believe that they might be deemed members of a\\ncontrolled group” but is nonetheless sued and alleged to be\\n\\f4 No. 18-2273\\n\\nliable for another party’s withdrawal liability based on\\nERISA’s “controlled group” provision. See Slotky, 956 F.2d at\\n1373. The controlled group provision imputes liability to all\\n“trades or businesses” under “common control” with another\\nparty who is liable for the withdrawal liability. See 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 1301(b)(1). And our decision in Slotky allows unsuspecting\\ndefendants who are sued in district court but had no idea they\\nmight be liable as members of a controlled group to litigate\\nthat question—membership in a controlled group. See 956\\nF.2d at 1373.\\n Relying on this framework, the district court concluded\\nthat T&W, The E Company, and the Edmier Corporation had\\nforfeited all defenses to liability, including the defense that\\nthey were not members of a controlled group, by failing to\\narbitrate after receiving the Pension Fund’s notice of with-\\ndrawal liability. This outcome reflected a straightforward ap-\\nplication of these defendants not complying with the clear ar-\\nbitration mandate in 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1).\\n As for each of the other defendants (Thomas, William, and\\nKevin Edmier; K. Edmier & Sons LLC; The William Edmier\\nTrust; Lake Street Realty, Inc.; and E&E Equipment & Leas-\\ning), the district court explained that they too had likely for-\\nfeited all defenses as they were not the type of unsuspecting\\ndefendant contemplated in Slotky. Put differently, the district\\ncourt reasoned that none of these defendants had such a cred-\\nible claim of surprise (at being a member of a controlled\\ngroup) to sidestep ERISA’s arbitration requirement. Regard-\\nless, the district court went further and determined as a fac-\\ntual matter that each of these defendants was a trade or busi-\\nness under common control with another party who received\\nthe notice of withdrawal liability. This reasoning finds strong\\n\\fNo. 18-2273 5\\n\\nsupport in the record and resulted in the district court con-\\ncluding that each of these defendants was liable under\\nERISA’s controlled group provision.\\n In the end, the district court entered summary judgment\\nfor the Pension Fund’s Trustees and ordered the defendants\\nto pay the full $640,900 of withdrawal liability, plus interest,\\nliquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. As members of\\na controlled group, each of the defendants became jointly and\\nseverally liable for payment. See Central States, Southeast and\\nSouthwest Areas Pension Fund v. Koder, 969 F.2d 451, 452 (7th\\nCir. 1992) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1)).\\n II\\n The defendants challenge the district court’s judgment by\\narguing that the Pension Fund’s notice of withdrawal liability\\nviolated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In their\\nview, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mullane v. Central\\nHanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) required the\\nPension Fund to serve the notice of withdrawal liability on\\neach of them and to explain the standard for controlled group\\nliability under ERISA in the notice. This contention misses the\\nmark.\\n The defendants’ reliance on Mullane is misplaced because\\nall parties agree that judicial proceedings commenced in the\\ndistrict court with proper service of process (notice of the\\ncomplaint) to each defendant. The due process standard an-\\nnounced in Mullane—a decision requiring sufficient notice of\\na pending judicial proceeding—was therefore satisfied. No\\nreading of Mullane, however, supports the view that ERISA’s\\ncontrolled group liability provisions and accompanying\\n\\f6 No. 18-2273\\n\\nprocedural framework (in which a defendant forfeits certain\\ndefenses by failing to arbitrate) violate due process.\\n A related observation is in order. The defendants colloqui-\\nally and imprecisely allege a violation of due process, time\\nand again citing Mullane. In no way, shape, or form did any\\ndue process violation occur here. The defendants who re-\\nceived—but chose to ignore—the notice of withdrawal liabil-\\nity had every opportunity to arbitrate and yet failed to do so,\\nresulting, by operation of ERISA, in a waiver of all defenses\\nto withdrawal liability. No unfairness inheres in that out-\\ncome. And, as for the defendants who did not receive the no-\\ntice of withdrawal liability but nonetheless found themselves\\nnamed in a federal lawsuit, the district court provided them a\\nfull and fair opportunity to litigate their liability as members\\nof a controlled group. Nothing about the path those defend-\\nants traveled offends due process.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":268,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4585524,"string":"4,585,524"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Juan Cervantes v. Ardagh Group"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3536"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐3536 \\nJUAN CERVANTES, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nARDAGH GROUP, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:16‐cv‐11080 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and BARRETT, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Juan Cervantes brought this action \\nagainst his employer, Ardagh Group (“Ardagh”), alleging \\nviolations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 \\nU.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 \\nILCS 5/1‐101 et seq. (“IHRA”). The complaint asserted that \\nArdagh had refused to promote him, had issued him per‐\\nformance warnings, and had demoted him because of his \\n\\f2 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nrace and national origin and in retaliation for previous com‐\\nplaints about discrimination and harassment. The district \\ncourt granted summary judgment in favor of Ardagh. \\n The district court’s decision is correct. Mr. Cervantes did \\nnot exhaust his administrative remedies for his discrimina‐\\ntion claims. His retaliation claim also must fail because there \\nis no evidence of a causal connection between any protected \\nactivity by Mr. Cervantes and an adverse employment action \\nby Ardagh. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the dis‐\\ntrict court. \\n I \\n BACKGROUND \\n Mr. Cervantes began his career at Ardagh in 1991 as a \\npallet loader. He was promoted to fork lift driver in 1998 \\nand to electro‐mechanic in 2000. His complaint followed an \\nincident that took place in 2015. Taking the facts in the light \\n 1\\nmost favorable to Mr. Cervantes, on June 20, 2015, after \\ncompleting his shift, he remained at the Ardagh facility to \\nassist his father, a fellow Ardagh employee, with fixing a \\nmachine. During this second shift, supervisor Katina Stewart \\nattempted to call Mr. Cervantes on his radio, but could not \\nreach him. When Stewart located Mr. Cervantes in the facili‐\\nty, he explained that he had not responded to the radio calls \\nbecause he was not working a second shift; he was only stay‐\\n \\n1 The relevant facts are contested. On review of the district court’s grant \\n\\nof summary judgment for Ardagh, we resolve any disputed facts in fa‐\\nvor of the non‐moving party, Mr. Cervantes, and “draw[] all reasonable \\ninferences from the facts in his favor.” Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, \\n627 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 3\\n\\ning past his shift to help his father. Stewart informed \\nMr. Cervantes that if he was not accepting assignments for \\nthe second shift, he must leave the facility. He eventually \\ncomplied. Stewart reported the incident, and Mr. Cervantes \\nwas written up for insubordination and temporarily sus‐\\npended. Following an investigation, Ardagh demoted \\nMr. Cervantes from electro‐mechanic to forklift driver. \\n On September 3, 2015, Mr. Cervantes filed a charge with \\nthe Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”). In the \\nsection of the form titled “Discrimination Based On,” Mr. \\nCervantes checked only the box for “Retaliation.”2 He did \\nnot check the box for race, national origin, or any other basis \\nof discrimination. The IDHR commenced an investigation \\ninto his allegations, seeking additional information from \\nMr. Cervantes and from Ardagh. By March 31, 2016, Mr. \\nCervantes had retained counsel, who sent a letter to IDHR \\non his behalf in response to the agency’s questions about the \\ncharge. On July 13, 2016, the IDHR dismissed Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes’s charge, finding a lack of substantial evidence to support \\nhis allegations. \\n On December 5, 2016, Mr. Cervantes filed a complaint in \\nthe district court. He alleged that Ardagh had violated Title \\nVII and the IHRA by failing to promote him, issuing him \\nperformance warnings, and demoting him based on his race \\nand national origin and in retaliation for his previous com‐\\nplaints about harassment and discrimination. Ardagh \\n\\n\\n\\n \\n2 See R.32 at 4 (Mr. Cervantes’s IDHR Charge (Sept. 3, 2015)). \\n\\f4 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nmoved for summary judgment on all claims, and the district \\ncourt granted that motion.3 \\n The district court first determined that Mr. Cervantes \\ncould not proceed on his claims for race and national origin \\ndiscrimination because he had failed to exhaust his adminis‐\\ntrative remedies and because these allegations were not rea‐\\nsonably related to his retaliation charge. The district court \\nthen concluded that Mr. Cervantes had failed to state a claim \\nfor retaliation because he had not established that he en‐\\ngaged in protected activity. He also failed to offer any evi‐\\ndence that his supervisors were aware of any complaints he \\nraised and therefore did not demonstrate a causal connec‐\\ntion between any protected activity and an adverse em‐\\nployment action. The district court entered judgment in fa‐\\nvor of Ardagh on November 14, 2017, and Mr. Cervantes \\ntimely appealed. \\n II \\n DISCUSSION \\n We review the district court’s grant of summary judg‐\\nment de novo. Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 \\n(7th Cir. 1996). “We will not resolve factual disputes or \\nweigh conflicting evidence,” but “will only determine \\nwhether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial.” Id. \\n 4\\nAs we noted earlier, this inquiry requires that we “view the \\n \\n3 In his complaint, Mr. Cervantes also asserted a claim under Illinois \\n\\nstate law for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court \\ngranted summary judgment for Ardagh on that claim, and Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes does not challenge that ruling in this appeal. \\n4 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 5\\n\\nevidence and draw all inferences in a way most favorable to \\nthe nonmoving party.” Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to \\nestablish the existence of an element essential to his case, one \\non which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, sum‐\\nmary judgment must be granted to the moving party.” Id. \\n A. \\n Mr. Cervantes first submits that the district court erred \\nwhen it determined that he had not exhausted his adminis‐\\ntrative remedies for his claims of discrimination based on \\nrace and national origin. We cannot accept this argument. \\n In general, a plaintiff can only bring claims under Title \\nVII or the IHRA that he has included in the original charge \\nfiled with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission \\n(“EEOC”) or the IDHR.5 Sitar v. Indiana Dep’t of Transp., 344 \\nF.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2003). This limitation serves two pur‐\\nposes. It affords the employer some notice of the conduct \\nunderlying the employee’s allegation. It also “affords the \\nagency and the employer an opportunity to attempt concilia‐\\ntion without resort to the courts.” Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., \\n966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992). \\n Here, Mr. Cervantes initially filed a charge with the \\nIDHR and checked only the box for discrimination based on \\nretaliation. He did not check the box for discrimination \\nbased on race, national origin, or any other protected charac‐\\nteristic. He described the “particulars” of his charge as fol‐\\nlows: \\n \\n5 The EEOC and the IDHR “have a work sharing arrangement providing \\n\\nthat a charge filed with one is deemed cross‐filed with the other.” \\nMcQueen v. City of Chi., 803 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902–03 (N.D. Ill. 2011). \\n\\f6 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\n I began my employment with Respondent \\n [Ardagh] in or around May 1991. My current \\n position is Forklift Driver. A family member \\n filed EEOC Charge No. 210‐1998‐00397 against \\n Respondent. During my employment, I have \\n been subjected to discipline, harassment, and I \\n have been demoted. \\n I believe I have been discriminated against in \\n retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil \\n Rights Act of 1964, as amended.6 \\n In his complaint, by contrast, he alleged that Ardagh had \\nfailed to promote him, had issued him performance warn‐\\nings, and had demoted him based on his race and national \\norigin. He further asserted that, after completing a four‐year \\napprenticeship and working as a “rotating shift mechanic” \\nfor several years, “because of his race, the decision makers at \\nthe company refused to promote him.”7 He alleged that he \\n“had previously complained to his superiors of discrimina‐\\ntion and harassment” based on his Hispanic background, \\nwhich “led to his superiors issuing poor job performance \\nwarnings, about which Cervantes filed grievances with the \\nunion because these warnings were retaliatory.”8 He added \\nthat “[t]hese superiors were Tom Jones, Maintenance Super‐\\nvisor, and Don Spells, Shift Supervisor.”9 \\n\\n \\n6 R.32 at 4. \\n\\n7 R.39‐4 ¶ 6. \\n\\n8 Id. ¶ 10. \\n\\n9 Id. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 7\\n\\n The district court concluded that the claims of discrimi‐\\nnation in Mr. Cervantes’s court complaint were outside the \\nscope of his retaliation charge filed with the IDHR. Mr. Cer‐\\nvantes contends, however, that his discrimination claims sat‐\\nisfy a recognized exception for “claims that are ‘like or rea‐\\nsonably related’ to the EEOC charge, and can be reasonably \\nexpected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the charg‐\\nes.” Sitar, 344 F.3d at 726 (quoting Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. \\nHosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc)). As \\na general matter, we do not consider a retaliation charge to \\nbe reasonably related to a discrimination claim. Id. The \\ncharge and the complaint may be reasonably related if, “at a \\nminimum,” they “describe the same circumstances and par‐\\nticipants.” Conner v. Illinois Dep’t of Natural Res., 413 F.3d 675, \\n680 (7th Cir. 2005). \\n Mr. Cervantes believes that his discrimination claims in \\nthis action are reasonably related to his retaliation charge \\nfiled with the IDHR because both involve the same entity \\n(Ardagh), the same conduct (his discipline and demotion), \\nand the same time frame (his tenure at Ardagh). These simi‐\\nlarities occur, however, at far too high a level of generality. \\nA simple comparison of his administrative retaliation charge \\nand his court discrimination complaint starkly reveals that \\nthey arise out of very different conduct in very different time \\nperiods. His administrative retaliation charge focuses on \\nconduct stemming from the 1998 EEOC charge filed by his \\nbrother. Mr. Cervantes’s discrimination complaint alleges \\nthat the adverse employment conduct was based on his race \\nand his own internal complaints about race and national \\norigin discrimination. The allegations in his complaint de‐\\nscribe different hostilities that arose at different times, e.g., \\nfollowing his apprenticeship, and that involved different in‐\\n\\f8 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\ndividuals, namely Jones and Spells. These allegations never \\nwere mentioned in the charge. The administrative retaliation \\ncharge therefore never gave Ardagh reasonable notice of \\nMr. Cervantes’s discrimination claims, nor did it provide \\nArdagh and the agency an opportunity to resolve his con‐\\ncerns before they ripened into this suit. \\n Mr. Cervantes further submits that the March 31, 2016 \\nletter from his attorney to the IDHR in response to an in‐\\nquiry from the agency expanded the scope of his charge. In \\nthe final section of the letter, titled “On the Basis of Retalia‐\\ntion,” his counsel wrote that, “After completing his 4 year \\napprenticeship program and working for several years as a \\nrotating shift mechanic,” Mr. Cervantes “desired to be \\nplaced on a straight day shift. Yet, because of his race, the \\ndecision makers at the company refused to promote him.”10 \\nHe added that Mr. Cervantes’s “family is of Hispanic back‐\\nground, and he felt that this was the reason he was not being \\npromoted at [Ardagh], despite being as qualified—or more \\nso—than those who were in fact being promoted.”11 \\n Even if we were to assume that this letter should have \\nalerted the agency investigators to the possibility of discrim‐\\nination, we must remember that his counsel submitted the \\nletter to the IDHR ex parte; it therefore did not provide \\nArdagh with any notice of Mr. Cervantes’s potential dis‐\\ncrimination claims. See O’Rourke v. Continental Cas. Co., 983 \\nF.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a follow‐up memo‐\\nrandum submitted by plaintiff to the EEOC did not enlarge \\n \\n10 R.39‐12 ¶ ZZ1. \\n\\n11 Id. ¶ ZZ4. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 9\\n\\nthe scope of his charge of discrimination to include a claim \\nfor retaliation because, even if his submission “should have \\nalerted the EEOC, [it] did nothing to alert the employer”). \\nFurthermore, the letter indicates that Mr. Cervantes’s attor‐\\nney understood these allegations to be part of a theory of \\ndiscrimination based on retaliation, as alleged in the IDHR \\ncharge, not a separate theory of discrimination based on race \\nand national origin. Where, as here, a plaintiff is assisted by \\ncounsel, it is “not unreasonable to require some additional \\nspecificity or detail as a condition precedent for permitting” \\nthe plaintiff to assert a claim that was not originally included \\nin the administrative charge. Rush, 966 F.2d at 1112. \\n Accordingly, we must conclude that Mr. Cervantes’s dis‐\\ncrimination claims were not within the scope of his retalia‐\\ntion charge, and that the district court properly granted \\nsummary judgment for Ardagh on those claims. \\n B. \\n We turn next to Mr. Cervantes’s retaliation claim. To \\nstate a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must \\n“present evidence of (1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a \\nmaterially adverse action taken by the employer; and (3) a \\ncausal connection between the two.” Volling v. Kurtz Para‐\\nmedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting \\nTurner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2010)). \\n Mr. Cervantes contends that he presented sufficient evi‐\\ndence to state a claim for retaliation. He alleged that he \\ncomplained internally at Ardagh about race and national \\norigin discrimination and that his supervisors subsequently \\ndisciplined and demoted him for those complaints. Howev‐\\ner, his deposition testimony clarified that he made his com‐\\n\\f10 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nplaints not to anyone at Ardagh but to the union president \\nand that he did not know whether the union president ever \\nbrought his concerns to the attention of anyone at Ardagh.12 \\nThe district court thus correctly concluded that Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law because he did \\nnot allege that he engaged in any protected activity. See, e.g., \\nGleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1147 (7th Cir. \\n1997) (holding that plaintiff did not engage in statutorily \\nprotected activity given that “she did not raise the subject of \\nsexual harassment to anyone in authority”). \\n Moreover, even if Mr. Cervantes has alleged that he en‐\\ngaged in protected activity, his retaliation claim still fails be‐\\ncause he conceded that none of his supervisors at Ardagh \\nwere aware of his complaints. Therefore, there is no “causal \\nconnection” between any protected activity and his disci‐\\npline and demotion. See, e.g., King v. Ford Motor Co., 872 F.2d \\n833, 842 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that plaintiff had “no \\nsupport for a claim of retaliation” because she failed to \\n“show[] that whoever was responsible for” her reassign‐\\nments and denials of overtime “was aware of her protected \\nactivity or was involved in the later actions”). \\n Finally, Mr. Cervantes maintains that disputed facts, \\nsuch as whether he agreed to work the second shift on June \\n20, 2015, and whether Ardagh properly trained him, pre‐\\nclude summary judgment on his retaliation claim. Because \\nany such issues are irrelevant to the undisputed facts that \\nMr. Cervantes did not complain about discrimination to an‐\\nyone at Ardagh and that his supervisors were not aware of \\n\\n \\n12 See R.44 at 8. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 11\\n\\nany complaints he may have made to the union, the district \\ncourt properly granted summary judgment for Ardagh. \\n Conclusion \\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the \\ndistrict court. \\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4362777/\", \"author_raw\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585524/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Juan Cervantes v. Ardagh Group\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐3536 \nJUAN CERVANTES, \n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \n v. \n\nARDAGH GROUP, \n Defendant‐Appellee. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \n No. 1:16‐cv‐11080 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and BARRETT, \nCircuit Judges. \n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Juan Cervantes brought this action \nagainst his employer, Ardagh Group (“Ardagh”), alleging \nviolations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 \nU.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 \nILCS 5/1‐101 et seq. (“IHRA”). The complaint asserted that \nArdagh had refused to promote him, had issued him per‐\nformance warnings, and had demoted him because of his \n\f2 No. 17‐3536 \n\nrace and national origin and in retaliation for previous com‐\nplaints about discrimination and harassment. The district \ncourt granted summary judgment in favor of Ardagh. \n The district court’s decision is correct. Mr. Cervantes did \nnot exhaust his administrative remedies for his discrimina‐\ntion claims. His retaliation claim also must fail because there \nis no evidence of a causal connection between any protected \nactivity by Mr. Cervantes and an adverse employment action \nby Ardagh. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the dis‐\ntrict court. \n I \n BACKGROUND \n Mr. Cervantes began his career at Ardagh in 1991 as a \npallet loader. He was promoted to fork lift driver in 1998 \nand to electro‐mechanic in 2000. His complaint followed an \nincident that took place in 2015. Taking the facts in the light \n 1\nmost favorable to Mr. Cervantes, on June 20, 2015, after \ncompleting his shift, he remained at the Ardagh facility to \nassist his father, a fellow Ardagh employee, with fixing a \nmachine. During this second shift, supervisor Katina Stewart \nattempted to call Mr. Cervantes on his radio, but could not \nreach him. When Stewart located Mr. Cervantes in the facili‐\nty, he explained that he had not responded to the radio calls \nbecause he was not working a second shift; he was only stay‐\n \n1 The relevant facts are contested. On review of the district court’s grant \n\nof summary judgment for Ardagh, we resolve any disputed facts in fa‐\nvor of the non‐moving party, Mr. Cervantes, and “draw[] all reasonable \ninferences from the facts in his favor.” Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, \n627 (7th Cir. 2016). \n\fNo. 17‐3536 3\n\ning past his shift to help his father. Stewart informed \nMr. Cervantes that if he was not accepting assignments for \nthe second shift, he must leave the facility. He eventually \ncomplied. Stewart reported the incident, and Mr. Cervantes \nwas written up for insubordination and temporarily sus‐\npended. Following an investigation, Ardagh demoted \nMr. Cervantes from electro‐mechanic to forklift driver. \n On September 3, 2015, Mr. Cervantes filed a charge with \nthe Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”). In the \nsection of the form titled “Discrimination Based On,” Mr. \nCervantes checked only the box for “Retaliation.”2 He did \nnot check the box for race, national origin, or any other basis \nof discrimination. The IDHR commenced an investigation \ninto his allegations, seeking additional information from \nMr. Cervantes and from Ardagh. By March 31, 2016, Mr. \nCervantes had retained counsel, who sent a letter to IDHR \non his behalf in response to the agency’s questions about the \ncharge. On July 13, 2016, the IDHR dismissed Mr. Cervan‐\ntes’s charge, finding a lack of substantial evidence to support \nhis allegations. \n On December 5, 2016, Mr. Cervantes filed a complaint in \nthe district court. He alleged that Ardagh had violated Title \nVII and the IHRA by failing to promote him, issuing him \nperformance warnings, and demoting him based on his race \nand national origin and in retaliation for his previous com‐\nplaints about harassment and discrimination. Ardagh \n\n\n\n \n2 See R.32 at 4 (Mr. Cervantes’s IDHR Charge (Sept. 3, 2015)). \n\f4 No. 17‐3536 \n\nmoved for summary judgment on all claims, and the district \ncourt granted that motion.3 \n The district court first determined that Mr. Cervantes \ncould not proceed on his claims for race and national origin \ndiscrimination because he had failed to exhaust his adminis‐\ntrative remedies and because these allegations were not rea‐\nsonably related to his retaliation charge. The district court \nthen concluded that Mr. Cervantes had failed to state a claim \nfor retaliation because he had not established that he en‐\ngaged in protected activity. He also failed to offer any evi‐\ndence that his supervisors were aware of any complaints he \nraised and therefore did not demonstrate a causal connec‐\ntion between any protected activity and an adverse em‐\nployment action. The district court entered judgment in fa‐\nvor of Ardagh on November 14, 2017, and Mr. Cervantes \ntimely appealed. \n II \n DISCUSSION \n We review the district court’s grant of summary judg‐\nment de novo. Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 \n(7th Cir. 1996). “We will not resolve factual disputes or \nweigh conflicting evidence,” but “will only determine \nwhether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial.” Id. \n 4\nAs we noted earlier, this inquiry requires that we “view the \n \n3 In his complaint, Mr. Cervantes also asserted a claim under Illinois \n\nstate law for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court \ngranted summary judgment for Ardagh on that claim, and Mr. Cervan‐\ntes does not challenge that ruling in this appeal. \n4 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. \n\fNo. 17‐3536 5\n\nevidence and draw all inferences in a way most favorable to \nthe nonmoving party.” Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to \nestablish the existence of an element essential to his case, one \non which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, sum‐\nmary judgment must be granted to the moving party.” Id. \n A. \n Mr. Cervantes first submits that the district court erred \nwhen it determined that he had not exhausted his adminis‐\ntrative remedies for his claims of discrimination based on \nrace and national origin. We cannot accept this argument. \n In general, a plaintiff can only bring claims under Title \nVII or the IHRA that he has included in the original charge \nfiled with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission \n(“EEOC”) or the IDHR.5 Sitar v. Indiana Dep’t of Transp., 344 \nF.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2003). This limitation serves two pur‐\nposes. It affords the employer some notice of the conduct \nunderlying the employee’s allegation. It also “affords the \nagency and the employer an opportunity to attempt concilia‐\ntion without resort to the courts.” Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., \n966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992). \n Here, Mr. Cervantes initially filed a charge with the \nIDHR and checked only the box for discrimination based on \nretaliation. He did not check the box for discrimination \nbased on race, national origin, or any other protected charac‐\nteristic. He described the “particulars” of his charge as fol‐\nlows: \n \n5 The EEOC and the IDHR “have a work sharing arrangement providing \n\nthat a charge filed with one is deemed cross‐filed with the other.” \nMcQueen v. City of Chi., 803 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902–03 (N.D. Ill. 2011). \n\f6 No. 17‐3536 \n\n I began my employment with Respondent \n [Ardagh] in or around May 1991. My current \n position is Forklift Driver. A family member \n filed EEOC Charge No. 210‐1998‐00397 against \n Respondent. During my employment, I have \n been subjected to discipline, harassment, and I \n have been demoted. \n I believe I have been discriminated against in \n retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil \n Rights Act of 1964, as amended.6 \n In his complaint, by contrast, he alleged that Ardagh had \nfailed to promote him, had issued him performance warn‐\nings, and had demoted him based on his race and national \norigin. He further asserted that, after completing a four‐year \napprenticeship and working as a “rotating shift mechanic” \nfor several years, “because of his race, the decision makers at \nthe company refused to promote him.”7 He alleged that he \n“had previously complained to his superiors of discrimina‐\ntion and harassment” based on his Hispanic background, \nwhich “led to his superiors issuing poor job performance \nwarnings, about which Cervantes filed grievances with the \nunion because these warnings were retaliatory.”8 He added \nthat “[t]hese superiors were Tom Jones, Maintenance Super‐\nvisor, and Don Spells, Shift Supervisor.”9 \n\n \n6 R.32 at 4. \n\n7 R.39‐4 ¶ 6. \n\n8 Id. ¶ 10. \n\n9 Id. \n\fNo. 17‐3536 7\n\n The district court concluded that the claims of discrimi‐\nnation in Mr. Cervantes’s court complaint were outside the \nscope of his retaliation charge filed with the IDHR. Mr. Cer‐\nvantes contends, however, that his discrimination claims sat‐\nisfy a recognized exception for “claims that are ‘like or rea‐\nsonably related’ to the EEOC charge, and can be reasonably \nexpected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the charg‐\nes.” Sitar, 344 F.3d at 726 (quoting Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. \nHosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc)). As \na general matter, we do not consider a retaliation charge to \nbe reasonably related to a discrimination claim. Id. The \ncharge and the complaint may be reasonably related if, “at a \nminimum,” they “describe the same circumstances and par‐\nticipants.” Conner v. Illinois Dep’t of Natural Res., 413 F.3d 675, \n680 (7th Cir. 2005). \n Mr. Cervantes believes that his discrimination claims in \nthis action are reasonably related to his retaliation charge \nfiled with the IDHR because both involve the same entity \n(Ardagh), the same conduct (his discipline and demotion), \nand the same time frame (his tenure at Ardagh). These simi‐\nlarities occur, however, at far too high a level of generality. \nA simple comparison of his administrative retaliation charge \nand his court discrimination complaint starkly reveals that \nthey arise out of very different conduct in very different time \nperiods. His administrative retaliation charge focuses on \nconduct stemming from the 1998 EEOC charge filed by his \nbrother. Mr. Cervantes’s discrimination complaint alleges \nthat the adverse employment conduct was based on his race \nand his own internal complaints about race and national \norigin discrimination. The allegations in his complaint de‐\nscribe different hostilities that arose at different times, e.g., \nfollowing his apprenticeship, and that involved different in‐\n\f8 No. 17‐3536 \n\ndividuals, namely Jones and Spells. These allegations never \nwere mentioned in the charge. The administrative retaliation \ncharge therefore never gave Ardagh reasonable notice of \nMr. Cervantes’s discrimination claims, nor did it provide \nArdagh and the agency an opportunity to resolve his con‐\ncerns before they ripened into this suit. \n Mr. Cervantes further submits that the March 31, 2016 \nletter from his attorney to the IDHR in response to an in‐\nquiry from the agency expanded the scope of his charge. In \nthe final section of the letter, titled “On the Basis of Retalia‐\ntion,” his counsel wrote that, “After completing his 4 year \napprenticeship program and working for several years as a \nrotating shift mechanic,” Mr. Cervantes “desired to be \nplaced on a straight day shift. Yet, because of his race, the \ndecision makers at the company refused to promote him.”10 \nHe added that Mr. Cervantes’s “family is of Hispanic back‐\nground, and he felt that this was the reason he was not being \npromoted at [Ardagh], despite being as qualified—or more \nso—than those who were in fact being promoted.”11 \n Even if we were to assume that this letter should have \nalerted the agency investigators to the possibility of discrim‐\nination, we must remember that his counsel submitted the \nletter to the IDHR ex parte; it therefore did not provide \nArdagh with any notice of Mr. Cervantes’s potential dis‐\ncrimination claims. See O’Rourke v. Continental Cas. Co., 983 \nF.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a follow‐up memo‐\nrandum submitted by plaintiff to the EEOC did not enlarge \n \n10 R.39‐12 ¶ ZZ1. \n\n11 Id. ¶ ZZ4. \n\fNo. 17‐3536 9\n\nthe scope of his charge of discrimination to include a claim \nfor retaliation because, even if his submission “should have \nalerted the EEOC, [it] did nothing to alert the employer”). \nFurthermore, the letter indicates that Mr. Cervantes’s attor‐\nney understood these allegations to be part of a theory of \ndiscrimination based on retaliation, as alleged in the IDHR \ncharge, not a separate theory of discrimination based on race \nand national origin. Where, as here, a plaintiff is assisted by \ncounsel, it is “not unreasonable to require some additional \nspecificity or detail as a condition precedent for permitting” \nthe plaintiff to assert a claim that was not originally included \nin the administrative charge. Rush, 966 F.2d at 1112. \n Accordingly, we must conclude that Mr. Cervantes’s dis‐\ncrimination claims were not within the scope of his retalia‐\ntion charge, and that the district court properly granted \nsummary judgment for Ardagh on those claims. \n B. \n We turn next to Mr. Cervantes’s retaliation claim. To \nstate a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must \n“present evidence of (1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a \nmaterially adverse action taken by the employer; and (3) a \ncausal connection between the two.” Volling v. Kurtz Para‐\nmedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting \nTurner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2010)). \n Mr. Cervantes contends that he presented sufficient evi‐\ndence to state a claim for retaliation. He alleged that he \ncomplained internally at Ardagh about race and national \norigin discrimination and that his supervisors subsequently \ndisciplined and demoted him for those complaints. Howev‐\ner, his deposition testimony clarified that he made his com‐\n\f10 No. 17‐3536 \n\nplaints not to anyone at Ardagh but to the union president \nand that he did not know whether the union president ever \nbrought his concerns to the attention of anyone at Ardagh.12 \nThe district court thus correctly concluded that Mr. Cervan‐\ntes’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law because he did \nnot allege that he engaged in any protected activity. See, e.g., \nGleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1147 (7th Cir. \n1997) (holding that plaintiff did not engage in statutorily \nprotected activity given that “she did not raise the subject of \nsexual harassment to anyone in authority”). \n Moreover, even if Mr. Cervantes has alleged that he en‐\ngaged in protected activity, his retaliation claim still fails be‐\ncause he conceded that none of his supervisors at Ardagh \nwere aware of his complaints. Therefore, there is no “causal \nconnection” between any protected activity and his disci‐\npline and demotion. See, e.g., King v. Ford Motor Co., 872 F.2d \n833, 842 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that plaintiff had “no \nsupport for a claim of retaliation” because she failed to \n“show[] that whoever was responsible for” her reassign‐\nments and denials of overtime “was aware of her protected \nactivity or was involved in the later actions”). \n Finally, Mr. Cervantes maintains that disputed facts, \nsuch as whether he agreed to work the second shift on June \n20, 2015, and whether Ardagh properly trained him, pre‐\nclude summary judgment on his retaliation claim. Because \nany such issues are irrelevant to the undisputed facts that \nMr. Cervantes did not complain about discrimination to an‐\nyone at Ardagh and that his supervisors were not aware of \n\n \n12 See R.44 at 8. \n\fNo. 17‐3536 11\n\nany complaints he may have made to the union, the district \ncourt properly granted summary judgment for Ardagh. \n Conclusion \n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the \ndistrict court. \n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Juan Cervantes v. Ardagh Group\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐3536 \\nJUAN CERVANTES, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nARDAGH GROUP, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:16‐cv‐11080 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and BARRETT, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Juan Cervantes brought this action \\nagainst his employer, Ardagh Group (“Ardagh”), alleging \\nviolations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 \\nU.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 \\nILCS 5/1‐101 et seq. (“IHRA”). The complaint asserted that \\nArdagh had refused to promote him, had issued him per‐\\nformance warnings, and had demoted him because of his \\n\\f2 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nrace and national origin and in retaliation for previous com‐\\nplaints about discrimination and harassment. The district \\ncourt granted summary judgment in favor of Ardagh. \\n The district court’s decision is correct. Mr. Cervantes did \\nnot exhaust his administrative remedies for his discrimina‐\\ntion claims. His retaliation claim also must fail because there \\nis no evidence of a causal connection between any protected \\nactivity by Mr. Cervantes and an adverse employment action \\nby Ardagh. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the dis‐\\ntrict court. \\n I \\n BACKGROUND \\n Mr. Cervantes began his career at Ardagh in 1991 as a \\npallet loader. He was promoted to fork lift driver in 1998 \\nand to electro‐mechanic in 2000. His complaint followed an \\nincident that took place in 2015. Taking the facts in the light \\n 1\\nmost favorable to Mr. Cervantes, on June 20, 2015, after \\ncompleting his shift, he remained at the Ardagh facility to \\nassist his father, a fellow Ardagh employee, with fixing a \\nmachine. During this second shift, supervisor Katina Stewart \\nattempted to call Mr. Cervantes on his radio, but could not \\nreach him. When Stewart located Mr. Cervantes in the facili‐\\nty, he explained that he had not responded to the radio calls \\nbecause he was not working a second shift; he was only stay‐\\n \\n1 The relevant facts are contested. On review of the district court’s grant \\n\\nof summary judgment for Ardagh, we resolve any disputed facts in fa‐\\nvor of the non‐moving party, Mr. Cervantes, and “draw[] all reasonable \\ninferences from the facts in his favor.” Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, \\n627 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 3\\n\\ning past his shift to help his father. Stewart informed \\nMr. Cervantes that if he was not accepting assignments for \\nthe second shift, he must leave the facility. He eventually \\ncomplied. Stewart reported the incident, and Mr. Cervantes \\nwas written up for insubordination and temporarily sus‐\\npended. Following an investigation, Ardagh demoted \\nMr. Cervantes from electro‐mechanic to forklift driver. \\n On September 3, 2015, Mr. Cervantes filed a charge with \\nthe Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”). In the \\nsection of the form titled “Discrimination Based On,” Mr. \\nCervantes checked only the box for “Retaliation.”2 He did \\nnot check the box for race, national origin, or any other basis \\nof discrimination. The IDHR commenced an investigation \\ninto his allegations, seeking additional information from \\nMr. Cervantes and from Ardagh. By March 31, 2016, Mr. \\nCervantes had retained counsel, who sent a letter to IDHR \\non his behalf in response to the agency’s questions about the \\ncharge. On July 13, 2016, the IDHR dismissed Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes’s charge, finding a lack of substantial evidence to support \\nhis allegations. \\n On December 5, 2016, Mr. Cervantes filed a complaint in \\nthe district court. He alleged that Ardagh had violated Title \\nVII and the IHRA by failing to promote him, issuing him \\nperformance warnings, and demoting him based on his race \\nand national origin and in retaliation for his previous com‐\\nplaints about harassment and discrimination. Ardagh \\n\\n\\n\\n \\n2 See R.32 at 4 (Mr. Cervantes’s IDHR Charge (Sept. 3, 2015)). \\n\\f4 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nmoved for summary judgment on all claims, and the district \\ncourt granted that motion.3 \\n The district court first determined that Mr. Cervantes \\ncould not proceed on his claims for race and national origin \\ndiscrimination because he had failed to exhaust his adminis‐\\ntrative remedies and because these allegations were not rea‐\\nsonably related to his retaliation charge. The district court \\nthen concluded that Mr. Cervantes had failed to state a claim \\nfor retaliation because he had not established that he en‐\\ngaged in protected activity. He also failed to offer any evi‐\\ndence that his supervisors were aware of any complaints he \\nraised and therefore did not demonstrate a causal connec‐\\ntion between any protected activity and an adverse em‐\\nployment action. The district court entered judgment in fa‐\\nvor of Ardagh on November 14, 2017, and Mr. Cervantes \\ntimely appealed. \\n II \\n DISCUSSION \\n We review the district court’s grant of summary judg‐\\nment de novo. Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 \\n(7th Cir. 1996). “We will not resolve factual disputes or \\nweigh conflicting evidence,” but “will only determine \\nwhether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial.” Id. \\n 4\\nAs we noted earlier, this inquiry requires that we “view the \\n \\n3 In his complaint, Mr. Cervantes also asserted a claim under Illinois \\n\\nstate law for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court \\ngranted summary judgment for Ardagh on that claim, and Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes does not challenge that ruling in this appeal. \\n4 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 5\\n\\nevidence and draw all inferences in a way most favorable to \\nthe nonmoving party.” Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to \\nestablish the existence of an element essential to his case, one \\non which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, sum‐\\nmary judgment must be granted to the moving party.” Id. \\n A. \\n Mr. Cervantes first submits that the district court erred \\nwhen it determined that he had not exhausted his adminis‐\\ntrative remedies for his claims of discrimination based on \\nrace and national origin. We cannot accept this argument. \\n In general, a plaintiff can only bring claims under Title \\nVII or the IHRA that he has included in the original charge \\nfiled with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission \\n(“EEOC”) or the IDHR.5 Sitar v. Indiana Dep’t of Transp., 344 \\nF.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2003). This limitation serves two pur‐\\nposes. It affords the employer some notice of the conduct \\nunderlying the employee’s allegation. It also “affords the \\nagency and the employer an opportunity to attempt concilia‐\\ntion without resort to the courts.” Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., \\n966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992). \\n Here, Mr. Cervantes initially filed a charge with the \\nIDHR and checked only the box for discrimination based on \\nretaliation. He did not check the box for discrimination \\nbased on race, national origin, or any other protected charac‐\\nteristic. He described the “particulars” of his charge as fol‐\\nlows: \\n \\n5 The EEOC and the IDHR “have a work sharing arrangement providing \\n\\nthat a charge filed with one is deemed cross‐filed with the other.” \\nMcQueen v. City of Chi., 803 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902–03 (N.D. Ill. 2011). \\n\\f6 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\n I began my employment with Respondent \\n [Ardagh] in or around May 1991. My current \\n position is Forklift Driver. A family member \\n filed EEOC Charge No. 210‐1998‐00397 against \\n Respondent. During my employment, I have \\n been subjected to discipline, harassment, and I \\n have been demoted. \\n I believe I have been discriminated against in \\n retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil \\n Rights Act of 1964, as amended.6 \\n In his complaint, by contrast, he alleged that Ardagh had \\nfailed to promote him, had issued him performance warn‐\\nings, and had demoted him based on his race and national \\norigin. He further asserted that, after completing a four‐year \\napprenticeship and working as a “rotating shift mechanic” \\nfor several years, “because of his race, the decision makers at \\nthe company refused to promote him.”7 He alleged that he \\n“had previously complained to his superiors of discrimina‐\\ntion and harassment” based on his Hispanic background, \\nwhich “led to his superiors issuing poor job performance \\nwarnings, about which Cervantes filed grievances with the \\nunion because these warnings were retaliatory.”8 He added \\nthat “[t]hese superiors were Tom Jones, Maintenance Super‐\\nvisor, and Don Spells, Shift Supervisor.”9 \\n\\n \\n6 R.32 at 4. \\n\\n7 R.39‐4 ¶ 6. \\n\\n8 Id. ¶ 10. \\n\\n9 Id. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 7\\n\\n The district court concluded that the claims of discrimi‐\\nnation in Mr. Cervantes’s court complaint were outside the \\nscope of his retaliation charge filed with the IDHR. Mr. Cer‐\\nvantes contends, however, that his discrimination claims sat‐\\nisfy a recognized exception for “claims that are ‘like or rea‐\\nsonably related’ to the EEOC charge, and can be reasonably \\nexpected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the charg‐\\nes.” Sitar, 344 F.3d at 726 (quoting Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. \\nHosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc)). As \\na general matter, we do not consider a retaliation charge to \\nbe reasonably related to a discrimination claim. Id. The \\ncharge and the complaint may be reasonably related if, “at a \\nminimum,” they “describe the same circumstances and par‐\\nticipants.” Conner v. Illinois Dep’t of Natural Res., 413 F.3d 675, \\n680 (7th Cir. 2005). \\n Mr. Cervantes believes that his discrimination claims in \\nthis action are reasonably related to his retaliation charge \\nfiled with the IDHR because both involve the same entity \\n(Ardagh), the same conduct (his discipline and demotion), \\nand the same time frame (his tenure at Ardagh). These simi‐\\nlarities occur, however, at far too high a level of generality. \\nA simple comparison of his administrative retaliation charge \\nand his court discrimination complaint starkly reveals that \\nthey arise out of very different conduct in very different time \\nperiods. His administrative retaliation charge focuses on \\nconduct stemming from the 1998 EEOC charge filed by his \\nbrother. Mr. Cervantes’s discrimination complaint alleges \\nthat the adverse employment conduct was based on his race \\nand his own internal complaints about race and national \\norigin discrimination. The allegations in his complaint de‐\\nscribe different hostilities that arose at different times, e.g., \\nfollowing his apprenticeship, and that involved different in‐\\n\\f8 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\ndividuals, namely Jones and Spells. These allegations never \\nwere mentioned in the charge. The administrative retaliation \\ncharge therefore never gave Ardagh reasonable notice of \\nMr. Cervantes’s discrimination claims, nor did it provide \\nArdagh and the agency an opportunity to resolve his con‐\\ncerns before they ripened into this suit. \\n Mr. Cervantes further submits that the March 31, 2016 \\nletter from his attorney to the IDHR in response to an in‐\\nquiry from the agency expanded the scope of his charge. In \\nthe final section of the letter, titled “On the Basis of Retalia‐\\ntion,” his counsel wrote that, “After completing his 4 year \\napprenticeship program and working for several years as a \\nrotating shift mechanic,” Mr. Cervantes “desired to be \\nplaced on a straight day shift. Yet, because of his race, the \\ndecision makers at the company refused to promote him.”10 \\nHe added that Mr. Cervantes’s “family is of Hispanic back‐\\nground, and he felt that this was the reason he was not being \\npromoted at [Ardagh], despite being as qualified—or more \\nso—than those who were in fact being promoted.”11 \\n Even if we were to assume that this letter should have \\nalerted the agency investigators to the possibility of discrim‐\\nination, we must remember that his counsel submitted the \\nletter to the IDHR ex parte; it therefore did not provide \\nArdagh with any notice of Mr. Cervantes’s potential dis‐\\ncrimination claims. See O’Rourke v. Continental Cas. Co., 983 \\nF.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a follow‐up memo‐\\nrandum submitted by plaintiff to the EEOC did not enlarge \\n \\n10 R.39‐12 ¶ ZZ1. \\n\\n11 Id. ¶ ZZ4. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 9\\n\\nthe scope of his charge of discrimination to include a claim \\nfor retaliation because, even if his submission “should have \\nalerted the EEOC, [it] did nothing to alert the employer”). \\nFurthermore, the letter indicates that Mr. Cervantes’s attor‐\\nney understood these allegations to be part of a theory of \\ndiscrimination based on retaliation, as alleged in the IDHR \\ncharge, not a separate theory of discrimination based on race \\nand national origin. Where, as here, a plaintiff is assisted by \\ncounsel, it is “not unreasonable to require some additional \\nspecificity or detail as a condition precedent for permitting” \\nthe plaintiff to assert a claim that was not originally included \\nin the administrative charge. Rush, 966 F.2d at 1112. \\n Accordingly, we must conclude that Mr. Cervantes’s dis‐\\ncrimination claims were not within the scope of his retalia‐\\ntion charge, and that the district court properly granted \\nsummary judgment for Ardagh on those claims. \\n B. \\n We turn next to Mr. Cervantes’s retaliation claim. To \\nstate a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must \\n“present evidence of (1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a \\nmaterially adverse action taken by the employer; and (3) a \\ncausal connection between the two.” Volling v. Kurtz Para‐\\nmedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting \\nTurner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2010)). \\n Mr. Cervantes contends that he presented sufficient evi‐\\ndence to state a claim for retaliation. He alleged that he \\ncomplained internally at Ardagh about race and national \\norigin discrimination and that his supervisors subsequently \\ndisciplined and demoted him for those complaints. Howev‐\\ner, his deposition testimony clarified that he made his com‐\\n\\f10 No. 17‐3536 \\n\\nplaints not to anyone at Ardagh but to the union president \\nand that he did not know whether the union president ever \\nbrought his concerns to the attention of anyone at Ardagh.12 \\nThe district court thus correctly concluded that Mr. Cervan‐\\ntes’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law because he did \\nnot allege that he engaged in any protected activity. See, e.g., \\nGleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1147 (7th Cir. \\n1997) (holding that plaintiff did not engage in statutorily \\nprotected activity given that “she did not raise the subject of \\nsexual harassment to anyone in authority”). \\n Moreover, even if Mr. Cervantes has alleged that he en‐\\ngaged in protected activity, his retaliation claim still fails be‐\\ncause he conceded that none of his supervisors at Ardagh \\nwere aware of his complaints. Therefore, there is no “causal \\nconnection” between any protected activity and his disci‐\\npline and demotion. See, e.g., King v. Ford Motor Co., 872 F.2d \\n833, 842 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that plaintiff had “no \\nsupport for a claim of retaliation” because she failed to \\n“show[] that whoever was responsible for” her reassign‐\\nments and denials of overtime “was aware of her protected \\nactivity or was involved in the later actions”). \\n Finally, Mr. Cervantes maintains that disputed facts, \\nsuch as whether he agreed to work the second shift on June \\n20, 2015, and whether Ardagh properly trained him, pre‐\\nclude summary judgment on his retaliation claim. Because \\nany such issues are irrelevant to the undisputed facts that \\nMr. Cervantes did not complain about discrimination to an‐\\nyone at Ardagh and that his supervisors were not aware of \\n\\n \\n12 See R.44 at 8. \\n\\fNo. 17‐3536 11\\n\\nany complaints he may have made to the union, the district \\ncourt properly granted summary judgment for Ardagh. \\n Conclusion \\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the \\ndistrict court. \\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":269,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4585525,"string":"4,585,525"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Aleksey Ruderman v. Matthew G. Whitaker"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-1689"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐1689 \\nALEKSEY ARKADYEVICH RUDERMAN, \\n Petitioner, \\n v. \\n\\nMATTHEW G. WHITAKER, \\nActing Attorney General of the United States, \\n Respondent. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of \\n the Board of Immigration Appeals. \\n No. A076‐054‐163 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Aleksey Arkadyevich Ruderman is \\nseeking to avoid removal to Belarus, his native country. An \\nimmigration judge ruled that Ruderman was inadmissible \\nunder the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. \\n§ 1182(a)(2)(B), and thus subject to removal. The judge also \\n\\f2 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nheld that Ruderman was not eligible for a waiver of inadmis‐\\nsibility and adjustment of status, cancellation of removal, asy‐\\nlum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Con‐\\nvention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals \\nagreed. In particular, it held that Ruderman had not raised \\nany meaningful challenge to his inadmissibility determina‐\\ntion and that even if the immigration judge had applied the \\nwrong legal standard to determine that Ruderman was ineli‐\\ngible for a waiver of inadmissibility, her alternative discre‐\\ntionary denial made the error harmless. \\n Ruderman petitions us for review of those holdings, along \\nwith others reached by the immigration judge and affirmed \\nby the Board. While we largely agree with the Board’s analy‐\\nsis, we hold that it was flawed with respect to one issue: the \\nquestion whether Ruderman is statutorily inadmissible. We \\ntherefore grant Ruderman’s petition and remand for the \\nBoard to revisit that question and, if necessary, to decide \\nwhether Ruderman is eligible for a waiver. \\n I. \\n Ruderman moved to the United States when he was nine‐\\nteen to escape discrimination and violence directed at him on \\naccount of his Jewish heritage. He moved from his native land \\nof Belarus, a former Soviet republic that declared independ‐\\nence during his childhood. In Belarus, Ruderman and his fam‐\\nily were targeted for abuse by Neo‐Nazis and pro‐Russia ad‐\\nvocates who would shout profanities at them, perform the \\nNazi salute, leave anti‐Jewish propaganda in their mailbox, \\nand throw bottles and stones at their home. \\n Ruderman received even worse treatment at school. His \\n(sometimes much older) classmates would bully and beat him \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 3 \\n\\nand the handful of other Jewish students. The head of the \\nschool and the police were alerted but did nothing to address \\nthe situation. One particularly severe attack resulted in \\nstitches and a permanent scar, while another resulted in two \\nbroken wrists that have bothered him ever since. \\n After attackers broke Ruderman’s wrists, his parents sent \\nhim to a private school where he would be safer. His time \\nthere was cut short, however, by his father’s death. Arkady \\nRuderman, a documentary filmmaker, died while filming a \\npiece on government corruption in Tajikistan—another for‐\\nmer Soviet republic. Although government officials reported \\nthat he was killed in a car accident, Arkady had previously \\nbeen detained and battered by the KGB, and eyewitnesses \\nsaid that they saw bullet holes in his dead body. Those reports \\ncould not be confirmed because the police ordered that \\nArkady’s casket remain closed at his funeral—and then at‐\\ntended the event to make sure that it did. \\n Without Arkady’s income, Ruderman’s family could no \\nlonger afford his private school tuition, so Ruderman enrolled \\nat a different public school where he was subjected to familiar \\nanti‐Semitic verbal abuse. He became so afraid that in the \\nninth grade he stopped attending classes entirely and later \\ntransferred to a technical school. There, in spite of continued \\nverbal abuse, he performed well and graduated with high \\ngrades. Once out of school, however, he found that his Jewish \\nheritage made it difficult for him to get a job. \\n Fed up with the abuse and intolerance, Ruderman fled to \\nthe United States in 2001 under a provision known as the \\nLautenberg Amendment, which lowers barriers to immigra‐\\ntion for certain former soviet nationals. See Pub. L. No. 101‐\\n167, tit. V, §§ 599D–E, 103 Stat. 1195, 1261–64 (1989) (codified \\n\\f4 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nas amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 note, § 1255 note). His life in \\nAmerica got off to a rocky start; shortly after arriving he was \\nconvicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and sen‐\\ntenced to court supervision. But over the next several years, \\nhe found work as a cab driver and a security officer, met his \\nfuture wife Elena, and moved into an apartment with her and \\nher two children in Milwaukee. \\n In 2008, Ruderman struck and killed a pedestrian with his \\nvehicle while driving drunk. He accepted responsibility, \\npleaded guilty to homicide by negligent operation of a vehi‐\\ncle, and was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. \\nFollowing his release in 2013, he worked at a transportation \\ncompany—until U.S. Customs and Immigration Services de‐\\nnied his adjustment‐of‐status application, causing his work \\npermit to expire. \\n In January of 2016, the government detained Ruderman \\nand began removal proceedings. The immigration judge ulti‐\\nmately concluded that Ruderman was statutorily inadmissi‐\\nble because of his two convictions. The judge also denied \\nRuderman’s applications for a waiver of inadmissibility, ad‐\\njustment of status under the Lautenberg Amendment, cancel‐\\nlation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and pro‐\\ntection under the Convention Against Torture. \\n Ruderman appealed the immigration judge’s decision in \\nan extensive pro se brief and later in a second brief filed by \\npro bono counsel. The counseled brief supplemented certain \\narguments that Ruderman had made in his initial brief but \\nconceded others. Significantly, the later brief conceded that \\n“[Ruderman’s] convictions for two crimes with an aggregate \\nprison sentence of five years make him ‘inadmissible.’” That \\nconcession contradicted Ruderman’s pro se argument that the \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 5 \\n\\ninadmissibility statute applies only when two or more convic‐\\ntions each result in a sentence to confinement, and so Ruder‐\\nman’s sole sentence to confinement—which imposed five \\nyears in prison—did not make him inadmissible. \\n The Board dismissed Ruderman’s appeal. First, it noted in \\npassing that Ruderman “ha[d] not raised any meaningful \\nchallenges” to his inadmissibility, and thus the issue was \\n“waived.” Second, the Board adopted and affirmed the immi‐\\ngration judge’s denial of Ruderman’s applications for cancel‐\\nlation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection un‐\\nder the Convention Against Torture. Finally, the Board af‐\\nfirmed the denial of Ruderman’s request for a waiver of inad‐\\nmissibility and adjustment of status under the Lautenberg \\nAmendment. The Board bypassed Ruderman’s argument that \\nthe immigration judge had applied the wrong standard to de‐\\ntermine whether Ruderman was eligible for a waiver of inad‐\\nmissibility and instead affirmed the judge’s conclusion that, \\neven if Ruderman were eligible to be considered for a waiver, \\nshe would exercise her discretion to deny him relief. \\n II. \\n Ruderman petitions us for review of the Board’s decision. \\nHe takes issue with the Board’s conclusion that he waived his \\nopportunity to challenge his inadmissibility, and he argues \\nthat the application of the wrong standard for determining his \\neligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility contaminated the im‐\\nmigration judge’s discretionary denial of a waiver. He also \\nclaims that the judge erred by holding—and the Board erred \\nby affirming—both that his negligent homicide was “particu‐\\nlarly serious” and that he failed to show a “substantial risk” \\nthat he would be tortured in Belarus. \\n\\f6 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\n Because the Board provided its own analysis and also af‐\\nfirmed the immigration judge’s decision, we review both de‐\\ncisions. Sobaleva v. Holder, 760 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2014). \\n A. \\n Ruderman argued in his pro se brief that he is not inad‐\\nmissible under § 212(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nation‐\\nality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B), because he has only ever re‐\\nceived one sentence to confinement. The Act states that an im‐\\nmigrant is inadmissible to receive a visa or to be admitted to \\nthe United States if he is convicted of “2 or more of‐\\nfenses … for which the aggregate sentences to confinement \\nwere 5 years or more.” Id. Ruderman interprets “sentences to \\nconfinement” to require more than one custodial sentence. He \\nsupports this reading by pointing to the word “aggregate,” \\nwhich he argues would be superfluous if the statute could be \\nsatisfied by a single sentence to confinement. Id. Because his \\nfirst conviction—for driving under the influence—did not re‐\\nsult in confinement, he concludes that he is not inadmissible. \\nHis pro bono counsel, however, conceded Ruderman’s inad‐\\nmissibility in a later‐filed brief. \\n The Board did not address Ruderman’s inadmissibility ar‐\\ngument, instead concluding that he had failed to raise any \\nmeaningful challenges to his inadmissibility and so had \\nwaived the issue. It appears likely that the Board reached that \\nconclusion on the basis of Ruderman’s counsel’s concession, \\nbecause Ruderman did raise the argument in several places—\\nincluding his notice of appeal and pro se brief, both of which \\nremained on the record. But the Board’s opinion did not oth‐\\nerwise indicate whether the counseled brief superseded the \\npro se brief. \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 7 \\n\\n A later‐in‐time concession waives an issue in federal \\ncourt—but we do not know whether that is true before the \\nBoard as well. On this record it is unclear why the Board con‐\\ncluded that Ruderman waived his challenge, and the Board’s \\nfailure to explain inhibits our review of the issue. See SEC v. \\nChenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“[A] reviewing court, \\nin dealing with a determination or judgment which an admin‐\\nistrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the \\npropriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the \\nagency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the \\ncourt is powerless to affirm the administrative action by sub‐\\nstituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper \\nbasis.”). We grant Ruderman’s petition and remand this issue \\nto the Board to clarify why it did not address Ruderman’s in‐\\nadmissibility argument. \\n B. \\n If on remand the Board confirms that Ruderman is inad‐\\nmissible, his application for a waiver of inadmissibility should \\nbe reviewed under the correct legal standard. The immigra‐\\ntion judge concluded that Ruderman was statutorily ineligi‐\\nble for a waiver because he did not show that his removal \\nwould cause “extreme hardship” to his U.S.‐citizen wife. 8 \\nU.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). When a waiver is sought in conjunction \\nwith an application for a status adjustment under the Lauten‐\\nberg Amendment, however, there is no threshold eligibility \\nrequirement; a waiver may be granted simply “for humani‐\\ntarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is other‐\\nwise in the public interest.” 8 U.S.C. 1255 note; see also 8 C.F.R. \\n§ 1245.7(d). The immigration judge erred by not considering \\nRuderman’s application under this less stringent standard. \\n\\f8 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\n The Board concluded that this error was harmless because \\nthe immigration judge held in the alternative that she would \\nexercise her discretion to deny Ruderman relief if he were el‐\\nigible to be considered for it. The assumption seems to be that \\nthe judge would have made the same discretionary denial of \\na waiver under the Lautenberg Amendment as she made un‐\\nder § 1182(h). But, as we have already noted, the former pro‐\\nvides discretion to grant a waiver for humanitarian purposes, \\nto assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public \\ninterest; the latter entails a potentially more complex consid‐\\neration of the ground for exclusion at issue, past immigration \\nviolations or criminal history, evidence of rehabilitation, gen‐\\neral evidence of good or bad character, strength of family ties, \\nduration of residence in the United States, and evidence of \\nvalue to the community. See In re Mendez‐Moralez, 21 I. & N. \\nDec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996). Because these statutes, along with \\nthe cases and regulations interpreting them, articulate distinct \\nfactors to be considered in deciding whether to grant a discre‐\\ntionary waiver of inadmissibility, the Board cannot simply \\nsubstitute one standard for another and assume that the out‐\\ncome would be the same. If the Board confirms Ruderman’s \\ninadmissibility on remand, it should consider his application \\nfor a waiver under the proper framework. \\n C. \\n Ruderman’s other arguments go nowhere. First, he claims \\nthat he is eligible for asylum and withholding of removal be‐\\ncause he did not commit a “particularly serious crime.” 8 \\nU.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Ruderman com‐\\nmitted homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle, Wis. Stat. \\n§ 940.10(1); he argues that Congress did not intend for crimi‐\\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 9 \\n\\nnal negligence like his to qualify as particularly serious. Gen‐\\nerally, classification of a crime as “particularly serious” is \\nwithin the discretion of the Attorney General—exercised here \\nby the Board. Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. \\n2006). Our review of these classifications is confined to consti‐\\ntutional and legal questions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2); see also Es‐\\ntrada‐Martinez v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 2015). And \\nwhen those legal questions implicate ambiguous statutory \\nprovisions, we give deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. \\nRes. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). \\n We considered the meaning of “particularly serious \\ncrime” in some depth in Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. \\n2006). In that case, the petitioner argued that the Board could \\nnot hold that his conviction for “substantial battery with a \\ndangerous weapon,” a nonaggravated felony, was a particu‐\\nlarly serious crime under § 1158(b)(2) and § 1231(b)(3) be‐\\ncause it did not fall within the two categories of crimes iden‐\\ntified as per se “particularly serious” in § 1158(b)(2): aggra‐\\nvated felonies and other crimes that the Attorney General des‐\\nignates by regulation. Id. at 468–69. We disagreed, explaining \\nthat the presence of these categories does not cabin the \\nBoard’s discretion to determine that nonaggravated felonies \\nare particularly serious on a case‐by‐case basis. Id. at 469. In \\nthe same way, the Board is not precluded from determining \\nthat some crimes of negligence are particularly serious. \\n Nor does the Immigration and Nationality Act’s separate \\ndefinition of “serious criminal offense” undermine the \\nBoard’s interpretation. The Act identifies “driving while in‐\\ntoxicated or under the influence of alcohol” as a serious crim‐\\ninal offense if it “involves personal injury to another.” 8 U.S.C. \\n§ 1101(h)(3). Ruderman argues that “particularly serious \\n\\f10 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\ncrime” must be interpreted to require more. Maybe so. But \\neven if he’s right, criminally negligent homicide entails more \\nthan mere “personal injury,” so the argument is a dead end. \\n Finally, even if § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) \\nwere ambiguous as to whether crimes of negligence could be \\n“particularly serious,” Ruderman has not shown that the \\nBoard’s interpretation is too unreasonable to merit deference \\nunder Chevron. See Ali, 468 F.3d at 470. Nor has he shown that \\nthe Board’s interpretation is so likely to conflict with the Con‐\\nstitution or international law that we need to consider \\nwhether some other interpretation is warranted. \\n D. \\n Finally, Ruderman contends that the Board should have \\ngranted him protection under the Convention Against Tor‐\\nture, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–18. The Convention forbids the re‐\\nturn of “a person to another State where there are substantial \\ngrounds for believing that he would be in danger of being \\nsubjected to torture.” Convention Against Torture and Other \\nCruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. \\n3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100‐20 (1990), 1465 \\nU.N.T.S. 85. Federal regulations define torture as requiring \\n“the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” 8 C.F.R \\n§ 1208.18(a)(1). Immigration judges must withhold or defer \\nremoval if an applicant demonstrates that “it is more likely \\nthan not that he or she would be tortured if removed.” 8 \\nC.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). We have explained that “more likely \\nthan not” means that there is a “substantial risk” that the alien \\nwill be tortured. Rodriguez‐Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, \\n1135–36 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Perez‐Montes v. Sessions, 880 \\nF.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir. 2018). \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 11 \\n\\n Ruderman argues that the immigration judge both misun‐\\nderstood and misapplied the “substantial risk” standard. But \\nthere is no evidence of the former; the immigration judge \\ncited our decision in Rodriguez‐Molinero and proceeded to an‐\\nalyze whether there was a substantial risk that Ruderman \\nwould be subject to torture inflicted by or with the consent of \\na public official if he returned to Belarus. See 8 C.F.R. \\n§ 1208.18(a)(1)–(2). And Ruderman fails to establish the latter. \\nWe review the Board’s conclusion that there was no substan‐\\ntial risk of torture under the “highly deferential substantial \\nevidence test,” which mandates denying the petition unless \\n“the record evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Lopez v. \\nLynch, 810 F.3d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). \\n The record evidence does not compel a contrary conclu‐\\nsion. To be sure, certain findings from the immigration judge \\ngive us pause. For one, the judge concluded that there was no \\nsubstantial risk of torture for Jews in Belarus because, despite \\n“widespread anti‐Semitism in Belarus,” incidents targeting \\nJews have been declining. While it is true that the raw number \\nof anti‐Jewish incidents in Belarus has declined, so has the \\nJewish population. In this context, an absolute decrease in in‐\\ncidents does not necessary equate to a relative increase in \\nsafety for any individual. Nor does the evidence of Ruder‐\\nman’s mother’s safe travel to and from Belarus mean that \\nRuderman will be equally safe. His mother has a Christian \\nname that is not associated with her late husband, whereas \\nRuderman’s patronymic clearly signals that he is both Jewish \\nand the son of a known political activist whom the KGB may \\nhave tortured and killed. But on the other hand, there is evi‐\\ndence that Ruderman became less susceptible to physical at‐\\ntacks as he grew and became better able to defend himself, \\nthat no one in his family has been threatened in Belarus, and \\n\\f12 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nthat he lived in Belarus for eight years following his father’s \\ndeath without any threat of torture on account of his relation‐\\nship to his father. Considering all the evidence, the record \\ndoes not compel the conclusion that there is a substantial risk \\nthat Ruderman would be tortured if he returned to Belarus. \\n * * * \\n Ruderman’s petition for review is GRANTED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4362778/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585525/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Aleksey Ruderman v. Matthew G. Whitaker\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐1689 \nALEKSEY ARKADYEVICH RUDERMAN, \n Petitioner, \n v. \n\nMATTHEW G. WHITAKER, \nActing Attorney General of the United States, \n Respondent. \n ____________________ \n\n Petition for Review of an Order of \n the Board of Immigration Appeals. \n No. A076‐054‐163 \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, \nCircuit Judges. \n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Aleksey Arkadyevich Ruderman is \nseeking to avoid removal to Belarus, his native country. An \nimmigration judge ruled that Ruderman was inadmissible \nunder the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. \n§ 1182(a)(2)(B), and thus subject to removal. The judge also \n\f2 No. 17‐1689 \n\nheld that Ruderman was not eligible for a waiver of inadmis‐\nsibility and adjustment of status, cancellation of removal, asy‐\nlum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Con‐\nvention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals \nagreed. In particular, it held that Ruderman had not raised \nany meaningful challenge to his inadmissibility determina‐\ntion and that even if the immigration judge had applied the \nwrong legal standard to determine that Ruderman was ineli‐\ngible for a waiver of inadmissibility, her alternative discre‐\ntionary denial made the error harmless. \n Ruderman petitions us for review of those holdings, along \nwith others reached by the immigration judge and affirmed \nby the Board. While we largely agree with the Board’s analy‐\nsis, we hold that it was flawed with respect to one issue: the \nquestion whether Ruderman is statutorily inadmissible. We \ntherefore grant Ruderman’s petition and remand for the \nBoard to revisit that question and, if necessary, to decide \nwhether Ruderman is eligible for a waiver. \n I. \n Ruderman moved to the United States when he was nine‐\nteen to escape discrimination and violence directed at him on \naccount of his Jewish heritage. He moved from his native land \nof Belarus, a former Soviet republic that declared independ‐\nence during his childhood. In Belarus, Ruderman and his fam‐\nily were targeted for abuse by Neo‐Nazis and pro‐Russia ad‐\nvocates who would shout profanities at them, perform the \nNazi salute, leave anti‐Jewish propaganda in their mailbox, \nand throw bottles and stones at their home. \n Ruderman received even worse treatment at school. His \n(sometimes much older) classmates would bully and beat him \n\fNo. 17‐1689 3 \n\nand the handful of other Jewish students. The head of the \nschool and the police were alerted but did nothing to address \nthe situation. One particularly severe attack resulted in \nstitches and a permanent scar, while another resulted in two \nbroken wrists that have bothered him ever since. \n After attackers broke Ruderman’s wrists, his parents sent \nhim to a private school where he would be safer. His time \nthere was cut short, however, by his father’s death. Arkady \nRuderman, a documentary filmmaker, died while filming a \npiece on government corruption in Tajikistan—another for‐\nmer Soviet republic. Although government officials reported \nthat he was killed in a car accident, Arkady had previously \nbeen detained and battered by the KGB, and eyewitnesses \nsaid that they saw bullet holes in his dead body. Those reports \ncould not be confirmed because the police ordered that \nArkady’s casket remain closed at his funeral—and then at‐\ntended the event to make sure that it did. \n Without Arkady’s income, Ruderman’s family could no \nlonger afford his private school tuition, so Ruderman enrolled \nat a different public school where he was subjected to familiar \nanti‐Semitic verbal abuse. He became so afraid that in the \nninth grade he stopped attending classes entirely and later \ntransferred to a technical school. There, in spite of continued \nverbal abuse, he performed well and graduated with high \ngrades. Once out of school, however, he found that his Jewish \nheritage made it difficult for him to get a job. \n Fed up with the abuse and intolerance, Ruderman fled to \nthe United States in 2001 under a provision known as the \nLautenberg Amendment, which lowers barriers to immigra‐\ntion for certain former soviet nationals. See Pub. L. No. 101‐\n167, tit. V, §§ 599D–E, 103 Stat. 1195, 1261–64 (1989) (codified \n\f4 No. 17‐1689 \n\nas amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 note, § 1255 note). His life in \nAmerica got off to a rocky start; shortly after arriving he was \nconvicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and sen‐\ntenced to court supervision. But over the next several years, \nhe found work as a cab driver and a security officer, met his \nfuture wife Elena, and moved into an apartment with her and \nher two children in Milwaukee. \n In 2008, Ruderman struck and killed a pedestrian with his \nvehicle while driving drunk. He accepted responsibility, \npleaded guilty to homicide by negligent operation of a vehi‐\ncle, and was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. \nFollowing his release in 2013, he worked at a transportation \ncompany—until U.S. Customs and Immigration Services de‐\nnied his adjustment‐of‐status application, causing his work \npermit to expire. \n In January of 2016, the government detained Ruderman \nand began removal proceedings. The immigration judge ulti‐\nmately concluded that Ruderman was statutorily inadmissi‐\nble because of his two convictions. The judge also denied \nRuderman’s applications for a waiver of inadmissibility, ad‐\njustment of status under the Lautenberg Amendment, cancel‐\nlation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and pro‐\ntection under the Convention Against Torture. \n Ruderman appealed the immigration judge’s decision in \nan extensive pro se brief and later in a second brief filed by \npro bono counsel. The counseled brief supplemented certain \narguments that Ruderman had made in his initial brief but \nconceded others. Significantly, the later brief conceded that \n“[Ruderman’s] convictions for two crimes with an aggregate \nprison sentence of five years make him ‘inadmissible.’” That \nconcession contradicted Ruderman’s pro se argument that the \n\fNo. 17‐1689 5 \n\ninadmissibility statute applies only when two or more convic‐\ntions each result in a sentence to confinement, and so Ruder‐\nman’s sole sentence to confinement—which imposed five \nyears in prison—did not make him inadmissible. \n The Board dismissed Ruderman’s appeal. First, it noted in \npassing that Ruderman “ha[d] not raised any meaningful \nchallenges” to his inadmissibility, and thus the issue was \n“waived.” Second, the Board adopted and affirmed the immi‐\ngration judge’s denial of Ruderman’s applications for cancel‐\nlation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection un‐\nder the Convention Against Torture. Finally, the Board af‐\nfirmed the denial of Ruderman’s request for a waiver of inad‐\nmissibility and adjustment of status under the Lautenberg \nAmendment. The Board bypassed Ruderman’s argument that \nthe immigration judge had applied the wrong standard to de‐\ntermine whether Ruderman was eligible for a waiver of inad‐\nmissibility and instead affirmed the judge’s conclusion that, \neven if Ruderman were eligible to be considered for a waiver, \nshe would exercise her discretion to deny him relief. \n II. \n Ruderman petitions us for review of the Board’s decision. \nHe takes issue with the Board’s conclusion that he waived his \nopportunity to challenge his inadmissibility, and he argues \nthat the application of the wrong standard for determining his \neligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility contaminated the im‐\nmigration judge’s discretionary denial of a waiver. He also \nclaims that the judge erred by holding—and the Board erred \nby affirming—both that his negligent homicide was “particu‐\nlarly serious” and that he failed to show a “substantial risk” \nthat he would be tortured in Belarus. \n\f6 No. 17‐1689 \n\n Because the Board provided its own analysis and also af‐\nfirmed the immigration judge’s decision, we review both de‐\ncisions. Sobaleva v. Holder, 760 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2014). \n A. \n Ruderman argued in his pro se brief that he is not inad‐\nmissible under § 212(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nation‐\nality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B), because he has only ever re‐\nceived one sentence to confinement. The Act states that an im‐\nmigrant is inadmissible to receive a visa or to be admitted to \nthe United States if he is convicted of “2 or more of‐\nfenses … for which the aggregate sentences to confinement \nwere 5 years or more.” Id. Ruderman interprets “sentences to \nconfinement” to require more than one custodial sentence. He \nsupports this reading by pointing to the word “aggregate,” \nwhich he argues would be superfluous if the statute could be \nsatisfied by a single sentence to confinement. Id. Because his \nfirst conviction—for driving under the influence—did not re‐\nsult in confinement, he concludes that he is not inadmissible. \nHis pro bono counsel, however, conceded Ruderman’s inad‐\nmissibility in a later‐filed brief. \n The Board did not address Ruderman’s inadmissibility ar‐\ngument, instead concluding that he had failed to raise any \nmeaningful challenges to his inadmissibility and so had \nwaived the issue. It appears likely that the Board reached that \nconclusion on the basis of Ruderman’s counsel’s concession, \nbecause Ruderman did raise the argument in several places—\nincluding his notice of appeal and pro se brief, both of which \nremained on the record. But the Board’s opinion did not oth‐\nerwise indicate whether the counseled brief superseded the \npro se brief. \n\fNo. 17‐1689 7 \n\n A later‐in‐time concession waives an issue in federal \ncourt—but we do not know whether that is true before the \nBoard as well. On this record it is unclear why the Board con‐\ncluded that Ruderman waived his challenge, and the Board’s \nfailure to explain inhibits our review of the issue. See SEC v. \nChenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“[A] reviewing court, \nin dealing with a determination or judgment which an admin‐\nistrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the \npropriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the \nagency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the \ncourt is powerless to affirm the administrative action by sub‐\nstituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper \nbasis.”). We grant Ruderman’s petition and remand this issue \nto the Board to clarify why it did not address Ruderman’s in‐\nadmissibility argument. \n B. \n If on remand the Board confirms that Ruderman is inad‐\nmissible, his application for a waiver of inadmissibility should \nbe reviewed under the correct legal standard. The immigra‐\ntion judge concluded that Ruderman was statutorily ineligi‐\nble for a waiver because he did not show that his removal \nwould cause “extreme hardship” to his U.S.‐citizen wife. 8 \nU.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). When a waiver is sought in conjunction \nwith an application for a status adjustment under the Lauten‐\nberg Amendment, however, there is no threshold eligibility \nrequirement; a waiver may be granted simply “for humani‐\ntarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is other‐\nwise in the public interest.” 8 U.S.C. 1255 note; see also 8 C.F.R. \n§ 1245.7(d). The immigration judge erred by not considering \nRuderman’s application under this less stringent standard. \n\f8 No. 17‐1689 \n\n The Board concluded that this error was harmless because \nthe immigration judge held in the alternative that she would \nexercise her discretion to deny Ruderman relief if he were el‐\nigible to be considered for it. The assumption seems to be that \nthe judge would have made the same discretionary denial of \na waiver under the Lautenberg Amendment as she made un‐\nder § 1182(h). But, as we have already noted, the former pro‐\nvides discretion to grant a waiver for humanitarian purposes, \nto assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public \ninterest; the latter entails a potentially more complex consid‐\neration of the ground for exclusion at issue, past immigration \nviolations or criminal history, evidence of rehabilitation, gen‐\neral evidence of good or bad character, strength of family ties, \nduration of residence in the United States, and evidence of \nvalue to the community. See In re Mendez‐Moralez, 21 I. & N. \nDec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996). Because these statutes, along with \nthe cases and regulations interpreting them, articulate distinct \nfactors to be considered in deciding whether to grant a discre‐\ntionary waiver of inadmissibility, the Board cannot simply \nsubstitute one standard for another and assume that the out‐\ncome would be the same. If the Board confirms Ruderman’s \ninadmissibility on remand, it should consider his application \nfor a waiver under the proper framework. \n C. \n Ruderman’s other arguments go nowhere. First, he claims \nthat he is eligible for asylum and withholding of removal be‐\ncause he did not commit a “particularly serious crime.” 8 \nU.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Ruderman com‐\nmitted homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle, Wis. Stat. \n§ 940.10(1); he argues that Congress did not intend for crimi‐\n\fNo. 17‐1689 9 \n\nnal negligence like his to qualify as particularly serious. Gen‐\nerally, classification of a crime as “particularly serious” is \nwithin the discretion of the Attorney General—exercised here \nby the Board. Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. \n2006). Our review of these classifications is confined to consti‐\ntutional and legal questions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2); see also Es‐\ntrada‐Martinez v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 2015). And \nwhen those legal questions implicate ambiguous statutory \nprovisions, we give deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. \nRes. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). \n We considered the meaning of “particularly serious \ncrime” in some depth in Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. \n2006). In that case, the petitioner argued that the Board could \nnot hold that his conviction for “substantial battery with a \ndangerous weapon,” a nonaggravated felony, was a particu‐\nlarly serious crime under § 1158(b)(2) and § 1231(b)(3) be‐\ncause it did not fall within the two categories of crimes iden‐\ntified as per se “particularly serious” in § 1158(b)(2): aggra‐\nvated felonies and other crimes that the Attorney General des‐\nignates by regulation. Id. at 468–69. We disagreed, explaining \nthat the presence of these categories does not cabin the \nBoard’s discretion to determine that nonaggravated felonies \nare particularly serious on a case‐by‐case basis. Id. at 469. In \nthe same way, the Board is not precluded from determining \nthat some crimes of negligence are particularly serious. \n Nor does the Immigration and Nationality Act’s separate \ndefinition of “serious criminal offense” undermine the \nBoard’s interpretation. The Act identifies “driving while in‐\ntoxicated or under the influence of alcohol” as a serious crim‐\ninal offense if it “involves personal injury to another.” 8 U.S.C. \n§ 1101(h)(3). Ruderman argues that “particularly serious \n\f10 No. 17‐1689 \n\ncrime” must be interpreted to require more. Maybe so. But \neven if he’s right, criminally negligent homicide entails more \nthan mere “personal injury,” so the argument is a dead end. \n Finally, even if § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) \nwere ambiguous as to whether crimes of negligence could be \n“particularly serious,” Ruderman has not shown that the \nBoard’s interpretation is too unreasonable to merit deference \nunder Chevron. See Ali, 468 F.3d at 470. Nor has he shown that \nthe Board’s interpretation is so likely to conflict with the Con‐\nstitution or international law that we need to consider \nwhether some other interpretation is warranted. \n D. \n Finally, Ruderman contends that the Board should have \ngranted him protection under the Convention Against Tor‐\nture, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–18. The Convention forbids the re‐\nturn of “a person to another State where there are substantial \ngrounds for believing that he would be in danger of being \nsubjected to torture.” Convention Against Torture and Other \nCruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. \n3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100‐20 (1990), 1465 \nU.N.T.S. 85. Federal regulations define torture as requiring \n“the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” 8 C.F.R \n§ 1208.18(a)(1). Immigration judges must withhold or defer \nremoval if an applicant demonstrates that “it is more likely \nthan not that he or she would be tortured if removed.” 8 \nC.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). We have explained that “more likely \nthan not” means that there is a “substantial risk” that the alien \nwill be tortured. Rodriguez‐Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, \n1135–36 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Perez‐Montes v. Sessions, 880 \nF.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir. 2018). \n\fNo. 17‐1689 11 \n\n Ruderman argues that the immigration judge both misun‐\nderstood and misapplied the “substantial risk” standard. But \nthere is no evidence of the former; the immigration judge \ncited our decision in Rodriguez‐Molinero and proceeded to an‐\nalyze whether there was a substantial risk that Ruderman \nwould be subject to torture inflicted by or with the consent of \na public official if he returned to Belarus. See 8 C.F.R. \n§ 1208.18(a)(1)–(2). And Ruderman fails to establish the latter. \nWe review the Board’s conclusion that there was no substan‐\ntial risk of torture under the “highly deferential substantial \nevidence test,” which mandates denying the petition unless \n“the record evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Lopez v. \nLynch, 810 F.3d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). \n The record evidence does not compel a contrary conclu‐\nsion. To be sure, certain findings from the immigration judge \ngive us pause. For one, the judge concluded that there was no \nsubstantial risk of torture for Jews in Belarus because, despite \n“widespread anti‐Semitism in Belarus,” incidents targeting \nJews have been declining. While it is true that the raw number \nof anti‐Jewish incidents in Belarus has declined, so has the \nJewish population. In this context, an absolute decrease in in‐\ncidents does not necessary equate to a relative increase in \nsafety for any individual. Nor does the evidence of Ruder‐\nman’s mother’s safe travel to and from Belarus mean that \nRuderman will be equally safe. His mother has a Christian \nname that is not associated with her late husband, whereas \nRuderman’s patronymic clearly signals that he is both Jewish \nand the son of a known political activist whom the KGB may \nhave tortured and killed. But on the other hand, there is evi‐\ndence that Ruderman became less susceptible to physical at‐\ntacks as he grew and became better able to defend himself, \nthat no one in his family has been threatened in Belarus, and \n\f12 No. 17‐1689 \n\nthat he lived in Belarus for eight years following his father’s \ndeath without any threat of torture on account of his relation‐\nship to his father. Considering all the evidence, the record \ndoes not compel the conclusion that there is a substantial risk \nthat Ruderman would be tortured if he returned to Belarus. \n * * * \n Ruderman’s petition for review is GRANTED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Aleksey Ruderman v. Matthew G. Whitaker\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐1689 \\nALEKSEY ARKADYEVICH RUDERMAN, \\n Petitioner, \\n v. \\n\\nMATTHEW G. WHITAKER, \\nActing Attorney General of the United States, \\n Respondent. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of \\n the Board of Immigration Appeals. \\n No. A076‐054‐163 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Aleksey Arkadyevich Ruderman is \\nseeking to avoid removal to Belarus, his native country. An \\nimmigration judge ruled that Ruderman was inadmissible \\nunder the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. \\n§ 1182(a)(2)(B), and thus subject to removal. The judge also \\n\\f2 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nheld that Ruderman was not eligible for a waiver of inadmis‐\\nsibility and adjustment of status, cancellation of removal, asy‐\\nlum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Con‐\\nvention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals \\nagreed. In particular, it held that Ruderman had not raised \\nany meaningful challenge to his inadmissibility determina‐\\ntion and that even if the immigration judge had applied the \\nwrong legal standard to determine that Ruderman was ineli‐\\ngible for a waiver of inadmissibility, her alternative discre‐\\ntionary denial made the error harmless. \\n Ruderman petitions us for review of those holdings, along \\nwith others reached by the immigration judge and affirmed \\nby the Board. While we largely agree with the Board’s analy‐\\nsis, we hold that it was flawed with respect to one issue: the \\nquestion whether Ruderman is statutorily inadmissible. We \\ntherefore grant Ruderman’s petition and remand for the \\nBoard to revisit that question and, if necessary, to decide \\nwhether Ruderman is eligible for a waiver. \\n I. \\n Ruderman moved to the United States when he was nine‐\\nteen to escape discrimination and violence directed at him on \\naccount of his Jewish heritage. He moved from his native land \\nof Belarus, a former Soviet republic that declared independ‐\\nence during his childhood. In Belarus, Ruderman and his fam‐\\nily were targeted for abuse by Neo‐Nazis and pro‐Russia ad‐\\nvocates who would shout profanities at them, perform the \\nNazi salute, leave anti‐Jewish propaganda in their mailbox, \\nand throw bottles and stones at their home. \\n Ruderman received even worse treatment at school. His \\n(sometimes much older) classmates would bully and beat him \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 3 \\n\\nand the handful of other Jewish students. The head of the \\nschool and the police were alerted but did nothing to address \\nthe situation. One particularly severe attack resulted in \\nstitches and a permanent scar, while another resulted in two \\nbroken wrists that have bothered him ever since. \\n After attackers broke Ruderman’s wrists, his parents sent \\nhim to a private school where he would be safer. His time \\nthere was cut short, however, by his father’s death. Arkady \\nRuderman, a documentary filmmaker, died while filming a \\npiece on government corruption in Tajikistan—another for‐\\nmer Soviet republic. Although government officials reported \\nthat he was killed in a car accident, Arkady had previously \\nbeen detained and battered by the KGB, and eyewitnesses \\nsaid that they saw bullet holes in his dead body. Those reports \\ncould not be confirmed because the police ordered that \\nArkady’s casket remain closed at his funeral—and then at‐\\ntended the event to make sure that it did. \\n Without Arkady’s income, Ruderman’s family could no \\nlonger afford his private school tuition, so Ruderman enrolled \\nat a different public school where he was subjected to familiar \\nanti‐Semitic verbal abuse. He became so afraid that in the \\nninth grade he stopped attending classes entirely and later \\ntransferred to a technical school. There, in spite of continued \\nverbal abuse, he performed well and graduated with high \\ngrades. Once out of school, however, he found that his Jewish \\nheritage made it difficult for him to get a job. \\n Fed up with the abuse and intolerance, Ruderman fled to \\nthe United States in 2001 under a provision known as the \\nLautenberg Amendment, which lowers barriers to immigra‐\\ntion for certain former soviet nationals. See Pub. L. No. 101‐\\n167, tit. V, §§ 599D–E, 103 Stat. 1195, 1261–64 (1989) (codified \\n\\f4 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nas amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 note, § 1255 note). His life in \\nAmerica got off to a rocky start; shortly after arriving he was \\nconvicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and sen‐\\ntenced to court supervision. But over the next several years, \\nhe found work as a cab driver and a security officer, met his \\nfuture wife Elena, and moved into an apartment with her and \\nher two children in Milwaukee. \\n In 2008, Ruderman struck and killed a pedestrian with his \\nvehicle while driving drunk. He accepted responsibility, \\npleaded guilty to homicide by negligent operation of a vehi‐\\ncle, and was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. \\nFollowing his release in 2013, he worked at a transportation \\ncompany—until U.S. Customs and Immigration Services de‐\\nnied his adjustment‐of‐status application, causing his work \\npermit to expire. \\n In January of 2016, the government detained Ruderman \\nand began removal proceedings. The immigration judge ulti‐\\nmately concluded that Ruderman was statutorily inadmissi‐\\nble because of his two convictions. The judge also denied \\nRuderman’s applications for a waiver of inadmissibility, ad‐\\njustment of status under the Lautenberg Amendment, cancel‐\\nlation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and pro‐\\ntection under the Convention Against Torture. \\n Ruderman appealed the immigration judge’s decision in \\nan extensive pro se brief and later in a second brief filed by \\npro bono counsel. The counseled brief supplemented certain \\narguments that Ruderman had made in his initial brief but \\nconceded others. Significantly, the later brief conceded that \\n“[Ruderman’s] convictions for two crimes with an aggregate \\nprison sentence of five years make him ‘inadmissible.’” That \\nconcession contradicted Ruderman’s pro se argument that the \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 5 \\n\\ninadmissibility statute applies only when two or more convic‐\\ntions each result in a sentence to confinement, and so Ruder‐\\nman’s sole sentence to confinement—which imposed five \\nyears in prison—did not make him inadmissible. \\n The Board dismissed Ruderman’s appeal. First, it noted in \\npassing that Ruderman “ha[d] not raised any meaningful \\nchallenges” to his inadmissibility, and thus the issue was \\n“waived.” Second, the Board adopted and affirmed the immi‐\\ngration judge’s denial of Ruderman’s applications for cancel‐\\nlation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection un‐\\nder the Convention Against Torture. Finally, the Board af‐\\nfirmed the denial of Ruderman’s request for a waiver of inad‐\\nmissibility and adjustment of status under the Lautenberg \\nAmendment. The Board bypassed Ruderman’s argument that \\nthe immigration judge had applied the wrong standard to de‐\\ntermine whether Ruderman was eligible for a waiver of inad‐\\nmissibility and instead affirmed the judge’s conclusion that, \\neven if Ruderman were eligible to be considered for a waiver, \\nshe would exercise her discretion to deny him relief. \\n II. \\n Ruderman petitions us for review of the Board’s decision. \\nHe takes issue with the Board’s conclusion that he waived his \\nopportunity to challenge his inadmissibility, and he argues \\nthat the application of the wrong standard for determining his \\neligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility contaminated the im‐\\nmigration judge’s discretionary denial of a waiver. He also \\nclaims that the judge erred by holding—and the Board erred \\nby affirming—both that his negligent homicide was “particu‐\\nlarly serious” and that he failed to show a “substantial risk” \\nthat he would be tortured in Belarus. \\n\\f6 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\n Because the Board provided its own analysis and also af‐\\nfirmed the immigration judge’s decision, we review both de‐\\ncisions. Sobaleva v. Holder, 760 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2014). \\n A. \\n Ruderman argued in his pro se brief that he is not inad‐\\nmissible under § 212(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nation‐\\nality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B), because he has only ever re‐\\nceived one sentence to confinement. The Act states that an im‐\\nmigrant is inadmissible to receive a visa or to be admitted to \\nthe United States if he is convicted of “2 or more of‐\\nfenses … for which the aggregate sentences to confinement \\nwere 5 years or more.” Id. Ruderman interprets “sentences to \\nconfinement” to require more than one custodial sentence. He \\nsupports this reading by pointing to the word “aggregate,” \\nwhich he argues would be superfluous if the statute could be \\nsatisfied by a single sentence to confinement. Id. Because his \\nfirst conviction—for driving under the influence—did not re‐\\nsult in confinement, he concludes that he is not inadmissible. \\nHis pro bono counsel, however, conceded Ruderman’s inad‐\\nmissibility in a later‐filed brief. \\n The Board did not address Ruderman’s inadmissibility ar‐\\ngument, instead concluding that he had failed to raise any \\nmeaningful challenges to his inadmissibility and so had \\nwaived the issue. It appears likely that the Board reached that \\nconclusion on the basis of Ruderman’s counsel’s concession, \\nbecause Ruderman did raise the argument in several places—\\nincluding his notice of appeal and pro se brief, both of which \\nremained on the record. But the Board’s opinion did not oth‐\\nerwise indicate whether the counseled brief superseded the \\npro se brief. \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 7 \\n\\n A later‐in‐time concession waives an issue in federal \\ncourt—but we do not know whether that is true before the \\nBoard as well. On this record it is unclear why the Board con‐\\ncluded that Ruderman waived his challenge, and the Board’s \\nfailure to explain inhibits our review of the issue. See SEC v. \\nChenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“[A] reviewing court, \\nin dealing with a determination or judgment which an admin‐\\nistrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the \\npropriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the \\nagency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the \\ncourt is powerless to affirm the administrative action by sub‐\\nstituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper \\nbasis.”). We grant Ruderman’s petition and remand this issue \\nto the Board to clarify why it did not address Ruderman’s in‐\\nadmissibility argument. \\n B. \\n If on remand the Board confirms that Ruderman is inad‐\\nmissible, his application for a waiver of inadmissibility should \\nbe reviewed under the correct legal standard. The immigra‐\\ntion judge concluded that Ruderman was statutorily ineligi‐\\nble for a waiver because he did not show that his removal \\nwould cause “extreme hardship” to his U.S.‐citizen wife. 8 \\nU.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). When a waiver is sought in conjunction \\nwith an application for a status adjustment under the Lauten‐\\nberg Amendment, however, there is no threshold eligibility \\nrequirement; a waiver may be granted simply “for humani‐\\ntarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is other‐\\nwise in the public interest.” 8 U.S.C. 1255 note; see also 8 C.F.R. \\n§ 1245.7(d). The immigration judge erred by not considering \\nRuderman’s application under this less stringent standard. \\n\\f8 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\n The Board concluded that this error was harmless because \\nthe immigration judge held in the alternative that she would \\nexercise her discretion to deny Ruderman relief if he were el‐\\nigible to be considered for it. The assumption seems to be that \\nthe judge would have made the same discretionary denial of \\na waiver under the Lautenberg Amendment as she made un‐\\nder § 1182(h). But, as we have already noted, the former pro‐\\nvides discretion to grant a waiver for humanitarian purposes, \\nto assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public \\ninterest; the latter entails a potentially more complex consid‐\\neration of the ground for exclusion at issue, past immigration \\nviolations or criminal history, evidence of rehabilitation, gen‐\\neral evidence of good or bad character, strength of family ties, \\nduration of residence in the United States, and evidence of \\nvalue to the community. See In re Mendez‐Moralez, 21 I. & N. \\nDec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996). Because these statutes, along with \\nthe cases and regulations interpreting them, articulate distinct \\nfactors to be considered in deciding whether to grant a discre‐\\ntionary waiver of inadmissibility, the Board cannot simply \\nsubstitute one standard for another and assume that the out‐\\ncome would be the same. If the Board confirms Ruderman’s \\ninadmissibility on remand, it should consider his application \\nfor a waiver under the proper framework. \\n C. \\n Ruderman’s other arguments go nowhere. First, he claims \\nthat he is eligible for asylum and withholding of removal be‐\\ncause he did not commit a “particularly serious crime.” 8 \\nU.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Ruderman com‐\\nmitted homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle, Wis. Stat. \\n§ 940.10(1); he argues that Congress did not intend for crimi‐\\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 9 \\n\\nnal negligence like his to qualify as particularly serious. Gen‐\\nerally, classification of a crime as “particularly serious” is \\nwithin the discretion of the Attorney General—exercised here \\nby the Board. Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. \\n2006). Our review of these classifications is confined to consti‐\\ntutional and legal questions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2); see also Es‐\\ntrada‐Martinez v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 2015). And \\nwhen those legal questions implicate ambiguous statutory \\nprovisions, we give deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. \\nRes. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). \\n We considered the meaning of “particularly serious \\ncrime” in some depth in Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. \\n2006). In that case, the petitioner argued that the Board could \\nnot hold that his conviction for “substantial battery with a \\ndangerous weapon,” a nonaggravated felony, was a particu‐\\nlarly serious crime under § 1158(b)(2) and § 1231(b)(3) be‐\\ncause it did not fall within the two categories of crimes iden‐\\ntified as per se “particularly serious” in § 1158(b)(2): aggra‐\\nvated felonies and other crimes that the Attorney General des‐\\nignates by regulation. Id. at 468–69. We disagreed, explaining \\nthat the presence of these categories does not cabin the \\nBoard’s discretion to determine that nonaggravated felonies \\nare particularly serious on a case‐by‐case basis. Id. at 469. In \\nthe same way, the Board is not precluded from determining \\nthat some crimes of negligence are particularly serious. \\n Nor does the Immigration and Nationality Act’s separate \\ndefinition of “serious criminal offense” undermine the \\nBoard’s interpretation. The Act identifies “driving while in‐\\ntoxicated or under the influence of alcohol” as a serious crim‐\\ninal offense if it “involves personal injury to another.” 8 U.S.C. \\n§ 1101(h)(3). Ruderman argues that “particularly serious \\n\\f10 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\ncrime” must be interpreted to require more. Maybe so. But \\neven if he’s right, criminally negligent homicide entails more \\nthan mere “personal injury,” so the argument is a dead end. \\n Finally, even if § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) \\nwere ambiguous as to whether crimes of negligence could be \\n“particularly serious,” Ruderman has not shown that the \\nBoard’s interpretation is too unreasonable to merit deference \\nunder Chevron. See Ali, 468 F.3d at 470. Nor has he shown that \\nthe Board’s interpretation is so likely to conflict with the Con‐\\nstitution or international law that we need to consider \\nwhether some other interpretation is warranted. \\n D. \\n Finally, Ruderman contends that the Board should have \\ngranted him protection under the Convention Against Tor‐\\nture, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–18. The Convention forbids the re‐\\nturn of “a person to another State where there are substantial \\ngrounds for believing that he would be in danger of being \\nsubjected to torture.” Convention Against Torture and Other \\nCruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. \\n3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100‐20 (1990), 1465 \\nU.N.T.S. 85. Federal regulations define torture as requiring \\n“the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” 8 C.F.R \\n§ 1208.18(a)(1). Immigration judges must withhold or defer \\nremoval if an applicant demonstrates that “it is more likely \\nthan not that he or she would be tortured if removed.” 8 \\nC.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). We have explained that “more likely \\nthan not” means that there is a “substantial risk” that the alien \\nwill be tortured. Rodriguez‐Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, \\n1135–36 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Perez‐Montes v. Sessions, 880 \\nF.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir. 2018). \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 11 \\n\\n Ruderman argues that the immigration judge both misun‐\\nderstood and misapplied the “substantial risk” standard. But \\nthere is no evidence of the former; the immigration judge \\ncited our decision in Rodriguez‐Molinero and proceeded to an‐\\nalyze whether there was a substantial risk that Ruderman \\nwould be subject to torture inflicted by or with the consent of \\na public official if he returned to Belarus. See 8 C.F.R. \\n§ 1208.18(a)(1)–(2). And Ruderman fails to establish the latter. \\nWe review the Board’s conclusion that there was no substan‐\\ntial risk of torture under the “highly deferential substantial \\nevidence test,” which mandates denying the petition unless \\n“the record evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Lopez v. \\nLynch, 810 F.3d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). \\n The record evidence does not compel a contrary conclu‐\\nsion. To be sure, certain findings from the immigration judge \\ngive us pause. For one, the judge concluded that there was no \\nsubstantial risk of torture for Jews in Belarus because, despite \\n“widespread anti‐Semitism in Belarus,” incidents targeting \\nJews have been declining. While it is true that the raw number \\nof anti‐Jewish incidents in Belarus has declined, so has the \\nJewish population. In this context, an absolute decrease in in‐\\ncidents does not necessary equate to a relative increase in \\nsafety for any individual. Nor does the evidence of Ruder‐\\nman’s mother’s safe travel to and from Belarus mean that \\nRuderman will be equally safe. His mother has a Christian \\nname that is not associated with her late husband, whereas \\nRuderman’s patronymic clearly signals that he is both Jewish \\nand the son of a known political activist whom the KGB may \\nhave tortured and killed. But on the other hand, there is evi‐\\ndence that Ruderman became less susceptible to physical at‐\\ntacks as he grew and became better able to defend himself, \\nthat no one in his family has been threatened in Belarus, and \\n\\f12 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nthat he lived in Belarus for eight years following his father’s \\ndeath without any threat of torture on account of his relation‐\\nship to his father. Considering all the evidence, the record \\ndoes not compel the conclusion that there is a substantial risk \\nthat Ruderman would be tortured if he returned to Belarus. \\n * * * \\n Ruderman’s petition for review is GRANTED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":270,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4585546,"string":"4,585,546"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Bruce GILES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Salvador A. GODINEZ, Acting Director, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Bruce Giles v. Salvador Godinez"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"15-3077"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Flaum, Manion, Eve\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 15-3077\\nBRUCE GILES,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nSALVADOR A. GODINEZ, Acting Director, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:12-cv-00965 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Bruce Giles is a prisoner in the cus-\\ntody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (the “Depart-\\nment”) who suffers from schizoaffective disorder. Giles filed\\nthis action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several De-\\npartment officials. He alleges the defendants violated his\\nrights under the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately in-\\ndifferent to his serious medical needs, subjecting him to un-\\nconstitutional conditions of confinement, and failing to\\n\\f2 No. 15-3077\\n\\nprotect him from other inmates. The district court granted\\nsummary judgment to the defendants and Giles now appeals.\\nThe district court’s conclusion was based largely on its hold-\\ning that Giles could not establish the subjective elements of\\nhis claims because the defendants, who are all non-medical\\nofficials, appropriately relied on the judgment of medical pro-\\nfessionals. Because we agree Giles cannot establish the de-\\nfendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind, we\\naffirm.\\n I. Background\\n A. Factual Background\\n At all times relevant to this appeal, Giles was in the cus-\\ntody of the Department and housed in five different correc-\\ntional facilities: Dixon Correctional Center (“Dixon”), Illinois\\nRiver Correctional Center (“Illinois River”), Stateville Correc-\\ntional Center (“Stateville”), Pontiac Correctional Center\\n(“Pontiac”), and Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”).\\nHe suffers from schizoaffective disorder. His symptoms in-\\nclude anxiety, depression, auditory hallucinations, and sui-\\ncidal ideation. He attempted suicide at least three times while\\nin the Department’s custody. He has at various times been\\nprescribed psychotropic medications that help him cope with\\nthese symptoms but do not eliminate them entirely.\\n Giles’s claims arise out of the medical treatment he re-\\nceived and the conditions of his confinement at multiple cor-\\nrectional facilities over a two-year period. Most of his com-\\nplaints relate specifically to his placement in segregation.1 The\\n\\n 1 Although Giles’s placement in segregation is at the core of his com-\\nplaint, the exact duration of his periods in segregation and the nature of\\nsegregation placement at each facility are not clear from the record or\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 3\\n\\nfollowing timeline of events is compiled from Giles’s allega-\\ntions, his medical records, and his deposition testimony.\\n From late June 2010 until September 2010, Giles was\\nhoused at Dixon, where he alleges he had daily access to men-\\ntal health professionals and the opportunity to participate in\\ntherapeutic programs.2 On September 22, 2010, Giles was\\ntransferred from Dixon to Illinois River. According to the\\nhealth status transfer summary prepared by an official at\\nDixon at the time of Giles’s transfer, Giles’s prescription for\\npsychotropic medications (Prozac and Depakote) had been\\ndiscontinued on July 23, 2010, about two months before he left\\nDixon.\\n Giles was examined by a nurse at Illinois River on October\\n3, 2010, at which point he requested to see a psychologist be-\\ncause he wanted to get back on his medications. The nurse\\nnoted he was “upset that [he] cannot see psych today.” Three\\ndays later, on October 6, Giles was transferred to Stateville\\ndue to an unrelated legal proceeding. On October 9, while\\nGiles was at Stateville, a psychiatrist again prescribed Prozac\\nand Depakote, less than a week after he requested the return\\nto medication.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nGiles’s allegations. As best as can be discerned, Giles was placed in segre-\\ngation during two separate periods and at three different facilities: first, at\\nIllinois River and Pontiac from March 2011 to approximately July 2011 (he\\nwas transferred to Pontiac in April), and second, at Lawrence from Febru-\\nary 2012 until approximately November 2012.\\n 2 Giles acknowledged in his deposition that he did not avail himself\\nof these programs, however, until he returned to Dixon after filing this\\nsuit.\\n\\f4 No. 15-3077\\n\\n Giles was sent back to Illinois River on November 10, 2010.\\nThis time, his transfer summary failed to include the fact that\\nhe was receiving psychotropic medications, resulting in a\\nlapse of medication. Giles was examined by a mental health\\ncounselor on November 22 and then by a psychiatrist on No-\\nvember 25. The psychiatrist again prescribed Prozac and De-\\npakote and requested Giles’s medical records from Stateville.\\nGiles was examined by a medical health counselor on Decem-\\nber 8. On December 12, a psychiatrist reviewed Giles’s medi-\\ncal records from Stateville and noticed Giles had received Pro-\\nlixin while there and his symptoms had improved, so Giles\\nwas placed back on Prolixin.\\n Giles was examined by a mental health counselor on ten\\ndifferent occasions from December 2010 until April 2011. He\\nwas also examined by a psychiatrist and attended group ther-\\napy sessions multiple times in January until he stopped show-\\ning up for the sessions in February.\\n Giles complained to a mental health counselor in March\\n2011 that he was not doing well and that he had not received\\nhis Prolixin medication for two days. The counselor wrote in\\nhis report that he addressed the medication issue with the\\nprison pharmacy. Around this time, Giles had an altercation\\nwith another inmate at Illinois River. According to Giles’s\\ndeposition testimony, the incident occurred when he was\\ntalking to himself and another inmate approached him, told\\nhim to shut up, and spit in his face. Giles pushed the inmate\\naway. He claims the reason he was talking to himself was be-\\ncause he had not received his Prolixin medication, which\\nhelps control the voices in his head.\\n Because of the altercation, Giles was placed in segregation.\\nAccording to Giles, while in segregation “you’re just thrown\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 5\\n\\nin a cell all day with other inmates that are violent, that don’t\\ncare about you.” He claims he was subjected to violence from\\nother inmates in segregation but that he never reported this\\nto prison officials. He testified inmates in segregation were\\ngiven yard time, but that he sometimes chose not to go be-\\ncause he did not feel safe in the yard, claiming “that is where\\nusually everybody fights.”\\n After being placed in segregation in March 2011, Giles at-\\ntempted suicide by cutting his wrists on his bed frame. His\\ntestimony indicates his cousin had passed away around this\\ntime and that his cellmate would not let him sleep at night.\\nHe also testified his symptoms were “just getting so bad,” par-\\nticularly the voices in his head, even though he acknowledges\\nhe was receiving his medications at this time. The stress from\\nthese combined factors led to his suicide attempt. Giles’s cell-\\nmate notified the prison staff and Giles was rescued. After\\nthis, he was placed on suicide watch and was examined by\\nmental health professionals.\\n Giles was examined by a mental health counselor on\\nApril 1 and April 8, 2011. The counselor noted there was “po-\\ntential for exaggeration of symptoms” and that Giles was “co-\\nherent” with “no overt distress.”\\n Giles was again transferred from Illinois River on April 13,\\n2011, this time to Pontiac. He remained in segregation at Pon-\\ntiac. While at Pontiac, Giles alleges he received medication\\nand one-on-one therapy, to “try to give [him] a little hope.”\\nHe felt this treatment was insufficient. He alleges he was not\\ngiven his medications “about twice.” A psychiatrist discontin-\\nued Giles’s existing prescriptions and prescribed new psycho-\\ntropic medications on April 26. Three days later, Giles was\\nagain examined by a psychiatrist who noted “there is nothing\\n\\f6 No. 15-3077\\n\\nto contraindicate continued segregation placement at this\\ntime.”\\n Giles received an extended interview with a psychiatrist\\non May 24, 2011. During this session, Giles stated he was\\n“fine, except that [he had] not been getting [his] Prolixin.” The\\npsychiatrist noted Giles’s mood was good; he was awake,\\nalert, and oriented; he displayed “[n]o acute distress/agita-\\ntion”; his speech was “fluent and coherent”; and his\\n“thoughts were organized.” Giles denied having any suicidal\\nor homicidal thoughts. Besides claiming he had not been re-\\nceiving Prolixin, “[h]e made no mention of any other serious\\nconcerns.” Giles was still in segregation at this time.\\n Giles was scheduled for another psychiatric appointment\\non July 5, 2011, which he did not attend, opting to go to the\\nprison yard instead. He was evaluated by a mental health pro-\\nfessional on July 29, who again noted “there is nothing to con-\\ntraindicate continued segregation placement at this time.” As\\nbest as can be discerned from the record, Giles was removed\\nfrom segregation sometime during July 2011.\\n Giles was transferred to Lawrence in early September\\n2011. He was examined by mental health professionals three\\ntimes in September, four times in October, twice in Novem-\\nber, twice in December, and three times in February 2012. Af-\\nter one of the October examinations, the mental health profes-\\nsional determined Giles was having issues with his cellmate\\nand his cell assignment was exacerbating his symptoms. As a\\nresult, Giles was assigned a new cell and cellmate the next\\nday. Notes from his examination the following week indicate\\n“notable improvement.”\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 7\\n\\n In February 2012, Giles was involved in another alterca-\\ntion with an inmate, which formed the basis of his original\\nfailure-to-protect claim. This altercation occurred when he ac-\\ncidentally bumped into the other inmate in the mess hall\\nwhile talking to himself. The other inmate assumed Giles was\\ntalking to him and struck him in retaliation. Giles was ren-\\ndered unconscious by the attack. Giles testified in his deposi-\\ntion he had never had trouble with this inmate before and\\nnever told the facility staff he felt he was in danger, but that\\n“it happened because of my symptoms. I was there, and [the\\nother inmate] just happened to be aggressive.” During the in-\\nvestigation of the altercation, when he was asked (apparently\\nby prison officials) if he was “guilty,” Giles alleges he simply\\nresponded he was. As a result, both Giles and the other inmate\\nwere placed in segregation. Giles apparently stayed in segre-\\ngation from February until November 2012.\\n Giles was examined by mental health professionals nine\\nmore times during the period spanning from March to July\\n2012. During this time, he expressed his unhappiness at Law-\\nrence, his unhappiness with being in segregation, and the\\nanxiety he felt regarding the possibility of future altercations.\\nGiles reported difficulties with cellmates and frequently re-\\nquested reassignment. The mental health professionals noted\\nGiles lacked focus during treatment sessions and often did\\nnot complete assigned therapy homework.\\n Throughout the two years at issue, Giles filed at least nine-\\nteen grievances. His complaints related to insufficient medical\\ntreatment, delays or interruptions in receiving medication,\\nunconstitutional conditions of confinement, lack of adequate\\nsuicide prevention, vermin infestations, his unhappiness in\\nsegregation, and other issues. He alleges all these grievances\\n\\f8 No. 15-3077\\n\\nwere either ignored outright or, if reviewed, his concerns\\nwere not addressed. He testified in his deposition, however,\\nthat he did not know whether the grievances were reviewed\\nor investigated. We know from the record that at least three\\nof these grievances (filed in March 2012, April 2012, and July\\n2012) were subjected to “Emergency Review” by Marc Hodge\\n(the warden at Lawrence). The record also includes responses\\nto many of Giles’s appeals of his grievances alleging that he\\nwas not receiving his medication, that segregation placement\\nwas not conducive to his mental health, and that the facilities\\nlacked proper mental health programs. These appeals were\\nall denied, as the Department’s Administrative Review Board\\n(the “ARB”) determined, “[b]ased on a total review of all\\navailable information,” that the complaints were without\\nmerit.\\n Giles was eventually transferred back to Dixon in early\\n2014.\\n B. District Court Proceedings\\n Giles filed this suit pro se on September 4, 2012. He named\\nseveral defendants, nine of which remain in the case at this\\nstage: S.A. Godinez (the Department’s acting director during\\nthe relevant time period), Richard Birkey (the warden at Illi-\\nnois River), Leonta Jackson (the assistant warden at Illinois\\nRiver), Ron Zessin (the clinical services supervisor at Illinois\\nRiver), Randy Pfister (the warden at Pontiac), Michael Lemke\\n(the assistant warden at Pontiac), Marc Hodge (the warden at\\nLawrence), Mark Storm (the assistant warden at Lawrence),\\nand Randy Stevenson (the clinical services supervisor at\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 9\\n\\nLawrence).3 Giles asserted three claims under the Eighth\\nAmendment, seeking to hold the defendants liable for these\\nalleged constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.\\nFirst, he asserted a claim of deliberate indifference to serious\\nmedical needs based on his allegations of inadequate treat-\\nment and delays in providing medication at Illinois River,\\nPontiac, and Lawrence. Second, he asserted a conditions-of-\\nconfinement claim based on his allegations of vermin infesta-\\ntions and unsanitary conditions while in segregation at Pon-\\ntiac and Lawrence. Third, he asserted a failure-to-protect\\nclaim based on the February 2012 altercation.\\n The case was referred to a U.S. magistrate judge in late\\n2012, with Giles’s consent. The defendants moved for sum-\\nmary judgment in June 2014. The magistrate judge issued a\\nReport & Recommendation (R&R) and recommended grant-\\ning summary judgment on the ground that Giles failed to\\nshow deliberate indifference. After a de novo review of the\\nR&R and Giles’s objections thereto, the district court adopted\\nthe R&R in its entirety and granted summary judgment to the\\ndefendants.\\n Throughout the district court proceedings, Giles filed mul-\\ntiple motions to appoint counsel. He first filed such a motion\\non September 4, 2012. The magistrate judge denied the motion\\nbecause Giles had not demonstrated that he had attempted to\\nfind counsel on his own. On December 17, Giles filed a motion\\nto reconsider his motion to appoint counsel after attempting\\nunsuccessfully to find an attorney. The magistrate judge again\\ndenied the motion, holding that the issues in the case were not\\n\\n\\n 3 Five other defendants, also Department officials, were dismissed by\\nthe district court in November 2012.\\n\\f10 No. 15-3077\\n\\nfactually complex because discovery had been limited at that\\ntime to only the issue of exhaustion of administrative reme-\\ndies. The court held that Giles was competent to litigate on his\\nown at that stage. Giles filed another motion to appoint coun-\\nsel on July 2, 2013. The court reaffirmed its previous decision\\nthat Giles appeared competent to litigate the case at the cur-\\nrent stage and stated that the issue of appointing counsel\\nwould not be reconsidered until after the resolution of the ad-\\nministrative remedies issue.\\n In August 2013, after the defendants’ deadline to raise a\\nfailure to exhaust administrative remedies defense had ex-\\npired, Giles once again moved the court to appoint counsel\\nfor him. The magistrate judge construed the motion as a mo-\\ntion for recruitment of counsel and granted it, noting that the\\ncourt has no authority to appoint counsel in § 1983 cases but\\ncan seek to recruit a volunteer attorney. See Navejar v. Iyiola,\\n718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court circulated\\na request for representation to the court’s list of “approxi-\\nmately 50 licensed and registered attorneys that have indi-\\ncated an interest in representing indigent litigants in this dis-\\ntrict.” However, no attorneys were willing and available to\\nrepresent Giles immediately.\\n Giles moved in February 2014 for additional time to seek\\ncounsel. Giles argued he needed legal assistance to “prepare\\ndocuments, for dispositive motions, and discovery.” The\\nmagistrate judge denied the motion because Giles had not\\nspecified a deadline for the extension request, but he stated he\\nwould continue to seek a volunteer to represent Giles. Giles\\nfiled another motion to recruit counsel in May 2014. The mag-\\nistrate judge denied the motion as moot, having already\\ngranted the earlier motion to recruit, but once again solicited\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 11\\n\\nvolunteers from the pro bono list. Giles moved for recruit-\\nment of counsel again in August 2014 while summary judg-\\nment was pending. The magistrate judge again explained that\\nthe motion to recruit counsel had previously been granted\\nand that the court had done all it could to solicit a volunteer.\\nGiles’s case was published to the list of volunteers a third\\ntime. The magistrate judge encouraged Giles to continue liti-\\ngating the case to the best of his ability. Finally, Giles filed a\\nmotion to appoint counsel once again in December 2014,\\nwhich the district court denied as moot in January 2015, stat-\\ning that it had already granted Giles’s motion to recruit and\\nthat Giles would be notified if an attorney volunteered to take\\nthe case.\\n Giles also moved multiple times, beginning on October 16,\\n2014, to appoint an expert. The magistrate judge denied these\\nmotions, stating “[t]he discovery period is closed, but the\\nplaintiff may later seek to appoint an expert for trial if the [de-\\nfendants’] motion for summary judgment is denied.”\\n Giles now appeals the district court’s grant of summary\\njudgment on his claim for deliberate indifference to serious\\nmedical needs and his conditions-of-confinement claim, as\\nwell as the district court’s actions regarding his motions to re-\\ncruit counsel and appoint an expert.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment\\nde novo. Knopick v. Jayco, Inc., 895 F.3d 525, 528 (7th Cir. 2018).\\nA district court properly grants summary judgment where\\nthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the\\nmoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.\\nR. CIV. P. 56(a); Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir.\\n\\f12 No. 15-3077\\n\\n2018). All justifiable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-\\nmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255\\n(1986). The non-movant must, however, present specific facts\\nestablishing a material issue for trial, and any inferences must\\nrely on more than mere speculation or conjecture. Aguilar v.\\nGaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 630–31 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States through\\nthe Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of “cruel\\nand unusual punishments.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Estelle v.\\nGamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101 (1976). The Supreme Court has inter-\\npreted the Eighth Amendment to prohibit any punishments\\n“which, although not physically barbarous, ‘involve the un-\\nnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Rhodes v. Chapman,\\n452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,\\n173 (1976)). Thus, the Eighth Amendment gives rise to consti-\\ntutional claims by inmates alleging that the conditions of their\\nconfinement violate this prohibition by imposing “the wanton\\nand unnecessary infliction of pain.” See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.\\nThe Supreme Court has further established that prison offi-\\ncials impose wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain when\\nthey are deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medi-\\ncal needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Giles here appeals summary\\njudgment on both a claim of deliberate indifference to his se-\\nrious medical needs as well as a conditions-of-confinement\\nclaim. We discuss each in turn.\\n A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs\\n To establish an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate in-\\ndifference to serious medical needs, the plaintiff must show\\ntwo elements: one objective and one subjective. Whiting v.\\nWexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n“[T]he plaintiff must prove that he suffered from ‘(1) an\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 13\\n\\nobjectively serious medical condition to which (2) a state offi-\\ncial was deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.’” Id.\\n(quoting Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir.\\n2008)). “[D]eliberate means more than negligent,” though\\n“something less than purposeful.” Duckworth, 532 F.3d at 679.\\nWe have described this subjective element as “’a sufficiently\\nculpable state of mind,’ something akin to recklessness.”\\nArnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting\\nJohnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 2006), overruled on\\nother grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 967 n.1 (7th\\nCir. 2013)). Although the inmate must demonstrate deliberate\\nindifference, he “is not required to show that he was literally\\nignored.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)\\n(quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000)).\\n Regarding the objective element of his claim, Giles has\\nclearly met his burden. His schizoaffective disorder diagno-\\nsis, his symptoms, and his multiple prescriptions for psycho-\\ntropic medications firmly establish that he suffered from an\\nobjectively serious medical condition. See id. (“A serious med-\\nical condition is one that has been diagnosed by a physician\\nas mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a\\nlay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.”).\\nGiles’s claim hinges, therefore, on whether he has shown the\\ndefendants possessed the “sufficiently culpable state of\\nmind” necessary to establish the subjective element of delib-\\nerate indifference. The district court held that Giles failed to\\nmeet this burden. We agree.\\n Giles cannot establish the subjective element of his claim\\nbecause the defendants are all non-medical officials who rea-\\nsonably relied on the judgment of medical professionals. We\\nhave long recognized that the division of labor within a prison\\n\\f14 No. 15-3077\\n\\nnecessitates that non-medical officials may reasonably defer\\nto the judgment of medical professionals regarding inmate\\ntreatment. “If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts\\n… a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in\\nbelieving that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Id. at 656\\n(quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). As\\nthe Third Circuit has held, “absent a reason to believe (or ac-\\ntual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are\\nmistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison\\nofficial … will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment\\nscienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Spruill, 372\\nF.3d at 236.\\n In Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527–28 (7th Cir. 2008), we\\naffirmed summary judgment for non-medical prison officials\\nwho relied on the professional judgment of prison medical\\nstaff. Like Giles, the inmate in Hayes sent several letters and\\nfiled multiple grievances alleging he was receiving inade-\\nquate treatment for his objectively serious medical condition.\\nId. at 526. Although the non-medical officials did not ignore\\nthe inmate’s grievances entirely, they did not investigate fur-\\nther than the medical staff’s reports and summaries, and oth-\\nerwise simply referred the complaints to the medical staff. Id.\\nat 527. We held that the non-medical officials did not have\\n“any duty to do more than they did, in light of their\\nknowledge of the situation.” Id. They “were entitled to rely on\\nthe professional judgment of medical prison officials” and\\n“nothing in [the medical] reports made it obvious that [the in-\\nmate] might not be receiving adequate care.” Id. at 527–28.\\n A review of the record demonstrates that throughout his\\nvarious stints at Illinois River, Stateville, Pontiac, and Law-\\nrence, Giles was receiving regular medical attention from\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 15\\n\\npsychologists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals.\\nAlthough the record does not contain detailed information\\nabout what the grievance procedures were at each facility, it\\ndoes contain evidence that several of his grievances were sub-\\njected to emergency review. Furthermore, Giles’s appeals\\nwere reviewed by the ARB, which found his complaints to be\\nwithout merit upon investigation. Giles has not presented ev-\\nidence that his grievances were ignored or mishandled. Nor\\nwas there an indication from his medical records that he was\\nnot receiving adequate care. In short, the non-medical officials\\nrelied on the medical professionals to provide proper treat-\\nment, and there was nothing to give notice to the officials of a\\nneed to intervene.\\n Giles asserts the defendants were deliberately indifferent\\nby allowing him to “go on and off of his medication many\\ntimes” despite knowing his health condition required contin-\\nuous treatment. However, the record does not support this as-\\nsertion. Giles’s medications were discontinued in July 2010\\nwhile still at Dixon pursuant to a decision made by medical\\nprofessionals. Several weeks later, after being transferred first\\nto Illinois River and then to Stateville, Giles was placed back\\non medications soon after he requested them. Although there\\nwere other brief delays in his receipt of medication, when he\\nbrought these to the medical professionals’ attention his con-\\ncerns were addressed, or else it was determined after a review\\nof all available information that he was properly receiving his\\nmedication as prescribed. Even during one of the periods\\nwhere Giles alleged he was not receiving his medication, a\\npsychiatrist reported after an extended interview that Giles’s\\ndemeanor was good, he was coherent and alert, and he dis-\\nplayed no acute distress or agitation. Such reports from the\\nmedical professionals charged with Giles’s care defy the\\n\\f16 No. 15-3077\\n\\nconclusion that the non-medical defendants knew of and dis-\\nregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety.\\n The most serious lapse in treatment was the two-week pe-\\nriod in November 2010 when he was transferred back to Illi-\\nnois River from Stateville. This lapse was caused by a failure\\nto include his current prescriptions on his transfer summary.\\nWhile this was certainly a concerning oversight, it does not\\nmeet the standard of deliberate indifference: a knowing dis-\\nregard of an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety. As we\\nhave noted before, “deliberate means more than negligent.”\\nDuckworth, 532 F.3d at 679. Giles’s medication was re-pre-\\nscribed as soon as he was examined by a psychologist at Illi-\\nnois River, who requested and reviewed Giles’s medical rec-\\nords from Stateville.\\n No reasonable jury could find that the defendants knew of\\nand disregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety,\\nand thus summary judgment on this claim was appropriate.\\n B. Conditions of Confinement\\n Giles also appeals the grant of summary judgment on his\\nconditions-of-confinement claim. Although the complaint fo-\\ncused on specific conditions to which Giles was subjected\\nwhile in segregation (such as vermin infestations, filthiness,\\nand lengthy periods of isolation), on appeal Giles has re-\\nframed the violation as being the combined effect that these\\nconditions had on his mental health.4 He asserts his place-\\nment in segregation subjected him to conditions which exac-\\nerbated his symptoms, or which were more difficult for him\\n\\n 4 Giles’s counsel explained at oral argument “what’s happening to his\\n\\nmental health while he’s in segregation is the conditions of confinement\\nviolation.”\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 17\\n\\nto cope with due to his symptoms. He argues that even\\nthough segregation placement and the conditions of his con-\\nfinement may not have been cruel and unusual in the case of\\nan ordinary inmate, they amounted to cruel and unusual\\ntreatment in his case given their combined effect on his illness.\\n The Eighth Amendment prohibits the States from subject-\\ning prisoners to conditions of confinement amounting to cruel\\nand unusual punishment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345–47. Accord-\\ning to the Supreme Court, however, “extreme deprivations\\nare required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.”\\nHudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Whether conditions\\nof confinement are cruel and unusual must be judged in ac-\\ncordance with contemporary standards of decency. Id. at 8;\\nRhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. If under contemporary standards the\\nconditions cannot be said to be cruel and unusual, then they\\nare not unconstitutional, and “[t]o the extent that such condi-\\ntions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the pen-\\nalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against so-\\nciety.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.\\n As with a claim for deliberate indifference to serious med-\\nical needs, a conditions-of-confinement claim includes an ob-\\njective and a subjective component. Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d\\n508, 521 (7th Cir. 2017). The plaintiff must first establish “an\\nobjective showing that the conditions are sufficiently seri-\\nous—i.e., that they deny the inmate ‘the minimal civilized\\nmeasure of life’s necessities,’ creating an excessive risk to the\\ninmate’s health and safety.” Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at\\n347) (internal citations omitted). The plaintiff must next estab-\\nlish “a subjective showing of a defendant’s culpable state of\\nmind.” Id. Once again, the state of mind necessary to establish\\nliability is deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or\\n\\f18 No. 15-3077\\n\\nsafety. Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cty. of Wood, 226 F.3d\\n525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n Giles attempts to satisfy the objective element by arguing\\nthat placing a mentally ill inmate in segregation—under con-\\nditions that exacerbate his symptoms or with which he has\\ndifficulty coping due to his symptoms—is an objectively seri-\\nous condition creating an excessive risk to his health and\\nsafety. We have indeed recognized that prolonged segregated\\nconfinement may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation\\nin some instances. See Isby, 856 F.3d at 521 (quoting Rice ex rel.\\nRice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 666 (7th Cir. 2012)). We\\nhave also held that the aggregate effect of a multitude of indi-\\nvidual conditions may constitute a violation even if each in-\\ndividual condition could not establish a violation standing on\\nits own. Id. at 522. However, this only occurs when the condi-\\ntions “have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the dep-\\nrivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food,\\nwarmth, or exercise.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,\\n304 (1991)). The core issue is whether the conditions deprived\\nthe plaintiff of a “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessi-\\nties.” Rice, 675 F.3d at 664–65.\\n While we do not deny that Giles experienced harsh condi-\\ntions in segregation, the record does not support a finding\\nthat he was deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life’s\\nnecessities, even considering the effects on his mental condi-\\ntion. He was regularly evaluated by mental health profession-\\nals at all facilities, and they repeatedly determined that his\\ncondition did not contraindicate continued segregation. And\\non the occasion in November 2011 when a mental health pro-\\nfessional determined that his mental condition was being ex-\\nacerbated by his cell assignment, he was reassigned and\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 19\\n\\nmoved the next day, checked on less than a week later, and\\nwas found to have notably improved. Giles has therefore not\\nestablished the objective element of his claim.\\n Even if Giles could establish an objectively serious condi-\\ntion, he ultimately fails to establish the necessary subjective\\ncomponent of his claim: the defendants’ culpable state of\\nmind. Once again, the defendants relied on the judgment of\\nthe medical professionals into whose care Giles was en-\\ntrusted. No reasonable jury could find that the defendants\\nconsciously disregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health by\\nkeeping him in segregation when the mental health profes-\\nsionals continually reported it was appropriate to do so.\\n Since Giles failed to establish both the objective and sub-\\njective elements of his claim, summary judgment in favor of\\nthe defendants was proper.\\n C. Motions to Recruit Counsel and Appoint Expert\\n The final issue on appeal concerns the district court’s han-\\ndling of Giles’s motions to appoint or recruit counsel and to\\nappoint an expert. We review the district court’s decisions on\\nthese motions for abuse of discretion. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d\\n647, 649, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (reviewing a decision on\\na motion to recruit counsel for abuse of discretion); Ledford v.\\nSullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a deci-\\nsion on a motion for appointment of an expert witness is re-\\nviewed for abuse of discretion). In reviewing for abuse of dis-\\ncretion, we do not substitute our own judgment for the dis-\\ntrict court’s; rather, the “decision must strike us as fundamen-\\ntally wrong for an abuse of discretion to occur.” Ladien v.\\nAstrachan, 128 F.3d 1051, 1056 (7th Cir. 1997).\\n\\f20 No. 15-3077\\n\\n We note at the outset of our discussion that “[t]here is no\\nright to court-appointed counsel in federal civil litigation.”\\nOlson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014). However,\\nthe district court does have the discretion to recruit a volun-\\nteer to represent a plaintiff who cannot otherwise afford coun-\\nsel. Navejar, 718 F.3d at 696. The court “must rely on the gen-\\nerosity of lawyers to volunteer their time and skill on behalf\\nof indigent civil parties.” Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1008\\n(7th Cir. 2018).\\n Evaluating whether to recruit counsel involves a two-step\\nprocess. First, the court must determine if the plaintiff made\\na reasonable attempt to secure counsel on his own. Navejar,\\n718 F.3d at 696. Next, the court must examine “whether the\\ndifficulty of the case—factually and legally—exceeds the par-\\nticular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to coherently present\\nit.” Id. (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). Even where the court\\ndecides to recruit a volunteer, however, it does not have “an\\nindefinite commitment to search until a volunteer is found.”\\nWilborn, 881 F.3d at 1008.\\n The insufficient number of volunteer attorneys in some of\\nour districts limits courts’ ability to locate representation for\\nindigents. See James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 330–31 (7th Cir. 2018).\\nThis case presents the question of what a court should do in\\nthe event a court determines that the case’s complexity ap-\\npears to exceed the plaintiff’s capacity to litigate his claims\\nand the court exercises discretion to seek a volunteer attorney\\nbut is unable to find one.\\n We considered a similar question in Wilborn v. Ealey, 881\\nF.3d 998 (7th Cir. 2018). In that case, the plaintiff filed multiple\\nmotions to recruit counsel. The district court eventually\\ngranted one such motion and spent several months searching.\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 21\\n\\nAfter contacting over four hundred attorneys, the court iden-\\ntified a volunteer. This success was short-lived, though. The\\nattorney had a scheduling conflict, which ultimately led the\\ncourt to grant his motion to withdraw. Despite this change,\\nthe plaintiff did not file another motion to recruit counsel. The\\ncourt offered to postpone the trial, but the plaintiff declined\\nthe court’s offer. As a result, the court allowed the plaintiff to\\nproceed to trial pro se. Based on those facts, we decided that\\nthe court’s efforts were “more than enough to satisfy any duty\\nto the indigent plaintiff,” and we held that the court did not\\nabuse its discretion in allowing the plaintiff to try his case pro\\nse. Id. at 1008.\\n Here too, we conclude that the district court fulfilled its\\nobligation to Giles by circulating a request for representation\\nto the court’s list of approximately fifty attorneys on three sep-\\narate occasions over the course of one year. Yet it is somewhat\\nconcerning that at some point the court determined further\\nsearching would be futile and, without communicating that\\nupdate to Giles, decided it was appropriate to resolve the\\npending motion for summary judgment.\\n Acknowledging that “[t]here are limits to what a court\\nmust do after deciding to recruit counsel,” id., in cases such as\\nthis—where the complexities of litigating are high, having\\ncounsel is increasingly important, and a district court has con-\\ncluded that it is unable to locate a volunteer attorney—it\\nwould be advisable for a judge to communicate with the\\nplaintiff and consider offering a reasonable continuance be-\\nfore proceeding to rule on a dispositive motion. The addi-\\ntional time after a court has exhausted its search efforts might\\nafford a limited opportunity for indigent litigants to seek\\n\\f22 No. 15-3077\\n\\ncounsel on their own, or at a minimum, conduct some prelim-\\ninary discovery.\\n The district court also denied Giles’s motion to appoint an\\nexpert witness, holding that an expert was not necessary be-\\nfore summary judgment but stating that Giles could move to\\nappoint an expert for trial if his case survived summary judg-\\nment. A court may, in its discretion, appoint an expert witness\\nwhere the expert’s “specialized knowledge will assist the\\ntrier-of-fact to understand the evidence or decide a fact in is-\\nsue.” Ledford, 105 F.3d at 358–59. The district court determined\\nGiles’s claims failed as a matter of law to show the defendants\\nknowingly disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to\\nhim. This decision did not hinge on specialized knowledge or\\nfact-finding. Instead, the court recognized Giles had received\\nconsistent treatment from medical professionals and the de-\\nfendants had relied on the medical judgment of those profes-\\nsionals. The grant of summary judgment was based on Giles’s\\nfailure to establish the defendants’ sufficiently culpable state\\nof mind, not on a technical analysis of the medical treatment\\nhe received or the sufficiency of that treatment. Thus, the dis-\\ntrict court acted fully within its discretion by denying the mo-\\ntion to appoint an expert witness at that stage of litigation.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Prison is, by its very nature, an unpleasant place to be, and\\nwe have no doubt that Giles’s objectively serious condition\\nand symptoms contributed to his overall discomfort. The dis-\\npositive defect of Giles’s case, however, is that the defendants\\nagainst whom he has filed this action are non-medical officials\\nwho were entitled by law to rely on the judgment of the med-\\nical professionals under whose care Giles was placed. Section\\n1983 does not create a system of vicarious liability. The\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 23\\n\\ndefendants cannot be held liable unless they were aware of\\nfacts from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that\\nGiles was subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm, drew\\nsuch an inference, and yet did not intervene. Based on this\\nrecord, we hold that Giles has failed to make that showing,\\nand therefore has failed as a matter of law to establish delib-\\nerate indifference. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district\\ncourt.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4362799/\", \"author_raw\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":""},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585546/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Bruce GILES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Salvador A. GODINEZ, Acting Director, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 15-3077\nBRUCE GILES,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nSALVADOR A. GODINEZ, Acting Director, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Illinois.\n No. 3:12-cv-00965 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Bruce Giles is a prisoner in the cus-\ntody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (the “Depart-\nment”) who suffers from schizoaffective disorder. Giles filed\nthis action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several De-\npartment officials. He alleges the defendants violated his\nrights under the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately in-\ndifferent to his serious medical needs, subjecting him to un-\nconstitutional conditions of confinement, and failing to\n\f2 No. 15-3077\n\nprotect him from other inmates. The district court granted\nsummary judgment to the defendants and Giles now appeals.\nThe district court’s conclusion was based largely on its hold-\ning that Giles could not establish the subjective elements of\nhis claims because the defendants, who are all non-medical\nofficials, appropriately relied on the judgment of medical pro-\nfessionals. Because we agree Giles cannot establish the de-\nfendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind, we\naffirm.\n I. Background\n A. Factual Background\n At all times relevant to this appeal, Giles was in the cus-\ntody of the Department and housed in five different correc-\ntional facilities: Dixon Correctional Center (“Dixon”), Illinois\nRiver Correctional Center (“Illinois River”), Stateville Correc-\ntional Center (“Stateville”), Pontiac Correctional Center\n(“Pontiac”), and Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”).\nHe suffers from schizoaffective disorder. His symptoms in-\nclude anxiety, depression, auditory hallucinations, and sui-\ncidal ideation. He attempted suicide at least three times while\nin the Department’s custody. He has at various times been\nprescribed psychotropic medications that help him cope with\nthese symptoms but do not eliminate them entirely.\n Giles’s claims arise out of the medical treatment he re-\nceived and the conditions of his confinement at multiple cor-\nrectional facilities over a two-year period. Most of his com-\nplaints relate specifically to his placement in segregation.1 The\n\n 1 Although Giles’s placement in segregation is at the core of his com-\nplaint, the exact duration of his periods in segregation and the nature of\nsegregation placement at each facility are not clear from the record or\n\fNo. 15-3077 3\n\nfollowing timeline of events is compiled from Giles’s allega-\ntions, his medical records, and his deposition testimony.\n From late June 2010 until September 2010, Giles was\nhoused at Dixon, where he alleges he had daily access to men-\ntal health professionals and the opportunity to participate in\ntherapeutic programs.2 On September 22, 2010, Giles was\ntransferred from Dixon to Illinois River. According to the\nhealth status transfer summary prepared by an official at\nDixon at the time of Giles’s transfer, Giles’s prescription for\npsychotropic medications (Prozac and Depakote) had been\ndiscontinued on July 23, 2010, about two months before he left\nDixon.\n Giles was examined by a nurse at Illinois River on October\n3, 2010, at which point he requested to see a psychologist be-\ncause he wanted to get back on his medications. The nurse\nnoted he was “upset that [he] cannot see psych today.” Three\ndays later, on October 6, Giles was transferred to Stateville\ndue to an unrelated legal proceeding. On October 9, while\nGiles was at Stateville, a psychiatrist again prescribed Prozac\nand Depakote, less than a week after he requested the return\nto medication.\n\n\n\n\nGiles’s allegations. As best as can be discerned, Giles was placed in segre-\ngation during two separate periods and at three different facilities: first, at\nIllinois River and Pontiac from March 2011 to approximately July 2011 (he\nwas transferred to Pontiac in April), and second, at Lawrence from Febru-\nary 2012 until approximately November 2012.\n 2 Giles acknowledged in his deposition that he did not avail himself\nof these programs, however, until he returned to Dixon after filing this\nsuit.\n\f4 No. 15-3077\n\n Giles was sent back to Illinois River on November 10, 2010.\nThis time, his transfer summary failed to include the fact that\nhe was receiving psychotropic medications, resulting in a\nlapse of medication. Giles was examined by a mental health\ncounselor on November 22 and then by a psychiatrist on No-\nvember 25. The psychiatrist again prescribed Prozac and De-\npakote and requested Giles’s medical records from Stateville.\nGiles was examined by a medical health counselor on Decem-\nber 8. On December 12, a psychiatrist reviewed Giles’s medi-\ncal records from Stateville and noticed Giles had received Pro-\nlixin while there and his symptoms had improved, so Giles\nwas placed back on Prolixin.\n Giles was examined by a mental health counselor on ten\ndifferent occasions from December 2010 until April 2011. He\nwas also examined by a psychiatrist and attended group ther-\napy sessions multiple times in January until he stopped show-\ning up for the sessions in February.\n Giles complained to a mental health counselor in March\n2011 that he was not doing well and that he had not received\nhis Prolixin medication for two days. The counselor wrote in\nhis report that he addressed the medication issue with the\nprison pharmacy. Around this time, Giles had an altercation\nwith another inmate at Illinois River. According to Giles’s\ndeposition testimony, the incident occurred when he was\ntalking to himself and another inmate approached him, told\nhim to shut up, and spit in his face. Giles pushed the inmate\naway. He claims the reason he was talking to himself was be-\ncause he had not received his Prolixin medication, which\nhelps control the voices in his head.\n Because of the altercation, Giles was placed in segregation.\nAccording to Giles, while in segregation “you’re just thrown\n\fNo. 15-3077 5\n\nin a cell all day with other inmates that are violent, that don’t\ncare about you.” He claims he was subjected to violence from\nother inmates in segregation but that he never reported this\nto prison officials. He testified inmates in segregation were\ngiven yard time, but that he sometimes chose not to go be-\ncause he did not feel safe in the yard, claiming “that is where\nusually everybody fights.”\n After being placed in segregation in March 2011, Giles at-\ntempted suicide by cutting his wrists on his bed frame. His\ntestimony indicates his cousin had passed away around this\ntime and that his cellmate would not let him sleep at night.\nHe also testified his symptoms were “just getting so bad,” par-\nticularly the voices in his head, even though he acknowledges\nhe was receiving his medications at this time. The stress from\nthese combined factors led to his suicide attempt. Giles’s cell-\nmate notified the prison staff and Giles was rescued. After\nthis, he was placed on suicide watch and was examined by\nmental health professionals.\n Giles was examined by a mental health counselor on\nApril 1 and April 8, 2011. The counselor noted there was “po-\ntential for exaggeration of symptoms” and that Giles was “co-\nherent” with “no overt distress.”\n Giles was again transferred from Illinois River on April 13,\n2011, this time to Pontiac. He remained in segregation at Pon-\ntiac. While at Pontiac, Giles alleges he received medication\nand one-on-one therapy, to “try to give [him] a little hope.”\nHe felt this treatment was insufficient. He alleges he was not\ngiven his medications “about twice.” A psychiatrist discontin-\nued Giles’s existing prescriptions and prescribed new psycho-\ntropic medications on April 26. Three days later, Giles was\nagain examined by a psychiatrist who noted “there is nothing\n\f6 No. 15-3077\n\nto contraindicate continued segregation placement at this\ntime.”\n Giles received an extended interview with a psychiatrist\non May 24, 2011. During this session, Giles stated he was\n“fine, except that [he had] not been getting [his] Prolixin.” The\npsychiatrist noted Giles’s mood was good; he was awake,\nalert, and oriented; he displayed “[n]o acute distress/agita-\ntion”; his speech was “fluent and coherent”; and his\n“thoughts were organized.” Giles denied having any suicidal\nor homicidal thoughts. Besides claiming he had not been re-\nceiving Prolixin, “[h]e made no mention of any other serious\nconcerns.” Giles was still in segregation at this time.\n Giles was scheduled for another psychiatric appointment\non July 5, 2011, which he did not attend, opting to go to the\nprison yard instead. He was evaluated by a mental health pro-\nfessional on July 29, who again noted “there is nothing to con-\ntraindicate continued segregation placement at this time.” As\nbest as can be discerned from the record, Giles was removed\nfrom segregation sometime during July 2011.\n Giles was transferred to Lawrence in early September\n2011. He was examined by mental health professionals three\ntimes in September, four times in October, twice in Novem-\nber, twice in December, and three times in February 2012. Af-\nter one of the October examinations, the mental health profes-\nsional determined Giles was having issues with his cellmate\nand his cell assignment was exacerbating his symptoms. As a\nresult, Giles was assigned a new cell and cellmate the next\nday. Notes from his examination the following week indicate\n“notable improvement.”\n\fNo. 15-3077 7\n\n In February 2012, Giles was involved in another alterca-\ntion with an inmate, which formed the basis of his original\nfailure-to-protect claim. This altercation occurred when he ac-\ncidentally bumped into the other inmate in the mess hall\nwhile talking to himself. The other inmate assumed Giles was\ntalking to him and struck him in retaliation. Giles was ren-\ndered unconscious by the attack. Giles testified in his deposi-\ntion he had never had trouble with this inmate before and\nnever told the facility staff he felt he was in danger, but that\n“it happened because of my symptoms. I was there, and [the\nother inmate] just happened to be aggressive.” During the in-\nvestigation of the altercation, when he was asked (apparently\nby prison officials) if he was “guilty,” Giles alleges he simply\nresponded he was. As a result, both Giles and the other inmate\nwere placed in segregation. Giles apparently stayed in segre-\ngation from February until November 2012.\n Giles was examined by mental health professionals nine\nmore times during the period spanning from March to July\n2012. During this time, he expressed his unhappiness at Law-\nrence, his unhappiness with being in segregation, and the\nanxiety he felt regarding the possibility of future altercations.\nGiles reported difficulties with cellmates and frequently re-\nquested reassignment. The mental health professionals noted\nGiles lacked focus during treatment sessions and often did\nnot complete assigned therapy homework.\n Throughout the two years at issue, Giles filed at least nine-\nteen grievances. His complaints related to insufficient medical\ntreatment, delays or interruptions in receiving medication,\nunconstitutional conditions of confinement, lack of adequate\nsuicide prevention, vermin infestations, his unhappiness in\nsegregation, and other issues. He alleges all these grievances\n\f8 No. 15-3077\n\nwere either ignored outright or, if reviewed, his concerns\nwere not addressed. He testified in his deposition, however,\nthat he did not know whether the grievances were reviewed\nor investigated. We know from the record that at least three\nof these grievances (filed in March 2012, April 2012, and July\n2012) were subjected to “Emergency Review” by Marc Hodge\n(the warden at Lawrence). The record also includes responses\nto many of Giles’s appeals of his grievances alleging that he\nwas not receiving his medication, that segregation placement\nwas not conducive to his mental health, and that the facilities\nlacked proper mental health programs. These appeals were\nall denied, as the Department’s Administrative Review Board\n(the “ARB”) determined, “[b]ased on a total review of all\navailable information,” that the complaints were without\nmerit.\n Giles was eventually transferred back to Dixon in early\n2014.\n B. District Court Proceedings\n Giles filed this suit pro se on September 4, 2012. He named\nseveral defendants, nine of which remain in the case at this\nstage: S.A. Godinez (the Department’s acting director during\nthe relevant time period), Richard Birkey (the warden at Illi-\nnois River), Leonta Jackson (the assistant warden at Illinois\nRiver), Ron Zessin (the clinical services supervisor at Illinois\nRiver), Randy Pfister (the warden at Pontiac), Michael Lemke\n(the assistant warden at Pontiac), Marc Hodge (the warden at\nLawrence), Mark Storm (the assistant warden at Lawrence),\nand Randy Stevenson (the clinical services supervisor at\n\fNo. 15-3077 9\n\nLawrence).3 Giles asserted three claims under the Eighth\nAmendment, seeking to hold the defendants liable for these\nalleged constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.\nFirst, he asserted a claim of deliberate indifference to serious\nmedical needs based on his allegations of inadequate treat-\nment and delays in providing medication at Illinois River,\nPontiac, and Lawrence. Second, he asserted a conditions-of-\nconfinement claim based on his allegations of vermin infesta-\ntions and unsanitary conditions while in segregation at Pon-\ntiac and Lawrence. Third, he asserted a failure-to-protect\nclaim based on the February 2012 altercation.\n The case was referred to a U.S. magistrate judge in late\n2012, with Giles’s consent. The defendants moved for sum-\nmary judgment in June 2014. The magistrate judge issued a\nReport & Recommendation (R&R) and recommended grant-\ning summary judgment on the ground that Giles failed to\nshow deliberate indifference. After a de novo review of the\nR&R and Giles’s objections thereto, the district court adopted\nthe R&R in its entirety and granted summary judgment to the\ndefendants.\n Throughout the district court proceedings, Giles filed mul-\ntiple motions to appoint counsel. He first filed such a motion\non September 4, 2012. The magistrate judge denied the motion\nbecause Giles had not demonstrated that he had attempted to\nfind counsel on his own. On December 17, Giles filed a motion\nto reconsider his motion to appoint counsel after attempting\nunsuccessfully to find an attorney. The magistrate judge again\ndenied the motion, holding that the issues in the case were not\n\n\n 3 Five other defendants, also Department officials, were dismissed by\nthe district court in November 2012.\n\f10 No. 15-3077\n\nfactually complex because discovery had been limited at that\ntime to only the issue of exhaustion of administrative reme-\ndies. The court held that Giles was competent to litigate on his\nown at that stage. Giles filed another motion to appoint coun-\nsel on July 2, 2013. The court reaffirmed its previous decision\nthat Giles appeared competent to litigate the case at the cur-\nrent stage and stated that the issue of appointing counsel\nwould not be reconsidered until after the resolution of the ad-\nministrative remedies issue.\n In August 2013, after the defendants’ deadline to raise a\nfailure to exhaust administrative remedies defense had ex-\npired, Giles once again moved the court to appoint counsel\nfor him. The magistrate judge construed the motion as a mo-\ntion for recruitment of counsel and granted it, noting that the\ncourt has no authority to appoint counsel in § 1983 cases but\ncan seek to recruit a volunteer attorney. See Navejar v. Iyiola,\n718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court circulated\na request for representation to the court’s list of “approxi-\nmately 50 licensed and registered attorneys that have indi-\ncated an interest in representing indigent litigants in this dis-\ntrict.” However, no attorneys were willing and available to\nrepresent Giles immediately.\n Giles moved in February 2014 for additional time to seek\ncounsel. Giles argued he needed legal assistance to “prepare\ndocuments, for dispositive motions, and discovery.” The\nmagistrate judge denied the motion because Giles had not\nspecified a deadline for the extension request, but he stated he\nwould continue to seek a volunteer to represent Giles. Giles\nfiled another motion to recruit counsel in May 2014. The mag-\nistrate judge denied the motion as moot, having already\ngranted the earlier motion to recruit, but once again solicited\n\fNo. 15-3077 11\n\nvolunteers from the pro bono list. Giles moved for recruit-\nment of counsel again in August 2014 while summary judg-\nment was pending. The magistrate judge again explained that\nthe motion to recruit counsel had previously been granted\nand that the court had done all it could to solicit a volunteer.\nGiles’s case was published to the list of volunteers a third\ntime. The magistrate judge encouraged Giles to continue liti-\ngating the case to the best of his ability. Finally, Giles filed a\nmotion to appoint counsel once again in December 2014,\nwhich the district court denied as moot in January 2015, stat-\ning that it had already granted Giles’s motion to recruit and\nthat Giles would be notified if an attorney volunteered to take\nthe case.\n Giles also moved multiple times, beginning on October 16,\n2014, to appoint an expert. The magistrate judge denied these\nmotions, stating “[t]he discovery period is closed, but the\nplaintiff may later seek to appoint an expert for trial if the [de-\nfendants’] motion for summary judgment is denied.”\n Giles now appeals the district court’s grant of summary\njudgment on his claim for deliberate indifference to serious\nmedical needs and his conditions-of-confinement claim, as\nwell as the district court’s actions regarding his motions to re-\ncruit counsel and appoint an expert.\n II. Discussion\n We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment\nde novo. Knopick v. Jayco, Inc., 895 F.3d 525, 528 (7th Cir. 2018).\nA district court properly grants summary judgment where\nthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the\nmoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.\nR. CIV. P. 56(a); Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir.\n\f12 No. 15-3077\n\n2018). All justifiable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-\nmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255\n(1986). The non-movant must, however, present specific facts\nestablishing a material issue for trial, and any inferences must\nrely on more than mere speculation or conjecture. Aguilar v.\nGaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 630–31 (7th Cir. 2017).\n The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States through\nthe Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of “cruel\nand unusual punishments.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Estelle v.\nGamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101 (1976). The Supreme Court has inter-\npreted the Eighth Amendment to prohibit any punishments\n“which, although not physically barbarous, ‘involve the un-\nnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Rhodes v. Chapman,\n452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,\n173 (1976)). Thus, the Eighth Amendment gives rise to consti-\ntutional claims by inmates alleging that the conditions of their\nconfinement violate this prohibition by imposing “the wanton\nand unnecessary infliction of pain.” See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.\nThe Supreme Court has further established that prison offi-\ncials impose wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain when\nthey are deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medi-\ncal needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Giles here appeals summary\njudgment on both a claim of deliberate indifference to his se-\nrious medical needs as well as a conditions-of-confinement\nclaim. We discuss each in turn.\n A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs\n To establish an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate in-\ndifference to serious medical needs, the plaintiff must show\ntwo elements: one objective and one subjective. Whiting v.\nWexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016).\n“[T]he plaintiff must prove that he suffered from ‘(1) an\n\fNo. 15-3077 13\n\nobjectively serious medical condition to which (2) a state offi-\ncial was deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.’” Id.\n(quoting Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir.\n2008)). “[D]eliberate means more than negligent,” though\n“something less than purposeful.” Duckworth, 532 F.3d at 679.\nWe have described this subjective element as “’a sufficiently\nculpable state of mind,’ something akin to recklessness.”\nArnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting\nJohnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 2006), overruled on\nother grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 967 n.1 (7th\nCir. 2013)). Although the inmate must demonstrate deliberate\nindifference, he “is not required to show that he was literally\nignored.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)\n(quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000)).\n Regarding the objective element of his claim, Giles has\nclearly met his burden. His schizoaffective disorder diagno-\nsis, his symptoms, and his multiple prescriptions for psycho-\ntropic medications firmly establish that he suffered from an\nobjectively serious medical condition. See id. (“A serious med-\nical condition is one that has been diagnosed by a physician\nas mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a\nlay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.”).\nGiles’s claim hinges, therefore, on whether he has shown the\ndefendants possessed the “sufficiently culpable state of\nmind” necessary to establish the subjective element of delib-\nerate indifference. The district court held that Giles failed to\nmeet this burden. We agree.\n Giles cannot establish the subjective element of his claim\nbecause the defendants are all non-medical officials who rea-\nsonably relied on the judgment of medical professionals. We\nhave long recognized that the division of labor within a prison\n\f14 No. 15-3077\n\nnecessitates that non-medical officials may reasonably defer\nto the judgment of medical professionals regarding inmate\ntreatment. “If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts\n… a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in\nbelieving that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Id. at 656\n(quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). As\nthe Third Circuit has held, “absent a reason to believe (or ac-\ntual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are\nmistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison\nofficial … will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment\nscienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Spruill, 372\nF.3d at 236.\n In Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527–28 (7th Cir. 2008), we\naffirmed summary judgment for non-medical prison officials\nwho relied on the professional judgment of prison medical\nstaff. Like Giles, the inmate in Hayes sent several letters and\nfiled multiple grievances alleging he was receiving inade-\nquate treatment for his objectively serious medical condition.\nId. at 526. Although the non-medical officials did not ignore\nthe inmate’s grievances entirely, they did not investigate fur-\nther than the medical staff’s reports and summaries, and oth-\nerwise simply referred the complaints to the medical staff. Id.\nat 527. We held that the non-medical officials did not have\n“any duty to do more than they did, in light of their\nknowledge of the situation.” Id. They “were entitled to rely on\nthe professional judgment of medical prison officials” and\n“nothing in [the medical] reports made it obvious that [the in-\nmate] might not be receiving adequate care.” Id. at 527–28.\n A review of the record demonstrates that throughout his\nvarious stints at Illinois River, Stateville, Pontiac, and Law-\nrence, Giles was receiving regular medical attention from\n\fNo. 15-3077 15\n\npsychologists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals.\nAlthough the record does not contain detailed information\nabout what the grievance procedures were at each facility, it\ndoes contain evidence that several of his grievances were sub-\njected to emergency review. Furthermore, Giles’s appeals\nwere reviewed by the ARB, which found his complaints to be\nwithout merit upon investigation. Giles has not presented ev-\nidence that his grievances were ignored or mishandled. Nor\nwas there an indication from his medical records that he was\nnot receiving adequate care. In short, the non-medical officials\nrelied on the medical professionals to provide proper treat-\nment, and there was nothing to give notice to the officials of a\nneed to intervene.\n Giles asserts the defendants were deliberately indifferent\nby allowing him to “go on and off of his medication many\ntimes” despite knowing his health condition required contin-\nuous treatment. However, the record does not support this as-\nsertion. Giles’s medications were discontinued in July 2010\nwhile still at Dixon pursuant to a decision made by medical\nprofessionals. Several weeks later, after being transferred first\nto Illinois River and then to Stateville, Giles was placed back\non medications soon after he requested them. Although there\nwere other brief delays in his receipt of medication, when he\nbrought these to the medical professionals’ attention his con-\ncerns were addressed, or else it was determined after a review\nof all available information that he was properly receiving his\nmedication as prescribed. Even during one of the periods\nwhere Giles alleged he was not receiving his medication, a\npsychiatrist reported after an extended interview that Giles’s\ndemeanor was good, he was coherent and alert, and he dis-\nplayed no acute distress or agitation. Such reports from the\nmedical professionals charged with Giles’s care defy the\n\f16 No. 15-3077\n\nconclusion that the non-medical defendants knew of and dis-\nregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety.\n The most serious lapse in treatment was the two-week pe-\nriod in November 2010 when he was transferred back to Illi-\nnois River from Stateville. This lapse was caused by a failure\nto include his current prescriptions on his transfer summary.\nWhile this was certainly a concerning oversight, it does not\nmeet the standard of deliberate indifference: a knowing dis-\nregard of an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety. As we\nhave noted before, “deliberate means more than negligent.”\nDuckworth, 532 F.3d at 679. Giles’s medication was re-pre-\nscribed as soon as he was examined by a psychologist at Illi-\nnois River, who requested and reviewed Giles’s medical rec-\nords from Stateville.\n No reasonable jury could find that the defendants knew of\nand disregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety,\nand thus summary judgment on this claim was appropriate.\n B. Conditions of Confinement\n Giles also appeals the grant of summary judgment on his\nconditions-of-confinement claim. Although the complaint fo-\ncused on specific conditions to which Giles was subjected\nwhile in segregation (such as vermin infestations, filthiness,\nand lengthy periods of isolation), on appeal Giles has re-\nframed the violation as being the combined effect that these\nconditions had on his mental health.4 He asserts his place-\nment in segregation subjected him to conditions which exac-\nerbated his symptoms, or which were more difficult for him\n\n 4 Giles’s counsel explained at oral argument “what’s happening to his\n\nmental health while he’s in segregation is the conditions of confinement\nviolation.”\n\fNo. 15-3077 17\n\nto cope with due to his symptoms. He argues that even\nthough segregation placement and the conditions of his con-\nfinement may not have been cruel and unusual in the case of\nan ordinary inmate, they amounted to cruel and unusual\ntreatment in his case given their combined effect on his illness.\n The Eighth Amendment prohibits the States from subject-\ning prisoners to conditions of confinement amounting to cruel\nand unusual punishment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345–47. Accord-\ning to the Supreme Court, however, “extreme deprivations\nare required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.”\nHudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Whether conditions\nof confinement are cruel and unusual must be judged in ac-\ncordance with contemporary standards of decency. Id. at 8;\nRhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. If under contemporary standards the\nconditions cannot be said to be cruel and unusual, then they\nare not unconstitutional, and “[t]o the extent that such condi-\ntions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the pen-\nalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against so-\nciety.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.\n As with a claim for deliberate indifference to serious med-\nical needs, a conditions-of-confinement claim includes an ob-\njective and a subjective component. Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d\n508, 521 (7th Cir. 2017). The plaintiff must first establish “an\nobjective showing that the conditions are sufficiently seri-\nous—i.e., that they deny the inmate ‘the minimal civilized\nmeasure of life’s necessities,’ creating an excessive risk to the\ninmate’s health and safety.” Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at\n347) (internal citations omitted). The plaintiff must next estab-\nlish “a subjective showing of a defendant’s culpable state of\nmind.” Id. Once again, the state of mind necessary to establish\nliability is deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or\n\f18 No. 15-3077\n\nsafety. Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cty. of Wood, 226 F.3d\n525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000).\n Giles attempts to satisfy the objective element by arguing\nthat placing a mentally ill inmate in segregation—under con-\nditions that exacerbate his symptoms or with which he has\ndifficulty coping due to his symptoms—is an objectively seri-\nous condition creating an excessive risk to his health and\nsafety. We have indeed recognized that prolonged segregated\nconfinement may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation\nin some instances. See Isby, 856 F.3d at 521 (quoting Rice ex rel.\nRice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 666 (7th Cir. 2012)). We\nhave also held that the aggregate effect of a multitude of indi-\nvidual conditions may constitute a violation even if each in-\ndividual condition could not establish a violation standing on\nits own. Id. at 522. However, this only occurs when the condi-\ntions “have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the dep-\nrivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food,\nwarmth, or exercise.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,\n304 (1991)). The core issue is whether the conditions deprived\nthe plaintiff of a “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessi-\nties.” Rice, 675 F.3d at 664–65.\n While we do not deny that Giles experienced harsh condi-\ntions in segregation, the record does not support a finding\nthat he was deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life’s\nnecessities, even considering the effects on his mental condi-\ntion. He was regularly evaluated by mental health profession-\nals at all facilities, and they repeatedly determined that his\ncondition did not contraindicate continued segregation. And\non the occasion in November 2011 when a mental health pro-\nfessional determined that his mental condition was being ex-\nacerbated by his cell assignment, he was reassigned and\n\fNo. 15-3077 19\n\nmoved the next day, checked on less than a week later, and\nwas found to have notably improved. Giles has therefore not\nestablished the objective element of his claim.\n Even if Giles could establish an objectively serious condi-\ntion, he ultimately fails to establish the necessary subjective\ncomponent of his claim: the defendants’ culpable state of\nmind. Once again, the defendants relied on the judgment of\nthe medical professionals into whose care Giles was en-\ntrusted. No reasonable jury could find that the defendants\nconsciously disregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health by\nkeeping him in segregation when the mental health profes-\nsionals continually reported it was appropriate to do so.\n Since Giles failed to establish both the objective and sub-\njective elements of his claim, summary judgment in favor of\nthe defendants was proper.\n C. Motions to Recruit Counsel and Appoint Expert\n The final issue on appeal concerns the district court’s han-\ndling of Giles’s motions to appoint or recruit counsel and to\nappoint an expert. We review the district court’s decisions on\nthese motions for abuse of discretion. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d\n647, 649, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (reviewing a decision on\na motion to recruit counsel for abuse of discretion); Ledford v.\nSullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a deci-\nsion on a motion for appointment of an expert witness is re-\nviewed for abuse of discretion). In reviewing for abuse of dis-\ncretion, we do not substitute our own judgment for the dis-\ntrict court’s; rather, the “decision must strike us as fundamen-\ntally wrong for an abuse of discretion to occur.” Ladien v.\nAstrachan, 128 F.3d 1051, 1056 (7th Cir. 1997).\n\f20 No. 15-3077\n\n We note at the outset of our discussion that “[t]here is no\nright to court-appointed counsel in federal civil litigation.”\nOlson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014). However,\nthe district court does have the discretion to recruit a volun-\nteer to represent a plaintiff who cannot otherwise afford coun-\nsel. Navejar, 718 F.3d at 696. The court “must rely on the gen-\nerosity of lawyers to volunteer their time and skill on behalf\nof indigent civil parties.” Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1008\n(7th Cir. 2018).\n Evaluating whether to recruit counsel involves a two-step\nprocess. First, the court must determine if the plaintiff made\na reasonable attempt to secure counsel on his own. Navejar,\n718 F.3d at 696. Next, the court must examine “whether the\ndifficulty of the case—factually and legally—exceeds the par-\nticular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to coherently present\nit.” Id. (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). Even where the court\ndecides to recruit a volunteer, however, it does not have “an\nindefinite commitment to search until a volunteer is found.”\nWilborn, 881 F.3d at 1008.\n The insufficient number of volunteer attorneys in some of\nour districts limits courts’ ability to locate representation for\nindigents. See James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 330–31 (7th Cir. 2018).\nThis case presents the question of what a court should do in\nthe event a court determines that the case’s complexity ap-\npears to exceed the plaintiff’s capacity to litigate his claims\nand the court exercises discretion to seek a volunteer attorney\nbut is unable to find one.\n We considered a similar question in Wilborn v. Ealey, 881\nF.3d 998 (7th Cir. 2018). In that case, the plaintiff filed multiple\nmotions to recruit counsel. The district court eventually\ngranted one such motion and spent several months searching.\n\fNo. 15-3077 21\n\nAfter contacting over four hundred attorneys, the court iden-\ntified a volunteer. This success was short-lived, though. The\nattorney had a scheduling conflict, which ultimately led the\ncourt to grant his motion to withdraw. Despite this change,\nthe plaintiff did not file another motion to recruit counsel. The\ncourt offered to postpone the trial, but the plaintiff declined\nthe court’s offer. As a result, the court allowed the plaintiff to\nproceed to trial pro se. Based on those facts, we decided that\nthe court’s efforts were “more than enough to satisfy any duty\nto the indigent plaintiff,” and we held that the court did not\nabuse its discretion in allowing the plaintiff to try his case pro\nse. Id. at 1008.\n Here too, we conclude that the district court fulfilled its\nobligation to Giles by circulating a request for representation\nto the court’s list of approximately fifty attorneys on three sep-\narate occasions over the course of one year. Yet it is somewhat\nconcerning that at some point the court determined further\nsearching would be futile and, without communicating that\nupdate to Giles, decided it was appropriate to resolve the\npending motion for summary judgment.\n Acknowledging that “[t]here are limits to what a court\nmust do after deciding to recruit counsel,” id., in cases such as\nthis—where the complexities of litigating are high, having\ncounsel is increasingly important, and a district court has con-\ncluded that it is unable to locate a volunteer attorney—it\nwould be advisable for a judge to communicate with the\nplaintiff and consider offering a reasonable continuance be-\nfore proceeding to rule on a dispositive motion. The addi-\ntional time after a court has exhausted its search efforts might\nafford a limited opportunity for indigent litigants to seek\n\f22 No. 15-3077\n\ncounsel on their own, or at a minimum, conduct some prelim-\ninary discovery.\n The district court also denied Giles’s motion to appoint an\nexpert witness, holding that an expert was not necessary be-\nfore summary judgment but stating that Giles could move to\nappoint an expert for trial if his case survived summary judg-\nment. A court may, in its discretion, appoint an expert witness\nwhere the expert’s “specialized knowledge will assist the\ntrier-of-fact to understand the evidence or decide a fact in is-\nsue.” Ledford, 105 F.3d at 358–59. The district court determined\nGiles’s claims failed as a matter of law to show the defendants\nknowingly disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to\nhim. This decision did not hinge on specialized knowledge or\nfact-finding. Instead, the court recognized Giles had received\nconsistent treatment from medical professionals and the de-\nfendants had relied on the medical judgment of those profes-\nsionals. The grant of summary judgment was based on Giles’s\nfailure to establish the defendants’ sufficiently culpable state\nof mind, not on a technical analysis of the medical treatment\nhe received or the sufficiency of that treatment. Thus, the dis-\ntrict court acted fully within its discretion by denying the mo-\ntion to appoint an expert witness at that stage of litigation.\n III. Conclusion\n Prison is, by its very nature, an unpleasant place to be, and\nwe have no doubt that Giles’s objectively serious condition\nand symptoms contributed to his overall discomfort. The dis-\npositive defect of Giles’s case, however, is that the defendants\nagainst whom he has filed this action are non-medical officials\nwho were entitled by law to rely on the judgment of the med-\nical professionals under whose care Giles was placed. Section\n1983 does not create a system of vicarious liability. The\n\fNo. 15-3077 23\n\ndefendants cannot be held liable unless they were aware of\nfacts from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that\nGiles was subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm, drew\nsuch an inference, and yet did not intervene. Based on this\nrecord, we hold that Giles has failed to make that showing,\nand therefore has failed as a matter of law to establish delib-\nerate indifference. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district\ncourt.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Bruce GILES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Salvador A. GODINEZ, Acting Director, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 15-3077\\nBRUCE GILES,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nSALVADOR A. GODINEZ, Acting Director, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:12-cv-00965 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Bruce Giles is a prisoner in the cus-\\ntody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (the “Depart-\\nment”) who suffers from schizoaffective disorder. Giles filed\\nthis action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several De-\\npartment officials. He alleges the defendants violated his\\nrights under the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately in-\\ndifferent to his serious medical needs, subjecting him to un-\\nconstitutional conditions of confinement, and failing to\\n\\f2 No. 15-3077\\n\\nprotect him from other inmates. The district court granted\\nsummary judgment to the defendants and Giles now appeals.\\nThe district court’s conclusion was based largely on its hold-\\ning that Giles could not establish the subjective elements of\\nhis claims because the defendants, who are all non-medical\\nofficials, appropriately relied on the judgment of medical pro-\\nfessionals. Because we agree Giles cannot establish the de-\\nfendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind, we\\naffirm.\\n I. Background\\n A. Factual Background\\n At all times relevant to this appeal, Giles was in the cus-\\ntody of the Department and housed in five different correc-\\ntional facilities: Dixon Correctional Center (“Dixon”), Illinois\\nRiver Correctional Center (“Illinois River”), Stateville Correc-\\ntional Center (“Stateville”), Pontiac Correctional Center\\n(“Pontiac”), and Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”).\\nHe suffers from schizoaffective disorder. His symptoms in-\\nclude anxiety, depression, auditory hallucinations, and sui-\\ncidal ideation. He attempted suicide at least three times while\\nin the Department’s custody. He has at various times been\\nprescribed psychotropic medications that help him cope with\\nthese symptoms but do not eliminate them entirely.\\n Giles’s claims arise out of the medical treatment he re-\\nceived and the conditions of his confinement at multiple cor-\\nrectional facilities over a two-year period. Most of his com-\\nplaints relate specifically to his placement in segregation.1 The\\n\\n 1 Although Giles’s placement in segregation is at the core of his com-\\nplaint, the exact duration of his periods in segregation and the nature of\\nsegregation placement at each facility are not clear from the record or\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 3\\n\\nfollowing timeline of events is compiled from Giles’s allega-\\ntions, his medical records, and his deposition testimony.\\n From late June 2010 until September 2010, Giles was\\nhoused at Dixon, where he alleges he had daily access to men-\\ntal health professionals and the opportunity to participate in\\ntherapeutic programs.2 On September 22, 2010, Giles was\\ntransferred from Dixon to Illinois River. According to the\\nhealth status transfer summary prepared by an official at\\nDixon at the time of Giles’s transfer, Giles’s prescription for\\npsychotropic medications (Prozac and Depakote) had been\\ndiscontinued on July 23, 2010, about two months before he left\\nDixon.\\n Giles was examined by a nurse at Illinois River on October\\n3, 2010, at which point he requested to see a psychologist be-\\ncause he wanted to get back on his medications. The nurse\\nnoted he was “upset that [he] cannot see psych today.” Three\\ndays later, on October 6, Giles was transferred to Stateville\\ndue to an unrelated legal proceeding. On October 9, while\\nGiles was at Stateville, a psychiatrist again prescribed Prozac\\nand Depakote, less than a week after he requested the return\\nto medication.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nGiles’s allegations. As best as can be discerned, Giles was placed in segre-\\ngation during two separate periods and at three different facilities: first, at\\nIllinois River and Pontiac from March 2011 to approximately July 2011 (he\\nwas transferred to Pontiac in April), and second, at Lawrence from Febru-\\nary 2012 until approximately November 2012.\\n 2 Giles acknowledged in his deposition that he did not avail himself\\nof these programs, however, until he returned to Dixon after filing this\\nsuit.\\n\\f4 No. 15-3077\\n\\n Giles was sent back to Illinois River on November 10, 2010.\\nThis time, his transfer summary failed to include the fact that\\nhe was receiving psychotropic medications, resulting in a\\nlapse of medication. Giles was examined by a mental health\\ncounselor on November 22 and then by a psychiatrist on No-\\nvember 25. The psychiatrist again prescribed Prozac and De-\\npakote and requested Giles’s medical records from Stateville.\\nGiles was examined by a medical health counselor on Decem-\\nber 8. On December 12, a psychiatrist reviewed Giles’s medi-\\ncal records from Stateville and noticed Giles had received Pro-\\nlixin while there and his symptoms had improved, so Giles\\nwas placed back on Prolixin.\\n Giles was examined by a mental health counselor on ten\\ndifferent occasions from December 2010 until April 2011. He\\nwas also examined by a psychiatrist and attended group ther-\\napy sessions multiple times in January until he stopped show-\\ning up for the sessions in February.\\n Giles complained to a mental health counselor in March\\n2011 that he was not doing well and that he had not received\\nhis Prolixin medication for two days. The counselor wrote in\\nhis report that he addressed the medication issue with the\\nprison pharmacy. Around this time, Giles had an altercation\\nwith another inmate at Illinois River. According to Giles’s\\ndeposition testimony, the incident occurred when he was\\ntalking to himself and another inmate approached him, told\\nhim to shut up, and spit in his face. Giles pushed the inmate\\naway. He claims the reason he was talking to himself was be-\\ncause he had not received his Prolixin medication, which\\nhelps control the voices in his head.\\n Because of the altercation, Giles was placed in segregation.\\nAccording to Giles, while in segregation “you’re just thrown\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 5\\n\\nin a cell all day with other inmates that are violent, that don’t\\ncare about you.” He claims he was subjected to violence from\\nother inmates in segregation but that he never reported this\\nto prison officials. He testified inmates in segregation were\\ngiven yard time, but that he sometimes chose not to go be-\\ncause he did not feel safe in the yard, claiming “that is where\\nusually everybody fights.”\\n After being placed in segregation in March 2011, Giles at-\\ntempted suicide by cutting his wrists on his bed frame. His\\ntestimony indicates his cousin had passed away around this\\ntime and that his cellmate would not let him sleep at night.\\nHe also testified his symptoms were “just getting so bad,” par-\\nticularly the voices in his head, even though he acknowledges\\nhe was receiving his medications at this time. The stress from\\nthese combined factors led to his suicide attempt. Giles’s cell-\\nmate notified the prison staff and Giles was rescued. After\\nthis, he was placed on suicide watch and was examined by\\nmental health professionals.\\n Giles was examined by a mental health counselor on\\nApril 1 and April 8, 2011. The counselor noted there was “po-\\ntential for exaggeration of symptoms” and that Giles was “co-\\nherent” with “no overt distress.”\\n Giles was again transferred from Illinois River on April 13,\\n2011, this time to Pontiac. He remained in segregation at Pon-\\ntiac. While at Pontiac, Giles alleges he received medication\\nand one-on-one therapy, to “try to give [him] a little hope.”\\nHe felt this treatment was insufficient. He alleges he was not\\ngiven his medications “about twice.” A psychiatrist discontin-\\nued Giles’s existing prescriptions and prescribed new psycho-\\ntropic medications on April 26. Three days later, Giles was\\nagain examined by a psychiatrist who noted “there is nothing\\n\\f6 No. 15-3077\\n\\nto contraindicate continued segregation placement at this\\ntime.”\\n Giles received an extended interview with a psychiatrist\\non May 24, 2011. During this session, Giles stated he was\\n“fine, except that [he had] not been getting [his] Prolixin.” The\\npsychiatrist noted Giles’s mood was good; he was awake,\\nalert, and oriented; he displayed “[n]o acute distress/agita-\\ntion”; his speech was “fluent and coherent”; and his\\n“thoughts were organized.” Giles denied having any suicidal\\nor homicidal thoughts. Besides claiming he had not been re-\\nceiving Prolixin, “[h]e made no mention of any other serious\\nconcerns.” Giles was still in segregation at this time.\\n Giles was scheduled for another psychiatric appointment\\non July 5, 2011, which he did not attend, opting to go to the\\nprison yard instead. He was evaluated by a mental health pro-\\nfessional on July 29, who again noted “there is nothing to con-\\ntraindicate continued segregation placement at this time.” As\\nbest as can be discerned from the record, Giles was removed\\nfrom segregation sometime during July 2011.\\n Giles was transferred to Lawrence in early September\\n2011. He was examined by mental health professionals three\\ntimes in September, four times in October, twice in Novem-\\nber, twice in December, and three times in February 2012. Af-\\nter one of the October examinations, the mental health profes-\\nsional determined Giles was having issues with his cellmate\\nand his cell assignment was exacerbating his symptoms. As a\\nresult, Giles was assigned a new cell and cellmate the next\\nday. Notes from his examination the following week indicate\\n“notable improvement.”\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 7\\n\\n In February 2012, Giles was involved in another alterca-\\ntion with an inmate, which formed the basis of his original\\nfailure-to-protect claim. This altercation occurred when he ac-\\ncidentally bumped into the other inmate in the mess hall\\nwhile talking to himself. The other inmate assumed Giles was\\ntalking to him and struck him in retaliation. Giles was ren-\\ndered unconscious by the attack. Giles testified in his deposi-\\ntion he had never had trouble with this inmate before and\\nnever told the facility staff he felt he was in danger, but that\\n“it happened because of my symptoms. I was there, and [the\\nother inmate] just happened to be aggressive.” During the in-\\nvestigation of the altercation, when he was asked (apparently\\nby prison officials) if he was “guilty,” Giles alleges he simply\\nresponded he was. As a result, both Giles and the other inmate\\nwere placed in segregation. Giles apparently stayed in segre-\\ngation from February until November 2012.\\n Giles was examined by mental health professionals nine\\nmore times during the period spanning from March to July\\n2012. During this time, he expressed his unhappiness at Law-\\nrence, his unhappiness with being in segregation, and the\\nanxiety he felt regarding the possibility of future altercations.\\nGiles reported difficulties with cellmates and frequently re-\\nquested reassignment. The mental health professionals noted\\nGiles lacked focus during treatment sessions and often did\\nnot complete assigned therapy homework.\\n Throughout the two years at issue, Giles filed at least nine-\\nteen grievances. His complaints related to insufficient medical\\ntreatment, delays or interruptions in receiving medication,\\nunconstitutional conditions of confinement, lack of adequate\\nsuicide prevention, vermin infestations, his unhappiness in\\nsegregation, and other issues. He alleges all these grievances\\n\\f8 No. 15-3077\\n\\nwere either ignored outright or, if reviewed, his concerns\\nwere not addressed. He testified in his deposition, however,\\nthat he did not know whether the grievances were reviewed\\nor investigated. We know from the record that at least three\\nof these grievances (filed in March 2012, April 2012, and July\\n2012) were subjected to “Emergency Review” by Marc Hodge\\n(the warden at Lawrence). The record also includes responses\\nto many of Giles’s appeals of his grievances alleging that he\\nwas not receiving his medication, that segregation placement\\nwas not conducive to his mental health, and that the facilities\\nlacked proper mental health programs. These appeals were\\nall denied, as the Department’s Administrative Review Board\\n(the “ARB”) determined, “[b]ased on a total review of all\\navailable information,” that the complaints were without\\nmerit.\\n Giles was eventually transferred back to Dixon in early\\n2014.\\n B. District Court Proceedings\\n Giles filed this suit pro se on September 4, 2012. He named\\nseveral defendants, nine of which remain in the case at this\\nstage: S.A. Godinez (the Department’s acting director during\\nthe relevant time period), Richard Birkey (the warden at Illi-\\nnois River), Leonta Jackson (the assistant warden at Illinois\\nRiver), Ron Zessin (the clinical services supervisor at Illinois\\nRiver), Randy Pfister (the warden at Pontiac), Michael Lemke\\n(the assistant warden at Pontiac), Marc Hodge (the warden at\\nLawrence), Mark Storm (the assistant warden at Lawrence),\\nand Randy Stevenson (the clinical services supervisor at\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 9\\n\\nLawrence).3 Giles asserted three claims under the Eighth\\nAmendment, seeking to hold the defendants liable for these\\nalleged constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.\\nFirst, he asserted a claim of deliberate indifference to serious\\nmedical needs based on his allegations of inadequate treat-\\nment and delays in providing medication at Illinois River,\\nPontiac, and Lawrence. Second, he asserted a conditions-of-\\nconfinement claim based on his allegations of vermin infesta-\\ntions and unsanitary conditions while in segregation at Pon-\\ntiac and Lawrence. Third, he asserted a failure-to-protect\\nclaim based on the February 2012 altercation.\\n The case was referred to a U.S. magistrate judge in late\\n2012, with Giles’s consent. The defendants moved for sum-\\nmary judgment in June 2014. The magistrate judge issued a\\nReport & Recommendation (R&R) and recommended grant-\\ning summary judgment on the ground that Giles failed to\\nshow deliberate indifference. After a de novo review of the\\nR&R and Giles’s objections thereto, the district court adopted\\nthe R&R in its entirety and granted summary judgment to the\\ndefendants.\\n Throughout the district court proceedings, Giles filed mul-\\ntiple motions to appoint counsel. He first filed such a motion\\non September 4, 2012. The magistrate judge denied the motion\\nbecause Giles had not demonstrated that he had attempted to\\nfind counsel on his own. On December 17, Giles filed a motion\\nto reconsider his motion to appoint counsel after attempting\\nunsuccessfully to find an attorney. The magistrate judge again\\ndenied the motion, holding that the issues in the case were not\\n\\n\\n 3 Five other defendants, also Department officials, were dismissed by\\nthe district court in November 2012.\\n\\f10 No. 15-3077\\n\\nfactually complex because discovery had been limited at that\\ntime to only the issue of exhaustion of administrative reme-\\ndies. The court held that Giles was competent to litigate on his\\nown at that stage. Giles filed another motion to appoint coun-\\nsel on July 2, 2013. The court reaffirmed its previous decision\\nthat Giles appeared competent to litigate the case at the cur-\\nrent stage and stated that the issue of appointing counsel\\nwould not be reconsidered until after the resolution of the ad-\\nministrative remedies issue.\\n In August 2013, after the defendants’ deadline to raise a\\nfailure to exhaust administrative remedies defense had ex-\\npired, Giles once again moved the court to appoint counsel\\nfor him. The magistrate judge construed the motion as a mo-\\ntion for recruitment of counsel and granted it, noting that the\\ncourt has no authority to appoint counsel in § 1983 cases but\\ncan seek to recruit a volunteer attorney. See Navejar v. Iyiola,\\n718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court circulated\\na request for representation to the court’s list of “approxi-\\nmately 50 licensed and registered attorneys that have indi-\\ncated an interest in representing indigent litigants in this dis-\\ntrict.” However, no attorneys were willing and available to\\nrepresent Giles immediately.\\n Giles moved in February 2014 for additional time to seek\\ncounsel. Giles argued he needed legal assistance to “prepare\\ndocuments, for dispositive motions, and discovery.” The\\nmagistrate judge denied the motion because Giles had not\\nspecified a deadline for the extension request, but he stated he\\nwould continue to seek a volunteer to represent Giles. Giles\\nfiled another motion to recruit counsel in May 2014. The mag-\\nistrate judge denied the motion as moot, having already\\ngranted the earlier motion to recruit, but once again solicited\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 11\\n\\nvolunteers from the pro bono list. Giles moved for recruit-\\nment of counsel again in August 2014 while summary judg-\\nment was pending. The magistrate judge again explained that\\nthe motion to recruit counsel had previously been granted\\nand that the court had done all it could to solicit a volunteer.\\nGiles’s case was published to the list of volunteers a third\\ntime. The magistrate judge encouraged Giles to continue liti-\\ngating the case to the best of his ability. Finally, Giles filed a\\nmotion to appoint counsel once again in December 2014,\\nwhich the district court denied as moot in January 2015, stat-\\ning that it had already granted Giles’s motion to recruit and\\nthat Giles would be notified if an attorney volunteered to take\\nthe case.\\n Giles also moved multiple times, beginning on October 16,\\n2014, to appoint an expert. The magistrate judge denied these\\nmotions, stating “[t]he discovery period is closed, but the\\nplaintiff may later seek to appoint an expert for trial if the [de-\\nfendants’] motion for summary judgment is denied.”\\n Giles now appeals the district court’s grant of summary\\njudgment on his claim for deliberate indifference to serious\\nmedical needs and his conditions-of-confinement claim, as\\nwell as the district court’s actions regarding his motions to re-\\ncruit counsel and appoint an expert.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment\\nde novo. Knopick v. Jayco, Inc., 895 F.3d 525, 528 (7th Cir. 2018).\\nA district court properly grants summary judgment where\\nthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the\\nmoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.\\nR. CIV. P. 56(a); Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir.\\n\\f12 No. 15-3077\\n\\n2018). All justifiable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-\\nmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255\\n(1986). The non-movant must, however, present specific facts\\nestablishing a material issue for trial, and any inferences must\\nrely on more than mere speculation or conjecture. Aguilar v.\\nGaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 630–31 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States through\\nthe Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of “cruel\\nand unusual punishments.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Estelle v.\\nGamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101 (1976). The Supreme Court has inter-\\npreted the Eighth Amendment to prohibit any punishments\\n“which, although not physically barbarous, ‘involve the un-\\nnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Rhodes v. Chapman,\\n452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,\\n173 (1976)). Thus, the Eighth Amendment gives rise to consti-\\ntutional claims by inmates alleging that the conditions of their\\nconfinement violate this prohibition by imposing “the wanton\\nand unnecessary infliction of pain.” See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.\\nThe Supreme Court has further established that prison offi-\\ncials impose wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain when\\nthey are deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medi-\\ncal needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Giles here appeals summary\\njudgment on both a claim of deliberate indifference to his se-\\nrious medical needs as well as a conditions-of-confinement\\nclaim. We discuss each in turn.\\n A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs\\n To establish an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate in-\\ndifference to serious medical needs, the plaintiff must show\\ntwo elements: one objective and one subjective. Whiting v.\\nWexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n“[T]he plaintiff must prove that he suffered from ‘(1) an\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 13\\n\\nobjectively serious medical condition to which (2) a state offi-\\ncial was deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.’” Id.\\n(quoting Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir.\\n2008)). “[D]eliberate means more than negligent,” though\\n“something less than purposeful.” Duckworth, 532 F.3d at 679.\\nWe have described this subjective element as “’a sufficiently\\nculpable state of mind,’ something akin to recklessness.”\\nArnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting\\nJohnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 2006), overruled on\\nother grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 967 n.1 (7th\\nCir. 2013)). Although the inmate must demonstrate deliberate\\nindifference, he “is not required to show that he was literally\\nignored.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)\\n(quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000)).\\n Regarding the objective element of his claim, Giles has\\nclearly met his burden. His schizoaffective disorder diagno-\\nsis, his symptoms, and his multiple prescriptions for psycho-\\ntropic medications firmly establish that he suffered from an\\nobjectively serious medical condition. See id. (“A serious med-\\nical condition is one that has been diagnosed by a physician\\nas mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a\\nlay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.”).\\nGiles’s claim hinges, therefore, on whether he has shown the\\ndefendants possessed the “sufficiently culpable state of\\nmind” necessary to establish the subjective element of delib-\\nerate indifference. The district court held that Giles failed to\\nmeet this burden. We agree.\\n Giles cannot establish the subjective element of his claim\\nbecause the defendants are all non-medical officials who rea-\\nsonably relied on the judgment of medical professionals. We\\nhave long recognized that the division of labor within a prison\\n\\f14 No. 15-3077\\n\\nnecessitates that non-medical officials may reasonably defer\\nto the judgment of medical professionals regarding inmate\\ntreatment. “If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts\\n… a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in\\nbelieving that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Id. at 656\\n(quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). As\\nthe Third Circuit has held, “absent a reason to believe (or ac-\\ntual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are\\nmistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison\\nofficial … will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment\\nscienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Spruill, 372\\nF.3d at 236.\\n In Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527–28 (7th Cir. 2008), we\\naffirmed summary judgment for non-medical prison officials\\nwho relied on the professional judgment of prison medical\\nstaff. Like Giles, the inmate in Hayes sent several letters and\\nfiled multiple grievances alleging he was receiving inade-\\nquate treatment for his objectively serious medical condition.\\nId. at 526. Although the non-medical officials did not ignore\\nthe inmate’s grievances entirely, they did not investigate fur-\\nther than the medical staff’s reports and summaries, and oth-\\nerwise simply referred the complaints to the medical staff. Id.\\nat 527. We held that the non-medical officials did not have\\n“any duty to do more than they did, in light of their\\nknowledge of the situation.” Id. They “were entitled to rely on\\nthe professional judgment of medical prison officials” and\\n“nothing in [the medical] reports made it obvious that [the in-\\nmate] might not be receiving adequate care.” Id. at 527–28.\\n A review of the record demonstrates that throughout his\\nvarious stints at Illinois River, Stateville, Pontiac, and Law-\\nrence, Giles was receiving regular medical attention from\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 15\\n\\npsychologists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals.\\nAlthough the record does not contain detailed information\\nabout what the grievance procedures were at each facility, it\\ndoes contain evidence that several of his grievances were sub-\\njected to emergency review. Furthermore, Giles’s appeals\\nwere reviewed by the ARB, which found his complaints to be\\nwithout merit upon investigation. Giles has not presented ev-\\nidence that his grievances were ignored or mishandled. Nor\\nwas there an indication from his medical records that he was\\nnot receiving adequate care. In short, the non-medical officials\\nrelied on the medical professionals to provide proper treat-\\nment, and there was nothing to give notice to the officials of a\\nneed to intervene.\\n Giles asserts the defendants were deliberately indifferent\\nby allowing him to “go on and off of his medication many\\ntimes” despite knowing his health condition required contin-\\nuous treatment. However, the record does not support this as-\\nsertion. Giles’s medications were discontinued in July 2010\\nwhile still at Dixon pursuant to a decision made by medical\\nprofessionals. Several weeks later, after being transferred first\\nto Illinois River and then to Stateville, Giles was placed back\\non medications soon after he requested them. Although there\\nwere other brief delays in his receipt of medication, when he\\nbrought these to the medical professionals’ attention his con-\\ncerns were addressed, or else it was determined after a review\\nof all available information that he was properly receiving his\\nmedication as prescribed. Even during one of the periods\\nwhere Giles alleged he was not receiving his medication, a\\npsychiatrist reported after an extended interview that Giles’s\\ndemeanor was good, he was coherent and alert, and he dis-\\nplayed no acute distress or agitation. Such reports from the\\nmedical professionals charged with Giles’s care defy the\\n\\f16 No. 15-3077\\n\\nconclusion that the non-medical defendants knew of and dis-\\nregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety.\\n The most serious lapse in treatment was the two-week pe-\\nriod in November 2010 when he was transferred back to Illi-\\nnois River from Stateville. This lapse was caused by a failure\\nto include his current prescriptions on his transfer summary.\\nWhile this was certainly a concerning oversight, it does not\\nmeet the standard of deliberate indifference: a knowing dis-\\nregard of an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety. As we\\nhave noted before, “deliberate means more than negligent.”\\nDuckworth, 532 F.3d at 679. Giles’s medication was re-pre-\\nscribed as soon as he was examined by a psychologist at Illi-\\nnois River, who requested and reviewed Giles’s medical rec-\\nords from Stateville.\\n No reasonable jury could find that the defendants knew of\\nand disregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety,\\nand thus summary judgment on this claim was appropriate.\\n B. Conditions of Confinement\\n Giles also appeals the grant of summary judgment on his\\nconditions-of-confinement claim. Although the complaint fo-\\ncused on specific conditions to which Giles was subjected\\nwhile in segregation (such as vermin infestations, filthiness,\\nand lengthy periods of isolation), on appeal Giles has re-\\nframed the violation as being the combined effect that these\\nconditions had on his mental health.4 He asserts his place-\\nment in segregation subjected him to conditions which exac-\\nerbated his symptoms, or which were more difficult for him\\n\\n 4 Giles’s counsel explained at oral argument “what’s happening to his\\n\\nmental health while he’s in segregation is the conditions of confinement\\nviolation.”\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 17\\n\\nto cope with due to his symptoms. He argues that even\\nthough segregation placement and the conditions of his con-\\nfinement may not have been cruel and unusual in the case of\\nan ordinary inmate, they amounted to cruel and unusual\\ntreatment in his case given their combined effect on his illness.\\n The Eighth Amendment prohibits the States from subject-\\ning prisoners to conditions of confinement amounting to cruel\\nand unusual punishment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345–47. Accord-\\ning to the Supreme Court, however, “extreme deprivations\\nare required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.”\\nHudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Whether conditions\\nof confinement are cruel and unusual must be judged in ac-\\ncordance with contemporary standards of decency. Id. at 8;\\nRhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. If under contemporary standards the\\nconditions cannot be said to be cruel and unusual, then they\\nare not unconstitutional, and “[t]o the extent that such condi-\\ntions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the pen-\\nalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against so-\\nciety.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.\\n As with a claim for deliberate indifference to serious med-\\nical needs, a conditions-of-confinement claim includes an ob-\\njective and a subjective component. Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d\\n508, 521 (7th Cir. 2017). The plaintiff must first establish “an\\nobjective showing that the conditions are sufficiently seri-\\nous—i.e., that they deny the inmate ‘the minimal civilized\\nmeasure of life’s necessities,’ creating an excessive risk to the\\ninmate’s health and safety.” Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at\\n347) (internal citations omitted). The plaintiff must next estab-\\nlish “a subjective showing of a defendant’s culpable state of\\nmind.” Id. Once again, the state of mind necessary to establish\\nliability is deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or\\n\\f18 No. 15-3077\\n\\nsafety. Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cty. of Wood, 226 F.3d\\n525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n Giles attempts to satisfy the objective element by arguing\\nthat placing a mentally ill inmate in segregation—under con-\\nditions that exacerbate his symptoms or with which he has\\ndifficulty coping due to his symptoms—is an objectively seri-\\nous condition creating an excessive risk to his health and\\nsafety. We have indeed recognized that prolonged segregated\\nconfinement may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation\\nin some instances. See Isby, 856 F.3d at 521 (quoting Rice ex rel.\\nRice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 666 (7th Cir. 2012)). We\\nhave also held that the aggregate effect of a multitude of indi-\\nvidual conditions may constitute a violation even if each in-\\ndividual condition could not establish a violation standing on\\nits own. Id. at 522. However, this only occurs when the condi-\\ntions “have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the dep-\\nrivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food,\\nwarmth, or exercise.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,\\n304 (1991)). The core issue is whether the conditions deprived\\nthe plaintiff of a “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessi-\\nties.” Rice, 675 F.3d at 664–65.\\n While we do not deny that Giles experienced harsh condi-\\ntions in segregation, the record does not support a finding\\nthat he was deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life’s\\nnecessities, even considering the effects on his mental condi-\\ntion. He was regularly evaluated by mental health profession-\\nals at all facilities, and they repeatedly determined that his\\ncondition did not contraindicate continued segregation. And\\non the occasion in November 2011 when a mental health pro-\\nfessional determined that his mental condition was being ex-\\nacerbated by his cell assignment, he was reassigned and\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 19\\n\\nmoved the next day, checked on less than a week later, and\\nwas found to have notably improved. Giles has therefore not\\nestablished the objective element of his claim.\\n Even if Giles could establish an objectively serious condi-\\ntion, he ultimately fails to establish the necessary subjective\\ncomponent of his claim: the defendants’ culpable state of\\nmind. Once again, the defendants relied on the judgment of\\nthe medical professionals into whose care Giles was en-\\ntrusted. No reasonable jury could find that the defendants\\nconsciously disregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health by\\nkeeping him in segregation when the mental health profes-\\nsionals continually reported it was appropriate to do so.\\n Since Giles failed to establish both the objective and sub-\\njective elements of his claim, summary judgment in favor of\\nthe defendants was proper.\\n C. Motions to Recruit Counsel and Appoint Expert\\n The final issue on appeal concerns the district court’s han-\\ndling of Giles’s motions to appoint or recruit counsel and to\\nappoint an expert. We review the district court’s decisions on\\nthese motions for abuse of discretion. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d\\n647, 649, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (reviewing a decision on\\na motion to recruit counsel for abuse of discretion); Ledford v.\\nSullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a deci-\\nsion on a motion for appointment of an expert witness is re-\\nviewed for abuse of discretion). In reviewing for abuse of dis-\\ncretion, we do not substitute our own judgment for the dis-\\ntrict court’s; rather, the “decision must strike us as fundamen-\\ntally wrong for an abuse of discretion to occur.” Ladien v.\\nAstrachan, 128 F.3d 1051, 1056 (7th Cir. 1997).\\n\\f20 No. 15-3077\\n\\n We note at the outset of our discussion that “[t]here is no\\nright to court-appointed counsel in federal civil litigation.”\\nOlson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014). However,\\nthe district court does have the discretion to recruit a volun-\\nteer to represent a plaintiff who cannot otherwise afford coun-\\nsel. Navejar, 718 F.3d at 696. The court “must rely on the gen-\\nerosity of lawyers to volunteer their time and skill on behalf\\nof indigent civil parties.” Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1008\\n(7th Cir. 2018).\\n Evaluating whether to recruit counsel involves a two-step\\nprocess. First, the court must determine if the plaintiff made\\na reasonable attempt to secure counsel on his own. Navejar,\\n718 F.3d at 696. Next, the court must examine “whether the\\ndifficulty of the case—factually and legally—exceeds the par-\\nticular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to coherently present\\nit.” Id. (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). Even where the court\\ndecides to recruit a volunteer, however, it does not have “an\\nindefinite commitment to search until a volunteer is found.”\\nWilborn, 881 F.3d at 1008.\\n The insufficient number of volunteer attorneys in some of\\nour districts limits courts’ ability to locate representation for\\nindigents. See James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 330–31 (7th Cir. 2018).\\nThis case presents the question of what a court should do in\\nthe event a court determines that the case’s complexity ap-\\npears to exceed the plaintiff’s capacity to litigate his claims\\nand the court exercises discretion to seek a volunteer attorney\\nbut is unable to find one.\\n We considered a similar question in Wilborn v. Ealey, 881\\nF.3d 998 (7th Cir. 2018). In that case, the plaintiff filed multiple\\nmotions to recruit counsel. The district court eventually\\ngranted one such motion and spent several months searching.\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 21\\n\\nAfter contacting over four hundred attorneys, the court iden-\\ntified a volunteer. This success was short-lived, though. The\\nattorney had a scheduling conflict, which ultimately led the\\ncourt to grant his motion to withdraw. Despite this change,\\nthe plaintiff did not file another motion to recruit counsel. The\\ncourt offered to postpone the trial, but the plaintiff declined\\nthe court’s offer. As a result, the court allowed the plaintiff to\\nproceed to trial pro se. Based on those facts, we decided that\\nthe court’s efforts were “more than enough to satisfy any duty\\nto the indigent plaintiff,” and we held that the court did not\\nabuse its discretion in allowing the plaintiff to try his case pro\\nse. Id. at 1008.\\n Here too, we conclude that the district court fulfilled its\\nobligation to Giles by circulating a request for representation\\nto the court’s list of approximately fifty attorneys on three sep-\\narate occasions over the course of one year. Yet it is somewhat\\nconcerning that at some point the court determined further\\nsearching would be futile and, without communicating that\\nupdate to Giles, decided it was appropriate to resolve the\\npending motion for summary judgment.\\n Acknowledging that “[t]here are limits to what a court\\nmust do after deciding to recruit counsel,” id., in cases such as\\nthis—where the complexities of litigating are high, having\\ncounsel is increasingly important, and a district court has con-\\ncluded that it is unable to locate a volunteer attorney—it\\nwould be advisable for a judge to communicate with the\\nplaintiff and consider offering a reasonable continuance be-\\nfore proceeding to rule on a dispositive motion. The addi-\\ntional time after a court has exhausted its search efforts might\\nafford a limited opportunity for indigent litigants to seek\\n\\f22 No. 15-3077\\n\\ncounsel on their own, or at a minimum, conduct some prelim-\\ninary discovery.\\n The district court also denied Giles’s motion to appoint an\\nexpert witness, holding that an expert was not necessary be-\\nfore summary judgment but stating that Giles could move to\\nappoint an expert for trial if his case survived summary judg-\\nment. A court may, in its discretion, appoint an expert witness\\nwhere the expert’s “specialized knowledge will assist the\\ntrier-of-fact to understand the evidence or decide a fact in is-\\nsue.” Ledford, 105 F.3d at 358–59. The district court determined\\nGiles’s claims failed as a matter of law to show the defendants\\nknowingly disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to\\nhim. This decision did not hinge on specialized knowledge or\\nfact-finding. Instead, the court recognized Giles had received\\nconsistent treatment from medical professionals and the de-\\nfendants had relied on the medical judgment of those profes-\\nsionals. The grant of summary judgment was based on Giles’s\\nfailure to establish the defendants’ sufficiently culpable state\\nof mind, not on a technical analysis of the medical treatment\\nhe received or the sufficiency of that treatment. Thus, the dis-\\ntrict court acted fully within its discretion by denying the mo-\\ntion to appoint an expert witness at that stage of litigation.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Prison is, by its very nature, an unpleasant place to be, and\\nwe have no doubt that Giles’s objectively serious condition\\nand symptoms contributed to his overall discomfort. The dis-\\npositive defect of Giles’s case, however, is that the defendants\\nagainst whom he has filed this action are non-medical officials\\nwho were entitled by law to rely on the judgment of the med-\\nical professionals under whose care Giles was placed. Section\\n1983 does not create a system of vicarious liability. The\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 23\\n\\ndefendants cannot be held liable unless they were aware of\\nfacts from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that\\nGiles was subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm, drew\\nsuch an inference, and yet did not intervene. Based on this\\nrecord, we hold that Giles has failed to make that showing,\\nand therefore has failed as a matter of law to establish delib-\\nerate indifference. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district\\ncourt.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":271,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4585547,"string":"4,585,547"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Aleksey Ruderman v. Matthew G. Whitaker"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-1689"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐1689 \\nALEKSEY ARKADYEVICH RUDERMAN, \\n Petitioner, \\n v. \\n\\nMATTHEW G. WHITAKER, \\nActing Attorney General of the United States, \\n Respondent. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of \\n the Board of Immigration Appeals. \\n No. A076‐054‐163 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Aleksey Arkadyevich Ruderman is \\nseeking to avoid removal to Belarus, his native country. An \\nimmigration judge ruled that Ruderman was inadmissible \\nunder the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. \\n§ 1182(a)(2)(B), and thus subject to removal. The judge also \\n\\f2 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nheld that Ruderman was not eligible for a waiver of inadmis‐\\nsibility and adjustment of status, cancellation of removal, asy‐\\nlum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Con‐\\nvention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals \\nagreed. In particular, it held that Ruderman had not raised \\nany meaningful challenge to his inadmissibility determina‐\\ntion and that even if the immigration judge had applied the \\nwrong legal standard to determine that Ruderman was ineli‐\\ngible for a waiver of inadmissibility, her alternative discre‐\\ntionary denial made the error harmless. \\n Ruderman petitions us for review of those holdings, along \\nwith others reached by the immigration judge and affirmed \\nby the Board. While we largely agree with the Board’s analy‐\\nsis, we hold that it was flawed with respect to one issue: the \\nquestion whether Ruderman is statutorily inadmissible. We \\ntherefore grant Ruderman’s petition and remand for the \\nBoard to revisit that question and, if necessary, to decide \\nwhether Ruderman is eligible for a waiver. \\n I. \\n Ruderman moved to the United States when he was nine‐\\nteen to escape discrimination and violence directed at him on \\naccount of his Jewish heritage. He moved from his native land \\nof Belarus, a former Soviet republic that declared independ‐\\nence during his childhood. In Belarus, Ruderman and his fam‐\\nily were targeted for abuse by Neo‐Nazis and pro‐Russia ad‐\\nvocates who would shout profanities at them, perform the \\nNazi salute, leave anti‐Jewish propaganda in their mailbox, \\nand throw bottles and stones at their home. \\n Ruderman received even worse treatment at school. His \\n(sometimes much older) classmates would bully and beat him \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 3 \\n\\nand the handful of other Jewish students. The head of the \\nschool and the police were alerted but did nothing to address \\nthe situation. One particularly severe attack resulted in \\nstitches and a permanent scar, while another resulted in two \\nbroken wrists that have bothered him ever since. \\n After attackers broke Ruderman’s wrists, his parents sent \\nhim to a private school where he would be safer. His time \\nthere was cut short, however, by his father’s death. Arkady \\nRuderman, a documentary filmmaker, died while filming a \\npiece on government corruption in Tajikistan—another for‐\\nmer Soviet republic. Although government officials reported \\nthat he was killed in a car accident, Arkady had previously \\nbeen detained and battered by the KGB, and eyewitnesses \\nsaid that they saw bullet holes in his dead body. Those reports \\ncould not be confirmed because the police ordered that \\nArkady’s casket remain closed at his funeral—and then at‐\\ntended the event to make sure that it did. \\n Without Arkady’s income, Ruderman’s family could no \\nlonger afford his private school tuition, so Ruderman enrolled \\nat a different public school where he was subjected to familiar \\nanti‐Semitic verbal abuse. He became so afraid that in the \\nninth grade he stopped attending classes entirely and later \\ntransferred to a technical school. There, in spite of continued \\nverbal abuse, he performed well and graduated with high \\ngrades. Once out of school, however, he found that his Jewish \\nheritage made it difficult for him to get a job. \\n Fed up with the abuse and intolerance, Ruderman fled to \\nthe United States in 2001 under a provision known as the \\nLautenberg Amendment, which lowers barriers to immigra‐\\ntion for certain former soviet nationals. See Pub. L. No. 101‐\\n167, tit. V, §§ 599D–E, 103 Stat. 1195, 1261–64 (1989) (codified \\n\\f4 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nas amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 note, § 1255 note). His life in \\nAmerica got off to a rocky start; shortly after arriving he was \\nconvicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and sen‐\\ntenced to court supervision. But over the next several years, \\nhe found work as a cab driver and a security officer, met his \\nfuture wife Elena, and moved into an apartment with her and \\nher two children in Milwaukee. \\n In 2008, Ruderman struck and killed a pedestrian with his \\nvehicle while driving drunk. He accepted responsibility, \\npleaded guilty to homicide by negligent operation of a vehi‐\\ncle, and was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. \\nFollowing his release in 2013, he worked at a transportation \\ncompany—until U.S. Customs and Immigration Services de‐\\nnied his adjustment‐of‐status application, causing his work \\npermit to expire. \\n In January of 2016, the government detained Ruderman \\nand began removal proceedings. The immigration judge ulti‐\\nmately concluded that Ruderman was statutorily inadmissi‐\\nble because of his two convictions. The judge also denied \\nRuderman’s applications for a waiver of inadmissibility, ad‐\\njustment of status under the Lautenberg Amendment, cancel‐\\nlation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and pro‐\\ntection under the Convention Against Torture. \\n Ruderman appealed the immigration judge’s decision in \\nan extensive pro se brief and later in a second brief filed by \\npro bono counsel. The counseled brief supplemented certain \\narguments that Ruderman had made in his initial brief but \\nconceded others. Significantly, the later brief conceded that \\n“[Ruderman’s] convictions for two crimes with an aggregate \\nprison sentence of five years make him ‘inadmissible.’” That \\nconcession contradicted Ruderman’s pro se argument that the \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 5 \\n\\ninadmissibility statute applies only when two or more convic‐\\ntions each result in a sentence to confinement, and so Ruder‐\\nman’s sole sentence to confinement—which imposed five \\nyears in prison—did not make him inadmissible. \\n The Board dismissed Ruderman’s appeal. First, it noted in \\npassing that Ruderman “ha[d] not raised any meaningful \\nchallenges” to his inadmissibility, and thus the issue was \\n“waived.” Second, the Board adopted and affirmed the immi‐\\ngration judge’s denial of Ruderman’s applications for cancel‐\\nlation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection un‐\\nder the Convention Against Torture. Finally, the Board af‐\\nfirmed the denial of Ruderman’s request for a waiver of inad‐\\nmissibility and adjustment of status under the Lautenberg \\nAmendment. The Board bypassed Ruderman’s argument that \\nthe immigration judge had applied the wrong standard to de‐\\ntermine whether Ruderman was eligible for a waiver of inad‐\\nmissibility and instead affirmed the judge’s conclusion that, \\neven if Ruderman were eligible to be considered for a waiver, \\nshe would exercise her discretion to deny him relief. \\n II. \\n Ruderman petitions us for review of the Board’s decision. \\nHe takes issue with the Board’s conclusion that he waived his \\nopportunity to challenge his inadmissibility, and he argues \\nthat the application of the wrong standard for determining his \\neligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility contaminated the im‐\\nmigration judge’s discretionary denial of a waiver. He also \\nclaims that the judge erred by holding—and the Board erred \\nby affirming—both that his negligent homicide was “particu‐\\nlarly serious” and that he failed to show a “substantial risk” \\nthat he would be tortured in Belarus. \\n\\f6 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\n Because the Board provided its own analysis and also af‐\\nfirmed the immigration judge’s decision, we review both de‐\\ncisions. Sobaleva v. Holder, 760 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2014). \\n A. \\n Ruderman argued in his pro se brief that he is not inad‐\\nmissible under § 212(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nation‐\\nality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B), because he has only ever re‐\\nceived one sentence to confinement. The Act states that an im‐\\nmigrant is inadmissible to receive a visa or to be admitted to \\nthe United States if he is convicted of “2 or more of‐\\nfenses … for which the aggregate sentences to confinement \\nwere 5 years or more.” Id. Ruderman interprets “sentences to \\nconfinement” to require more than one custodial sentence. He \\nsupports this reading by pointing to the word “aggregate,” \\nwhich he argues would be superfluous if the statute could be \\nsatisfied by a single sentence to confinement. Id. Because his \\nfirst conviction—for driving under the influence—did not re‐\\nsult in confinement, he concludes that he is not inadmissible. \\nHis pro bono counsel, however, conceded Ruderman’s inad‐\\nmissibility in a later‐filed brief. \\n The Board did not address Ruderman’s inadmissibility ar‐\\ngument, instead concluding that he had failed to raise any \\nmeaningful challenges to his inadmissibility and so had \\nwaived the issue. It appears likely that the Board reached that \\nconclusion on the basis of Ruderman’s counsel’s concession, \\nbecause Ruderman did raise the argument in several places—\\nincluding his notice of appeal and pro se brief, both of which \\nremained on the record. But the Board’s opinion did not oth‐\\nerwise indicate whether the counseled brief superseded the \\npro se brief. \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 7 \\n\\n A later‐in‐time concession waives an issue in federal \\ncourt—but we do not know whether that is true before the \\nBoard as well. On this record it is unclear why the Board con‐\\ncluded that Ruderman waived his challenge, and the Board’s \\nfailure to explain inhibits our review of the issue. See SEC v. \\nChenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“[A] reviewing court, \\nin dealing with a determination or judgment which an admin‐\\nistrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the \\npropriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the \\nagency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the \\ncourt is powerless to affirm the administrative action by sub‐\\nstituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper \\nbasis.”). We grant Ruderman’s petition and remand this issue \\nto the Board to clarify why it did not address Ruderman’s in‐\\nadmissibility argument. \\n B. \\n If on remand the Board confirms that Ruderman is inad‐\\nmissible, his application for a waiver of inadmissibility should \\nbe reviewed under the correct legal standard. The immigra‐\\ntion judge concluded that Ruderman was statutorily ineligi‐\\nble for a waiver because he did not show that his removal \\nwould cause “extreme hardship” to his U.S.‐citizen wife. 8 \\nU.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). When a waiver is sought in conjunction \\nwith an application for a status adjustment under the Lauten‐\\nberg Amendment, however, there is no threshold eligibility \\nrequirement; a waiver may be granted simply “for humani‐\\ntarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is other‐\\nwise in the public interest.” 8 U.S.C. 1255 note; see also 8 C.F.R. \\n§ 1245.7(d). The immigration judge erred by not considering \\nRuderman’s application under this less stringent standard. \\n\\f8 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\n The Board concluded that this error was harmless because \\nthe immigration judge held in the alternative that she would \\nexercise her discretion to deny Ruderman relief if he were el‐\\nigible to be considered for it. The assumption seems to be that \\nthe judge would have made the same discretionary denial of \\na waiver under the Lautenberg Amendment as she made un‐\\nder § 1182(h). But, as we have already noted, the former pro‐\\nvides discretion to grant a waiver for humanitarian purposes, \\nto assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public \\ninterest; the latter entails a potentially more complex consid‐\\neration of the ground for exclusion at issue, past immigration \\nviolations or criminal history, evidence of rehabilitation, gen‐\\neral evidence of good or bad character, strength of family ties, \\nduration of residence in the United States, and evidence of \\nvalue to the community. See In re Mendez‐Moralez, 21 I. & N. \\nDec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996). Because these statutes, along with \\nthe cases and regulations interpreting them, articulate distinct \\nfactors to be considered in deciding whether to grant a discre‐\\ntionary waiver of inadmissibility, the Board cannot simply \\nsubstitute one standard for another and assume that the out‐\\ncome would be the same. If the Board confirms Ruderman’s \\ninadmissibility on remand, it should consider his application \\nfor a waiver under the proper framework. \\n C. \\n Ruderman’s other arguments go nowhere. First, he claims \\nthat he is eligible for asylum and withholding of removal be‐\\ncause he did not commit a “particularly serious crime.” 8 \\nU.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Ruderman com‐\\nmitted homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle, Wis. Stat. \\n§ 940.10(1); he argues that Congress did not intend for crimi‐\\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 9 \\n\\nnal negligence like his to qualify as particularly serious. Gen‐\\nerally, classification of a crime as “particularly serious” is \\nwithin the discretion of the Attorney General—exercised here \\nby the Board. Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. \\n2006). Our review of these classifications is confined to consti‐\\ntutional and legal questions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2); see also Es‐\\ntrada‐Martinez v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 2015). And \\nwhen those legal questions implicate ambiguous statutory \\nprovisions, we give deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. \\nRes. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). \\n We considered the meaning of “particularly serious \\ncrime” in some depth in Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. \\n2006). In that case, the petitioner argued that the Board could \\nnot hold that his conviction for “substantial battery with a \\ndangerous weapon,” a nonaggravated felony, was a particu‐\\nlarly serious crime under § 1158(b)(2) and § 1231(b)(3) be‐\\ncause it did not fall within the two categories of crimes iden‐\\ntified as per se “particularly serious” in § 1158(b)(2): aggra‐\\nvated felonies and other crimes that the Attorney General des‐\\nignates by regulation. Id. at 468–69. We disagreed, explaining \\nthat the presence of these categories does not cabin the \\nBoard’s discretion to determine that nonaggravated felonies \\nare particularly serious on a case‐by‐case basis. Id. at 469. In \\nthe same way, the Board is not precluded from determining \\nthat some crimes of negligence are particularly serious. \\n Nor does the Immigration and Nationality Act’s separate \\ndefinition of “serious criminal offense” undermine the \\nBoard’s interpretation. The Act identifies “driving while in‐\\ntoxicated or under the influence of alcohol” as a serious crim‐\\ninal offense if it “involves personal injury to another.” 8 U.S.C. \\n§ 1101(h)(3). Ruderman argues that “particularly serious \\n\\f10 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\ncrime” must be interpreted to require more. Maybe so. But \\neven if he’s right, criminally negligent homicide entails more \\nthan mere “personal injury,” so the argument is a dead end. \\n Finally, even if § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) \\nwere ambiguous as to whether crimes of negligence could be \\n“particularly serious,” Ruderman has not shown that the \\nBoard’s interpretation is too unreasonable to merit deference \\nunder Chevron. See Ali, 468 F.3d at 470. Nor has he shown that \\nthe Board’s interpretation is so likely to conflict with the Con‐\\nstitution or international law that we need to consider \\nwhether some other interpretation is warranted. \\n D. \\n Finally, Ruderman contends that the Board should have \\ngranted him protection under the Convention Against Tor‐\\nture, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–18. The Convention forbids the re‐\\nturn of “a person to another State where there are substantial \\ngrounds for believing that he would be in danger of being \\nsubjected to torture.” Convention Against Torture and Other \\nCruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. \\n3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100‐20 (1990), 1465 \\nU.N.T.S. 85. Federal regulations define torture as requiring \\n“the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” 8 C.F.R \\n§ 1208.18(a)(1). Immigration judges must withhold or defer \\nremoval if an applicant demonstrates that “it is more likely \\nthan not that he or she would be tortured if removed.” 8 \\nC.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). We have explained that “more likely \\nthan not” means that there is a “substantial risk” that the alien \\nwill be tortured. Rodriguez‐Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, \\n1135–36 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Perez‐Montes v. Sessions, 880 \\nF.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir. 2018). \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 11 \\n\\n Ruderman argues that the immigration judge both misun‐\\nderstood and misapplied the “substantial risk” standard. But \\nthere is no evidence of the former; the immigration judge \\ncited our decision in Rodriguez‐Molinero and proceeded to an‐\\nalyze whether there was a substantial risk that Ruderman \\nwould be subject to torture inflicted by or with the consent of \\na public official if he returned to Belarus. See 8 C.F.R. \\n§ 1208.18(a)(1)–(2). And Ruderman fails to establish the latter. \\nWe review the Board’s conclusion that there was no substan‐\\ntial risk of torture under the “highly deferential substantial \\nevidence test,” which mandates denying the petition unless \\n“the record evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Lopez v. \\nLynch, 810 F.3d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). \\n The record evidence does not compel a contrary conclu‐\\nsion. To be sure, certain findings from the immigration judge \\ngive us pause. For one, the judge concluded that there was no \\nsubstantial risk of torture for Jews in Belarus because, despite \\n“widespread anti‐Semitism in Belarus,” incidents targeting \\nJews have been declining. While it is true that the raw number \\nof anti‐Jewish incidents in Belarus has declined, so has the \\nJewish population. In this context, an absolute decrease in in‐\\ncidents does not necessary equate to a relative increase in \\nsafety for any individual. Nor does the evidence of Ruder‐\\nman’s mother’s safe travel to and from Belarus mean that \\nRuderman will be equally safe. His mother has a Christian \\nname that is not associated with her late husband, whereas \\nRuderman’s patronymic clearly signals that he is both Jewish \\nand the son of a known political activist whom the KGB may \\nhave tortured and killed. But on the other hand, there is evi‐\\ndence that Ruderman became less susceptible to physical at‐\\ntacks as he grew and became better able to defend himself, \\nthat no one in his family has been threatened in Belarus, and \\n\\f12 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nthat he lived in Belarus for eight years following his father’s \\ndeath without any threat of torture on account of his relation‐\\nship to his father. Considering all the evidence, the record \\ndoes not compel the conclusion that there is a substantial risk \\nthat Ruderman would be tortured if he returned to Belarus. \\n * * * \\n Ruderman’s petition for review is GRANTED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4362800/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585547/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Aleksey Ruderman v. Matthew G. Whitaker\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐1689 \nALEKSEY ARKADYEVICH RUDERMAN, \n Petitioner, \n v. \n\nMATTHEW G. WHITAKER, \nActing Attorney General of the United States, \n Respondent. \n ____________________ \n\n Petition for Review of an Order of \n the Board of Immigration Appeals. \n No. A076‐054‐163 \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, \nCircuit Judges. \n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Aleksey Arkadyevich Ruderman is \nseeking to avoid removal to Belarus, his native country. An \nimmigration judge ruled that Ruderman was inadmissible \nunder the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. \n§ 1182(a)(2)(B), and thus subject to removal. The judge also \n\f2 No. 17‐1689 \n\nheld that Ruderman was not eligible for a waiver of inadmis‐\nsibility and adjustment of status, cancellation of removal, asy‐\nlum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Con‐\nvention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals \nagreed. In particular, it held that Ruderman had not raised \nany meaningful challenge to his inadmissibility determina‐\ntion and that even if the immigration judge had applied the \nwrong legal standard to determine that Ruderman was ineli‐\ngible for a waiver of inadmissibility, her alternative discre‐\ntionary denial made the error harmless. \n Ruderman petitions us for review of those holdings, along \nwith others reached by the immigration judge and affirmed \nby the Board. While we largely agree with the Board’s analy‐\nsis, we hold that it was flawed with respect to one issue: the \nquestion whether Ruderman is statutorily inadmissible. We \ntherefore grant Ruderman’s petition and remand for the \nBoard to revisit that question and, if necessary, to decide \nwhether Ruderman is eligible for a waiver. \n I. \n Ruderman moved to the United States when he was nine‐\nteen to escape discrimination and violence directed at him on \naccount of his Jewish heritage. He moved from his native land \nof Belarus, a former Soviet republic that declared independ‐\nence during his childhood. In Belarus, Ruderman and his fam‐\nily were targeted for abuse by Neo‐Nazis and pro‐Russia ad‐\nvocates who would shout profanities at them, perform the \nNazi salute, leave anti‐Jewish propaganda in their mailbox, \nand throw bottles and stones at their home. \n Ruderman received even worse treatment at school. His \n(sometimes much older) classmates would bully and beat him \n\fNo. 17‐1689 3 \n\nand the handful of other Jewish students. The head of the \nschool and the police were alerted but did nothing to address \nthe situation. One particularly severe attack resulted in \nstitches and a permanent scar, while another resulted in two \nbroken wrists that have bothered him ever since. \n After attackers broke Ruderman’s wrists, his parents sent \nhim to a private school where he would be safer. His time \nthere was cut short, however, by his father’s death. Arkady \nRuderman, a documentary filmmaker, died while filming a \npiece on government corruption in Tajikistan—another for‐\nmer Soviet republic. Although government officials reported \nthat he was killed in a car accident, Arkady had previously \nbeen detained and battered by the KGB, and eyewitnesses \nsaid that they saw bullet holes in his dead body. Those reports \ncould not be confirmed because the police ordered that \nArkady’s casket remain closed at his funeral—and then at‐\ntended the event to make sure that it did. \n Without Arkady’s income, Ruderman’s family could no \nlonger afford his private school tuition, so Ruderman enrolled \nat a different public school where he was subjected to familiar \nanti‐Semitic verbal abuse. He became so afraid that in the \nninth grade he stopped attending classes entirely and later \ntransferred to a technical school. There, in spite of continued \nverbal abuse, he performed well and graduated with high \ngrades. Once out of school, however, he found that his Jewish \nheritage made it difficult for him to get a job. \n Fed up with the abuse and intolerance, Ruderman fled to \nthe United States in 2001 under a provision known as the \nLautenberg Amendment, which lowers barriers to immigra‐\ntion for certain former soviet nationals. See Pub. L. No. 101‐\n167, tit. V, §§ 599D–E, 103 Stat. 1195, 1261–64 (1989) (codified \n\f4 No. 17‐1689 \n\nas amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 note, § 1255 note). His life in \nAmerica got off to a rocky start; shortly after arriving he was \nconvicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and sen‐\ntenced to court supervision. But over the next several years, \nhe found work as a cab driver and a security officer, met his \nfuture wife Elena, and moved into an apartment with her and \nher two children in Milwaukee. \n In 2008, Ruderman struck and killed a pedestrian with his \nvehicle while driving drunk. He accepted responsibility, \npleaded guilty to homicide by negligent operation of a vehi‐\ncle, and was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. \nFollowing his release in 2013, he worked at a transportation \ncompany—until U.S. Customs and Immigration Services de‐\nnied his adjustment‐of‐status application, causing his work \npermit to expire. \n In January of 2016, the government detained Ruderman \nand began removal proceedings. The immigration judge ulti‐\nmately concluded that Ruderman was statutorily inadmissi‐\nble because of his two convictions. The judge also denied \nRuderman’s applications for a waiver of inadmissibility, ad‐\njustment of status under the Lautenberg Amendment, cancel‐\nlation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and pro‐\ntection under the Convention Against Torture. \n Ruderman appealed the immigration judge’s decision in \nan extensive pro se brief and later in a second brief filed by \npro bono counsel. The counseled brief supplemented certain \narguments that Ruderman had made in his initial brief but \nconceded others. Significantly, the later brief conceded that \n“[Ruderman’s] convictions for two crimes with an aggregate \nprison sentence of five years make him ‘inadmissible.’” That \nconcession contradicted Ruderman’s pro se argument that the \n\fNo. 17‐1689 5 \n\ninadmissibility statute applies only when two or more convic‐\ntions each result in a sentence to confinement, and so Ruder‐\nman’s sole sentence to confinement—which imposed five \nyears in prison—did not make him inadmissible. \n The Board dismissed Ruderman’s appeal. First, it noted in \npassing that Ruderman “ha[d] not raised any meaningful \nchallenges” to his inadmissibility, and thus the issue was \n“waived.” Second, the Board adopted and affirmed the immi‐\ngration judge’s denial of Ruderman’s applications for cancel‐\nlation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection un‐\nder the Convention Against Torture. Finally, the Board af‐\nfirmed the denial of Ruderman’s request for a waiver of inad‐\nmissibility and adjustment of status under the Lautenberg \nAmendment. The Board bypassed Ruderman’s argument that \nthe immigration judge had applied the wrong standard to de‐\ntermine whether Ruderman was eligible for a waiver of inad‐\nmissibility and instead affirmed the judge’s conclusion that, \neven if Ruderman were eligible to be considered for a waiver, \nshe would exercise her discretion to deny him relief. \n II. \n Ruderman petitions us for review of the Board’s decision. \nHe takes issue with the Board’s conclusion that he waived his \nopportunity to challenge his inadmissibility, and he argues \nthat the application of the wrong standard for determining his \neligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility contaminated the im‐\nmigration judge’s discretionary denial of a waiver. He also \nclaims that the judge erred by holding—and the Board erred \nby affirming—both that his negligent homicide was “particu‐\nlarly serious” and that he failed to show a “substantial risk” \nthat he would be tortured in Belarus. \n\f6 No. 17‐1689 \n\n Because the Board provided its own analysis and also af‐\nfirmed the immigration judge’s decision, we review both de‐\ncisions. Sobaleva v. Holder, 760 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2014). \n A. \n Ruderman argued in his pro se brief that he is not inad‐\nmissible under § 212(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nation‐\nality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B), because he has only ever re‐\nceived one sentence to confinement. The Act states that an im‐\nmigrant is inadmissible to receive a visa or to be admitted to \nthe United States if he is convicted of “2 or more of‐\nfenses … for which the aggregate sentences to confinement \nwere 5 years or more.” Id. Ruderman interprets “sentences to \nconfinement” to require more than one custodial sentence. He \nsupports this reading by pointing to the word “aggregate,” \nwhich he argues would be superfluous if the statute could be \nsatisfied by a single sentence to confinement. Id. Because his \nfirst conviction—for driving under the influence—did not re‐\nsult in confinement, he concludes that he is not inadmissible. \nHis pro bono counsel, however, conceded Ruderman’s inad‐\nmissibility in a later‐filed brief. \n The Board did not address Ruderman’s inadmissibility ar‐\ngument, instead concluding that he had failed to raise any \nmeaningful challenges to his inadmissibility and so had \nwaived the issue. It appears likely that the Board reached that \nconclusion on the basis of Ruderman’s counsel’s concession, \nbecause Ruderman did raise the argument in several places—\nincluding his notice of appeal and pro se brief, both of which \nremained on the record. But the Board’s opinion did not oth‐\nerwise indicate whether the counseled brief superseded the \npro se brief. \n\fNo. 17‐1689 7 \n\n A later‐in‐time concession waives an issue in federal \ncourt—but we do not know whether that is true before the \nBoard as well. On this record it is unclear why the Board con‐\ncluded that Ruderman waived his challenge, and the Board’s \nfailure to explain inhibits our review of the issue. See SEC v. \nChenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“[A] reviewing court, \nin dealing with a determination or judgment which an admin‐\nistrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the \npropriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the \nagency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the \ncourt is powerless to affirm the administrative action by sub‐\nstituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper \nbasis.”). We grant Ruderman’s petition and remand this issue \nto the Board to clarify why it did not address Ruderman’s in‐\nadmissibility argument. \n B. \n If on remand the Board confirms that Ruderman is inad‐\nmissible, his application for a waiver of inadmissibility should \nbe reviewed under the correct legal standard. The immigra‐\ntion judge concluded that Ruderman was statutorily ineligi‐\nble for a waiver because he did not show that his removal \nwould cause “extreme hardship” to his U.S.‐citizen wife. 8 \nU.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). When a waiver is sought in conjunction \nwith an application for a status adjustment under the Lauten‐\nberg Amendment, however, there is no threshold eligibility \nrequirement; a waiver may be granted simply “for humani‐\ntarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is other‐\nwise in the public interest.” 8 U.S.C. 1255 note; see also 8 C.F.R. \n§ 1245.7(d). The immigration judge erred by not considering \nRuderman’s application under this less stringent standard. \n\f8 No. 17‐1689 \n\n The Board concluded that this error was harmless because \nthe immigration judge held in the alternative that she would \nexercise her discretion to deny Ruderman relief if he were el‐\nigible to be considered for it. The assumption seems to be that \nthe judge would have made the same discretionary denial of \na waiver under the Lautenberg Amendment as she made un‐\nder § 1182(h). But, as we have already noted, the former pro‐\nvides discretion to grant a waiver for humanitarian purposes, \nto assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public \ninterest; the latter entails a potentially more complex consid‐\neration of the ground for exclusion at issue, past immigration \nviolations or criminal history, evidence of rehabilitation, gen‐\neral evidence of good or bad character, strength of family ties, \nduration of residence in the United States, and evidence of \nvalue to the community. See In re Mendez‐Moralez, 21 I. & N. \nDec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996). Because these statutes, along with \nthe cases and regulations interpreting them, articulate distinct \nfactors to be considered in deciding whether to grant a discre‐\ntionary waiver of inadmissibility, the Board cannot simply \nsubstitute one standard for another and assume that the out‐\ncome would be the same. If the Board confirms Ruderman’s \ninadmissibility on remand, it should consider his application \nfor a waiver under the proper framework. \n C. \n Ruderman’s other arguments go nowhere. First, he claims \nthat he is eligible for asylum and withholding of removal be‐\ncause he did not commit a “particularly serious crime.” 8 \nU.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Ruderman com‐\nmitted homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle, Wis. Stat. \n§ 940.10(1); he argues that Congress did not intend for crimi‐\n\fNo. 17‐1689 9 \n\nnal negligence like his to qualify as particularly serious. Gen‐\nerally, classification of a crime as “particularly serious” is \nwithin the discretion of the Attorney General—exercised here \nby the Board. Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. \n2006). Our review of these classifications is confined to consti‐\ntutional and legal questions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2); see also Es‐\ntrada‐Martinez v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 2015). And \nwhen those legal questions implicate ambiguous statutory \nprovisions, we give deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. \nRes. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). \n We considered the meaning of “particularly serious \ncrime” in some depth in Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. \n2006). In that case, the petitioner argued that the Board could \nnot hold that his conviction for “substantial battery with a \ndangerous weapon,” a nonaggravated felony, was a particu‐\nlarly serious crime under § 1158(b)(2) and § 1231(b)(3) be‐\ncause it did not fall within the two categories of crimes iden‐\ntified as per se “particularly serious” in § 1158(b)(2): aggra‐\nvated felonies and other crimes that the Attorney General des‐\nignates by regulation. Id. at 468–69. We disagreed, explaining \nthat the presence of these categories does not cabin the \nBoard’s discretion to determine that nonaggravated felonies \nare particularly serious on a case‐by‐case basis. Id. at 469. In \nthe same way, the Board is not precluded from determining \nthat some crimes of negligence are particularly serious. \n Nor does the Immigration and Nationality Act’s separate \ndefinition of “serious criminal offense” undermine the \nBoard’s interpretation. The Act identifies “driving while in‐\ntoxicated or under the influence of alcohol” as a serious crim‐\ninal offense if it “involves personal injury to another.” 8 U.S.C. \n§ 1101(h)(3). Ruderman argues that “particularly serious \n\f10 No. 17‐1689 \n\ncrime” must be interpreted to require more. Maybe so. But \neven if he’s right, criminally negligent homicide entails more \nthan mere “personal injury,” so the argument is a dead end. \n Finally, even if § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) \nwere ambiguous as to whether crimes of negligence could be \n“particularly serious,” Ruderman has not shown that the \nBoard’s interpretation is too unreasonable to merit deference \nunder Chevron. See Ali, 468 F.3d at 470. Nor has he shown that \nthe Board’s interpretation is so likely to conflict with the Con‐\nstitution or international law that we need to consider \nwhether some other interpretation is warranted. \n D. \n Finally, Ruderman contends that the Board should have \ngranted him protection under the Convention Against Tor‐\nture, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–18. The Convention forbids the re‐\nturn of “a person to another State where there are substantial \ngrounds for believing that he would be in danger of being \nsubjected to torture.” Convention Against Torture and Other \nCruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. \n3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100‐20 (1990), 1465 \nU.N.T.S. 85. Federal regulations define torture as requiring \n“the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” 8 C.F.R \n§ 1208.18(a)(1). Immigration judges must withhold or defer \nremoval if an applicant demonstrates that “it is more likely \nthan not that he or she would be tortured if removed.” 8 \nC.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). We have explained that “more likely \nthan not” means that there is a “substantial risk” that the alien \nwill be tortured. Rodriguez‐Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, \n1135–36 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Perez‐Montes v. Sessions, 880 \nF.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir. 2018). \n\fNo. 17‐1689 11 \n\n Ruderman argues that the immigration judge both misun‐\nderstood and misapplied the “substantial risk” standard. But \nthere is no evidence of the former; the immigration judge \ncited our decision in Rodriguez‐Molinero and proceeded to an‐\nalyze whether there was a substantial risk that Ruderman \nwould be subject to torture inflicted by or with the consent of \na public official if he returned to Belarus. See 8 C.F.R. \n§ 1208.18(a)(1)–(2). And Ruderman fails to establish the latter. \nWe review the Board’s conclusion that there was no substan‐\ntial risk of torture under the “highly deferential substantial \nevidence test,” which mandates denying the petition unless \n“the record evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Lopez v. \nLynch, 810 F.3d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). \n The record evidence does not compel a contrary conclu‐\nsion. To be sure, certain findings from the immigration judge \ngive us pause. For one, the judge concluded that there was no \nsubstantial risk of torture for Jews in Belarus because, despite \n“widespread anti‐Semitism in Belarus,” incidents targeting \nJews have been declining. While it is true that the raw number \nof anti‐Jewish incidents in Belarus has declined, so has the \nJewish population. In this context, an absolute decrease in in‐\ncidents does not necessary equate to a relative increase in \nsafety for any individual. Nor does the evidence of Ruder‐\nman’s mother’s safe travel to and from Belarus mean that \nRuderman will be equally safe. His mother has a Christian \nname that is not associated with her late husband, whereas \nRuderman’s patronymic clearly signals that he is both Jewish \nand the son of a known political activist whom the KGB may \nhave tortured and killed. But on the other hand, there is evi‐\ndence that Ruderman became less susceptible to physical at‐\ntacks as he grew and became better able to defend himself, \nthat no one in his family has been threatened in Belarus, and \n\f12 No. 17‐1689 \n\nthat he lived in Belarus for eight years following his father’s \ndeath without any threat of torture on account of his relation‐\nship to his father. Considering all the evidence, the record \ndoes not compel the conclusion that there is a substantial risk \nthat Ruderman would be tortured if he returned to Belarus. \n * * * \n Ruderman’s petition for review is GRANTED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Aleksey Ruderman v. Matthew G. Whitaker\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐1689 \\nALEKSEY ARKADYEVICH RUDERMAN, \\n Petitioner, \\n v. \\n\\nMATTHEW G. WHITAKER, \\nActing Attorney General of the United States, \\n Respondent. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of \\n the Board of Immigration Appeals. \\n No. A076‐054‐163 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Aleksey Arkadyevich Ruderman is \\nseeking to avoid removal to Belarus, his native country. An \\nimmigration judge ruled that Ruderman was inadmissible \\nunder the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. \\n§ 1182(a)(2)(B), and thus subject to removal. The judge also \\n\\f2 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nheld that Ruderman was not eligible for a waiver of inadmis‐\\nsibility and adjustment of status, cancellation of removal, asy‐\\nlum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Con‐\\nvention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals \\nagreed. In particular, it held that Ruderman had not raised \\nany meaningful challenge to his inadmissibility determina‐\\ntion and that even if the immigration judge had applied the \\nwrong legal standard to determine that Ruderman was ineli‐\\ngible for a waiver of inadmissibility, her alternative discre‐\\ntionary denial made the error harmless. \\n Ruderman petitions us for review of those holdings, along \\nwith others reached by the immigration judge and affirmed \\nby the Board. While we largely agree with the Board’s analy‐\\nsis, we hold that it was flawed with respect to one issue: the \\nquestion whether Ruderman is statutorily inadmissible. We \\ntherefore grant Ruderman’s petition and remand for the \\nBoard to revisit that question and, if necessary, to decide \\nwhether Ruderman is eligible for a waiver. \\n I. \\n Ruderman moved to the United States when he was nine‐\\nteen to escape discrimination and violence directed at him on \\naccount of his Jewish heritage. He moved from his native land \\nof Belarus, a former Soviet republic that declared independ‐\\nence during his childhood. In Belarus, Ruderman and his fam‐\\nily were targeted for abuse by Neo‐Nazis and pro‐Russia ad‐\\nvocates who would shout profanities at them, perform the \\nNazi salute, leave anti‐Jewish propaganda in their mailbox, \\nand throw bottles and stones at their home. \\n Ruderman received even worse treatment at school. His \\n(sometimes much older) classmates would bully and beat him \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 3 \\n\\nand the handful of other Jewish students. The head of the \\nschool and the police were alerted but did nothing to address \\nthe situation. One particularly severe attack resulted in \\nstitches and a permanent scar, while another resulted in two \\nbroken wrists that have bothered him ever since. \\n After attackers broke Ruderman’s wrists, his parents sent \\nhim to a private school where he would be safer. His time \\nthere was cut short, however, by his father’s death. Arkady \\nRuderman, a documentary filmmaker, died while filming a \\npiece on government corruption in Tajikistan—another for‐\\nmer Soviet republic. Although government officials reported \\nthat he was killed in a car accident, Arkady had previously \\nbeen detained and battered by the KGB, and eyewitnesses \\nsaid that they saw bullet holes in his dead body. Those reports \\ncould not be confirmed because the police ordered that \\nArkady’s casket remain closed at his funeral—and then at‐\\ntended the event to make sure that it did. \\n Without Arkady’s income, Ruderman’s family could no \\nlonger afford his private school tuition, so Ruderman enrolled \\nat a different public school where he was subjected to familiar \\nanti‐Semitic verbal abuse. He became so afraid that in the \\nninth grade he stopped attending classes entirely and later \\ntransferred to a technical school. There, in spite of continued \\nverbal abuse, he performed well and graduated with high \\ngrades. Once out of school, however, he found that his Jewish \\nheritage made it difficult for him to get a job. \\n Fed up with the abuse and intolerance, Ruderman fled to \\nthe United States in 2001 under a provision known as the \\nLautenberg Amendment, which lowers barriers to immigra‐\\ntion for certain former soviet nationals. See Pub. L. No. 101‐\\n167, tit. V, §§ 599D–E, 103 Stat. 1195, 1261–64 (1989) (codified \\n\\f4 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nas amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 note, § 1255 note). His life in \\nAmerica got off to a rocky start; shortly after arriving he was \\nconvicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and sen‐\\ntenced to court supervision. But over the next several years, \\nhe found work as a cab driver and a security officer, met his \\nfuture wife Elena, and moved into an apartment with her and \\nher two children in Milwaukee. \\n In 2008, Ruderman struck and killed a pedestrian with his \\nvehicle while driving drunk. He accepted responsibility, \\npleaded guilty to homicide by negligent operation of a vehi‐\\ncle, and was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. \\nFollowing his release in 2013, he worked at a transportation \\ncompany—until U.S. Customs and Immigration Services de‐\\nnied his adjustment‐of‐status application, causing his work \\npermit to expire. \\n In January of 2016, the government detained Ruderman \\nand began removal proceedings. The immigration judge ulti‐\\nmately concluded that Ruderman was statutorily inadmissi‐\\nble because of his two convictions. The judge also denied \\nRuderman’s applications for a waiver of inadmissibility, ad‐\\njustment of status under the Lautenberg Amendment, cancel‐\\nlation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and pro‐\\ntection under the Convention Against Torture. \\n Ruderman appealed the immigration judge’s decision in \\nan extensive pro se brief and later in a second brief filed by \\npro bono counsel. The counseled brief supplemented certain \\narguments that Ruderman had made in his initial brief but \\nconceded others. Significantly, the later brief conceded that \\n“[Ruderman’s] convictions for two crimes with an aggregate \\nprison sentence of five years make him ‘inadmissible.’” That \\nconcession contradicted Ruderman’s pro se argument that the \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 5 \\n\\ninadmissibility statute applies only when two or more convic‐\\ntions each result in a sentence to confinement, and so Ruder‐\\nman’s sole sentence to confinement—which imposed five \\nyears in prison—did not make him inadmissible. \\n The Board dismissed Ruderman’s appeal. First, it noted in \\npassing that Ruderman “ha[d] not raised any meaningful \\nchallenges” to his inadmissibility, and thus the issue was \\n“waived.” Second, the Board adopted and affirmed the immi‐\\ngration judge’s denial of Ruderman’s applications for cancel‐\\nlation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection un‐\\nder the Convention Against Torture. Finally, the Board af‐\\nfirmed the denial of Ruderman’s request for a waiver of inad‐\\nmissibility and adjustment of status under the Lautenberg \\nAmendment. The Board bypassed Ruderman’s argument that \\nthe immigration judge had applied the wrong standard to de‐\\ntermine whether Ruderman was eligible for a waiver of inad‐\\nmissibility and instead affirmed the judge’s conclusion that, \\neven if Ruderman were eligible to be considered for a waiver, \\nshe would exercise her discretion to deny him relief. \\n II. \\n Ruderman petitions us for review of the Board’s decision. \\nHe takes issue with the Board’s conclusion that he waived his \\nopportunity to challenge his inadmissibility, and he argues \\nthat the application of the wrong standard for determining his \\neligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility contaminated the im‐\\nmigration judge’s discretionary denial of a waiver. He also \\nclaims that the judge erred by holding—and the Board erred \\nby affirming—both that his negligent homicide was “particu‐\\nlarly serious” and that he failed to show a “substantial risk” \\nthat he would be tortured in Belarus. \\n\\f6 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\n Because the Board provided its own analysis and also af‐\\nfirmed the immigration judge’s decision, we review both de‐\\ncisions. Sobaleva v. Holder, 760 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2014). \\n A. \\n Ruderman argued in his pro se brief that he is not inad‐\\nmissible under § 212(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nation‐\\nality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B), because he has only ever re‐\\nceived one sentence to confinement. The Act states that an im‐\\nmigrant is inadmissible to receive a visa or to be admitted to \\nthe United States if he is convicted of “2 or more of‐\\nfenses … for which the aggregate sentences to confinement \\nwere 5 years or more.” Id. Ruderman interprets “sentences to \\nconfinement” to require more than one custodial sentence. He \\nsupports this reading by pointing to the word “aggregate,” \\nwhich he argues would be superfluous if the statute could be \\nsatisfied by a single sentence to confinement. Id. Because his \\nfirst conviction—for driving under the influence—did not re‐\\nsult in confinement, he concludes that he is not inadmissible. \\nHis pro bono counsel, however, conceded Ruderman’s inad‐\\nmissibility in a later‐filed brief. \\n The Board did not address Ruderman’s inadmissibility ar‐\\ngument, instead concluding that he had failed to raise any \\nmeaningful challenges to his inadmissibility and so had \\nwaived the issue. It appears likely that the Board reached that \\nconclusion on the basis of Ruderman’s counsel’s concession, \\nbecause Ruderman did raise the argument in several places—\\nincluding his notice of appeal and pro se brief, both of which \\nremained on the record. But the Board’s opinion did not oth‐\\nerwise indicate whether the counseled brief superseded the \\npro se brief. \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 7 \\n\\n A later‐in‐time concession waives an issue in federal \\ncourt—but we do not know whether that is true before the \\nBoard as well. On this record it is unclear why the Board con‐\\ncluded that Ruderman waived his challenge, and the Board’s \\nfailure to explain inhibits our review of the issue. See SEC v. \\nChenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“[A] reviewing court, \\nin dealing with a determination or judgment which an admin‐\\nistrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the \\npropriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the \\nagency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the \\ncourt is powerless to affirm the administrative action by sub‐\\nstituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper \\nbasis.”). We grant Ruderman’s petition and remand this issue \\nto the Board to clarify why it did not address Ruderman’s in‐\\nadmissibility argument. \\n B. \\n If on remand the Board confirms that Ruderman is inad‐\\nmissible, his application for a waiver of inadmissibility should \\nbe reviewed under the correct legal standard. The immigra‐\\ntion judge concluded that Ruderman was statutorily ineligi‐\\nble for a waiver because he did not show that his removal \\nwould cause “extreme hardship” to his U.S.‐citizen wife. 8 \\nU.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). When a waiver is sought in conjunction \\nwith an application for a status adjustment under the Lauten‐\\nberg Amendment, however, there is no threshold eligibility \\nrequirement; a waiver may be granted simply “for humani‐\\ntarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is other‐\\nwise in the public interest.” 8 U.S.C. 1255 note; see also 8 C.F.R. \\n§ 1245.7(d). The immigration judge erred by not considering \\nRuderman’s application under this less stringent standard. \\n\\f8 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\n The Board concluded that this error was harmless because \\nthe immigration judge held in the alternative that she would \\nexercise her discretion to deny Ruderman relief if he were el‐\\nigible to be considered for it. The assumption seems to be that \\nthe judge would have made the same discretionary denial of \\na waiver under the Lautenberg Amendment as she made un‐\\nder § 1182(h). But, as we have already noted, the former pro‐\\nvides discretion to grant a waiver for humanitarian purposes, \\nto assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public \\ninterest; the latter entails a potentially more complex consid‐\\neration of the ground for exclusion at issue, past immigration \\nviolations or criminal history, evidence of rehabilitation, gen‐\\neral evidence of good or bad character, strength of family ties, \\nduration of residence in the United States, and evidence of \\nvalue to the community. See In re Mendez‐Moralez, 21 I. & N. \\nDec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996). Because these statutes, along with \\nthe cases and regulations interpreting them, articulate distinct \\nfactors to be considered in deciding whether to grant a discre‐\\ntionary waiver of inadmissibility, the Board cannot simply \\nsubstitute one standard for another and assume that the out‐\\ncome would be the same. If the Board confirms Ruderman’s \\ninadmissibility on remand, it should consider his application \\nfor a waiver under the proper framework. \\n C. \\n Ruderman’s other arguments go nowhere. First, he claims \\nthat he is eligible for asylum and withholding of removal be‐\\ncause he did not commit a “particularly serious crime.” 8 \\nU.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Ruderman com‐\\nmitted homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle, Wis. Stat. \\n§ 940.10(1); he argues that Congress did not intend for crimi‐\\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 9 \\n\\nnal negligence like his to qualify as particularly serious. Gen‐\\nerally, classification of a crime as “particularly serious” is \\nwithin the discretion of the Attorney General—exercised here \\nby the Board. Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. \\n2006). Our review of these classifications is confined to consti‐\\ntutional and legal questions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2); see also Es‐\\ntrada‐Martinez v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 2015). And \\nwhen those legal questions implicate ambiguous statutory \\nprovisions, we give deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. \\nRes. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). \\n We considered the meaning of “particularly serious \\ncrime” in some depth in Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. \\n2006). In that case, the petitioner argued that the Board could \\nnot hold that his conviction for “substantial battery with a \\ndangerous weapon,” a nonaggravated felony, was a particu‐\\nlarly serious crime under § 1158(b)(2) and § 1231(b)(3) be‐\\ncause it did not fall within the two categories of crimes iden‐\\ntified as per se “particularly serious” in § 1158(b)(2): aggra‐\\nvated felonies and other crimes that the Attorney General des‐\\nignates by regulation. Id. at 468–69. We disagreed, explaining \\nthat the presence of these categories does not cabin the \\nBoard’s discretion to determine that nonaggravated felonies \\nare particularly serious on a case‐by‐case basis. Id. at 469. In \\nthe same way, the Board is not precluded from determining \\nthat some crimes of negligence are particularly serious. \\n Nor does the Immigration and Nationality Act’s separate \\ndefinition of “serious criminal offense” undermine the \\nBoard’s interpretation. The Act identifies “driving while in‐\\ntoxicated or under the influence of alcohol” as a serious crim‐\\ninal offense if it “involves personal injury to another.” 8 U.S.C. \\n§ 1101(h)(3). Ruderman argues that “particularly serious \\n\\f10 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\ncrime” must be interpreted to require more. Maybe so. But \\neven if he’s right, criminally negligent homicide entails more \\nthan mere “personal injury,” so the argument is a dead end. \\n Finally, even if § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) \\nwere ambiguous as to whether crimes of negligence could be \\n“particularly serious,” Ruderman has not shown that the \\nBoard’s interpretation is too unreasonable to merit deference \\nunder Chevron. See Ali, 468 F.3d at 470. Nor has he shown that \\nthe Board’s interpretation is so likely to conflict with the Con‐\\nstitution or international law that we need to consider \\nwhether some other interpretation is warranted. \\n D. \\n Finally, Ruderman contends that the Board should have \\ngranted him protection under the Convention Against Tor‐\\nture, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–18. The Convention forbids the re‐\\nturn of “a person to another State where there are substantial \\ngrounds for believing that he would be in danger of being \\nsubjected to torture.” Convention Against Torture and Other \\nCruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. \\n3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100‐20 (1990), 1465 \\nU.N.T.S. 85. Federal regulations define torture as requiring \\n“the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” 8 C.F.R \\n§ 1208.18(a)(1). Immigration judges must withhold or defer \\nremoval if an applicant demonstrates that “it is more likely \\nthan not that he or she would be tortured if removed.” 8 \\nC.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). We have explained that “more likely \\nthan not” means that there is a “substantial risk” that the alien \\nwill be tortured. Rodriguez‐Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, \\n1135–36 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Perez‐Montes v. Sessions, 880 \\nF.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir. 2018). \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 11 \\n\\n Ruderman argues that the immigration judge both misun‐\\nderstood and misapplied the “substantial risk” standard. But \\nthere is no evidence of the former; the immigration judge \\ncited our decision in Rodriguez‐Molinero and proceeded to an‐\\nalyze whether there was a substantial risk that Ruderman \\nwould be subject to torture inflicted by or with the consent of \\na public official if he returned to Belarus. See 8 C.F.R. \\n§ 1208.18(a)(1)–(2). And Ruderman fails to establish the latter. \\nWe review the Board’s conclusion that there was no substan‐\\ntial risk of torture under the “highly deferential substantial \\nevidence test,” which mandates denying the petition unless \\n“the record evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Lopez v. \\nLynch, 810 F.3d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). \\n The record evidence does not compel a contrary conclu‐\\nsion. To be sure, certain findings from the immigration judge \\ngive us pause. For one, the judge concluded that there was no \\nsubstantial risk of torture for Jews in Belarus because, despite \\n“widespread anti‐Semitism in Belarus,” incidents targeting \\nJews have been declining. While it is true that the raw number \\nof anti‐Jewish incidents in Belarus has declined, so has the \\nJewish population. In this context, an absolute decrease in in‐\\ncidents does not necessary equate to a relative increase in \\nsafety for any individual. Nor does the evidence of Ruder‐\\nman’s mother’s safe travel to and from Belarus mean that \\nRuderman will be equally safe. His mother has a Christian \\nname that is not associated with her late husband, whereas \\nRuderman’s patronymic clearly signals that he is both Jewish \\nand the son of a known political activist whom the KGB may \\nhave tortured and killed. But on the other hand, there is evi‐\\ndence that Ruderman became less susceptible to physical at‐\\ntacks as he grew and became better able to defend himself, \\nthat no one in his family has been threatened in Belarus, and \\n\\f12 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nthat he lived in Belarus for eight years following his father’s \\ndeath without any threat of torture on account of his relation‐\\nship to his father. Considering all the evidence, the record \\ndoes not compel the conclusion that there is a substantial risk \\nthat Ruderman would be tortured if he returned to Belarus. \\n * * * \\n Ruderman’s petition for review is GRANTED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":272,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4585618,"string":"4,585,618"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Scott BOOKS, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Scott Books"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3493"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Bauer, Brennan, Scudder\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3493\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nSCOTT BOOKS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 1:16-cr-10037 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. On trial for bank robbery, Scott\\nBooks chose not to testify in his own defense and was found\\nguilty and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. He now\\nchallenges two pretrial decisions by the district court. The\\nfirst allowed eyewitness testimony at trial from the two bank\\ntellers that Books alleged based their identification of him as\\nthe robber not on personal knowledge, but rather on infor-\\nmation improperly supplied by a police detective. The sec-\\n\\f2 No. 17-3493\\n\\nond ruling would have allowed the government, had Books\\nchosen to testify at trial, to impeach him with physical evi-\\ndence directly tying him to the robbery—evidence the police\\nlearned of (and then recovered) only as a result of a confes-\\nsion the district court separately had determined was unlaw-\\nfully coerced.\\n Neither challenge succeeds. The district court did not err\\nin finding the eyewitness identifications reflected the tellers’\\nfirsthand knowledge of Books, and thus allowing their tes-\\ntimony at trial was entirely proper. Nor can we conclude\\nthat the district court’s conditional impeachment ruling,\\neven if wrong on the law, mandates reversal in light of the\\noverwhelming weight of evidence against Books. So we\\naffirm.\\n I\\n A\\n On July 28, 2016 a man robbed the Land of Lincoln Credit\\nUnion in Normal, Illinois. Dressed in a black hooded sweat-\\nshirt, wearing a mask and neon gloves, the robber ap-\\nproached the counter and, while motioning toward the\\ndrawer with what appeared to be a black handgun, de-\\nmanded “all the money.” The robbery lasted all but 20 sec-\\nonds, with the offender making off with $18,000 and fleeing\\nin a Buick SUV.\\n Two tellers recognized the robber’s voice and manner-\\nisms and immediately identified him as Scott Books—a long-\\ntime customer of the credit union. Holly Bateman told her\\nsupervisor (and later the police) she was 99% certain Books\\nwas the robber because she had interacted with him on at\\nleast six prior occasions. The second teller, Susan Phelps,\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 3\\n\\nagreed with Bateman’s identification of Books as the offend-\\ner. A third witness, James Teidman, was driving by the bank\\nwhen he saw the robber running from the bank with a gun,\\nonly then to speed away in a Buick SUV.\\n The police arrested Books the next day. After waiving his\\nMiranda rights and agreeing to an interview, he confessed to\\nthe robbery, while also telling the police where they could\\nfind the gloves, clothing, and fake gun he used. The police\\nfound these items exactly where Books described, and in\\ntime a grand jury indicted Books for the robbery.\\n B\\n The district court held a series of pretrial hearings to de-\\ntermine the admissibility of evidence contested by Books.\\nThree of those rulings are significant to this appeal.\\n First, the district court suppressed Books’s confession,\\nfinding that the police officers overstepped and overcame\\nBooks’s will by threatening to arrest his wife and take his\\nchildren into custody if he did not own up to his role in the\\nrobbery—rendering the confession involuntary. The court\\nsuppressed both the confession and its physical fruits—\\nspecifically, the clothing, gloves, and fake gun the police re-\\ncovered based upon Books telling them where to look.\\n Second, the district court denied Books’s motion to pre-\\nvent the two bank tellers (Bateman and Phelps) from testify-\\ning at trial. Books had sought to exclude their testimony on\\nthe basis that the police detective who investigated the rob-\\nbery improperly tainted their identifications when, a day af-\\nter the robbery, he allegedly told both witnesses that Books\\nhad confessed to the crime. The government disagreed, tak-\\ning the position that the detective in no way revealed\\n\\f4 No. 17-3493\\n\\nBooks’s confession and thus in no way influenced the tellers’\\nclear and definitive identification of Books as the robber. The\\ndistrict court held a hearing, received testimony from the\\ntellers and detective, and found it “clear from th[e] record\\nthat [both tellers] have a truly independent source of identi-\\nfication of [Books] other than any suggestion that would\\nhave been put in their mind by the officer.” Accordingly, the\\ndistrict court permitted the tellers to testify at trial.\\n Third, the district court considered but reserved defini-\\ntively ruling until trial on the government’s motion for per-\\nmission to impeach Books with the fruits of his confession in\\nthe event he chose to testify. Books opposed the motion and\\nurged the district court to hold that the price for the police\\nunlawfully coercing his confession should be the suppres-\\nsion of all incriminating evidence (his admission and the\\nphysical fruits) for all purposes, including impeachment. The\\ndistrict court said it was inclined to allow some impeach-\\nment but reserved a final ruling unless and until Books\\nchose to testify and the government sought to impeach him\\non cross-examination with his prior statements describing\\nthe whereabouts of the clothing he wore during the robbery.\\nThe district court cast its ruling this way: “[I]f and when we\\nget to that point [of the trial], any questions that the gov-\\nernment wished to ask the defendant if he testifies, I would\\nhave to hear exactly what the questions are outside the pres-\\nence of the jury so there could be specific objections.”\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 5\\n\\n C\\n In the end, Books chose not to testify at trial, and thus\\nneither his coerced confession nor the resulting physical\\nfruits came into evidence. The government nonetheless pre-\\nsented a strong case, including testimony from these wit-\\nnesses:\\n Bank teller Holly Bateman identified Books\\n as the robber. She testified that she knew\\n Books from her work at the credit union\\n and immediately recognized him as the\\n robber—so much so that she almost said\\n “Scott, can you remove your mask?”\\n Bateman told the jury that she “instantly”\\n recognized Books’s voice and likewise\\n knew it was Books from his distinct\\n mannerisms. Asked at trial about her\\n confidence level that Books committed the\\n robbery, Bateman testified that she was\\n 110% sure because the incident had\\n replayed over and over in her mind.\\n Susan Phelps, the second bank teller, also\\n identified Books as the robber. While not as\\n fast as Bateman to recognize Books during\\n the robbery, Phelps testified she was confi-\\n dent Books was the offender based on his\\n unique mannerisms, including his walk and\\n jittery disposition.\\n Phillip Meyer, a friend and former cowork-\\n er of Books, testified that he had received a\\n text message from Books on the day of the\\n\\f6 No. 17-3493\\n\\n robbery or the day before asking, “I wonder\\n what bank I should rob today?”\\n Todd Hogan, the bank’s vice president, tes-\\n tified that he remembered teller Holly\\n Bateman calling him immediately after the\\n robbery to tell him she was 99% sure the\\n robber was Books. Hogan also explained\\n that Books’s business account had been\\n flagged in the bank’s system on multiple\\n occasions due to attempts to deposit checks\\n backed by insufficient funds.\\n James Teidman testified that he was driving\\n by the credit union when the robbery oc-\\n curred and saw a Buick SUV, the same\\n model later tracked to Books’s residence,\\n flee the scene.\\n While Books chose not to testify, his counsel vigorously\\ncross-examined the government’s witnesses. When it came\\nto tellers Bateman and Phelps, defense counsel challenged\\ntheir recollection of the robbery, probed the reliability of\\ntheir identifications of Books and the getaway car, and exam-\\nined their memory of the robber’s dress, voice, and manner-\\nisms—all in an effort to question their overall confidence\\nthat Books was the offender. At no point during the trial did\\nBooks’s counsel or the government refer to Books’s confes-\\nsion or to the police detective’s (allegedly impermissible) in-\\nteraction with the two tellers. The jury returned a guilty ver-\\ndict.\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 7\\n\\n II\\n A\\n Books challenges the district court’s pretrial ruling deny-\\ning his motion to preclude the two tellers from testifying at\\ntrial on the basis that the police detective allegedly tainted\\ntheir eyewitness identifications by telling them that he had\\nconfessed to the robbery. This misconduct, Books contends,\\nviolated his Fifth Amendment right against self-\\nincrimination. He further argues that the district court’s pre-\\ntrial ruling too circumscribed his Sixth Amendment right to\\ncross-examine the tellers at trial. The facts belie both conten-\\ntions.\\n While all agree that our review of legal issues is de novo,\\nthe parties dispute the legal standard that governs the ad-\\nmission at trial of the bank tellers’ identification testimony.\\nBooks invites us to follow Kastigar v. United States, and\\nthereby place the burden on the government to show that\\nthe tellers’ testimony was “derived from legitimate inde-\\npendent sources” and, as a result, not unduly influenced by\\nthe police detective. See 406 U.S. 441, 461–62 (1972). The\\ngovernment, on the other hand, urges us to read Kastigar as\\nmore narrowly applying to, and not beyond, the setting that\\ngave rise to its holding—circumstances in which a witness\\ntestifies pursuant to a grant of immunity. See id. The gov-\\nernment instead asks us to employ the less onerous, due-\\nprocess based standard found in cases like Neil v. Biggers,\\n409 U.S. 188 (1972), where the focus is more simply on the\\nreliability of in-court identification testimony with the de-\\nfendant (not the government) bearing the initial burden of\\nshowing that the government did something to taint the\\nidentification. See also, e.g., United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d\\n\\f8 No. 17-3493\\n\\n234, 239 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the defendant bears\\nthe burden of showing that the challenged identification was\\nunduly suggestive).\\n The proper reach and application of the Kastigar rule has\\nnot gone unnoticed by other courts. See, e.g., United States v.\\nAllen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 n.121 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[I]t is not clear\\nwhether all involuntary statements or all compelled\\nstatements should be subjected to the strong medicine\\nprescribed in Kastigar, or whether some other doctrine\\nshould govern in certain circumstances.”); United States v.\\nJones, 542 F.2d 186, 199 n.24 (4th Cir. 1976) (discussing\\nuncertainty over Kastigar’s application to coerced\\nconfessions).\\n We have not had a case requiring us to choose sides, and\\nthis appeal does not either. We can comfortably resolve the\\ncase on narrower grounds, because under either Kastigar or\\nBiggers (or hybrids of either standard), the evidence was\\nmore than sufficient to show that the two tellers, Bateman\\nand Phelps, identified Books based on their prior dealings\\nand first-hand familiarity with him, without regard to any\\ninformation supplied by the police detective. At no point did\\nthe tellers, and most especially Holly Bateman, ever waiver\\nin their confidence that Books was the robber. So, whether\\nassessed under Kastigar or a lesser standard, Books’s chal-\\nlenge to the district court’s admission of the tellers’ testimo-\\nny cannot succeed.\\n Books fares no better when contending that the district\\ncourt’s ruling on the tellers’ testimony also violated the Sixth\\nAmendment by limiting his ability to confront and cross-\\nexamine these witnesses. A fulsome cross-examination,\\nBooks posits, would have entailed questioning how the wit-\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 9\\n\\nnesses arrived at their identification testimony—a line of\\nquestioning, as Books sees it, that necessarily would have\\nexposed that the police improperly told both tellers that he\\nhad confessed to the robbery. We cannot agree, as Books’s\\nposition misfires on the law and facts.\\n A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront wit-\\nnesses is not absolute, but instead subject to reasonable limi-\\ntations imposed by the district court. See United States v.\\nSaunders, 166 F.3d 907, 918 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Delaware v.\\nVan Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). The limitation Books\\nchallenges came from the district court’s pretrial ruling sup-\\npressing his coerced confession. This ruling favored Books\\nand, beyond precluding the government from using the con-\\nfession as evidence, naturally limited how he would ap-\\nproach cross-examining government witnesses, for he right-\\nly wanted to avoid the jury learning that he had confessed to\\nthe robbery. But accepting a necessary and proper limitation\\non cross-examination does not, without more, run afoul of\\nthe Confrontation Clause, especially where, as here, Books\\nwas able as a practical matter to adequately, and indeed vig-\\norously, cross-examine both bank tellers. See United States v.\\nSasson, 62 F.3d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the\\nConfrontation Clause “guarantees only an opportunity for a\\nthorough and effective cross-examination, ‘not cross-\\nexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to what-\\never extent, the defense might wish’”) (quoting Delaware v.\\nFensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). And Books was able to do\\nso without ever insinuating, much less revealing, that he had\\nconfessed to the robbery. The Confrontation Clause required\\nno more.\\n\\f10 No. 17-3493\\n\\n B\\n This brings us to Books’s Fifth Amendment challenge to\\nthe district court’s pretrial impeachment ruling. Books ar-\\ngues that the ruling—allowing the government, if he chose\\nto testify, to cross-examine him with the fruits of his coerced\\nconfession—created an unconstitutional predicament and\\ncatch-22: he was forced to either forfeit his right to testify in\\nhis own defense, or, if he did take the stand, face a surefire\\nconviction once the government impeached him with the\\nfruits of his confession.\\n Books may be right in his contention that the district\\ncourt, even though reserving a final ruling until after seeing\\nwhether he chose to testify and what questions the govern-\\nment wanted to ask on cross-examination, committed legal\\nerror in concluding, however conditionally, that some im-\\npeachment with the physical fruits of a coerced confession\\nmay be permissible. While that proposition is not settled in\\nthe law, Books’s position is not without some support. See,\\ne.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003) (plurality\\nopinion) (emphasizing, albeit in dicta, that “those subjected\\nto coercive police interrogations have an automatic protection\\nfrom the use of their involuntary statements (or evidence de-\\nrived from their statements) in any subsequent criminal tri-\\nal”).\\n The government urges us to avoid answering this ques-\\ntion. Pointing to Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), the\\ngovernment says that Books waived any challenge to the dis-\\ntrict court’s ruling by not testifying at trial. The govern-\\nment’s position finds substantial, if not dispositive, support\\nin our decision in United States v. Wilson, 307 F.3d 596, 600–\\n01 (7th Cir. 2002), where the defendant chose not to testify at\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 11\\n\\ntrial and, as a result, we declined to review the merits of his\\nclaim that a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of particular\\nimpeachment testimony violated his Fifth Amendment right\\nto remain silent.\\n The whole point of the rule announced in Luce, which we\\nextended to the domain of a Fifth Amendment claim in\\nWilson, is that courts should refrain from reviewing claims\\nthat a particular line of cross-examination would have\\nviolated a defendant’s right against self-incrimination when\\nthe defendant in fact never testified at trial and thus never\\nunderwent cross-examination. Any other course, the\\nreasoning runs, would require too much speculation on how\\nthe testimony and related questioning would have played\\nout at trial. See Wilson, 307 F.3d at 600–01.\\n Even if we agreed with Books that Wilson should be read\\nmore narrowly, our ensuing reasoning would not travel a\\npath that resulted in an award of relief. Both parties agree\\nthat the ultimate merits of Books’s Fifth Amendment claim is\\nsubject to harmless error review. Indeed, the doctrine of\\nharmless error finds straightforward application on the evi-\\ndence presented at Books’s trial.\\n Not every constitutional error automatically requires the\\nreversal of a defendant’s conviction. Instead, as the Supreme\\nCourt has explained, “if the government can show ‘beyond a\\nreasonable doubt that the error complained of did not con-\\ntribute to the verdict obtained,’ … then the error is deemed\\nharmless and the defendant is not entitled to reversal.”\\nWeaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (quoting\\nChapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). This precise\\nstandard would apply if Books had testified and was sub-\\njected to certain impermissible impeachment. See Arizona v.\\n\\f12 No. 17-3493\\n\\nFulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (holding that the doc-\\ntrine of harmless error applies to the violation of the defend-\\nant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination\\nthrough the admission at trial of an involuntary confession).\\nAnd the same analysis would apply if we accept Books’s\\ncontention that the district court’s ruling constructively fore-\\nclosed his decision to take the stand. See Ortega v. O’Leary,\\n843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying harmless error\\nanalysis to the denial of the right to testify); Alicea v. Ganon,\\n675 F.2d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 1982) (reaching the same conclu-\\nsion).\\n In reviewing the trial record, our obligation is to deter-\\nmine whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt, and we do so in no small part by evaluating the over-\\nall strength of the prosecution’s case. See Jones v. Basinger,\\n635 F.3d 1030, 1052 (7th Cir. 2011). On this front, Books faces\\nan insurmountable burden because the evidence against him\\nat trial was overwhelming: the eyewitness testimony of the\\ntwo bank tellers, the text message to a friend indicating his\\ndesire to rob a bank, the identification of his car as the geta-\\nway vehicle, and the testimony of over a dozen other wit-\\nnesses—all in the broader context of his financial difficulties\\nand prior disputes with the Land of Lincoln Credit Union.\\nOn this record, any error in the district court’s pretrial ruling\\non the scope of permissible impeachment was harmless be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt.\\n III\\n Two other matters warrant attention. First, relying on\\nBrooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), Books argues that the\\ndistrict court’s impeachment ruling deprived him of the\\n“guiding hand of counsel” by undermining his attorney’s\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 13\\n\\nability to make informed and independent decisions about\\nthe best trial strategy, including whether Books should take\\nthe stand in his own defense. Id. at 612. But Brooks provides\\nno refuge, for there the Supreme Court considered a state\\nstatute that required a defendant, if he chose to put on a de-\\nfense at trial, to be the first defense witness to testify, forcing\\na preemptive decision to take the stand absent “a full survey\\nof all the case.” Id. at 608. Books, in contrast, faced only the\\nuncertainty that often accompanies an unfavorable (and\\nperhaps even incorrect) pretrial ruling on the scope of im-\\npeachment. Whatever limitations this may have imposed on\\nthe strategic choices of Books’s defense, they were far afield\\nfrom the extreme circumstances defense counsel confronted\\nin Brooks.\\n Finally, we reject Books’s invitation to overturn his con-\\nviction on the basis of cumulative error. We have reviewed\\nthe record carefully and cannot get anywhere near conclud-\\ning that there are “multiple errors [that] so infected the jury’s\\ndeliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally\\nfair trial.” United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir.\\n2001). The bottom line is that Books’s cumulative error ar-\\ngument cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence pre-\\nsented against him at trial.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4362871/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585618/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Scott BOOKS, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3493\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nSCOTT BOOKS,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 1:16-cr-10037 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. On trial for bank robbery, Scott\nBooks chose not to testify in his own defense and was found\nguilty and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. He now\nchallenges two pretrial decisions by the district court. The\nfirst allowed eyewitness testimony at trial from the two bank\ntellers that Books alleged based their identification of him as\nthe robber not on personal knowledge, but rather on infor-\nmation improperly supplied by a police detective. The sec-\n\f2 No. 17-3493\n\nond ruling would have allowed the government, had Books\nchosen to testify at trial, to impeach him with physical evi-\ndence directly tying him to the robbery—evidence the police\nlearned of (and then recovered) only as a result of a confes-\nsion the district court separately had determined was unlaw-\nfully coerced.\n Neither challenge succeeds. The district court did not err\nin finding the eyewitness identifications reflected the tellers’\nfirsthand knowledge of Books, and thus allowing their tes-\ntimony at trial was entirely proper. Nor can we conclude\nthat the district court’s conditional impeachment ruling,\neven if wrong on the law, mandates reversal in light of the\noverwhelming weight of evidence against Books. So we\naffirm.\n I\n A\n On July 28, 2016 a man robbed the Land of Lincoln Credit\nUnion in Normal, Illinois. Dressed in a black hooded sweat-\nshirt, wearing a mask and neon gloves, the robber ap-\nproached the counter and, while motioning toward the\ndrawer with what appeared to be a black handgun, de-\nmanded “all the money.” The robbery lasted all but 20 sec-\nonds, with the offender making off with $18,000 and fleeing\nin a Buick SUV.\n Two tellers recognized the robber’s voice and manner-\nisms and immediately identified him as Scott Books—a long-\ntime customer of the credit union. Holly Bateman told her\nsupervisor (and later the police) she was 99% certain Books\nwas the robber because she had interacted with him on at\nleast six prior occasions. The second teller, Susan Phelps,\n\fNo. 17-3493 3\n\nagreed with Bateman’s identification of Books as the offend-\ner. A third witness, James Teidman, was driving by the bank\nwhen he saw the robber running from the bank with a gun,\nonly then to speed away in a Buick SUV.\n The police arrested Books the next day. After waiving his\nMiranda rights and agreeing to an interview, he confessed to\nthe robbery, while also telling the police where they could\nfind the gloves, clothing, and fake gun he used. The police\nfound these items exactly where Books described, and in\ntime a grand jury indicted Books for the robbery.\n B\n The district court held a series of pretrial hearings to de-\ntermine the admissibility of evidence contested by Books.\nThree of those rulings are significant to this appeal.\n First, the district court suppressed Books’s confession,\nfinding that the police officers overstepped and overcame\nBooks’s will by threatening to arrest his wife and take his\nchildren into custody if he did not own up to his role in the\nrobbery—rendering the confession involuntary. The court\nsuppressed both the confession and its physical fruits—\nspecifically, the clothing, gloves, and fake gun the police re-\ncovered based upon Books telling them where to look.\n Second, the district court denied Books’s motion to pre-\nvent the two bank tellers (Bateman and Phelps) from testify-\ning at trial. Books had sought to exclude their testimony on\nthe basis that the police detective who investigated the rob-\nbery improperly tainted their identifications when, a day af-\nter the robbery, he allegedly told both witnesses that Books\nhad confessed to the crime. The government disagreed, tak-\ning the position that the detective in no way revealed\n\f4 No. 17-3493\n\nBooks’s confession and thus in no way influenced the tellers’\nclear and definitive identification of Books as the robber. The\ndistrict court held a hearing, received testimony from the\ntellers and detective, and found it “clear from th[e] record\nthat [both tellers] have a truly independent source of identi-\nfication of [Books] other than any suggestion that would\nhave been put in their mind by the officer.” Accordingly, the\ndistrict court permitted the tellers to testify at trial.\n Third, the district court considered but reserved defini-\ntively ruling until trial on the government’s motion for per-\nmission to impeach Books with the fruits of his confession in\nthe event he chose to testify. Books opposed the motion and\nurged the district court to hold that the price for the police\nunlawfully coercing his confession should be the suppres-\nsion of all incriminating evidence (his admission and the\nphysical fruits) for all purposes, including impeachment. The\ndistrict court said it was inclined to allow some impeach-\nment but reserved a final ruling unless and until Books\nchose to testify and the government sought to impeach him\non cross-examination with his prior statements describing\nthe whereabouts of the clothing he wore during the robbery.\nThe district court cast its ruling this way: “[I]f and when we\nget to that point [of the trial], any questions that the gov-\nernment wished to ask the defendant if he testifies, I would\nhave to hear exactly what the questions are outside the pres-\nence of the jury so there could be specific objections.”\n\fNo. 17-3493 5\n\n C\n In the end, Books chose not to testify at trial, and thus\nneither his coerced confession nor the resulting physical\nfruits came into evidence. The government nonetheless pre-\nsented a strong case, including testimony from these wit-\nnesses:\n Bank teller Holly Bateman identified Books\n as the robber. She testified that she knew\n Books from her work at the credit union\n and immediately recognized him as the\n robber—so much so that she almost said\n “Scott, can you remove your mask?”\n Bateman told the jury that she “instantly”\n recognized Books’s voice and likewise\n knew it was Books from his distinct\n mannerisms. Asked at trial about her\n confidence level that Books committed the\n robbery, Bateman testified that she was\n 110% sure because the incident had\n replayed over and over in her mind.\n Susan Phelps, the second bank teller, also\n identified Books as the robber. While not as\n fast as Bateman to recognize Books during\n the robbery, Phelps testified she was confi-\n dent Books was the offender based on his\n unique mannerisms, including his walk and\n jittery disposition.\n Phillip Meyer, a friend and former cowork-\n er of Books, testified that he had received a\n text message from Books on the day of the\n\f6 No. 17-3493\n\n robbery or the day before asking, “I wonder\n what bank I should rob today?”\n Todd Hogan, the bank’s vice president, tes-\n tified that he remembered teller Holly\n Bateman calling him immediately after the\n robbery to tell him she was 99% sure the\n robber was Books. Hogan also explained\n that Books’s business account had been\n flagged in the bank’s system on multiple\n occasions due to attempts to deposit checks\n backed by insufficient funds.\n James Teidman testified that he was driving\n by the credit union when the robbery oc-\n curred and saw a Buick SUV, the same\n model later tracked to Books’s residence,\n flee the scene.\n While Books chose not to testify, his counsel vigorously\ncross-examined the government’s witnesses. When it came\nto tellers Bateman and Phelps, defense counsel challenged\ntheir recollection of the robbery, probed the reliability of\ntheir identifications of Books and the getaway car, and exam-\nined their memory of the robber’s dress, voice, and manner-\nisms—all in an effort to question their overall confidence\nthat Books was the offender. At no point during the trial did\nBooks’s counsel or the government refer to Books’s confes-\nsion or to the police detective’s (allegedly impermissible) in-\nteraction with the two tellers. The jury returned a guilty ver-\ndict.\n\fNo. 17-3493 7\n\n II\n A\n Books challenges the district court’s pretrial ruling deny-\ning his motion to preclude the two tellers from testifying at\ntrial on the basis that the police detective allegedly tainted\ntheir eyewitness identifications by telling them that he had\nconfessed to the robbery. This misconduct, Books contends,\nviolated his Fifth Amendment right against self-\nincrimination. He further argues that the district court’s pre-\ntrial ruling too circumscribed his Sixth Amendment right to\ncross-examine the tellers at trial. The facts belie both conten-\ntions.\n While all agree that our review of legal issues is de novo,\nthe parties dispute the legal standard that governs the ad-\nmission at trial of the bank tellers’ identification testimony.\nBooks invites us to follow Kastigar v. United States, and\nthereby place the burden on the government to show that\nthe tellers’ testimony was “derived from legitimate inde-\npendent sources” and, as a result, not unduly influenced by\nthe police detective. See 406 U.S. 441, 461–62 (1972). The\ngovernment, on the other hand, urges us to read Kastigar as\nmore narrowly applying to, and not beyond, the setting that\ngave rise to its holding—circumstances in which a witness\ntestifies pursuant to a grant of immunity. See id. The gov-\nernment instead asks us to employ the less onerous, due-\nprocess based standard found in cases like Neil v. Biggers,\n409 U.S. 188 (1972), where the focus is more simply on the\nreliability of in-court identification testimony with the de-\nfendant (not the government) bearing the initial burden of\nshowing that the government did something to taint the\nidentification. See also, e.g., United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d\n\f8 No. 17-3493\n\n234, 239 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the defendant bears\nthe burden of showing that the challenged identification was\nunduly suggestive).\n The proper reach and application of the Kastigar rule has\nnot gone unnoticed by other courts. See, e.g., United States v.\nAllen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 n.121 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[I]t is not clear\nwhether all involuntary statements or all compelled\nstatements should be subjected to the strong medicine\nprescribed in Kastigar, or whether some other doctrine\nshould govern in certain circumstances.”); United States v.\nJones, 542 F.2d 186, 199 n.24 (4th Cir. 1976) (discussing\nuncertainty over Kastigar’s application to coerced\nconfessions).\n We have not had a case requiring us to choose sides, and\nthis appeal does not either. We can comfortably resolve the\ncase on narrower grounds, because under either Kastigar or\nBiggers (or hybrids of either standard), the evidence was\nmore than sufficient to show that the two tellers, Bateman\nand Phelps, identified Books based on their prior dealings\nand first-hand familiarity with him, without regard to any\ninformation supplied by the police detective. At no point did\nthe tellers, and most especially Holly Bateman, ever waiver\nin their confidence that Books was the robber. So, whether\nassessed under Kastigar or a lesser standard, Books’s chal-\nlenge to the district court’s admission of the tellers’ testimo-\nny cannot succeed.\n Books fares no better when contending that the district\ncourt’s ruling on the tellers’ testimony also violated the Sixth\nAmendment by limiting his ability to confront and cross-\nexamine these witnesses. A fulsome cross-examination,\nBooks posits, would have entailed questioning how the wit-\n\fNo. 17-3493 9\n\nnesses arrived at their identification testimony—a line of\nquestioning, as Books sees it, that necessarily would have\nexposed that the police improperly told both tellers that he\nhad confessed to the robbery. We cannot agree, as Books’s\nposition misfires on the law and facts.\n A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront wit-\nnesses is not absolute, but instead subject to reasonable limi-\ntations imposed by the district court. See United States v.\nSaunders, 166 F.3d 907, 918 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Delaware v.\nVan Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). The limitation Books\nchallenges came from the district court’s pretrial ruling sup-\npressing his coerced confession. This ruling favored Books\nand, beyond precluding the government from using the con-\nfession as evidence, naturally limited how he would ap-\nproach cross-examining government witnesses, for he right-\nly wanted to avoid the jury learning that he had confessed to\nthe robbery. But accepting a necessary and proper limitation\non cross-examination does not, without more, run afoul of\nthe Confrontation Clause, especially where, as here, Books\nwas able as a practical matter to adequately, and indeed vig-\norously, cross-examine both bank tellers. See United States v.\nSasson, 62 F.3d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the\nConfrontation Clause “guarantees only an opportunity for a\nthorough and effective cross-examination, ‘not cross-\nexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to what-\never extent, the defense might wish’”) (quoting Delaware v.\nFensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). And Books was able to do\nso without ever insinuating, much less revealing, that he had\nconfessed to the robbery. The Confrontation Clause required\nno more.\n\f10 No. 17-3493\n\n B\n This brings us to Books’s Fifth Amendment challenge to\nthe district court’s pretrial impeachment ruling. Books ar-\ngues that the ruling—allowing the government, if he chose\nto testify, to cross-examine him with the fruits of his coerced\nconfession—created an unconstitutional predicament and\ncatch-22: he was forced to either forfeit his right to testify in\nhis own defense, or, if he did take the stand, face a surefire\nconviction once the government impeached him with the\nfruits of his confession.\n Books may be right in his contention that the district\ncourt, even though reserving a final ruling until after seeing\nwhether he chose to testify and what questions the govern-\nment wanted to ask on cross-examination, committed legal\nerror in concluding, however conditionally, that some im-\npeachment with the physical fruits of a coerced confession\nmay be permissible. While that proposition is not settled in\nthe law, Books’s position is not without some support. See,\ne.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003) (plurality\nopinion) (emphasizing, albeit in dicta, that “those subjected\nto coercive police interrogations have an automatic protection\nfrom the use of their involuntary statements (or evidence de-\nrived from their statements) in any subsequent criminal tri-\nal”).\n The government urges us to avoid answering this ques-\ntion. Pointing to Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), the\ngovernment says that Books waived any challenge to the dis-\ntrict court’s ruling by not testifying at trial. The govern-\nment’s position finds substantial, if not dispositive, support\nin our decision in United States v. Wilson, 307 F.3d 596, 600–\n01 (7th Cir. 2002), where the defendant chose not to testify at\n\fNo. 17-3493 11\n\ntrial and, as a result, we declined to review the merits of his\nclaim that a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of particular\nimpeachment testimony violated his Fifth Amendment right\nto remain silent.\n The whole point of the rule announced in Luce, which we\nextended to the domain of a Fifth Amendment claim in\nWilson, is that courts should refrain from reviewing claims\nthat a particular line of cross-examination would have\nviolated a defendant’s right against self-incrimination when\nthe defendant in fact never testified at trial and thus never\nunderwent cross-examination. Any other course, the\nreasoning runs, would require too much speculation on how\nthe testimony and related questioning would have played\nout at trial. See Wilson, 307 F.3d at 600–01.\n Even if we agreed with Books that Wilson should be read\nmore narrowly, our ensuing reasoning would not travel a\npath that resulted in an award of relief. Both parties agree\nthat the ultimate merits of Books’s Fifth Amendment claim is\nsubject to harmless error review. Indeed, the doctrine of\nharmless error finds straightforward application on the evi-\ndence presented at Books’s trial.\n Not every constitutional error automatically requires the\nreversal of a defendant’s conviction. Instead, as the Supreme\nCourt has explained, “if the government can show ‘beyond a\nreasonable doubt that the error complained of did not con-\ntribute to the verdict obtained,’ … then the error is deemed\nharmless and the defendant is not entitled to reversal.”\nWeaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (quoting\nChapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). This precise\nstandard would apply if Books had testified and was sub-\njected to certain impermissible impeachment. See Arizona v.\n\f12 No. 17-3493\n\nFulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (holding that the doc-\ntrine of harmless error applies to the violation of the defend-\nant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination\nthrough the admission at trial of an involuntary confession).\nAnd the same analysis would apply if we accept Books’s\ncontention that the district court’s ruling constructively fore-\nclosed his decision to take the stand. See Ortega v. O’Leary,\n843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying harmless error\nanalysis to the denial of the right to testify); Alicea v. Ganon,\n675 F.2d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 1982) (reaching the same conclu-\nsion).\n In reviewing the trial record, our obligation is to deter-\nmine whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable\ndoubt, and we do so in no small part by evaluating the over-\nall strength of the prosecution’s case. See Jones v. Basinger,\n635 F.3d 1030, 1052 (7th Cir. 2011). On this front, Books faces\nan insurmountable burden because the evidence against him\nat trial was overwhelming: the eyewitness testimony of the\ntwo bank tellers, the text message to a friend indicating his\ndesire to rob a bank, the identification of his car as the geta-\nway vehicle, and the testimony of over a dozen other wit-\nnesses—all in the broader context of his financial difficulties\nand prior disputes with the Land of Lincoln Credit Union.\nOn this record, any error in the district court’s pretrial ruling\non the scope of permissible impeachment was harmless be-\nyond a reasonable doubt.\n III\n Two other matters warrant attention. First, relying on\nBrooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), Books argues that the\ndistrict court’s impeachment ruling deprived him of the\n“guiding hand of counsel” by undermining his attorney’s\n\fNo. 17-3493 13\n\nability to make informed and independent decisions about\nthe best trial strategy, including whether Books should take\nthe stand in his own defense. Id. at 612. But Brooks provides\nno refuge, for there the Supreme Court considered a state\nstatute that required a defendant, if he chose to put on a de-\nfense at trial, to be the first defense witness to testify, forcing\na preemptive decision to take the stand absent “a full survey\nof all the case.” Id. at 608. Books, in contrast, faced only the\nuncertainty that often accompanies an unfavorable (and\nperhaps even incorrect) pretrial ruling on the scope of im-\npeachment. Whatever limitations this may have imposed on\nthe strategic choices of Books’s defense, they were far afield\nfrom the extreme circumstances defense counsel confronted\nin Brooks.\n Finally, we reject Books’s invitation to overturn his con-\nviction on the basis of cumulative error. We have reviewed\nthe record carefully and cannot get anywhere near conclud-\ning that there are “multiple errors [that] so infected the jury’s\ndeliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally\nfair trial.” United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir.\n2001). The bottom line is that Books’s cumulative error ar-\ngument cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence pre-\nsented against him at trial.\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Scott BOOKS, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3493\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nSCOTT BOOKS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 1:16-cr-10037 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. On trial for bank robbery, Scott\\nBooks chose not to testify in his own defense and was found\\nguilty and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. He now\\nchallenges two pretrial decisions by the district court. The\\nfirst allowed eyewitness testimony at trial from the two bank\\ntellers that Books alleged based their identification of him as\\nthe robber not on personal knowledge, but rather on infor-\\nmation improperly supplied by a police detective. The sec-\\n\\f2 No. 17-3493\\n\\nond ruling would have allowed the government, had Books\\nchosen to testify at trial, to impeach him with physical evi-\\ndence directly tying him to the robbery—evidence the police\\nlearned of (and then recovered) only as a result of a confes-\\nsion the district court separately had determined was unlaw-\\nfully coerced.\\n Neither challenge succeeds. The district court did not err\\nin finding the eyewitness identifications reflected the tellers’\\nfirsthand knowledge of Books, and thus allowing their tes-\\ntimony at trial was entirely proper. Nor can we conclude\\nthat the district court’s conditional impeachment ruling,\\neven if wrong on the law, mandates reversal in light of the\\noverwhelming weight of evidence against Books. So we\\naffirm.\\n I\\n A\\n On July 28, 2016 a man robbed the Land of Lincoln Credit\\nUnion in Normal, Illinois. Dressed in a black hooded sweat-\\nshirt, wearing a mask and neon gloves, the robber ap-\\nproached the counter and, while motioning toward the\\ndrawer with what appeared to be a black handgun, de-\\nmanded “all the money.” The robbery lasted all but 20 sec-\\nonds, with the offender making off with $18,000 and fleeing\\nin a Buick SUV.\\n Two tellers recognized the robber’s voice and manner-\\nisms and immediately identified him as Scott Books—a long-\\ntime customer of the credit union. Holly Bateman told her\\nsupervisor (and later the police) she was 99% certain Books\\nwas the robber because she had interacted with him on at\\nleast six prior occasions. The second teller, Susan Phelps,\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 3\\n\\nagreed with Bateman’s identification of Books as the offend-\\ner. A third witness, James Teidman, was driving by the bank\\nwhen he saw the robber running from the bank with a gun,\\nonly then to speed away in a Buick SUV.\\n The police arrested Books the next day. After waiving his\\nMiranda rights and agreeing to an interview, he confessed to\\nthe robbery, while also telling the police where they could\\nfind the gloves, clothing, and fake gun he used. The police\\nfound these items exactly where Books described, and in\\ntime a grand jury indicted Books for the robbery.\\n B\\n The district court held a series of pretrial hearings to de-\\ntermine the admissibility of evidence contested by Books.\\nThree of those rulings are significant to this appeal.\\n First, the district court suppressed Books’s confession,\\nfinding that the police officers overstepped and overcame\\nBooks’s will by threatening to arrest his wife and take his\\nchildren into custody if he did not own up to his role in the\\nrobbery—rendering the confession involuntary. The court\\nsuppressed both the confession and its physical fruits—\\nspecifically, the clothing, gloves, and fake gun the police re-\\ncovered based upon Books telling them where to look.\\n Second, the district court denied Books’s motion to pre-\\nvent the two bank tellers (Bateman and Phelps) from testify-\\ning at trial. Books had sought to exclude their testimony on\\nthe basis that the police detective who investigated the rob-\\nbery improperly tainted their identifications when, a day af-\\nter the robbery, he allegedly told both witnesses that Books\\nhad confessed to the crime. The government disagreed, tak-\\ning the position that the detective in no way revealed\\n\\f4 No. 17-3493\\n\\nBooks’s confession and thus in no way influenced the tellers’\\nclear and definitive identification of Books as the robber. The\\ndistrict court held a hearing, received testimony from the\\ntellers and detective, and found it “clear from th[e] record\\nthat [both tellers] have a truly independent source of identi-\\nfication of [Books] other than any suggestion that would\\nhave been put in their mind by the officer.” Accordingly, the\\ndistrict court permitted the tellers to testify at trial.\\n Third, the district court considered but reserved defini-\\ntively ruling until trial on the government’s motion for per-\\nmission to impeach Books with the fruits of his confession in\\nthe event he chose to testify. Books opposed the motion and\\nurged the district court to hold that the price for the police\\nunlawfully coercing his confession should be the suppres-\\nsion of all incriminating evidence (his admission and the\\nphysical fruits) for all purposes, including impeachment. The\\ndistrict court said it was inclined to allow some impeach-\\nment but reserved a final ruling unless and until Books\\nchose to testify and the government sought to impeach him\\non cross-examination with his prior statements describing\\nthe whereabouts of the clothing he wore during the robbery.\\nThe district court cast its ruling this way: “[I]f and when we\\nget to that point [of the trial], any questions that the gov-\\nernment wished to ask the defendant if he testifies, I would\\nhave to hear exactly what the questions are outside the pres-\\nence of the jury so there could be specific objections.”\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 5\\n\\n C\\n In the end, Books chose not to testify at trial, and thus\\nneither his coerced confession nor the resulting physical\\nfruits came into evidence. The government nonetheless pre-\\nsented a strong case, including testimony from these wit-\\nnesses:\\n Bank teller Holly Bateman identified Books\\n as the robber. She testified that she knew\\n Books from her work at the credit union\\n and immediately recognized him as the\\n robber—so much so that she almost said\\n “Scott, can you remove your mask?”\\n Bateman told the jury that she “instantly”\\n recognized Books’s voice and likewise\\n knew it was Books from his distinct\\n mannerisms. Asked at trial about her\\n confidence level that Books committed the\\n robbery, Bateman testified that she was\\n 110% sure because the incident had\\n replayed over and over in her mind.\\n Susan Phelps, the second bank teller, also\\n identified Books as the robber. While not as\\n fast as Bateman to recognize Books during\\n the robbery, Phelps testified she was confi-\\n dent Books was the offender based on his\\n unique mannerisms, including his walk and\\n jittery disposition.\\n Phillip Meyer, a friend and former cowork-\\n er of Books, testified that he had received a\\n text message from Books on the day of the\\n\\f6 No. 17-3493\\n\\n robbery or the day before asking, “I wonder\\n what bank I should rob today?”\\n Todd Hogan, the bank’s vice president, tes-\\n tified that he remembered teller Holly\\n Bateman calling him immediately after the\\n robbery to tell him she was 99% sure the\\n robber was Books. Hogan also explained\\n that Books’s business account had been\\n flagged in the bank’s system on multiple\\n occasions due to attempts to deposit checks\\n backed by insufficient funds.\\n James Teidman testified that he was driving\\n by the credit union when the robbery oc-\\n curred and saw a Buick SUV, the same\\n model later tracked to Books’s residence,\\n flee the scene.\\n While Books chose not to testify, his counsel vigorously\\ncross-examined the government’s witnesses. When it came\\nto tellers Bateman and Phelps, defense counsel challenged\\ntheir recollection of the robbery, probed the reliability of\\ntheir identifications of Books and the getaway car, and exam-\\nined their memory of the robber’s dress, voice, and manner-\\nisms—all in an effort to question their overall confidence\\nthat Books was the offender. At no point during the trial did\\nBooks’s counsel or the government refer to Books’s confes-\\nsion or to the police detective’s (allegedly impermissible) in-\\nteraction with the two tellers. The jury returned a guilty ver-\\ndict.\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 7\\n\\n II\\n A\\n Books challenges the district court’s pretrial ruling deny-\\ning his motion to preclude the two tellers from testifying at\\ntrial on the basis that the police detective allegedly tainted\\ntheir eyewitness identifications by telling them that he had\\nconfessed to the robbery. This misconduct, Books contends,\\nviolated his Fifth Amendment right against self-\\nincrimination. He further argues that the district court’s pre-\\ntrial ruling too circumscribed his Sixth Amendment right to\\ncross-examine the tellers at trial. The facts belie both conten-\\ntions.\\n While all agree that our review of legal issues is de novo,\\nthe parties dispute the legal standard that governs the ad-\\nmission at trial of the bank tellers’ identification testimony.\\nBooks invites us to follow Kastigar v. United States, and\\nthereby place the burden on the government to show that\\nthe tellers’ testimony was “derived from legitimate inde-\\npendent sources” and, as a result, not unduly influenced by\\nthe police detective. See 406 U.S. 441, 461–62 (1972). The\\ngovernment, on the other hand, urges us to read Kastigar as\\nmore narrowly applying to, and not beyond, the setting that\\ngave rise to its holding—circumstances in which a witness\\ntestifies pursuant to a grant of immunity. See id. The gov-\\nernment instead asks us to employ the less onerous, due-\\nprocess based standard found in cases like Neil v. Biggers,\\n409 U.S. 188 (1972), where the focus is more simply on the\\nreliability of in-court identification testimony with the de-\\nfendant (not the government) bearing the initial burden of\\nshowing that the government did something to taint the\\nidentification. See also, e.g., United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d\\n\\f8 No. 17-3493\\n\\n234, 239 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the defendant bears\\nthe burden of showing that the challenged identification was\\nunduly suggestive).\\n The proper reach and application of the Kastigar rule has\\nnot gone unnoticed by other courts. See, e.g., United States v.\\nAllen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 n.121 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[I]t is not clear\\nwhether all involuntary statements or all compelled\\nstatements should be subjected to the strong medicine\\nprescribed in Kastigar, or whether some other doctrine\\nshould govern in certain circumstances.”); United States v.\\nJones, 542 F.2d 186, 199 n.24 (4th Cir. 1976) (discussing\\nuncertainty over Kastigar’s application to coerced\\nconfessions).\\n We have not had a case requiring us to choose sides, and\\nthis appeal does not either. We can comfortably resolve the\\ncase on narrower grounds, because under either Kastigar or\\nBiggers (or hybrids of either standard), the evidence was\\nmore than sufficient to show that the two tellers, Bateman\\nand Phelps, identified Books based on their prior dealings\\nand first-hand familiarity with him, without regard to any\\ninformation supplied by the police detective. At no point did\\nthe tellers, and most especially Holly Bateman, ever waiver\\nin their confidence that Books was the robber. So, whether\\nassessed under Kastigar or a lesser standard, Books’s chal-\\nlenge to the district court’s admission of the tellers’ testimo-\\nny cannot succeed.\\n Books fares no better when contending that the district\\ncourt’s ruling on the tellers’ testimony also violated the Sixth\\nAmendment by limiting his ability to confront and cross-\\nexamine these witnesses. A fulsome cross-examination,\\nBooks posits, would have entailed questioning how the wit-\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 9\\n\\nnesses arrived at their identification testimony—a line of\\nquestioning, as Books sees it, that necessarily would have\\nexposed that the police improperly told both tellers that he\\nhad confessed to the robbery. We cannot agree, as Books’s\\nposition misfires on the law and facts.\\n A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront wit-\\nnesses is not absolute, but instead subject to reasonable limi-\\ntations imposed by the district court. See United States v.\\nSaunders, 166 F.3d 907, 918 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Delaware v.\\nVan Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). The limitation Books\\nchallenges came from the district court’s pretrial ruling sup-\\npressing his coerced confession. This ruling favored Books\\nand, beyond precluding the government from using the con-\\nfession as evidence, naturally limited how he would ap-\\nproach cross-examining government witnesses, for he right-\\nly wanted to avoid the jury learning that he had confessed to\\nthe robbery. But accepting a necessary and proper limitation\\non cross-examination does not, without more, run afoul of\\nthe Confrontation Clause, especially where, as here, Books\\nwas able as a practical matter to adequately, and indeed vig-\\norously, cross-examine both bank tellers. See United States v.\\nSasson, 62 F.3d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the\\nConfrontation Clause “guarantees only an opportunity for a\\nthorough and effective cross-examination, ‘not cross-\\nexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to what-\\never extent, the defense might wish’”) (quoting Delaware v.\\nFensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). And Books was able to do\\nso without ever insinuating, much less revealing, that he had\\nconfessed to the robbery. The Confrontation Clause required\\nno more.\\n\\f10 No. 17-3493\\n\\n B\\n This brings us to Books’s Fifth Amendment challenge to\\nthe district court’s pretrial impeachment ruling. Books ar-\\ngues that the ruling—allowing the government, if he chose\\nto testify, to cross-examine him with the fruits of his coerced\\nconfession—created an unconstitutional predicament and\\ncatch-22: he was forced to either forfeit his right to testify in\\nhis own defense, or, if he did take the stand, face a surefire\\nconviction once the government impeached him with the\\nfruits of his confession.\\n Books may be right in his contention that the district\\ncourt, even though reserving a final ruling until after seeing\\nwhether he chose to testify and what questions the govern-\\nment wanted to ask on cross-examination, committed legal\\nerror in concluding, however conditionally, that some im-\\npeachment with the physical fruits of a coerced confession\\nmay be permissible. While that proposition is not settled in\\nthe law, Books’s position is not without some support. See,\\ne.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003) (plurality\\nopinion) (emphasizing, albeit in dicta, that “those subjected\\nto coercive police interrogations have an automatic protection\\nfrom the use of their involuntary statements (or evidence de-\\nrived from their statements) in any subsequent criminal tri-\\nal”).\\n The government urges us to avoid answering this ques-\\ntion. Pointing to Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), the\\ngovernment says that Books waived any challenge to the dis-\\ntrict court’s ruling by not testifying at trial. The govern-\\nment’s position finds substantial, if not dispositive, support\\nin our decision in United States v. Wilson, 307 F.3d 596, 600–\\n01 (7th Cir. 2002), where the defendant chose not to testify at\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 11\\n\\ntrial and, as a result, we declined to review the merits of his\\nclaim that a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of particular\\nimpeachment testimony violated his Fifth Amendment right\\nto remain silent.\\n The whole point of the rule announced in Luce, which we\\nextended to the domain of a Fifth Amendment claim in\\nWilson, is that courts should refrain from reviewing claims\\nthat a particular line of cross-examination would have\\nviolated a defendant’s right against self-incrimination when\\nthe defendant in fact never testified at trial and thus never\\nunderwent cross-examination. Any other course, the\\nreasoning runs, would require too much speculation on how\\nthe testimony and related questioning would have played\\nout at trial. See Wilson, 307 F.3d at 600–01.\\n Even if we agreed with Books that Wilson should be read\\nmore narrowly, our ensuing reasoning would not travel a\\npath that resulted in an award of relief. Both parties agree\\nthat the ultimate merits of Books’s Fifth Amendment claim is\\nsubject to harmless error review. Indeed, the doctrine of\\nharmless error finds straightforward application on the evi-\\ndence presented at Books’s trial.\\n Not every constitutional error automatically requires the\\nreversal of a defendant’s conviction. Instead, as the Supreme\\nCourt has explained, “if the government can show ‘beyond a\\nreasonable doubt that the error complained of did not con-\\ntribute to the verdict obtained,’ … then the error is deemed\\nharmless and the defendant is not entitled to reversal.”\\nWeaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (quoting\\nChapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). This precise\\nstandard would apply if Books had testified and was sub-\\njected to certain impermissible impeachment. See Arizona v.\\n\\f12 No. 17-3493\\n\\nFulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (holding that the doc-\\ntrine of harmless error applies to the violation of the defend-\\nant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination\\nthrough the admission at trial of an involuntary confession).\\nAnd the same analysis would apply if we accept Books’s\\ncontention that the district court’s ruling constructively fore-\\nclosed his decision to take the stand. See Ortega v. O’Leary,\\n843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying harmless error\\nanalysis to the denial of the right to testify); Alicea v. Ganon,\\n675 F.2d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 1982) (reaching the same conclu-\\nsion).\\n In reviewing the trial record, our obligation is to deter-\\nmine whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt, and we do so in no small part by evaluating the over-\\nall strength of the prosecution’s case. See Jones v. Basinger,\\n635 F.3d 1030, 1052 (7th Cir. 2011). On this front, Books faces\\nan insurmountable burden because the evidence against him\\nat trial was overwhelming: the eyewitness testimony of the\\ntwo bank tellers, the text message to a friend indicating his\\ndesire to rob a bank, the identification of his car as the geta-\\nway vehicle, and the testimony of over a dozen other wit-\\nnesses—all in the broader context of his financial difficulties\\nand prior disputes with the Land of Lincoln Credit Union.\\nOn this record, any error in the district court’s pretrial ruling\\non the scope of permissible impeachment was harmless be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt.\\n III\\n Two other matters warrant attention. First, relying on\\nBrooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), Books argues that the\\ndistrict court’s impeachment ruling deprived him of the\\n“guiding hand of counsel” by undermining his attorney’s\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 13\\n\\nability to make informed and independent decisions about\\nthe best trial strategy, including whether Books should take\\nthe stand in his own defense. Id. at 612. But Brooks provides\\nno refuge, for there the Supreme Court considered a state\\nstatute that required a defendant, if he chose to put on a de-\\nfense at trial, to be the first defense witness to testify, forcing\\na preemptive decision to take the stand absent “a full survey\\nof all the case.” Id. at 608. Books, in contrast, faced only the\\nuncertainty that often accompanies an unfavorable (and\\nperhaps even incorrect) pretrial ruling on the scope of im-\\npeachment. Whatever limitations this may have imposed on\\nthe strategic choices of Books’s defense, they were far afield\\nfrom the extreme circumstances defense counsel confronted\\nin Brooks.\\n Finally, we reject Books’s invitation to overturn his con-\\nviction on the basis of cumulative error. We have reviewed\\nthe record carefully and cannot get anywhere near conclud-\\ning that there are “multiple errors [that] so infected the jury’s\\ndeliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally\\nfair trial.” United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir.\\n2001). The bottom line is that Books’s cumulative error ar-\\ngument cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence pre-\\nsented against him at trial.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":273,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4585620,"string":"4,585,620"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Bruce Giles v. Salvador Godinez"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"15-3077"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 15-3077\\nBRUCE GILES,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nSALVADOR A. GODINEZ, Acting Director, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:12-cv-00965 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Bruce Giles is a prisoner in the cus-\\ntody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (the “Depart-\\nment”) who suffers from schizoaffective disorder. Giles filed\\nthis action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several De-\\npartment officials. He alleges the defendants violated his\\nrights under the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately in-\\ndifferent to his serious medical needs, subjecting him to un-\\nconstitutional conditions of confinement, and failing to\\n\\f2 No. 15-3077\\n\\nprotect him from other inmates. The district court granted\\nsummary judgment to the defendants and Giles now appeals.\\nThe district court’s conclusion was based largely on its hold-\\ning that Giles could not establish the subjective elements of\\nhis claims because the defendants, who are all non-medical\\nofficials, appropriately relied on the judgment of medical pro-\\nfessionals. Because we agree Giles cannot establish the de-\\nfendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind, we\\naffirm.\\n I. Background\\n A. Factual Background\\n At all times relevant to this appeal, Giles was in the cus-\\ntody of the Department and housed in five different correc-\\ntional facilities: Dixon Correctional Center (“Dixon”), Illinois\\nRiver Correctional Center (“Illinois River”), Stateville Correc-\\ntional Center (“Stateville”), Pontiac Correctional Center\\n(“Pontiac”), and Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”).\\nHe suffers from schizoaffective disorder. His symptoms in-\\nclude anxiety, depression, auditory hallucinations, and sui-\\ncidal ideation. He attempted suicide at least three times while\\nin the Department’s custody. He has at various times been\\nprescribed psychotropic medications that help him cope with\\nthese symptoms but do not eliminate them entirely.\\n Giles’s claims arise out of the medical treatment he re-\\nceived and the conditions of his confinement at multiple cor-\\nrectional facilities over a two-year period. Most of his com-\\nplaints relate specifically to his placement in segregation.1 The\\n\\n 1 Although Giles’s placement in segregation is at the core of his com-\\nplaint, the exact duration of his periods in segregation and the nature of\\nsegregation placement at each facility are not clear from the record or\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 3\\n\\nfollowing timeline of events is compiled from Giles’s allega-\\ntions, his medical records, and his deposition testimony.\\n From late June 2010 until September 2010, Giles was\\nhoused at Dixon, where he alleges he had daily access to men-\\ntal health professionals and the opportunity to participate in\\ntherapeutic programs.2 On September 22, 2010, Giles was\\ntransferred from Dixon to Illinois River. According to the\\nhealth status transfer summary prepared by an official at\\nDixon at the time of Giles’s transfer, Giles’s prescription for\\npsychotropic medications (Prozac and Depakote) had been\\ndiscontinued on July 23, 2010, about two months before he left\\nDixon.\\n Giles was examined by a nurse at Illinois River on October\\n3, 2010, at which point he requested to see a psychologist be-\\ncause he wanted to get back on his medications. The nurse\\nnoted he was “upset that [he] cannot see psych today.” Three\\ndays later, on October 6, Giles was transferred to Stateville\\ndue to an unrelated legal proceeding. On October 9, while\\nGiles was at Stateville, a psychiatrist again prescribed Prozac\\nand Depakote, less than a week after he requested the return\\nto medication.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nGiles’s allegations. As best as can be discerned, Giles was placed in segre-\\ngation during two separate periods and at three different facilities: first, at\\nIllinois River and Pontiac from March 2011 to approximately July 2011 (he\\nwas transferred to Pontiac in April), and second, at Lawrence from Febru-\\nary 2012 until approximately November 2012.\\n 2 Giles acknowledged in his deposition that he did not avail himself\\nof these programs, however, until he returned to Dixon after filing this\\nsuit.\\n\\f4 No. 15-3077\\n\\n Giles was sent back to Illinois River on November 10, 2010.\\nThis time, his transfer summary failed to include the fact that\\nhe was receiving psychotropic medications, resulting in a\\nlapse of medication. Giles was examined by a mental health\\ncounselor on November 22 and then by a psychiatrist on No-\\nvember 25. The psychiatrist again prescribed Prozac and De-\\npakote and requested Giles’s medical records from Stateville.\\nGiles was examined by a medical health counselor on Decem-\\nber 8. On December 12, a psychiatrist reviewed Giles’s medi-\\ncal records from Stateville and noticed Giles had received Pro-\\nlixin while there and his symptoms had improved, so Giles\\nwas placed back on Prolixin.\\n Giles was examined by a mental health counselor on ten\\ndifferent occasions from December 2010 until April 2011. He\\nwas also examined by a psychiatrist and attended group ther-\\napy sessions multiple times in January until he stopped show-\\ning up for the sessions in February.\\n Giles complained to a mental health counselor in March\\n2011 that he was not doing well and that he had not received\\nhis Prolixin medication for two days. The counselor wrote in\\nhis report that he addressed the medication issue with the\\nprison pharmacy. Around this time, Giles had an altercation\\nwith another inmate at Illinois River. According to Giles’s\\ndeposition testimony, the incident occurred when he was\\ntalking to himself and another inmate approached him, told\\nhim to shut up, and spit in his face. Giles pushed the inmate\\naway. He claims the reason he was talking to himself was be-\\ncause he had not received his Prolixin medication, which\\nhelps control the voices in his head.\\n Because of the altercation, Giles was placed in segregation.\\nAccording to Giles, while in segregation “you’re just thrown\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 5\\n\\nin a cell all day with other inmates that are violent, that don’t\\ncare about you.” He claims he was subjected to violence from\\nother inmates in segregation but that he never reported this\\nto prison officials. He testified inmates in segregation were\\ngiven yard time, but that he sometimes chose not to go be-\\ncause he did not feel safe in the yard, claiming “that is where\\nusually everybody fights.”\\n After being placed in segregation in March 2011, Giles at-\\ntempted suicide by cutting his wrists on his bed frame. His\\ntestimony indicates his cousin had passed away around this\\ntime and that his cellmate would not let him sleep at night.\\nHe also testified his symptoms were “just getting so bad,” par-\\nticularly the voices in his head, even though he acknowledges\\nhe was receiving his medications at this time. The stress from\\nthese combined factors led to his suicide attempt. Giles’s cell-\\nmate notified the prison staff and Giles was rescued. After\\nthis, he was placed on suicide watch and was examined by\\nmental health professionals.\\n Giles was examined by a mental health counselor on\\nApril 1 and April 8, 2011. The counselor noted there was “po-\\ntential for exaggeration of symptoms” and that Giles was “co-\\nherent” with “no overt distress.”\\n Giles was again transferred from Illinois River on April 13,\\n2011, this time to Pontiac. He remained in segregation at Pon-\\ntiac. While at Pontiac, Giles alleges he received medication\\nand one-on-one therapy, to “try to give [him] a little hope.”\\nHe felt this treatment was insufficient. He alleges he was not\\ngiven his medications “about twice.” A psychiatrist discontin-\\nued Giles’s existing prescriptions and prescribed new psycho-\\ntropic medications on April 26. Three days later, Giles was\\nagain examined by a psychiatrist who noted “there is nothing\\n\\f6 No. 15-3077\\n\\nto contraindicate continued segregation placement at this\\ntime.”\\n Giles received an extended interview with a psychiatrist\\non May 24, 2011. During this session, Giles stated he was\\n“fine, except that [he had] not been getting [his] Prolixin.” The\\npsychiatrist noted Giles’s mood was good; he was awake,\\nalert, and oriented; he displayed “[n]o acute distress/agita-\\ntion”; his speech was “fluent and coherent”; and his\\n“thoughts were organized.” Giles denied having any suicidal\\nor homicidal thoughts. Besides claiming he had not been re-\\nceiving Prolixin, “[h]e made no mention of any other serious\\nconcerns.” Giles was still in segregation at this time.\\n Giles was scheduled for another psychiatric appointment\\non July 5, 2011, which he did not attend, opting to go to the\\nprison yard instead. He was evaluated by a mental health pro-\\nfessional on July 29, who again noted “there is nothing to con-\\ntraindicate continued segregation placement at this time.” As\\nbest as can be discerned from the record, Giles was removed\\nfrom segregation sometime during July 2011.\\n Giles was transferred to Lawrence in early September\\n2011. He was examined by mental health professionals three\\ntimes in September, four times in October, twice in Novem-\\nber, twice in December, and three times in February 2012. Af-\\nter one of the October examinations, the mental health profes-\\nsional determined Giles was having issues with his cellmate\\nand his cell assignment was exacerbating his symptoms. As a\\nresult, Giles was assigned a new cell and cellmate the next\\nday. Notes from his examination the following week indicate\\n“notable improvement.”\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 7\\n\\n In February 2012, Giles was involved in another alterca-\\ntion with an inmate, which formed the basis of his original\\nfailure-to-protect claim. This altercation occurred when he ac-\\ncidentally bumped into the other inmate in the mess hall\\nwhile talking to himself. The other inmate assumed Giles was\\ntalking to him and struck him in retaliation. Giles was ren-\\ndered unconscious by the attack. Giles testified in his deposi-\\ntion he had never had trouble with this inmate before and\\nnever told the facility staff he felt he was in danger, but that\\n“it happened because of my symptoms. I was there, and [the\\nother inmate] just happened to be aggressive.” During the in-\\nvestigation of the altercation, when he was asked (apparently\\nby prison officials) if he was “guilty,” Giles alleges he simply\\nresponded he was. As a result, both Giles and the other inmate\\nwere placed in segregation. Giles apparently stayed in segre-\\ngation from February until November 2012.\\n Giles was examined by mental health professionals nine\\nmore times during the period spanning from March to July\\n2012. During this time, he expressed his unhappiness at Law-\\nrence, his unhappiness with being in segregation, and the\\nanxiety he felt regarding the possibility of future altercations.\\nGiles reported difficulties with cellmates and frequently re-\\nquested reassignment. The mental health professionals noted\\nGiles lacked focus during treatment sessions and often did\\nnot complete assigned therapy homework.\\n Throughout the two years at issue, Giles filed at least nine-\\nteen grievances. His complaints related to insufficient medical\\ntreatment, delays or interruptions in receiving medication,\\nunconstitutional conditions of confinement, lack of adequate\\nsuicide prevention, vermin infestations, his unhappiness in\\nsegregation, and other issues. He alleges all these grievances\\n\\f8 No. 15-3077\\n\\nwere either ignored outright or, if reviewed, his concerns\\nwere not addressed. He testified in his deposition, however,\\nthat he did not know whether the grievances were reviewed\\nor investigated. We know from the record that at least three\\nof these grievances (filed in March 2012, April 2012, and July\\n2012) were subjected to “Emergency Review” by Marc Hodge\\n(the warden at Lawrence). The record also includes responses\\nto many of Giles’s appeals of his grievances alleging that he\\nwas not receiving his medication, that segregation placement\\nwas not conducive to his mental health, and that the facilities\\nlacked proper mental health programs. These appeals were\\nall denied, as the Department’s Administrative Review Board\\n(the “ARB”) determined, “[b]ased on a total review of all\\navailable information,” that the complaints were without\\nmerit.\\n Giles was eventually transferred back to Dixon in early\\n2014.\\n B. District Court Proceedings\\n Giles filed this suit pro se on September 4, 2012. He named\\nseveral defendants, nine of which remain in the case at this\\nstage: S.A. Godinez (the Department’s acting director during\\nthe relevant time period), Richard Birkey (the warden at Illi-\\nnois River), Leonta Jackson (the assistant warden at Illinois\\nRiver), Ron Zessin (the clinical services supervisor at Illinois\\nRiver), Randy Pfister (the warden at Pontiac), Michael Lemke\\n(the assistant warden at Pontiac), Marc Hodge (the warden at\\nLawrence), Mark Storm (the assistant warden at Lawrence),\\nand Randy Stevenson (the clinical services supervisor at\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 9\\n\\nLawrence).3 Giles asserted three claims under the Eighth\\nAmendment, seeking to hold the defendants liable for these\\nalleged constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.\\nFirst, he asserted a claim of deliberate indifference to serious\\nmedical needs based on his allegations of inadequate treat-\\nment and delays in providing medication at Illinois River,\\nPontiac, and Lawrence. Second, he asserted a conditions-of-\\nconfinement claim based on his allegations of vermin infesta-\\ntions and unsanitary conditions while in segregation at Pon-\\ntiac and Lawrence. Third, he asserted a failure-to-protect\\nclaim based on the February 2012 altercation.\\n The case was referred to a U.S. magistrate judge in late\\n2012, with Giles’s consent. The defendants moved for sum-\\nmary judgment in June 2014. The magistrate judge issued a\\nReport & Recommendation (R&R) and recommended grant-\\ning summary judgment on the ground that Giles failed to\\nshow deliberate indifference. After a de novo review of the\\nR&R and Giles’s objections thereto, the district court adopted\\nthe R&R in its entirety and granted summary judgment to the\\ndefendants.\\n Throughout the district court proceedings, Giles filed mul-\\ntiple motions to appoint counsel. He first filed such a motion\\non September 4, 2012. The magistrate judge denied the motion\\nbecause Giles had not demonstrated that he had attempted to\\nfind counsel on his own. On December 17, Giles filed a motion\\nto reconsider his motion to appoint counsel after attempting\\nunsuccessfully to find an attorney. The magistrate judge again\\ndenied the motion, holding that the issues in the case were not\\n\\n\\n 3 Five other defendants, also Department officials, were dismissed by\\nthe district court in November 2012.\\n\\f10 No. 15-3077\\n\\nfactually complex because discovery had been limited at that\\ntime to only the issue of exhaustion of administrative reme-\\ndies. The court held that Giles was competent to litigate on his\\nown at that stage. Giles filed another motion to appoint coun-\\nsel on July 2, 2013. The court reaffirmed its previous decision\\nthat Giles appeared competent to litigate the case at the cur-\\nrent stage and stated that the issue of appointing counsel\\nwould not be reconsidered until after the resolution of the ad-\\nministrative remedies issue.\\n In August 2013, after the defendants’ deadline to raise a\\nfailure to exhaust administrative remedies defense had ex-\\npired, Giles once again moved the court to appoint counsel\\nfor him. The magistrate judge construed the motion as a mo-\\ntion for recruitment of counsel and granted it, noting that the\\ncourt has no authority to appoint counsel in § 1983 cases but\\ncan seek to recruit a volunteer attorney. See Navejar v. Iyiola,\\n718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court circulated\\na request for representation to the court’s list of “approxi-\\nmately 50 licensed and registered attorneys that have indi-\\ncated an interest in representing indigent litigants in this dis-\\ntrict.” However, no attorneys were willing and available to\\nrepresent Giles immediately.\\n Giles moved in February 2014 for additional time to seek\\ncounsel. Giles argued he needed legal assistance to “prepare\\ndocuments, for dispositive motions, and discovery.” The\\nmagistrate judge denied the motion because Giles had not\\nspecified a deadline for the extension request, but he stated he\\nwould continue to seek a volunteer to represent Giles. Giles\\nfiled another motion to recruit counsel in May 2014. The mag-\\nistrate judge denied the motion as moot, having already\\ngranted the earlier motion to recruit, but once again solicited\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 11\\n\\nvolunteers from the pro bono list. Giles moved for recruit-\\nment of counsel again in August 2014 while summary judg-\\nment was pending. The magistrate judge again explained that\\nthe motion to recruit counsel had previously been granted\\nand that the court had done all it could to solicit a volunteer.\\nGiles’s case was published to the list of volunteers a third\\ntime. The magistrate judge encouraged Giles to continue liti-\\ngating the case to the best of his ability. Finally, Giles filed a\\nmotion to appoint counsel once again in December 2014,\\nwhich the district court denied as moot in January 2015, stat-\\ning that it had already granted Giles’s motion to recruit and\\nthat Giles would be notified if an attorney volunteered to take\\nthe case.\\n Giles also moved multiple times, beginning on October 16,\\n2014, to appoint an expert. The magistrate judge denied these\\nmotions, stating “[t]he discovery period is closed, but the\\nplaintiff may later seek to appoint an expert for trial if the [de-\\nfendants’] motion for summary judgment is denied.”\\n Giles now appeals the district court’s grant of summary\\njudgment on his claim for deliberate indifference to serious\\nmedical needs and his conditions-of-confinement claim, as\\nwell as the district court’s actions regarding his motions to re-\\ncruit counsel and appoint an expert.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment\\nde novo. Knopick v. Jayco, Inc., 895 F.3d 525, 528 (7th Cir. 2018).\\nA district court properly grants summary judgment where\\nthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the\\nmoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.\\nR. CIV. P. 56(a); Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir.\\n\\f12 No. 15-3077\\n\\n2018). All justifiable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-\\nmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255\\n(1986). The non-movant must, however, present specific facts\\nestablishing a material issue for trial, and any inferences must\\nrely on more than mere speculation or conjecture. Aguilar v.\\nGaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 630–31 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States through\\nthe Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of “cruel\\nand unusual punishments.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Estelle v.\\nGamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101 (1976). The Supreme Court has inter-\\npreted the Eighth Amendment to prohibit any punishments\\n“which, although not physically barbarous, ‘involve the un-\\nnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Rhodes v. Chapman,\\n452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,\\n173 (1976)). Thus, the Eighth Amendment gives rise to consti-\\ntutional claims by inmates alleging that the conditions of their\\nconfinement violate this prohibition by imposing “the wanton\\nand unnecessary infliction of pain.” See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.\\nThe Supreme Court has further established that prison offi-\\ncials impose wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain when\\nthey are deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medi-\\ncal needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Giles here appeals summary\\njudgment on both a claim of deliberate indifference to his se-\\nrious medical needs as well as a conditions-of-confinement\\nclaim. We discuss each in turn.\\n A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs\\n To establish an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate in-\\ndifference to serious medical needs, the plaintiff must show\\ntwo elements: one objective and one subjective. Whiting v.\\nWexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n“[T]he plaintiff must prove that he suffered from ‘(1) an\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 13\\n\\nobjectively serious medical condition to which (2) a state offi-\\ncial was deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.’” Id.\\n(quoting Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir.\\n2008)). “[D]eliberate means more than negligent,” though\\n“something less than purposeful.” Duckworth, 532 F.3d at 679.\\nWe have described this subjective element as “’a sufficiently\\nculpable state of mind,’ something akin to recklessness.”\\nArnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting\\nJohnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 2006), overruled on\\nother grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 967 n.1 (7th\\nCir. 2013)). Although the inmate must demonstrate deliberate\\nindifference, he “is not required to show that he was literally\\nignored.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)\\n(quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000)).\\n Regarding the objective element of his claim, Giles has\\nclearly met his burden. His schizoaffective disorder diagno-\\nsis, his symptoms, and his multiple prescriptions for psycho-\\ntropic medications firmly establish that he suffered from an\\nobjectively serious medical condition. See id. (“A serious med-\\nical condition is one that has been diagnosed by a physician\\nas mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a\\nlay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.”).\\nGiles’s claim hinges, therefore, on whether he has shown the\\ndefendants possessed the “sufficiently culpable state of\\nmind” necessary to establish the subjective element of delib-\\nerate indifference. The district court held that Giles failed to\\nmeet this burden. We agree.\\n Giles cannot establish the subjective element of his claim\\nbecause the defendants are all non-medical officials who rea-\\nsonably relied on the judgment of medical professionals. We\\nhave long recognized that the division of labor within a prison\\n\\f14 No. 15-3077\\n\\nnecessitates that non-medical officials may reasonably defer\\nto the judgment of medical professionals regarding inmate\\ntreatment. “If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts\\n… a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in\\nbelieving that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Id. at 656\\n(quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). As\\nthe Third Circuit has held, “absent a reason to believe (or ac-\\ntual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are\\nmistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison\\nofficial … will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment\\nscienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Spruill, 372\\nF.3d at 236.\\n In Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527–28 (7th Cir. 2008), we\\naffirmed summary judgment for non-medical prison officials\\nwho relied on the professional judgment of prison medical\\nstaff. Like Giles, the inmate in Hayes sent several letters and\\nfiled multiple grievances alleging he was receiving inade-\\nquate treatment for his objectively serious medical condition.\\nId. at 526. Although the non-medical officials did not ignore\\nthe inmate’s grievances entirely, they did not investigate fur-\\nther than the medical staff’s reports and summaries, and oth-\\nerwise simply referred the complaints to the medical staff. Id.\\nat 527. We held that the non-medical officials did not have\\n“any duty to do more than they did, in light of their\\nknowledge of the situation.” Id. They “were entitled to rely on\\nthe professional judgment of medical prison officials” and\\n“nothing in [the medical] reports made it obvious that [the in-\\nmate] might not be receiving adequate care.” Id. at 527–28.\\n A review of the record demonstrates that throughout his\\nvarious stints at Illinois River, Stateville, Pontiac, and Law-\\nrence, Giles was receiving regular medical attention from\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 15\\n\\npsychologists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals.\\nAlthough the record does not contain detailed information\\nabout what the grievance procedures were at each facility, it\\ndoes contain evidence that several of his grievances were sub-\\njected to emergency review. Furthermore, Giles’s appeals\\nwere reviewed by the ARB, which found his complaints to be\\nwithout merit upon investigation. Giles has not presented ev-\\nidence that his grievances were ignored or mishandled. Nor\\nwas there an indication from his medical records that he was\\nnot receiving adequate care. In short, the non-medical officials\\nrelied on the medical professionals to provide proper treat-\\nment, and there was nothing to give notice to the officials of a\\nneed to intervene.\\n Giles asserts the defendants were deliberately indifferent\\nby allowing him to “go on and off of his medication many\\ntimes” despite knowing his health condition required contin-\\nuous treatment. However, the record does not support this as-\\nsertion. Giles’s medications were discontinued in July 2010\\nwhile still at Dixon pursuant to a decision made by medical\\nprofessionals. Several weeks later, after being transferred first\\nto Illinois River and then to Stateville, Giles was placed back\\non medications soon after he requested them. Although there\\nwere other brief delays in his receipt of medication, when he\\nbrought these to the medical professionals’ attention his con-\\ncerns were addressed, or else it was determined after a review\\nof all available information that he was properly receiving his\\nmedication as prescribed. Even during one of the periods\\nwhere Giles alleged he was not receiving his medication, a\\npsychiatrist reported after an extended interview that Giles’s\\ndemeanor was good, he was coherent and alert, and he dis-\\nplayed no acute distress or agitation. Such reports from the\\nmedical professionals charged with Giles’s care defy the\\n\\f16 No. 15-3077\\n\\nconclusion that the non-medical defendants knew of and dis-\\nregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety.\\n The most serious lapse in treatment was the two-week pe-\\nriod in November 2010 when he was transferred back to Illi-\\nnois River from Stateville. This lapse was caused by a failure\\nto include his current prescriptions on his transfer summary.\\nWhile this was certainly a concerning oversight, it does not\\nmeet the standard of deliberate indifference: a knowing dis-\\nregard of an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety. As we\\nhave noted before, “deliberate means more than negligent.”\\nDuckworth, 532 F.3d at 679. Giles’s medication was re-pre-\\nscribed as soon as he was examined by a psychologist at Illi-\\nnois River, who requested and reviewed Giles’s medical rec-\\nords from Stateville.\\n No reasonable jury could find that the defendants knew of\\nand disregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety,\\nand thus summary judgment on this claim was appropriate.\\n B. Conditions of Confinement\\n Giles also appeals the grant of summary judgment on his\\nconditions-of-confinement claim. Although the complaint fo-\\ncused on specific conditions to which Giles was subjected\\nwhile in segregation (such as vermin infestations, filthiness,\\nand lengthy periods of isolation), on appeal Giles has re-\\nframed the violation as being the combined effect that these\\nconditions had on his mental health.4 He asserts his place-\\nment in segregation subjected him to conditions which exac-\\nerbated his symptoms, or which were more difficult for him\\n\\n 4 Giles’s counsel explained at oral argument “what’s happening to his\\n\\nmental health while he’s in segregation is the conditions of confinement\\nviolation.”\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 17\\n\\nto cope with due to his symptoms. He argues that even\\nthough segregation placement and the conditions of his con-\\nfinement may not have been cruel and unusual in the case of\\nan ordinary inmate, they amounted to cruel and unusual\\ntreatment in his case given their combined effect on his illness.\\n The Eighth Amendment prohibits the States from subject-\\ning prisoners to conditions of confinement amounting to cruel\\nand unusual punishment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345–47. Accord-\\ning to the Supreme Court, however, “extreme deprivations\\nare required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.”\\nHudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Whether conditions\\nof confinement are cruel and unusual must be judged in ac-\\ncordance with contemporary standards of decency. Id. at 8;\\nRhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. If under contemporary standards the\\nconditions cannot be said to be cruel and unusual, then they\\nare not unconstitutional, and “[t]o the extent that such condi-\\ntions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the pen-\\nalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against so-\\nciety.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.\\n As with a claim for deliberate indifference to serious med-\\nical needs, a conditions-of-confinement claim includes an ob-\\njective and a subjective component. Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d\\n508, 521 (7th Cir. 2017). The plaintiff must first establish “an\\nobjective showing that the conditions are sufficiently seri-\\nous—i.e., that they deny the inmate ‘the minimal civilized\\nmeasure of life’s necessities,’ creating an excessive risk to the\\ninmate’s health and safety.” Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at\\n347) (internal citations omitted). The plaintiff must next estab-\\nlish “a subjective showing of a defendant’s culpable state of\\nmind.” Id. Once again, the state of mind necessary to establish\\nliability is deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or\\n\\f18 No. 15-3077\\n\\nsafety. Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cty. of Wood, 226 F.3d\\n525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n Giles attempts to satisfy the objective element by arguing\\nthat placing a mentally ill inmate in segregation—under con-\\nditions that exacerbate his symptoms or with which he has\\ndifficulty coping due to his symptoms—is an objectively seri-\\nous condition creating an excessive risk to his health and\\nsafety. We have indeed recognized that prolonged segregated\\nconfinement may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation\\nin some instances. See Isby, 856 F.3d at 521 (quoting Rice ex rel.\\nRice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 666 (7th Cir. 2012)). We\\nhave also held that the aggregate effect of a multitude of indi-\\nvidual conditions may constitute a violation even if each in-\\ndividual condition could not establish a violation standing on\\nits own. Id. at 522. However, this only occurs when the condi-\\ntions “have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the dep-\\nrivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food,\\nwarmth, or exercise.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,\\n304 (1991)). The core issue is whether the conditions deprived\\nthe plaintiff of a “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessi-\\nties.” Rice, 675 F.3d at 664–65.\\n While we do not deny that Giles experienced harsh condi-\\ntions in segregation, the record does not support a finding\\nthat he was deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life’s\\nnecessities, even considering the effects on his mental condi-\\ntion. He was regularly evaluated by mental health profession-\\nals at all facilities, and they repeatedly determined that his\\ncondition did not contraindicate continued segregation. And\\non the occasion in November 2011 when a mental health pro-\\nfessional determined that his mental condition was being ex-\\nacerbated by his cell assignment, he was reassigned and\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 19\\n\\nmoved the next day, checked on less than a week later, and\\nwas found to have notably improved. Giles has therefore not\\nestablished the objective element of his claim.\\n Even if Giles could establish an objectively serious condi-\\ntion, he ultimately fails to establish the necessary subjective\\ncomponent of his claim: the defendants’ culpable state of\\nmind. Once again, the defendants relied on the judgment of\\nthe medical professionals into whose care Giles was en-\\ntrusted. No reasonable jury could find that the defendants\\nconsciously disregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health by\\nkeeping him in segregation when the mental health profes-\\nsionals continually reported it was appropriate to do so.\\n Since Giles failed to establish both the objective and sub-\\njective elements of his claim, summary judgment in favor of\\nthe defendants was proper.\\n C. Motions to Recruit Counsel and Appoint Expert\\n The final issue on appeal concerns the district court’s han-\\ndling of Giles’s motions to appoint or recruit counsel and to\\nappoint an expert. We review the district court’s decisions on\\nthese motions for abuse of discretion. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d\\n647, 649, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (reviewing a decision on\\na motion to recruit counsel for abuse of discretion); Ledford v.\\nSullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a deci-\\nsion on a motion for appointment of an expert witness is re-\\nviewed for abuse of discretion). In reviewing for abuse of dis-\\ncretion, we do not substitute our own judgment for the dis-\\ntrict court’s; rather, the “decision must strike us as fundamen-\\ntally wrong for an abuse of discretion to occur.” Ladien v.\\nAstrachan, 128 F.3d 1051, 1056 (7th Cir. 1997).\\n\\f20 No. 15-3077\\n\\n We note at the outset of our discussion that “[t]here is no\\nright to court-appointed counsel in federal civil litigation.”\\nOlson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014). However,\\nthe district court does have the discretion to recruit a volun-\\nteer to represent a plaintiff who cannot otherwise afford coun-\\nsel. Navejar, 718 F.3d at 696. The court “must rely on the gen-\\nerosity of lawyers to volunteer their time and skill on behalf\\nof indigent civil parties.” Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1008\\n(7th Cir. 2018).\\n Evaluating whether to recruit counsel involves a two-step\\nprocess. First, the court must determine if the plaintiff made\\na reasonable attempt to secure counsel on his own. Navejar,\\n718 F.3d at 696. Next, the court must examine “whether the\\ndifficulty of the case—factually and legally—exceeds the par-\\nticular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to coherently present\\nit.” Id. (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). Even where the court\\ndecides to recruit a volunteer, however, it does not have “an\\nindefinite commitment to search until a volunteer is found.”\\nWilborn, 881 F.3d at 1008.\\n The insufficient number of volunteer attorneys in some of\\nour districts limits courts’ ability to locate representation for\\nindigents. See James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 330–31 (7th Cir. 2018).\\nThis case presents the question of what a court should do in\\nthe event a court determines that the case’s complexity ap-\\npears to exceed the plaintiff’s capacity to litigate his claims\\nand the court exercises discretion to seek a volunteer attorney\\nbut is unable to find one.\\n We considered a similar question in Wilborn v. Ealey, 881\\nF.3d 998 (7th Cir. 2018). In that case, the plaintiff filed multiple\\nmotions to recruit counsel. The district court eventually\\ngranted one such motion and spent several months searching.\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 21\\n\\nAfter contacting over four hundred attorneys, the court iden-\\ntified a volunteer. This success was short-lived, though. The\\nattorney had a scheduling conflict, which ultimately led the\\ncourt to grant his motion to withdraw. Despite this change,\\nthe plaintiff did not file another motion to recruit counsel. The\\ncourt offered to postpone the trial, but the plaintiff declined\\nthe court’s offer. As a result, the court allowed the plaintiff to\\nproceed to trial pro se. Based on those facts, we decided that\\nthe court’s efforts were “more than enough to satisfy any duty\\nto the indigent plaintiff,” and we held that the court did not\\nabuse its discretion in allowing the plaintiff to try his case pro\\nse. Id. at 1008.\\n Here too, we conclude that the district court fulfilled its\\nobligation to Giles by circulating a request for representation\\nto the court’s list of approximately fifty attorneys on three sep-\\narate occasions over the course of one year. Yet it is somewhat\\nconcerning that at some point the court determined further\\nsearching would be futile and, without communicating that\\nupdate to Giles, decided it was appropriate to resolve the\\npending motion for summary judgment.\\n Acknowledging that “[t]here are limits to what a court\\nmust do after deciding to recruit counsel,” id., in cases such as\\nthis—where the complexities of litigating are high, having\\ncounsel is increasingly important, and a district court has con-\\ncluded that it is unable to locate a volunteer attorney—it\\nwould be advisable for a judge to communicate with the\\nplaintiff and consider offering a reasonable continuance be-\\nfore proceeding to rule on a dispositive motion. The addi-\\ntional time after a court has exhausted its search efforts might\\nafford a limited opportunity for indigent litigants to seek\\n\\f22 No. 15-3077\\n\\ncounsel on their own, or at a minimum, conduct some prelim-\\ninary discovery.\\n The district court also denied Giles’s motion to appoint an\\nexpert witness, holding that an expert was not necessary be-\\nfore summary judgment but stating that Giles could move to\\nappoint an expert for trial if his case survived summary judg-\\nment. A court may, in its discretion, appoint an expert witness\\nwhere the expert’s “specialized knowledge will assist the\\ntrier-of-fact to understand the evidence or decide a fact in is-\\nsue.” Ledford, 105 F.3d at 358–59. The district court determined\\nGiles’s claims failed as a matter of law to show the defendants\\nknowingly disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to\\nhim. This decision did not hinge on specialized knowledge or\\nfact-finding. Instead, the court recognized Giles had received\\nconsistent treatment from medical professionals and the de-\\nfendants had relied on the medical judgment of those profes-\\nsionals. The grant of summary judgment was based on Giles’s\\nfailure to establish the defendants’ sufficiently culpable state\\nof mind, not on a technical analysis of the medical treatment\\nhe received or the sufficiency of that treatment. Thus, the dis-\\ntrict court acted fully within its discretion by denying the mo-\\ntion to appoint an expert witness at that stage of litigation.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Prison is, by its very nature, an unpleasant place to be, and\\nwe have no doubt that Giles’s objectively serious condition\\nand symptoms contributed to his overall discomfort. The dis-\\npositive defect of Giles’s case, however, is that the defendants\\nagainst whom he has filed this action are non-medical officials\\nwho were entitled by law to rely on the judgment of the med-\\nical professionals under whose care Giles was placed. Section\\n1983 does not create a system of vicarious liability. The\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 23\\n\\ndefendants cannot be held liable unless they were aware of\\nfacts from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that\\nGiles was subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm, drew\\nsuch an inference, and yet did not intervene. Based on this\\nrecord, we hold that Giles has failed to make that showing,\\nand therefore has failed as a matter of law to establish delib-\\nerate indifference. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district\\ncourt.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4362873/\", \"author_raw\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585620/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Bruce Giles v. Salvador Godinez\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 15-3077\nBRUCE GILES,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nSALVADOR A. GODINEZ, Acting Director, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Illinois.\n No. 3:12-cv-00965 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Bruce Giles is a prisoner in the cus-\ntody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (the “Depart-\nment”) who suffers from schizoaffective disorder. Giles filed\nthis action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several De-\npartment officials. He alleges the defendants violated his\nrights under the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately in-\ndifferent to his serious medical needs, subjecting him to un-\nconstitutional conditions of confinement, and failing to\n\f2 No. 15-3077\n\nprotect him from other inmates. The district court granted\nsummary judgment to the defendants and Giles now appeals.\nThe district court’s conclusion was based largely on its hold-\ning that Giles could not establish the subjective elements of\nhis claims because the defendants, who are all non-medical\nofficials, appropriately relied on the judgment of medical pro-\nfessionals. Because we agree Giles cannot establish the de-\nfendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind, we\naffirm.\n I. Background\n A. Factual Background\n At all times relevant to this appeal, Giles was in the cus-\ntody of the Department and housed in five different correc-\ntional facilities: Dixon Correctional Center (“Dixon”), Illinois\nRiver Correctional Center (“Illinois River”), Stateville Correc-\ntional Center (“Stateville”), Pontiac Correctional Center\n(“Pontiac”), and Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”).\nHe suffers from schizoaffective disorder. His symptoms in-\nclude anxiety, depression, auditory hallucinations, and sui-\ncidal ideation. He attempted suicide at least three times while\nin the Department’s custody. He has at various times been\nprescribed psychotropic medications that help him cope with\nthese symptoms but do not eliminate them entirely.\n Giles’s claims arise out of the medical treatment he re-\nceived and the conditions of his confinement at multiple cor-\nrectional facilities over a two-year period. Most of his com-\nplaints relate specifically to his placement in segregation.1 The\n\n 1 Although Giles’s placement in segregation is at the core of his com-\nplaint, the exact duration of his periods in segregation and the nature of\nsegregation placement at each facility are not clear from the record or\n\fNo. 15-3077 3\n\nfollowing timeline of events is compiled from Giles’s allega-\ntions, his medical records, and his deposition testimony.\n From late June 2010 until September 2010, Giles was\nhoused at Dixon, where he alleges he had daily access to men-\ntal health professionals and the opportunity to participate in\ntherapeutic programs.2 On September 22, 2010, Giles was\ntransferred from Dixon to Illinois River. According to the\nhealth status transfer summary prepared by an official at\nDixon at the time of Giles’s transfer, Giles’s prescription for\npsychotropic medications (Prozac and Depakote) had been\ndiscontinued on July 23, 2010, about two months before he left\nDixon.\n Giles was examined by a nurse at Illinois River on October\n3, 2010, at which point he requested to see a psychologist be-\ncause he wanted to get back on his medications. The nurse\nnoted he was “upset that [he] cannot see psych today.” Three\ndays later, on October 6, Giles was transferred to Stateville\ndue to an unrelated legal proceeding. On October 9, while\nGiles was at Stateville, a psychiatrist again prescribed Prozac\nand Depakote, less than a week after he requested the return\nto medication.\n\n\n\n\nGiles’s allegations. As best as can be discerned, Giles was placed in segre-\ngation during two separate periods and at three different facilities: first, at\nIllinois River and Pontiac from March 2011 to approximately July 2011 (he\nwas transferred to Pontiac in April), and second, at Lawrence from Febru-\nary 2012 until approximately November 2012.\n 2 Giles acknowledged in his deposition that he did not avail himself\nof these programs, however, until he returned to Dixon after filing this\nsuit.\n\f4 No. 15-3077\n\n Giles was sent back to Illinois River on November 10, 2010.\nThis time, his transfer summary failed to include the fact that\nhe was receiving psychotropic medications, resulting in a\nlapse of medication. Giles was examined by a mental health\ncounselor on November 22 and then by a psychiatrist on No-\nvember 25. The psychiatrist again prescribed Prozac and De-\npakote and requested Giles’s medical records from Stateville.\nGiles was examined by a medical health counselor on Decem-\nber 8. On December 12, a psychiatrist reviewed Giles’s medi-\ncal records from Stateville and noticed Giles had received Pro-\nlixin while there and his symptoms had improved, so Giles\nwas placed back on Prolixin.\n Giles was examined by a mental health counselor on ten\ndifferent occasions from December 2010 until April 2011. He\nwas also examined by a psychiatrist and attended group ther-\napy sessions multiple times in January until he stopped show-\ning up for the sessions in February.\n Giles complained to a mental health counselor in March\n2011 that he was not doing well and that he had not received\nhis Prolixin medication for two days. The counselor wrote in\nhis report that he addressed the medication issue with the\nprison pharmacy. Around this time, Giles had an altercation\nwith another inmate at Illinois River. According to Giles’s\ndeposition testimony, the incident occurred when he was\ntalking to himself and another inmate approached him, told\nhim to shut up, and spit in his face. Giles pushed the inmate\naway. He claims the reason he was talking to himself was be-\ncause he had not received his Prolixin medication, which\nhelps control the voices in his head.\n Because of the altercation, Giles was placed in segregation.\nAccording to Giles, while in segregation “you’re just thrown\n\fNo. 15-3077 5\n\nin a cell all day with other inmates that are violent, that don’t\ncare about you.” He claims he was subjected to violence from\nother inmates in segregation but that he never reported this\nto prison officials. He testified inmates in segregation were\ngiven yard time, but that he sometimes chose not to go be-\ncause he did not feel safe in the yard, claiming “that is where\nusually everybody fights.”\n After being placed in segregation in March 2011, Giles at-\ntempted suicide by cutting his wrists on his bed frame. His\ntestimony indicates his cousin had passed away around this\ntime and that his cellmate would not let him sleep at night.\nHe also testified his symptoms were “just getting so bad,” par-\nticularly the voices in his head, even though he acknowledges\nhe was receiving his medications at this time. The stress from\nthese combined factors led to his suicide attempt. Giles’s cell-\nmate notified the prison staff and Giles was rescued. After\nthis, he was placed on suicide watch and was examined by\nmental health professionals.\n Giles was examined by a mental health counselor on\nApril 1 and April 8, 2011. The counselor noted there was “po-\ntential for exaggeration of symptoms” and that Giles was “co-\nherent” with “no overt distress.”\n Giles was again transferred from Illinois River on April 13,\n2011, this time to Pontiac. He remained in segregation at Pon-\ntiac. While at Pontiac, Giles alleges he received medication\nand one-on-one therapy, to “try to give [him] a little hope.”\nHe felt this treatment was insufficient. He alleges he was not\ngiven his medications “about twice.” A psychiatrist discontin-\nued Giles’s existing prescriptions and prescribed new psycho-\ntropic medications on April 26. Three days later, Giles was\nagain examined by a psychiatrist who noted “there is nothing\n\f6 No. 15-3077\n\nto contraindicate continued segregation placement at this\ntime.”\n Giles received an extended interview with a psychiatrist\non May 24, 2011. During this session, Giles stated he was\n“fine, except that [he had] not been getting [his] Prolixin.” The\npsychiatrist noted Giles’s mood was good; he was awake,\nalert, and oriented; he displayed “[n]o acute distress/agita-\ntion”; his speech was “fluent and coherent”; and his\n“thoughts were organized.” Giles denied having any suicidal\nor homicidal thoughts. Besides claiming he had not been re-\nceiving Prolixin, “[h]e made no mention of any other serious\nconcerns.” Giles was still in segregation at this time.\n Giles was scheduled for another psychiatric appointment\non July 5, 2011, which he did not attend, opting to go to the\nprison yard instead. He was evaluated by a mental health pro-\nfessional on July 29, who again noted “there is nothing to con-\ntraindicate continued segregation placement at this time.” As\nbest as can be discerned from the record, Giles was removed\nfrom segregation sometime during July 2011.\n Giles was transferred to Lawrence in early September\n2011. He was examined by mental health professionals three\ntimes in September, four times in October, twice in Novem-\nber, twice in December, and three times in February 2012. Af-\nter one of the October examinations, the mental health profes-\nsional determined Giles was having issues with his cellmate\nand his cell assignment was exacerbating his symptoms. As a\nresult, Giles was assigned a new cell and cellmate the next\nday. Notes from his examination the following week indicate\n“notable improvement.”\n\fNo. 15-3077 7\n\n In February 2012, Giles was involved in another alterca-\ntion with an inmate, which formed the basis of his original\nfailure-to-protect claim. This altercation occurred when he ac-\ncidentally bumped into the other inmate in the mess hall\nwhile talking to himself. The other inmate assumed Giles was\ntalking to him and struck him in retaliation. Giles was ren-\ndered unconscious by the attack. Giles testified in his deposi-\ntion he had never had trouble with this inmate before and\nnever told the facility staff he felt he was in danger, but that\n“it happened because of my symptoms. I was there, and [the\nother inmate] just happened to be aggressive.” During the in-\nvestigation of the altercation, when he was asked (apparently\nby prison officials) if he was “guilty,” Giles alleges he simply\nresponded he was. As a result, both Giles and the other inmate\nwere placed in segregation. Giles apparently stayed in segre-\ngation from February until November 2012.\n Giles was examined by mental health professionals nine\nmore times during the period spanning from March to July\n2012. During this time, he expressed his unhappiness at Law-\nrence, his unhappiness with being in segregation, and the\nanxiety he felt regarding the possibility of future altercations.\nGiles reported difficulties with cellmates and frequently re-\nquested reassignment. The mental health professionals noted\nGiles lacked focus during treatment sessions and often did\nnot complete assigned therapy homework.\n Throughout the two years at issue, Giles filed at least nine-\nteen grievances. His complaints related to insufficient medical\ntreatment, delays or interruptions in receiving medication,\nunconstitutional conditions of confinement, lack of adequate\nsuicide prevention, vermin infestations, his unhappiness in\nsegregation, and other issues. He alleges all these grievances\n\f8 No. 15-3077\n\nwere either ignored outright or, if reviewed, his concerns\nwere not addressed. He testified in his deposition, however,\nthat he did not know whether the grievances were reviewed\nor investigated. We know from the record that at least three\nof these grievances (filed in March 2012, April 2012, and July\n2012) were subjected to “Emergency Review” by Marc Hodge\n(the warden at Lawrence). The record also includes responses\nto many of Giles’s appeals of his grievances alleging that he\nwas not receiving his medication, that segregation placement\nwas not conducive to his mental health, and that the facilities\nlacked proper mental health programs. These appeals were\nall denied, as the Department’s Administrative Review Board\n(the “ARB”) determined, “[b]ased on a total review of all\navailable information,” that the complaints were without\nmerit.\n Giles was eventually transferred back to Dixon in early\n2014.\n B. District Court Proceedings\n Giles filed this suit pro se on September 4, 2012. He named\nseveral defendants, nine of which remain in the case at this\nstage: S.A. Godinez (the Department’s acting director during\nthe relevant time period), Richard Birkey (the warden at Illi-\nnois River), Leonta Jackson (the assistant warden at Illinois\nRiver), Ron Zessin (the clinical services supervisor at Illinois\nRiver), Randy Pfister (the warden at Pontiac), Michael Lemke\n(the assistant warden at Pontiac), Marc Hodge (the warden at\nLawrence), Mark Storm (the assistant warden at Lawrence),\nand Randy Stevenson (the clinical services supervisor at\n\fNo. 15-3077 9\n\nLawrence).3 Giles asserted three claims under the Eighth\nAmendment, seeking to hold the defendants liable for these\nalleged constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.\nFirst, he asserted a claim of deliberate indifference to serious\nmedical needs based on his allegations of inadequate treat-\nment and delays in providing medication at Illinois River,\nPontiac, and Lawrence. Second, he asserted a conditions-of-\nconfinement claim based on his allegations of vermin infesta-\ntions and unsanitary conditions while in segregation at Pon-\ntiac and Lawrence. Third, he asserted a failure-to-protect\nclaim based on the February 2012 altercation.\n The case was referred to a U.S. magistrate judge in late\n2012, with Giles’s consent. The defendants moved for sum-\nmary judgment in June 2014. The magistrate judge issued a\nReport & Recommendation (R&R) and recommended grant-\ning summary judgment on the ground that Giles failed to\nshow deliberate indifference. After a de novo review of the\nR&R and Giles’s objections thereto, the district court adopted\nthe R&R in its entirety and granted summary judgment to the\ndefendants.\n Throughout the district court proceedings, Giles filed mul-\ntiple motions to appoint counsel. He first filed such a motion\non September 4, 2012. The magistrate judge denied the motion\nbecause Giles had not demonstrated that he had attempted to\nfind counsel on his own. On December 17, Giles filed a motion\nto reconsider his motion to appoint counsel after attempting\nunsuccessfully to find an attorney. The magistrate judge again\ndenied the motion, holding that the issues in the case were not\n\n\n 3 Five other defendants, also Department officials, were dismissed by\nthe district court in November 2012.\n\f10 No. 15-3077\n\nfactually complex because discovery had been limited at that\ntime to only the issue of exhaustion of administrative reme-\ndies. The court held that Giles was competent to litigate on his\nown at that stage. Giles filed another motion to appoint coun-\nsel on July 2, 2013. The court reaffirmed its previous decision\nthat Giles appeared competent to litigate the case at the cur-\nrent stage and stated that the issue of appointing counsel\nwould not be reconsidered until after the resolution of the ad-\nministrative remedies issue.\n In August 2013, after the defendants’ deadline to raise a\nfailure to exhaust administrative remedies defense had ex-\npired, Giles once again moved the court to appoint counsel\nfor him. The magistrate judge construed the motion as a mo-\ntion for recruitment of counsel and granted it, noting that the\ncourt has no authority to appoint counsel in § 1983 cases but\ncan seek to recruit a volunteer attorney. See Navejar v. Iyiola,\n718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court circulated\na request for representation to the court’s list of “approxi-\nmately 50 licensed and registered attorneys that have indi-\ncated an interest in representing indigent litigants in this dis-\ntrict.” However, no attorneys were willing and available to\nrepresent Giles immediately.\n Giles moved in February 2014 for additional time to seek\ncounsel. Giles argued he needed legal assistance to “prepare\ndocuments, for dispositive motions, and discovery.” The\nmagistrate judge denied the motion because Giles had not\nspecified a deadline for the extension request, but he stated he\nwould continue to seek a volunteer to represent Giles. Giles\nfiled another motion to recruit counsel in May 2014. The mag-\nistrate judge denied the motion as moot, having already\ngranted the earlier motion to recruit, but once again solicited\n\fNo. 15-3077 11\n\nvolunteers from the pro bono list. Giles moved for recruit-\nment of counsel again in August 2014 while summary judg-\nment was pending. The magistrate judge again explained that\nthe motion to recruit counsel had previously been granted\nand that the court had done all it could to solicit a volunteer.\nGiles’s case was published to the list of volunteers a third\ntime. The magistrate judge encouraged Giles to continue liti-\ngating the case to the best of his ability. Finally, Giles filed a\nmotion to appoint counsel once again in December 2014,\nwhich the district court denied as moot in January 2015, stat-\ning that it had already granted Giles’s motion to recruit and\nthat Giles would be notified if an attorney volunteered to take\nthe case.\n Giles also moved multiple times, beginning on October 16,\n2014, to appoint an expert. The magistrate judge denied these\nmotions, stating “[t]he discovery period is closed, but the\nplaintiff may later seek to appoint an expert for trial if the [de-\nfendants’] motion for summary judgment is denied.”\n Giles now appeals the district court’s grant of summary\njudgment on his claim for deliberate indifference to serious\nmedical needs and his conditions-of-confinement claim, as\nwell as the district court’s actions regarding his motions to re-\ncruit counsel and appoint an expert.\n II. Discussion\n We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment\nde novo. Knopick v. Jayco, Inc., 895 F.3d 525, 528 (7th Cir. 2018).\nA district court properly grants summary judgment where\nthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the\nmoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.\nR. CIV. P. 56(a); Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir.\n\f12 No. 15-3077\n\n2018). All justifiable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-\nmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255\n(1986). The non-movant must, however, present specific facts\nestablishing a material issue for trial, and any inferences must\nrely on more than mere speculation or conjecture. Aguilar v.\nGaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 630–31 (7th Cir. 2017).\n The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States through\nthe Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of “cruel\nand unusual punishments.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Estelle v.\nGamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101 (1976). The Supreme Court has inter-\npreted the Eighth Amendment to prohibit any punishments\n“which, although not physically barbarous, ‘involve the un-\nnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Rhodes v. Chapman,\n452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,\n173 (1976)). Thus, the Eighth Amendment gives rise to consti-\ntutional claims by inmates alleging that the conditions of their\nconfinement violate this prohibition by imposing “the wanton\nand unnecessary infliction of pain.” See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.\nThe Supreme Court has further established that prison offi-\ncials impose wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain when\nthey are deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medi-\ncal needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Giles here appeals summary\njudgment on both a claim of deliberate indifference to his se-\nrious medical needs as well as a conditions-of-confinement\nclaim. We discuss each in turn.\n A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs\n To establish an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate in-\ndifference to serious medical needs, the plaintiff must show\ntwo elements: one objective and one subjective. Whiting v.\nWexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016).\n“[T]he plaintiff must prove that he suffered from ‘(1) an\n\fNo. 15-3077 13\n\nobjectively serious medical condition to which (2) a state offi-\ncial was deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.’” Id.\n(quoting Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir.\n2008)). “[D]eliberate means more than negligent,” though\n“something less than purposeful.” Duckworth, 532 F.3d at 679.\nWe have described this subjective element as “’a sufficiently\nculpable state of mind,’ something akin to recklessness.”\nArnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting\nJohnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 2006), overruled on\nother grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 967 n.1 (7th\nCir. 2013)). Although the inmate must demonstrate deliberate\nindifference, he “is not required to show that he was literally\nignored.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)\n(quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000)).\n Regarding the objective element of his claim, Giles has\nclearly met his burden. His schizoaffective disorder diagno-\nsis, his symptoms, and his multiple prescriptions for psycho-\ntropic medications firmly establish that he suffered from an\nobjectively serious medical condition. See id. (“A serious med-\nical condition is one that has been diagnosed by a physician\nas mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a\nlay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.”).\nGiles’s claim hinges, therefore, on whether he has shown the\ndefendants possessed the “sufficiently culpable state of\nmind” necessary to establish the subjective element of delib-\nerate indifference. The district court held that Giles failed to\nmeet this burden. We agree.\n Giles cannot establish the subjective element of his claim\nbecause the defendants are all non-medical officials who rea-\nsonably relied on the judgment of medical professionals. We\nhave long recognized that the division of labor within a prison\n\f14 No. 15-3077\n\nnecessitates that non-medical officials may reasonably defer\nto the judgment of medical professionals regarding inmate\ntreatment. “If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts\n… a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in\nbelieving that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Id. at 656\n(quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). As\nthe Third Circuit has held, “absent a reason to believe (or ac-\ntual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are\nmistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison\nofficial … will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment\nscienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Spruill, 372\nF.3d at 236.\n In Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527–28 (7th Cir. 2008), we\naffirmed summary judgment for non-medical prison officials\nwho relied on the professional judgment of prison medical\nstaff. Like Giles, the inmate in Hayes sent several letters and\nfiled multiple grievances alleging he was receiving inade-\nquate treatment for his objectively serious medical condition.\nId. at 526. Although the non-medical officials did not ignore\nthe inmate’s grievances entirely, they did not investigate fur-\nther than the medical staff’s reports and summaries, and oth-\nerwise simply referred the complaints to the medical staff. Id.\nat 527. We held that the non-medical officials did not have\n“any duty to do more than they did, in light of their\nknowledge of the situation.” Id. They “were entitled to rely on\nthe professional judgment of medical prison officials” and\n“nothing in [the medical] reports made it obvious that [the in-\nmate] might not be receiving adequate care.” Id. at 527–28.\n A review of the record demonstrates that throughout his\nvarious stints at Illinois River, Stateville, Pontiac, and Law-\nrence, Giles was receiving regular medical attention from\n\fNo. 15-3077 15\n\npsychologists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals.\nAlthough the record does not contain detailed information\nabout what the grievance procedures were at each facility, it\ndoes contain evidence that several of his grievances were sub-\njected to emergency review. Furthermore, Giles’s appeals\nwere reviewed by the ARB, which found his complaints to be\nwithout merit upon investigation. Giles has not presented ev-\nidence that his grievances were ignored or mishandled. Nor\nwas there an indication from his medical records that he was\nnot receiving adequate care. In short, the non-medical officials\nrelied on the medical professionals to provide proper treat-\nment, and there was nothing to give notice to the officials of a\nneed to intervene.\n Giles asserts the defendants were deliberately indifferent\nby allowing him to “go on and off of his medication many\ntimes” despite knowing his health condition required contin-\nuous treatment. However, the record does not support this as-\nsertion. Giles’s medications were discontinued in July 2010\nwhile still at Dixon pursuant to a decision made by medical\nprofessionals. Several weeks later, after being transferred first\nto Illinois River and then to Stateville, Giles was placed back\non medications soon after he requested them. Although there\nwere other brief delays in his receipt of medication, when he\nbrought these to the medical professionals’ attention his con-\ncerns were addressed, or else it was determined after a review\nof all available information that he was properly receiving his\nmedication as prescribed. Even during one of the periods\nwhere Giles alleged he was not receiving his medication, a\npsychiatrist reported after an extended interview that Giles’s\ndemeanor was good, he was coherent and alert, and he dis-\nplayed no acute distress or agitation. Such reports from the\nmedical professionals charged with Giles’s care defy the\n\f16 No. 15-3077\n\nconclusion that the non-medical defendants knew of and dis-\nregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety.\n The most serious lapse in treatment was the two-week pe-\nriod in November 2010 when he was transferred back to Illi-\nnois River from Stateville. This lapse was caused by a failure\nto include his current prescriptions on his transfer summary.\nWhile this was certainly a concerning oversight, it does not\nmeet the standard of deliberate indifference: a knowing dis-\nregard of an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety. As we\nhave noted before, “deliberate means more than negligent.”\nDuckworth, 532 F.3d at 679. Giles’s medication was re-pre-\nscribed as soon as he was examined by a psychologist at Illi-\nnois River, who requested and reviewed Giles’s medical rec-\nords from Stateville.\n No reasonable jury could find that the defendants knew of\nand disregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety,\nand thus summary judgment on this claim was appropriate.\n B. Conditions of Confinement\n Giles also appeals the grant of summary judgment on his\nconditions-of-confinement claim. Although the complaint fo-\ncused on specific conditions to which Giles was subjected\nwhile in segregation (such as vermin infestations, filthiness,\nand lengthy periods of isolation), on appeal Giles has re-\nframed the violation as being the combined effect that these\nconditions had on his mental health.4 He asserts his place-\nment in segregation subjected him to conditions which exac-\nerbated his symptoms, or which were more difficult for him\n\n 4 Giles’s counsel explained at oral argument “what’s happening to his\n\nmental health while he’s in segregation is the conditions of confinement\nviolation.”\n\fNo. 15-3077 17\n\nto cope with due to his symptoms. He argues that even\nthough segregation placement and the conditions of his con-\nfinement may not have been cruel and unusual in the case of\nan ordinary inmate, they amounted to cruel and unusual\ntreatment in his case given their combined effect on his illness.\n The Eighth Amendment prohibits the States from subject-\ning prisoners to conditions of confinement amounting to cruel\nand unusual punishment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345–47. Accord-\ning to the Supreme Court, however, “extreme deprivations\nare required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.”\nHudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Whether conditions\nof confinement are cruel and unusual must be judged in ac-\ncordance with contemporary standards of decency. Id. at 8;\nRhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. If under contemporary standards the\nconditions cannot be said to be cruel and unusual, then they\nare not unconstitutional, and “[t]o the extent that such condi-\ntions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the pen-\nalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against so-\nciety.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.\n As with a claim for deliberate indifference to serious med-\nical needs, a conditions-of-confinement claim includes an ob-\njective and a subjective component. Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d\n508, 521 (7th Cir. 2017). The plaintiff must first establish “an\nobjective showing that the conditions are sufficiently seri-\nous—i.e., that they deny the inmate ‘the minimal civilized\nmeasure of life’s necessities,’ creating an excessive risk to the\ninmate’s health and safety.” Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at\n347) (internal citations omitted). The plaintiff must next estab-\nlish “a subjective showing of a defendant’s culpable state of\nmind.” Id. Once again, the state of mind necessary to establish\nliability is deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or\n\f18 No. 15-3077\n\nsafety. Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cty. of Wood, 226 F.3d\n525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000).\n Giles attempts to satisfy the objective element by arguing\nthat placing a mentally ill inmate in segregation—under con-\nditions that exacerbate his symptoms or with which he has\ndifficulty coping due to his symptoms—is an objectively seri-\nous condition creating an excessive risk to his health and\nsafety. We have indeed recognized that prolonged segregated\nconfinement may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation\nin some instances. See Isby, 856 F.3d at 521 (quoting Rice ex rel.\nRice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 666 (7th Cir. 2012)). We\nhave also held that the aggregate effect of a multitude of indi-\nvidual conditions may constitute a violation even if each in-\ndividual condition could not establish a violation standing on\nits own. Id. at 522. However, this only occurs when the condi-\ntions “have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the dep-\nrivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food,\nwarmth, or exercise.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,\n304 (1991)). The core issue is whether the conditions deprived\nthe plaintiff of a “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessi-\nties.” Rice, 675 F.3d at 664–65.\n While we do not deny that Giles experienced harsh condi-\ntions in segregation, the record does not support a finding\nthat he was deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life’s\nnecessities, even considering the effects on his mental condi-\ntion. He was regularly evaluated by mental health profession-\nals at all facilities, and they repeatedly determined that his\ncondition did not contraindicate continued segregation. And\non the occasion in November 2011 when a mental health pro-\nfessional determined that his mental condition was being ex-\nacerbated by his cell assignment, he was reassigned and\n\fNo. 15-3077 19\n\nmoved the next day, checked on less than a week later, and\nwas found to have notably improved. Giles has therefore not\nestablished the objective element of his claim.\n Even if Giles could establish an objectively serious condi-\ntion, he ultimately fails to establish the necessary subjective\ncomponent of his claim: the defendants’ culpable state of\nmind. Once again, the defendants relied on the judgment of\nthe medical professionals into whose care Giles was en-\ntrusted. No reasonable jury could find that the defendants\nconsciously disregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health by\nkeeping him in segregation when the mental health profes-\nsionals continually reported it was appropriate to do so.\n Since Giles failed to establish both the objective and sub-\njective elements of his claim, summary judgment in favor of\nthe defendants was proper.\n C. Motions to Recruit Counsel and Appoint Expert\n The final issue on appeal concerns the district court’s han-\ndling of Giles’s motions to appoint or recruit counsel and to\nappoint an expert. We review the district court’s decisions on\nthese motions for abuse of discretion. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d\n647, 649, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (reviewing a decision on\na motion to recruit counsel for abuse of discretion); Ledford v.\nSullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a deci-\nsion on a motion for appointment of an expert witness is re-\nviewed for abuse of discretion). In reviewing for abuse of dis-\ncretion, we do not substitute our own judgment for the dis-\ntrict court’s; rather, the “decision must strike us as fundamen-\ntally wrong for an abuse of discretion to occur.” Ladien v.\nAstrachan, 128 F.3d 1051, 1056 (7th Cir. 1997).\n\f20 No. 15-3077\n\n We note at the outset of our discussion that “[t]here is no\nright to court-appointed counsel in federal civil litigation.”\nOlson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014). However,\nthe district court does have the discretion to recruit a volun-\nteer to represent a plaintiff who cannot otherwise afford coun-\nsel. Navejar, 718 F.3d at 696. The court “must rely on the gen-\nerosity of lawyers to volunteer their time and skill on behalf\nof indigent civil parties.” Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1008\n(7th Cir. 2018).\n Evaluating whether to recruit counsel involves a two-step\nprocess. First, the court must determine if the plaintiff made\na reasonable attempt to secure counsel on his own. Navejar,\n718 F.3d at 696. Next, the court must examine “whether the\ndifficulty of the case—factually and legally—exceeds the par-\nticular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to coherently present\nit.” Id. (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). Even where the court\ndecides to recruit a volunteer, however, it does not have “an\nindefinite commitment to search until a volunteer is found.”\nWilborn, 881 F.3d at 1008.\n The insufficient number of volunteer attorneys in some of\nour districts limits courts’ ability to locate representation for\nindigents. See James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 330–31 (7th Cir. 2018).\nThis case presents the question of what a court should do in\nthe event a court determines that the case’s complexity ap-\npears to exceed the plaintiff’s capacity to litigate his claims\nand the court exercises discretion to seek a volunteer attorney\nbut is unable to find one.\n We considered a similar question in Wilborn v. Ealey, 881\nF.3d 998 (7th Cir. 2018). In that case, the plaintiff filed multiple\nmotions to recruit counsel. The district court eventually\ngranted one such motion and spent several months searching.\n\fNo. 15-3077 21\n\nAfter contacting over four hundred attorneys, the court iden-\ntified a volunteer. This success was short-lived, though. The\nattorney had a scheduling conflict, which ultimately led the\ncourt to grant his motion to withdraw. Despite this change,\nthe plaintiff did not file another motion to recruit counsel. The\ncourt offered to postpone the trial, but the plaintiff declined\nthe court’s offer. As a result, the court allowed the plaintiff to\nproceed to trial pro se. Based on those facts, we decided that\nthe court’s efforts were “more than enough to satisfy any duty\nto the indigent plaintiff,” and we held that the court did not\nabuse its discretion in allowing the plaintiff to try his case pro\nse. Id. at 1008.\n Here too, we conclude that the district court fulfilled its\nobligation to Giles by circulating a request for representation\nto the court’s list of approximately fifty attorneys on three sep-\narate occasions over the course of one year. Yet it is somewhat\nconcerning that at some point the court determined further\nsearching would be futile and, without communicating that\nupdate to Giles, decided it was appropriate to resolve the\npending motion for summary judgment.\n Acknowledging that “[t]here are limits to what a court\nmust do after deciding to recruit counsel,” id., in cases such as\nthis—where the complexities of litigating are high, having\ncounsel is increasingly important, and a district court has con-\ncluded that it is unable to locate a volunteer attorney—it\nwould be advisable for a judge to communicate with the\nplaintiff and consider offering a reasonable continuance be-\nfore proceeding to rule on a dispositive motion. The addi-\ntional time after a court has exhausted its search efforts might\nafford a limited opportunity for indigent litigants to seek\n\f22 No. 15-3077\n\ncounsel on their own, or at a minimum, conduct some prelim-\ninary discovery.\n The district court also denied Giles’s motion to appoint an\nexpert witness, holding that an expert was not necessary be-\nfore summary judgment but stating that Giles could move to\nappoint an expert for trial if his case survived summary judg-\nment. A court may, in its discretion, appoint an expert witness\nwhere the expert’s “specialized knowledge will assist the\ntrier-of-fact to understand the evidence or decide a fact in is-\nsue.” Ledford, 105 F.3d at 358–59. The district court determined\nGiles’s claims failed as a matter of law to show the defendants\nknowingly disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to\nhim. This decision did not hinge on specialized knowledge or\nfact-finding. Instead, the court recognized Giles had received\nconsistent treatment from medical professionals and the de-\nfendants had relied on the medical judgment of those profes-\nsionals. The grant of summary judgment was based on Giles’s\nfailure to establish the defendants’ sufficiently culpable state\nof mind, not on a technical analysis of the medical treatment\nhe received or the sufficiency of that treatment. Thus, the dis-\ntrict court acted fully within its discretion by denying the mo-\ntion to appoint an expert witness at that stage of litigation.\n III. Conclusion\n Prison is, by its very nature, an unpleasant place to be, and\nwe have no doubt that Giles’s objectively serious condition\nand symptoms contributed to his overall discomfort. The dis-\npositive defect of Giles’s case, however, is that the defendants\nagainst whom he has filed this action are non-medical officials\nwho were entitled by law to rely on the judgment of the med-\nical professionals under whose care Giles was placed. Section\n1983 does not create a system of vicarious liability. The\n\fNo. 15-3077 23\n\ndefendants cannot be held liable unless they were aware of\nfacts from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that\nGiles was subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm, drew\nsuch an inference, and yet did not intervene. Based on this\nrecord, we hold that Giles has failed to make that showing,\nand therefore has failed as a matter of law to establish delib-\nerate indifference. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district\ncourt.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Bruce Giles v. Salvador Godinez\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 15-3077\\nBRUCE GILES,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nSALVADOR A. GODINEZ, Acting Director, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 3:12-cv-00965 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Bruce Giles is a prisoner in the cus-\\ntody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (the “Depart-\\nment”) who suffers from schizoaffective disorder. Giles filed\\nthis action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several De-\\npartment officials. He alleges the defendants violated his\\nrights under the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately in-\\ndifferent to his serious medical needs, subjecting him to un-\\nconstitutional conditions of confinement, and failing to\\n\\f2 No. 15-3077\\n\\nprotect him from other inmates. The district court granted\\nsummary judgment to the defendants and Giles now appeals.\\nThe district court’s conclusion was based largely on its hold-\\ning that Giles could not establish the subjective elements of\\nhis claims because the defendants, who are all non-medical\\nofficials, appropriately relied on the judgment of medical pro-\\nfessionals. Because we agree Giles cannot establish the de-\\nfendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind, we\\naffirm.\\n I. Background\\n A. Factual Background\\n At all times relevant to this appeal, Giles was in the cus-\\ntody of the Department and housed in five different correc-\\ntional facilities: Dixon Correctional Center (“Dixon”), Illinois\\nRiver Correctional Center (“Illinois River”), Stateville Correc-\\ntional Center (“Stateville”), Pontiac Correctional Center\\n(“Pontiac”), and Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”).\\nHe suffers from schizoaffective disorder. His symptoms in-\\nclude anxiety, depression, auditory hallucinations, and sui-\\ncidal ideation. He attempted suicide at least three times while\\nin the Department’s custody. He has at various times been\\nprescribed psychotropic medications that help him cope with\\nthese symptoms but do not eliminate them entirely.\\n Giles’s claims arise out of the medical treatment he re-\\nceived and the conditions of his confinement at multiple cor-\\nrectional facilities over a two-year period. Most of his com-\\nplaints relate specifically to his placement in segregation.1 The\\n\\n 1 Although Giles’s placement in segregation is at the core of his com-\\nplaint, the exact duration of his periods in segregation and the nature of\\nsegregation placement at each facility are not clear from the record or\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 3\\n\\nfollowing timeline of events is compiled from Giles’s allega-\\ntions, his medical records, and his deposition testimony.\\n From late June 2010 until September 2010, Giles was\\nhoused at Dixon, where he alleges he had daily access to men-\\ntal health professionals and the opportunity to participate in\\ntherapeutic programs.2 On September 22, 2010, Giles was\\ntransferred from Dixon to Illinois River. According to the\\nhealth status transfer summary prepared by an official at\\nDixon at the time of Giles’s transfer, Giles’s prescription for\\npsychotropic medications (Prozac and Depakote) had been\\ndiscontinued on July 23, 2010, about two months before he left\\nDixon.\\n Giles was examined by a nurse at Illinois River on October\\n3, 2010, at which point he requested to see a psychologist be-\\ncause he wanted to get back on his medications. The nurse\\nnoted he was “upset that [he] cannot see psych today.” Three\\ndays later, on October 6, Giles was transferred to Stateville\\ndue to an unrelated legal proceeding. On October 9, while\\nGiles was at Stateville, a psychiatrist again prescribed Prozac\\nand Depakote, less than a week after he requested the return\\nto medication.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nGiles’s allegations. As best as can be discerned, Giles was placed in segre-\\ngation during two separate periods and at three different facilities: first, at\\nIllinois River and Pontiac from March 2011 to approximately July 2011 (he\\nwas transferred to Pontiac in April), and second, at Lawrence from Febru-\\nary 2012 until approximately November 2012.\\n 2 Giles acknowledged in his deposition that he did not avail himself\\nof these programs, however, until he returned to Dixon after filing this\\nsuit.\\n\\f4 No. 15-3077\\n\\n Giles was sent back to Illinois River on November 10, 2010.\\nThis time, his transfer summary failed to include the fact that\\nhe was receiving psychotropic medications, resulting in a\\nlapse of medication. Giles was examined by a mental health\\ncounselor on November 22 and then by a psychiatrist on No-\\nvember 25. The psychiatrist again prescribed Prozac and De-\\npakote and requested Giles’s medical records from Stateville.\\nGiles was examined by a medical health counselor on Decem-\\nber 8. On December 12, a psychiatrist reviewed Giles’s medi-\\ncal records from Stateville and noticed Giles had received Pro-\\nlixin while there and his symptoms had improved, so Giles\\nwas placed back on Prolixin.\\n Giles was examined by a mental health counselor on ten\\ndifferent occasions from December 2010 until April 2011. He\\nwas also examined by a psychiatrist and attended group ther-\\napy sessions multiple times in January until he stopped show-\\ning up for the sessions in February.\\n Giles complained to a mental health counselor in March\\n2011 that he was not doing well and that he had not received\\nhis Prolixin medication for two days. The counselor wrote in\\nhis report that he addressed the medication issue with the\\nprison pharmacy. Around this time, Giles had an altercation\\nwith another inmate at Illinois River. According to Giles’s\\ndeposition testimony, the incident occurred when he was\\ntalking to himself and another inmate approached him, told\\nhim to shut up, and spit in his face. Giles pushed the inmate\\naway. He claims the reason he was talking to himself was be-\\ncause he had not received his Prolixin medication, which\\nhelps control the voices in his head.\\n Because of the altercation, Giles was placed in segregation.\\nAccording to Giles, while in segregation “you’re just thrown\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 5\\n\\nin a cell all day with other inmates that are violent, that don’t\\ncare about you.” He claims he was subjected to violence from\\nother inmates in segregation but that he never reported this\\nto prison officials. He testified inmates in segregation were\\ngiven yard time, but that he sometimes chose not to go be-\\ncause he did not feel safe in the yard, claiming “that is where\\nusually everybody fights.”\\n After being placed in segregation in March 2011, Giles at-\\ntempted suicide by cutting his wrists on his bed frame. His\\ntestimony indicates his cousin had passed away around this\\ntime and that his cellmate would not let him sleep at night.\\nHe also testified his symptoms were “just getting so bad,” par-\\nticularly the voices in his head, even though he acknowledges\\nhe was receiving his medications at this time. The stress from\\nthese combined factors led to his suicide attempt. Giles’s cell-\\nmate notified the prison staff and Giles was rescued. After\\nthis, he was placed on suicide watch and was examined by\\nmental health professionals.\\n Giles was examined by a mental health counselor on\\nApril 1 and April 8, 2011. The counselor noted there was “po-\\ntential for exaggeration of symptoms” and that Giles was “co-\\nherent” with “no overt distress.”\\n Giles was again transferred from Illinois River on April 13,\\n2011, this time to Pontiac. He remained in segregation at Pon-\\ntiac. While at Pontiac, Giles alleges he received medication\\nand one-on-one therapy, to “try to give [him] a little hope.”\\nHe felt this treatment was insufficient. He alleges he was not\\ngiven his medications “about twice.” A psychiatrist discontin-\\nued Giles’s existing prescriptions and prescribed new psycho-\\ntropic medications on April 26. Three days later, Giles was\\nagain examined by a psychiatrist who noted “there is nothing\\n\\f6 No. 15-3077\\n\\nto contraindicate continued segregation placement at this\\ntime.”\\n Giles received an extended interview with a psychiatrist\\non May 24, 2011. During this session, Giles stated he was\\n“fine, except that [he had] not been getting [his] Prolixin.” The\\npsychiatrist noted Giles’s mood was good; he was awake,\\nalert, and oriented; he displayed “[n]o acute distress/agita-\\ntion”; his speech was “fluent and coherent”; and his\\n“thoughts were organized.” Giles denied having any suicidal\\nor homicidal thoughts. Besides claiming he had not been re-\\nceiving Prolixin, “[h]e made no mention of any other serious\\nconcerns.” Giles was still in segregation at this time.\\n Giles was scheduled for another psychiatric appointment\\non July 5, 2011, which he did not attend, opting to go to the\\nprison yard instead. He was evaluated by a mental health pro-\\nfessional on July 29, who again noted “there is nothing to con-\\ntraindicate continued segregation placement at this time.” As\\nbest as can be discerned from the record, Giles was removed\\nfrom segregation sometime during July 2011.\\n Giles was transferred to Lawrence in early September\\n2011. He was examined by mental health professionals three\\ntimes in September, four times in October, twice in Novem-\\nber, twice in December, and three times in February 2012. Af-\\nter one of the October examinations, the mental health profes-\\nsional determined Giles was having issues with his cellmate\\nand his cell assignment was exacerbating his symptoms. As a\\nresult, Giles was assigned a new cell and cellmate the next\\nday. Notes from his examination the following week indicate\\n“notable improvement.”\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 7\\n\\n In February 2012, Giles was involved in another alterca-\\ntion with an inmate, which formed the basis of his original\\nfailure-to-protect claim. This altercation occurred when he ac-\\ncidentally bumped into the other inmate in the mess hall\\nwhile talking to himself. The other inmate assumed Giles was\\ntalking to him and struck him in retaliation. Giles was ren-\\ndered unconscious by the attack. Giles testified in his deposi-\\ntion he had never had trouble with this inmate before and\\nnever told the facility staff he felt he was in danger, but that\\n“it happened because of my symptoms. I was there, and [the\\nother inmate] just happened to be aggressive.” During the in-\\nvestigation of the altercation, when he was asked (apparently\\nby prison officials) if he was “guilty,” Giles alleges he simply\\nresponded he was. As a result, both Giles and the other inmate\\nwere placed in segregation. Giles apparently stayed in segre-\\ngation from February until November 2012.\\n Giles was examined by mental health professionals nine\\nmore times during the period spanning from March to July\\n2012. During this time, he expressed his unhappiness at Law-\\nrence, his unhappiness with being in segregation, and the\\nanxiety he felt regarding the possibility of future altercations.\\nGiles reported difficulties with cellmates and frequently re-\\nquested reassignment. The mental health professionals noted\\nGiles lacked focus during treatment sessions and often did\\nnot complete assigned therapy homework.\\n Throughout the two years at issue, Giles filed at least nine-\\nteen grievances. His complaints related to insufficient medical\\ntreatment, delays or interruptions in receiving medication,\\nunconstitutional conditions of confinement, lack of adequate\\nsuicide prevention, vermin infestations, his unhappiness in\\nsegregation, and other issues. He alleges all these grievances\\n\\f8 No. 15-3077\\n\\nwere either ignored outright or, if reviewed, his concerns\\nwere not addressed. He testified in his deposition, however,\\nthat he did not know whether the grievances were reviewed\\nor investigated. We know from the record that at least three\\nof these grievances (filed in March 2012, April 2012, and July\\n2012) were subjected to “Emergency Review” by Marc Hodge\\n(the warden at Lawrence). The record also includes responses\\nto many of Giles’s appeals of his grievances alleging that he\\nwas not receiving his medication, that segregation placement\\nwas not conducive to his mental health, and that the facilities\\nlacked proper mental health programs. These appeals were\\nall denied, as the Department’s Administrative Review Board\\n(the “ARB”) determined, “[b]ased on a total review of all\\navailable information,” that the complaints were without\\nmerit.\\n Giles was eventually transferred back to Dixon in early\\n2014.\\n B. District Court Proceedings\\n Giles filed this suit pro se on September 4, 2012. He named\\nseveral defendants, nine of which remain in the case at this\\nstage: S.A. Godinez (the Department’s acting director during\\nthe relevant time period), Richard Birkey (the warden at Illi-\\nnois River), Leonta Jackson (the assistant warden at Illinois\\nRiver), Ron Zessin (the clinical services supervisor at Illinois\\nRiver), Randy Pfister (the warden at Pontiac), Michael Lemke\\n(the assistant warden at Pontiac), Marc Hodge (the warden at\\nLawrence), Mark Storm (the assistant warden at Lawrence),\\nand Randy Stevenson (the clinical services supervisor at\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 9\\n\\nLawrence).3 Giles asserted three claims under the Eighth\\nAmendment, seeking to hold the defendants liable for these\\nalleged constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.\\nFirst, he asserted a claim of deliberate indifference to serious\\nmedical needs based on his allegations of inadequate treat-\\nment and delays in providing medication at Illinois River,\\nPontiac, and Lawrence. Second, he asserted a conditions-of-\\nconfinement claim based on his allegations of vermin infesta-\\ntions and unsanitary conditions while in segregation at Pon-\\ntiac and Lawrence. Third, he asserted a failure-to-protect\\nclaim based on the February 2012 altercation.\\n The case was referred to a U.S. magistrate judge in late\\n2012, with Giles’s consent. The defendants moved for sum-\\nmary judgment in June 2014. The magistrate judge issued a\\nReport & Recommendation (R&R) and recommended grant-\\ning summary judgment on the ground that Giles failed to\\nshow deliberate indifference. After a de novo review of the\\nR&R and Giles’s objections thereto, the district court adopted\\nthe R&R in its entirety and granted summary judgment to the\\ndefendants.\\n Throughout the district court proceedings, Giles filed mul-\\ntiple motions to appoint counsel. He first filed such a motion\\non September 4, 2012. The magistrate judge denied the motion\\nbecause Giles had not demonstrated that he had attempted to\\nfind counsel on his own. On December 17, Giles filed a motion\\nto reconsider his motion to appoint counsel after attempting\\nunsuccessfully to find an attorney. The magistrate judge again\\ndenied the motion, holding that the issues in the case were not\\n\\n\\n 3 Five other defendants, also Department officials, were dismissed by\\nthe district court in November 2012.\\n\\f10 No. 15-3077\\n\\nfactually complex because discovery had been limited at that\\ntime to only the issue of exhaustion of administrative reme-\\ndies. The court held that Giles was competent to litigate on his\\nown at that stage. Giles filed another motion to appoint coun-\\nsel on July 2, 2013. The court reaffirmed its previous decision\\nthat Giles appeared competent to litigate the case at the cur-\\nrent stage and stated that the issue of appointing counsel\\nwould not be reconsidered until after the resolution of the ad-\\nministrative remedies issue.\\n In August 2013, after the defendants’ deadline to raise a\\nfailure to exhaust administrative remedies defense had ex-\\npired, Giles once again moved the court to appoint counsel\\nfor him. The magistrate judge construed the motion as a mo-\\ntion for recruitment of counsel and granted it, noting that the\\ncourt has no authority to appoint counsel in § 1983 cases but\\ncan seek to recruit a volunteer attorney. See Navejar v. Iyiola,\\n718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court circulated\\na request for representation to the court’s list of “approxi-\\nmately 50 licensed and registered attorneys that have indi-\\ncated an interest in representing indigent litigants in this dis-\\ntrict.” However, no attorneys were willing and available to\\nrepresent Giles immediately.\\n Giles moved in February 2014 for additional time to seek\\ncounsel. Giles argued he needed legal assistance to “prepare\\ndocuments, for dispositive motions, and discovery.” The\\nmagistrate judge denied the motion because Giles had not\\nspecified a deadline for the extension request, but he stated he\\nwould continue to seek a volunteer to represent Giles. Giles\\nfiled another motion to recruit counsel in May 2014. The mag-\\nistrate judge denied the motion as moot, having already\\ngranted the earlier motion to recruit, but once again solicited\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 11\\n\\nvolunteers from the pro bono list. Giles moved for recruit-\\nment of counsel again in August 2014 while summary judg-\\nment was pending. The magistrate judge again explained that\\nthe motion to recruit counsel had previously been granted\\nand that the court had done all it could to solicit a volunteer.\\nGiles’s case was published to the list of volunteers a third\\ntime. The magistrate judge encouraged Giles to continue liti-\\ngating the case to the best of his ability. Finally, Giles filed a\\nmotion to appoint counsel once again in December 2014,\\nwhich the district court denied as moot in January 2015, stat-\\ning that it had already granted Giles’s motion to recruit and\\nthat Giles would be notified if an attorney volunteered to take\\nthe case.\\n Giles also moved multiple times, beginning on October 16,\\n2014, to appoint an expert. The magistrate judge denied these\\nmotions, stating “[t]he discovery period is closed, but the\\nplaintiff may later seek to appoint an expert for trial if the [de-\\nfendants’] motion for summary judgment is denied.”\\n Giles now appeals the district court’s grant of summary\\njudgment on his claim for deliberate indifference to serious\\nmedical needs and his conditions-of-confinement claim, as\\nwell as the district court’s actions regarding his motions to re-\\ncruit counsel and appoint an expert.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment\\nde novo. Knopick v. Jayco, Inc., 895 F.3d 525, 528 (7th Cir. 2018).\\nA district court properly grants summary judgment where\\nthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the\\nmoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.\\nR. CIV. P. 56(a); Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir.\\n\\f12 No. 15-3077\\n\\n2018). All justifiable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-\\nmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255\\n(1986). The non-movant must, however, present specific facts\\nestablishing a material issue for trial, and any inferences must\\nrely on more than mere speculation or conjecture. Aguilar v.\\nGaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 630–31 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States through\\nthe Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of “cruel\\nand unusual punishments.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Estelle v.\\nGamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101 (1976). The Supreme Court has inter-\\npreted the Eighth Amendment to prohibit any punishments\\n“which, although not physically barbarous, ‘involve the un-\\nnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Rhodes v. Chapman,\\n452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,\\n173 (1976)). Thus, the Eighth Amendment gives rise to consti-\\ntutional claims by inmates alleging that the conditions of their\\nconfinement violate this prohibition by imposing “the wanton\\nand unnecessary infliction of pain.” See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.\\nThe Supreme Court has further established that prison offi-\\ncials impose wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain when\\nthey are deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medi-\\ncal needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Giles here appeals summary\\njudgment on both a claim of deliberate indifference to his se-\\nrious medical needs as well as a conditions-of-confinement\\nclaim. We discuss each in turn.\\n A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs\\n To establish an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate in-\\ndifference to serious medical needs, the plaintiff must show\\ntwo elements: one objective and one subjective. Whiting v.\\nWexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n“[T]he plaintiff must prove that he suffered from ‘(1) an\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 13\\n\\nobjectively serious medical condition to which (2) a state offi-\\ncial was deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.’” Id.\\n(quoting Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir.\\n2008)). “[D]eliberate means more than negligent,” though\\n“something less than purposeful.” Duckworth, 532 F.3d at 679.\\nWe have described this subjective element as “’a sufficiently\\nculpable state of mind,’ something akin to recklessness.”\\nArnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting\\nJohnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 2006), overruled on\\nother grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 967 n.1 (7th\\nCir. 2013)). Although the inmate must demonstrate deliberate\\nindifference, he “is not required to show that he was literally\\nignored.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)\\n(quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000)).\\n Regarding the objective element of his claim, Giles has\\nclearly met his burden. His schizoaffective disorder diagno-\\nsis, his symptoms, and his multiple prescriptions for psycho-\\ntropic medications firmly establish that he suffered from an\\nobjectively serious medical condition. See id. (“A serious med-\\nical condition is one that has been diagnosed by a physician\\nas mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a\\nlay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.”).\\nGiles’s claim hinges, therefore, on whether he has shown the\\ndefendants possessed the “sufficiently culpable state of\\nmind” necessary to establish the subjective element of delib-\\nerate indifference. The district court held that Giles failed to\\nmeet this burden. We agree.\\n Giles cannot establish the subjective element of his claim\\nbecause the defendants are all non-medical officials who rea-\\nsonably relied on the judgment of medical professionals. We\\nhave long recognized that the division of labor within a prison\\n\\f14 No. 15-3077\\n\\nnecessitates that non-medical officials may reasonably defer\\nto the judgment of medical professionals regarding inmate\\ntreatment. “If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts\\n… a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in\\nbelieving that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Id. at 656\\n(quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). As\\nthe Third Circuit has held, “absent a reason to believe (or ac-\\ntual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are\\nmistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison\\nofficial … will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment\\nscienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Spruill, 372\\nF.3d at 236.\\n In Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527–28 (7th Cir. 2008), we\\naffirmed summary judgment for non-medical prison officials\\nwho relied on the professional judgment of prison medical\\nstaff. Like Giles, the inmate in Hayes sent several letters and\\nfiled multiple grievances alleging he was receiving inade-\\nquate treatment for his objectively serious medical condition.\\nId. at 526. Although the non-medical officials did not ignore\\nthe inmate’s grievances entirely, they did not investigate fur-\\nther than the medical staff’s reports and summaries, and oth-\\nerwise simply referred the complaints to the medical staff. Id.\\nat 527. We held that the non-medical officials did not have\\n“any duty to do more than they did, in light of their\\nknowledge of the situation.” Id. They “were entitled to rely on\\nthe professional judgment of medical prison officials” and\\n“nothing in [the medical] reports made it obvious that [the in-\\nmate] might not be receiving adequate care.” Id. at 527–28.\\n A review of the record demonstrates that throughout his\\nvarious stints at Illinois River, Stateville, Pontiac, and Law-\\nrence, Giles was receiving regular medical attention from\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 15\\n\\npsychologists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals.\\nAlthough the record does not contain detailed information\\nabout what the grievance procedures were at each facility, it\\ndoes contain evidence that several of his grievances were sub-\\njected to emergency review. Furthermore, Giles’s appeals\\nwere reviewed by the ARB, which found his complaints to be\\nwithout merit upon investigation. Giles has not presented ev-\\nidence that his grievances were ignored or mishandled. Nor\\nwas there an indication from his medical records that he was\\nnot receiving adequate care. In short, the non-medical officials\\nrelied on the medical professionals to provide proper treat-\\nment, and there was nothing to give notice to the officials of a\\nneed to intervene.\\n Giles asserts the defendants were deliberately indifferent\\nby allowing him to “go on and off of his medication many\\ntimes” despite knowing his health condition required contin-\\nuous treatment. However, the record does not support this as-\\nsertion. Giles’s medications were discontinued in July 2010\\nwhile still at Dixon pursuant to a decision made by medical\\nprofessionals. Several weeks later, after being transferred first\\nto Illinois River and then to Stateville, Giles was placed back\\non medications soon after he requested them. Although there\\nwere other brief delays in his receipt of medication, when he\\nbrought these to the medical professionals’ attention his con-\\ncerns were addressed, or else it was determined after a review\\nof all available information that he was properly receiving his\\nmedication as prescribed. Even during one of the periods\\nwhere Giles alleged he was not receiving his medication, a\\npsychiatrist reported after an extended interview that Giles’s\\ndemeanor was good, he was coherent and alert, and he dis-\\nplayed no acute distress or agitation. Such reports from the\\nmedical professionals charged with Giles’s care defy the\\n\\f16 No. 15-3077\\n\\nconclusion that the non-medical defendants knew of and dis-\\nregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety.\\n The most serious lapse in treatment was the two-week pe-\\nriod in November 2010 when he was transferred back to Illi-\\nnois River from Stateville. This lapse was caused by a failure\\nto include his current prescriptions on his transfer summary.\\nWhile this was certainly a concerning oversight, it does not\\nmeet the standard of deliberate indifference: a knowing dis-\\nregard of an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety. As we\\nhave noted before, “deliberate means more than negligent.”\\nDuckworth, 532 F.3d at 679. Giles’s medication was re-pre-\\nscribed as soon as he was examined by a psychologist at Illi-\\nnois River, who requested and reviewed Giles’s medical rec-\\nords from Stateville.\\n No reasonable jury could find that the defendants knew of\\nand disregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health and safety,\\nand thus summary judgment on this claim was appropriate.\\n B. Conditions of Confinement\\n Giles also appeals the grant of summary judgment on his\\nconditions-of-confinement claim. Although the complaint fo-\\ncused on specific conditions to which Giles was subjected\\nwhile in segregation (such as vermin infestations, filthiness,\\nand lengthy periods of isolation), on appeal Giles has re-\\nframed the violation as being the combined effect that these\\nconditions had on his mental health.4 He asserts his place-\\nment in segregation subjected him to conditions which exac-\\nerbated his symptoms, or which were more difficult for him\\n\\n 4 Giles’s counsel explained at oral argument “what’s happening to his\\n\\nmental health while he’s in segregation is the conditions of confinement\\nviolation.”\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 17\\n\\nto cope with due to his symptoms. He argues that even\\nthough segregation placement and the conditions of his con-\\nfinement may not have been cruel and unusual in the case of\\nan ordinary inmate, they amounted to cruel and unusual\\ntreatment in his case given their combined effect on his illness.\\n The Eighth Amendment prohibits the States from subject-\\ning prisoners to conditions of confinement amounting to cruel\\nand unusual punishment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345–47. Accord-\\ning to the Supreme Court, however, “extreme deprivations\\nare required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.”\\nHudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Whether conditions\\nof confinement are cruel and unusual must be judged in ac-\\ncordance with contemporary standards of decency. Id. at 8;\\nRhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. If under contemporary standards the\\nconditions cannot be said to be cruel and unusual, then they\\nare not unconstitutional, and “[t]o the extent that such condi-\\ntions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the pen-\\nalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against so-\\nciety.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.\\n As with a claim for deliberate indifference to serious med-\\nical needs, a conditions-of-confinement claim includes an ob-\\njective and a subjective component. Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d\\n508, 521 (7th Cir. 2017). The plaintiff must first establish “an\\nobjective showing that the conditions are sufficiently seri-\\nous—i.e., that they deny the inmate ‘the minimal civilized\\nmeasure of life’s necessities,’ creating an excessive risk to the\\ninmate’s health and safety.” Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at\\n347) (internal citations omitted). The plaintiff must next estab-\\nlish “a subjective showing of a defendant’s culpable state of\\nmind.” Id. Once again, the state of mind necessary to establish\\nliability is deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or\\n\\f18 No. 15-3077\\n\\nsafety. Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cty. of Wood, 226 F.3d\\n525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n Giles attempts to satisfy the objective element by arguing\\nthat placing a mentally ill inmate in segregation—under con-\\nditions that exacerbate his symptoms or with which he has\\ndifficulty coping due to his symptoms—is an objectively seri-\\nous condition creating an excessive risk to his health and\\nsafety. We have indeed recognized that prolonged segregated\\nconfinement may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation\\nin some instances. See Isby, 856 F.3d at 521 (quoting Rice ex rel.\\nRice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 666 (7th Cir. 2012)). We\\nhave also held that the aggregate effect of a multitude of indi-\\nvidual conditions may constitute a violation even if each in-\\ndividual condition could not establish a violation standing on\\nits own. Id. at 522. However, this only occurs when the condi-\\ntions “have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the dep-\\nrivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food,\\nwarmth, or exercise.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,\\n304 (1991)). The core issue is whether the conditions deprived\\nthe plaintiff of a “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessi-\\nties.” Rice, 675 F.3d at 664–65.\\n While we do not deny that Giles experienced harsh condi-\\ntions in segregation, the record does not support a finding\\nthat he was deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life’s\\nnecessities, even considering the effects on his mental condi-\\ntion. He was regularly evaluated by mental health profession-\\nals at all facilities, and they repeatedly determined that his\\ncondition did not contraindicate continued segregation. And\\non the occasion in November 2011 when a mental health pro-\\nfessional determined that his mental condition was being ex-\\nacerbated by his cell assignment, he was reassigned and\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 19\\n\\nmoved the next day, checked on less than a week later, and\\nwas found to have notably improved. Giles has therefore not\\nestablished the objective element of his claim.\\n Even if Giles could establish an objectively serious condi-\\ntion, he ultimately fails to establish the necessary subjective\\ncomponent of his claim: the defendants’ culpable state of\\nmind. Once again, the defendants relied on the judgment of\\nthe medical professionals into whose care Giles was en-\\ntrusted. No reasonable jury could find that the defendants\\nconsciously disregarded an excessive risk to Giles’s health by\\nkeeping him in segregation when the mental health profes-\\nsionals continually reported it was appropriate to do so.\\n Since Giles failed to establish both the objective and sub-\\njective elements of his claim, summary judgment in favor of\\nthe defendants was proper.\\n C. Motions to Recruit Counsel and Appoint Expert\\n The final issue on appeal concerns the district court’s han-\\ndling of Giles’s motions to appoint or recruit counsel and to\\nappoint an expert. We review the district court’s decisions on\\nthese motions for abuse of discretion. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d\\n647, 649, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (reviewing a decision on\\na motion to recruit counsel for abuse of discretion); Ledford v.\\nSullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a deci-\\nsion on a motion for appointment of an expert witness is re-\\nviewed for abuse of discretion). In reviewing for abuse of dis-\\ncretion, we do not substitute our own judgment for the dis-\\ntrict court’s; rather, the “decision must strike us as fundamen-\\ntally wrong for an abuse of discretion to occur.” Ladien v.\\nAstrachan, 128 F.3d 1051, 1056 (7th Cir. 1997).\\n\\f20 No. 15-3077\\n\\n We note at the outset of our discussion that “[t]here is no\\nright to court-appointed counsel in federal civil litigation.”\\nOlson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014). However,\\nthe district court does have the discretion to recruit a volun-\\nteer to represent a plaintiff who cannot otherwise afford coun-\\nsel. Navejar, 718 F.3d at 696. The court “must rely on the gen-\\nerosity of lawyers to volunteer their time and skill on behalf\\nof indigent civil parties.” Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1008\\n(7th Cir. 2018).\\n Evaluating whether to recruit counsel involves a two-step\\nprocess. First, the court must determine if the plaintiff made\\na reasonable attempt to secure counsel on his own. Navejar,\\n718 F.3d at 696. Next, the court must examine “whether the\\ndifficulty of the case—factually and legally—exceeds the par-\\nticular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to coherently present\\nit.” Id. (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). Even where the court\\ndecides to recruit a volunteer, however, it does not have “an\\nindefinite commitment to search until a volunteer is found.”\\nWilborn, 881 F.3d at 1008.\\n The insufficient number of volunteer attorneys in some of\\nour districts limits courts’ ability to locate representation for\\nindigents. See James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 330–31 (7th Cir. 2018).\\nThis case presents the question of what a court should do in\\nthe event a court determines that the case’s complexity ap-\\npears to exceed the plaintiff’s capacity to litigate his claims\\nand the court exercises discretion to seek a volunteer attorney\\nbut is unable to find one.\\n We considered a similar question in Wilborn v. Ealey, 881\\nF.3d 998 (7th Cir. 2018). In that case, the plaintiff filed multiple\\nmotions to recruit counsel. The district court eventually\\ngranted one such motion and spent several months searching.\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 21\\n\\nAfter contacting over four hundred attorneys, the court iden-\\ntified a volunteer. This success was short-lived, though. The\\nattorney had a scheduling conflict, which ultimately led the\\ncourt to grant his motion to withdraw. Despite this change,\\nthe plaintiff did not file another motion to recruit counsel. The\\ncourt offered to postpone the trial, but the plaintiff declined\\nthe court’s offer. As a result, the court allowed the plaintiff to\\nproceed to trial pro se. Based on those facts, we decided that\\nthe court’s efforts were “more than enough to satisfy any duty\\nto the indigent plaintiff,” and we held that the court did not\\nabuse its discretion in allowing the plaintiff to try his case pro\\nse. Id. at 1008.\\n Here too, we conclude that the district court fulfilled its\\nobligation to Giles by circulating a request for representation\\nto the court’s list of approximately fifty attorneys on three sep-\\narate occasions over the course of one year. Yet it is somewhat\\nconcerning that at some point the court determined further\\nsearching would be futile and, without communicating that\\nupdate to Giles, decided it was appropriate to resolve the\\npending motion for summary judgment.\\n Acknowledging that “[t]here are limits to what a court\\nmust do after deciding to recruit counsel,” id., in cases such as\\nthis—where the complexities of litigating are high, having\\ncounsel is increasingly important, and a district court has con-\\ncluded that it is unable to locate a volunteer attorney—it\\nwould be advisable for a judge to communicate with the\\nplaintiff and consider offering a reasonable continuance be-\\nfore proceeding to rule on a dispositive motion. The addi-\\ntional time after a court has exhausted its search efforts might\\nafford a limited opportunity for indigent litigants to seek\\n\\f22 No. 15-3077\\n\\ncounsel on their own, or at a minimum, conduct some prelim-\\ninary discovery.\\n The district court also denied Giles’s motion to appoint an\\nexpert witness, holding that an expert was not necessary be-\\nfore summary judgment but stating that Giles could move to\\nappoint an expert for trial if his case survived summary judg-\\nment. A court may, in its discretion, appoint an expert witness\\nwhere the expert’s “specialized knowledge will assist the\\ntrier-of-fact to understand the evidence or decide a fact in is-\\nsue.” Ledford, 105 F.3d at 358–59. The district court determined\\nGiles’s claims failed as a matter of law to show the defendants\\nknowingly disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to\\nhim. This decision did not hinge on specialized knowledge or\\nfact-finding. Instead, the court recognized Giles had received\\nconsistent treatment from medical professionals and the de-\\nfendants had relied on the medical judgment of those profes-\\nsionals. The grant of summary judgment was based on Giles’s\\nfailure to establish the defendants’ sufficiently culpable state\\nof mind, not on a technical analysis of the medical treatment\\nhe received or the sufficiency of that treatment. Thus, the dis-\\ntrict court acted fully within its discretion by denying the mo-\\ntion to appoint an expert witness at that stage of litigation.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Prison is, by its very nature, an unpleasant place to be, and\\nwe have no doubt that Giles’s objectively serious condition\\nand symptoms contributed to his overall discomfort. The dis-\\npositive defect of Giles’s case, however, is that the defendants\\nagainst whom he has filed this action are non-medical officials\\nwho were entitled by law to rely on the judgment of the med-\\nical professionals under whose care Giles was placed. Section\\n1983 does not create a system of vicarious liability. The\\n\\fNo. 15-3077 23\\n\\ndefendants cannot be held liable unless they were aware of\\nfacts from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that\\nGiles was subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm, drew\\nsuch an inference, and yet did not intervene. Based on this\\nrecord, we hold that Giles has failed to make that showing,\\nand therefore has failed as a matter of law to establish delib-\\nerate indifference. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district\\ncourt.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":274,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4585621,"string":"4,585,621"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Aleksey Ruderman v. Matthew G. Whitaker"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-1689"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐1689 \\nALEKSEY ARKADYEVICH RUDERMAN, \\n Petitioner, \\n v. \\n\\nMATTHEW G. WHITAKER, \\nActing Attorney General of the United States, \\n Respondent. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of \\n the Board of Immigration Appeals. \\n No. A076‐054‐163 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Aleksey Arkadyevich Ruderman is \\nseeking to avoid removal to Belarus, his native country. An \\nimmigration judge ruled that Ruderman was inadmissible \\nunder the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. \\n§ 1182(a)(2)(B), and thus subject to removal. The judge also \\n\\f2 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nheld that Ruderman was not eligible for a waiver of inadmis‐\\nsibility and adjustment of status, cancellation of removal, asy‐\\nlum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Con‐\\nvention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals \\nagreed. In particular, it held that Ruderman had not raised \\nany meaningful challenge to his inadmissibility determina‐\\ntion and that even if the immigration judge had applied the \\nwrong legal standard to determine that Ruderman was ineli‐\\ngible for a waiver of inadmissibility, her alternative discre‐\\ntionary denial made the error harmless. \\n Ruderman petitions us for review of those holdings, along \\nwith others reached by the immigration judge and affirmed \\nby the Board. While we largely agree with the Board’s analy‐\\nsis, we hold that it was flawed with respect to one issue: the \\nquestion whether Ruderman is statutorily inadmissible. We \\ntherefore grant Ruderman’s petition and remand for the \\nBoard to revisit that question and, if necessary, to decide \\nwhether Ruderman is eligible for a waiver. \\n I. \\n Ruderman moved to the United States when he was nine‐\\nteen to escape discrimination and violence directed at him on \\naccount of his Jewish heritage. He moved from his native land \\nof Belarus, a former Soviet republic that declared independ‐\\nence during his childhood. In Belarus, Ruderman and his fam‐\\nily were targeted for abuse by Neo‐Nazis and pro‐Russia ad‐\\nvocates who would shout profanities at them, perform the \\nNazi salute, leave anti‐Jewish propaganda in their mailbox, \\nand throw bottles and stones at their home. \\n Ruderman received even worse treatment at school. His \\n(sometimes much older) classmates would bully and beat him \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 3 \\n\\nand the handful of other Jewish students. The head of the \\nschool and the police were alerted but did nothing to address \\nthe situation. One particularly severe attack resulted in \\nstitches and a permanent scar, while another resulted in two \\nbroken wrists that have bothered him ever since. \\n After attackers broke Ruderman’s wrists, his parents sent \\nhim to a private school where he would be safer. His time \\nthere was cut short, however, by his father’s death. Arkady \\nRuderman, a documentary filmmaker, died while filming a \\npiece on government corruption in Tajikistan—another for‐\\nmer Soviet republic. Although government officials reported \\nthat he was killed in a car accident, Arkady had previously \\nbeen detained and battered by the KGB, and eyewitnesses \\nsaid that they saw bullet holes in his dead body. Those reports \\ncould not be confirmed because the police ordered that \\nArkady’s casket remain closed at his funeral—and then at‐\\ntended the event to make sure that it did. \\n Without Arkady’s income, Ruderman’s family could no \\nlonger afford his private school tuition, so Ruderman enrolled \\nat a different public school where he was subjected to familiar \\nanti‐Semitic verbal abuse. He became so afraid that in the \\nninth grade he stopped attending classes entirely and later \\ntransferred to a technical school. There, in spite of continued \\nverbal abuse, he performed well and graduated with high \\ngrades. Once out of school, however, he found that his Jewish \\nheritage made it difficult for him to get a job. \\n Fed up with the abuse and intolerance, Ruderman fled to \\nthe United States in 2001 under a provision known as the \\nLautenberg Amendment, which lowers barriers to immigra‐\\ntion for certain former soviet nationals. See Pub. L. No. 101‐\\n167, tit. V, §§ 599D–E, 103 Stat. 1195, 1261–64 (1989) (codified \\n\\f4 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nas amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 note, § 1255 note). His life in \\nAmerica got off to a rocky start; shortly after arriving he was \\nconvicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and sen‐\\ntenced to court supervision. But over the next several years, \\nhe found work as a cab driver and a security officer, met his \\nfuture wife Elena, and moved into an apartment with her and \\nher two children in Milwaukee. \\n In 2008, Ruderman struck and killed a pedestrian with his \\nvehicle while driving drunk. He accepted responsibility, \\npleaded guilty to homicide by negligent operation of a vehi‐\\ncle, and was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. \\nFollowing his release in 2013, he worked at a transportation \\ncompany—until U.S. Customs and Immigration Services de‐\\nnied his adjustment‐of‐status application, causing his work \\npermit to expire. \\n In January of 2016, the government detained Ruderman \\nand began removal proceedings. The immigration judge ulti‐\\nmately concluded that Ruderman was statutorily inadmissi‐\\nble because of his two convictions. The judge also denied \\nRuderman’s applications for a waiver of inadmissibility, ad‐\\njustment of status under the Lautenberg Amendment, cancel‐\\nlation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and pro‐\\ntection under the Convention Against Torture. \\n Ruderman appealed the immigration judge’s decision in \\nan extensive pro se brief and later in a second brief filed by \\npro bono counsel. The counseled brief supplemented certain \\narguments that Ruderman had made in his initial brief but \\nconceded others. Significantly, the later brief conceded that \\n“[Ruderman’s] convictions for two crimes with an aggregate \\nprison sentence of five years make him ‘inadmissible.’” That \\nconcession contradicted Ruderman’s pro se argument that the \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 5 \\n\\ninadmissibility statute applies only when two or more convic‐\\ntions each result in a sentence to confinement, and so Ruder‐\\nman’s sole sentence to confinement—which imposed five \\nyears in prison—did not make him inadmissible. \\n The Board dismissed Ruderman’s appeal. First, it noted in \\npassing that Ruderman “ha[d] not raised any meaningful \\nchallenges” to his inadmissibility, and thus the issue was \\n“waived.” Second, the Board adopted and affirmed the immi‐\\ngration judge’s denial of Ruderman’s applications for cancel‐\\nlation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection un‐\\nder the Convention Against Torture. Finally, the Board af‐\\nfirmed the denial of Ruderman’s request for a waiver of inad‐\\nmissibility and adjustment of status under the Lautenberg \\nAmendment. The Board bypassed Ruderman’s argument that \\nthe immigration judge had applied the wrong standard to de‐\\ntermine whether Ruderman was eligible for a waiver of inad‐\\nmissibility and instead affirmed the judge’s conclusion that, \\neven if Ruderman were eligible to be considered for a waiver, \\nshe would exercise her discretion to deny him relief. \\n II. \\n Ruderman petitions us for review of the Board’s decision. \\nHe takes issue with the Board’s conclusion that he waived his \\nopportunity to challenge his inadmissibility, and he argues \\nthat the application of the wrong standard for determining his \\neligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility contaminated the im‐\\nmigration judge’s discretionary denial of a waiver. He also \\nclaims that the judge erred by holding—and the Board erred \\nby affirming—both that his negligent homicide was “particu‐\\nlarly serious” and that he failed to show a “substantial risk” \\nthat he would be tortured in Belarus. \\n\\f6 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\n Because the Board provided its own analysis and also af‐\\nfirmed the immigration judge’s decision, we review both de‐\\ncisions. Sobaleva v. Holder, 760 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2014). \\n A. \\n Ruderman argued in his pro se brief that he is not inad‐\\nmissible under § 212(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nation‐\\nality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B), because he has only ever re‐\\nceived one sentence to confinement. The Act states that an im‐\\nmigrant is inadmissible to receive a visa or to be admitted to \\nthe United States if he is convicted of “2 or more of‐\\nfenses … for which the aggregate sentences to confinement \\nwere 5 years or more.” Id. Ruderman interprets “sentences to \\nconfinement” to require more than one custodial sentence. He \\nsupports this reading by pointing to the word “aggregate,” \\nwhich he argues would be superfluous if the statute could be \\nsatisfied by a single sentence to confinement. Id. Because his \\nfirst conviction—for driving under the influence—did not re‐\\nsult in confinement, he concludes that he is not inadmissible. \\nHis pro bono counsel, however, conceded Ruderman’s inad‐\\nmissibility in a later‐filed brief. \\n The Board did not address Ruderman’s inadmissibility ar‐\\ngument, instead concluding that he had failed to raise any \\nmeaningful challenges to his inadmissibility and so had \\nwaived the issue. It appears likely that the Board reached that \\nconclusion on the basis of Ruderman’s counsel’s concession, \\nbecause Ruderman did raise the argument in several places—\\nincluding his notice of appeal and pro se brief, both of which \\nremained on the record. But the Board’s opinion did not oth‐\\nerwise indicate whether the counseled brief superseded the \\npro se brief. \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 7 \\n\\n A later‐in‐time concession waives an issue in federal \\ncourt—but we do not know whether that is true before the \\nBoard as well. On this record it is unclear why the Board con‐\\ncluded that Ruderman waived his challenge, and the Board’s \\nfailure to explain inhibits our review of the issue. See SEC v. \\nChenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“[A] reviewing court, \\nin dealing with a determination or judgment which an admin‐\\nistrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the \\npropriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the \\nagency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the \\ncourt is powerless to affirm the administrative action by sub‐\\nstituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper \\nbasis.”). We grant Ruderman’s petition and remand this issue \\nto the Board to clarify why it did not address Ruderman’s in‐\\nadmissibility argument. \\n B. \\n If on remand the Board confirms that Ruderman is inad‐\\nmissible, his application for a waiver of inadmissibility should \\nbe reviewed under the correct legal standard. The immigra‐\\ntion judge concluded that Ruderman was statutorily ineligi‐\\nble for a waiver because he did not show that his removal \\nwould cause “extreme hardship” to his U.S.‐citizen wife. 8 \\nU.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). When a waiver is sought in conjunction \\nwith an application for a status adjustment under the Lauten‐\\nberg Amendment, however, there is no threshold eligibility \\nrequirement; a waiver may be granted simply “for humani‐\\ntarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is other‐\\nwise in the public interest.” 8 U.S.C. 1255 note; see also 8 C.F.R. \\n§ 1245.7(d). The immigration judge erred by not considering \\nRuderman’s application under this less stringent standard. \\n\\f8 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\n The Board concluded that this error was harmless because \\nthe immigration judge held in the alternative that she would \\nexercise her discretion to deny Ruderman relief if he were el‐\\nigible to be considered for it. The assumption seems to be that \\nthe judge would have made the same discretionary denial of \\na waiver under the Lautenberg Amendment as she made un‐\\nder § 1182(h). But, as we have already noted, the former pro‐\\nvides discretion to grant a waiver for humanitarian purposes, \\nto assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public \\ninterest; the latter entails a potentially more complex consid‐\\neration of the ground for exclusion at issue, past immigration \\nviolations or criminal history, evidence of rehabilitation, gen‐\\neral evidence of good or bad character, strength of family ties, \\nduration of residence in the United States, and evidence of \\nvalue to the community. See In re Mendez‐Moralez, 21 I. & N. \\nDec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996). Because these statutes, along with \\nthe cases and regulations interpreting them, articulate distinct \\nfactors to be considered in deciding whether to grant a discre‐\\ntionary waiver of inadmissibility, the Board cannot simply \\nsubstitute one standard for another and assume that the out‐\\ncome would be the same. If the Board confirms Ruderman’s \\ninadmissibility on remand, it should consider his application \\nfor a waiver under the proper framework. \\n C. \\n Ruderman’s other arguments go nowhere. First, he claims \\nthat he is eligible for asylum and withholding of removal be‐\\ncause he did not commit a “particularly serious crime.” 8 \\nU.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Ruderman com‐\\nmitted homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle, Wis. Stat. \\n§ 940.10(1); he argues that Congress did not intend for crimi‐\\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 9 \\n\\nnal negligence like his to qualify as particularly serious. Gen‐\\nerally, classification of a crime as “particularly serious” is \\nwithin the discretion of the Attorney General—exercised here \\nby the Board. Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. \\n2006). Our review of these classifications is confined to consti‐\\ntutional and legal questions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2); see also Es‐\\ntrada‐Martinez v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 2015). And \\nwhen those legal questions implicate ambiguous statutory \\nprovisions, we give deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. \\nRes. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). \\n We considered the meaning of “particularly serious \\ncrime” in some depth in Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. \\n2006). In that case, the petitioner argued that the Board could \\nnot hold that his conviction for “substantial battery with a \\ndangerous weapon,” a nonaggravated felony, was a particu‐\\nlarly serious crime under § 1158(b)(2) and § 1231(b)(3) be‐\\ncause it did not fall within the two categories of crimes iden‐\\ntified as per se “particularly serious” in § 1158(b)(2): aggra‐\\nvated felonies and other crimes that the Attorney General des‐\\nignates by regulation. Id. at 468–69. We disagreed, explaining \\nthat the presence of these categories does not cabin the \\nBoard’s discretion to determine that nonaggravated felonies \\nare particularly serious on a case‐by‐case basis. Id. at 469. In \\nthe same way, the Board is not precluded from determining \\nthat some crimes of negligence are particularly serious. \\n Nor does the Immigration and Nationality Act’s separate \\ndefinition of “serious criminal offense” undermine the \\nBoard’s interpretation. The Act identifies “driving while in‐\\ntoxicated or under the influence of alcohol” as a serious crim‐\\ninal offense if it “involves personal injury to another.” 8 U.S.C. \\n§ 1101(h)(3). Ruderman argues that “particularly serious \\n\\f10 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\ncrime” must be interpreted to require more. Maybe so. But \\neven if he’s right, criminally negligent homicide entails more \\nthan mere “personal injury,” so the argument is a dead end. \\n Finally, even if § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) \\nwere ambiguous as to whether crimes of negligence could be \\n“particularly serious,” Ruderman has not shown that the \\nBoard’s interpretation is too unreasonable to merit deference \\nunder Chevron. See Ali, 468 F.3d at 470. Nor has he shown that \\nthe Board’s interpretation is so likely to conflict with the Con‐\\nstitution or international law that we need to consider \\nwhether some other interpretation is warranted. \\n D. \\n Finally, Ruderman contends that the Board should have \\ngranted him protection under the Convention Against Tor‐\\nture, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–18. The Convention forbids the re‐\\nturn of “a person to another State where there are substantial \\ngrounds for believing that he would be in danger of being \\nsubjected to torture.” Convention Against Torture and Other \\nCruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. \\n3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100‐20 (1990), 1465 \\nU.N.T.S. 85. Federal regulations define torture as requiring \\n“the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” 8 C.F.R \\n§ 1208.18(a)(1). Immigration judges must withhold or defer \\nremoval if an applicant demonstrates that “it is more likely \\nthan not that he or she would be tortured if removed.” 8 \\nC.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). We have explained that “more likely \\nthan not” means that there is a “substantial risk” that the alien \\nwill be tortured. Rodriguez‐Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, \\n1135–36 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Perez‐Montes v. Sessions, 880 \\nF.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir. 2018). \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 11 \\n\\n Ruderman argues that the immigration judge both misun‐\\nderstood and misapplied the “substantial risk” standard. But \\nthere is no evidence of the former; the immigration judge \\ncited our decision in Rodriguez‐Molinero and proceeded to an‐\\nalyze whether there was a substantial risk that Ruderman \\nwould be subject to torture inflicted by or with the consent of \\na public official if he returned to Belarus. See 8 C.F.R. \\n§ 1208.18(a)(1)–(2). And Ruderman fails to establish the latter. \\nWe review the Board’s conclusion that there was no substan‐\\ntial risk of torture under the “highly deferential substantial \\nevidence test,” which mandates denying the petition unless \\n“the record evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Lopez v. \\nLynch, 810 F.3d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). \\n The record evidence does not compel a contrary conclu‐\\nsion. To be sure, certain findings from the immigration judge \\ngive us pause. For one, the judge concluded that there was no \\nsubstantial risk of torture for Jews in Belarus because, despite \\n“widespread anti‐Semitism in Belarus,” incidents targeting \\nJews have been declining. While it is true that the raw number \\nof anti‐Jewish incidents in Belarus has declined, so has the \\nJewish population. In this context, an absolute decrease in in‐\\ncidents does not necessary equate to a relative increase in \\nsafety for any individual. Nor does the evidence of Ruder‐\\nman’s mother’s safe travel to and from Belarus mean that \\nRuderman will be equally safe. His mother has a Christian \\nname that is not associated with her late husband, whereas \\nRuderman’s patronymic clearly signals that he is both Jewish \\nand the son of a known political activist whom the KGB may \\nhave tortured and killed. But on the other hand, there is evi‐\\ndence that Ruderman became less susceptible to physical at‐\\ntacks as he grew and became better able to defend himself, \\nthat no one in his family has been threatened in Belarus, and \\n\\f12 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nthat he lived in Belarus for eight years following his father’s \\ndeath without any threat of torture on account of his relation‐\\nship to his father. Considering all the evidence, the record \\ndoes not compel the conclusion that there is a substantial risk \\nthat Ruderman would be tortured if he returned to Belarus. \\n * * * \\n Ruderman’s petition for review is GRANTED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4362874/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585621/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Aleksey Ruderman v. Matthew G. Whitaker\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐1689 \nALEKSEY ARKADYEVICH RUDERMAN, \n Petitioner, \n v. \n\nMATTHEW G. WHITAKER, \nActing Attorney General of the United States, \n Respondent. \n ____________________ \n\n Petition for Review of an Order of \n the Board of Immigration Appeals. \n No. A076‐054‐163 \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, \nCircuit Judges. \n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Aleksey Arkadyevich Ruderman is \nseeking to avoid removal to Belarus, his native country. An \nimmigration judge ruled that Ruderman was inadmissible \nunder the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. \n§ 1182(a)(2)(B), and thus subject to removal. The judge also \n\f2 No. 17‐1689 \n\nheld that Ruderman was not eligible for a waiver of inadmis‐\nsibility and adjustment of status, cancellation of removal, asy‐\nlum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Con‐\nvention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals \nagreed. In particular, it held that Ruderman had not raised \nany meaningful challenge to his inadmissibility determina‐\ntion and that even if the immigration judge had applied the \nwrong legal standard to determine that Ruderman was ineli‐\ngible for a waiver of inadmissibility, her alternative discre‐\ntionary denial made the error harmless. \n Ruderman petitions us for review of those holdings, along \nwith others reached by the immigration judge and affirmed \nby the Board. While we largely agree with the Board’s analy‐\nsis, we hold that it was flawed with respect to one issue: the \nquestion whether Ruderman is statutorily inadmissible. We \ntherefore grant Ruderman’s petition and remand for the \nBoard to revisit that question and, if necessary, to decide \nwhether Ruderman is eligible for a waiver. \n I. \n Ruderman moved to the United States when he was nine‐\nteen to escape discrimination and violence directed at him on \naccount of his Jewish heritage. He moved from his native land \nof Belarus, a former Soviet republic that declared independ‐\nence during his childhood. In Belarus, Ruderman and his fam‐\nily were targeted for abuse by Neo‐Nazis and pro‐Russia ad‐\nvocates who would shout profanities at them, perform the \nNazi salute, leave anti‐Jewish propaganda in their mailbox, \nand throw bottles and stones at their home. \n Ruderman received even worse treatment at school. His \n(sometimes much older) classmates would bully and beat him \n\fNo. 17‐1689 3 \n\nand the handful of other Jewish students. The head of the \nschool and the police were alerted but did nothing to address \nthe situation. One particularly severe attack resulted in \nstitches and a permanent scar, while another resulted in two \nbroken wrists that have bothered him ever since. \n After attackers broke Ruderman’s wrists, his parents sent \nhim to a private school where he would be safer. His time \nthere was cut short, however, by his father’s death. Arkady \nRuderman, a documentary filmmaker, died while filming a \npiece on government corruption in Tajikistan—another for‐\nmer Soviet republic. Although government officials reported \nthat he was killed in a car accident, Arkady had previously \nbeen detained and battered by the KGB, and eyewitnesses \nsaid that they saw bullet holes in his dead body. Those reports \ncould not be confirmed because the police ordered that \nArkady’s casket remain closed at his funeral—and then at‐\ntended the event to make sure that it did. \n Without Arkady’s income, Ruderman’s family could no \nlonger afford his private school tuition, so Ruderman enrolled \nat a different public school where he was subjected to familiar \nanti‐Semitic verbal abuse. He became so afraid that in the \nninth grade he stopped attending classes entirely and later \ntransferred to a technical school. There, in spite of continued \nverbal abuse, he performed well and graduated with high \ngrades. Once out of school, however, he found that his Jewish \nheritage made it difficult for him to get a job. \n Fed up with the abuse and intolerance, Ruderman fled to \nthe United States in 2001 under a provision known as the \nLautenberg Amendment, which lowers barriers to immigra‐\ntion for certain former soviet nationals. See Pub. L. No. 101‐\n167, tit. V, §§ 599D–E, 103 Stat. 1195, 1261–64 (1989) (codified \n\f4 No. 17‐1689 \n\nas amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 note, § 1255 note). His life in \nAmerica got off to a rocky start; shortly after arriving he was \nconvicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and sen‐\ntenced to court supervision. But over the next several years, \nhe found work as a cab driver and a security officer, met his \nfuture wife Elena, and moved into an apartment with her and \nher two children in Milwaukee. \n In 2008, Ruderman struck and killed a pedestrian with his \nvehicle while driving drunk. He accepted responsibility, \npleaded guilty to homicide by negligent operation of a vehi‐\ncle, and was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. \nFollowing his release in 2013, he worked at a transportation \ncompany—until U.S. Customs and Immigration Services de‐\nnied his adjustment‐of‐status application, causing his work \npermit to expire. \n In January of 2016, the government detained Ruderman \nand began removal proceedings. The immigration judge ulti‐\nmately concluded that Ruderman was statutorily inadmissi‐\nble because of his two convictions. The judge also denied \nRuderman’s applications for a waiver of inadmissibility, ad‐\njustment of status under the Lautenberg Amendment, cancel‐\nlation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and pro‐\ntection under the Convention Against Torture. \n Ruderman appealed the immigration judge’s decision in \nan extensive pro se brief and later in a second brief filed by \npro bono counsel. The counseled brief supplemented certain \narguments that Ruderman had made in his initial brief but \nconceded others. Significantly, the later brief conceded that \n“[Ruderman’s] convictions for two crimes with an aggregate \nprison sentence of five years make him ‘inadmissible.’” That \nconcession contradicted Ruderman’s pro se argument that the \n\fNo. 17‐1689 5 \n\ninadmissibility statute applies only when two or more convic‐\ntions each result in a sentence to confinement, and so Ruder‐\nman’s sole sentence to confinement—which imposed five \nyears in prison—did not make him inadmissible. \n The Board dismissed Ruderman’s appeal. First, it noted in \npassing that Ruderman “ha[d] not raised any meaningful \nchallenges” to his inadmissibility, and thus the issue was \n“waived.” Second, the Board adopted and affirmed the immi‐\ngration judge’s denial of Ruderman’s applications for cancel‐\nlation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection un‐\nder the Convention Against Torture. Finally, the Board af‐\nfirmed the denial of Ruderman’s request for a waiver of inad‐\nmissibility and adjustment of status under the Lautenberg \nAmendment. The Board bypassed Ruderman’s argument that \nthe immigration judge had applied the wrong standard to de‐\ntermine whether Ruderman was eligible for a waiver of inad‐\nmissibility and instead affirmed the judge’s conclusion that, \neven if Ruderman were eligible to be considered for a waiver, \nshe would exercise her discretion to deny him relief. \n II. \n Ruderman petitions us for review of the Board’s decision. \nHe takes issue with the Board’s conclusion that he waived his \nopportunity to challenge his inadmissibility, and he argues \nthat the application of the wrong standard for determining his \neligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility contaminated the im‐\nmigration judge’s discretionary denial of a waiver. He also \nclaims that the judge erred by holding—and the Board erred \nby affirming—both that his negligent homicide was “particu‐\nlarly serious” and that he failed to show a “substantial risk” \nthat he would be tortured in Belarus. \n\f6 No. 17‐1689 \n\n Because the Board provided its own analysis and also af‐\nfirmed the immigration judge’s decision, we review both de‐\ncisions. Sobaleva v. Holder, 760 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2014). \n A. \n Ruderman argued in his pro se brief that he is not inad‐\nmissible under § 212(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nation‐\nality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B), because he has only ever re‐\nceived one sentence to confinement. The Act states that an im‐\nmigrant is inadmissible to receive a visa or to be admitted to \nthe United States if he is convicted of “2 or more of‐\nfenses … for which the aggregate sentences to confinement \nwere 5 years or more.” Id. Ruderman interprets “sentences to \nconfinement” to require more than one custodial sentence. He \nsupports this reading by pointing to the word “aggregate,” \nwhich he argues would be superfluous if the statute could be \nsatisfied by a single sentence to confinement. Id. Because his \nfirst conviction—for driving under the influence—did not re‐\nsult in confinement, he concludes that he is not inadmissible. \nHis pro bono counsel, however, conceded Ruderman’s inad‐\nmissibility in a later‐filed brief. \n The Board did not address Ruderman’s inadmissibility ar‐\ngument, instead concluding that he had failed to raise any \nmeaningful challenges to his inadmissibility and so had \nwaived the issue. It appears likely that the Board reached that \nconclusion on the basis of Ruderman’s counsel’s concession, \nbecause Ruderman did raise the argument in several places—\nincluding his notice of appeal and pro se brief, both of which \nremained on the record. But the Board’s opinion did not oth‐\nerwise indicate whether the counseled brief superseded the \npro se brief. \n\fNo. 17‐1689 7 \n\n A later‐in‐time concession waives an issue in federal \ncourt—but we do not know whether that is true before the \nBoard as well. On this record it is unclear why the Board con‐\ncluded that Ruderman waived his challenge, and the Board’s \nfailure to explain inhibits our review of the issue. See SEC v. \nChenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“[A] reviewing court, \nin dealing with a determination or judgment which an admin‐\nistrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the \npropriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the \nagency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the \ncourt is powerless to affirm the administrative action by sub‐\nstituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper \nbasis.”). We grant Ruderman’s petition and remand this issue \nto the Board to clarify why it did not address Ruderman’s in‐\nadmissibility argument. \n B. \n If on remand the Board confirms that Ruderman is inad‐\nmissible, his application for a waiver of inadmissibility should \nbe reviewed under the correct legal standard. The immigra‐\ntion judge concluded that Ruderman was statutorily ineligi‐\nble for a waiver because he did not show that his removal \nwould cause “extreme hardship” to his U.S.‐citizen wife. 8 \nU.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). When a waiver is sought in conjunction \nwith an application for a status adjustment under the Lauten‐\nberg Amendment, however, there is no threshold eligibility \nrequirement; a waiver may be granted simply “for humani‐\ntarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is other‐\nwise in the public interest.” 8 U.S.C. 1255 note; see also 8 C.F.R. \n§ 1245.7(d). The immigration judge erred by not considering \nRuderman’s application under this less stringent standard. \n\f8 No. 17‐1689 \n\n The Board concluded that this error was harmless because \nthe immigration judge held in the alternative that she would \nexercise her discretion to deny Ruderman relief if he were el‐\nigible to be considered for it. The assumption seems to be that \nthe judge would have made the same discretionary denial of \na waiver under the Lautenberg Amendment as she made un‐\nder § 1182(h). But, as we have already noted, the former pro‐\nvides discretion to grant a waiver for humanitarian purposes, \nto assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public \ninterest; the latter entails a potentially more complex consid‐\neration of the ground for exclusion at issue, past immigration \nviolations or criminal history, evidence of rehabilitation, gen‐\neral evidence of good or bad character, strength of family ties, \nduration of residence in the United States, and evidence of \nvalue to the community. See In re Mendez‐Moralez, 21 I. & N. \nDec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996). Because these statutes, along with \nthe cases and regulations interpreting them, articulate distinct \nfactors to be considered in deciding whether to grant a discre‐\ntionary waiver of inadmissibility, the Board cannot simply \nsubstitute one standard for another and assume that the out‐\ncome would be the same. If the Board confirms Ruderman’s \ninadmissibility on remand, it should consider his application \nfor a waiver under the proper framework. \n C. \n Ruderman’s other arguments go nowhere. First, he claims \nthat he is eligible for asylum and withholding of removal be‐\ncause he did not commit a “particularly serious crime.” 8 \nU.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Ruderman com‐\nmitted homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle, Wis. Stat. \n§ 940.10(1); he argues that Congress did not intend for crimi‐\n\fNo. 17‐1689 9 \n\nnal negligence like his to qualify as particularly serious. Gen‐\nerally, classification of a crime as “particularly serious” is \nwithin the discretion of the Attorney General—exercised here \nby the Board. Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. \n2006). Our review of these classifications is confined to consti‐\ntutional and legal questions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2); see also Es‐\ntrada‐Martinez v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 2015). And \nwhen those legal questions implicate ambiguous statutory \nprovisions, we give deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. \nRes. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). \n We considered the meaning of “particularly serious \ncrime” in some depth in Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. \n2006). In that case, the petitioner argued that the Board could \nnot hold that his conviction for “substantial battery with a \ndangerous weapon,” a nonaggravated felony, was a particu‐\nlarly serious crime under § 1158(b)(2) and § 1231(b)(3) be‐\ncause it did not fall within the two categories of crimes iden‐\ntified as per se “particularly serious” in § 1158(b)(2): aggra‐\nvated felonies and other crimes that the Attorney General des‐\nignates by regulation. Id. at 468–69. We disagreed, explaining \nthat the presence of these categories does not cabin the \nBoard’s discretion to determine that nonaggravated felonies \nare particularly serious on a case‐by‐case basis. Id. at 469. In \nthe same way, the Board is not precluded from determining \nthat some crimes of negligence are particularly serious. \n Nor does the Immigration and Nationality Act’s separate \ndefinition of “serious criminal offense” undermine the \nBoard’s interpretation. The Act identifies “driving while in‐\ntoxicated or under the influence of alcohol” as a serious crim‐\ninal offense if it “involves personal injury to another.” 8 U.S.C. \n§ 1101(h)(3). Ruderman argues that “particularly serious \n\f10 No. 17‐1689 \n\ncrime” must be interpreted to require more. Maybe so. But \neven if he’s right, criminally negligent homicide entails more \nthan mere “personal injury,” so the argument is a dead end. \n Finally, even if § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) \nwere ambiguous as to whether crimes of negligence could be \n“particularly serious,” Ruderman has not shown that the \nBoard’s interpretation is too unreasonable to merit deference \nunder Chevron. See Ali, 468 F.3d at 470. Nor has he shown that \nthe Board’s interpretation is so likely to conflict with the Con‐\nstitution or international law that we need to consider \nwhether some other interpretation is warranted. \n D. \n Finally, Ruderman contends that the Board should have \ngranted him protection under the Convention Against Tor‐\nture, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–18. The Convention forbids the re‐\nturn of “a person to another State where there are substantial \ngrounds for believing that he would be in danger of being \nsubjected to torture.” Convention Against Torture and Other \nCruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. \n3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100‐20 (1990), 1465 \nU.N.T.S. 85. Federal regulations define torture as requiring \n“the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” 8 C.F.R \n§ 1208.18(a)(1). Immigration judges must withhold or defer \nremoval if an applicant demonstrates that “it is more likely \nthan not that he or she would be tortured if removed.” 8 \nC.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). We have explained that “more likely \nthan not” means that there is a “substantial risk” that the alien \nwill be tortured. Rodriguez‐Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, \n1135–36 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Perez‐Montes v. Sessions, 880 \nF.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir. 2018). \n\fNo. 17‐1689 11 \n\n Ruderman argues that the immigration judge both misun‐\nderstood and misapplied the “substantial risk” standard. But \nthere is no evidence of the former; the immigration judge \ncited our decision in Rodriguez‐Molinero and proceeded to an‐\nalyze whether there was a substantial risk that Ruderman \nwould be subject to torture inflicted by or with the consent of \na public official if he returned to Belarus. See 8 C.F.R. \n§ 1208.18(a)(1)–(2). And Ruderman fails to establish the latter. \nWe review the Board’s conclusion that there was no substan‐\ntial risk of torture under the “highly deferential substantial \nevidence test,” which mandates denying the petition unless \n“the record evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Lopez v. \nLynch, 810 F.3d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). \n The record evidence does not compel a contrary conclu‐\nsion. To be sure, certain findings from the immigration judge \ngive us pause. For one, the judge concluded that there was no \nsubstantial risk of torture for Jews in Belarus because, despite \n“widespread anti‐Semitism in Belarus,” incidents targeting \nJews have been declining. While it is true that the raw number \nof anti‐Jewish incidents in Belarus has declined, so has the \nJewish population. In this context, an absolute decrease in in‐\ncidents does not necessary equate to a relative increase in \nsafety for any individual. Nor does the evidence of Ruder‐\nman’s mother’s safe travel to and from Belarus mean that \nRuderman will be equally safe. His mother has a Christian \nname that is not associated with her late husband, whereas \nRuderman’s patronymic clearly signals that he is both Jewish \nand the son of a known political activist whom the KGB may \nhave tortured and killed. But on the other hand, there is evi‐\ndence that Ruderman became less susceptible to physical at‐\ntacks as he grew and became better able to defend himself, \nthat no one in his family has been threatened in Belarus, and \n\f12 No. 17‐1689 \n\nthat he lived in Belarus for eight years following his father’s \ndeath without any threat of torture on account of his relation‐\nship to his father. Considering all the evidence, the record \ndoes not compel the conclusion that there is a substantial risk \nthat Ruderman would be tortured if he returned to Belarus. \n * * * \n Ruderman’s petition for review is GRANTED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Aleksey Ruderman v. Matthew G. Whitaker\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 17‐1689 \\nALEKSEY ARKADYEVICH RUDERMAN, \\n Petitioner, \\n v. \\n\\nMATTHEW G. WHITAKER, \\nActing Attorney General of the United States, \\n Respondent. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of \\n the Board of Immigration Appeals. \\n No. A076‐054‐163 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Aleksey Arkadyevich Ruderman is \\nseeking to avoid removal to Belarus, his native country. An \\nimmigration judge ruled that Ruderman was inadmissible \\nunder the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. \\n§ 1182(a)(2)(B), and thus subject to removal. The judge also \\n\\f2 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nheld that Ruderman was not eligible for a waiver of inadmis‐\\nsibility and adjustment of status, cancellation of removal, asy‐\\nlum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Con‐\\nvention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals \\nagreed. In particular, it held that Ruderman had not raised \\nany meaningful challenge to his inadmissibility determina‐\\ntion and that even if the immigration judge had applied the \\nwrong legal standard to determine that Ruderman was ineli‐\\ngible for a waiver of inadmissibility, her alternative discre‐\\ntionary denial made the error harmless. \\n Ruderman petitions us for review of those holdings, along \\nwith others reached by the immigration judge and affirmed \\nby the Board. While we largely agree with the Board’s analy‐\\nsis, we hold that it was flawed with respect to one issue: the \\nquestion whether Ruderman is statutorily inadmissible. We \\ntherefore grant Ruderman’s petition and remand for the \\nBoard to revisit that question and, if necessary, to decide \\nwhether Ruderman is eligible for a waiver. \\n I. \\n Ruderman moved to the United States when he was nine‐\\nteen to escape discrimination and violence directed at him on \\naccount of his Jewish heritage. He moved from his native land \\nof Belarus, a former Soviet republic that declared independ‐\\nence during his childhood. In Belarus, Ruderman and his fam‐\\nily were targeted for abuse by Neo‐Nazis and pro‐Russia ad‐\\nvocates who would shout profanities at them, perform the \\nNazi salute, leave anti‐Jewish propaganda in their mailbox, \\nand throw bottles and stones at their home. \\n Ruderman received even worse treatment at school. His \\n(sometimes much older) classmates would bully and beat him \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 3 \\n\\nand the handful of other Jewish students. The head of the \\nschool and the police were alerted but did nothing to address \\nthe situation. One particularly severe attack resulted in \\nstitches and a permanent scar, while another resulted in two \\nbroken wrists that have bothered him ever since. \\n After attackers broke Ruderman’s wrists, his parents sent \\nhim to a private school where he would be safer. His time \\nthere was cut short, however, by his father’s death. Arkady \\nRuderman, a documentary filmmaker, died while filming a \\npiece on government corruption in Tajikistan—another for‐\\nmer Soviet republic. Although government officials reported \\nthat he was killed in a car accident, Arkady had previously \\nbeen detained and battered by the KGB, and eyewitnesses \\nsaid that they saw bullet holes in his dead body. Those reports \\ncould not be confirmed because the police ordered that \\nArkady’s casket remain closed at his funeral—and then at‐\\ntended the event to make sure that it did. \\n Without Arkady’s income, Ruderman’s family could no \\nlonger afford his private school tuition, so Ruderman enrolled \\nat a different public school where he was subjected to familiar \\nanti‐Semitic verbal abuse. He became so afraid that in the \\nninth grade he stopped attending classes entirely and later \\ntransferred to a technical school. There, in spite of continued \\nverbal abuse, he performed well and graduated with high \\ngrades. Once out of school, however, he found that his Jewish \\nheritage made it difficult for him to get a job. \\n Fed up with the abuse and intolerance, Ruderman fled to \\nthe United States in 2001 under a provision known as the \\nLautenberg Amendment, which lowers barriers to immigra‐\\ntion for certain former soviet nationals. See Pub. L. No. 101‐\\n167, tit. V, §§ 599D–E, 103 Stat. 1195, 1261–64 (1989) (codified \\n\\f4 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nas amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1157 note, § 1255 note). His life in \\nAmerica got off to a rocky start; shortly after arriving he was \\nconvicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and sen‐\\ntenced to court supervision. But over the next several years, \\nhe found work as a cab driver and a security officer, met his \\nfuture wife Elena, and moved into an apartment with her and \\nher two children in Milwaukee. \\n In 2008, Ruderman struck and killed a pedestrian with his \\nvehicle while driving drunk. He accepted responsibility, \\npleaded guilty to homicide by negligent operation of a vehi‐\\ncle, and was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. \\nFollowing his release in 2013, he worked at a transportation \\ncompany—until U.S. Customs and Immigration Services de‐\\nnied his adjustment‐of‐status application, causing his work \\npermit to expire. \\n In January of 2016, the government detained Ruderman \\nand began removal proceedings. The immigration judge ulti‐\\nmately concluded that Ruderman was statutorily inadmissi‐\\nble because of his two convictions. The judge also denied \\nRuderman’s applications for a waiver of inadmissibility, ad‐\\njustment of status under the Lautenberg Amendment, cancel‐\\nlation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and pro‐\\ntection under the Convention Against Torture. \\n Ruderman appealed the immigration judge’s decision in \\nan extensive pro se brief and later in a second brief filed by \\npro bono counsel. The counseled brief supplemented certain \\narguments that Ruderman had made in his initial brief but \\nconceded others. Significantly, the later brief conceded that \\n“[Ruderman’s] convictions for two crimes with an aggregate \\nprison sentence of five years make him ‘inadmissible.’” That \\nconcession contradicted Ruderman’s pro se argument that the \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 5 \\n\\ninadmissibility statute applies only when two or more convic‐\\ntions each result in a sentence to confinement, and so Ruder‐\\nman’s sole sentence to confinement—which imposed five \\nyears in prison—did not make him inadmissible. \\n The Board dismissed Ruderman’s appeal. First, it noted in \\npassing that Ruderman “ha[d] not raised any meaningful \\nchallenges” to his inadmissibility, and thus the issue was \\n“waived.” Second, the Board adopted and affirmed the immi‐\\ngration judge’s denial of Ruderman’s applications for cancel‐\\nlation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection un‐\\nder the Convention Against Torture. Finally, the Board af‐\\nfirmed the denial of Ruderman’s request for a waiver of inad‐\\nmissibility and adjustment of status under the Lautenberg \\nAmendment. The Board bypassed Ruderman’s argument that \\nthe immigration judge had applied the wrong standard to de‐\\ntermine whether Ruderman was eligible for a waiver of inad‐\\nmissibility and instead affirmed the judge’s conclusion that, \\neven if Ruderman were eligible to be considered for a waiver, \\nshe would exercise her discretion to deny him relief. \\n II. \\n Ruderman petitions us for review of the Board’s decision. \\nHe takes issue with the Board’s conclusion that he waived his \\nopportunity to challenge his inadmissibility, and he argues \\nthat the application of the wrong standard for determining his \\neligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility contaminated the im‐\\nmigration judge’s discretionary denial of a waiver. He also \\nclaims that the judge erred by holding—and the Board erred \\nby affirming—both that his negligent homicide was “particu‐\\nlarly serious” and that he failed to show a “substantial risk” \\nthat he would be tortured in Belarus. \\n\\f6 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\n Because the Board provided its own analysis and also af‐\\nfirmed the immigration judge’s decision, we review both de‐\\ncisions. Sobaleva v. Holder, 760 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2014). \\n A. \\n Ruderman argued in his pro se brief that he is not inad‐\\nmissible under § 212(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nation‐\\nality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B), because he has only ever re‐\\nceived one sentence to confinement. The Act states that an im‐\\nmigrant is inadmissible to receive a visa or to be admitted to \\nthe United States if he is convicted of “2 or more of‐\\nfenses … for which the aggregate sentences to confinement \\nwere 5 years or more.” Id. Ruderman interprets “sentences to \\nconfinement” to require more than one custodial sentence. He \\nsupports this reading by pointing to the word “aggregate,” \\nwhich he argues would be superfluous if the statute could be \\nsatisfied by a single sentence to confinement. Id. Because his \\nfirst conviction—for driving under the influence—did not re‐\\nsult in confinement, he concludes that he is not inadmissible. \\nHis pro bono counsel, however, conceded Ruderman’s inad‐\\nmissibility in a later‐filed brief. \\n The Board did not address Ruderman’s inadmissibility ar‐\\ngument, instead concluding that he had failed to raise any \\nmeaningful challenges to his inadmissibility and so had \\nwaived the issue. It appears likely that the Board reached that \\nconclusion on the basis of Ruderman’s counsel’s concession, \\nbecause Ruderman did raise the argument in several places—\\nincluding his notice of appeal and pro se brief, both of which \\nremained on the record. But the Board’s opinion did not oth‐\\nerwise indicate whether the counseled brief superseded the \\npro se brief. \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 7 \\n\\n A later‐in‐time concession waives an issue in federal \\ncourt—but we do not know whether that is true before the \\nBoard as well. On this record it is unclear why the Board con‐\\ncluded that Ruderman waived his challenge, and the Board’s \\nfailure to explain inhibits our review of the issue. See SEC v. \\nChenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (“[A] reviewing court, \\nin dealing with a determination or judgment which an admin‐\\nistrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the \\npropriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the \\nagency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the \\ncourt is powerless to affirm the administrative action by sub‐\\nstituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper \\nbasis.”). We grant Ruderman’s petition and remand this issue \\nto the Board to clarify why it did not address Ruderman’s in‐\\nadmissibility argument. \\n B. \\n If on remand the Board confirms that Ruderman is inad‐\\nmissible, his application for a waiver of inadmissibility should \\nbe reviewed under the correct legal standard. The immigra‐\\ntion judge concluded that Ruderman was statutorily ineligi‐\\nble for a waiver because he did not show that his removal \\nwould cause “extreme hardship” to his U.S.‐citizen wife. 8 \\nU.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). When a waiver is sought in conjunction \\nwith an application for a status adjustment under the Lauten‐\\nberg Amendment, however, there is no threshold eligibility \\nrequirement; a waiver may be granted simply “for humani‐\\ntarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is other‐\\nwise in the public interest.” 8 U.S.C. 1255 note; see also 8 C.F.R. \\n§ 1245.7(d). The immigration judge erred by not considering \\nRuderman’s application under this less stringent standard. \\n\\f8 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\n The Board concluded that this error was harmless because \\nthe immigration judge held in the alternative that she would \\nexercise her discretion to deny Ruderman relief if he were el‐\\nigible to be considered for it. The assumption seems to be that \\nthe judge would have made the same discretionary denial of \\na waiver under the Lautenberg Amendment as she made un‐\\nder § 1182(h). But, as we have already noted, the former pro‐\\nvides discretion to grant a waiver for humanitarian purposes, \\nto assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public \\ninterest; the latter entails a potentially more complex consid‐\\neration of the ground for exclusion at issue, past immigration \\nviolations or criminal history, evidence of rehabilitation, gen‐\\neral evidence of good or bad character, strength of family ties, \\nduration of residence in the United States, and evidence of \\nvalue to the community. See In re Mendez‐Moralez, 21 I. & N. \\nDec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996). Because these statutes, along with \\nthe cases and regulations interpreting them, articulate distinct \\nfactors to be considered in deciding whether to grant a discre‐\\ntionary waiver of inadmissibility, the Board cannot simply \\nsubstitute one standard for another and assume that the out‐\\ncome would be the same. If the Board confirms Ruderman’s \\ninadmissibility on remand, it should consider his application \\nfor a waiver under the proper framework. \\n C. \\n Ruderman’s other arguments go nowhere. First, he claims \\nthat he is eligible for asylum and withholding of removal be‐\\ncause he did not commit a “particularly serious crime.” 8 \\nU.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Ruderman com‐\\nmitted homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle, Wis. Stat. \\n§ 940.10(1); he argues that Congress did not intend for crimi‐\\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 9 \\n\\nnal negligence like his to qualify as particularly serious. Gen‐\\nerally, classification of a crime as “particularly serious” is \\nwithin the discretion of the Attorney General—exercised here \\nby the Board. Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. \\n2006). Our review of these classifications is confined to consti‐\\ntutional and legal questions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2); see also Es‐\\ntrada‐Martinez v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 2015). And \\nwhen those legal questions implicate ambiguous statutory \\nprovisions, we give deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. \\nRes. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). \\n We considered the meaning of “particularly serious \\ncrime” in some depth in Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. \\n2006). In that case, the petitioner argued that the Board could \\nnot hold that his conviction for “substantial battery with a \\ndangerous weapon,” a nonaggravated felony, was a particu‐\\nlarly serious crime under § 1158(b)(2) and § 1231(b)(3) be‐\\ncause it did not fall within the two categories of crimes iden‐\\ntified as per se “particularly serious” in § 1158(b)(2): aggra‐\\nvated felonies and other crimes that the Attorney General des‐\\nignates by regulation. Id. at 468–69. We disagreed, explaining \\nthat the presence of these categories does not cabin the \\nBoard’s discretion to determine that nonaggravated felonies \\nare particularly serious on a case‐by‐case basis. Id. at 469. In \\nthe same way, the Board is not precluded from determining \\nthat some crimes of negligence are particularly serious. \\n Nor does the Immigration and Nationality Act’s separate \\ndefinition of “serious criminal offense” undermine the \\nBoard’s interpretation. The Act identifies “driving while in‐\\ntoxicated or under the influence of alcohol” as a serious crim‐\\ninal offense if it “involves personal injury to another.” 8 U.S.C. \\n§ 1101(h)(3). Ruderman argues that “particularly serious \\n\\f10 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\ncrime” must be interpreted to require more. Maybe so. But \\neven if he’s right, criminally negligent homicide entails more \\nthan mere “personal injury,” so the argument is a dead end. \\n Finally, even if § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) \\nwere ambiguous as to whether crimes of negligence could be \\n“particularly serious,” Ruderman has not shown that the \\nBoard’s interpretation is too unreasonable to merit deference \\nunder Chevron. See Ali, 468 F.3d at 470. Nor has he shown that \\nthe Board’s interpretation is so likely to conflict with the Con‐\\nstitution or international law that we need to consider \\nwhether some other interpretation is warranted. \\n D. \\n Finally, Ruderman contends that the Board should have \\ngranted him protection under the Convention Against Tor‐\\nture, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–18. The Convention forbids the re‐\\nturn of “a person to another State where there are substantial \\ngrounds for believing that he would be in danger of being \\nsubjected to torture.” Convention Against Torture and Other \\nCruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. \\n3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100‐20 (1990), 1465 \\nU.N.T.S. 85. Federal regulations define torture as requiring \\n“the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” 8 C.F.R \\n§ 1208.18(a)(1). Immigration judges must withhold or defer \\nremoval if an applicant demonstrates that “it is more likely \\nthan not that he or she would be tortured if removed.” 8 \\nC.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). We have explained that “more likely \\nthan not” means that there is a “substantial risk” that the alien \\nwill be tortured. Rodriguez‐Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, \\n1135–36 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Perez‐Montes v. Sessions, 880 \\nF.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir. 2018). \\n\\fNo. 17‐1689 11 \\n\\n Ruderman argues that the immigration judge both misun‐\\nderstood and misapplied the “substantial risk” standard. But \\nthere is no evidence of the former; the immigration judge \\ncited our decision in Rodriguez‐Molinero and proceeded to an‐\\nalyze whether there was a substantial risk that Ruderman \\nwould be subject to torture inflicted by or with the consent of \\na public official if he returned to Belarus. See 8 C.F.R. \\n§ 1208.18(a)(1)–(2). And Ruderman fails to establish the latter. \\nWe review the Board’s conclusion that there was no substan‐\\ntial risk of torture under the “highly deferential substantial \\nevidence test,” which mandates denying the petition unless \\n“the record evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Lopez v. \\nLynch, 810 F.3d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). \\n The record evidence does not compel a contrary conclu‐\\nsion. To be sure, certain findings from the immigration judge \\ngive us pause. For one, the judge concluded that there was no \\nsubstantial risk of torture for Jews in Belarus because, despite \\n“widespread anti‐Semitism in Belarus,” incidents targeting \\nJews have been declining. While it is true that the raw number \\nof anti‐Jewish incidents in Belarus has declined, so has the \\nJewish population. In this context, an absolute decrease in in‐\\ncidents does not necessary equate to a relative increase in \\nsafety for any individual. Nor does the evidence of Ruder‐\\nman’s mother’s safe travel to and from Belarus mean that \\nRuderman will be equally safe. His mother has a Christian \\nname that is not associated with her late husband, whereas \\nRuderman’s patronymic clearly signals that he is both Jewish \\nand the son of a known political activist whom the KGB may \\nhave tortured and killed. But on the other hand, there is evi‐\\ndence that Ruderman became less susceptible to physical at‐\\ntacks as he grew and became better able to defend himself, \\nthat no one in his family has been threatened in Belarus, and \\n\\f12 No. 17‐1689 \\n\\nthat he lived in Belarus for eight years following his father’s \\ndeath without any threat of torture on account of his relation‐\\nship to his father. Considering all the evidence, the record \\ndoes not compel the conclusion that there is a substantial risk \\nthat Ruderman would be tortured if he returned to Belarus. \\n * * * \\n Ruderman’s petition for review is GRANTED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":275,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4585624,"string":"4,585,624"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Scott Books"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3493"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3493\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nSCOTT BOOKS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 1:16-cr-10037 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. On trial for bank robbery, Scott\\nBooks chose not to testify in his own defense and was found\\nguilty and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. He now\\nchallenges two pretrial decisions by the district court. The\\nfirst allowed eyewitness testimony at trial from the two bank\\ntellers that Books alleged based their identification of him as\\nthe robber not on personal knowledge, but rather on infor-\\nmation improperly supplied by a police detective. The sec-\\n\\f2 No. 17-3493\\n\\nond ruling would have allowed the government, had Books\\nchosen to testify at trial, to impeach him with physical evi-\\ndence directly tying him to the robbery—evidence the police\\nlearned of (and then recovered) only as a result of a confes-\\nsion the district court separately had determined was unlaw-\\nfully coerced.\\n Neither challenge succeeds. The district court did not err\\nin finding the eyewitness identifications reflected the tellers’\\nfirsthand knowledge of Books, and thus allowing their tes-\\ntimony at trial was entirely proper. Nor can we conclude\\nthat the district court’s conditional impeachment ruling,\\neven if wrong on the law, mandates reversal in light of the\\noverwhelming weight of evidence against Books. So we\\naffirm.\\n I\\n A\\n On July 28, 2016 a man robbed the Land of Lincoln Credit\\nUnion in Normal, Illinois. Dressed in a black hooded sweat-\\nshirt, wearing a mask and neon gloves, the robber ap-\\nproached the counter and, while motioning toward the\\ndrawer with what appeared to be a black handgun, de-\\nmanded “all the money.” The robbery lasted all but 20 sec-\\nonds, with the offender making off with $18,000 and fleeing\\nin a Buick SUV.\\n Two tellers recognized the robber’s voice and manner-\\nisms and immediately identified him as Scott Books—a long-\\ntime customer of the credit union. Holly Bateman told her\\nsupervisor (and later the police) she was 99% certain Books\\nwas the robber because she had interacted with him on at\\nleast six prior occasions. The second teller, Susan Phelps,\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 3\\n\\nagreed with Bateman’s identification of Books as the offend-\\ner. A third witness, James Teidman, was driving by the bank\\nwhen he saw the robber running from the bank with a gun,\\nonly then to speed away in a Buick SUV.\\n The police arrested Books the next day. After waiving his\\nMiranda rights and agreeing to an interview, he confessed to\\nthe robbery, while also telling the police where they could\\nfind the gloves, clothing, and fake gun he used. The police\\nfound these items exactly where Books described, and in\\ntime a grand jury indicted Books for the robbery.\\n B\\n The district court held a series of pretrial hearings to de-\\ntermine the admissibility of evidence contested by Books.\\nThree of those rulings are significant to this appeal.\\n First, the district court suppressed Books’s confession,\\nfinding that the police officers overstepped and overcame\\nBooks’s will by threatening to arrest his wife and take his\\nchildren into custody if he did not own up to his role in the\\nrobbery—rendering the confession involuntary. The court\\nsuppressed both the confession and its physical fruits—\\nspecifically, the clothing, gloves, and fake gun the police re-\\ncovered based upon Books telling them where to look.\\n Second, the district court denied Books’s motion to pre-\\nvent the two bank tellers (Bateman and Phelps) from testify-\\ning at trial. Books had sought to exclude their testimony on\\nthe basis that the police detective who investigated the rob-\\nbery improperly tainted their identifications when, a day af-\\nter the robbery, he allegedly told both witnesses that Books\\nhad confessed to the crime. The government disagreed, tak-\\ning the position that the detective in no way revealed\\n\\f4 No. 17-3493\\n\\nBooks’s confession and thus in no way influenced the tellers’\\nclear and definitive identification of Books as the robber. The\\ndistrict court held a hearing, received testimony from the\\ntellers and detective, and found it “clear from th[e] record\\nthat [both tellers] have a truly independent source of identi-\\nfication of [Books] other than any suggestion that would\\nhave been put in their mind by the officer.” Accordingly, the\\ndistrict court permitted the tellers to testify at trial.\\n Third, the district court considered but reserved defini-\\ntively ruling until trial on the government’s motion for per-\\nmission to impeach Books with the fruits of his confession in\\nthe event he chose to testify. Books opposed the motion and\\nurged the district court to hold that the price for the police\\nunlawfully coercing his confession should be the suppres-\\nsion of all incriminating evidence (his admission and the\\nphysical fruits) for all purposes, including impeachment. The\\ndistrict court said it was inclined to allow some impeach-\\nment but reserved a final ruling unless and until Books\\nchose to testify and the government sought to impeach him\\non cross-examination with his prior statements describing\\nthe whereabouts of the clothing he wore during the robbery.\\nThe district court cast its ruling this way: “[I]f and when we\\nget to that point [of the trial], any questions that the gov-\\nernment wished to ask the defendant if he testifies, I would\\nhave to hear exactly what the questions are outside the pres-\\nence of the jury so there could be specific objections.”\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 5\\n\\n C\\n In the end, Books chose not to testify at trial, and thus\\nneither his coerced confession nor the resulting physical\\nfruits came into evidence. The government nonetheless pre-\\nsented a strong case, including testimony from these wit-\\nnesses:\\n Bank teller Holly Bateman identified Books\\n as the robber. She testified that she knew\\n Books from her work at the credit union\\n and immediately recognized him as the\\n robber—so much so that she almost said\\n “Scott, can you remove your mask?”\\n Bateman told the jury that she “instantly”\\n recognized Books’s voice and likewise\\n knew it was Books from his distinct\\n mannerisms. Asked at trial about her\\n confidence level that Books committed the\\n robbery, Bateman testified that she was\\n 110% sure because the incident had\\n replayed over and over in her mind.\\n Susan Phelps, the second bank teller, also\\n identified Books as the robber. While not as\\n fast as Bateman to recognize Books during\\n the robbery, Phelps testified she was confi-\\n dent Books was the offender based on his\\n unique mannerisms, including his walk and\\n jittery disposition.\\n Phillip Meyer, a friend and former cowork-\\n er of Books, testified that he had received a\\n text message from Books on the day of the\\n\\f6 No. 17-3493\\n\\n robbery or the day before asking, “I wonder\\n what bank I should rob today?”\\n Todd Hogan, the bank’s vice president, tes-\\n tified that he remembered teller Holly\\n Bateman calling him immediately after the\\n robbery to tell him she was 99% sure the\\n robber was Books. Hogan also explained\\n that Books’s business account had been\\n flagged in the bank’s system on multiple\\n occasions due to attempts to deposit checks\\n backed by insufficient funds.\\n James Teidman testified that he was driving\\n by the credit union when the robbery oc-\\n curred and saw a Buick SUV, the same\\n model later tracked to Books’s residence,\\n flee the scene.\\n While Books chose not to testify, his counsel vigorously\\ncross-examined the government’s witnesses. When it came\\nto tellers Bateman and Phelps, defense counsel challenged\\ntheir recollection of the robbery, probed the reliability of\\ntheir identifications of Books and the getaway car, and exam-\\nined their memory of the robber’s dress, voice, and manner-\\nisms—all in an effort to question their overall confidence\\nthat Books was the offender. At no point during the trial did\\nBooks’s counsel or the government refer to Books’s confes-\\nsion or to the police detective’s (allegedly impermissible) in-\\nteraction with the two tellers. The jury returned a guilty ver-\\ndict.\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 7\\n\\n II\\n A\\n Books challenges the district court’s pretrial ruling deny-\\ning his motion to preclude the two tellers from testifying at\\ntrial on the basis that the police detective allegedly tainted\\ntheir eyewitness identifications by telling them that he had\\nconfessed to the robbery. This misconduct, Books contends,\\nviolated his Fifth Amendment right against self-\\nincrimination. He further argues that the district court’s pre-\\ntrial ruling too circumscribed his Sixth Amendment right to\\ncross-examine the tellers at trial. The facts belie both conten-\\ntions.\\n While all agree that our review of legal issues is de novo,\\nthe parties dispute the legal standard that governs the ad-\\nmission at trial of the bank tellers’ identification testimony.\\nBooks invites us to follow Kastigar v. United States, and\\nthereby place the burden on the government to show that\\nthe tellers’ testimony was “derived from legitimate inde-\\npendent sources” and, as a result, not unduly influenced by\\nthe police detective. See 406 U.S. 441, 461–62 (1972). The\\ngovernment, on the other hand, urges us to read Kastigar as\\nmore narrowly applying to, and not beyond, the setting that\\ngave rise to its holding—circumstances in which a witness\\ntestifies pursuant to a grant of immunity. See id. The gov-\\nernment instead asks us to employ the less onerous, due-\\nprocess based standard found in cases like Neil v. Biggers,\\n409 U.S. 188 (1972), where the focus is more simply on the\\nreliability of in-court identification testimony with the de-\\nfendant (not the government) bearing the initial burden of\\nshowing that the government did something to taint the\\nidentification. See also, e.g., United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d\\n\\f8 No. 17-3493\\n\\n234, 239 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the defendant bears\\nthe burden of showing that the challenged identification was\\nunduly suggestive).\\n The proper reach and application of the Kastigar rule has\\nnot gone unnoticed by other courts. See, e.g., United States v.\\nAllen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 n.121 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[I]t is not clear\\nwhether all involuntary statements or all compelled\\nstatements should be subjected to the strong medicine\\nprescribed in Kastigar, or whether some other doctrine\\nshould govern in certain circumstances.”); United States v.\\nJones, 542 F.2d 186, 199 n.24 (4th Cir. 1976) (discussing\\nuncertainty over Kastigar’s application to coerced\\nconfessions).\\n We have not had a case requiring us to choose sides, and\\nthis appeal does not either. We can comfortably resolve the\\ncase on narrower grounds, because under either Kastigar or\\nBiggers (or hybrids of either standard), the evidence was\\nmore than sufficient to show that the two tellers, Bateman\\nand Phelps, identified Books based on their prior dealings\\nand first-hand familiarity with him, without regard to any\\ninformation supplied by the police detective. At no point did\\nthe tellers, and most especially Holly Bateman, ever waiver\\nin their confidence that Books was the robber. So, whether\\nassessed under Kastigar or a lesser standard, Books’s chal-\\nlenge to the district court’s admission of the tellers’ testimo-\\nny cannot succeed.\\n Books fares no better when contending that the district\\ncourt’s ruling on the tellers’ testimony also violated the Sixth\\nAmendment by limiting his ability to confront and cross-\\nexamine these witnesses. A fulsome cross-examination,\\nBooks posits, would have entailed questioning how the wit-\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 9\\n\\nnesses arrived at their identification testimony—a line of\\nquestioning, as Books sees it, that necessarily would have\\nexposed that the police improperly told both tellers that he\\nhad confessed to the robbery. We cannot agree, as Books’s\\nposition misfires on the law and facts.\\n A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront wit-\\nnesses is not absolute, but instead subject to reasonable limi-\\ntations imposed by the district court. See United States v.\\nSaunders, 166 F.3d 907, 918 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Delaware v.\\nVan Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). The limitation Books\\nchallenges came from the district court’s pretrial ruling sup-\\npressing his coerced confession. This ruling favored Books\\nand, beyond precluding the government from using the con-\\nfession as evidence, naturally limited how he would ap-\\nproach cross-examining government witnesses, for he right-\\nly wanted to avoid the jury learning that he had confessed to\\nthe robbery. But accepting a necessary and proper limitation\\non cross-examination does not, without more, run afoul of\\nthe Confrontation Clause, especially where, as here, Books\\nwas able as a practical matter to adequately, and indeed vig-\\norously, cross-examine both bank tellers. See United States v.\\nSasson, 62 F.3d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the\\nConfrontation Clause “guarantees only an opportunity for a\\nthorough and effective cross-examination, ‘not cross-\\nexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to what-\\never extent, the defense might wish’”) (quoting Delaware v.\\nFensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). And Books was able to do\\nso without ever insinuating, much less revealing, that he had\\nconfessed to the robbery. The Confrontation Clause required\\nno more.\\n\\f10 No. 17-3493\\n\\n B\\n This brings us to Books’s Fifth Amendment challenge to\\nthe district court’s pretrial impeachment ruling. Books ar-\\ngues that the ruling—allowing the government, if he chose\\nto testify, to cross-examine him with the fruits of his coerced\\nconfession—created an unconstitutional predicament and\\ncatch-22: he was forced to either forfeit his right to testify in\\nhis own defense, or, if he did take the stand, face a surefire\\nconviction once the government impeached him with the\\nfruits of his confession.\\n Books may be right in his contention that the district\\ncourt, even though reserving a final ruling until after seeing\\nwhether he chose to testify and what questions the govern-\\nment wanted to ask on cross-examination, committed legal\\nerror in concluding, however conditionally, that some im-\\npeachment with the physical fruits of a coerced confession\\nmay be permissible. While that proposition is not settled in\\nthe law, Books’s position is not without some support. See,\\ne.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003) (plurality\\nopinion) (emphasizing, albeit in dicta, that “those subjected\\nto coercive police interrogations have an automatic protection\\nfrom the use of their involuntary statements (or evidence de-\\nrived from their statements) in any subsequent criminal tri-\\nal”).\\n The government urges us to avoid answering this ques-\\ntion. Pointing to Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), the\\ngovernment says that Books waived any challenge to the dis-\\ntrict court’s ruling by not testifying at trial. The govern-\\nment’s position finds substantial, if not dispositive, support\\nin our decision in United States v. Wilson, 307 F.3d 596, 600–\\n01 (7th Cir. 2002), where the defendant chose not to testify at\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 11\\n\\ntrial and, as a result, we declined to review the merits of his\\nclaim that a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of particular\\nimpeachment testimony violated his Fifth Amendment right\\nto remain silent.\\n The whole point of the rule announced in Luce, which we\\nextended to the domain of a Fifth Amendment claim in\\nWilson, is that courts should refrain from reviewing claims\\nthat a particular line of cross-examination would have\\nviolated a defendant’s right against self-incrimination when\\nthe defendant in fact never testified at trial and thus never\\nunderwent cross-examination. Any other course, the\\nreasoning runs, would require too much speculation on how\\nthe testimony and related questioning would have played\\nout at trial. See Wilson, 307 F.3d at 600–01.\\n Even if we agreed with Books that Wilson should be read\\nmore narrowly, our ensuing reasoning would not travel a\\npath that resulted in an award of relief. Both parties agree\\nthat the ultimate merits of Books’s Fifth Amendment claim is\\nsubject to harmless error review. Indeed, the doctrine of\\nharmless error finds straightforward application on the evi-\\ndence presented at Books’s trial.\\n Not every constitutional error automatically requires the\\nreversal of a defendant’s conviction. Instead, as the Supreme\\nCourt has explained, “if the government can show ‘beyond a\\nreasonable doubt that the error complained of did not con-\\ntribute to the verdict obtained,’ … then the error is deemed\\nharmless and the defendant is not entitled to reversal.”\\nWeaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (quoting\\nChapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). This precise\\nstandard would apply if Books had testified and was sub-\\njected to certain impermissible impeachment. See Arizona v.\\n\\f12 No. 17-3493\\n\\nFulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (holding that the doc-\\ntrine of harmless error applies to the violation of the defend-\\nant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination\\nthrough the admission at trial of an involuntary confession).\\nAnd the same analysis would apply if we accept Books’s\\ncontention that the district court’s ruling constructively fore-\\nclosed his decision to take the stand. See Ortega v. O’Leary,\\n843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying harmless error\\nanalysis to the denial of the right to testify); Alicea v. Ganon,\\n675 F.2d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 1982) (reaching the same conclu-\\nsion).\\n In reviewing the trial record, our obligation is to deter-\\nmine whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt, and we do so in no small part by evaluating the over-\\nall strength of the prosecution’s case. See Jones v. Basinger,\\n635 F.3d 1030, 1052 (7th Cir. 2011). On this front, Books faces\\nan insurmountable burden because the evidence against him\\nat trial was overwhelming: the eyewitness testimony of the\\ntwo bank tellers, the text message to a friend indicating his\\ndesire to rob a bank, the identification of his car as the geta-\\nway vehicle, and the testimony of over a dozen other wit-\\nnesses—all in the broader context of his financial difficulties\\nand prior disputes with the Land of Lincoln Credit Union.\\nOn this record, any error in the district court’s pretrial ruling\\non the scope of permissible impeachment was harmless be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt.\\n III\\n Two other matters warrant attention. First, relying on\\nBrooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), Books argues that the\\ndistrict court’s impeachment ruling deprived him of the\\n“guiding hand of counsel” by undermining his attorney’s\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 13\\n\\nability to make informed and independent decisions about\\nthe best trial strategy, including whether Books should take\\nthe stand in his own defense. Id. at 612. But Brooks provides\\nno refuge, for there the Supreme Court considered a state\\nstatute that required a defendant, if he chose to put on a de-\\nfense at trial, to be the first defense witness to testify, forcing\\na preemptive decision to take the stand absent “a full survey\\nof all the case.” Id. at 608. Books, in contrast, faced only the\\nuncertainty that often accompanies an unfavorable (and\\nperhaps even incorrect) pretrial ruling on the scope of im-\\npeachment. Whatever limitations this may have imposed on\\nthe strategic choices of Books’s defense, they were far afield\\nfrom the extreme circumstances defense counsel confronted\\nin Brooks.\\n Finally, we reject Books’s invitation to overturn his con-\\nviction on the basis of cumulative error. We have reviewed\\nthe record carefully and cannot get anywhere near conclud-\\ning that there are “multiple errors [that] so infected the jury’s\\ndeliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally\\nfair trial.” United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir.\\n2001). The bottom line is that Books’s cumulative error ar-\\ngument cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence pre-\\nsented against him at trial.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4362877/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585624/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Scott Books\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3493\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nSCOTT BOOKS,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 1:16-cr-10037 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. On trial for bank robbery, Scott\nBooks chose not to testify in his own defense and was found\nguilty and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. He now\nchallenges two pretrial decisions by the district court. The\nfirst allowed eyewitness testimony at trial from the two bank\ntellers that Books alleged based their identification of him as\nthe robber not on personal knowledge, but rather on infor-\nmation improperly supplied by a police detective. The sec-\n\f2 No. 17-3493\n\nond ruling would have allowed the government, had Books\nchosen to testify at trial, to impeach him with physical evi-\ndence directly tying him to the robbery—evidence the police\nlearned of (and then recovered) only as a result of a confes-\nsion the district court separately had determined was unlaw-\nfully coerced.\n Neither challenge succeeds. The district court did not err\nin finding the eyewitness identifications reflected the tellers’\nfirsthand knowledge of Books, and thus allowing their tes-\ntimony at trial was entirely proper. Nor can we conclude\nthat the district court’s conditional impeachment ruling,\neven if wrong on the law, mandates reversal in light of the\noverwhelming weight of evidence against Books. So we\naffirm.\n I\n A\n On July 28, 2016 a man robbed the Land of Lincoln Credit\nUnion in Normal, Illinois. Dressed in a black hooded sweat-\nshirt, wearing a mask and neon gloves, the robber ap-\nproached the counter and, while motioning toward the\ndrawer with what appeared to be a black handgun, de-\nmanded “all the money.” The robbery lasted all but 20 sec-\nonds, with the offender making off with $18,000 and fleeing\nin a Buick SUV.\n Two tellers recognized the robber’s voice and manner-\nisms and immediately identified him as Scott Books—a long-\ntime customer of the credit union. Holly Bateman told her\nsupervisor (and later the police) she was 99% certain Books\nwas the robber because she had interacted with him on at\nleast six prior occasions. The second teller, Susan Phelps,\n\fNo. 17-3493 3\n\nagreed with Bateman’s identification of Books as the offend-\ner. A third witness, James Teidman, was driving by the bank\nwhen he saw the robber running from the bank with a gun,\nonly then to speed away in a Buick SUV.\n The police arrested Books the next day. After waiving his\nMiranda rights and agreeing to an interview, he confessed to\nthe robbery, while also telling the police where they could\nfind the gloves, clothing, and fake gun he used. The police\nfound these items exactly where Books described, and in\ntime a grand jury indicted Books for the robbery.\n B\n The district court held a series of pretrial hearings to de-\ntermine the admissibility of evidence contested by Books.\nThree of those rulings are significant to this appeal.\n First, the district court suppressed Books’s confession,\nfinding that the police officers overstepped and overcame\nBooks’s will by threatening to arrest his wife and take his\nchildren into custody if he did not own up to his role in the\nrobbery—rendering the confession involuntary. The court\nsuppressed both the confession and its physical fruits—\nspecifically, the clothing, gloves, and fake gun the police re-\ncovered based upon Books telling them where to look.\n Second, the district court denied Books’s motion to pre-\nvent the two bank tellers (Bateman and Phelps) from testify-\ning at trial. Books had sought to exclude their testimony on\nthe basis that the police detective who investigated the rob-\nbery improperly tainted their identifications when, a day af-\nter the robbery, he allegedly told both witnesses that Books\nhad confessed to the crime. The government disagreed, tak-\ning the position that the detective in no way revealed\n\f4 No. 17-3493\n\nBooks’s confession and thus in no way influenced the tellers’\nclear and definitive identification of Books as the robber. The\ndistrict court held a hearing, received testimony from the\ntellers and detective, and found it “clear from th[e] record\nthat [both tellers] have a truly independent source of identi-\nfication of [Books] other than any suggestion that would\nhave been put in their mind by the officer.” Accordingly, the\ndistrict court permitted the tellers to testify at trial.\n Third, the district court considered but reserved defini-\ntively ruling until trial on the government’s motion for per-\nmission to impeach Books with the fruits of his confession in\nthe event he chose to testify. Books opposed the motion and\nurged the district court to hold that the price for the police\nunlawfully coercing his confession should be the suppres-\nsion of all incriminating evidence (his admission and the\nphysical fruits) for all purposes, including impeachment. The\ndistrict court said it was inclined to allow some impeach-\nment but reserved a final ruling unless and until Books\nchose to testify and the government sought to impeach him\non cross-examination with his prior statements describing\nthe whereabouts of the clothing he wore during the robbery.\nThe district court cast its ruling this way: “[I]f and when we\nget to that point [of the trial], any questions that the gov-\nernment wished to ask the defendant if he testifies, I would\nhave to hear exactly what the questions are outside the pres-\nence of the jury so there could be specific objections.”\n\fNo. 17-3493 5\n\n C\n In the end, Books chose not to testify at trial, and thus\nneither his coerced confession nor the resulting physical\nfruits came into evidence. The government nonetheless pre-\nsented a strong case, including testimony from these wit-\nnesses:\n Bank teller Holly Bateman identified Books\n as the robber. She testified that she knew\n Books from her work at the credit union\n and immediately recognized him as the\n robber—so much so that she almost said\n “Scott, can you remove your mask?”\n Bateman told the jury that she “instantly”\n recognized Books’s voice and likewise\n knew it was Books from his distinct\n mannerisms. Asked at trial about her\n confidence level that Books committed the\n robbery, Bateman testified that she was\n 110% sure because the incident had\n replayed over and over in her mind.\n Susan Phelps, the second bank teller, also\n identified Books as the robber. While not as\n fast as Bateman to recognize Books during\n the robbery, Phelps testified she was confi-\n dent Books was the offender based on his\n unique mannerisms, including his walk and\n jittery disposition.\n Phillip Meyer, a friend and former cowork-\n er of Books, testified that he had received a\n text message from Books on the day of the\n\f6 No. 17-3493\n\n robbery or the day before asking, “I wonder\n what bank I should rob today?”\n Todd Hogan, the bank’s vice president, tes-\n tified that he remembered teller Holly\n Bateman calling him immediately after the\n robbery to tell him she was 99% sure the\n robber was Books. Hogan also explained\n that Books’s business account had been\n flagged in the bank’s system on multiple\n occasions due to attempts to deposit checks\n backed by insufficient funds.\n James Teidman testified that he was driving\n by the credit union when the robbery oc-\n curred and saw a Buick SUV, the same\n model later tracked to Books’s residence,\n flee the scene.\n While Books chose not to testify, his counsel vigorously\ncross-examined the government’s witnesses. When it came\nto tellers Bateman and Phelps, defense counsel challenged\ntheir recollection of the robbery, probed the reliability of\ntheir identifications of Books and the getaway car, and exam-\nined their memory of the robber’s dress, voice, and manner-\nisms—all in an effort to question their overall confidence\nthat Books was the offender. At no point during the trial did\nBooks’s counsel or the government refer to Books’s confes-\nsion or to the police detective’s (allegedly impermissible) in-\nteraction with the two tellers. The jury returned a guilty ver-\ndict.\n\fNo. 17-3493 7\n\n II\n A\n Books challenges the district court’s pretrial ruling deny-\ning his motion to preclude the two tellers from testifying at\ntrial on the basis that the police detective allegedly tainted\ntheir eyewitness identifications by telling them that he had\nconfessed to the robbery. This misconduct, Books contends,\nviolated his Fifth Amendment right against self-\nincrimination. He further argues that the district court’s pre-\ntrial ruling too circumscribed his Sixth Amendment right to\ncross-examine the tellers at trial. The facts belie both conten-\ntions.\n While all agree that our review of legal issues is de novo,\nthe parties dispute the legal standard that governs the ad-\nmission at trial of the bank tellers’ identification testimony.\nBooks invites us to follow Kastigar v. United States, and\nthereby place the burden on the government to show that\nthe tellers’ testimony was “derived from legitimate inde-\npendent sources” and, as a result, not unduly influenced by\nthe police detective. See 406 U.S. 441, 461–62 (1972). The\ngovernment, on the other hand, urges us to read Kastigar as\nmore narrowly applying to, and not beyond, the setting that\ngave rise to its holding—circumstances in which a witness\ntestifies pursuant to a grant of immunity. See id. The gov-\nernment instead asks us to employ the less onerous, due-\nprocess based standard found in cases like Neil v. Biggers,\n409 U.S. 188 (1972), where the focus is more simply on the\nreliability of in-court identification testimony with the de-\nfendant (not the government) bearing the initial burden of\nshowing that the government did something to taint the\nidentification. See also, e.g., United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d\n\f8 No. 17-3493\n\n234, 239 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the defendant bears\nthe burden of showing that the challenged identification was\nunduly suggestive).\n The proper reach and application of the Kastigar rule has\nnot gone unnoticed by other courts. See, e.g., United States v.\nAllen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 n.121 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[I]t is not clear\nwhether all involuntary statements or all compelled\nstatements should be subjected to the strong medicine\nprescribed in Kastigar, or whether some other doctrine\nshould govern in certain circumstances.”); United States v.\nJones, 542 F.2d 186, 199 n.24 (4th Cir. 1976) (discussing\nuncertainty over Kastigar’s application to coerced\nconfessions).\n We have not had a case requiring us to choose sides, and\nthis appeal does not either. We can comfortably resolve the\ncase on narrower grounds, because under either Kastigar or\nBiggers (or hybrids of either standard), the evidence was\nmore than sufficient to show that the two tellers, Bateman\nand Phelps, identified Books based on their prior dealings\nand first-hand familiarity with him, without regard to any\ninformation supplied by the police detective. At no point did\nthe tellers, and most especially Holly Bateman, ever waiver\nin their confidence that Books was the robber. So, whether\nassessed under Kastigar or a lesser standard, Books’s chal-\nlenge to the district court’s admission of the tellers’ testimo-\nny cannot succeed.\n Books fares no better when contending that the district\ncourt’s ruling on the tellers’ testimony also violated the Sixth\nAmendment by limiting his ability to confront and cross-\nexamine these witnesses. A fulsome cross-examination,\nBooks posits, would have entailed questioning how the wit-\n\fNo. 17-3493 9\n\nnesses arrived at their identification testimony—a line of\nquestioning, as Books sees it, that necessarily would have\nexposed that the police improperly told both tellers that he\nhad confessed to the robbery. We cannot agree, as Books’s\nposition misfires on the law and facts.\n A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront wit-\nnesses is not absolute, but instead subject to reasonable limi-\ntations imposed by the district court. See United States v.\nSaunders, 166 F.3d 907, 918 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Delaware v.\nVan Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). The limitation Books\nchallenges came from the district court’s pretrial ruling sup-\npressing his coerced confession. This ruling favored Books\nand, beyond precluding the government from using the con-\nfession as evidence, naturally limited how he would ap-\nproach cross-examining government witnesses, for he right-\nly wanted to avoid the jury learning that he had confessed to\nthe robbery. But accepting a necessary and proper limitation\non cross-examination does not, without more, run afoul of\nthe Confrontation Clause, especially where, as here, Books\nwas able as a practical matter to adequately, and indeed vig-\norously, cross-examine both bank tellers. See United States v.\nSasson, 62 F.3d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the\nConfrontation Clause “guarantees only an opportunity for a\nthorough and effective cross-examination, ‘not cross-\nexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to what-\never extent, the defense might wish’”) (quoting Delaware v.\nFensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). And Books was able to do\nso without ever insinuating, much less revealing, that he had\nconfessed to the robbery. The Confrontation Clause required\nno more.\n\f10 No. 17-3493\n\n B\n This brings us to Books’s Fifth Amendment challenge to\nthe district court’s pretrial impeachment ruling. Books ar-\ngues that the ruling—allowing the government, if he chose\nto testify, to cross-examine him with the fruits of his coerced\nconfession—created an unconstitutional predicament and\ncatch-22: he was forced to either forfeit his right to testify in\nhis own defense, or, if he did take the stand, face a surefire\nconviction once the government impeached him with the\nfruits of his confession.\n Books may be right in his contention that the district\ncourt, even though reserving a final ruling until after seeing\nwhether he chose to testify and what questions the govern-\nment wanted to ask on cross-examination, committed legal\nerror in concluding, however conditionally, that some im-\npeachment with the physical fruits of a coerced confession\nmay be permissible. While that proposition is not settled in\nthe law, Books’s position is not without some support. See,\ne.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003) (plurality\nopinion) (emphasizing, albeit in dicta, that “those subjected\nto coercive police interrogations have an automatic protection\nfrom the use of their involuntary statements (or evidence de-\nrived from their statements) in any subsequent criminal tri-\nal”).\n The government urges us to avoid answering this ques-\ntion. Pointing to Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), the\ngovernment says that Books waived any challenge to the dis-\ntrict court’s ruling by not testifying at trial. The govern-\nment’s position finds substantial, if not dispositive, support\nin our decision in United States v. Wilson, 307 F.3d 596, 600–\n01 (7th Cir. 2002), where the defendant chose not to testify at\n\fNo. 17-3493 11\n\ntrial and, as a result, we declined to review the merits of his\nclaim that a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of particular\nimpeachment testimony violated his Fifth Amendment right\nto remain silent.\n The whole point of the rule announced in Luce, which we\nextended to the domain of a Fifth Amendment claim in\nWilson, is that courts should refrain from reviewing claims\nthat a particular line of cross-examination would have\nviolated a defendant’s right against self-incrimination when\nthe defendant in fact never testified at trial and thus never\nunderwent cross-examination. Any other course, the\nreasoning runs, would require too much speculation on how\nthe testimony and related questioning would have played\nout at trial. See Wilson, 307 F.3d at 600–01.\n Even if we agreed with Books that Wilson should be read\nmore narrowly, our ensuing reasoning would not travel a\npath that resulted in an award of relief. Both parties agree\nthat the ultimate merits of Books’s Fifth Amendment claim is\nsubject to harmless error review. Indeed, the doctrine of\nharmless error finds straightforward application on the evi-\ndence presented at Books’s trial.\n Not every constitutional error automatically requires the\nreversal of a defendant’s conviction. Instead, as the Supreme\nCourt has explained, “if the government can show ‘beyond a\nreasonable doubt that the error complained of did not con-\ntribute to the verdict obtained,’ … then the error is deemed\nharmless and the defendant is not entitled to reversal.”\nWeaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (quoting\nChapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). This precise\nstandard would apply if Books had testified and was sub-\njected to certain impermissible impeachment. See Arizona v.\n\f12 No. 17-3493\n\nFulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (holding that the doc-\ntrine of harmless error applies to the violation of the defend-\nant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination\nthrough the admission at trial of an involuntary confession).\nAnd the same analysis would apply if we accept Books’s\ncontention that the district court’s ruling constructively fore-\nclosed his decision to take the stand. See Ortega v. O’Leary,\n843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying harmless error\nanalysis to the denial of the right to testify); Alicea v. Ganon,\n675 F.2d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 1982) (reaching the same conclu-\nsion).\n In reviewing the trial record, our obligation is to deter-\nmine whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable\ndoubt, and we do so in no small part by evaluating the over-\nall strength of the prosecution’s case. See Jones v. Basinger,\n635 F.3d 1030, 1052 (7th Cir. 2011). On this front, Books faces\nan insurmountable burden because the evidence against him\nat trial was overwhelming: the eyewitness testimony of the\ntwo bank tellers, the text message to a friend indicating his\ndesire to rob a bank, the identification of his car as the geta-\nway vehicle, and the testimony of over a dozen other wit-\nnesses—all in the broader context of his financial difficulties\nand prior disputes with the Land of Lincoln Credit Union.\nOn this record, any error in the district court’s pretrial ruling\non the scope of permissible impeachment was harmless be-\nyond a reasonable doubt.\n III\n Two other matters warrant attention. First, relying on\nBrooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), Books argues that the\ndistrict court’s impeachment ruling deprived him of the\n“guiding hand of counsel” by undermining his attorney’s\n\fNo. 17-3493 13\n\nability to make informed and independent decisions about\nthe best trial strategy, including whether Books should take\nthe stand in his own defense. Id. at 612. But Brooks provides\nno refuge, for there the Supreme Court considered a state\nstatute that required a defendant, if he chose to put on a de-\nfense at trial, to be the first defense witness to testify, forcing\na preemptive decision to take the stand absent “a full survey\nof all the case.” Id. at 608. Books, in contrast, faced only the\nuncertainty that often accompanies an unfavorable (and\nperhaps even incorrect) pretrial ruling on the scope of im-\npeachment. Whatever limitations this may have imposed on\nthe strategic choices of Books’s defense, they were far afield\nfrom the extreme circumstances defense counsel confronted\nin Brooks.\n Finally, we reject Books’s invitation to overturn his con-\nviction on the basis of cumulative error. We have reviewed\nthe record carefully and cannot get anywhere near conclud-\ning that there are “multiple errors [that] so infected the jury’s\ndeliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally\nfair trial.” United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir.\n2001). The bottom line is that Books’s cumulative error ar-\ngument cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence pre-\nsented against him at trial.\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Scott Books\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3493\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nSCOTT BOOKS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 1:16-cr-10037 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. On trial for bank robbery, Scott\\nBooks chose not to testify in his own defense and was found\\nguilty and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. He now\\nchallenges two pretrial decisions by the district court. The\\nfirst allowed eyewitness testimony at trial from the two bank\\ntellers that Books alleged based their identification of him as\\nthe robber not on personal knowledge, but rather on infor-\\nmation improperly supplied by a police detective. The sec-\\n\\f2 No. 17-3493\\n\\nond ruling would have allowed the government, had Books\\nchosen to testify at trial, to impeach him with physical evi-\\ndence directly tying him to the robbery—evidence the police\\nlearned of (and then recovered) only as a result of a confes-\\nsion the district court separately had determined was unlaw-\\nfully coerced.\\n Neither challenge succeeds. The district court did not err\\nin finding the eyewitness identifications reflected the tellers’\\nfirsthand knowledge of Books, and thus allowing their tes-\\ntimony at trial was entirely proper. Nor can we conclude\\nthat the district court’s conditional impeachment ruling,\\neven if wrong on the law, mandates reversal in light of the\\noverwhelming weight of evidence against Books. So we\\naffirm.\\n I\\n A\\n On July 28, 2016 a man robbed the Land of Lincoln Credit\\nUnion in Normal, Illinois. Dressed in a black hooded sweat-\\nshirt, wearing a mask and neon gloves, the robber ap-\\nproached the counter and, while motioning toward the\\ndrawer with what appeared to be a black handgun, de-\\nmanded “all the money.” The robbery lasted all but 20 sec-\\nonds, with the offender making off with $18,000 and fleeing\\nin a Buick SUV.\\n Two tellers recognized the robber’s voice and manner-\\nisms and immediately identified him as Scott Books—a long-\\ntime customer of the credit union. Holly Bateman told her\\nsupervisor (and later the police) she was 99% certain Books\\nwas the robber because she had interacted with him on at\\nleast six prior occasions. The second teller, Susan Phelps,\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 3\\n\\nagreed with Bateman’s identification of Books as the offend-\\ner. A third witness, James Teidman, was driving by the bank\\nwhen he saw the robber running from the bank with a gun,\\nonly then to speed away in a Buick SUV.\\n The police arrested Books the next day. After waiving his\\nMiranda rights and agreeing to an interview, he confessed to\\nthe robbery, while also telling the police where they could\\nfind the gloves, clothing, and fake gun he used. The police\\nfound these items exactly where Books described, and in\\ntime a grand jury indicted Books for the robbery.\\n B\\n The district court held a series of pretrial hearings to de-\\ntermine the admissibility of evidence contested by Books.\\nThree of those rulings are significant to this appeal.\\n First, the district court suppressed Books’s confession,\\nfinding that the police officers overstepped and overcame\\nBooks’s will by threatening to arrest his wife and take his\\nchildren into custody if he did not own up to his role in the\\nrobbery—rendering the confession involuntary. The court\\nsuppressed both the confession and its physical fruits—\\nspecifically, the clothing, gloves, and fake gun the police re-\\ncovered based upon Books telling them where to look.\\n Second, the district court denied Books’s motion to pre-\\nvent the two bank tellers (Bateman and Phelps) from testify-\\ning at trial. Books had sought to exclude their testimony on\\nthe basis that the police detective who investigated the rob-\\nbery improperly tainted their identifications when, a day af-\\nter the robbery, he allegedly told both witnesses that Books\\nhad confessed to the crime. The government disagreed, tak-\\ning the position that the detective in no way revealed\\n\\f4 No. 17-3493\\n\\nBooks’s confession and thus in no way influenced the tellers’\\nclear and definitive identification of Books as the robber. The\\ndistrict court held a hearing, received testimony from the\\ntellers and detective, and found it “clear from th[e] record\\nthat [both tellers] have a truly independent source of identi-\\nfication of [Books] other than any suggestion that would\\nhave been put in their mind by the officer.” Accordingly, the\\ndistrict court permitted the tellers to testify at trial.\\n Third, the district court considered but reserved defini-\\ntively ruling until trial on the government’s motion for per-\\nmission to impeach Books with the fruits of his confession in\\nthe event he chose to testify. Books opposed the motion and\\nurged the district court to hold that the price for the police\\nunlawfully coercing his confession should be the suppres-\\nsion of all incriminating evidence (his admission and the\\nphysical fruits) for all purposes, including impeachment. The\\ndistrict court said it was inclined to allow some impeach-\\nment but reserved a final ruling unless and until Books\\nchose to testify and the government sought to impeach him\\non cross-examination with his prior statements describing\\nthe whereabouts of the clothing he wore during the robbery.\\nThe district court cast its ruling this way: “[I]f and when we\\nget to that point [of the trial], any questions that the gov-\\nernment wished to ask the defendant if he testifies, I would\\nhave to hear exactly what the questions are outside the pres-\\nence of the jury so there could be specific objections.”\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 5\\n\\n C\\n In the end, Books chose not to testify at trial, and thus\\nneither his coerced confession nor the resulting physical\\nfruits came into evidence. The government nonetheless pre-\\nsented a strong case, including testimony from these wit-\\nnesses:\\n Bank teller Holly Bateman identified Books\\n as the robber. She testified that she knew\\n Books from her work at the credit union\\n and immediately recognized him as the\\n robber—so much so that she almost said\\n “Scott, can you remove your mask?”\\n Bateman told the jury that she “instantly”\\n recognized Books’s voice and likewise\\n knew it was Books from his distinct\\n mannerisms. Asked at trial about her\\n confidence level that Books committed the\\n robbery, Bateman testified that she was\\n 110% sure because the incident had\\n replayed over and over in her mind.\\n Susan Phelps, the second bank teller, also\\n identified Books as the robber. While not as\\n fast as Bateman to recognize Books during\\n the robbery, Phelps testified she was confi-\\n dent Books was the offender based on his\\n unique mannerisms, including his walk and\\n jittery disposition.\\n Phillip Meyer, a friend and former cowork-\\n er of Books, testified that he had received a\\n text message from Books on the day of the\\n\\f6 No. 17-3493\\n\\n robbery or the day before asking, “I wonder\\n what bank I should rob today?”\\n Todd Hogan, the bank’s vice president, tes-\\n tified that he remembered teller Holly\\n Bateman calling him immediately after the\\n robbery to tell him she was 99% sure the\\n robber was Books. Hogan also explained\\n that Books’s business account had been\\n flagged in the bank’s system on multiple\\n occasions due to attempts to deposit checks\\n backed by insufficient funds.\\n James Teidman testified that he was driving\\n by the credit union when the robbery oc-\\n curred and saw a Buick SUV, the same\\n model later tracked to Books’s residence,\\n flee the scene.\\n While Books chose not to testify, his counsel vigorously\\ncross-examined the government’s witnesses. When it came\\nto tellers Bateman and Phelps, defense counsel challenged\\ntheir recollection of the robbery, probed the reliability of\\ntheir identifications of Books and the getaway car, and exam-\\nined their memory of the robber’s dress, voice, and manner-\\nisms—all in an effort to question their overall confidence\\nthat Books was the offender. At no point during the trial did\\nBooks’s counsel or the government refer to Books’s confes-\\nsion or to the police detective’s (allegedly impermissible) in-\\nteraction with the two tellers. The jury returned a guilty ver-\\ndict.\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 7\\n\\n II\\n A\\n Books challenges the district court’s pretrial ruling deny-\\ning his motion to preclude the two tellers from testifying at\\ntrial on the basis that the police detective allegedly tainted\\ntheir eyewitness identifications by telling them that he had\\nconfessed to the robbery. This misconduct, Books contends,\\nviolated his Fifth Amendment right against self-\\nincrimination. He further argues that the district court’s pre-\\ntrial ruling too circumscribed his Sixth Amendment right to\\ncross-examine the tellers at trial. The facts belie both conten-\\ntions.\\n While all agree that our review of legal issues is de novo,\\nthe parties dispute the legal standard that governs the ad-\\nmission at trial of the bank tellers’ identification testimony.\\nBooks invites us to follow Kastigar v. United States, and\\nthereby place the burden on the government to show that\\nthe tellers’ testimony was “derived from legitimate inde-\\npendent sources” and, as a result, not unduly influenced by\\nthe police detective. See 406 U.S. 441, 461–62 (1972). The\\ngovernment, on the other hand, urges us to read Kastigar as\\nmore narrowly applying to, and not beyond, the setting that\\ngave rise to its holding—circumstances in which a witness\\ntestifies pursuant to a grant of immunity. See id. The gov-\\nernment instead asks us to employ the less onerous, due-\\nprocess based standard found in cases like Neil v. Biggers,\\n409 U.S. 188 (1972), where the focus is more simply on the\\nreliability of in-court identification testimony with the de-\\nfendant (not the government) bearing the initial burden of\\nshowing that the government did something to taint the\\nidentification. See also, e.g., United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d\\n\\f8 No. 17-3493\\n\\n234, 239 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the defendant bears\\nthe burden of showing that the challenged identification was\\nunduly suggestive).\\n The proper reach and application of the Kastigar rule has\\nnot gone unnoticed by other courts. See, e.g., United States v.\\nAllen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 n.121 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[I]t is not clear\\nwhether all involuntary statements or all compelled\\nstatements should be subjected to the strong medicine\\nprescribed in Kastigar, or whether some other doctrine\\nshould govern in certain circumstances.”); United States v.\\nJones, 542 F.2d 186, 199 n.24 (4th Cir. 1976) (discussing\\nuncertainty over Kastigar’s application to coerced\\nconfessions).\\n We have not had a case requiring us to choose sides, and\\nthis appeal does not either. We can comfortably resolve the\\ncase on narrower grounds, because under either Kastigar or\\nBiggers (or hybrids of either standard), the evidence was\\nmore than sufficient to show that the two tellers, Bateman\\nand Phelps, identified Books based on their prior dealings\\nand first-hand familiarity with him, without regard to any\\ninformation supplied by the police detective. At no point did\\nthe tellers, and most especially Holly Bateman, ever waiver\\nin their confidence that Books was the robber. So, whether\\nassessed under Kastigar or a lesser standard, Books’s chal-\\nlenge to the district court’s admission of the tellers’ testimo-\\nny cannot succeed.\\n Books fares no better when contending that the district\\ncourt’s ruling on the tellers’ testimony also violated the Sixth\\nAmendment by limiting his ability to confront and cross-\\nexamine these witnesses. A fulsome cross-examination,\\nBooks posits, would have entailed questioning how the wit-\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 9\\n\\nnesses arrived at their identification testimony—a line of\\nquestioning, as Books sees it, that necessarily would have\\nexposed that the police improperly told both tellers that he\\nhad confessed to the robbery. We cannot agree, as Books’s\\nposition misfires on the law and facts.\\n A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront wit-\\nnesses is not absolute, but instead subject to reasonable limi-\\ntations imposed by the district court. See United States v.\\nSaunders, 166 F.3d 907, 918 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Delaware v.\\nVan Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). The limitation Books\\nchallenges came from the district court’s pretrial ruling sup-\\npressing his coerced confession. This ruling favored Books\\nand, beyond precluding the government from using the con-\\nfession as evidence, naturally limited how he would ap-\\nproach cross-examining government witnesses, for he right-\\nly wanted to avoid the jury learning that he had confessed to\\nthe robbery. But accepting a necessary and proper limitation\\non cross-examination does not, without more, run afoul of\\nthe Confrontation Clause, especially where, as here, Books\\nwas able as a practical matter to adequately, and indeed vig-\\norously, cross-examine both bank tellers. See United States v.\\nSasson, 62 F.3d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the\\nConfrontation Clause “guarantees only an opportunity for a\\nthorough and effective cross-examination, ‘not cross-\\nexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to what-\\never extent, the defense might wish’”) (quoting Delaware v.\\nFensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). And Books was able to do\\nso without ever insinuating, much less revealing, that he had\\nconfessed to the robbery. The Confrontation Clause required\\nno more.\\n\\f10 No. 17-3493\\n\\n B\\n This brings us to Books’s Fifth Amendment challenge to\\nthe district court’s pretrial impeachment ruling. Books ar-\\ngues that the ruling—allowing the government, if he chose\\nto testify, to cross-examine him with the fruits of his coerced\\nconfession—created an unconstitutional predicament and\\ncatch-22: he was forced to either forfeit his right to testify in\\nhis own defense, or, if he did take the stand, face a surefire\\nconviction once the government impeached him with the\\nfruits of his confession.\\n Books may be right in his contention that the district\\ncourt, even though reserving a final ruling until after seeing\\nwhether he chose to testify and what questions the govern-\\nment wanted to ask on cross-examination, committed legal\\nerror in concluding, however conditionally, that some im-\\npeachment with the physical fruits of a coerced confession\\nmay be permissible. While that proposition is not settled in\\nthe law, Books’s position is not without some support. See,\\ne.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003) (plurality\\nopinion) (emphasizing, albeit in dicta, that “those subjected\\nto coercive police interrogations have an automatic protection\\nfrom the use of their involuntary statements (or evidence de-\\nrived from their statements) in any subsequent criminal tri-\\nal”).\\n The government urges us to avoid answering this ques-\\ntion. Pointing to Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), the\\ngovernment says that Books waived any challenge to the dis-\\ntrict court’s ruling by not testifying at trial. The govern-\\nment’s position finds substantial, if not dispositive, support\\nin our decision in United States v. Wilson, 307 F.3d 596, 600–\\n01 (7th Cir. 2002), where the defendant chose not to testify at\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 11\\n\\ntrial and, as a result, we declined to review the merits of his\\nclaim that a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of particular\\nimpeachment testimony violated his Fifth Amendment right\\nto remain silent.\\n The whole point of the rule announced in Luce, which we\\nextended to the domain of a Fifth Amendment claim in\\nWilson, is that courts should refrain from reviewing claims\\nthat a particular line of cross-examination would have\\nviolated a defendant’s right against self-incrimination when\\nthe defendant in fact never testified at trial and thus never\\nunderwent cross-examination. Any other course, the\\nreasoning runs, would require too much speculation on how\\nthe testimony and related questioning would have played\\nout at trial. See Wilson, 307 F.3d at 600–01.\\n Even if we agreed with Books that Wilson should be read\\nmore narrowly, our ensuing reasoning would not travel a\\npath that resulted in an award of relief. Both parties agree\\nthat the ultimate merits of Books’s Fifth Amendment claim is\\nsubject to harmless error review. Indeed, the doctrine of\\nharmless error finds straightforward application on the evi-\\ndence presented at Books’s trial.\\n Not every constitutional error automatically requires the\\nreversal of a defendant’s conviction. Instead, as the Supreme\\nCourt has explained, “if the government can show ‘beyond a\\nreasonable doubt that the error complained of did not con-\\ntribute to the verdict obtained,’ … then the error is deemed\\nharmless and the defendant is not entitled to reversal.”\\nWeaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (quoting\\nChapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). This precise\\nstandard would apply if Books had testified and was sub-\\njected to certain impermissible impeachment. See Arizona v.\\n\\f12 No. 17-3493\\n\\nFulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (holding that the doc-\\ntrine of harmless error applies to the violation of the defend-\\nant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination\\nthrough the admission at trial of an involuntary confession).\\nAnd the same analysis would apply if we accept Books’s\\ncontention that the district court’s ruling constructively fore-\\nclosed his decision to take the stand. See Ortega v. O’Leary,\\n843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying harmless error\\nanalysis to the denial of the right to testify); Alicea v. Ganon,\\n675 F.2d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 1982) (reaching the same conclu-\\nsion).\\n In reviewing the trial record, our obligation is to deter-\\nmine whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt, and we do so in no small part by evaluating the over-\\nall strength of the prosecution’s case. See Jones v. Basinger,\\n635 F.3d 1030, 1052 (7th Cir. 2011). On this front, Books faces\\nan insurmountable burden because the evidence against him\\nat trial was overwhelming: the eyewitness testimony of the\\ntwo bank tellers, the text message to a friend indicating his\\ndesire to rob a bank, the identification of his car as the geta-\\nway vehicle, and the testimony of over a dozen other wit-\\nnesses—all in the broader context of his financial difficulties\\nand prior disputes with the Land of Lincoln Credit Union.\\nOn this record, any error in the district court’s pretrial ruling\\non the scope of permissible impeachment was harmless be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt.\\n III\\n Two other matters warrant attention. First, relying on\\nBrooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), Books argues that the\\ndistrict court’s impeachment ruling deprived him of the\\n“guiding hand of counsel” by undermining his attorney’s\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 13\\n\\nability to make informed and independent decisions about\\nthe best trial strategy, including whether Books should take\\nthe stand in his own defense. Id. at 612. But Brooks provides\\nno refuge, for there the Supreme Court considered a state\\nstatute that required a defendant, if he chose to put on a de-\\nfense at trial, to be the first defense witness to testify, forcing\\na preemptive decision to take the stand absent “a full survey\\nof all the case.” Id. at 608. Books, in contrast, faced only the\\nuncertainty that often accompanies an unfavorable (and\\nperhaps even incorrect) pretrial ruling on the scope of im-\\npeachment. Whatever limitations this may have imposed on\\nthe strategic choices of Books’s defense, they were far afield\\nfrom the extreme circumstances defense counsel confronted\\nin Brooks.\\n Finally, we reject Books’s invitation to overturn his con-\\nviction on the basis of cumulative error. We have reviewed\\nthe record carefully and cannot get anywhere near conclud-\\ning that there are “multiple errors [that] so infected the jury’s\\ndeliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally\\nfair trial.” United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir.\\n2001). The bottom line is that Books’s cumulative error ar-\\ngument cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence pre-\\nsented against him at trial.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":276,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4585676,"string":"4,585,676"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Scott Books"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3493"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3493\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nSCOTT BOOKS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 1:16-cr-10037 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. On trial for bank robbery, Scott\\nBooks chose not to testify in his own defense and was found\\nguilty and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. He now\\nchallenges two pretrial decisions by the district court. The\\nfirst allowed eyewitness testimony at trial from the two bank\\ntellers that Books alleged based their identification of him as\\nthe robber not on personal knowledge, but rather on infor-\\nmation improperly supplied by a police detective. The sec-\\n\\f2 No. 17-3493\\n\\nond ruling would have allowed the government, had Books\\nchosen to testify at trial, to impeach him with physical evi-\\ndence directly tying him to the robbery—evidence the police\\nlearned of (and then recovered) only as a result of a confes-\\nsion the district court separately had determined was unlaw-\\nfully coerced.\\n Neither challenge succeeds. The district court did not err\\nin finding the eyewitness identifications reflected the tellers’\\nfirsthand knowledge of Books, and thus allowing their tes-\\ntimony at trial was entirely proper. Nor can we conclude\\nthat the district court’s conditional impeachment ruling,\\neven if wrong on the law, mandates reversal in light of the\\noverwhelming weight of evidence against Books. So we\\naffirm.\\n I\\n A\\n On July 28, 2016 a man robbed the Land of Lincoln Credit\\nUnion in Normal, Illinois. Dressed in a black hooded sweat-\\nshirt, wearing a mask and neon gloves, the robber ap-\\nproached the counter and, while motioning toward the\\ndrawer with what appeared to be a black handgun, de-\\nmanded “all the money.” The robbery lasted all but 20 sec-\\nonds, with the offender making off with $18,000 and fleeing\\nin a Buick SUV.\\n Two tellers recognized the robber’s voice and manner-\\nisms and immediately identified him as Scott Books—a long-\\ntime customer of the credit union. Holly Bateman told her\\nsupervisor (and later the police) she was 99% certain Books\\nwas the robber because she had interacted with him on at\\nleast six prior occasions. The second teller, Susan Phelps,\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 3\\n\\nagreed with Bateman’s identification of Books as the offend-\\ner. A third witness, James Teidman, was driving by the bank\\nwhen he saw the robber running from the bank with a gun,\\nonly then to speed away in a Buick SUV.\\n The police arrested Books the next day. After waiving his\\nMiranda rights and agreeing to an interview, he confessed to\\nthe robbery, while also telling the police where they could\\nfind the gloves, clothing, and fake gun he used. The police\\nfound these items exactly where Books described, and in\\ntime a grand jury indicted Books for the robbery.\\n B\\n The district court held a series of pretrial hearings to de-\\ntermine the admissibility of evidence contested by Books.\\nThree of those rulings are significant to this appeal.\\n First, the district court suppressed Books’s confession,\\nfinding that the police officers overstepped and overcame\\nBooks’s will by threatening to arrest his wife and take his\\nchildren into custody if he did not own up to his role in the\\nrobbery—rendering the confession involuntary. The court\\nsuppressed both the confession and its physical fruits—\\nspecifically, the clothing, gloves, and fake gun the police re-\\ncovered based upon Books telling them where to look.\\n Second, the district court denied Books’s motion to pre-\\nvent the two bank tellers (Bateman and Phelps) from testify-\\ning at trial. Books had sought to exclude their testimony on\\nthe basis that the police detective who investigated the rob-\\nbery improperly tainted their identifications when, a day af-\\nter the robbery, he allegedly told both witnesses that Books\\nhad confessed to the crime. The government disagreed, tak-\\ning the position that the detective in no way revealed\\n\\f4 No. 17-3493\\n\\nBooks’s confession and thus in no way influenced the tellers’\\nclear and definitive identification of Books as the robber. The\\ndistrict court held a hearing, received testimony from the\\ntellers and detective, and found it “clear from th[e] record\\nthat [both tellers] have a truly independent source of identi-\\nfication of [Books] other than any suggestion that would\\nhave been put in their mind by the officer.” Accordingly, the\\ndistrict court permitted the tellers to testify at trial.\\n Third, the district court considered but reserved defini-\\ntively ruling until trial on the government’s motion for per-\\nmission to impeach Books with the fruits of his confession in\\nthe event he chose to testify. Books opposed the motion and\\nurged the district court to hold that the price for the police\\nunlawfully coercing his confession should be the suppres-\\nsion of all incriminating evidence (his admission and the\\nphysical fruits) for all purposes, including impeachment. The\\ndistrict court said it was inclined to allow some impeach-\\nment but reserved a final ruling unless and until Books\\nchose to testify and the government sought to impeach him\\non cross-examination with his prior statements describing\\nthe whereabouts of the clothing he wore during the robbery.\\nThe district court cast its ruling this way: “[I]f and when we\\nget to that point [of the trial], any questions that the gov-\\nernment wished to ask the defendant if he testifies, I would\\nhave to hear exactly what the questions are outside the pres-\\nence of the jury so there could be specific objections.”\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 5\\n\\n C\\n In the end, Books chose not to testify at trial, and thus\\nneither his coerced confession nor the resulting physical\\nfruits came into evidence. The government nonetheless pre-\\nsented a strong case, including testimony from these wit-\\nnesses:\\n Bank teller Holly Bateman identified Books\\n as the robber. She testified that she knew\\n Books from her work at the credit union\\n and immediately recognized him as the\\n robber—so much so that she almost said\\n “Scott, can you remove your mask?”\\n Bateman told the jury that she “instantly”\\n recognized Books’s voice and likewise\\n knew it was Books from his distinct\\n mannerisms. Asked at trial about her\\n confidence level that Books committed the\\n robbery, Bateman testified that she was\\n 110% sure because the incident had\\n replayed over and over in her mind.\\n Susan Phelps, the second bank teller, also\\n identified Books as the robber. While not as\\n fast as Bateman to recognize Books during\\n the robbery, Phelps testified she was confi-\\n dent Books was the offender based on his\\n unique mannerisms, including his walk and\\n jittery disposition.\\n Phillip Meyer, a friend and former cowork-\\n er of Books, testified that he had received a\\n text message from Books on the day of the\\n\\f6 No. 17-3493\\n\\n robbery or the day before asking, “I wonder\\n what bank I should rob today?”\\n Todd Hogan, the bank’s vice president, tes-\\n tified that he remembered teller Holly\\n Bateman calling him immediately after the\\n robbery to tell him she was 99% sure the\\n robber was Books. Hogan also explained\\n that Books’s business account had been\\n flagged in the bank’s system on multiple\\n occasions due to attempts to deposit checks\\n backed by insufficient funds.\\n James Teidman testified that he was driving\\n by the credit union when the robbery oc-\\n curred and saw a Buick SUV, the same\\n model later tracked to Books’s residence,\\n flee the scene.\\n While Books chose not to testify, his counsel vigorously\\ncross-examined the government’s witnesses. When it came\\nto tellers Bateman and Phelps, defense counsel challenged\\ntheir recollection of the robbery, probed the reliability of\\ntheir identifications of Books and the getaway car, and exam-\\nined their memory of the robber’s dress, voice, and manner-\\nisms—all in an effort to question their overall confidence\\nthat Books was the offender. At no point during the trial did\\nBooks’s counsel or the government refer to Books’s confes-\\nsion or to the police detective’s (allegedly impermissible) in-\\nteraction with the two tellers. The jury returned a guilty ver-\\ndict.\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 7\\n\\n II\\n A\\n Books challenges the district court’s pretrial ruling deny-\\ning his motion to preclude the two tellers from testifying at\\ntrial on the basis that the police detective allegedly tainted\\ntheir eyewitness identifications by telling them that he had\\nconfessed to the robbery. This misconduct, Books contends,\\nviolated his Fifth Amendment right against self-\\nincrimination. He further argues that the district court’s pre-\\ntrial ruling too circumscribed his Sixth Amendment right to\\ncross-examine the tellers at trial. The facts belie both conten-\\ntions.\\n While all agree that our review of legal issues is de novo,\\nthe parties dispute the legal standard that governs the ad-\\nmission at trial of the bank tellers’ identification testimony.\\nBooks invites us to follow Kastigar v. United States, and\\nthereby place the burden on the government to show that\\nthe tellers’ testimony was “derived from legitimate inde-\\npendent sources” and, as a result, not unduly influenced by\\nthe police detective. See 406 U.S. 441, 461–62 (1972). The\\ngovernment, on the other hand, urges us to read Kastigar as\\nmore narrowly applying to, and not beyond, the setting that\\ngave rise to its holding—circumstances in which a witness\\ntestifies pursuant to a grant of immunity. See id. The gov-\\nernment instead asks us to employ the less onerous, due-\\nprocess based standard found in cases like Neil v. Biggers,\\n409 U.S. 188 (1972), where the focus is more simply on the\\nreliability of in-court identification testimony with the de-\\nfendant (not the government) bearing the initial burden of\\nshowing that the government did something to taint the\\nidentification. See also, e.g., United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d\\n\\f8 No. 17-3493\\n\\n234, 239 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the defendant bears\\nthe burden of showing that the challenged identification was\\nunduly suggestive).\\n The proper reach and application of the Kastigar rule has\\nnot gone unnoticed by other courts. See, e.g., United States v.\\nAllen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 n.121 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[I]t is not clear\\nwhether all involuntary statements or all compelled\\nstatements should be subjected to the strong medicine\\nprescribed in Kastigar, or whether some other doctrine\\nshould govern in certain circumstances.”); United States v.\\nJones, 542 F.2d 186, 199 n.24 (4th Cir. 1976) (discussing\\nuncertainty over Kastigar’s application to coerced\\nconfessions).\\n We have not had a case requiring us to choose sides, and\\nthis appeal does not either. We can comfortably resolve the\\ncase on narrower grounds, because under either Kastigar or\\nBiggers (or hybrids of either standard), the evidence was\\nmore than sufficient to show that the two tellers, Bateman\\nand Phelps, identified Books based on their prior dealings\\nand first-hand familiarity with him, without regard to any\\ninformation supplied by the police detective. At no point did\\nthe tellers, and most especially Holly Bateman, ever waiver\\nin their confidence that Books was the robber. So, whether\\nassessed under Kastigar or a lesser standard, Books’s chal-\\nlenge to the district court’s admission of the tellers’ testimo-\\nny cannot succeed.\\n Books fares no better when contending that the district\\ncourt’s ruling on the tellers’ testimony also violated the Sixth\\nAmendment by limiting his ability to confront and cross-\\nexamine these witnesses. A fulsome cross-examination,\\nBooks posits, would have entailed questioning how the wit-\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 9\\n\\nnesses arrived at their identification testimony—a line of\\nquestioning, as Books sees it, that necessarily would have\\nexposed that the police improperly told both tellers that he\\nhad confessed to the robbery. We cannot agree, as Books’s\\nposition misfires on the law and facts.\\n A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront wit-\\nnesses is not absolute, but instead subject to reasonable limi-\\ntations imposed by the district court. See United States v.\\nSaunders, 166 F.3d 907, 918 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Delaware v.\\nVan Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). The limitation Books\\nchallenges came from the district court’s pretrial ruling sup-\\npressing his coerced confession. This ruling favored Books\\nand, beyond precluding the government from using the con-\\nfession as evidence, naturally limited how he would ap-\\nproach cross-examining government witnesses, for he right-\\nly wanted to avoid the jury learning that he had confessed to\\nthe robbery. But accepting a necessary and proper limitation\\non cross-examination does not, without more, run afoul of\\nthe Confrontation Clause, especially where, as here, Books\\nwas able as a practical matter to adequately, and indeed vig-\\norously, cross-examine both bank tellers. See United States v.\\nSasson, 62 F.3d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the\\nConfrontation Clause “guarantees only an opportunity for a\\nthorough and effective cross-examination, ‘not cross-\\nexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to what-\\never extent, the defense might wish’”) (quoting Delaware v.\\nFensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). And Books was able to do\\nso without ever insinuating, much less revealing, that he had\\nconfessed to the robbery. The Confrontation Clause required\\nno more.\\n\\f10 No. 17-3493\\n\\n B\\n This brings us to Books’s Fifth Amendment challenge to\\nthe district court’s pretrial impeachment ruling. Books ar-\\ngues that the ruling—allowing the government, if he chose\\nto testify, to cross-examine him with the fruits of his coerced\\nconfession—created an unconstitutional predicament and\\ncatch-22: he was forced to either forfeit his right to testify in\\nhis own defense, or, if he did take the stand, face a surefire\\nconviction once the government impeached him with the\\nfruits of his confession.\\n Books may be right in his contention that the district\\ncourt, even though reserving a final ruling until after seeing\\nwhether he chose to testify and what questions the govern-\\nment wanted to ask on cross-examination, committed legal\\nerror in concluding, however conditionally, that some im-\\npeachment with the physical fruits of a coerced confession\\nmay be permissible. While that proposition is not settled in\\nthe law, Books’s position is not without some support. See,\\ne.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003) (plurality\\nopinion) (emphasizing, albeit in dicta, that “those subjected\\nto coercive police interrogations have an automatic protection\\nfrom the use of their involuntary statements (or evidence de-\\nrived from their statements) in any subsequent criminal tri-\\nal”).\\n The government urges us to avoid answering this ques-\\ntion. Pointing to Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), the\\ngovernment says that Books waived any challenge to the dis-\\ntrict court’s ruling by not testifying at trial. The govern-\\nment’s position finds substantial, if not dispositive, support\\nin our decision in United States v. Wilson, 307 F.3d 596, 600–\\n01 (7th Cir. 2002), where the defendant chose not to testify at\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 11\\n\\ntrial and, as a result, we declined to review the merits of his\\nclaim that a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of particular\\nimpeachment testimony violated his Fifth Amendment right\\nto remain silent.\\n The whole point of the rule announced in Luce, which we\\nextended to the domain of a Fifth Amendment claim in\\nWilson, is that courts should refrain from reviewing claims\\nthat a particular line of cross-examination would have\\nviolated a defendant’s right against self-incrimination when\\nthe defendant in fact never testified at trial and thus never\\nunderwent cross-examination. Any other course, the\\nreasoning runs, would require too much speculation on how\\nthe testimony and related questioning would have played\\nout at trial. See Wilson, 307 F.3d at 600–01.\\n Even if we agreed with Books that Wilson should be read\\nmore narrowly, our ensuing reasoning would not travel a\\npath that resulted in an award of relief. Both parties agree\\nthat the ultimate merits of Books’s Fifth Amendment claim is\\nsubject to harmless error review. Indeed, the doctrine of\\nharmless error finds straightforward application on the evi-\\ndence presented at Books’s trial.\\n Not every constitutional error automatically requires the\\nreversal of a defendant’s conviction. Instead, as the Supreme\\nCourt has explained, “if the government can show ‘beyond a\\nreasonable doubt that the error complained of did not con-\\ntribute to the verdict obtained,’ … then the error is deemed\\nharmless and the defendant is not entitled to reversal.”\\nWeaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (quoting\\nChapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). This precise\\nstandard would apply if Books had testified and was sub-\\njected to certain impermissible impeachment. See Arizona v.\\n\\f12 No. 17-3493\\n\\nFulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (holding that the doc-\\ntrine of harmless error applies to the violation of the defend-\\nant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination\\nthrough the admission at trial of an involuntary confession).\\nAnd the same analysis would apply if we accept Books’s\\ncontention that the district court’s ruling constructively fore-\\nclosed his decision to take the stand. See Ortega v. O’Leary,\\n843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying harmless error\\nanalysis to the denial of the right to testify); Alicea v. Ganon,\\n675 F.2d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 1982) (reaching the same conclu-\\nsion).\\n In reviewing the trial record, our obligation is to deter-\\nmine whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt, and we do so in no small part by evaluating the over-\\nall strength of the prosecution’s case. See Jones v. Basinger,\\n635 F.3d 1030, 1052 (7th Cir. 2011). On this front, Books faces\\nan insurmountable burden because the evidence against him\\nat trial was overwhelming: the eyewitness testimony of the\\ntwo bank tellers, the text message to a friend indicating his\\ndesire to rob a bank, the identification of his car as the geta-\\nway vehicle, and the testimony of over a dozen other wit-\\nnesses—all in the broader context of his financial difficulties\\nand prior disputes with the Land of Lincoln Credit Union.\\nOn this record, any error in the district court’s pretrial ruling\\non the scope of permissible impeachment was harmless be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt.\\n III\\n Two other matters warrant attention. First, relying on\\nBrooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), Books argues that the\\ndistrict court’s impeachment ruling deprived him of the\\n“guiding hand of counsel” by undermining his attorney’s\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 13\\n\\nability to make informed and independent decisions about\\nthe best trial strategy, including whether Books should take\\nthe stand in his own defense. Id. at 612. But Brooks provides\\nno refuge, for there the Supreme Court considered a state\\nstatute that required a defendant, if he chose to put on a de-\\nfense at trial, to be the first defense witness to testify, forcing\\na preemptive decision to take the stand absent “a full survey\\nof all the case.” Id. at 608. Books, in contrast, faced only the\\nuncertainty that often accompanies an unfavorable (and\\nperhaps even incorrect) pretrial ruling on the scope of im-\\npeachment. Whatever limitations this may have imposed on\\nthe strategic choices of Books’s defense, they were far afield\\nfrom the extreme circumstances defense counsel confronted\\nin Brooks.\\n Finally, we reject Books’s invitation to overturn his con-\\nviction on the basis of cumulative error. We have reviewed\\nthe record carefully and cannot get anywhere near conclud-\\ning that there are “multiple errors [that] so infected the jury’s\\ndeliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally\\nfair trial.” United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir.\\n2001). The bottom line is that Books’s cumulative error ar-\\ngument cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence pre-\\nsented against him at trial.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4362929/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585676/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Scott Books\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3493\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nSCOTT BOOKS,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 1:16-cr-10037 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. On trial for bank robbery, Scott\nBooks chose not to testify in his own defense and was found\nguilty and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. He now\nchallenges two pretrial decisions by the district court. The\nfirst allowed eyewitness testimony at trial from the two bank\ntellers that Books alleged based their identification of him as\nthe robber not on personal knowledge, but rather on infor-\nmation improperly supplied by a police detective. The sec-\n\f2 No. 17-3493\n\nond ruling would have allowed the government, had Books\nchosen to testify at trial, to impeach him with physical evi-\ndence directly tying him to the robbery—evidence the police\nlearned of (and then recovered) only as a result of a confes-\nsion the district court separately had determined was unlaw-\nfully coerced.\n Neither challenge succeeds. The district court did not err\nin finding the eyewitness identifications reflected the tellers’\nfirsthand knowledge of Books, and thus allowing their tes-\ntimony at trial was entirely proper. Nor can we conclude\nthat the district court’s conditional impeachment ruling,\neven if wrong on the law, mandates reversal in light of the\noverwhelming weight of evidence against Books. So we\naffirm.\n I\n A\n On July 28, 2016 a man robbed the Land of Lincoln Credit\nUnion in Normal, Illinois. Dressed in a black hooded sweat-\nshirt, wearing a mask and neon gloves, the robber ap-\nproached the counter and, while motioning toward the\ndrawer with what appeared to be a black handgun, de-\nmanded “all the money.” The robbery lasted all but 20 sec-\nonds, with the offender making off with $18,000 and fleeing\nin a Buick SUV.\n Two tellers recognized the robber’s voice and manner-\nisms and immediately identified him as Scott Books—a long-\ntime customer of the credit union. Holly Bateman told her\nsupervisor (and later the police) she was 99% certain Books\nwas the robber because she had interacted with him on at\nleast six prior occasions. The second teller, Susan Phelps,\n\fNo. 17-3493 3\n\nagreed with Bateman’s identification of Books as the offend-\ner. A third witness, James Teidman, was driving by the bank\nwhen he saw the robber running from the bank with a gun,\nonly then to speed away in a Buick SUV.\n The police arrested Books the next day. After waiving his\nMiranda rights and agreeing to an interview, he confessed to\nthe robbery, while also telling the police where they could\nfind the gloves, clothing, and fake gun he used. The police\nfound these items exactly where Books described, and in\ntime a grand jury indicted Books for the robbery.\n B\n The district court held a series of pretrial hearings to de-\ntermine the admissibility of evidence contested by Books.\nThree of those rulings are significant to this appeal.\n First, the district court suppressed Books’s confession,\nfinding that the police officers overstepped and overcame\nBooks’s will by threatening to arrest his wife and take his\nchildren into custody if he did not own up to his role in the\nrobbery—rendering the confession involuntary. The court\nsuppressed both the confession and its physical fruits—\nspecifically, the clothing, gloves, and fake gun the police re-\ncovered based upon Books telling them where to look.\n Second, the district court denied Books’s motion to pre-\nvent the two bank tellers (Bateman and Phelps) from testify-\ning at trial. Books had sought to exclude their testimony on\nthe basis that the police detective who investigated the rob-\nbery improperly tainted their identifications when, a day af-\nter the robbery, he allegedly told both witnesses that Books\nhad confessed to the crime. The government disagreed, tak-\ning the position that the detective in no way revealed\n\f4 No. 17-3493\n\nBooks’s confession and thus in no way influenced the tellers’\nclear and definitive identification of Books as the robber. The\ndistrict court held a hearing, received testimony from the\ntellers and detective, and found it “clear from th[e] record\nthat [both tellers] have a truly independent source of identi-\nfication of [Books] other than any suggestion that would\nhave been put in their mind by the officer.” Accordingly, the\ndistrict court permitted the tellers to testify at trial.\n Third, the district court considered but reserved defini-\ntively ruling until trial on the government’s motion for per-\nmission to impeach Books with the fruits of his confession in\nthe event he chose to testify. Books opposed the motion and\nurged the district court to hold that the price for the police\nunlawfully coercing his confession should be the suppres-\nsion of all incriminating evidence (his admission and the\nphysical fruits) for all purposes, including impeachment. The\ndistrict court said it was inclined to allow some impeach-\nment but reserved a final ruling unless and until Books\nchose to testify and the government sought to impeach him\non cross-examination with his prior statements describing\nthe whereabouts of the clothing he wore during the robbery.\nThe district court cast its ruling this way: “[I]f and when we\nget to that point [of the trial], any questions that the gov-\nernment wished to ask the defendant if he testifies, I would\nhave to hear exactly what the questions are outside the pres-\nence of the jury so there could be specific objections.”\n\fNo. 17-3493 5\n\n C\n In the end, Books chose not to testify at trial, and thus\nneither his coerced confession nor the resulting physical\nfruits came into evidence. The government nonetheless pre-\nsented a strong case, including testimony from these wit-\nnesses:\n Bank teller Holly Bateman identified Books\n as the robber. She testified that she knew\n Books from her work at the credit union\n and immediately recognized him as the\n robber—so much so that she almost said\n “Scott, can you remove your mask?”\n Bateman told the jury that she “instantly”\n recognized Books’s voice and likewise\n knew it was Books from his distinct\n mannerisms. Asked at trial about her\n confidence level that Books committed the\n robbery, Bateman testified that she was\n 110% sure because the incident had\n replayed over and over in her mind.\n Susan Phelps, the second bank teller, also\n identified Books as the robber. While not as\n fast as Bateman to recognize Books during\n the robbery, Phelps testified she was confi-\n dent Books was the offender based on his\n unique mannerisms, including his walk and\n jittery disposition.\n Phillip Meyer, a friend and former cowork-\n er of Books, testified that he had received a\n text message from Books on the day of the\n\f6 No. 17-3493\n\n robbery or the day before asking, “I wonder\n what bank I should rob today?”\n Todd Hogan, the bank’s vice president, tes-\n tified that he remembered teller Holly\n Bateman calling him immediately after the\n robbery to tell him she was 99% sure the\n robber was Books. Hogan also explained\n that Books’s business account had been\n flagged in the bank’s system on multiple\n occasions due to attempts to deposit checks\n backed by insufficient funds.\n James Teidman testified that he was driving\n by the credit union when the robbery oc-\n curred and saw a Buick SUV, the same\n model later tracked to Books’s residence,\n flee the scene.\n While Books chose not to testify, his counsel vigorously\ncross-examined the government’s witnesses. When it came\nto tellers Bateman and Phelps, defense counsel challenged\ntheir recollection of the robbery, probed the reliability of\ntheir identifications of Books and the getaway car, and exam-\nined their memory of the robber’s dress, voice, and manner-\nisms—all in an effort to question their overall confidence\nthat Books was the offender. At no point during the trial did\nBooks’s counsel or the government refer to Books’s confes-\nsion or to the police detective’s (allegedly impermissible) in-\nteraction with the two tellers. The jury returned a guilty ver-\ndict.\n\fNo. 17-3493 7\n\n II\n A\n Books challenges the district court’s pretrial ruling deny-\ning his motion to preclude the two tellers from testifying at\ntrial on the basis that the police detective allegedly tainted\ntheir eyewitness identifications by telling them that he had\nconfessed to the robbery. This misconduct, Books contends,\nviolated his Fifth Amendment right against self-\nincrimination. He further argues that the district court’s pre-\ntrial ruling too circumscribed his Sixth Amendment right to\ncross-examine the tellers at trial. The facts belie both conten-\ntions.\n While all agree that our review of legal issues is de novo,\nthe parties dispute the legal standard that governs the ad-\nmission at trial of the bank tellers’ identification testimony.\nBooks invites us to follow Kastigar v. United States, and\nthereby place the burden on the government to show that\nthe tellers’ testimony was “derived from legitimate inde-\npendent sources” and, as a result, not unduly influenced by\nthe police detective. See 406 U.S. 441, 461–62 (1972). The\ngovernment, on the other hand, urges us to read Kastigar as\nmore narrowly applying to, and not beyond, the setting that\ngave rise to its holding—circumstances in which a witness\ntestifies pursuant to a grant of immunity. See id. The gov-\nernment instead asks us to employ the less onerous, due-\nprocess based standard found in cases like Neil v. Biggers,\n409 U.S. 188 (1972), where the focus is more simply on the\nreliability of in-court identification testimony with the de-\nfendant (not the government) bearing the initial burden of\nshowing that the government did something to taint the\nidentification. See also, e.g., United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d\n\f8 No. 17-3493\n\n234, 239 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the defendant bears\nthe burden of showing that the challenged identification was\nunduly suggestive).\n The proper reach and application of the Kastigar rule has\nnot gone unnoticed by other courts. See, e.g., United States v.\nAllen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 n.121 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[I]t is not clear\nwhether all involuntary statements or all compelled\nstatements should be subjected to the strong medicine\nprescribed in Kastigar, or whether some other doctrine\nshould govern in certain circumstances.”); United States v.\nJones, 542 F.2d 186, 199 n.24 (4th Cir. 1976) (discussing\nuncertainty over Kastigar’s application to coerced\nconfessions).\n We have not had a case requiring us to choose sides, and\nthis appeal does not either. We can comfortably resolve the\ncase on narrower grounds, because under either Kastigar or\nBiggers (or hybrids of either standard), the evidence was\nmore than sufficient to show that the two tellers, Bateman\nand Phelps, identified Books based on their prior dealings\nand first-hand familiarity with him, without regard to any\ninformation supplied by the police detective. At no point did\nthe tellers, and most especially Holly Bateman, ever waiver\nin their confidence that Books was the robber. So, whether\nassessed under Kastigar or a lesser standard, Books’s chal-\nlenge to the district court’s admission of the tellers’ testimo-\nny cannot succeed.\n Books fares no better when contending that the district\ncourt’s ruling on the tellers’ testimony also violated the Sixth\nAmendment by limiting his ability to confront and cross-\nexamine these witnesses. A fulsome cross-examination,\nBooks posits, would have entailed questioning how the wit-\n\fNo. 17-3493 9\n\nnesses arrived at their identification testimony—a line of\nquestioning, as Books sees it, that necessarily would have\nexposed that the police improperly told both tellers that he\nhad confessed to the robbery. We cannot agree, as Books’s\nposition misfires on the law and facts.\n A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront wit-\nnesses is not absolute, but instead subject to reasonable limi-\ntations imposed by the district court. See United States v.\nSaunders, 166 F.3d 907, 918 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Delaware v.\nVan Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). The limitation Books\nchallenges came from the district court’s pretrial ruling sup-\npressing his coerced confession. This ruling favored Books\nand, beyond precluding the government from using the con-\nfession as evidence, naturally limited how he would ap-\nproach cross-examining government witnesses, for he right-\nly wanted to avoid the jury learning that he had confessed to\nthe robbery. But accepting a necessary and proper limitation\non cross-examination does not, without more, run afoul of\nthe Confrontation Clause, especially where, as here, Books\nwas able as a practical matter to adequately, and indeed vig-\norously, cross-examine both bank tellers. See United States v.\nSasson, 62 F.3d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the\nConfrontation Clause “guarantees only an opportunity for a\nthorough and effective cross-examination, ‘not cross-\nexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to what-\never extent, the defense might wish’”) (quoting Delaware v.\nFensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). And Books was able to do\nso without ever insinuating, much less revealing, that he had\nconfessed to the robbery. The Confrontation Clause required\nno more.\n\f10 No. 17-3493\n\n B\n This brings us to Books’s Fifth Amendment challenge to\nthe district court’s pretrial impeachment ruling. Books ar-\ngues that the ruling—allowing the government, if he chose\nto testify, to cross-examine him with the fruits of his coerced\nconfession—created an unconstitutional predicament and\ncatch-22: he was forced to either forfeit his right to testify in\nhis own defense, or, if he did take the stand, face a surefire\nconviction once the government impeached him with the\nfruits of his confession.\n Books may be right in his contention that the district\ncourt, even though reserving a final ruling until after seeing\nwhether he chose to testify and what questions the govern-\nment wanted to ask on cross-examination, committed legal\nerror in concluding, however conditionally, that some im-\npeachment with the physical fruits of a coerced confession\nmay be permissible. While that proposition is not settled in\nthe law, Books’s position is not without some support. See,\ne.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003) (plurality\nopinion) (emphasizing, albeit in dicta, that “those subjected\nto coercive police interrogations have an automatic protection\nfrom the use of their involuntary statements (or evidence de-\nrived from their statements) in any subsequent criminal tri-\nal”).\n The government urges us to avoid answering this ques-\ntion. Pointing to Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), the\ngovernment says that Books waived any challenge to the dis-\ntrict court’s ruling by not testifying at trial. The govern-\nment’s position finds substantial, if not dispositive, support\nin our decision in United States v. Wilson, 307 F.3d 596, 600–\n01 (7th Cir. 2002), where the defendant chose not to testify at\n\fNo. 17-3493 11\n\ntrial and, as a result, we declined to review the merits of his\nclaim that a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of particular\nimpeachment testimony violated his Fifth Amendment right\nto remain silent.\n The whole point of the rule announced in Luce, which we\nextended to the domain of a Fifth Amendment claim in\nWilson, is that courts should refrain from reviewing claims\nthat a particular line of cross-examination would have\nviolated a defendant’s right against self-incrimination when\nthe defendant in fact never testified at trial and thus never\nunderwent cross-examination. Any other course, the\nreasoning runs, would require too much speculation on how\nthe testimony and related questioning would have played\nout at trial. See Wilson, 307 F.3d at 600–01.\n Even if we agreed with Books that Wilson should be read\nmore narrowly, our ensuing reasoning would not travel a\npath that resulted in an award of relief. Both parties agree\nthat the ultimate merits of Books’s Fifth Amendment claim is\nsubject to harmless error review. Indeed, the doctrine of\nharmless error finds straightforward application on the evi-\ndence presented at Books’s trial.\n Not every constitutional error automatically requires the\nreversal of a defendant’s conviction. Instead, as the Supreme\nCourt has explained, “if the government can show ‘beyond a\nreasonable doubt that the error complained of did not con-\ntribute to the verdict obtained,’ … then the error is deemed\nharmless and the defendant is not entitled to reversal.”\nWeaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (quoting\nChapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). This precise\nstandard would apply if Books had testified and was sub-\njected to certain impermissible impeachment. See Arizona v.\n\f12 No. 17-3493\n\nFulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (holding that the doc-\ntrine of harmless error applies to the violation of the defend-\nant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination\nthrough the admission at trial of an involuntary confession).\nAnd the same analysis would apply if we accept Books’s\ncontention that the district court’s ruling constructively fore-\nclosed his decision to take the stand. See Ortega v. O’Leary,\n843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying harmless error\nanalysis to the denial of the right to testify); Alicea v. Ganon,\n675 F.2d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 1982) (reaching the same conclu-\nsion).\n In reviewing the trial record, our obligation is to deter-\nmine whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable\ndoubt, and we do so in no small part by evaluating the over-\nall strength of the prosecution’s case. See Jones v. Basinger,\n635 F.3d 1030, 1052 (7th Cir. 2011). On this front, Books faces\nan insurmountable burden because the evidence against him\nat trial was overwhelming: the eyewitness testimony of the\ntwo bank tellers, the text message to a friend indicating his\ndesire to rob a bank, the identification of his car as the geta-\nway vehicle, and the testimony of over a dozen other wit-\nnesses—all in the broader context of his financial difficulties\nand prior disputes with the Land of Lincoln Credit Union.\nOn this record, any error in the district court’s pretrial ruling\non the scope of permissible impeachment was harmless be-\nyond a reasonable doubt.\n III\n Two other matters warrant attention. First, relying on\nBrooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), Books argues that the\ndistrict court’s impeachment ruling deprived him of the\n“guiding hand of counsel” by undermining his attorney’s\n\fNo. 17-3493 13\n\nability to make informed and independent decisions about\nthe best trial strategy, including whether Books should take\nthe stand in his own defense. Id. at 612. But Brooks provides\nno refuge, for there the Supreme Court considered a state\nstatute that required a defendant, if he chose to put on a de-\nfense at trial, to be the first defense witness to testify, forcing\na preemptive decision to take the stand absent “a full survey\nof all the case.” Id. at 608. Books, in contrast, faced only the\nuncertainty that often accompanies an unfavorable (and\nperhaps even incorrect) pretrial ruling on the scope of im-\npeachment. Whatever limitations this may have imposed on\nthe strategic choices of Books’s defense, they were far afield\nfrom the extreme circumstances defense counsel confronted\nin Brooks.\n Finally, we reject Books’s invitation to overturn his con-\nviction on the basis of cumulative error. We have reviewed\nthe record carefully and cannot get anywhere near conclud-\ning that there are “multiple errors [that] so infected the jury’s\ndeliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally\nfair trial.” United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir.\n2001). The bottom line is that Books’s cumulative error ar-\ngument cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence pre-\nsented against him at trial.\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Scott Books\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3493\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nSCOTT BOOKS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 1:16-cr-10037 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. On trial for bank robbery, Scott\\nBooks chose not to testify in his own defense and was found\\nguilty and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. He now\\nchallenges two pretrial decisions by the district court. The\\nfirst allowed eyewitness testimony at trial from the two bank\\ntellers that Books alleged based their identification of him as\\nthe robber not on personal knowledge, but rather on infor-\\nmation improperly supplied by a police detective. The sec-\\n\\f2 No. 17-3493\\n\\nond ruling would have allowed the government, had Books\\nchosen to testify at trial, to impeach him with physical evi-\\ndence directly tying him to the robbery—evidence the police\\nlearned of (and then recovered) only as a result of a confes-\\nsion the district court separately had determined was unlaw-\\nfully coerced.\\n Neither challenge succeeds. The district court did not err\\nin finding the eyewitness identifications reflected the tellers’\\nfirsthand knowledge of Books, and thus allowing their tes-\\ntimony at trial was entirely proper. Nor can we conclude\\nthat the district court’s conditional impeachment ruling,\\neven if wrong on the law, mandates reversal in light of the\\noverwhelming weight of evidence against Books. So we\\naffirm.\\n I\\n A\\n On July 28, 2016 a man robbed the Land of Lincoln Credit\\nUnion in Normal, Illinois. Dressed in a black hooded sweat-\\nshirt, wearing a mask and neon gloves, the robber ap-\\nproached the counter and, while motioning toward the\\ndrawer with what appeared to be a black handgun, de-\\nmanded “all the money.” The robbery lasted all but 20 sec-\\nonds, with the offender making off with $18,000 and fleeing\\nin a Buick SUV.\\n Two tellers recognized the robber’s voice and manner-\\nisms and immediately identified him as Scott Books—a long-\\ntime customer of the credit union. Holly Bateman told her\\nsupervisor (and later the police) she was 99% certain Books\\nwas the robber because she had interacted with him on at\\nleast six prior occasions. The second teller, Susan Phelps,\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 3\\n\\nagreed with Bateman’s identification of Books as the offend-\\ner. A third witness, James Teidman, was driving by the bank\\nwhen he saw the robber running from the bank with a gun,\\nonly then to speed away in a Buick SUV.\\n The police arrested Books the next day. After waiving his\\nMiranda rights and agreeing to an interview, he confessed to\\nthe robbery, while also telling the police where they could\\nfind the gloves, clothing, and fake gun he used. The police\\nfound these items exactly where Books described, and in\\ntime a grand jury indicted Books for the robbery.\\n B\\n The district court held a series of pretrial hearings to de-\\ntermine the admissibility of evidence contested by Books.\\nThree of those rulings are significant to this appeal.\\n First, the district court suppressed Books’s confession,\\nfinding that the police officers overstepped and overcame\\nBooks’s will by threatening to arrest his wife and take his\\nchildren into custody if he did not own up to his role in the\\nrobbery—rendering the confession involuntary. The court\\nsuppressed both the confession and its physical fruits—\\nspecifically, the clothing, gloves, and fake gun the police re-\\ncovered based upon Books telling them where to look.\\n Second, the district court denied Books’s motion to pre-\\nvent the two bank tellers (Bateman and Phelps) from testify-\\ning at trial. Books had sought to exclude their testimony on\\nthe basis that the police detective who investigated the rob-\\nbery improperly tainted their identifications when, a day af-\\nter the robbery, he allegedly told both witnesses that Books\\nhad confessed to the crime. The government disagreed, tak-\\ning the position that the detective in no way revealed\\n\\f4 No. 17-3493\\n\\nBooks’s confession and thus in no way influenced the tellers’\\nclear and definitive identification of Books as the robber. The\\ndistrict court held a hearing, received testimony from the\\ntellers and detective, and found it “clear from th[e] record\\nthat [both tellers] have a truly independent source of identi-\\nfication of [Books] other than any suggestion that would\\nhave been put in their mind by the officer.” Accordingly, the\\ndistrict court permitted the tellers to testify at trial.\\n Third, the district court considered but reserved defini-\\ntively ruling until trial on the government’s motion for per-\\nmission to impeach Books with the fruits of his confession in\\nthe event he chose to testify. Books opposed the motion and\\nurged the district court to hold that the price for the police\\nunlawfully coercing his confession should be the suppres-\\nsion of all incriminating evidence (his admission and the\\nphysical fruits) for all purposes, including impeachment. The\\ndistrict court said it was inclined to allow some impeach-\\nment but reserved a final ruling unless and until Books\\nchose to testify and the government sought to impeach him\\non cross-examination with his prior statements describing\\nthe whereabouts of the clothing he wore during the robbery.\\nThe district court cast its ruling this way: “[I]f and when we\\nget to that point [of the trial], any questions that the gov-\\nernment wished to ask the defendant if he testifies, I would\\nhave to hear exactly what the questions are outside the pres-\\nence of the jury so there could be specific objections.”\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 5\\n\\n C\\n In the end, Books chose not to testify at trial, and thus\\nneither his coerced confession nor the resulting physical\\nfruits came into evidence. The government nonetheless pre-\\nsented a strong case, including testimony from these wit-\\nnesses:\\n Bank teller Holly Bateman identified Books\\n as the robber. She testified that she knew\\n Books from her work at the credit union\\n and immediately recognized him as the\\n robber—so much so that she almost said\\n “Scott, can you remove your mask?”\\n Bateman told the jury that she “instantly”\\n recognized Books’s voice and likewise\\n knew it was Books from his distinct\\n mannerisms. Asked at trial about her\\n confidence level that Books committed the\\n robbery, Bateman testified that she was\\n 110% sure because the incident had\\n replayed over and over in her mind.\\n Susan Phelps, the second bank teller, also\\n identified Books as the robber. While not as\\n fast as Bateman to recognize Books during\\n the robbery, Phelps testified she was confi-\\n dent Books was the offender based on his\\n unique mannerisms, including his walk and\\n jittery disposition.\\n Phillip Meyer, a friend and former cowork-\\n er of Books, testified that he had received a\\n text message from Books on the day of the\\n\\f6 No. 17-3493\\n\\n robbery or the day before asking, “I wonder\\n what bank I should rob today?”\\n Todd Hogan, the bank’s vice president, tes-\\n tified that he remembered teller Holly\\n Bateman calling him immediately after the\\n robbery to tell him she was 99% sure the\\n robber was Books. Hogan also explained\\n that Books’s business account had been\\n flagged in the bank’s system on multiple\\n occasions due to attempts to deposit checks\\n backed by insufficient funds.\\n James Teidman testified that he was driving\\n by the credit union when the robbery oc-\\n curred and saw a Buick SUV, the same\\n model later tracked to Books’s residence,\\n flee the scene.\\n While Books chose not to testify, his counsel vigorously\\ncross-examined the government’s witnesses. When it came\\nto tellers Bateman and Phelps, defense counsel challenged\\ntheir recollection of the robbery, probed the reliability of\\ntheir identifications of Books and the getaway car, and exam-\\nined their memory of the robber’s dress, voice, and manner-\\nisms—all in an effort to question their overall confidence\\nthat Books was the offender. At no point during the trial did\\nBooks’s counsel or the government refer to Books’s confes-\\nsion or to the police detective’s (allegedly impermissible) in-\\nteraction with the two tellers. The jury returned a guilty ver-\\ndict.\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 7\\n\\n II\\n A\\n Books challenges the district court’s pretrial ruling deny-\\ning his motion to preclude the two tellers from testifying at\\ntrial on the basis that the police detective allegedly tainted\\ntheir eyewitness identifications by telling them that he had\\nconfessed to the robbery. This misconduct, Books contends,\\nviolated his Fifth Amendment right against self-\\nincrimination. He further argues that the district court’s pre-\\ntrial ruling too circumscribed his Sixth Amendment right to\\ncross-examine the tellers at trial. The facts belie both conten-\\ntions.\\n While all agree that our review of legal issues is de novo,\\nthe parties dispute the legal standard that governs the ad-\\nmission at trial of the bank tellers’ identification testimony.\\nBooks invites us to follow Kastigar v. United States, and\\nthereby place the burden on the government to show that\\nthe tellers’ testimony was “derived from legitimate inde-\\npendent sources” and, as a result, not unduly influenced by\\nthe police detective. See 406 U.S. 441, 461–62 (1972). The\\ngovernment, on the other hand, urges us to read Kastigar as\\nmore narrowly applying to, and not beyond, the setting that\\ngave rise to its holding—circumstances in which a witness\\ntestifies pursuant to a grant of immunity. See id. The gov-\\nernment instead asks us to employ the less onerous, due-\\nprocess based standard found in cases like Neil v. Biggers,\\n409 U.S. 188 (1972), where the focus is more simply on the\\nreliability of in-court identification testimony with the de-\\nfendant (not the government) bearing the initial burden of\\nshowing that the government did something to taint the\\nidentification. See also, e.g., United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d\\n\\f8 No. 17-3493\\n\\n234, 239 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the defendant bears\\nthe burden of showing that the challenged identification was\\nunduly suggestive).\\n The proper reach and application of the Kastigar rule has\\nnot gone unnoticed by other courts. See, e.g., United States v.\\nAllen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 n.121 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[I]t is not clear\\nwhether all involuntary statements or all compelled\\nstatements should be subjected to the strong medicine\\nprescribed in Kastigar, or whether some other doctrine\\nshould govern in certain circumstances.”); United States v.\\nJones, 542 F.2d 186, 199 n.24 (4th Cir. 1976) (discussing\\nuncertainty over Kastigar’s application to coerced\\nconfessions).\\n We have not had a case requiring us to choose sides, and\\nthis appeal does not either. We can comfortably resolve the\\ncase on narrower grounds, because under either Kastigar or\\nBiggers (or hybrids of either standard), the evidence was\\nmore than sufficient to show that the two tellers, Bateman\\nand Phelps, identified Books based on their prior dealings\\nand first-hand familiarity with him, without regard to any\\ninformation supplied by the police detective. At no point did\\nthe tellers, and most especially Holly Bateman, ever waiver\\nin their confidence that Books was the robber. So, whether\\nassessed under Kastigar or a lesser standard, Books’s chal-\\nlenge to the district court’s admission of the tellers’ testimo-\\nny cannot succeed.\\n Books fares no better when contending that the district\\ncourt’s ruling on the tellers’ testimony also violated the Sixth\\nAmendment by limiting his ability to confront and cross-\\nexamine these witnesses. A fulsome cross-examination,\\nBooks posits, would have entailed questioning how the wit-\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 9\\n\\nnesses arrived at their identification testimony—a line of\\nquestioning, as Books sees it, that necessarily would have\\nexposed that the police improperly told both tellers that he\\nhad confessed to the robbery. We cannot agree, as Books’s\\nposition misfires on the law and facts.\\n A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront wit-\\nnesses is not absolute, but instead subject to reasonable limi-\\ntations imposed by the district court. See United States v.\\nSaunders, 166 F.3d 907, 918 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Delaware v.\\nVan Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). The limitation Books\\nchallenges came from the district court’s pretrial ruling sup-\\npressing his coerced confession. This ruling favored Books\\nand, beyond precluding the government from using the con-\\nfession as evidence, naturally limited how he would ap-\\nproach cross-examining government witnesses, for he right-\\nly wanted to avoid the jury learning that he had confessed to\\nthe robbery. But accepting a necessary and proper limitation\\non cross-examination does not, without more, run afoul of\\nthe Confrontation Clause, especially where, as here, Books\\nwas able as a practical matter to adequately, and indeed vig-\\norously, cross-examine both bank tellers. See United States v.\\nSasson, 62 F.3d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the\\nConfrontation Clause “guarantees only an opportunity for a\\nthorough and effective cross-examination, ‘not cross-\\nexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to what-\\never extent, the defense might wish’”) (quoting Delaware v.\\nFensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). And Books was able to do\\nso without ever insinuating, much less revealing, that he had\\nconfessed to the robbery. The Confrontation Clause required\\nno more.\\n\\f10 No. 17-3493\\n\\n B\\n This brings us to Books’s Fifth Amendment challenge to\\nthe district court’s pretrial impeachment ruling. Books ar-\\ngues that the ruling—allowing the government, if he chose\\nto testify, to cross-examine him with the fruits of his coerced\\nconfession—created an unconstitutional predicament and\\ncatch-22: he was forced to either forfeit his right to testify in\\nhis own defense, or, if he did take the stand, face a surefire\\nconviction once the government impeached him with the\\nfruits of his confession.\\n Books may be right in his contention that the district\\ncourt, even though reserving a final ruling until after seeing\\nwhether he chose to testify and what questions the govern-\\nment wanted to ask on cross-examination, committed legal\\nerror in concluding, however conditionally, that some im-\\npeachment with the physical fruits of a coerced confession\\nmay be permissible. While that proposition is not settled in\\nthe law, Books’s position is not without some support. See,\\ne.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003) (plurality\\nopinion) (emphasizing, albeit in dicta, that “those subjected\\nto coercive police interrogations have an automatic protection\\nfrom the use of their involuntary statements (or evidence de-\\nrived from their statements) in any subsequent criminal tri-\\nal”).\\n The government urges us to avoid answering this ques-\\ntion. Pointing to Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), the\\ngovernment says that Books waived any challenge to the dis-\\ntrict court’s ruling by not testifying at trial. The govern-\\nment’s position finds substantial, if not dispositive, support\\nin our decision in United States v. Wilson, 307 F.3d 596, 600–\\n01 (7th Cir. 2002), where the defendant chose not to testify at\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 11\\n\\ntrial and, as a result, we declined to review the merits of his\\nclaim that a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of particular\\nimpeachment testimony violated his Fifth Amendment right\\nto remain silent.\\n The whole point of the rule announced in Luce, which we\\nextended to the domain of a Fifth Amendment claim in\\nWilson, is that courts should refrain from reviewing claims\\nthat a particular line of cross-examination would have\\nviolated a defendant’s right against self-incrimination when\\nthe defendant in fact never testified at trial and thus never\\nunderwent cross-examination. Any other course, the\\nreasoning runs, would require too much speculation on how\\nthe testimony and related questioning would have played\\nout at trial. See Wilson, 307 F.3d at 600–01.\\n Even if we agreed with Books that Wilson should be read\\nmore narrowly, our ensuing reasoning would not travel a\\npath that resulted in an award of relief. Both parties agree\\nthat the ultimate merits of Books’s Fifth Amendment claim is\\nsubject to harmless error review. Indeed, the doctrine of\\nharmless error finds straightforward application on the evi-\\ndence presented at Books’s trial.\\n Not every constitutional error automatically requires the\\nreversal of a defendant’s conviction. Instead, as the Supreme\\nCourt has explained, “if the government can show ‘beyond a\\nreasonable doubt that the error complained of did not con-\\ntribute to the verdict obtained,’ … then the error is deemed\\nharmless and the defendant is not entitled to reversal.”\\nWeaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (quoting\\nChapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). This precise\\nstandard would apply if Books had testified and was sub-\\njected to certain impermissible impeachment. See Arizona v.\\n\\f12 No. 17-3493\\n\\nFulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (holding that the doc-\\ntrine of harmless error applies to the violation of the defend-\\nant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination\\nthrough the admission at trial of an involuntary confession).\\nAnd the same analysis would apply if we accept Books’s\\ncontention that the district court’s ruling constructively fore-\\nclosed his decision to take the stand. See Ortega v. O’Leary,\\n843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying harmless error\\nanalysis to the denial of the right to testify); Alicea v. Ganon,\\n675 F.2d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 1982) (reaching the same conclu-\\nsion).\\n In reviewing the trial record, our obligation is to deter-\\nmine whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt, and we do so in no small part by evaluating the over-\\nall strength of the prosecution’s case. See Jones v. Basinger,\\n635 F.3d 1030, 1052 (7th Cir. 2011). On this front, Books faces\\nan insurmountable burden because the evidence against him\\nat trial was overwhelming: the eyewitness testimony of the\\ntwo bank tellers, the text message to a friend indicating his\\ndesire to rob a bank, the identification of his car as the geta-\\nway vehicle, and the testimony of over a dozen other wit-\\nnesses—all in the broader context of his financial difficulties\\nand prior disputes with the Land of Lincoln Credit Union.\\nOn this record, any error in the district court’s pretrial ruling\\non the scope of permissible impeachment was harmless be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt.\\n III\\n Two other matters warrant attention. First, relying on\\nBrooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), Books argues that the\\ndistrict court’s impeachment ruling deprived him of the\\n“guiding hand of counsel” by undermining his attorney’s\\n\\fNo. 17-3493 13\\n\\nability to make informed and independent decisions about\\nthe best trial strategy, including whether Books should take\\nthe stand in his own defense. Id. at 612. But Brooks provides\\nno refuge, for there the Supreme Court considered a state\\nstatute that required a defendant, if he chose to put on a de-\\nfense at trial, to be the first defense witness to testify, forcing\\na preemptive decision to take the stand absent “a full survey\\nof all the case.” Id. at 608. Books, in contrast, faced only the\\nuncertainty that often accompanies an unfavorable (and\\nperhaps even incorrect) pretrial ruling on the scope of im-\\npeachment. Whatever limitations this may have imposed on\\nthe strategic choices of Books’s defense, they were far afield\\nfrom the extreme circumstances defense counsel confronted\\nin Brooks.\\n Finally, we reject Books’s invitation to overturn his con-\\nviction on the basis of cumulative error. We have reviewed\\nthe record carefully and cannot get anywhere near conclud-\\ning that there are “multiple errors [that] so infected the jury’s\\ndeliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally\\nfair trial.” United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir.\\n2001). The bottom line is that Books’s cumulative error ar-\\ngument cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence pre-\\nsented against him at trial.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":277,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443857,"string":"8,443,857"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Juan CERVANTES v. ARDAGH GROUP"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Cervantes v. Ardagh Grp."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 17-3536"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Barrett, Ripple, Wood\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415284/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443857/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Juan CERVANTES v. ARDAGH GROUP\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Juan CERVANTES v. ARDAGH GROUP\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":278,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443858,"string":"8,443,858"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Aleksey Arkadyevich RUDERMAN v. Matthew G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General of the United States"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Ruderman v. Whitaker"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 17-1689"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Barrett, Easterbrook, Wood\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415285/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443858/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Aleksey Arkadyevich RUDERMAN v. Matthew G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General of the United States\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Aleksey Arkadyevich RUDERMAN v. Matthew G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General of the United States\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":279,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443866,"string":"8,443,866"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"ABS GLOBAL, INC., Plaintiff/Counterclaim and Genus PLC, Counterclaim v. INGURAN, LLC, Doing Business as Sexing Technologies, Defendant/Counterclaim and XY, LLC, Intervening Defendant/Counterclaim"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"ABS Global, Inc. v. Inguran, LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 17-1873"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Barrett, Easterbrook, Wood\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415293/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443866/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: ABS GLOBAL, INC., Plaintiff/Counterclaim and Genus PLC, Counterclaim v. INGURAN, LLC, Doing Business as Sexing Technologies, Defendant/Counterclaim and XY, LLC, Intervening Defendant/Counterclaim\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: ABS GLOBAL, INC., Plaintiff/Counterclaim and Genus PLC, Counterclaim v. INGURAN, LLC, Doing Business as Sexing Technologies, Defendant/Counterclaim and XY, LLC, Intervening Defendant/Counterclaim\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":280,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4578284,"string":"4,578,284"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Matthew Wade PARRISH, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Jason DINGMAN, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Hamilton County Jailer; Dennis Hagenson, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Hamilton County Sheriff; Hamilton County, Iowa, Defendants - Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Matthew Parrish v. Jason Dingman"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-02"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3705"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wollman, Colloton, Benton\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3705\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Matthew Wade Parrish\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Jason Dingman, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Hamilton County\\n Jailer; Dennis Hagenson, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Hamilton\\n County Sheriff; Hamilton County, Iowa\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Ft. Dodge\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 17, 2018\\n Filed: January 2, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Matthew Wade Parrish sued jailer Jason D. Dingman, Sheriff Dennis\\nHagenson, and Hamilton County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Iowa law. The district\\n\\fcourt1 granted qualified immunity to Dingman and summary judgment to the\\ndefendants. Parrish v. Dingman, 2017 WL 5560280 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 17, 2017).\\nHaving jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n An Iowa state trooper stopped Parrish at a checkpoint. After testing for\\nsobriety and finding marijuana in the vehicle, police transported him to the Hamilton\\nCounty Jail. Dingman conducted the booking procedure.\\n\\n During booking, Parrish told Dingman he had several physical impairments\\nfrom breaking his right femur and right arm in a motorcycle accident five years\\nearlier. Dingman had heard about the accident and knew Parrish had significant\\ninjuries. Parrish walked with a limp. He told Dingman that he wears prescription\\nglasses for double vision and special orthotic shoes because his right leg is shorter\\nthan his left. Dingman let him keep his shoes and glasses in the holding cell. Parrish\\nalso asked for an isolated cell due to his physical impairments. After completing\\nintake, Dingman gave Parrish a mattress to make him more comfortable and escorted\\nhim to the male holding cell. During booking and intake, Parrish was cooperative.\\n\\n Surveillance video captured what happened next. Parrish walked through the\\ncell door holding the mattress in front of his chest. Dingman was behind him. Seeing\\nanother inmate in the cell, Parrish turned to face Dingman and asked again for an\\nisolated cell. Dingman shook his head no. Parrish then stepped forward toward the\\nopen cell door “to get the doorway open to get [Dingman’s] answer.” The mattress\\nprotruded through the cell door.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District\\nCourt for the Northern District of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Dingman believed Parrish was attacking him and trying to leave the holding\\ncell. He was concerned Parrish could use the mattress as a shield. Dingman then\\nstepped into the cell, pushed Parrish into the wall, leveraged him to the floor with his\\nhands on Parrish’s arm and neck, and handcuffed him. Parrish’s right wrist was\\nswollen and bruised from the handcuffs. He later received chiropractic treatment for\\nlower back pain and four injured ribs. He also sought mental health treatment.\\n\\n Parrish sued Dingman, Hagenson, and Hamilton County under federal and state\\nlaw. The officers and the County invoked qualified and statutory immunity. The\\ndistrict court granted them summary judgment. Parrish appeals his claims against\\nDingman for excessive force and assault and battery, and his claim against the County\\nfor respondeat superior liability.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n This court reviews de novo the grant of summary judgment on the basis of\\nqualified immunity, “viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving\\nparty and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Chambers v.\\nPennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2011). Qualified immunity shields Dingman\\nfrom liability in this § 1983 action unless Parrish can show: (1) that Dingman\\n“violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly\\nestablished’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.\\n731, 735 (2011), quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).\\n\\n Parrish’s excessive-force claim is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s\\nobjective reasonableness standard. Hicks v. Norwood, 640 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir.\\n2011) (“It is settled in this circuit that the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective\\nreasonableness’ standard for arrestees governs excessive-force claims arising during\\nthe booking process.”). To prove a constitutional violation, Parrish must show that\\nDingman’s use of force was not objectively reasonable under the particular\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fcircumstances. Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009).\\nObjective reasonableness is “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on\\nthe scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490\\nU.S. 386, 396 (1989). In determining objective reasonableness, a court may look to\\n“the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used;\\nthe extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit\\nthe amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat\\nreasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.”\\nZubrod v. Hoch, 907 F.3d 568, 577 (8th Cir. 2018), quoting Kingsley v.\\nHendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). A court must also consider the\\n“legitimate interests in managing a jail” and give “deference to policies and practices\\nneeded to maintain order and institutional security.” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2474.\\n\\n Parrish argues the use of any force was unreasonable because no reasonable\\nofficer would think he was actively resisting or posing any threat—he was unarmed,\\nhad significant physical impairments, and was cooperative during booking. See\\nBrown, 574 F.3d at 499 (“[F]orce is least justified against nonviolent misdemeanants\\nwho do not flee or actively resist arrest and pose little or no threat to the security of\\nthe officers or the public.”). He contends this case is similar to Shekleton, where the\\nuse of force against a suspect with known disabilities was not objectively reasonable.\\nShekleton v. Eichenberger, 677 F.3d 361, 366 (8th Cir. 2012). Shekleton, however,\\nis factually distinguishable. The suspect was not in jail and posed no threat to the\\nofficer. Id. The officer used a taser—more intrusive force than Dingman\\nused—despite knowing that Shekleton’s physical disabilities prevented him from\\ncomplying with orders to place his hands behind his back. Id.\\n\\n Parrish was in jail. Jailers like Dingman have an important interest in\\nmaintaining order and institutional security within the jail. See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct.\\nat 2474. After Dingman refused to give him an isolated cell, Parrish stepped forward\\ntoward the open cell door. A reasonable officer could believe Parrish was trying to\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fleave the holding cell, justifying force to maintain order and security in the jail. Id.\\nBy holding the mattress in front of his chest and pushing it through the open door,\\nParrish limited Dingman’s ability to close the door and to stop Parrish from leaving\\nthe cell. It was reasonable for Dingman to view this as passive resistance and a threat\\nto his safety, further justifying the use of force. See Hicks, 640 F.3d at 842\\n(explaining the use of force is justified where the officer has a reasonable belief a\\ndetainee constitutes a threat to his safety); Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062,\\n1066–67 (8th Cir. 2006) (“When a suspect is passively resistant, somewhat more\\nforce may reasonably be required.”).\\n\\n Parrish further contends that the amount of force used was unreasonable.\\n“[O]fficers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that\\nare tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is\\nnecessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Dingman was forced\\nto make a split-second judgment when Parrish suddenly moved toward an open cell\\ndoor holding the mattress. To restrain and handcuff him, Dingman forced him into\\nthe wall and leveraged him to the ground. This is a common technique to restrain\\nindividuals and was proportional to the need for force. See Blazek v. City of Iowa\\nCity, 761 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2014) (describing a similar handcuffing technique\\nas a “relatively common and ordinarily accepted non-excessive way to detain an\\narrestee,” quoting Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002));\\nHosea v. City of St. Paul, 867 F.3d 949, 958–59 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding no\\nconstitutional violation where an officer tackled a suspect after he began complying\\nwith orders to lower himself to the ground); Hicks, 640 F.3d at 842 (holding the\\nofficer’s use of an arm-bar maneuver to restrain a resistant detainee objectively\\nreasonable). Cf. Cravener v. Shuster, 885 F.3d 1135, 1140 (8th Cir. 2018)\\n(“Unarmed, passively resisting subjects can pose a threat necessitating the use of taser\\nforce.”). Dingman’s handcuffing also complied with Hamilton County Jail policy\\nauthorizing the use of “hands” and “compliance holds” against a passively resistant\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\finmate. See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2474 (recognizing courts’ “deference to policies\\nand practices needed to maintain order and institutional security is appropriate”).\\n\\n Due to the need to maintain order and institutional security and Dingman’s\\nreasonable belief that Parrish posed a security threat, the amount of force used was\\nobjectively reasonable. Because he did not violate Parrish’s constitutional rights,\\nDingman is entitled to qualified immunity.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Parrish also appeals the grant of summary judgment on the Iowa state-law\\nclaims for assault and battery and respondeat superior liability. To prevent an\\narrested person from escaping, Iowa law permits police to use the amount of force\\nthat the officer “would be justified in using if the officer . . . were arresting such\\nperson.” Iowa Code § 804.13. To make an arrest, police can use “any force which\\nthe . . . officer reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest.” Id. § 804.8.\\nIowa courts apply an objective reasonableness standard to an officer’s use of force\\nunder these statutes. See Chelf v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of Davenport, 515 N.W.2d\\n353, 355–56 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). See also Lawyer v. City of Council Bluffs, 240\\nF. Supp. 2d 941, 953 (S.D. Iowa 2002). Because Dingman’s use of force was\\nobjectively reasonable, summary judgment was appropriate for the assault and battery\\nand respondeat superior claims. See Iowa Code § 670.4(1)(c) (no municipal liability\\nwhere the employee “exercis[es] due care[] in the execution of a statute”); Dickens\\nv. Associated Anesthesiologists, P.C., 709 N.W.2d 122, 125 (Iowa 2006) (“One of\\nthe limitations of the [respondeat superior] doctrine is that the employer has no\\nliability unless the employee is liable.”).\\n\\n *******\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, concurs in the result.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4355537/\", \"author_raw\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4578284/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Matthew Wade PARRISH, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Jason DINGMAN, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Hamilton County Jailer; Dennis Hagenson, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Hamilton County Sheriff; Hamilton County, Iowa, Defendants - Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-02\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3705\n ___________________________\n\n Matthew Wade Parrish\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Jason Dingman, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Hamilton County\n Jailer; Dennis Hagenson, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Hamilton\n County Sheriff; Hamilton County, Iowa\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Ft. Dodge\n ____________\n\n Submitted: October 17, 2018\n Filed: January 2, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Matthew Wade Parrish sued jailer Jason D. Dingman, Sheriff Dennis\nHagenson, and Hamilton County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Iowa law. The district\n\fcourt1 granted qualified immunity to Dingman and summary judgment to the\ndefendants. Parrish v. Dingman, 2017 WL 5560280 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 17, 2017).\nHaving jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.\n\n I.\n\n An Iowa state trooper stopped Parrish at a checkpoint. After testing for\nsobriety and finding marijuana in the vehicle, police transported him to the Hamilton\nCounty Jail. Dingman conducted the booking procedure.\n\n During booking, Parrish told Dingman he had several physical impairments\nfrom breaking his right femur and right arm in a motorcycle accident five years\nearlier. Dingman had heard about the accident and knew Parrish had significant\ninjuries. Parrish walked with a limp. He told Dingman that he wears prescription\nglasses for double vision and special orthotic shoes because his right leg is shorter\nthan his left. Dingman let him keep his shoes and glasses in the holding cell. Parrish\nalso asked for an isolated cell due to his physical impairments. After completing\nintake, Dingman gave Parrish a mattress to make him more comfortable and escorted\nhim to the male holding cell. During booking and intake, Parrish was cooperative.\n\n Surveillance video captured what happened next. Parrish walked through the\ncell door holding the mattress in front of his chest. Dingman was behind him. Seeing\nanother inmate in the cell, Parrish turned to face Dingman and asked again for an\nisolated cell. Dingman shook his head no. Parrish then stepped forward toward the\nopen cell door “to get the doorway open to get [Dingman’s] answer.” The mattress\nprotruded through the cell door.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District\nCourt for the Northern District of Iowa.\n\n -2-\n\f Dingman believed Parrish was attacking him and trying to leave the holding\ncell. He was concerned Parrish could use the mattress as a shield. Dingman then\nstepped into the cell, pushed Parrish into the wall, leveraged him to the floor with his\nhands on Parrish’s arm and neck, and handcuffed him. Parrish’s right wrist was\nswollen and bruised from the handcuffs. He later received chiropractic treatment for\nlower back pain and four injured ribs. He also sought mental health treatment.\n\n Parrish sued Dingman, Hagenson, and Hamilton County under federal and state\nlaw. The officers and the County invoked qualified and statutory immunity. The\ndistrict court granted them summary judgment. Parrish appeals his claims against\nDingman for excessive force and assault and battery, and his claim against the County\nfor respondeat superior liability.\n\n II.\n\n This court reviews de novo the grant of summary judgment on the basis of\nqualified immunity, “viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving\nparty and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Chambers v.\nPennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2011). Qualified immunity shields Dingman\nfrom liability in this § 1983 action unless Parrish can show: (1) that Dingman\n“violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly\nestablished’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.\n731, 735 (2011), quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).\n\n Parrish’s excessive-force claim is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s\nobjective reasonableness standard. Hicks v. Norwood, 640 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir.\n2011) (“It is settled in this circuit that the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective\nreasonableness’ standard for arrestees governs excessive-force claims arising during\nthe booking process.”). To prove a constitutional violation, Parrish must show that\nDingman’s use of force was not objectively reasonable under the particular\n\n\n -3-\n\fcircumstances. Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009).\nObjective reasonableness is “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on\nthe scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490\nU.S. 386, 396 (1989). In determining objective reasonableness, a court may look to\n“the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used;\nthe extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit\nthe amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat\nreasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.”\nZubrod v. Hoch, 907 F.3d 568, 577 (8th Cir. 2018), quoting Kingsley v.\nHendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). A court must also consider the\n“legitimate interests in managing a jail” and give “deference to policies and practices\nneeded to maintain order and institutional security.” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2474.\n\n Parrish argues the use of any force was unreasonable because no reasonable\nofficer would think he was actively resisting or posing any threat—he was unarmed,\nhad significant physical impairments, and was cooperative during booking. See\nBrown, 574 F.3d at 499 (“[F]orce is least justified against nonviolent misdemeanants\nwho do not flee or actively resist arrest and pose little or no threat to the security of\nthe officers or the public.”). He contends this case is similar to Shekleton, where the\nuse of force against a suspect with known disabilities was not objectively reasonable.\nShekleton v. Eichenberger, 677 F.3d 361, 366 (8th Cir. 2012). Shekleton, however,\nis factually distinguishable. The suspect was not in jail and posed no threat to the\nofficer. Id. The officer used a taser—more intrusive force than Dingman\nused—despite knowing that Shekleton’s physical disabilities prevented him from\ncomplying with orders to place his hands behind his back. Id.\n\n Parrish was in jail. Jailers like Dingman have an important interest in\nmaintaining order and institutional security within the jail. See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct.\nat 2474. After Dingman refused to give him an isolated cell, Parrish stepped forward\ntoward the open cell door. A reasonable officer could believe Parrish was trying to\n\n\n -4-\n\fleave the holding cell, justifying force to maintain order and security in the jail. Id.\nBy holding the mattress in front of his chest and pushing it through the open door,\nParrish limited Dingman’s ability to close the door and to stop Parrish from leaving\nthe cell. It was reasonable for Dingman to view this as passive resistance and a threat\nto his safety, further justifying the use of force. See Hicks, 640 F.3d at 842\n(explaining the use of force is justified where the officer has a reasonable belief a\ndetainee constitutes a threat to his safety); Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062,\n1066–67 (8th Cir. 2006) (“When a suspect is passively resistant, somewhat more\nforce may reasonably be required.”).\n\n Parrish further contends that the amount of force used was unreasonable.\n“[O]fficers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that\nare tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is\nnecessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Dingman was forced\nto make a split-second judgment when Parrish suddenly moved toward an open cell\ndoor holding the mattress. To restrain and handcuff him, Dingman forced him into\nthe wall and leveraged him to the ground. This is a common technique to restrain\nindividuals and was proportional to the need for force. See Blazek v. City of Iowa\nCity, 761 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2014) (describing a similar handcuffing technique\nas a “relatively common and ordinarily accepted non-excessive way to detain an\narrestee,” quoting Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002));\nHosea v. City of St. Paul, 867 F.3d 949, 958–59 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding no\nconstitutional violation where an officer tackled a suspect after he began complying\nwith orders to lower himself to the ground); Hicks, 640 F.3d at 842 (holding the\nofficer’s use of an arm-bar maneuver to restrain a resistant detainee objectively\nreasonable). Cf. Cravener v. Shuster, 885 F.3d 1135, 1140 (8th Cir. 2018)\n(“Unarmed, passively resisting subjects can pose a threat necessitating the use of taser\nforce.”). Dingman’s handcuffing also complied with Hamilton County Jail policy\nauthorizing the use of “hands” and “compliance holds” against a passively resistant\n\n\n\n -5-\n\finmate. See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2474 (recognizing courts’ “deference to policies\nand practices needed to maintain order and institutional security is appropriate”).\n\n Due to the need to maintain order and institutional security and Dingman’s\nreasonable belief that Parrish posed a security threat, the amount of force used was\nobjectively reasonable. Because he did not violate Parrish’s constitutional rights,\nDingman is entitled to qualified immunity.\n\n III.\n\n Parrish also appeals the grant of summary judgment on the Iowa state-law\nclaims for assault and battery and respondeat superior liability. To prevent an\narrested person from escaping, Iowa law permits police to use the amount of force\nthat the officer “would be justified in using if the officer . . . were arresting such\nperson.” Iowa Code § 804.13. To make an arrest, police can use “any force which\nthe . . . officer reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest.” Id. § 804.8.\nIowa courts apply an objective reasonableness standard to an officer’s use of force\nunder these statutes. See Chelf v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of Davenport, 515 N.W.2d\n353, 355–56 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). See also Lawyer v. City of Council Bluffs, 240\nF. Supp. 2d 941, 953 (S.D. Iowa 2002). Because Dingman’s use of force was\nobjectively reasonable, summary judgment was appropriate for the assault and battery\nand respondeat superior claims. See Iowa Code § 670.4(1)(c) (no municipal liability\nwhere the employee “exercis[es] due care[] in the execution of a statute”); Dickens\nv. Associated Anesthesiologists, P.C., 709 N.W.2d 122, 125 (Iowa 2006) (“One of\nthe limitations of the [respondeat superior] doctrine is that the employer has no\nliability unless the employee is liable.”).\n\n *******\n\n The judgment is affirmed.\n\n\n -6-\n\fWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, concurs in the result.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Matthew Wade PARRISH, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Jason DINGMAN, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Hamilton County Jailer; Dennis Hagenson, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Hamilton County Sheriff; Hamilton County, Iowa, Defendants - Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-02\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3705\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Matthew Wade Parrish\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Jason Dingman, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Hamilton County\\n Jailer; Dennis Hagenson, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Hamilton\\n County Sheriff; Hamilton County, Iowa\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Ft. Dodge\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 17, 2018\\n Filed: January 2, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Matthew Wade Parrish sued jailer Jason D. Dingman, Sheriff Dennis\\nHagenson, and Hamilton County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Iowa law. The district\\n\\fcourt1 granted qualified immunity to Dingman and summary judgment to the\\ndefendants. Parrish v. Dingman, 2017 WL 5560280 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 17, 2017).\\nHaving jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n An Iowa state trooper stopped Parrish at a checkpoint. After testing for\\nsobriety and finding marijuana in the vehicle, police transported him to the Hamilton\\nCounty Jail. Dingman conducted the booking procedure.\\n\\n During booking, Parrish told Dingman he had several physical impairments\\nfrom breaking his right femur and right arm in a motorcycle accident five years\\nearlier. Dingman had heard about the accident and knew Parrish had significant\\ninjuries. Parrish walked with a limp. He told Dingman that he wears prescription\\nglasses for double vision and special orthotic shoes because his right leg is shorter\\nthan his left. Dingman let him keep his shoes and glasses in the holding cell. Parrish\\nalso asked for an isolated cell due to his physical impairments. After completing\\nintake, Dingman gave Parrish a mattress to make him more comfortable and escorted\\nhim to the male holding cell. During booking and intake, Parrish was cooperative.\\n\\n Surveillance video captured what happened next. Parrish walked through the\\ncell door holding the mattress in front of his chest. Dingman was behind him. Seeing\\nanother inmate in the cell, Parrish turned to face Dingman and asked again for an\\nisolated cell. Dingman shook his head no. Parrish then stepped forward toward the\\nopen cell door “to get the doorway open to get [Dingman’s] answer.” The mattress\\nprotruded through the cell door.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District\\nCourt for the Northern District of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Dingman believed Parrish was attacking him and trying to leave the holding\\ncell. He was concerned Parrish could use the mattress as a shield. Dingman then\\nstepped into the cell, pushed Parrish into the wall, leveraged him to the floor with his\\nhands on Parrish’s arm and neck, and handcuffed him. Parrish’s right wrist was\\nswollen and bruised from the handcuffs. He later received chiropractic treatment for\\nlower back pain and four injured ribs. He also sought mental health treatment.\\n\\n Parrish sued Dingman, Hagenson, and Hamilton County under federal and state\\nlaw. The officers and the County invoked qualified and statutory immunity. The\\ndistrict court granted them summary judgment. Parrish appeals his claims against\\nDingman for excessive force and assault and battery, and his claim against the County\\nfor respondeat superior liability.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n This court reviews de novo the grant of summary judgment on the basis of\\nqualified immunity, “viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving\\nparty and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Chambers v.\\nPennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2011). Qualified immunity shields Dingman\\nfrom liability in this § 1983 action unless Parrish can show: (1) that Dingman\\n“violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly\\nestablished’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.\\n731, 735 (2011), quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).\\n\\n Parrish’s excessive-force claim is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s\\nobjective reasonableness standard. Hicks v. Norwood, 640 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir.\\n2011) (“It is settled in this circuit that the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective\\nreasonableness’ standard for arrestees governs excessive-force claims arising during\\nthe booking process.”). To prove a constitutional violation, Parrish must show that\\nDingman’s use of force was not objectively reasonable under the particular\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fcircumstances. Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009).\\nObjective reasonableness is “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on\\nthe scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490\\nU.S. 386, 396 (1989). In determining objective reasonableness, a court may look to\\n“the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used;\\nthe extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit\\nthe amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat\\nreasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.”\\nZubrod v. Hoch, 907 F.3d 568, 577 (8th Cir. 2018), quoting Kingsley v.\\nHendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). A court must also consider the\\n“legitimate interests in managing a jail” and give “deference to policies and practices\\nneeded to maintain order and institutional security.” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2474.\\n\\n Parrish argues the use of any force was unreasonable because no reasonable\\nofficer would think he was actively resisting or posing any threat—he was unarmed,\\nhad significant physical impairments, and was cooperative during booking. See\\nBrown, 574 F.3d at 499 (“[F]orce is least justified against nonviolent misdemeanants\\nwho do not flee or actively resist arrest and pose little or no threat to the security of\\nthe officers or the public.”). He contends this case is similar to Shekleton, where the\\nuse of force against a suspect with known disabilities was not objectively reasonable.\\nShekleton v. Eichenberger, 677 F.3d 361, 366 (8th Cir. 2012). Shekleton, however,\\nis factually distinguishable. The suspect was not in jail and posed no threat to the\\nofficer. Id. The officer used a taser—more intrusive force than Dingman\\nused—despite knowing that Shekleton’s physical disabilities prevented him from\\ncomplying with orders to place his hands behind his back. Id.\\n\\n Parrish was in jail. Jailers like Dingman have an important interest in\\nmaintaining order and institutional security within the jail. See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct.\\nat 2474. After Dingman refused to give him an isolated cell, Parrish stepped forward\\ntoward the open cell door. A reasonable officer could believe Parrish was trying to\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fleave the holding cell, justifying force to maintain order and security in the jail. Id.\\nBy holding the mattress in front of his chest and pushing it through the open door,\\nParrish limited Dingman’s ability to close the door and to stop Parrish from leaving\\nthe cell. It was reasonable for Dingman to view this as passive resistance and a threat\\nto his safety, further justifying the use of force. See Hicks, 640 F.3d at 842\\n(explaining the use of force is justified where the officer has a reasonable belief a\\ndetainee constitutes a threat to his safety); Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062,\\n1066–67 (8th Cir. 2006) (“When a suspect is passively resistant, somewhat more\\nforce may reasonably be required.”).\\n\\n Parrish further contends that the amount of force used was unreasonable.\\n“[O]fficers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that\\nare tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is\\nnecessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Dingman was forced\\nto make a split-second judgment when Parrish suddenly moved toward an open cell\\ndoor holding the mattress. To restrain and handcuff him, Dingman forced him into\\nthe wall and leveraged him to the ground. This is a common technique to restrain\\nindividuals and was proportional to the need for force. See Blazek v. City of Iowa\\nCity, 761 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2014) (describing a similar handcuffing technique\\nas a “relatively common and ordinarily accepted non-excessive way to detain an\\narrestee,” quoting Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002));\\nHosea v. City of St. Paul, 867 F.3d 949, 958–59 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding no\\nconstitutional violation where an officer tackled a suspect after he began complying\\nwith orders to lower himself to the ground); Hicks, 640 F.3d at 842 (holding the\\nofficer’s use of an arm-bar maneuver to restrain a resistant detainee objectively\\nreasonable). Cf. Cravener v. Shuster, 885 F.3d 1135, 1140 (8th Cir. 2018)\\n(“Unarmed, passively resisting subjects can pose a threat necessitating the use of taser\\nforce.”). Dingman’s handcuffing also complied with Hamilton County Jail policy\\nauthorizing the use of “hands” and “compliance holds” against a passively resistant\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\finmate. See Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2474 (recognizing courts’ “deference to policies\\nand practices needed to maintain order and institutional security is appropriate”).\\n\\n Due to the need to maintain order and institutional security and Dingman’s\\nreasonable belief that Parrish posed a security threat, the amount of force used was\\nobjectively reasonable. Because he did not violate Parrish’s constitutional rights,\\nDingman is entitled to qualified immunity.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Parrish also appeals the grant of summary judgment on the Iowa state-law\\nclaims for assault and battery and respondeat superior liability. To prevent an\\narrested person from escaping, Iowa law permits police to use the amount of force\\nthat the officer “would be justified in using if the officer . . . were arresting such\\nperson.” Iowa Code § 804.13. To make an arrest, police can use “any force which\\nthe . . . officer reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest.” Id. § 804.8.\\nIowa courts apply an objective reasonableness standard to an officer’s use of force\\nunder these statutes. See Chelf v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of Davenport, 515 N.W.2d\\n353, 355–56 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). See also Lawyer v. City of Council Bluffs, 240\\nF. Supp. 2d 941, 953 (S.D. Iowa 2002). Because Dingman’s use of force was\\nobjectively reasonable, summary judgment was appropriate for the assault and battery\\nand respondeat superior claims. See Iowa Code § 670.4(1)(c) (no municipal liability\\nwhere the employee “exercis[es] due care[] in the execution of a statute”); Dickens\\nv. Associated Anesthesiologists, P.C., 709 N.W.2d 122, 125 (Iowa 2006) (“One of\\nthe limitations of the [respondeat superior] doctrine is that the employer has no\\nliability unless the employee is liable.”).\\n\\n *******\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, concurs in the result.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":281,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4578576,"string":"4,578,576"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Eva Angelica LUCKE, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Andrew SOLSVIG, Individually and in His Capacity as Director, Minot International Airport ; City of Minot, a North Dakota Municipal Corporation, Defendants - Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Eva Angelica Lucke v. Andrew Solsvig"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3618"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Shepherd, Kelly, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3618\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Eva Angelica Lucke\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\nAndrew Solsvig, individually and in his capacity as Director, Minot International\\n Airport; City of Minot, a North Dakota Municipal Corporation\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of North Dakota - Bismarck\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 17, 2018\\n Filed: January 3, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Appellant, Eva Lucke, owns a building located on property leased from the\\nMinot International Airport in Minot, North Dakota. She filed suit against Appellees,\\nthe City of Minot and Minot International Airport Director Andrew Solsvig, in his\\nindividual and official capacities, alleging racial discrimination in violation of 42\\nU.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal\\n\\fProtection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court1 granted summary\\njudgment in favor of Appellees on all claims. Ms. Lucke appeals. Having\\njurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Ms. Lucke, a Hispanic woman, purchased a building on airport property in\\n1983 and opened Minot Aviation, an aviation-themed hobby shop, in 1985. She\\noriginally ran a crop-spraying business and offered flight lessons out of the remainder\\nof the building, but discontinued such operations sometime prior to 2001. Ms. Lucke\\nnow leases the majority of her building to her ex-husband, Stewart Lucke, to\\nconstruct experimental aircraft.\\n\\n Ms. Lucke’s most recent written lease with the City of Minot ran from March\\n2003 until September 2013. In 2006, the City commenced an unlawful detainer\\naction against her, which was dismissed. When her lease ended, she held over as a\\nmonth-to-month tenant until December 2015, when the City offered her the lease at\\nissue here. The new lease offered Ms. Lucke an 18-month initial term, renewable on\\na year-to-year basis with mutual consent, at a rate of $0.30 per square foot per annum.\\nFred Anderson, a Caucasian man who owns an inactive crop-spraying business\\nlocated on airport property, was offered a lease with identical terms.\\n\\n After requesting and receiving copies of new leases offered to other tenants\\naround the same time, Ms. Lucke determined her offered lease terms compared\\nunfavorably to those presented to another tenant, PS Properties, LLP. PS Properties\\nwas offered a new lease with an initial term of 20 months, an option to renew for 20\\nyears with mutual consent, and an initial rent rate of $0.30 per square foot per year,\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, United States District Court\\nfor the District of North Dakota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fto be adjusted after the first five years. When Ms. Lucke asked Director Solsvig why\\nshe was offered different lease terms, Director Solsvig cited the airport’s need for\\nflexibility as it redeveloped, as well as concerns about the physical state of Ms.\\nLucke’s building and whether her hobby shop qualified as an aeronautical use under\\nFAA regulations.\\n\\n Considering the lease terms offered to her inferior to those offered to PS\\nProperties due to the differences in the leases’ initial durations and renewal options,\\nMs. Lucke filed suit. She alleged that Appellees presented her with these unfavorable\\nlease terms because of her race. Appellees moved for summary judgment. The\\ndistrict court granted Appellees’ motion, finding that Ms. Lucke had not presented\\nsufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case and that, even if she had, Appellees\\npresented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the differing lease terms and Ms.\\nLucke could not establish those reasons were merely pretextual. Ms. Lucke then\\nappealed to this Court.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Ms. Lucke argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting Appellees’\\nmotion for summary judgment when it concluded that she failed to meet her burden\\nof establishing an inference of unlawful discrimination. “We review de novo a grant\\nof summary judgment, considering the facts in the light most favorable to the\\nnonmoving party.” Meuir v. Greene Cnty. Jail Emps., 487 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.\\n2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any\\nmaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 56(a); see also Doe ex rel. Thomas v. Tsai, 648 F.3d 584, 587 (8th Cir. 2011). The\\nnonmoving party must cite to specific facts in the record demonstrating a genuine\\nissue of fact for trial and may not rely solely on allegations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);\\nMosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005).\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f A plaintiff may prove unlawful racial discrimination through either direct or\\ncircumstantial evidence. Young v. Builders Steel Co., 754 F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir.\\n2014). If she presents circumstantial evidence, she must proceed under the\\nframework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).\\nUnder McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of racial\\ndiscrimination through evidence giving rise to an inference that she has been\\nintentionally discriminated against because of her race. Young, 754 F.3d at 577. She\\nmay do so by showing that a similarly-situated person of another race received more\\nfavorable treatment. Id. at 578. That person must be “similarly situated in all\\nrelevant respects.” Id. (quoting Chappell v. Bilco Co., 675 F.3d 1110, 1119 (8th Cir.\\n2012)).\\n\\n A person is similarly situated to the plaintiff if he or she possesses all the\\nrelevant characteristics the plaintiff possesses except for the characteristic about\\nwhich the plaintiff alleges discrimination. See Barstad v. Murray Cnty., 420 F.3d\\n880, 886-87 (8th Cir. 2005) (landowners denied a permit to build an RV campground\\non their land were not similarly situated to successor landowner who received a\\npermit to build a dock and two cabins because, even though they sought to improve\\nthe same parcel of land, they did not seek to institute the same improvements);\\nMeyers v. Ford Motor Co., 659 F.2d 91, 93-94 (8th Cir. 1981) (white male car\\ndealership operator who voluntarily terminated his dealership contract without\\nnegotiating was not similarly situated to his black male predecessor because the\\npredecessor had a long-term relationship with the car company and received a more\\nfavorable termination package by negotiating for one). What constitutes a “relevant\\nrespect” or characteristic varies based on the context. See Barstad, 420 F.3d at 884-\\n85 (land use context); Chappell, 675 F.3d at 1119 (employment context). The\\nplaintiff has the burden of locating similarly-situated comparators. Harvey v.\\nAnheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f If a plaintiff succeeds in establishing her prima facie case, the defendant must\\nthen show a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for the challenged conduct.\\nYoung, 754 F.3d at 577-78. Legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons must be “clear\\nand reasonably specific.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258\\n(1981). Examples include that the defendant’s actions stemmed from economic\\nmotivations rather than racial animus, see Meyers, 659 F.2d at 94, or, in the\\nemployment context, that the plaintiff violated a workplace rule or policy, see\\nChappell, 675 F.3d at 1119, or demonstrated poor work performance. Fiero v. CSG\\nSys., Inc., 759 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 2014). Should the defendant articulate such\\na reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the offered reason is\\npretextual. Young, 754 F.3d at 578. This requires more than merely disputing the\\nreason; the plaintiff must present evidence “that the reason was false, and that\\ndiscrimination was the real reason.” Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 838 n.5 (8th\\nCir. 1997) (emphasis omitted) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,\\n515 (1993)).\\n\\n The plaintiff may show pretext either through discrediting the proffered reasons\\nor through showing “that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the\\n[defendant] . . . .” White v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 985 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir.\\n1993) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). In this Court, “the applicable standard\\n. . . on summary judgment . . . ‘require[s] only that [the] plaintiff adduce enough\\nadmissible evidence to raise a genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of the defendant’s\\nmotive, even if that evidence [does] not directly contradict or disprove [the]\\ndefendant’s articulated reasons for its actions.’” Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc.,\\n398 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted)\\n(quoting Davenport v. Riverview Gardens Sch. Dist., 30 F.3d 940, 945 n.8 (8th Cir.\\n1994)). However, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the\\ndefendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with\\nthe plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f While McDonnell Douglas itself dealt with racial discrimination under Title\\nVII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 411 U.S. at 802, we apply its burden-shifting\\nframework when analyzing racial discrimination claims in a host of other contexts.\\nSee Wimbley v. Cashion, 588 F.3d 959, 961-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (Fourteenth\\nAmendment claims); Freeman v. Fahey, 374 F.3d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 2004) (Title VI\\nclaims); Richmond v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., 957 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir.\\n1992) (§ 1981 and § 1983 claims). Ms. Lucke relies solely on circumstantial\\nevidence in making her claims. Each of her four claims thus falls under the\\nMcDonnell Douglas analysis.\\n\\n The district court found that Ms. Lucke failed to make out a prima facie case\\nof discrimination because she did not identify a similarly-situated individual of\\nanother race who received more favorable treatment. Ms. Lucke argues that PS\\nProperties is similarly situated because she, like PS Properties, operates out of a large\\npermanent building with a concrete foundation. However, Appellees counter that PS\\nProperties holds ten airport leases and runs an entirely different form of business than\\nMs. Lucke runs. They point to Fred Anderson, a male Caucasian, as a similarly-\\nsituated individual because, like Ms. Lucke, Anderson owns an inactive crop-\\nspraying business and uses his hangar for aircraft storage. Because Anderson\\nreceived new lease terms identical to those offered Ms. Lucke, Appellees contend Ms.\\nLucke cannot show her new lease terms constitute intentional discrimination against\\nher because of her race. See Henry v. Hobbs, 824 F.3d 735, 740 (8th Cir. 2016)\\n(“[D]efendants have provided evidence that a similarly-situated Caucasian employee\\nwas subject to the same treatment . . . . Thus, the only evidence in the record\\nconcerning a similarly situated Caucasian employee undermines [plaintiff]’s claim\\nthat his termination was motivated by race.”).\\n\\n However, even assuming Ms. Lucke successfully states a prima facie case, she\\ncannot survive summary judgment because she fails to rebut the nondiscriminatory\\nreasons Appellees offered for their conduct. Appellees presented the district court\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fwith three legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the differing lease terms: (1) the\\nairport’s need for flexibility in its redevelopment efforts; (2) concern over the\\nphysical state of Ms. Lucke’s building, and (3) concern over whether a hobby shop\\nis an FAA-approved aeronautical use. Ms. Lucke does not dispute on appeal that\\nthese reasons are both legitimate and nondiscriminatory. Despite this fact, she does\\nnot present evidence showing that an impermissible, discriminatory reason more\\nlikely motivated Appellees. See White, 985 F.2d at 436. Ms. Lucke argues only that\\nAppellees’ concern over the nature of her business is unjustified and pretextual. Her\\nbrief mentions the airport’s need for flexibility only in passing and does not reference\\nthe physical state of her building at all. Even though Ms. Lucke is not required to\\ndirectly contradict each of Appellees’ stated reasons through evidence, see Strate, 398\\nF.3d at 1021, by introducing no evidence at all against either of these arguments, she\\ndoes not even raise a genuine doubt as to their legitimacy. Id. Because Ms. Lucke\\ncannot discredit Appellees’ proffered reasons, see White, 985 F.2d at 436, and has not\\npresented other evidence that raises a genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of\\nAppellees’ motives, see Strate, 398 F.3d 1021, she cannot meet her burden under\\nMcDonnell Douglas to show discriminatory intent. We therefore find Ms. Lucke\\ncannot prevail on her claims.\\n\\n The district court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4355829/\", \"author_raw\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4578576/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Eva Angelica LUCKE, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Andrew SOLSVIG, Individually and in His Capacity as Director, Minot International Airport ; City of Minot, a North Dakota Municipal Corporation, Defendants - Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3618\n ___________________________\n\n Eva Angelica Lucke\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\nAndrew Solsvig, individually and in his capacity as Director, Minot International\n Airport; City of Minot, a North Dakota Municipal Corporation\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of North Dakota - Bismarck\n ____________\n\n Submitted: October 17, 2018\n Filed: January 3, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\n\n Appellant, Eva Lucke, owns a building located on property leased from the\nMinot International Airport in Minot, North Dakota. She filed suit against Appellees,\nthe City of Minot and Minot International Airport Director Andrew Solsvig, in his\nindividual and official capacities, alleging racial discrimination in violation of 42\nU.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal\n\fProtection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court1 granted summary\njudgment in favor of Appellees on all claims. Ms. Lucke appeals. Having\njurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\n\n I.\n\n Ms. Lucke, a Hispanic woman, purchased a building on airport property in\n1983 and opened Minot Aviation, an aviation-themed hobby shop, in 1985. She\noriginally ran a crop-spraying business and offered flight lessons out of the remainder\nof the building, but discontinued such operations sometime prior to 2001. Ms. Lucke\nnow leases the majority of her building to her ex-husband, Stewart Lucke, to\nconstruct experimental aircraft.\n\n Ms. Lucke’s most recent written lease with the City of Minot ran from March\n2003 until September 2013. In 2006, the City commenced an unlawful detainer\naction against her, which was dismissed. When her lease ended, she held over as a\nmonth-to-month tenant until December 2015, when the City offered her the lease at\nissue here. The new lease offered Ms. Lucke an 18-month initial term, renewable on\na year-to-year basis with mutual consent, at a rate of $0.30 per square foot per annum.\nFred Anderson, a Caucasian man who owns an inactive crop-spraying business\nlocated on airport property, was offered a lease with identical terms.\n\n After requesting and receiving copies of new leases offered to other tenants\naround the same time, Ms. Lucke determined her offered lease terms compared\nunfavorably to those presented to another tenant, PS Properties, LLP. PS Properties\nwas offered a new lease with an initial term of 20 months, an option to renew for 20\nyears with mutual consent, and an initial rent rate of $0.30 per square foot per year,\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, United States District Court\nfor the District of North Dakota.\n\n -2-\n\fto be adjusted after the first five years. When Ms. Lucke asked Director Solsvig why\nshe was offered different lease terms, Director Solsvig cited the airport’s need for\nflexibility as it redeveloped, as well as concerns about the physical state of Ms.\nLucke’s building and whether her hobby shop qualified as an aeronautical use under\nFAA regulations.\n\n Considering the lease terms offered to her inferior to those offered to PS\nProperties due to the differences in the leases’ initial durations and renewal options,\nMs. Lucke filed suit. She alleged that Appellees presented her with these unfavorable\nlease terms because of her race. Appellees moved for summary judgment. The\ndistrict court granted Appellees’ motion, finding that Ms. Lucke had not presented\nsufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case and that, even if she had, Appellees\npresented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the differing lease terms and Ms.\nLucke could not establish those reasons were merely pretextual. Ms. Lucke then\nappealed to this Court.\n\n II.\n\n Ms. Lucke argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting Appellees’\nmotion for summary judgment when it concluded that she failed to meet her burden\nof establishing an inference of unlawful discrimination. “We review de novo a grant\nof summary judgment, considering the facts in the light most favorable to the\nnonmoving party.” Meuir v. Greene Cnty. Jail Emps., 487 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.\n2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any\nmaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.\nP. 56(a); see also Doe ex rel. Thomas v. Tsai, 648 F.3d 584, 587 (8th Cir. 2011). The\nnonmoving party must cite to specific facts in the record demonstrating a genuine\nissue of fact for trial and may not rely solely on allegations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);\nMosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005).\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f A plaintiff may prove unlawful racial discrimination through either direct or\ncircumstantial evidence. Young v. Builders Steel Co., 754 F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir.\n2014). If she presents circumstantial evidence, she must proceed under the\nframework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).\nUnder McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of racial\ndiscrimination through evidence giving rise to an inference that she has been\nintentionally discriminated against because of her race. Young, 754 F.3d at 577. She\nmay do so by showing that a similarly-situated person of another race received more\nfavorable treatment. Id. at 578. That person must be “similarly situated in all\nrelevant respects.” Id. (quoting Chappell v. Bilco Co., 675 F.3d 1110, 1119 (8th Cir.\n2012)).\n\n A person is similarly situated to the plaintiff if he or she possesses all the\nrelevant characteristics the plaintiff possesses except for the characteristic about\nwhich the plaintiff alleges discrimination. See Barstad v. Murray Cnty., 420 F.3d\n880, 886-87 (8th Cir. 2005) (landowners denied a permit to build an RV campground\non their land were not similarly situated to successor landowner who received a\npermit to build a dock and two cabins because, even though they sought to improve\nthe same parcel of land, they did not seek to institute the same improvements);\nMeyers v. Ford Motor Co., 659 F.2d 91, 93-94 (8th Cir. 1981) (white male car\ndealership operator who voluntarily terminated his dealership contract without\nnegotiating was not similarly situated to his black male predecessor because the\npredecessor had a long-term relationship with the car company and received a more\nfavorable termination package by negotiating for one). What constitutes a “relevant\nrespect” or characteristic varies based on the context. See Barstad, 420 F.3d at 884-\n85 (land use context); Chappell, 675 F.3d at 1119 (employment context). The\nplaintiff has the burden of locating similarly-situated comparators. Harvey v.\nAnheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994).\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n\f If a plaintiff succeeds in establishing her prima facie case, the defendant must\nthen show a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for the challenged conduct.\nYoung, 754 F.3d at 577-78. Legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons must be “clear\nand reasonably specific.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258\n(1981). Examples include that the defendant’s actions stemmed from economic\nmotivations rather than racial animus, see Meyers, 659 F.2d at 94, or, in the\nemployment context, that the plaintiff violated a workplace rule or policy, see\nChappell, 675 F.3d at 1119, or demonstrated poor work performance. Fiero v. CSG\nSys., Inc., 759 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 2014). Should the defendant articulate such\na reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the offered reason is\npretextual. Young, 754 F.3d at 578. This requires more than merely disputing the\nreason; the plaintiff must present evidence “that the reason was false, and that\ndiscrimination was the real reason.” Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 838 n.5 (8th\nCir. 1997) (emphasis omitted) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,\n515 (1993)).\n\n The plaintiff may show pretext either through discrediting the proffered reasons\nor through showing “that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the\n[defendant] . . . .” White v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 985 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir.\n1993) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). In this Court, “the applicable standard\n. . . on summary judgment . . . ‘require[s] only that [the] plaintiff adduce enough\nadmissible evidence to raise a genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of the defendant’s\nmotive, even if that evidence [does] not directly contradict or disprove [the]\ndefendant’s articulated reasons for its actions.’” Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc.,\n398 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted)\n(quoting Davenport v. Riverview Gardens Sch. Dist., 30 F.3d 940, 945 n.8 (8th Cir.\n1994)). However, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the\ndefendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with\nthe plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f While McDonnell Douglas itself dealt with racial discrimination under Title\nVII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 411 U.S. at 802, we apply its burden-shifting\nframework when analyzing racial discrimination claims in a host of other contexts.\nSee Wimbley v. Cashion, 588 F.3d 959, 961-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (Fourteenth\nAmendment claims); Freeman v. Fahey, 374 F.3d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 2004) (Title VI\nclaims); Richmond v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., 957 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir.\n1992) (§ 1981 and § 1983 claims). Ms. Lucke relies solely on circumstantial\nevidence in making her claims. Each of her four claims thus falls under the\nMcDonnell Douglas analysis.\n\n The district court found that Ms. Lucke failed to make out a prima facie case\nof discrimination because she did not identify a similarly-situated individual of\nanother race who received more favorable treatment. Ms. Lucke argues that PS\nProperties is similarly situated because she, like PS Properties, operates out of a large\npermanent building with a concrete foundation. However, Appellees counter that PS\nProperties holds ten airport leases and runs an entirely different form of business than\nMs. Lucke runs. They point to Fred Anderson, a male Caucasian, as a similarly-\nsituated individual because, like Ms. Lucke, Anderson owns an inactive crop-\nspraying business and uses his hangar for aircraft storage. Because Anderson\nreceived new lease terms identical to those offered Ms. Lucke, Appellees contend Ms.\nLucke cannot show her new lease terms constitute intentional discrimination against\nher because of her race. See Henry v. Hobbs, 824 F.3d 735, 740 (8th Cir. 2016)\n(“[D]efendants have provided evidence that a similarly-situated Caucasian employee\nwas subject to the same treatment . . . . Thus, the only evidence in the record\nconcerning a similarly situated Caucasian employee undermines [plaintiff]’s claim\nthat his termination was motivated by race.”).\n\n However, even assuming Ms. Lucke successfully states a prima facie case, she\ncannot survive summary judgment because she fails to rebut the nondiscriminatory\nreasons Appellees offered for their conduct. Appellees presented the district court\n\n -6-\n\fwith three legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the differing lease terms: (1) the\nairport’s need for flexibility in its redevelopment efforts; (2) concern over the\nphysical state of Ms. Lucke’s building, and (3) concern over whether a hobby shop\nis an FAA-approved aeronautical use. Ms. Lucke does not dispute on appeal that\nthese reasons are both legitimate and nondiscriminatory. Despite this fact, she does\nnot present evidence showing that an impermissible, discriminatory reason more\nlikely motivated Appellees. See White, 985 F.2d at 436. Ms. Lucke argues only that\nAppellees’ concern over the nature of her business is unjustified and pretextual. Her\nbrief mentions the airport’s need for flexibility only in passing and does not reference\nthe physical state of her building at all. Even though Ms. Lucke is not required to\ndirectly contradict each of Appellees’ stated reasons through evidence, see Strate, 398\nF.3d at 1021, by introducing no evidence at all against either of these arguments, she\ndoes not even raise a genuine doubt as to their legitimacy. Id. Because Ms. Lucke\ncannot discredit Appellees’ proffered reasons, see White, 985 F.2d at 436, and has not\npresented other evidence that raises a genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of\nAppellees’ motives, see Strate, 398 F.3d 1021, she cannot meet her burden under\nMcDonnell Douglas to show discriminatory intent. We therefore find Ms. Lucke\ncannot prevail on her claims.\n\n The district court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Eva Angelica LUCKE, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Andrew SOLSVIG, Individually and in His Capacity as Director, Minot International Airport ; City of Minot, a North Dakota Municipal Corporation, Defendants - Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3618\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Eva Angelica Lucke\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\nAndrew Solsvig, individually and in his capacity as Director, Minot International\\n Airport; City of Minot, a North Dakota Municipal Corporation\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of North Dakota - Bismarck\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 17, 2018\\n Filed: January 3, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Appellant, Eva Lucke, owns a building located on property leased from the\\nMinot International Airport in Minot, North Dakota. She filed suit against Appellees,\\nthe City of Minot and Minot International Airport Director Andrew Solsvig, in his\\nindividual and official capacities, alleging racial discrimination in violation of 42\\nU.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal\\n\\fProtection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court1 granted summary\\njudgment in favor of Appellees on all claims. Ms. Lucke appeals. Having\\njurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Ms. Lucke, a Hispanic woman, purchased a building on airport property in\\n1983 and opened Minot Aviation, an aviation-themed hobby shop, in 1985. She\\noriginally ran a crop-spraying business and offered flight lessons out of the remainder\\nof the building, but discontinued such operations sometime prior to 2001. Ms. Lucke\\nnow leases the majority of her building to her ex-husband, Stewart Lucke, to\\nconstruct experimental aircraft.\\n\\n Ms. Lucke’s most recent written lease with the City of Minot ran from March\\n2003 until September 2013. In 2006, the City commenced an unlawful detainer\\naction against her, which was dismissed. When her lease ended, she held over as a\\nmonth-to-month tenant until December 2015, when the City offered her the lease at\\nissue here. The new lease offered Ms. Lucke an 18-month initial term, renewable on\\na year-to-year basis with mutual consent, at a rate of $0.30 per square foot per annum.\\nFred Anderson, a Caucasian man who owns an inactive crop-spraying business\\nlocated on airport property, was offered a lease with identical terms.\\n\\n After requesting and receiving copies of new leases offered to other tenants\\naround the same time, Ms. Lucke determined her offered lease terms compared\\nunfavorably to those presented to another tenant, PS Properties, LLP. PS Properties\\nwas offered a new lease with an initial term of 20 months, an option to renew for 20\\nyears with mutual consent, and an initial rent rate of $0.30 per square foot per year,\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, United States District Court\\nfor the District of North Dakota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fto be adjusted after the first five years. When Ms. Lucke asked Director Solsvig why\\nshe was offered different lease terms, Director Solsvig cited the airport’s need for\\nflexibility as it redeveloped, as well as concerns about the physical state of Ms.\\nLucke’s building and whether her hobby shop qualified as an aeronautical use under\\nFAA regulations.\\n\\n Considering the lease terms offered to her inferior to those offered to PS\\nProperties due to the differences in the leases’ initial durations and renewal options,\\nMs. Lucke filed suit. She alleged that Appellees presented her with these unfavorable\\nlease terms because of her race. Appellees moved for summary judgment. The\\ndistrict court granted Appellees’ motion, finding that Ms. Lucke had not presented\\nsufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case and that, even if she had, Appellees\\npresented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the differing lease terms and Ms.\\nLucke could not establish those reasons were merely pretextual. Ms. Lucke then\\nappealed to this Court.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Ms. Lucke argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting Appellees’\\nmotion for summary judgment when it concluded that she failed to meet her burden\\nof establishing an inference of unlawful discrimination. “We review de novo a grant\\nof summary judgment, considering the facts in the light most favorable to the\\nnonmoving party.” Meuir v. Greene Cnty. Jail Emps., 487 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.\\n2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any\\nmaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 56(a); see also Doe ex rel. Thomas v. Tsai, 648 F.3d 584, 587 (8th Cir. 2011). The\\nnonmoving party must cite to specific facts in the record demonstrating a genuine\\nissue of fact for trial and may not rely solely on allegations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);\\nMosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005).\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f A plaintiff may prove unlawful racial discrimination through either direct or\\ncircumstantial evidence. Young v. Builders Steel Co., 754 F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir.\\n2014). If she presents circumstantial evidence, she must proceed under the\\nframework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).\\nUnder McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of racial\\ndiscrimination through evidence giving rise to an inference that she has been\\nintentionally discriminated against because of her race. Young, 754 F.3d at 577. She\\nmay do so by showing that a similarly-situated person of another race received more\\nfavorable treatment. Id. at 578. That person must be “similarly situated in all\\nrelevant respects.” Id. (quoting Chappell v. Bilco Co., 675 F.3d 1110, 1119 (8th Cir.\\n2012)).\\n\\n A person is similarly situated to the plaintiff if he or she possesses all the\\nrelevant characteristics the plaintiff possesses except for the characteristic about\\nwhich the plaintiff alleges discrimination. See Barstad v. Murray Cnty., 420 F.3d\\n880, 886-87 (8th Cir. 2005) (landowners denied a permit to build an RV campground\\non their land were not similarly situated to successor landowner who received a\\npermit to build a dock and two cabins because, even though they sought to improve\\nthe same parcel of land, they did not seek to institute the same improvements);\\nMeyers v. Ford Motor Co., 659 F.2d 91, 93-94 (8th Cir. 1981) (white male car\\ndealership operator who voluntarily terminated his dealership contract without\\nnegotiating was not similarly situated to his black male predecessor because the\\npredecessor had a long-term relationship with the car company and received a more\\nfavorable termination package by negotiating for one). What constitutes a “relevant\\nrespect” or characteristic varies based on the context. See Barstad, 420 F.3d at 884-\\n85 (land use context); Chappell, 675 F.3d at 1119 (employment context). The\\nplaintiff has the burden of locating similarly-situated comparators. Harvey v.\\nAnheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f If a plaintiff succeeds in establishing her prima facie case, the defendant must\\nthen show a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for the challenged conduct.\\nYoung, 754 F.3d at 577-78. Legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons must be “clear\\nand reasonably specific.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258\\n(1981). Examples include that the defendant’s actions stemmed from economic\\nmotivations rather than racial animus, see Meyers, 659 F.2d at 94, or, in the\\nemployment context, that the plaintiff violated a workplace rule or policy, see\\nChappell, 675 F.3d at 1119, or demonstrated poor work performance. Fiero v. CSG\\nSys., Inc., 759 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 2014). Should the defendant articulate such\\na reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the offered reason is\\npretextual. Young, 754 F.3d at 578. This requires more than merely disputing the\\nreason; the plaintiff must present evidence “that the reason was false, and that\\ndiscrimination was the real reason.” Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 838 n.5 (8th\\nCir. 1997) (emphasis omitted) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,\\n515 (1993)).\\n\\n The plaintiff may show pretext either through discrediting the proffered reasons\\nor through showing “that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the\\n[defendant] . . . .” White v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 985 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir.\\n1993) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). In this Court, “the applicable standard\\n. . . on summary judgment . . . ‘require[s] only that [the] plaintiff adduce enough\\nadmissible evidence to raise a genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of the defendant’s\\nmotive, even if that evidence [does] not directly contradict or disprove [the]\\ndefendant’s articulated reasons for its actions.’” Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc.,\\n398 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted)\\n(quoting Davenport v. Riverview Gardens Sch. Dist., 30 F.3d 940, 945 n.8 (8th Cir.\\n1994)). However, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the\\ndefendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with\\nthe plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f While McDonnell Douglas itself dealt with racial discrimination under Title\\nVII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 411 U.S. at 802, we apply its burden-shifting\\nframework when analyzing racial discrimination claims in a host of other contexts.\\nSee Wimbley v. Cashion, 588 F.3d 959, 961-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (Fourteenth\\nAmendment claims); Freeman v. Fahey, 374 F.3d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 2004) (Title VI\\nclaims); Richmond v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., 957 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir.\\n1992) (§ 1981 and § 1983 claims). Ms. Lucke relies solely on circumstantial\\nevidence in making her claims. Each of her four claims thus falls under the\\nMcDonnell Douglas analysis.\\n\\n The district court found that Ms. Lucke failed to make out a prima facie case\\nof discrimination because she did not identify a similarly-situated individual of\\nanother race who received more favorable treatment. Ms. Lucke argues that PS\\nProperties is similarly situated because she, like PS Properties, operates out of a large\\npermanent building with a concrete foundation. However, Appellees counter that PS\\nProperties holds ten airport leases and runs an entirely different form of business than\\nMs. Lucke runs. They point to Fred Anderson, a male Caucasian, as a similarly-\\nsituated individual because, like Ms. Lucke, Anderson owns an inactive crop-\\nspraying business and uses his hangar for aircraft storage. Because Anderson\\nreceived new lease terms identical to those offered Ms. Lucke, Appellees contend Ms.\\nLucke cannot show her new lease terms constitute intentional discrimination against\\nher because of her race. See Henry v. Hobbs, 824 F.3d 735, 740 (8th Cir. 2016)\\n(“[D]efendants have provided evidence that a similarly-situated Caucasian employee\\nwas subject to the same treatment . . . . Thus, the only evidence in the record\\nconcerning a similarly situated Caucasian employee undermines [plaintiff]’s claim\\nthat his termination was motivated by race.”).\\n\\n However, even assuming Ms. Lucke successfully states a prima facie case, she\\ncannot survive summary judgment because she fails to rebut the nondiscriminatory\\nreasons Appellees offered for their conduct. Appellees presented the district court\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fwith three legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the differing lease terms: (1) the\\nairport’s need for flexibility in its redevelopment efforts; (2) concern over the\\nphysical state of Ms. Lucke’s building, and (3) concern over whether a hobby shop\\nis an FAA-approved aeronautical use. Ms. Lucke does not dispute on appeal that\\nthese reasons are both legitimate and nondiscriminatory. Despite this fact, she does\\nnot present evidence showing that an impermissible, discriminatory reason more\\nlikely motivated Appellees. See White, 985 F.2d at 436. Ms. Lucke argues only that\\nAppellees’ concern over the nature of her business is unjustified and pretextual. Her\\nbrief mentions the airport’s need for flexibility only in passing and does not reference\\nthe physical state of her building at all. Even though Ms. Lucke is not required to\\ndirectly contradict each of Appellees’ stated reasons through evidence, see Strate, 398\\nF.3d at 1021, by introducing no evidence at all against either of these arguments, she\\ndoes not even raise a genuine doubt as to their legitimacy. Id. Because Ms. Lucke\\ncannot discredit Appellees’ proffered reasons, see White, 985 F.2d at 436, and has not\\npresented other evidence that raises a genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of\\nAppellees’ motives, see Strate, 398 F.3d 1021, she cannot meet her burden under\\nMcDonnell Douglas to show discriminatory intent. We therefore find Ms. Lucke\\ncannot prevail on her claims.\\n\\n The district court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":282,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4578577,"string":"4,578,577"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"E. D., a Minor, BY AND THROUGH His Parents and Next Friends Anthony DOUGHERTY and Katherine D. Dougherty; Anthony Dougherty, Individually and as Parent of E.D.; Katherine D. Dougherty, Individually and as Parent of E.D. Plaintiffs - Appellants v. PALMYRA R-I SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"E. Dougherty D. v. Palmyra R-I Sch. Dist."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1095"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Melloy, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"STRAS, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1095\\n ___________________________\\n\\n E. D., a Minor, by and through his Parents and Next Friends Anthony Dougherty\\n and Katherine D. Dougherty; Anthony Dougherty, individually and as Parent of\\n E.D.; Katherine D. Dougherty, individually and as Parent of E.D.\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Palmyra R-I School District\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - Hannibal\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 26, 2018\\n Filed: January 3, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, MELLOY and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n At issue here is what parents must do if they decide to sue a school district\\nafter refusing special-education services for their child under the Individuals with\\nDisabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Even if they bring a lawsuit under a\\ndifferent disability-discrimination law, we conclude that they still must exhaust\\ntheir administrative remedies if the relief they seek is “also available” under the\\n\\fIDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s1 grant of\\nsummary judgment to Palmyra R-I School District.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n E.D. has Down Syndrome. Before he began kindergarten at Palmyra\\nElementary School, his mother informed the school that she was seeking\\naccommodations for his disability. E.D.’s parents had some specific\\naccommodations in mind, though, and made clear that they wanted E.D. placed in a\\nregular classroom without special-education instruction.\\n\\n They sought what they referred to as a “section 504 plan”—after section 504\\nof the Rehabilitation Act—which would have provided E.D. with some of the\\neducational accommodations otherwise available under the IDEA but without the\\nspecialized classes. All they wanted was for E.D. to be able to use an iPad “to\\ncompensate for his speech and fine motor delays” and for his teachers to integrate\\nhis iPad into their lessons.\\n\\n The negotiations between E.D.’s parents and the school lasted for\\napproximately a year. Twice the school offered an IDEA plan—more commonly\\nknown as an Individualized Education Program or “IEP”—instead of the\\nsection 504 plan his parents envisioned. The IEPs would have provided all the\\niPad-related accommodations his parents sought but would have required him to\\nattend special-education classes. E.D.’s parents rejected both IEPs. The second\\ntime, they reiterated their desire for a section 504 plan. Palmyra again refused, and\\nwith no resolution in sight, E.D.’s parents pulled him out of school just two weeks\\nafter he started first grade.\\n\\n Not long thereafter, the dispute landed in court. E.D.’s parents sued and\\nalleged that Palmyra had violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of\\n 1\\n The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n -2-\\n\\fthe Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United\\nStates Constitution. At the heart of their lawsuit was the claim that, by failing to\\nprovide educational accommodations, Palmyra had denied E.D. “access to a free\\npublic education.”\\n\\n In their complaint, E.D.’s parents sought what they had all along: for E.D. to\\nuse an iPad to complete his classroom assignments and for his teachers to adapt\\ntheir teaching methods to incorporate it. They also requested additional\\naccommodations, including a change to the school’s testing formats to account for\\nE.D.’s “speech [and] fine motor issues” and more time for him to complete his\\n“assignments, tests[,] and homework.”\\n\\n Palmyra moved for summary judgment on the theory that E.D.’s parents had\\nfailed to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures. Even though E.D.’s\\nparents had neither sued nor accepted services under the IDEA, Palmyra claimed\\nthat they were still required to exhaust their administrative remedies because they\\nwere seeking “relief that is also available under [the IDEA].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).\\nE.D.’s parents viewed their refusal to accept services as a total opt-out, excusing\\nany failure to comply with the IDEA’s procedural requirements. The district court\\ndisagreed and granted summary judgment to Palmyra. We now review de novo\\nwhether E.D.’s parents had to exhaust their administrative remedies before suing.\\nNelson v. Charles City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 900 F.3d 587, 591 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The IDEA requires schools receiving federal funds to provide a “free\\nappropriate public education” to all children who have qualifying disabilities. 20\\nU.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). Because parents and schools do not always agree about\\nthe best way to provide a child with a free appropriate public education, “the IDEA\\nestablishes formal procedures for resolving disputes.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty.\\nSchs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 749 (2017). Included among them are a “due process\\nhearing” before an impartial official and, in certain circumstances, an appeal to a\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fstate agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A), (g)(1). Only after parents have exhausted\\nthese administrative procedures can they sue in court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).\\n\\n Other federal laws, including the Americans with Disabilities Act and\\nsection 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, also protect children with disabilities from\\ndiscrimination at school. Although these laws focus more broadly on ensuring\\n“non-discriminatory access to public institutions,” to the extent the discrimination\\noccurs in schools, “[t]he same conduct [can] violate all three statutes.” Fry, 137 S.\\nCt. at 756; see also id. at 749–50. The IDEA itself recognizes that parents may\\npursue relief under multiple statutes, but it requires parents to exhaust their\\nadministrative remedies first. See id. at 750. Specifically, it provides that\\n\\n [n]othing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the\\n rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the\\n Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, [or section 504] of the\\n Rehabilitation Act of 1973, . . . except that before the filing of a civil\\n action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under [the\\n IDEA], the [IDEA’s administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to\\n the same extent as would be required had the action been brought\\n under [the IDEA].\\n\\n20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).\\n\\n The complaint in this case includes only claims expressly listed in the first\\nhalf of the statute, so all that is in dispute here is the second half, and specifically\\nwhether the relief sought “is also available” under the IDEA. E.D.’s parents would\\nhave us recognize a categorical exception to the exhaustion requirement for parents\\nwho refuse all IDEA services. We decline to do so.\\n\\n Section 1415(l)’s plain language precludes the exception they seek. All\\nparents, not just those who have previously sought or accepted IDEA services,\\nmust exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures if the relief they seek “is also\\navailable under” the IDEA.\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f We have little trouble concluding that the relief E.D.’s parents seek is\\navailable under the IDEA. IDEA exhaustion, as the Supreme Court has recently\\nmade clear, “hinges on whether a lawsuit seeks relief for a denial of a free\\nappropriate public education.” Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 754. If it does, then exhaustion\\nmust occur first. Id. If, however, the lawsuit seeks relief “for simple\\ndiscrimination,” only tangentially related to education because the discriminatory\\nacts just happened to take place in a school, then exhaustion is unnecessary. See\\nid. at 754–56 (explaining that a “simple discrimination” claim would include “a\\nwheelchair-bound child [who] sues his school for discrimination . . . because the\\nbuilding lacks access ramps”).\\n\\n “[A] pair of hypothetical questions” is critical to determining whether the\\n“gravamen” of the complaint is “the denial of a free appropriate public education”:\\n\\n First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the\\n alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a\\n school—say, a public theater or library? And second, could an adult\\n at the school—say, an employee or visitor—have pressed essentially\\n the same grievance? . . . [W]hen the answer [to both questions] is no,\\n then the complaint probably does concern a [free appropriate public\\n education], even if it does not explicitly say so . . . .\\n\\nId. at 754, 756; see also Nelson, 900 F.3d at 592 (stating that these hypothetical\\nquestions are fact-intensive and should not be “approach[ed] . . . at a high[] level of\\ngenerality”).\\n\\n In this case, the answer to both questions is no. E.D. and his parents could\\nnot have sued a public theater, public library, or any other public facility for any of\\nthe relief they seek—whether it is greater incorporation of his iPad into the\\nclassroom or additional time to complete his assignments. Cf. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at\\n756–56 (explaining that “a student with a learning disability” who alleged that his\\nschool discriminated against him by “failing to provide remedial tutoring in\\nmathematics” would be seeking relief for the denial of a free appropriate public\\n\\n -5-\\n\\feducation). Nor could any of the claims have been brought by a visitor or\\nemployee of the school. E.D.’s parents should have, in other words, exhausted.\\n\\n It makes no difference that they refused all services under the IDEA. Opting\\nout of IDEA services does not unlock a pathway around exhaustion. Indeed, the\\nstatute on which E.D.’s parents most heavily rely, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D), says\\nonly that the school must get the parents’ informed consent before providing\\nservices under the IDEA, not that a lack of consent will permit them to blow past\\nthe exhaustion requirement. See id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (ii)(II). Accordingly,\\nwe conclude that Palmyra was entitled to summary judgment.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4355830/\", \"author_raw\": \"STRAS, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4578577/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: E. D., a Minor, BY AND THROUGH His Parents and Next Friends Anthony DOUGHERTY and Katherine D. Dougherty; Anthony Dougherty, Individually and as Parent of E.D.; Katherine D. Dougherty, Individually and as Parent of E.D. Plaintiffs - Appellants v. PALMYRA R-I SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1095\n ___________________________\n\n E. D., a Minor, by and through his Parents and Next Friends Anthony Dougherty\n and Katherine D. Dougherty; Anthony Dougherty, individually and as Parent of\n E.D.; Katherine D. Dougherty, individually and as Parent of E.D.\n\n Plaintiffs - Appellants\n\n v.\n\n Palmyra R-I School District\n\n Defendant - Appellee\n\n ____________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - Hannibal\n ____________\n\n Submitted: September 26, 2018\n Filed: January 3, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, MELLOY and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\n\n At issue here is what parents must do if they decide to sue a school district\nafter refusing special-education services for their child under the Individuals with\nDisabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Even if they bring a lawsuit under a\ndifferent disability-discrimination law, we conclude that they still must exhaust\ntheir administrative remedies if the relief they seek is “also available” under the\n\fIDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s1 grant of\nsummary judgment to Palmyra R-I School District.\n\n I.\n\n E.D. has Down Syndrome. Before he began kindergarten at Palmyra\nElementary School, his mother informed the school that she was seeking\naccommodations for his disability. E.D.’s parents had some specific\naccommodations in mind, though, and made clear that they wanted E.D. placed in a\nregular classroom without special-education instruction.\n\n They sought what they referred to as a “section 504 plan”—after section 504\nof the Rehabilitation Act—which would have provided E.D. with some of the\neducational accommodations otherwise available under the IDEA but without the\nspecialized classes. All they wanted was for E.D. to be able to use an iPad “to\ncompensate for his speech and fine motor delays” and for his teachers to integrate\nhis iPad into their lessons.\n\n The negotiations between E.D.’s parents and the school lasted for\napproximately a year. Twice the school offered an IDEA plan—more commonly\nknown as an Individualized Education Program or “IEP”—instead of the\nsection 504 plan his parents envisioned. The IEPs would have provided all the\niPad-related accommodations his parents sought but would have required him to\nattend special-education classes. E.D.’s parents rejected both IEPs. The second\ntime, they reiterated their desire for a section 504 plan. Palmyra again refused, and\nwith no resolution in sight, E.D.’s parents pulled him out of school just two weeks\nafter he started first grade.\n\n Not long thereafter, the dispute landed in court. E.D.’s parents sued and\nalleged that Palmyra had violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of\n 1\n The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern\nDistrict of Missouri.\n -2-\n\fthe Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United\nStates Constitution. At the heart of their lawsuit was the claim that, by failing to\nprovide educational accommodations, Palmyra had denied E.D. “access to a free\npublic education.”\n\n In their complaint, E.D.’s parents sought what they had all along: for E.D. to\nuse an iPad to complete his classroom assignments and for his teachers to adapt\ntheir teaching methods to incorporate it. They also requested additional\naccommodations, including a change to the school’s testing formats to account for\nE.D.’s “speech [and] fine motor issues” and more time for him to complete his\n“assignments, tests[,] and homework.”\n\n Palmyra moved for summary judgment on the theory that E.D.’s parents had\nfailed to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures. Even though E.D.’s\nparents had neither sued nor accepted services under the IDEA, Palmyra claimed\nthat they were still required to exhaust their administrative remedies because they\nwere seeking “relief that is also available under [the IDEA].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).\nE.D.’s parents viewed their refusal to accept services as a total opt-out, excusing\nany failure to comply with the IDEA’s procedural requirements. The district court\ndisagreed and granted summary judgment to Palmyra. We now review de novo\nwhether E.D.’s parents had to exhaust their administrative remedies before suing.\nNelson v. Charles City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 900 F.3d 587, 591 (8th Cir. 2018).\n\n II.\n\n The IDEA requires schools receiving federal funds to provide a “free\nappropriate public education” to all children who have qualifying disabilities. 20\nU.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). Because parents and schools do not always agree about\nthe best way to provide a child with a free appropriate public education, “the IDEA\nestablishes formal procedures for resolving disputes.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty.\nSchs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 749 (2017). Included among them are a “due process\nhearing” before an impartial official and, in certain circumstances, an appeal to a\n\n -3-\n\fstate agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A), (g)(1). Only after parents have exhausted\nthese administrative procedures can they sue in court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).\n\n Other federal laws, including the Americans with Disabilities Act and\nsection 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, also protect children with disabilities from\ndiscrimination at school. Although these laws focus more broadly on ensuring\n“non-discriminatory access to public institutions,” to the extent the discrimination\noccurs in schools, “[t]he same conduct [can] violate all three statutes.” Fry, 137 S.\nCt. at 756; see also id. at 749–50. The IDEA itself recognizes that parents may\npursue relief under multiple statutes, but it requires parents to exhaust their\nadministrative remedies first. See id. at 750. Specifically, it provides that\n\n [n]othing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the\n rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the\n Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, [or section 504] of the\n Rehabilitation Act of 1973, . . . except that before the filing of a civil\n action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under [the\n IDEA], the [IDEA’s administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to\n the same extent as would be required had the action been brought\n under [the IDEA].\n\n20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).\n\n The complaint in this case includes only claims expressly listed in the first\nhalf of the statute, so all that is in dispute here is the second half, and specifically\nwhether the relief sought “is also available” under the IDEA. E.D.’s parents would\nhave us recognize a categorical exception to the exhaustion requirement for parents\nwho refuse all IDEA services. We decline to do so.\n\n Section 1415(l)’s plain language precludes the exception they seek. All\nparents, not just those who have previously sought or accepted IDEA services,\nmust exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures if the relief they seek “is also\navailable under” the IDEA.\n\n\n -4-\n\f We have little trouble concluding that the relief E.D.’s parents seek is\navailable under the IDEA. IDEA exhaustion, as the Supreme Court has recently\nmade clear, “hinges on whether a lawsuit seeks relief for a denial of a free\nappropriate public education.” Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 754. If it does, then exhaustion\nmust occur first. Id. If, however, the lawsuit seeks relief “for simple\ndiscrimination,” only tangentially related to education because the discriminatory\nacts just happened to take place in a school, then exhaustion is unnecessary. See\nid. at 754–56 (explaining that a “simple discrimination” claim would include “a\nwheelchair-bound child [who] sues his school for discrimination . . . because the\nbuilding lacks access ramps”).\n\n “[A] pair of hypothetical questions” is critical to determining whether the\n“gravamen” of the complaint is “the denial of a free appropriate public education”:\n\n First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the\n alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a\n school—say, a public theater or library? And second, could an adult\n at the school—say, an employee or visitor—have pressed essentially\n the same grievance? . . . [W]hen the answer [to both questions] is no,\n then the complaint probably does concern a [free appropriate public\n education], even if it does not explicitly say so . . . .\n\nId. at 754, 756; see also Nelson, 900 F.3d at 592 (stating that these hypothetical\nquestions are fact-intensive and should not be “approach[ed] . . . at a high[] level of\ngenerality”).\n\n In this case, the answer to both questions is no. E.D. and his parents could\nnot have sued a public theater, public library, or any other public facility for any of\nthe relief they seek—whether it is greater incorporation of his iPad into the\nclassroom or additional time to complete his assignments. Cf. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at\n756–56 (explaining that “a student with a learning disability” who alleged that his\nschool discriminated against him by “failing to provide remedial tutoring in\nmathematics” would be seeking relief for the denial of a free appropriate public\n\n -5-\n\feducation). Nor could any of the claims have been brought by a visitor or\nemployee of the school. E.D.’s parents should have, in other words, exhausted.\n\n It makes no difference that they refused all services under the IDEA. Opting\nout of IDEA services does not unlock a pathway around exhaustion. Indeed, the\nstatute on which E.D.’s parents most heavily rely, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D), says\nonly that the school must get the parents’ informed consent before providing\nservices under the IDEA, not that a lack of consent will permit them to blow past\nthe exhaustion requirement. See id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (ii)(II). Accordingly,\nwe conclude that Palmyra was entitled to summary judgment.\n\n III.\n\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: E. D., a Minor, BY AND THROUGH His Parents and Next Friends Anthony DOUGHERTY and Katherine D. Dougherty; Anthony Dougherty, Individually and as Parent of E.D.; Katherine D. Dougherty, Individually and as Parent of E.D. Plaintiffs - Appellants v. PALMYRA R-I SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1095\\n ___________________________\\n\\n E. D., a Minor, by and through his Parents and Next Friends Anthony Dougherty\\n and Katherine D. Dougherty; Anthony Dougherty, individually and as Parent of\\n E.D.; Katherine D. Dougherty, individually and as Parent of E.D.\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Palmyra R-I School District\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - Hannibal\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 26, 2018\\n Filed: January 3, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, MELLOY and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSTRAS, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n At issue here is what parents must do if they decide to sue a school district\\nafter refusing special-education services for their child under the Individuals with\\nDisabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Even if they bring a lawsuit under a\\ndifferent disability-discrimination law, we conclude that they still must exhaust\\ntheir administrative remedies if the relief they seek is “also available” under the\\n\\fIDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s1 grant of\\nsummary judgment to Palmyra R-I School District.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n E.D. has Down Syndrome. Before he began kindergarten at Palmyra\\nElementary School, his mother informed the school that she was seeking\\naccommodations for his disability. E.D.’s parents had some specific\\naccommodations in mind, though, and made clear that they wanted E.D. placed in a\\nregular classroom without special-education instruction.\\n\\n They sought what they referred to as a “section 504 plan”—after section 504\\nof the Rehabilitation Act—which would have provided E.D. with some of the\\neducational accommodations otherwise available under the IDEA but without the\\nspecialized classes. All they wanted was for E.D. to be able to use an iPad “to\\ncompensate for his speech and fine motor delays” and for his teachers to integrate\\nhis iPad into their lessons.\\n\\n The negotiations between E.D.’s parents and the school lasted for\\napproximately a year. Twice the school offered an IDEA plan—more commonly\\nknown as an Individualized Education Program or “IEP”—instead of the\\nsection 504 plan his parents envisioned. The IEPs would have provided all the\\niPad-related accommodations his parents sought but would have required him to\\nattend special-education classes. E.D.’s parents rejected both IEPs. The second\\ntime, they reiterated their desire for a section 504 plan. Palmyra again refused, and\\nwith no resolution in sight, E.D.’s parents pulled him out of school just two weeks\\nafter he started first grade.\\n\\n Not long thereafter, the dispute landed in court. E.D.’s parents sued and\\nalleged that Palmyra had violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of\\n 1\\n The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n -2-\\n\\fthe Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United\\nStates Constitution. At the heart of their lawsuit was the claim that, by failing to\\nprovide educational accommodations, Palmyra had denied E.D. “access to a free\\npublic education.”\\n\\n In their complaint, E.D.’s parents sought what they had all along: for E.D. to\\nuse an iPad to complete his classroom assignments and for his teachers to adapt\\ntheir teaching methods to incorporate it. They also requested additional\\naccommodations, including a change to the school’s testing formats to account for\\nE.D.’s “speech [and] fine motor issues” and more time for him to complete his\\n“assignments, tests[,] and homework.”\\n\\n Palmyra moved for summary judgment on the theory that E.D.’s parents had\\nfailed to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures. Even though E.D.’s\\nparents had neither sued nor accepted services under the IDEA, Palmyra claimed\\nthat they were still required to exhaust their administrative remedies because they\\nwere seeking “relief that is also available under [the IDEA].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).\\nE.D.’s parents viewed their refusal to accept services as a total opt-out, excusing\\nany failure to comply with the IDEA’s procedural requirements. The district court\\ndisagreed and granted summary judgment to Palmyra. We now review de novo\\nwhether E.D.’s parents had to exhaust their administrative remedies before suing.\\nNelson v. Charles City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 900 F.3d 587, 591 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The IDEA requires schools receiving federal funds to provide a “free\\nappropriate public education” to all children who have qualifying disabilities. 20\\nU.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). Because parents and schools do not always agree about\\nthe best way to provide a child with a free appropriate public education, “the IDEA\\nestablishes formal procedures for resolving disputes.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty.\\nSchs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 749 (2017). Included among them are a “due process\\nhearing” before an impartial official and, in certain circumstances, an appeal to a\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fstate agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A), (g)(1). Only after parents have exhausted\\nthese administrative procedures can they sue in court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).\\n\\n Other federal laws, including the Americans with Disabilities Act and\\nsection 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, also protect children with disabilities from\\ndiscrimination at school. Although these laws focus more broadly on ensuring\\n“non-discriminatory access to public institutions,” to the extent the discrimination\\noccurs in schools, “[t]he same conduct [can] violate all three statutes.” Fry, 137 S.\\nCt. at 756; see also id. at 749–50. The IDEA itself recognizes that parents may\\npursue relief under multiple statutes, but it requires parents to exhaust their\\nadministrative remedies first. See id. at 750. Specifically, it provides that\\n\\n [n]othing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the\\n rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the\\n Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, [or section 504] of the\\n Rehabilitation Act of 1973, . . . except that before the filing of a civil\\n action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under [the\\n IDEA], the [IDEA’s administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to\\n the same extent as would be required had the action been brought\\n under [the IDEA].\\n\\n20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).\\n\\n The complaint in this case includes only claims expressly listed in the first\\nhalf of the statute, so all that is in dispute here is the second half, and specifically\\nwhether the relief sought “is also available” under the IDEA. E.D.’s parents would\\nhave us recognize a categorical exception to the exhaustion requirement for parents\\nwho refuse all IDEA services. We decline to do so.\\n\\n Section 1415(l)’s plain language precludes the exception they seek. All\\nparents, not just those who have previously sought or accepted IDEA services,\\nmust exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures if the relief they seek “is also\\navailable under” the IDEA.\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f We have little trouble concluding that the relief E.D.’s parents seek is\\navailable under the IDEA. IDEA exhaustion, as the Supreme Court has recently\\nmade clear, “hinges on whether a lawsuit seeks relief for a denial of a free\\nappropriate public education.” Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 754. If it does, then exhaustion\\nmust occur first. Id. If, however, the lawsuit seeks relief “for simple\\ndiscrimination,” only tangentially related to education because the discriminatory\\nacts just happened to take place in a school, then exhaustion is unnecessary. See\\nid. at 754–56 (explaining that a “simple discrimination” claim would include “a\\nwheelchair-bound child [who] sues his school for discrimination . . . because the\\nbuilding lacks access ramps”).\\n\\n “[A] pair of hypothetical questions” is critical to determining whether the\\n“gravamen” of the complaint is “the denial of a free appropriate public education”:\\n\\n First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the\\n alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a\\n school—say, a public theater or library? And second, could an adult\\n at the school—say, an employee or visitor—have pressed essentially\\n the same grievance? . . . [W]hen the answer [to both questions] is no,\\n then the complaint probably does concern a [free appropriate public\\n education], even if it does not explicitly say so . . . .\\n\\nId. at 754, 756; see also Nelson, 900 F.3d at 592 (stating that these hypothetical\\nquestions are fact-intensive and should not be “approach[ed] . . . at a high[] level of\\ngenerality”).\\n\\n In this case, the answer to both questions is no. E.D. and his parents could\\nnot have sued a public theater, public library, or any other public facility for any of\\nthe relief they seek—whether it is greater incorporation of his iPad into the\\nclassroom or additional time to complete his assignments. Cf. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at\\n756–56 (explaining that “a student with a learning disability” who alleged that his\\nschool discriminated against him by “failing to provide remedial tutoring in\\nmathematics” would be seeking relief for the denial of a free appropriate public\\n\\n -5-\\n\\feducation). Nor could any of the claims have been brought by a visitor or\\nemployee of the school. E.D.’s parents should have, in other words, exhausted.\\n\\n It makes no difference that they refused all services under the IDEA. Opting\\nout of IDEA services does not unlock a pathway around exhaustion. Indeed, the\\nstatute on which E.D.’s parents most heavily rely, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D), says\\nonly that the school must get the parents’ informed consent before providing\\nservices under the IDEA, not that a lack of consent will permit them to blow past\\nthe exhaustion requirement. See id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (ii)(II). Accordingly,\\nwe conclude that Palmyra was entitled to summary judgment.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n We affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":283,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4578578,"string":"4,578,578"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff - Appellee v. VEIN CENTERS FOR EXCELLENCE, INC., Defendant St. Louis Heart Center, Inc., Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"American Family Mutual Ins. Co v. St. Louis Heart Center, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3266"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Beam, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3266\\n ___________________________\\n\\n American Family Mutual Insurance Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Vein Centers for Excellence, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant\\n\\n St. Louis Heart Center, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - Eastern Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 26, 2018\\n Filed: January 3, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, BEAM, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\f American Family Mutual Insurance Company (“American Family”) filed a\\ncomplaint for declaratory judgment against its insured, Vein Centers for Excellence,\\nInc. (“Vein Centers”), disputing American Family’s duty under certain policies to\\ndefend and indemnify Vein Centers in a class action lawsuit. St. Louis Heart Center,\\nInc. (“St. Louis Heart”) was the class representative in the underlying suit against\\nVein Centers and was later joined as a defendant in the declaratory action. The\\ndistrict court1 concluded American Family’s insurance policies did not cover the\\nclaims against Vein Centers in the class action lawsuit and awarded summary\\njudgment in favor of American Family. On appeal, St. Louis Heart argues that\\nsubject matter jurisdiction is lacking and that summary judgment in favor of\\nAmerican Family was improper. We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n In 2011, St. Louis Heart filed a class action petition against Vein Centers for\\nsending unsolicited advertisements via facsimile to multiple recipients, alleging a\\nviolation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227.2\\nThe district court granted St. Louis Heart’s motion for class certification on\\nDecember 11, 2013. Vein Centers subsequently moved to decertify the class and the\\ndistrict court granted that motion in 2017.\\n\\n The merits of the class action are not the subject of this appeal. Rather, the\\nissue presented is whether the insurance policies of Vein Centers obligated its\\ninsurance provider, American Family, to defend and indemnify the lawsuit.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n 2\\n The class action petition also included claims for common law conversion and\\nviolations of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, which were voluntarily\\ndismissed.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Vein Centers tendered the lawsuit to American Family for defense and\\nindemnification under two insurance policies: a Businessowners Policy and a\\nCommercial Liability Umbrella Policy. American Family agreed to provide a defense\\nto Vein Centers subject to a full reservation of rights.\\n\\n Both policies contained an exclusion for the “Distribution of Material in\\nViolation of Statutes.” Under the Businessowners Policy,3 the relevant portion of this\\nexclusion barred coverage for:\\n\\n “Bodily injury”, “property damage”, or “personal and advertising injury”\\n arising directly or indirectly out of any action or omission that violates\\n or is alleged to violate:\\n\\n (1) The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), including any\\n amendment of or addition to such law[.]\\n\\n In 2015, American Family filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking\\na declaration that coverage did not exist for the claims alleged in the underlying\\nlawsuit. American Family later amended its complaint in 2016, adding St. Louis\\nHeart as an additional defendant.\\n\\n St. Louis Heart moved to dismiss the declaratory action, claiming the district\\ncourt lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the amount in controversy did not\\nexceed $75,000 as required for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. St.\\nLouis Heart contended the class members’ claims were improperly aggregated to\\nsatisfy the amount-in-controversy threshold. The district court rejected this position\\nand denied the motion to dismiss.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The Umbrella Policy contained a substantially similar exclusion.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in 2017. American\\nFamily argued that neither the Business nor Umbrella policies provided coverage for\\nthe TCPA claim in part because both explicitly excluded coverage for violations of\\nthe TCPA. St. Louis Heart conceded the TCPA exclusion was enforceable under the\\nUmbrella Policy. However, St. Louis Heart contended the exclusion in the\\nBusinessowners Policy never took effect because American Family failed to properly\\nnotify Vein Centers of the provision’s addition when the policy was renewed. On this\\nbasis, St. Louis Heart argued Missouri law dictated it was entitled to indemnification\\nunder the Businessowners Policy.\\n\\n The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of American Family.\\nSt. Louis Heart timely appealed both the district court’s denial of its motion to\\ndismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the district court’s summary\\njudgment order.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n We begin our discussion with the jurisdictional question raised in St. Louis\\nHeart’s motion to dismiss.\\n\\nA. Subject Matter Jurisdiction\\n\\n Subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts where based on diversity of\\ncitizenship of the parties is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), which provides:\\n“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the\\nmatter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and\\ncosts, and is between citizens of different States.”\\n\\n St. Louis Heart argues the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction\\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement was\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fnot met. “The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that this\\ncourt reviews de novo.” ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.3d\\n954, 958 (8th Cir. 2011). However, we review the district court’s factual findings\\nmade in conjunction with its amount-in-controversy ruling for clear error. Scottsdale\\nIns. Co. v. Universal Crop Prot. All., LLC, 620 F.3d 926, 930–31 (8th Cir. 2010).\\n\\n Typically, complaints need only allege the jurisdictional amount in good faith\\nand will be dismissed only if it “appear[s] to a legal certainty that the claim is really\\nfor less than the jurisdictional amount.” Scottsdale, 620 F.3d at 931 (alteration in\\noriginal) (quoting Kopp v. Kopp, 280 F.3d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 2002)). However, “[i]f\\nthe defendant challenges the plaintiff’s allegations of the amount in controversy, then\\nthe plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.\\n(quoting Kopp, 280 F.3d at 884–85).4 St. Louis Heart’s challenge required American\\nFamily to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the amount in controversy did\\nnot appear to a legal certainty to be $75,000 or less.\\n\\n “[T]he amount in controversy is measured by the value to the plaintiff of the\\nright sought to be enforced.” Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moody Station & Grocery,\\n821 F.3d 973, 977 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Schubert v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 649\\nF.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2011)). This value is assessed at the time of filing the action.\\nScottsdale, 620 F.3d at 931. “Subsequent events reducing the amount in controversy\\ndo not destroy diversity jurisdiction,” but they may “be relevant to prove the existence\\nor nonexistence of diversity jurisdiction at the time of filing.” Id. In measuring the\\n\\n\\n 4\\n When deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), courts\\ntypically look only to the pleadings and determine whether they state a plausible\\nclaim for relief. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–80 (2009); Bell Atl.\\nCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–56 (2007). But a motion to dismiss for lack of\\nsubject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) raises a factual challenge\\nto the court’s jurisdiction, and courts may look to evidence outside the pleadings and\\nmake factual findings. See Davis v. Anthony, Inc., 886 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fvalue of the plaintiff’s right to be enforced, this Court has recognized a “general rule\\n[] that ‘individual class members’ distinct claims for actual damages may not be\\naggregated to satisfy the . . . amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity\\njurisdiction.’” Kessler v. Nat’l Enters., Inc., 347 F.3d 1076, 1078 (8th Cir. 2003)\\n(omission in original) (quoting Crawford v. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd., 267 F.3d 760,\\n765 (8th Cir. 2001)).\\n\\n Application of the foregoing legal standards convinces us the district court did\\nnot err in concluding American Family satisfied its burden of establishing the\\nminimum amount in controversy for the reasons set forth below.\\n\\n “In a declaratory judgment action such as this one, wherein an insurer sues an\\ninsured to determine its obligation to defend and indemnify, the amount in\\ncontroversy . . . ordinarily equals the probable costs of defense and indemnification\\nof the underlying litigation less any applicable deductible.” Scottsdale, 620 F.3d at\\n932. An adverse judgment against Vein Centers would have entitled St. Louis Heart\\nto an award far exceeding the threshold, as evidenced by St. Louis Heart’s motion for\\nsummary judgement requesting $17,605,500 plus prejudgment interest. American\\nFamily’s insurance policies created the potential for a single indemnity obligation to\\nVein Centers in the millions of dollars.5 While the coverage limit is not the measure\\nof the amount in controversy, the indemnification amount is, and in this case that\\namount clearly exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. And that is to say nothing of the\\ncosts of defending the underlying action, which would have likely exceeded $75,000.\\n\\n On appeal, St. Louis Heart does not argue the potential indemnification was\\ninaccurately calculated. Instead, it argues the cost of indemnification was only\\n\\n\\n 5\\n The Businessowners Policy contained a liability limit of $2,000,000 per\\noccurrence and/or $4,000,000 in the aggregate, and the Umbrella Policy contained a\\nliability limit of up to $1,000,000.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\farrived at by improperly aggregating the claims of all the class plaintiffs. It is true\\nthat the class members here cannot aggregate the indemnification value of their\\nclaims to satisfy diversity jurisdiction. “[W]here [plaintiffs’] interests are distinct,\\nand their only relationship is that ‘they form a class of parties whose rights or\\nliabilities arose out of the same transaction, or have a relation to a common fund or\\nmass or property sought to be administered, such distinct demands or liabilities\\ncannot be aggregated.’” Crenshaw v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 482 F.2d 1255, 1259 (8th\\nCir. 1973) (quoting Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Maltes, 313 F.2d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 1963)).\\nBut that is not what occurred here. “From [American Family’s] perspective, there is\\nonly one claim—by its insured,” Vein Centers, “for the sum of defense and indemnity\\ncosts.” Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 539 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n\\n American Family relies only on its own potential indemnification liability and\\ndefense costs to satisfy the jurisdictional threshold, which distinguishes this case from\\nthe various cases cited by St. Louis Heart.6 As our sister circuit explained, “the anti-\\naggregation rule does not apply to a federal declaratory-judgment action between a\\nsingle plaintiff and a single defendant, just because the unitary controversy between\\n\\n 6\\n See Crenshaw, 482 F.2d at 1259–60 (holding two separate and distinct\\nplaintiffs could not aggregate their claims); Siding & Insulation Co., Inc. v. Acuity\\nMut. Ins. Co., 754 F.3d 367, 368–69, 372–73 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding class members\\ncould not aggregate their claims to satisfy the amount in controversy threshold in a\\ndeclaratory judgment against an insurer); CE Design Ltd. v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 755\\nF.3d 39, 44–45 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding class plaintiffs in an action alleging violation\\nof the TCPA could not aggregate their claims or view the amount in controversy from\\nthe perspective of the defendant insurer); Travelers Prop. Cas. v. Good, 689 F.3d 714\\n(7th Cir. 2012) (holding diversity jurisdiction did not exist where the insured\\ndefendant in a class lawsuit assigned its right to class plaintiffs, and the insurance\\ncompanies in turn brought a declaratory action against the class claimants regarding\\ncoverage obligations); Friedman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.\\n2005) (holding the district court did not have diversity jurisdiction over a class action\\nbrought by insured class members because the insureds’ claims could not be\\naggregated to satisfy the amount in controversy threshold).\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fthese parties reflects the sum of many smaller controversies. No more need be said\\non this subject.” Meridian, 441 F.3d at 539.\\n\\n Subject matter jurisdiction over this action was proper under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1332(a)(1).\\n\\nB. Summary Judgment\\n\\n We next address St. Louis Heart’s argument that summary judgment in favor\\nof American Family was improper. The district court granted summary judgment\\nafter concluding the “Distribution of Material in Violation of Statutes” provision was\\na valid exclusion from the Businessowners Policy. St. Louis Heart appeals this\\nconclusion, arguing the exclusion constituted a constructive nonrenewal of the\\nBusinessowners Policy, for which American Family failed to provide notice.\\nAmerican Family does not dispute their obligation to provide notice of the\\nconstructive nonrenewal. Instead, they claim they sufficiently demonstrated\\ncompliance with the notice obligation. We agree.\\n\\n “We . . . review de novo the district court’s resolution of cross-motions for\\nsummary judgment viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the\\nnonmoving party and giving the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable\\ninferences.” Fed. Ins. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 893 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2018)\\n(omission in original) (quoting LaCurtis v. Express Med. Transporters, Inc., 856 F.3d\\n571, 576 (8th Cir. 2017)). “Summary judgment is required ‘if the movant shows that\\nthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to\\njudgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting LaCurtis, 856 F.3d at 576–77).\\n\\n Under Missouri law, which both parties agree controls in this diversity case,\\n“[n]o notice of nonrenewal of a commercial casualty insurance policy shall be\\neffective unless mailed or delivered by the insurer to the named insured at least sixty\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fdays prior to the effective date of the nonrenewal.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 379.883(2). An\\ninsurer’s “tendering of a policy with a significant change in coverage constitute[s] a\\nconstructive nonrenewal,” triggering notice requirements. Resolution Tr. Corp. v.\\nAm. Cas. Co., 874 F. Supp. 961, 967 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (applying Missouri law).\\n\\n Missouri law recognizes a presumption as to receipt of mailed materials.\\nSpecifically, “[t]here is a presumption that a letter duly mailed has been received by\\nthe addressee.” Ins. Placements, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 917 S.W.2d 592, 595\\n(Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flint, 837 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Mo.\\nCt. App. 1992)). This presumption of receipt by the addressee can be triggered even\\nin the absence of direct proof that a particular letter was mailed. See id. at 595–96\\n(citing same). In circumstances where the customary volume of mail would render\\nproof impractical or infeasible, the purported sender may rely on “evidence of the\\nsettled custom and usage of the sender in the regular and systematic transaction of its\\nbusiness” to establish the presumption. Id. at 595 (citing same).\\n\\n In light of this legal framework, American Family is entitled to the presumption\\nthat Vein Centers received notice of the policy exclusion. To establish compliance\\nwith the notice requirements under Missouri law, American Family offered the\\ndeposition testimony of Ms. Deborah Woodcock, one of its corporate representatives.\\nMs. Woodcock testified that American Family mailed a Coverage Summary Letter\\n(“CSL”) to Vein Centers more than sixty days prior to the Businessowners Policy\\nrenewal date. Ms. Woodcock further testified that it was American Family’s standard\\nbusiness practice to include with the CSL a Policyholder Communication (“PLC”),\\nwhich is a notification of changes made to an insured’s policy. Ms. Woodcock went\\non to identify an internal communication sent to American Family agents and staff,\\nwhich indicated current holders of the Businessowners Policy would be sent a PLC\\nnotification setting forth the newly instituted “Distribution of Material in Violation\\nof Statutes” exclusion. While Ms. Woodcock could not produce an actual copy of\\nthis PLC addressed to Vein Centers, her testimony established it was likely mailed\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fto Vein Centers as part of American Family’s custom and procedure of transacting\\nbusiness. This evidence creates the presumption that Vein Centers received notice\\nof the exclusion.\\n\\n The presumption of a letter’s receipt is not unassailable. When a purported\\nsender presents evidence that a letter was mailed, the presumption of receipt “may be\\nrebutted by evidence it was not, in fact, received.” Id. (citing Williams v. Northeast\\nMut. Ins. Ass’n, 72 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934)). If the presumption is\\nrebutted with evidence of non-receipt, the question of receipt is left “for the\\ndetermination of the jury under all of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Id.\\nHowever, St. Louis Heart has made no such rebuttal.\\n\\n St. Louis Heart failed to submit any evidence which would indicate Vein\\nCenters did not, in fact, receive the CSL and PLC. Instead, St. Louis Heart argues\\nMs. Woodcock’s testimony was insufficient to establish the presumption of receipt\\nin the first place. It highlights the lack of definitive proof that the PLC was sent and\\nnotes that Ms. Woodcock did not personally send the documents and lacks personal\\nknowledge as to whether the documents were sent. But Missouri law does not require\\ndirect proof or personal knowledge of mailing; only “evidence of the settled custom\\nand usage of the sender in the regular and systematic transaction of its business.”\\nFlint, 837 S.W.2d at 528 (quoting Hills v. McComas Rentals, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 297,\\n299 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)). Speculation that American Family’s normal business\\nprocedures were not followed in this case is not the same as affirmative evidence that\\nVein Centers did not receive the documents. In short, St. Louis Heart has not\\nprovided a sufficient evidentiary basis to rebut the presumption that Vein Centers\\nreceived notice.\\n\\n Summary judgment in favor of American Family was proper because St. Louis\\nHeart has not provided any evidence that adequate notice of the exclusion was not\\nprovided to Vein Centers.\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f III. Conclusion\\n\\n We affirm both the district court’s finding of jurisdiction and its summary\\njudgment order in favor of American Family.7\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n We grant American Family’s motion to supplement its Supplemental\\nAppendix.\\n\\n -11-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4355831/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BEAM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4578578/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff - Appellee v. VEIN CENTERS FOR EXCELLENCE, INC., Defendant St. Louis Heart Center, Inc., Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3266\n ___________________________\n\n American Family Mutual Insurance Company\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Vein Centers for Excellence, Inc.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant\n\n St. Louis Heart Center, Inc.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - Eastern Division\n ____________\n\n Submitted: September 26, 2018\n Filed: January 3, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, BEAM, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\f American Family Mutual Insurance Company (“American Family”) filed a\ncomplaint for declaratory judgment against its insured, Vein Centers for Excellence,\nInc. (“Vein Centers”), disputing American Family’s duty under certain policies to\ndefend and indemnify Vein Centers in a class action lawsuit. St. Louis Heart Center,\nInc. (“St. Louis Heart”) was the class representative in the underlying suit against\nVein Centers and was later joined as a defendant in the declaratory action. The\ndistrict court1 concluded American Family’s insurance policies did not cover the\nclaims against Vein Centers in the class action lawsuit and awarded summary\njudgment in favor of American Family. On appeal, St. Louis Heart argues that\nsubject matter jurisdiction is lacking and that summary judgment in favor of\nAmerican Family was improper. We affirm.\n\n I. Background\n\n In 2011, St. Louis Heart filed a class action petition against Vein Centers for\nsending unsolicited advertisements via facsimile to multiple recipients, alleging a\nviolation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227.2\nThe district court granted St. Louis Heart’s motion for class certification on\nDecember 11, 2013. Vein Centers subsequently moved to decertify the class and the\ndistrict court granted that motion in 2017.\n\n The merits of the class action are not the subject of this appeal. Rather, the\nissue presented is whether the insurance policies of Vein Centers obligated its\ninsurance provider, American Family, to defend and indemnify the lawsuit.\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, United States District Judge for the Eastern\nDistrict of Missouri.\n 2\n The class action petition also included claims for common law conversion and\nviolations of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, which were voluntarily\ndismissed.\n\n -2-\n\f Vein Centers tendered the lawsuit to American Family for defense and\nindemnification under two insurance policies: a Businessowners Policy and a\nCommercial Liability Umbrella Policy. American Family agreed to provide a defense\nto Vein Centers subject to a full reservation of rights.\n\n Both policies contained an exclusion for the “Distribution of Material in\nViolation of Statutes.” Under the Businessowners Policy,3 the relevant portion of this\nexclusion barred coverage for:\n\n “Bodily injury”, “property damage”, or “personal and advertising injury”\n arising directly or indirectly out of any action or omission that violates\n or is alleged to violate:\n\n (1) The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), including any\n amendment of or addition to such law[.]\n\n In 2015, American Family filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking\na declaration that coverage did not exist for the claims alleged in the underlying\nlawsuit. American Family later amended its complaint in 2016, adding St. Louis\nHeart as an additional defendant.\n\n St. Louis Heart moved to dismiss the declaratory action, claiming the district\ncourt lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the amount in controversy did not\nexceed $75,000 as required for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. St.\nLouis Heart contended the class members’ claims were improperly aggregated to\nsatisfy the amount-in-controversy threshold. The district court rejected this position\nand denied the motion to dismiss.\n\n\n\n\n 3\n The Umbrella Policy contained a substantially similar exclusion.\n\n -3-\n\f The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in 2017. American\nFamily argued that neither the Business nor Umbrella policies provided coverage for\nthe TCPA claim in part because both explicitly excluded coverage for violations of\nthe TCPA. St. Louis Heart conceded the TCPA exclusion was enforceable under the\nUmbrella Policy. However, St. Louis Heart contended the exclusion in the\nBusinessowners Policy never took effect because American Family failed to properly\nnotify Vein Centers of the provision’s addition when the policy was renewed. On this\nbasis, St. Louis Heart argued Missouri law dictated it was entitled to indemnification\nunder the Businessowners Policy.\n\n The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of American Family.\nSt. Louis Heart timely appealed both the district court’s denial of its motion to\ndismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the district court’s summary\njudgment order.\n\n II. Discussion\n\n We begin our discussion with the jurisdictional question raised in St. Louis\nHeart’s motion to dismiss.\n\nA. Subject Matter Jurisdiction\n\n Subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts where based on diversity of\ncitizenship of the parties is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), which provides:\n“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the\nmatter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and\ncosts, and is between citizens of different States.”\n\n St. Louis Heart argues the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement was\n\n -4-\n\fnot met. “The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that this\ncourt reviews de novo.” ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.3d\n954, 958 (8th Cir. 2011). However, we review the district court’s factual findings\nmade in conjunction with its amount-in-controversy ruling for clear error. Scottsdale\nIns. Co. v. Universal Crop Prot. All., LLC, 620 F.3d 926, 930–31 (8th Cir. 2010).\n\n Typically, complaints need only allege the jurisdictional amount in good faith\nand will be dismissed only if it “appear[s] to a legal certainty that the claim is really\nfor less than the jurisdictional amount.” Scottsdale, 620 F.3d at 931 (alteration in\noriginal) (quoting Kopp v. Kopp, 280 F.3d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 2002)). However, “[i]f\nthe defendant challenges the plaintiff’s allegations of the amount in controversy, then\nthe plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.\n(quoting Kopp, 280 F.3d at 884–85).4 St. Louis Heart’s challenge required American\nFamily to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the amount in controversy did\nnot appear to a legal certainty to be $75,000 or less.\n\n “[T]he amount in controversy is measured by the value to the plaintiff of the\nright sought to be enforced.” Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moody Station & Grocery,\n821 F.3d 973, 977 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Schubert v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 649\nF.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2011)). This value is assessed at the time of filing the action.\nScottsdale, 620 F.3d at 931. “Subsequent events reducing the amount in controversy\ndo not destroy diversity jurisdiction,” but they may “be relevant to prove the existence\nor nonexistence of diversity jurisdiction at the time of filing.” Id. In measuring the\n\n\n 4\n When deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), courts\ntypically look only to the pleadings and determine whether they state a plausible\nclaim for relief. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–80 (2009); Bell Atl.\nCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–56 (2007). But a motion to dismiss for lack of\nsubject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) raises a factual challenge\nto the court’s jurisdiction, and courts may look to evidence outside the pleadings and\nmake factual findings. See Davis v. Anthony, Inc., 886 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 2018).\n\n -5-\n\fvalue of the plaintiff’s right to be enforced, this Court has recognized a “general rule\n[] that ‘individual class members’ distinct claims for actual damages may not be\naggregated to satisfy the . . . amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity\njurisdiction.’” Kessler v. Nat’l Enters., Inc., 347 F.3d 1076, 1078 (8th Cir. 2003)\n(omission in original) (quoting Crawford v. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd., 267 F.3d 760,\n765 (8th Cir. 2001)).\n\n Application of the foregoing legal standards convinces us the district court did\nnot err in concluding American Family satisfied its burden of establishing the\nminimum amount in controversy for the reasons set forth below.\n\n “In a declaratory judgment action such as this one, wherein an insurer sues an\ninsured to determine its obligation to defend and indemnify, the amount in\ncontroversy . . . ordinarily equals the probable costs of defense and indemnification\nof the underlying litigation less any applicable deductible.” Scottsdale, 620 F.3d at\n932. An adverse judgment against Vein Centers would have entitled St. Louis Heart\nto an award far exceeding the threshold, as evidenced by St. Louis Heart’s motion for\nsummary judgement requesting $17,605,500 plus prejudgment interest. American\nFamily’s insurance policies created the potential for a single indemnity obligation to\nVein Centers in the millions of dollars.5 While the coverage limit is not the measure\nof the amount in controversy, the indemnification amount is, and in this case that\namount clearly exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. And that is to say nothing of the\ncosts of defending the underlying action, which would have likely exceeded $75,000.\n\n On appeal, St. Louis Heart does not argue the potential indemnification was\ninaccurately calculated. Instead, it argues the cost of indemnification was only\n\n\n 5\n The Businessowners Policy contained a liability limit of $2,000,000 per\noccurrence and/or $4,000,000 in the aggregate, and the Umbrella Policy contained a\nliability limit of up to $1,000,000.\n\n -6-\n\farrived at by improperly aggregating the claims of all the class plaintiffs. It is true\nthat the class members here cannot aggregate the indemnification value of their\nclaims to satisfy diversity jurisdiction. “[W]here [plaintiffs’] interests are distinct,\nand their only relationship is that ‘they form a class of parties whose rights or\nliabilities arose out of the same transaction, or have a relation to a common fund or\nmass or property sought to be administered, such distinct demands or liabilities\ncannot be aggregated.’” Crenshaw v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 482 F.2d 1255, 1259 (8th\nCir. 1973) (quoting Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Maltes, 313 F.2d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 1963)).\nBut that is not what occurred here. “From [American Family’s] perspective, there is\nonly one claim—by its insured,” Vein Centers, “for the sum of defense and indemnity\ncosts.” Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 539 (7th Cir. 2006).\n\n American Family relies only on its own potential indemnification liability and\ndefense costs to satisfy the jurisdictional threshold, which distinguishes this case from\nthe various cases cited by St. Louis Heart.6 As our sister circuit explained, “the anti-\naggregation rule does not apply to a federal declaratory-judgment action between a\nsingle plaintiff and a single defendant, just because the unitary controversy between\n\n 6\n See Crenshaw, 482 F.2d at 1259–60 (holding two separate and distinct\nplaintiffs could not aggregate their claims); Siding & Insulation Co., Inc. v. Acuity\nMut. Ins. Co., 754 F.3d 367, 368–69, 372–73 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding class members\ncould not aggregate their claims to satisfy the amount in controversy threshold in a\ndeclaratory judgment against an insurer); CE Design Ltd. v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 755\nF.3d 39, 44–45 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding class plaintiffs in an action alleging violation\nof the TCPA could not aggregate their claims or view the amount in controversy from\nthe perspective of the defendant insurer); Travelers Prop. Cas. v. Good, 689 F.3d 714\n(7th Cir. 2012) (holding diversity jurisdiction did not exist where the insured\ndefendant in a class lawsuit assigned its right to class plaintiffs, and the insurance\ncompanies in turn brought a declaratory action against the class claimants regarding\ncoverage obligations); Friedman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.\n2005) (holding the district court did not have diversity jurisdiction over a class action\nbrought by insured class members because the insureds’ claims could not be\naggregated to satisfy the amount in controversy threshold).\n\n -7-\n\fthese parties reflects the sum of many smaller controversies. No more need be said\non this subject.” Meridian, 441 F.3d at 539.\n\n Subject matter jurisdiction over this action was proper under 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1332(a)(1).\n\nB. Summary Judgment\n\n We next address St. Louis Heart’s argument that summary judgment in favor\nof American Family was improper. The district court granted summary judgment\nafter concluding the “Distribution of Material in Violation of Statutes” provision was\na valid exclusion from the Businessowners Policy. St. Louis Heart appeals this\nconclusion, arguing the exclusion constituted a constructive nonrenewal of the\nBusinessowners Policy, for which American Family failed to provide notice.\nAmerican Family does not dispute their obligation to provide notice of the\nconstructive nonrenewal. Instead, they claim they sufficiently demonstrated\ncompliance with the notice obligation. We agree.\n\n “We . . . review de novo the district court’s resolution of cross-motions for\nsummary judgment viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the\nnonmoving party and giving the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable\ninferences.” Fed. Ins. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 893 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2018)\n(omission in original) (quoting LaCurtis v. Express Med. Transporters, Inc., 856 F.3d\n571, 576 (8th Cir. 2017)). “Summary judgment is required ‘if the movant shows that\nthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to\njudgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting LaCurtis, 856 F.3d at 576–77).\n\n Under Missouri law, which both parties agree controls in this diversity case,\n“[n]o notice of nonrenewal of a commercial casualty insurance policy shall be\neffective unless mailed or delivered by the insurer to the named insured at least sixty\n\n -8-\n\fdays prior to the effective date of the nonrenewal.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 379.883(2). An\ninsurer’s “tendering of a policy with a significant change in coverage constitute[s] a\nconstructive nonrenewal,” triggering notice requirements. Resolution Tr. Corp. v.\nAm. Cas. Co., 874 F. Supp. 961, 967 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (applying Missouri law).\n\n Missouri law recognizes a presumption as to receipt of mailed materials.\nSpecifically, “[t]here is a presumption that a letter duly mailed has been received by\nthe addressee.” Ins. Placements, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 917 S.W.2d 592, 595\n(Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flint, 837 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Mo.\nCt. App. 1992)). This presumption of receipt by the addressee can be triggered even\nin the absence of direct proof that a particular letter was mailed. See id. at 595–96\n(citing same). In circumstances where the customary volume of mail would render\nproof impractical or infeasible, the purported sender may rely on “evidence of the\nsettled custom and usage of the sender in the regular and systematic transaction of its\nbusiness” to establish the presumption. Id. at 595 (citing same).\n\n In light of this legal framework, American Family is entitled to the presumption\nthat Vein Centers received notice of the policy exclusion. To establish compliance\nwith the notice requirements under Missouri law, American Family offered the\ndeposition testimony of Ms. Deborah Woodcock, one of its corporate representatives.\nMs. Woodcock testified that American Family mailed a Coverage Summary Letter\n(“CSL”) to Vein Centers more than sixty days prior to the Businessowners Policy\nrenewal date. Ms. Woodcock further testified that it was American Family’s standard\nbusiness practice to include with the CSL a Policyholder Communication (“PLC”),\nwhich is a notification of changes made to an insured’s policy. Ms. Woodcock went\non to identify an internal communication sent to American Family agents and staff,\nwhich indicated current holders of the Businessowners Policy would be sent a PLC\nnotification setting forth the newly instituted “Distribution of Material in Violation\nof Statutes” exclusion. While Ms. Woodcock could not produce an actual copy of\nthis PLC addressed to Vein Centers, her testimony established it was likely mailed\n\n -9-\n\fto Vein Centers as part of American Family’s custom and procedure of transacting\nbusiness. This evidence creates the presumption that Vein Centers received notice\nof the exclusion.\n\n The presumption of a letter’s receipt is not unassailable. When a purported\nsender presents evidence that a letter was mailed, the presumption of receipt “may be\nrebutted by evidence it was not, in fact, received.” Id. (citing Williams v. Northeast\nMut. Ins. Ass’n, 72 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934)). If the presumption is\nrebutted with evidence of non-receipt, the question of receipt is left “for the\ndetermination of the jury under all of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Id.\nHowever, St. Louis Heart has made no such rebuttal.\n\n St. Louis Heart failed to submit any evidence which would indicate Vein\nCenters did not, in fact, receive the CSL and PLC. Instead, St. Louis Heart argues\nMs. Woodcock’s testimony was insufficient to establish the presumption of receipt\nin the first place. It highlights the lack of definitive proof that the PLC was sent and\nnotes that Ms. Woodcock did not personally send the documents and lacks personal\nknowledge as to whether the documents were sent. But Missouri law does not require\ndirect proof or personal knowledge of mailing; only “evidence of the settled custom\nand usage of the sender in the regular and systematic transaction of its business.”\nFlint, 837 S.W.2d at 528 (quoting Hills v. McComas Rentals, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 297,\n299 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)). Speculation that American Family’s normal business\nprocedures were not followed in this case is not the same as affirmative evidence that\nVein Centers did not receive the documents. In short, St. Louis Heart has not\nprovided a sufficient evidentiary basis to rebut the presumption that Vein Centers\nreceived notice.\n\n Summary judgment in favor of American Family was proper because St. Louis\nHeart has not provided any evidence that adequate notice of the exclusion was not\nprovided to Vein Centers.\n\n -10-\n\f III. Conclusion\n\n We affirm both the district court’s finding of jurisdiction and its summary\njudgment order in favor of American Family.7\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n 7\n We grant American Family’s motion to supplement its Supplemental\nAppendix.\n\n -11-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff - Appellee v. VEIN CENTERS FOR EXCELLENCE, INC., Defendant St. Louis Heart Center, Inc., Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3266\\n ___________________________\\n\\n American Family Mutual Insurance Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Vein Centers for Excellence, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant\\n\\n St. Louis Heart Center, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - Eastern Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 26, 2018\\n Filed: January 3, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, BEAM, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\f American Family Mutual Insurance Company (“American Family”) filed a\\ncomplaint for declaratory judgment against its insured, Vein Centers for Excellence,\\nInc. (“Vein Centers”), disputing American Family’s duty under certain policies to\\ndefend and indemnify Vein Centers in a class action lawsuit. St. Louis Heart Center,\\nInc. (“St. Louis Heart”) was the class representative in the underlying suit against\\nVein Centers and was later joined as a defendant in the declaratory action. The\\ndistrict court1 concluded American Family’s insurance policies did not cover the\\nclaims against Vein Centers in the class action lawsuit and awarded summary\\njudgment in favor of American Family. On appeal, St. Louis Heart argues that\\nsubject matter jurisdiction is lacking and that summary judgment in favor of\\nAmerican Family was improper. We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n In 2011, St. Louis Heart filed a class action petition against Vein Centers for\\nsending unsolicited advertisements via facsimile to multiple recipients, alleging a\\nviolation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227.2\\nThe district court granted St. Louis Heart’s motion for class certification on\\nDecember 11, 2013. Vein Centers subsequently moved to decertify the class and the\\ndistrict court granted that motion in 2017.\\n\\n The merits of the class action are not the subject of this appeal. Rather, the\\nissue presented is whether the insurance policies of Vein Centers obligated its\\ninsurance provider, American Family, to defend and indemnify the lawsuit.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n 2\\n The class action petition also included claims for common law conversion and\\nviolations of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, which were voluntarily\\ndismissed.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Vein Centers tendered the lawsuit to American Family for defense and\\nindemnification under two insurance policies: a Businessowners Policy and a\\nCommercial Liability Umbrella Policy. American Family agreed to provide a defense\\nto Vein Centers subject to a full reservation of rights.\\n\\n Both policies contained an exclusion for the “Distribution of Material in\\nViolation of Statutes.” Under the Businessowners Policy,3 the relevant portion of this\\nexclusion barred coverage for:\\n\\n “Bodily injury”, “property damage”, or “personal and advertising injury”\\n arising directly or indirectly out of any action or omission that violates\\n or is alleged to violate:\\n\\n (1) The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), including any\\n amendment of or addition to such law[.]\\n\\n In 2015, American Family filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking\\na declaration that coverage did not exist for the claims alleged in the underlying\\nlawsuit. American Family later amended its complaint in 2016, adding St. Louis\\nHeart as an additional defendant.\\n\\n St. Louis Heart moved to dismiss the declaratory action, claiming the district\\ncourt lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the amount in controversy did not\\nexceed $75,000 as required for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. St.\\nLouis Heart contended the class members’ claims were improperly aggregated to\\nsatisfy the amount-in-controversy threshold. The district court rejected this position\\nand denied the motion to dismiss.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The Umbrella Policy contained a substantially similar exclusion.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in 2017. American\\nFamily argued that neither the Business nor Umbrella policies provided coverage for\\nthe TCPA claim in part because both explicitly excluded coverage for violations of\\nthe TCPA. St. Louis Heart conceded the TCPA exclusion was enforceable under the\\nUmbrella Policy. However, St. Louis Heart contended the exclusion in the\\nBusinessowners Policy never took effect because American Family failed to properly\\nnotify Vein Centers of the provision’s addition when the policy was renewed. On this\\nbasis, St. Louis Heart argued Missouri law dictated it was entitled to indemnification\\nunder the Businessowners Policy.\\n\\n The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of American Family.\\nSt. Louis Heart timely appealed both the district court’s denial of its motion to\\ndismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the district court’s summary\\njudgment order.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n We begin our discussion with the jurisdictional question raised in St. Louis\\nHeart’s motion to dismiss.\\n\\nA. Subject Matter Jurisdiction\\n\\n Subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts where based on diversity of\\ncitizenship of the parties is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), which provides:\\n“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the\\nmatter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and\\ncosts, and is between citizens of different States.”\\n\\n St. Louis Heart argues the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction\\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement was\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fnot met. “The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that this\\ncourt reviews de novo.” ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.3d\\n954, 958 (8th Cir. 2011). However, we review the district court’s factual findings\\nmade in conjunction with its amount-in-controversy ruling for clear error. Scottsdale\\nIns. Co. v. Universal Crop Prot. All., LLC, 620 F.3d 926, 930–31 (8th Cir. 2010).\\n\\n Typically, complaints need only allege the jurisdictional amount in good faith\\nand will be dismissed only if it “appear[s] to a legal certainty that the claim is really\\nfor less than the jurisdictional amount.” Scottsdale, 620 F.3d at 931 (alteration in\\noriginal) (quoting Kopp v. Kopp, 280 F.3d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 2002)). However, “[i]f\\nthe defendant challenges the plaintiff’s allegations of the amount in controversy, then\\nthe plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.\\n(quoting Kopp, 280 F.3d at 884–85).4 St. Louis Heart’s challenge required American\\nFamily to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the amount in controversy did\\nnot appear to a legal certainty to be $75,000 or less.\\n\\n “[T]he amount in controversy is measured by the value to the plaintiff of the\\nright sought to be enforced.” Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moody Station & Grocery,\\n821 F.3d 973, 977 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Schubert v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 649\\nF.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2011)). This value is assessed at the time of filing the action.\\nScottsdale, 620 F.3d at 931. “Subsequent events reducing the amount in controversy\\ndo not destroy diversity jurisdiction,” but they may “be relevant to prove the existence\\nor nonexistence of diversity jurisdiction at the time of filing.” Id. In measuring the\\n\\n\\n 4\\n When deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), courts\\ntypically look only to the pleadings and determine whether they state a plausible\\nclaim for relief. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–80 (2009); Bell Atl.\\nCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–56 (2007). But a motion to dismiss for lack of\\nsubject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) raises a factual challenge\\nto the court’s jurisdiction, and courts may look to evidence outside the pleadings and\\nmake factual findings. See Davis v. Anthony, Inc., 886 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fvalue of the plaintiff’s right to be enforced, this Court has recognized a “general rule\\n[] that ‘individual class members’ distinct claims for actual damages may not be\\naggregated to satisfy the . . . amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity\\njurisdiction.’” Kessler v. Nat’l Enters., Inc., 347 F.3d 1076, 1078 (8th Cir. 2003)\\n(omission in original) (quoting Crawford v. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd., 267 F.3d 760,\\n765 (8th Cir. 2001)).\\n\\n Application of the foregoing legal standards convinces us the district court did\\nnot err in concluding American Family satisfied its burden of establishing the\\nminimum amount in controversy for the reasons set forth below.\\n\\n “In a declaratory judgment action such as this one, wherein an insurer sues an\\ninsured to determine its obligation to defend and indemnify, the amount in\\ncontroversy . . . ordinarily equals the probable costs of defense and indemnification\\nof the underlying litigation less any applicable deductible.” Scottsdale, 620 F.3d at\\n932. An adverse judgment against Vein Centers would have entitled St. Louis Heart\\nto an award far exceeding the threshold, as evidenced by St. Louis Heart’s motion for\\nsummary judgement requesting $17,605,500 plus prejudgment interest. American\\nFamily’s insurance policies created the potential for a single indemnity obligation to\\nVein Centers in the millions of dollars.5 While the coverage limit is not the measure\\nof the amount in controversy, the indemnification amount is, and in this case that\\namount clearly exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. And that is to say nothing of the\\ncosts of defending the underlying action, which would have likely exceeded $75,000.\\n\\n On appeal, St. Louis Heart does not argue the potential indemnification was\\ninaccurately calculated. Instead, it argues the cost of indemnification was only\\n\\n\\n 5\\n The Businessowners Policy contained a liability limit of $2,000,000 per\\noccurrence and/or $4,000,000 in the aggregate, and the Umbrella Policy contained a\\nliability limit of up to $1,000,000.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\farrived at by improperly aggregating the claims of all the class plaintiffs. It is true\\nthat the class members here cannot aggregate the indemnification value of their\\nclaims to satisfy diversity jurisdiction. “[W]here [plaintiffs’] interests are distinct,\\nand their only relationship is that ‘they form a class of parties whose rights or\\nliabilities arose out of the same transaction, or have a relation to a common fund or\\nmass or property sought to be administered, such distinct demands or liabilities\\ncannot be aggregated.’” Crenshaw v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 482 F.2d 1255, 1259 (8th\\nCir. 1973) (quoting Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Maltes, 313 F.2d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 1963)).\\nBut that is not what occurred here. “From [American Family’s] perspective, there is\\nonly one claim—by its insured,” Vein Centers, “for the sum of defense and indemnity\\ncosts.” Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 539 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n\\n American Family relies only on its own potential indemnification liability and\\ndefense costs to satisfy the jurisdictional threshold, which distinguishes this case from\\nthe various cases cited by St. Louis Heart.6 As our sister circuit explained, “the anti-\\naggregation rule does not apply to a federal declaratory-judgment action between a\\nsingle plaintiff and a single defendant, just because the unitary controversy between\\n\\n 6\\n See Crenshaw, 482 F.2d at 1259–60 (holding two separate and distinct\\nplaintiffs could not aggregate their claims); Siding & Insulation Co., Inc. v. Acuity\\nMut. Ins. Co., 754 F.3d 367, 368–69, 372–73 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding class members\\ncould not aggregate their claims to satisfy the amount in controversy threshold in a\\ndeclaratory judgment against an insurer); CE Design Ltd. v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 755\\nF.3d 39, 44–45 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding class plaintiffs in an action alleging violation\\nof the TCPA could not aggregate their claims or view the amount in controversy from\\nthe perspective of the defendant insurer); Travelers Prop. Cas. v. Good, 689 F.3d 714\\n(7th Cir. 2012) (holding diversity jurisdiction did not exist where the insured\\ndefendant in a class lawsuit assigned its right to class plaintiffs, and the insurance\\ncompanies in turn brought a declaratory action against the class claimants regarding\\ncoverage obligations); Friedman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.\\n2005) (holding the district court did not have diversity jurisdiction over a class action\\nbrought by insured class members because the insureds’ claims could not be\\naggregated to satisfy the amount in controversy threshold).\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fthese parties reflects the sum of many smaller controversies. No more need be said\\non this subject.” Meridian, 441 F.3d at 539.\\n\\n Subject matter jurisdiction over this action was proper under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1332(a)(1).\\n\\nB. Summary Judgment\\n\\n We next address St. Louis Heart’s argument that summary judgment in favor\\nof American Family was improper. The district court granted summary judgment\\nafter concluding the “Distribution of Material in Violation of Statutes” provision was\\na valid exclusion from the Businessowners Policy. St. Louis Heart appeals this\\nconclusion, arguing the exclusion constituted a constructive nonrenewal of the\\nBusinessowners Policy, for which American Family failed to provide notice.\\nAmerican Family does not dispute their obligation to provide notice of the\\nconstructive nonrenewal. Instead, they claim they sufficiently demonstrated\\ncompliance with the notice obligation. We agree.\\n\\n “We . . . review de novo the district court’s resolution of cross-motions for\\nsummary judgment viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the\\nnonmoving party and giving the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable\\ninferences.” Fed. Ins. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 893 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2018)\\n(omission in original) (quoting LaCurtis v. Express Med. Transporters, Inc., 856 F.3d\\n571, 576 (8th Cir. 2017)). “Summary judgment is required ‘if the movant shows that\\nthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to\\njudgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting LaCurtis, 856 F.3d at 576–77).\\n\\n Under Missouri law, which both parties agree controls in this diversity case,\\n“[n]o notice of nonrenewal of a commercial casualty insurance policy shall be\\neffective unless mailed or delivered by the insurer to the named insured at least sixty\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fdays prior to the effective date of the nonrenewal.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 379.883(2). An\\ninsurer’s “tendering of a policy with a significant change in coverage constitute[s] a\\nconstructive nonrenewal,” triggering notice requirements. Resolution Tr. Corp. v.\\nAm. Cas. Co., 874 F. Supp. 961, 967 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (applying Missouri law).\\n\\n Missouri law recognizes a presumption as to receipt of mailed materials.\\nSpecifically, “[t]here is a presumption that a letter duly mailed has been received by\\nthe addressee.” Ins. Placements, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 917 S.W.2d 592, 595\\n(Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flint, 837 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Mo.\\nCt. App. 1992)). This presumption of receipt by the addressee can be triggered even\\nin the absence of direct proof that a particular letter was mailed. See id. at 595–96\\n(citing same). In circumstances where the customary volume of mail would render\\nproof impractical or infeasible, the purported sender may rely on “evidence of the\\nsettled custom and usage of the sender in the regular and systematic transaction of its\\nbusiness” to establish the presumption. Id. at 595 (citing same).\\n\\n In light of this legal framework, American Family is entitled to the presumption\\nthat Vein Centers received notice of the policy exclusion. To establish compliance\\nwith the notice requirements under Missouri law, American Family offered the\\ndeposition testimony of Ms. Deborah Woodcock, one of its corporate representatives.\\nMs. Woodcock testified that American Family mailed a Coverage Summary Letter\\n(“CSL”) to Vein Centers more than sixty days prior to the Businessowners Policy\\nrenewal date. Ms. Woodcock further testified that it was American Family’s standard\\nbusiness practice to include with the CSL a Policyholder Communication (“PLC”),\\nwhich is a notification of changes made to an insured’s policy. Ms. Woodcock went\\non to identify an internal communication sent to American Family agents and staff,\\nwhich indicated current holders of the Businessowners Policy would be sent a PLC\\nnotification setting forth the newly instituted “Distribution of Material in Violation\\nof Statutes” exclusion. While Ms. Woodcock could not produce an actual copy of\\nthis PLC addressed to Vein Centers, her testimony established it was likely mailed\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fto Vein Centers as part of American Family’s custom and procedure of transacting\\nbusiness. This evidence creates the presumption that Vein Centers received notice\\nof the exclusion.\\n\\n The presumption of a letter’s receipt is not unassailable. When a purported\\nsender presents evidence that a letter was mailed, the presumption of receipt “may be\\nrebutted by evidence it was not, in fact, received.” Id. (citing Williams v. Northeast\\nMut. Ins. Ass’n, 72 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934)). If the presumption is\\nrebutted with evidence of non-receipt, the question of receipt is left “for the\\ndetermination of the jury under all of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Id.\\nHowever, St. Louis Heart has made no such rebuttal.\\n\\n St. Louis Heart failed to submit any evidence which would indicate Vein\\nCenters did not, in fact, receive the CSL and PLC. Instead, St. Louis Heart argues\\nMs. Woodcock’s testimony was insufficient to establish the presumption of receipt\\nin the first place. It highlights the lack of definitive proof that the PLC was sent and\\nnotes that Ms. Woodcock did not personally send the documents and lacks personal\\nknowledge as to whether the documents were sent. But Missouri law does not require\\ndirect proof or personal knowledge of mailing; only “evidence of the settled custom\\nand usage of the sender in the regular and systematic transaction of its business.”\\nFlint, 837 S.W.2d at 528 (quoting Hills v. McComas Rentals, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 297,\\n299 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)). Speculation that American Family’s normal business\\nprocedures were not followed in this case is not the same as affirmative evidence that\\nVein Centers did not receive the documents. In short, St. Louis Heart has not\\nprovided a sufficient evidentiary basis to rebut the presumption that Vein Centers\\nreceived notice.\\n\\n Summary judgment in favor of American Family was proper because St. Louis\\nHeart has not provided any evidence that adequate notice of the exclusion was not\\nprovided to Vein Centers.\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f III. Conclusion\\n\\n We affirm both the district court’s finding of jurisdiction and its summary\\njudgment order in favor of American Family.7\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n We grant American Family’s motion to supplement its Supplemental\\nAppendix.\\n\\n -11-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":284,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4578915,"string":"4,578,915"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Lynn Alisa ESPEJO, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Lynn Espejo"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3562"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Gruender, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3562\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Lynn Alisa Espejo\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Western Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 28, 2018\\n Filed: January 4, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Lynn Alisa Espejo appeals her conviction for various crimes related to stealing\\nfunds from a medical practice while working as its bookkeeper, arguing that the\\ndistrict court erred by excluding potentially exculpatory evidence regarding the\\n\\fmedical practice’s destruction of financial records. We conclude that the district\\ncourt1 did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n Espejo was the administrator for Practice Management Services Inc. (“PMSI”),\\na medical practice. As the administrator, Espejo was effectively responsible for\\nmanaging the office. When PMSI changed presidents from Dr. Bruce Sanderson to\\nDr. Scott Brown in 2010, Brown discovered a debit card linked to PMSI’s account\\nwhich, along with several other issues, caused him to further investigate PMSI’s\\nfinances. PMSI placed Espejo on administrative leave, and she subsequently resigned\\non October 1, 2010. The investigation ultimately revealed that Espejo had transferred\\nsome of PMSI’s funds into her personal account.\\n\\n Many of PMSI’s financial records that were part of the investigation into\\nEspejo’s use of funds are now missing. During the investigation into the funds in\\n2010, Espejo’s attorney asked PMSI’s counsel to retain all financial documents for\\nthe case. In February 2011, after You Shred-It visited PMSI for its periodic\\nshredding of records, a PMSI employee discovered that all of the documents in\\nstorage were gone, including the Espejo documents stored in a locked cabinet. PMSI\\nalso failed to preserve Espejo’s computer. Fortunately, off-site bank and credit card\\nrecords reproduced the relevant transactions, and every testifying doctor besides\\nSanderson reproduced their settlement statements from PMSI for the relevant years.\\nSanderson reproduced only his 2010 settlement statements.\\n\\n In 2014, a grand jury indicted Espejo on fifteen counts of wire fraud, seven\\ncounts of money laundering, and four counts of filing false tax returns. Espejo moved\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Kristine G. Baker, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Arkansas.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fto dismiss the indictment for, among other reasons, intentional destruction of\\nevidence. The district court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment but, on the\\nGovernment’s motion, dismissed one of the counts of money laundering.\\n\\n In pretrial motions, the Government moved to exclude evidence and argument\\nrelated to PMSI’s destruction of financial documents. At trial, the district court\\nexcluded evidence related to the destruction of the records under Fed. R. Evid. 401,\\n402, and 403. The district court explained that it did not understand why the missing\\ndocuments would be needed for a defense given the availability of credit card\\nstatements to show what Espejo purchased with the funds at issue. It also explained\\nthat there was no evidence the Government destroyed the documents. It further\\nprohibited defense counsel from asking Sanderson about intentional destruction of\\nhis settlement statements, pending review of further evidence in the case.\\n\\n Espejo wanted the missing records to support her defense that Sanderson\\nrouted personal funds through PMSI’s account in order to hide money from his wife.\\nShe conceded that she transferred $611,099.04 from PMSI and a related entity to her\\npersonal bank account and that she maintained separate Quickbooks files to hide the\\ntransactions. She testified that Sanderson authorized these practices, asking her to\\npurchase items for him and reimburse herself from PMSI’s account, and occasionally\\nallowing her to purchase gifts for her children with funds reimbursed from PMSI’s\\naccount. She also conceded that she made a few personal purchases using the PMSI\\ndebit card, but she stated that those purchases involved mistaken use of the wrong\\ncard and that she reimbursed any such mistakes.\\n\\n Sanderson admitted he had routed personal transactions through PMSI’s\\naccount, using checks directly from the account for purchases. He denied ever\\nauthorizing Espejo to use her personal account for purchases on his behalf.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f Some of the evidence indicated that Espejo transferred more funds to her\\naccount than Sanderson deposited in PMSI’s account. Sanderson’s 2010 statements\\nshowed that he deposited $4,612.07 beyond what he owed PMSI between January 1\\nand September 9, 2010. Espejo took $210,425.41 in funds from PMSI’s account\\nduring the same time period. Her defense was that Sanderson had deposited extra\\nfunds in the account that had continually built up over time.\\n\\n Despite the missing records, the evidence at trial indicated that PMSI’s account\\ncontained some extra funds with an unknown source. At the end of 2009, the account\\nbalance was $99,259.27. There were six doctors in the practice at that time, each of\\nwhom contributed about $5,000-6,000 when they joined. Sanderson also testified that\\na previous member of the practice, Dr. Columbus Brown, was in arrears by “a big\\namount” to PMSI, indicating that the doctors’ collective contributions alone could not\\naccount for the surplus in the account. The Government introduced evidence of other\\nsources of income: a $14,000 check from Memphis Pathology Lab that was not\\ncredited to any doctor, and a $41,062.48 refund from McKesson Specialty Care\\nDistribution that was not credited to any doctor. There was additional testimony\\nabout Espejo possibly depositing the doctors’ tax refunds into PMSI’s account\\nwithout crediting them.\\n\\n After hearing most of this evidence, the district court excluded all evidence\\nregarding intentional destruction of the settlement statements, including questions on\\nthe topic directed to Sanderson. The district court explained that it had heard no\\nevidence of what particular documents were destroyed and no evidence of any\\nparticular person destroying documents. It observed that the destruction also\\noccurred several months after Espejo resigned from PMSI, which suggested that the\\ndestruction was not an intentional act. It also explained that it did not want to allow\\nspeculation on the issue without more particular evidence. After reviewing the\\nrelevant testimony from the motion to dismiss hearings, the district court concluded\\nthe evidence of destruction was too speculative because the key witness could only\\n\\n -4-\\n\\ftestify that documents went missing over a weekend, without confirming what\\ndocuments they were or even confirming that it was the shredding company that took\\nthem.\\n\\n At the end of the trial, the jury convicted Espejo on all counts at issue. The\\ndistrict court sentenced Espejo, and she timely appealed.\\n\\n II. Standard of Review\\n\\n “We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, but our review is de\\nnovo when the challenge implicates a constitutional right.” United States v. West,\\n829 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2016). “Even where an evidentiary ruling is an abuse\\nof discretion or violates a constitutional proscription, however, we will not reverse\\nunless the error is more than harmless in that it affected a substantial right or had\\nmore than a slight influence on the verdict.” Id.\\n\\n III. Analysis\\n\\n The district court did not err in excluding evidence regarding the destroyed\\nmedical records. “We have recognized the right of a criminal defendant to present\\na complete defense, grounded in either the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments, with the\\ncaveat that it may be limited by other legitimate interests of criminal trials, such as\\nexcluding incompetent, irrelevant, or privileged testimony.” Id. The right is also\\nlimited by Fed. R. Evid. 403. See id. at 1019.\\n\\n The limited probative value of the missing documents is apparent because\\nEspejo would have to prove the existence of deposits that were not in the available\\nbank account records in order to show probative value. Sanderson’s deposits only\\nappear to exceed his bills by a few thousand dollars, and Espejo took $611,099.04 in\\nreimbursements. The only evidence in the record of other sources of funds is the\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fGovernment’s evidence that Espejo was depositing vendor refunds and tax refunds\\nwithout crediting them to the doctors.\\n\\n Even if the missing documents were relevant, the limited probative value of the\\ndestruction of those documents is also apparent because Espejo did not offer a clear\\nmotive for anyone at PMSI to destroy those documents. Espejo had no evidence\\nestablishing Sanderson’s motive beyond her own testimony, and Sanderson openly\\nadmitted to using the account directly for personal purchases. There is also no\\nevidence that any other doctor would have wanted those records destroyed. In fact,\\nit appears that the new president of PMSI would have an interest in maintaining the\\nrecords and investigating Sanderson’s practices of routing personal purchases through\\nPMSI. In the absence of any significant evidence linking an individual to the\\ndestruction of the records, the district court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing\\nany evidence on the issue.\\n\\n IV. Conclusion\\n\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence regarding\\nthe destruction of documents. We affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4356168/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4578915/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Lynn Alisa ESPEJO, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3562\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Lynn Alisa Espejo\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Western Division\n ____________\n\n Submitted: September 28, 2018\n Filed: January 4, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\n Lynn Alisa Espejo appeals her conviction for various crimes related to stealing\nfunds from a medical practice while working as its bookkeeper, arguing that the\ndistrict court erred by excluding potentially exculpatory evidence regarding the\n\fmedical practice’s destruction of financial records. We conclude that the district\ncourt1 did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.\n\n I. Background\n\n Espejo was the administrator for Practice Management Services Inc. (“PMSI”),\na medical practice. As the administrator, Espejo was effectively responsible for\nmanaging the office. When PMSI changed presidents from Dr. Bruce Sanderson to\nDr. Scott Brown in 2010, Brown discovered a debit card linked to PMSI’s account\nwhich, along with several other issues, caused him to further investigate PMSI’s\nfinances. PMSI placed Espejo on administrative leave, and she subsequently resigned\non October 1, 2010. The investigation ultimately revealed that Espejo had transferred\nsome of PMSI’s funds into her personal account.\n\n Many of PMSI’s financial records that were part of the investigation into\nEspejo’s use of funds are now missing. During the investigation into the funds in\n2010, Espejo’s attorney asked PMSI’s counsel to retain all financial documents for\nthe case. In February 2011, after You Shred-It visited PMSI for its periodic\nshredding of records, a PMSI employee discovered that all of the documents in\nstorage were gone, including the Espejo documents stored in a locked cabinet. PMSI\nalso failed to preserve Espejo’s computer. Fortunately, off-site bank and credit card\nrecords reproduced the relevant transactions, and every testifying doctor besides\nSanderson reproduced their settlement statements from PMSI for the relevant years.\nSanderson reproduced only his 2010 settlement statements.\n\n In 2014, a grand jury indicted Espejo on fifteen counts of wire fraud, seven\ncounts of money laundering, and four counts of filing false tax returns. Espejo moved\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Kristine G. Baker, United States District Judge for the Eastern\nDistrict of Arkansas.\n\n -2-\n\fto dismiss the indictment for, among other reasons, intentional destruction of\nevidence. The district court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment but, on the\nGovernment’s motion, dismissed one of the counts of money laundering.\n\n In pretrial motions, the Government moved to exclude evidence and argument\nrelated to PMSI’s destruction of financial documents. At trial, the district court\nexcluded evidence related to the destruction of the records under Fed. R. Evid. 401,\n402, and 403. The district court explained that it did not understand why the missing\ndocuments would be needed for a defense given the availability of credit card\nstatements to show what Espejo purchased with the funds at issue. It also explained\nthat there was no evidence the Government destroyed the documents. It further\nprohibited defense counsel from asking Sanderson about intentional destruction of\nhis settlement statements, pending review of further evidence in the case.\n\n Espejo wanted the missing records to support her defense that Sanderson\nrouted personal funds through PMSI’s account in order to hide money from his wife.\nShe conceded that she transferred $611,099.04 from PMSI and a related entity to her\npersonal bank account and that she maintained separate Quickbooks files to hide the\ntransactions. She testified that Sanderson authorized these practices, asking her to\npurchase items for him and reimburse herself from PMSI’s account, and occasionally\nallowing her to purchase gifts for her children with funds reimbursed from PMSI’s\naccount. She also conceded that she made a few personal purchases using the PMSI\ndebit card, but she stated that those purchases involved mistaken use of the wrong\ncard and that she reimbursed any such mistakes.\n\n Sanderson admitted he had routed personal transactions through PMSI’s\naccount, using checks directly from the account for purchases. He denied ever\nauthorizing Espejo to use her personal account for purchases on his behalf.\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f Some of the evidence indicated that Espejo transferred more funds to her\naccount than Sanderson deposited in PMSI’s account. Sanderson’s 2010 statements\nshowed that he deposited $4,612.07 beyond what he owed PMSI between January 1\nand September 9, 2010. Espejo took $210,425.41 in funds from PMSI’s account\nduring the same time period. Her defense was that Sanderson had deposited extra\nfunds in the account that had continually built up over time.\n\n Despite the missing records, the evidence at trial indicated that PMSI’s account\ncontained some extra funds with an unknown source. At the end of 2009, the account\nbalance was $99,259.27. There were six doctors in the practice at that time, each of\nwhom contributed about $5,000-6,000 when they joined. Sanderson also testified that\na previous member of the practice, Dr. Columbus Brown, was in arrears by “a big\namount” to PMSI, indicating that the doctors’ collective contributions alone could not\naccount for the surplus in the account. The Government introduced evidence of other\nsources of income: a $14,000 check from Memphis Pathology Lab that was not\ncredited to any doctor, and a $41,062.48 refund from McKesson Specialty Care\nDistribution that was not credited to any doctor. There was additional testimony\nabout Espejo possibly depositing the doctors’ tax refunds into PMSI’s account\nwithout crediting them.\n\n After hearing most of this evidence, the district court excluded all evidence\nregarding intentional destruction of the settlement statements, including questions on\nthe topic directed to Sanderson. The district court explained that it had heard no\nevidence of what particular documents were destroyed and no evidence of any\nparticular person destroying documents. It observed that the destruction also\noccurred several months after Espejo resigned from PMSI, which suggested that the\ndestruction was not an intentional act. It also explained that it did not want to allow\nspeculation on the issue without more particular evidence. After reviewing the\nrelevant testimony from the motion to dismiss hearings, the district court concluded\nthe evidence of destruction was too speculative because the key witness could only\n\n -4-\n\ftestify that documents went missing over a weekend, without confirming what\ndocuments they were or even confirming that it was the shredding company that took\nthem.\n\n At the end of the trial, the jury convicted Espejo on all counts at issue. The\ndistrict court sentenced Espejo, and she timely appealed.\n\n II. Standard of Review\n\n “We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, but our review is de\nnovo when the challenge implicates a constitutional right.” United States v. West,\n829 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2016). “Even where an evidentiary ruling is an abuse\nof discretion or violates a constitutional proscription, however, we will not reverse\nunless the error is more than harmless in that it affected a substantial right or had\nmore than a slight influence on the verdict.” Id.\n\n III. Analysis\n\n The district court did not err in excluding evidence regarding the destroyed\nmedical records. “We have recognized the right of a criminal defendant to present\na complete defense, grounded in either the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments, with the\ncaveat that it may be limited by other legitimate interests of criminal trials, such as\nexcluding incompetent, irrelevant, or privileged testimony.” Id. The right is also\nlimited by Fed. R. Evid. 403. See id. at 1019.\n\n The limited probative value of the missing documents is apparent because\nEspejo would have to prove the existence of deposits that were not in the available\nbank account records in order to show probative value. Sanderson’s deposits only\nappear to exceed his bills by a few thousand dollars, and Espejo took $611,099.04 in\nreimbursements. The only evidence in the record of other sources of funds is the\n\n -5-\n\fGovernment’s evidence that Espejo was depositing vendor refunds and tax refunds\nwithout crediting them to the doctors.\n\n Even if the missing documents were relevant, the limited probative value of the\ndestruction of those documents is also apparent because Espejo did not offer a clear\nmotive for anyone at PMSI to destroy those documents. Espejo had no evidence\nestablishing Sanderson’s motive beyond her own testimony, and Sanderson openly\nadmitted to using the account directly for personal purchases. There is also no\nevidence that any other doctor would have wanted those records destroyed. In fact,\nit appears that the new president of PMSI would have an interest in maintaining the\nrecords and investigating Sanderson’s practices of routing personal purchases through\nPMSI. In the absence of any significant evidence linking an individual to the\ndestruction of the records, the district court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing\nany evidence on the issue.\n\n IV. Conclusion\n\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence regarding\nthe destruction of documents. We affirm.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Lynn Alisa ESPEJO, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3562\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Lynn Alisa Espejo\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Western Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 28, 2018\\n Filed: January 4, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Lynn Alisa Espejo appeals her conviction for various crimes related to stealing\\nfunds from a medical practice while working as its bookkeeper, arguing that the\\ndistrict court erred by excluding potentially exculpatory evidence regarding the\\n\\fmedical practice’s destruction of financial records. We conclude that the district\\ncourt1 did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n Espejo was the administrator for Practice Management Services Inc. (“PMSI”),\\na medical practice. As the administrator, Espejo was effectively responsible for\\nmanaging the office. When PMSI changed presidents from Dr. Bruce Sanderson to\\nDr. Scott Brown in 2010, Brown discovered a debit card linked to PMSI’s account\\nwhich, along with several other issues, caused him to further investigate PMSI’s\\nfinances. PMSI placed Espejo on administrative leave, and she subsequently resigned\\non October 1, 2010. The investigation ultimately revealed that Espejo had transferred\\nsome of PMSI’s funds into her personal account.\\n\\n Many of PMSI’s financial records that were part of the investigation into\\nEspejo’s use of funds are now missing. During the investigation into the funds in\\n2010, Espejo’s attorney asked PMSI’s counsel to retain all financial documents for\\nthe case. In February 2011, after You Shred-It visited PMSI for its periodic\\nshredding of records, a PMSI employee discovered that all of the documents in\\nstorage were gone, including the Espejo documents stored in a locked cabinet. PMSI\\nalso failed to preserve Espejo’s computer. Fortunately, off-site bank and credit card\\nrecords reproduced the relevant transactions, and every testifying doctor besides\\nSanderson reproduced their settlement statements from PMSI for the relevant years.\\nSanderson reproduced only his 2010 settlement statements.\\n\\n In 2014, a grand jury indicted Espejo on fifteen counts of wire fraud, seven\\ncounts of money laundering, and four counts of filing false tax returns. Espejo moved\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Kristine G. Baker, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Arkansas.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fto dismiss the indictment for, among other reasons, intentional destruction of\\nevidence. The district court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment but, on the\\nGovernment’s motion, dismissed one of the counts of money laundering.\\n\\n In pretrial motions, the Government moved to exclude evidence and argument\\nrelated to PMSI’s destruction of financial documents. At trial, the district court\\nexcluded evidence related to the destruction of the records under Fed. R. Evid. 401,\\n402, and 403. The district court explained that it did not understand why the missing\\ndocuments would be needed for a defense given the availability of credit card\\nstatements to show what Espejo purchased with the funds at issue. It also explained\\nthat there was no evidence the Government destroyed the documents. It further\\nprohibited defense counsel from asking Sanderson about intentional destruction of\\nhis settlement statements, pending review of further evidence in the case.\\n\\n Espejo wanted the missing records to support her defense that Sanderson\\nrouted personal funds through PMSI’s account in order to hide money from his wife.\\nShe conceded that she transferred $611,099.04 from PMSI and a related entity to her\\npersonal bank account and that she maintained separate Quickbooks files to hide the\\ntransactions. She testified that Sanderson authorized these practices, asking her to\\npurchase items for him and reimburse herself from PMSI’s account, and occasionally\\nallowing her to purchase gifts for her children with funds reimbursed from PMSI’s\\naccount. She also conceded that she made a few personal purchases using the PMSI\\ndebit card, but she stated that those purchases involved mistaken use of the wrong\\ncard and that she reimbursed any such mistakes.\\n\\n Sanderson admitted he had routed personal transactions through PMSI’s\\naccount, using checks directly from the account for purchases. He denied ever\\nauthorizing Espejo to use her personal account for purchases on his behalf.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f Some of the evidence indicated that Espejo transferred more funds to her\\naccount than Sanderson deposited in PMSI’s account. Sanderson’s 2010 statements\\nshowed that he deposited $4,612.07 beyond what he owed PMSI between January 1\\nand September 9, 2010. Espejo took $210,425.41 in funds from PMSI’s account\\nduring the same time period. Her defense was that Sanderson had deposited extra\\nfunds in the account that had continually built up over time.\\n\\n Despite the missing records, the evidence at trial indicated that PMSI’s account\\ncontained some extra funds with an unknown source. At the end of 2009, the account\\nbalance was $99,259.27. There were six doctors in the practice at that time, each of\\nwhom contributed about $5,000-6,000 when they joined. Sanderson also testified that\\na previous member of the practice, Dr. Columbus Brown, was in arrears by “a big\\namount” to PMSI, indicating that the doctors’ collective contributions alone could not\\naccount for the surplus in the account. The Government introduced evidence of other\\nsources of income: a $14,000 check from Memphis Pathology Lab that was not\\ncredited to any doctor, and a $41,062.48 refund from McKesson Specialty Care\\nDistribution that was not credited to any doctor. There was additional testimony\\nabout Espejo possibly depositing the doctors’ tax refunds into PMSI’s account\\nwithout crediting them.\\n\\n After hearing most of this evidence, the district court excluded all evidence\\nregarding intentional destruction of the settlement statements, including questions on\\nthe topic directed to Sanderson. The district court explained that it had heard no\\nevidence of what particular documents were destroyed and no evidence of any\\nparticular person destroying documents. It observed that the destruction also\\noccurred several months after Espejo resigned from PMSI, which suggested that the\\ndestruction was not an intentional act. It also explained that it did not want to allow\\nspeculation on the issue without more particular evidence. After reviewing the\\nrelevant testimony from the motion to dismiss hearings, the district court concluded\\nthe evidence of destruction was too speculative because the key witness could only\\n\\n -4-\\n\\ftestify that documents went missing over a weekend, without confirming what\\ndocuments they were or even confirming that it was the shredding company that took\\nthem.\\n\\n At the end of the trial, the jury convicted Espejo on all counts at issue. The\\ndistrict court sentenced Espejo, and she timely appealed.\\n\\n II. Standard of Review\\n\\n “We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, but our review is de\\nnovo when the challenge implicates a constitutional right.” United States v. West,\\n829 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2016). “Even where an evidentiary ruling is an abuse\\nof discretion or violates a constitutional proscription, however, we will not reverse\\nunless the error is more than harmless in that it affected a substantial right or had\\nmore than a slight influence on the verdict.” Id.\\n\\n III. Analysis\\n\\n The district court did not err in excluding evidence regarding the destroyed\\nmedical records. “We have recognized the right of a criminal defendant to present\\na complete defense, grounded in either the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments, with the\\ncaveat that it may be limited by other legitimate interests of criminal trials, such as\\nexcluding incompetent, irrelevant, or privileged testimony.” Id. The right is also\\nlimited by Fed. R. Evid. 403. See id. at 1019.\\n\\n The limited probative value of the missing documents is apparent because\\nEspejo would have to prove the existence of deposits that were not in the available\\nbank account records in order to show probative value. Sanderson’s deposits only\\nappear to exceed his bills by a few thousand dollars, and Espejo took $611,099.04 in\\nreimbursements. The only evidence in the record of other sources of funds is the\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fGovernment’s evidence that Espejo was depositing vendor refunds and tax refunds\\nwithout crediting them to the doctors.\\n\\n Even if the missing documents were relevant, the limited probative value of the\\ndestruction of those documents is also apparent because Espejo did not offer a clear\\nmotive for anyone at PMSI to destroy those documents. Espejo had no evidence\\nestablishing Sanderson’s motive beyond her own testimony, and Sanderson openly\\nadmitted to using the account directly for personal purchases. There is also no\\nevidence that any other doctor would have wanted those records destroyed. In fact,\\nit appears that the new president of PMSI would have an interest in maintaining the\\nrecords and investigating Sanderson’s practices of routing personal purchases through\\nPMSI. In the absence of any significant evidence linking an individual to the\\ndestruction of the records, the district court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing\\nany evidence on the issue.\\n\\n IV. Conclusion\\n\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence regarding\\nthe destruction of documents. We affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":285,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4578916,"string":"4,578,916"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Thompson L. AWNINGS, Formerly Known as Tristan Simon, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Joshua FULLERTON; Ryan Duncan, Defendants-Appellees Jeremy Carther; Todd Roberts, Defendants Tarvis Banks; 1-10 Does, Defendants-Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Thompson Awnings v. Joshua Fullerton"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2884"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Beam, Colloton\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SMITH, Chief Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2884\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Thompson L. Awnings, formerly known as Tristan Simon\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Joshua Fullerton; Ryan Duncan\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n\\n Jeremy Carther; Todd Roberts\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\\n\\n Tarvis Banks; 1-10 Does\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: May 16, 2018\\n Filed: January 4, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, BEAM and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSMITH, Chief Judge.\\n\\n Thompson Awnings sued, among others, Officers Joshua Fullerton, Ryan\\nDuncan, and Tarvis Banks of the Lincoln Police Department (LPD) under 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983 in their individual capacities. Awnings’s suit alleged multiple constitutional\\nviolations by the officers, including false arrest, excessive force, and denial of\\nmedical care. He claims the district court1 erred by: (1) refusing to disqualify the\\nentire City of Lincoln Attorney’s Office; (2) granting qualified immunity to Officers\\nFullerton and Duncan; and (3) dismissing Officer Banks from Awnings’s suit\\npursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background\\n A. Awnings’s Arrest2\\n On an early morning in July 2013, Officers Fullerton and Duncan of the LPD\\nencountered Damien Wilkins on a sidewalk in Lincoln. The officers questioned\\nWilkins about his possible involvement with criminal activity. Awnings, Wilkins’s\\ncompanion, inserted himself into the conversation and began asking the officers why\\nthey were questioning Wilkins. Officer Fullerton informed Awnings that the officers\\nwere conducting law enforcement business with Wilkins. Officer Fullerton then told\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Nebraska.\\n 2\\n Although Awnings disputed the defendants’ version of the events, the district\\ncourt found that most of the defendants’ statements of material facts did not\\ncontrovert Awnings’s own recitation. See Mem. & Order at 7–23, Awnings v.\\nFullerton, No. 4:15-cv-03078-RGK-CRZ (D. Neb. Apr. 24, 2017), ECF No. 133\\n(“Qualified Immunity Order”). Upon review, we find that the parties’ versions of\\nevents largely do not controvert each other, and we recite here only the undisputed\\nfacts. See Morris v. City of Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard\\nof review) (citation omitted).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\nAwnings, who had been drinking, that he could wait for his friend a short distance\\naway, if he wished.\\n\\n Unsatisfied, Awnings—now obviously angry and agitated—refused the\\ndirection to step away. Awnings then, in an expletive-laced exclamation, declared that\\n“[h]e would protect his buddy” and that he was “not going anywhere.” Qualified\\nImmunity Order at 9. Awnings was several feet from Officer Fullerton, and the officer\\ninstructed Awnings to step away from the officers. Awnings again refused, asking,\\n“Why should I leave?” Id. at 9. Officer Fullerton answered that Awnings was\\ninterfering with an investigation and that his behavior distracted them from their\\nwork. Awnings uttered another expletive and told the officer, “I am staying right\\nhere.” Id. Officer Fullerton—for the third time—asked Awnings to leave the\\nimmediate area; Officer Fullerton reinforced his request by warning Awnings that if\\nhe refused, he would go to jail. In response, Awnings again blurted out the same\\nexpletive, followed by “I’ll kick your ass.” Id.\\n\\n At that point, Officer Fullerton informed Awnings that he was under arrest and\\ncommanded Awnings to place his hands behind his back. Awnings refused, telling\\nOfficer Fullerton, “I’m gonna kick your [expletive] ass.” Id. Officer Fullerton then\\n“reached out and grabbed onto [Awning’s] arm and wrist, but then [Awnings]\\nstiffened his arm and began to pull away. Officer Fullerton again told [Awnings] he\\nwas under arrest and to stop resisting and [Awnings] continued to resist and pull\\naway.” Id. at 10. The officer then executed a hip toss maneuver, which put Awnings\\n“on his back on the ground with Officer Fullerton on top of him.” Id. The two men\\nbegan to fight. Officer Jon-Eric Meyer, who had arrived at the scene, joined with\\nOfficer Duncan and came to Officer Fullerton’s assistance. As the officers attempted\\nto handcuff Awnings, he resisted, “actively kicking and punching at the officers.” Id.\\nAwnings then\\n hook[ed] his hand under Officer Duncan’s LPD uniform shirt and\\n [brought] his hand up to the collar, grabbing onto the body armor and\\n\\n -3-\\n\\n undershirt as well as his collar. [Awnings] used this hold . . . to try to\\n pull Officer Duncan to the ground with force, causing the collar to cinch\\n around Officer Duncan’s neck.\\n\\nId. Meanwhile, “Officer Duncan gave numerous commands for [Awnings] to let go”\\nand to put his hands behind his back. Id. Awnings ignored the directive and continued\\nto tighten his grip on Officer Duncan’s shirt collar, and the officer “tried to strike\\n[Awnings] a couple of times” to induce Awnings to release his grasp. Id. at 11.\\nAwnings pinned Officer Duncan to the ground.\\n\\n Officer Duncan yelled to his colleagues for help. Awnings eventually released\\nOfficer Duncan’s shirt, and the officers then rolled Awnings onto his stomach and\\nhandcuffed him. Awnings refused to walk to the police cruiser. Officer Jeremy\\nCarther from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln Police Department arrived and\\nassisted the LPD officers in placing Awnings on his back in the backseat of the\\ncruiser. Awnings continued to resist and yell profanities. Awnings kicked Officer\\nCarther in the chest twice. At that point, Officers Fullerton, Meyer, and Carther\\nremoved Awnings from the cruiser and called for a vehicle with a “full backseat\\ncage.” Id. at 11. Awnings continued to resist the officers, and when a police vehicle\\nequipped with the full cage arrived, Officer Chris Howard placed Awnings in leg\\nrestraints. The officers then placed Awnings into the police cruiser. Officer Duncan\\nsustained minor injuries from the scuffle.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\n B. Awnings’s Transport to the Detention Center3\\n Awnings sustained visible injuries during his arrest. Because he was bleeding,\\nthe LPD officers called for an ambulance to transport Awnings to the Bryan West\\nMedical Center (“the Hospital”). Officer Howard accompanied Awnings in the\\nambulance. At the Hospital, Awnings told the examining physician that he believed\\nhe had one or more fractured ribs. The doctor ordered a chest X-ray, which revealed\\nno rib fracture. The doctor pronounced Awnings fit for incarceration, but he ordered\\na follow-up examination at the Hospital within one to two days. Officer Banks, who\\nhad relieved Officer Howard during Awnings’s examination at the Hospital, then\\ntransported Awnings to the Lancaster County Jail. Officer Banks neglected to inform\\njail personnel of the doctor’s request for a follow-up appointment with Awnings; he\\n“simply informed jail personnel that [Awnings] had been to the emergency room and\\nhad been deemed fit for confinement.” Mem. & Order at 3, Awnings v. Fullerton, No.\\n4:15-cv-03078-RGK-CRZ (D. Neb. Jan. 20, 2016), ECF No. 40.\\n\\n C. District Court and Other Proceedings\\n Awnings’s scuffle with the LPD led to several, subsequent state criminal\\ncharges.4 Awnings pleaded no contest to two of the charges, and the District Court\\nof Lancaster County, Nebraska, sentenced him to two consecutive 90-day jail terms.\\nThe Nebraska Court of Appeals upheld Awnings’s convictions.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n We recite these facts as alleged in Awnings’s complaint and assume them to\\nbe true. See Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1098 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per\\ncuriam) (“We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss . . . de novo. We\\nassume all facts in the complaint to be true, and draw all reasonable inferences in\\nfavor of the non-moving party.” (citations omitted)).\\n 4\\n These charges included assault on an officer in the third degree, in violation\\nof Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-931, assault in the third degree, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat.\\n§ 28-310(1), and resisting arrest, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-904(1).\\n\\n -5-\\n\\n After his state convictions, Awnings filed a lawsuit in federal court pursuant\\nto 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, among other things, that Officer Fullerton arrested\\nAwnings without probable cause and that Officers Fullerton and Duncan used\\nexcessive force in effecting his arrest. Awnings also alleged that Officer\\nBanks—because of his failure to inform jail personnel of the Hospital doctor’s\\nrequest for a follow-up examination—deprived him of his right to be free from\\nunreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Awnings also claimed that\\nOfficer Banks’s conduct amounted to a denial of medical care, violating his due\\nprocess rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.\\n\\n Elizabeth Elliott, an attorney employed by the City of Lincoln Attorney’s\\nOffice (CLAO), initially represented the LPD officers. In that capacity, she filed a\\nnotice of intent to serve subpoena duces tecum with the district court. Elliott\\npreviously had worked in the Lancaster County Public Defender’s Office (LPDO).\\nIn fact, Elliott worked as an attorney in that office while the LPDO defended\\nAwnings’s state criminal charges. Awnings objected to the notice, and Elliott moved\\nto withdraw from the case upon discovering the potential conflict. Awnings then\\nmoved to disqualify the entire CLAO, claiming Elliott’s employment at the LPDO\\nwhile that office represented Awnings created a conflict of interest that could\\nprejudice his civil suit against the officers.\\n\\n The magistrate judge considered Awnings’s motion and found that while\\nemployed with the LPDO, Elliott “did not represent [Awnings], never appeared with\\n[Awnings] in court, and never spoke to him about his case. She [did] not recall\\n[Awnings] or the underlying facts of his state criminal case. She was never ‘actively\\ninvolved’ in [Awnings’s] underlying state criminal case.” Mem. & Order at 3,\\nAwnings v. Fullerton, No. 4:15-cv-03078-RGK-CRZ (D. Neb. Oct. 14, 2015), ECF\\nNo. 26 (citation omitted). And Awnings pleaded no contest to the criminal charges\\nafter Elliott left the LPDO. The CLAO assured the court that “Elliott has no\\nconfidential information regarding [Awnings] and as such, has not divulged any\\n\\n -6-\\n\\nconfidential information to [the CLAO] about [Awnings] or his criminal case.” Id. at\\n4. Further, the CLAO had screened Elliott from any further work in Awnings’s case.\\nFinding no imputed conflict of interest stemming from Elliott’s prior employment at\\nthe LPDO, the magistrate judge denied Awnings’s motion to disqualify the entire\\nCLAO. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge’s order.\\n\\n Officers Banks, Duncan, and Fullerton moved to dismiss Awnings’s § 1983\\nsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). The district court partially\\ngranted the motion and dismissed Officer Banks from the suit. Officers Duncan and\\nFullerton subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court\\ngranted. The court concluded that the Heck5 doctrine barred Awnings from claiming\\nfalse arrest. But even if Heck did not foreclose Awnings’s false arrest claim, the\\ndistrict court determined that Officers Duncan and Fullerton had probable cause to\\narrest Awnings. Further, the court concluded that the officers’ use of force was\\n“objectively reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate [Awnings’s]\\nconstitutional rights.” Qualified Immunity Order at 34. The district court then granted\\nsummary judgment to the officers. The court held that the officers were entitled to\\nqualified immunity and dismissed both the false arrest and the excessive force claims.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n In this appeal, Awnings claims the district court erred by: (1) failing to\\ndisqualify the entire CLAO; (2) granting qualified immunity to Officers Duncan and\\nFullerton; and (3) granting Officer Banks’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. We disagree and\\naffirm.\\n\\n A. Disqualification of the CLAO Attorneys\\n Awnings argues that Elliott’s employment with the LPDO prior to joining the\\nCLAO raises a conflict of interest. Furthermore, he contends that Elliott’s conflict\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).\\n\\n -7-\\n\\nshould be imputed to the entire CLAO and that the district court should have granted\\nAwnings’s motion to disqualify. We review the district court’s denial of attorney\\ndisqualification for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579,\\n590 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 605–06\\n(8th Cir. 1977)). “Because of the potential for abuse by opposing counsel,\\n‘disqualification motions should be subjected to particularly strict scrutiny.’”\\nMacheca Transp. Co. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 463 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2006)\\n(quoting Harker v. Comm’r, 82 F.3d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 1996)). “[W]e apply the same\\nrules governing the professional conduct of attorneys that the district court has\\nadopted.” Harker, 82 F.3d at 808 (citing Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1333\\n(8th Cir. 1990)). The moving party bears the burden of proving that disqualification\\nis required. See A.J. by L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 859 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Duncan\\nv. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020, 1028 (5th Cir. 1981)).\\n\\n Under its general rules, the district court does not “adopt other codes of\\nprofessional responsibility or ethics.” NEGenR 1.7(b)(2)(A). But, “the court may\\nconsult other codes of professional responsibility or ethics to determine whether a\\nlawyer has engaged in conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar.” NEGenR\\n1.7(b)(2)(B); cf. Malone v. Kantner Ingredients, Inc., No. 4:12CV3190, 2013 WL\\n5524548, at *7 (D. Neb. Oct. 3, 2013) (“When analyzing motions to disqualify, this\\ncourt refers to the Nebraska Rules of Professional conduct.”). In this case, the\\nmagistrate judge cited State v. Kinkennon, 747 N.W.2d 437 (Neb. 2008), as the basis\\nfor denying Awnings’s motion to disqualify the entire CLAO. The district court\\nsubsequently affirmed the magistrate judge.\\n\\n In Kinkennon, a Nebraska court appointed an attorney from a private law firm\\nto represent a defendant in a criminal case. Id. at 441. During the pendency of the\\ncase, another attorney from the law firm began employment as a deputy county\\nattorney. Id. The defendant then moved to disqualify the entire county attorney’s\\noffice, asking the state court to appoint a special prosecutor. Id. The state court denied\\n\\n -8-\\n\\nthe defendant’s motion. The Nebraska Supreme Court, after rejecting a per se rule of\\ndisqualification, affirmed the trial court and explained:\\n\\n We recognize that complete disqualification of a prosecutor’s office may\\n be warranted in cases where the appearance of unfairness or impropriety\\n is so great that the public trust and confidence in our judicial system\\n simply could not be maintained otherwise. Such an extreme case might\\n exist, even where the State has done all in its power to establish an\\n effective screening procedure precluding the individual lawyer’s direct\\n or indirect participation in the prosecution. But when the disqualified\\n attorney is effectively screened from any participation in the prosecution\\n of the defendant, the prosecutor’s office may, in general, proceed with\\n the prosecution.\\n\\nId. at 444 (footnote omitted).\\n\\n Awnings says the district court erroneously relied on Kinkennon and contends\\nthat our prior decision, State of Arkansas v. Dean Foods Products Co., 605 F.2d 380\\n(8th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim Products Liability\\nLitigation, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980), compels reversal of the district court. He is\\nwrong. As we explained,\\n\\n [i]n Dean Foods Products, this court affirmed a district court order\\n disqualifying an Assistant Attorney General from taking part in an\\n antitrust action against a defendant that was being represented by his\\n former law firm. Moreover, the court disqualified those members of the\\n Attorney General’s staff who had actively participated in the case under\\n the supervision of the disqualified attorney. The court explicitly reserved\\n judgment on whether the conflict should have resulted in the imputed\\n disqualification of the entire Attorney General’s office.\\n\\nBlair, 916 F.2d at 1332 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, Dean Foods\\nProducts does not command the disqualification of an entire attorney’s office even\\n\\n -9-\\n\\nwhen an attorney in that office possesses confidential information about the\\ndefendant. Rather, it is satisfactory that the attorney and the staff supervised by the\\nattorney be disqualified and appropriately screened.\\n\\n We find no conflict between Kinkennon and Dean Foods Products, and neither\\ndecision supports disqualifying the entire CLAO in Awnings’s civil case. When the\\npotential for a conflict became known, Elliott moved to recuse herself from the case\\nout of caution. She did not represent Awnings in his state criminal proceedings, did\\nnot recall Awnings or his criminal case, and was never actively involved in the\\ncriminal proceedings. Awnings pleaded no contest to the criminal charges after Elliott\\ndeparted the LPDO. Aside from filing the notice of intent to serve a subpoena duces\\ntecum, the CLAO screened Elliott from further participation in Awnings’s case.\\nWhile Awnings suggested that Elliott might have imparted confidential information\\nregarding his criminal case to the CLAO, see Appellant’s Br. at 16–17, “[g]eneral\\nassertions that an attorney possesses knowledge of a party’s ‘trade secrets, trial\\nstrategies, negotiation strategies, legal theories or business practices’ are not typically\\nsufficient and can be overcome by an attorney affidavit stating the attorney has no\\nknowledge of such items.” Infogroup, Inc. v. DatabaseLLC, No. 8:14CV49, 2016 WL\\n2350113, at *2 (D. Neb. May 4, 2016) (citing Jacob N. Printing Co. v. Mosley, 779\\nN.W.2d 596, 602 (Neb. 2010)). Awnings only presented conjecture to support his\\nassertion that Elliott possessed confidential information regarding his case. Elliott,\\non the other hand, submitted an affidavit claiming no knowledge of the case from her\\nprevious employment.\\n\\n Because Awnings failed in his burden to show the necessity of disqualifying\\nof the entire CLAO, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of\\nAwnings’s motion to disqualify. See A.J. by L.B., 56 F.3d at 859 (citation omitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\n B. Qualified Immunity\\n Next, Awnings claims the district court erred when it granted qualified\\nimmunity to Officers Duncan and Fullerton because the district court erroneously:\\n(1) excluded Awnings’s statements about his medical condition; (2) admitted\\naffidavits from the LPD officers; and (3) ignored material fact disputes raised by\\nAwnings. “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and\\nmay affirm the district court on any basis supported by the record.” Figg v. Russell,\\n433 F.3d 593, 597 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 716 (8th Cir.\\n2000); Gonzales-Perez v. Harper, 241 F.3d 633, 638 n.6 (8th Cir. 2001)). We review\\nthe district court’s admission of evidence for summary judgment purposes under an\\nabuse-of-discretion standard. Gannon Int’l., Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 793 (8th\\nCir. 2012) (citing Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 591\\n(8th Cir. 2011)). We address each of Awnings’s claims in turn.\\n\\n 1. Evidentiary Rulings\\n Awnings claims that the district court erred in excluding statements he made\\nabout his medical examination at the Hospital after his release from jail. He also\\nasserts that the court erred in admitting affidavits from Officers Fullerton, Duncan,\\nMeyer, Howard, and one other officer of the LPD and from Officer Carther from the\\nUniversity of Nebraska–Lincoln Police Department.\\n\\n Awnings submitted a declaration stating that following his release from jail, he\\nvisited a physician at the Hospital, who diagnosed him with four broken ribs and a\\ncollapsed lung. The district court excluded Awnings’s medical condition statement\\nbecause the “[examining] physician [was] not identified, the diagnoses [were]\\nhearsay, and there [was] no medical evidence to establish a causal link to” Awning’s\\nencounter with the LPD. Qualified Immunity Order at 22 n.22. Awnings says that at\\nthe summary judgment stage, he need not present evidence in a trial-ready form. He\\ncontends that he could have called the examining physician to testify at trial. Further,\\nhe asserts that he was not required to disclose the physician’s name, especially when\\n\\n -11-\\n\\nthe doctor’s identity was readily discernible from the record. Lastly, Awnings, citing\\nZiesmer v. Hagen, 785 F.3d 1233 (8th Cir. 2015), argues that because his injuries\\nwere not sophisticated and within the range of common experience, he was not\\nrequired to produce an expert witness to prove causation. We disagree.\\n\\n In Ziesmer, a police search of an individual turned into a physical altercation.\\nId. at 1236. The trooper “tackled the [plaintiff, Ziesmer,] to the ground and dug his\\nknee into [Ziesmer’s] back, while pulling Ziesmer’s hands behind his back, causing\\nhis shoulder to pop out of its socket. Trooper Hagen popped Ziesmer’s shoulder back\\ninto its socket.” Id. “Immediately after the incident Ziesmer reports that he had\\nbruising and scrapes on his face and a large knot on the back of his head. He took\\npictures of his bruised face when he got home.” Id. Ziesmer also sustained a welt on\\nhis head. Id. We reversed the district court’s conclusion that Ziesmer needed to\\nproduce a medical expert to opine on Ziesmer’s condition, reasoning:\\n\\n It is true that “[w]hen an injury is sophisticated, proof of causation\\n generally must be established by expert testimony.” Robinson v. Hager,\\n 292 F.3d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 2002). However, “[a] causal connection\\n between an event and an injury may be inferred in cases in which a\\n visible injury or a sudden onset of an injury occurs.” Id. (quoting Turner\\n v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1210 (8th Cir. 2000)).\\n\\n Given that Ziesmer claims he began experiencing neck pain\\n shortly after the alleged altercation with Trooper Hagen, and given that\\n there is no evidence suggesting he experienced any such pain before [the\\n incident with the trooper], a layperson could conclude that Ziesmer’s\\n symptoms were caused by the trauma to his neck and back. See also Hill\\n v. Gonzalez, 454 F.2d 1201, 1203 (8th Cir. 1972) (noting that “expert\\n testimony is not necessary” to prove causation when the “inferences to\\n be drawn from the facts are within the range of common experience” of\\n the jury members (quotation omitted)); cf. Saunders v. Frost, 124 Fed.\\n Appx. 468, 469 (8th Cir. 2005) (agreeing that the plaintiff’s knee injury\\n was sophisticated, requiring an expert witness to prove causation,\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\n because his knee “had a long medical history marked by earlier traumas\\n and an earlier surgery”). Injuries such as those claimed by Ziesmer are\\n “within the range of common experience,” and the lack of a medical\\n expert on this issue is not fatal to his claim at this stage of the\\n proceedings.\\n\\nId. at 1239 (first and second alterations in original).\\n\\n Here, Awnings’s alleged injuries—fractured ribs and a collapsed lung—were\\ninternal and required sophisticated medical tools to diagnose accurately. As such,\\nAwnings’s non-visible alleged injuries are not within the range of common\\nexperience where inferences may be made with confidence. Further, Awnings’s visit\\nto the Hospital immediately after his arrest showed no fractured ribs or a collapsed\\nlung. In the absence of medical evidence, only Awnings’s own allegations remain.\\nBut, “[a] plaintiff may not merely point to unsupported self-serving allegations, but\\nmust substantiate allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would permit a\\nfinding in the plaintiff’s favor.” Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638 (8th\\nCir. 2005) (citing Wilson v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 62 F.3d 237, 241 (8th Cir. 1995));\\nsee also Bacon v. Hennepin Cty. Med. Ctr., 550 F.3d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[A]\\nproperly supported motion for summary judgment is not defeated by self-serving\\naffidavits.” (alteration in original) (quoting Gander Mountain Co. v. Cabela’s, Inc.,\\n540 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir. 2008))). Thus, in contrast to Ziesmer, without probative\\nmedical evidence, Awnings can establish neither severity of injury nor causation. This\\nevidentiary void is fatal to Awnings’s claim. We find no abuse of discretion in the\\ndistrict court’s conclusion that Awnings failed to present evidence of a causal link\\nbetween his alleged injuries and his encounter with the law enforcement officers.\\n\\n Awnings also challenges the district court’s decision to admit affidavits from\\nthe officers, contending that the affidavits should have been excluded because the\\nofficers do not state that they had personal knowledge of “any of the facts [they]\\nrecited, and “the affidavit[s] do[] not establish that [the officers] would be competent\\n\\n -13-\\n\\nto testify as to the objectionable portions.” Appellant’s Br. at 39. Awnings cites to no\\nauthority that the affidavits must expressly state they came from personal knowledge,\\nand we decline to endorse the kind of formalism that Awnings propounds. The district\\ncourt found that the officers’ statements were based on personal knowledge and\\noverruled Awnings’s objections. See Qualified Immunity Order at 4 n.1. In his\\nobjections, Awnings presented no arguments or evidence why the officers would not\\nbe competent to testify at a trial. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the district\\ncourt’s evidentiary rulings.\\n\\n 2. False Arrest\\n Awnings contests the district court’s conclusion that the Heck doctrine barred\\nhis false arrest claim. He also challenges the district court’s alternative ruling—that\\neven if Heck does not bar Awnings’s claim, Officers Duncan and Fullerton had\\nprobable cause to arrest Awnings. We need not address Awnings argument that the\\ndistrict court misapplied Heck because the officers had probable cause to arrest him\\nfor obstruction of a peace officer.\\n\\n Awnings argues that at the beginning of his encounter with Officers Fullerton\\nand Duncan, he did not resist. The record, however, does not support Awnings’s\\ncontention. According to Awnings, Officer Fullerton “yelled at him to shut up and\\npointed to a direction behind him.” Qualified Immunity Order at 17. Awnings averred\\nthat he could not hear Officer Fullerton and he “yelled back at [Officer] Fullerton.”\\nId. at 18. Officer Fullerton then “grabbed [Awnings’s] right arm and started to yank\\nit.” Id. “Awnings [then] recoiled and tried to get his arm loose.” Id. Awnings does not\\ndispute that Officers Fullerton and Duncan were conducting law enforcement\\nbusiness with his companion, that Officer Fullerton pointed Awnings away from the\\nscene, or that he refused to comply. At that point, Officer Fullerton grabbed Awnings,\\nand Awnings pulled away.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -14-\\n\\n Under Nebraska law, Awnings’s admitted conduct qualified as obstruction of\\na peace officer and resisting arrest. “A person commits the offense of obstructing a\\npeace officer, when, by . . . physical interference, or obstacle, he . . . intentionally\\nobstructs, impairs, or hinders . . . the enforcement of the penal law or the preservation\\nof the peace by a peace officer . . . acting under color of his . . . official authority.”\\nNeb. Rev. Stat. § 28-906(1)(a). Here, Awnings acknowledged that Officer Fullerton\\nwas initially at least five feet from him, but Officer Fullerton moved closer during\\ntheir encounter. Officer Fullerton had previously told Awnings “that it was none of\\n[Awnings’s] business, and that if he wanted to wait for Wilkins he could do so at\\nsome distance away.” Qualified Immunity Order at 16–17. Awnings refused to move\\nback. Officer Fullerton subsequently gestured to Awnings to move away by waving.\\nBut Awnings again refused to move and “yelled back at [Officer] Fullerton.” Id. at\\n18. Awnings’s does not deny yelling, “[Expletive] you, I am staying right here” and\\n“[Expletive] you, I’ll kick your ass.” Id. at 9. Awnings’s conduct constituted\\nobstruction of a peace officer. See State v. Rosado, No. A-09-014, 2009 WL 3381652,\\nat *2 (Neb. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2009) (holding that pounding chest, saying “shoot me,\\n[expletive],” and being in close proximity to peace officer attempting to arrest another\\nindividual was obstructing a peace officer under Nebraska law); State v. Chapman,\\nNo. A-92-451, 1993 WL 100146, at *5 (Neb. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 1993) (holding that\\nunder the Nebraska obstruction statute, a defendant “could ‘threaten to use force or\\nviolence’ with words, such as telling [the officer] he ‘was going to kick [his] ass’”\\n(second alteration in original)); see also Ehlers v. City of Rapid City, 846 F.3d 1002,\\n1009 (8th Cir. 2017) (concluding that “[r]efusing to comply with a police officer’s\\norders can constitute obstruction” under a similar South Dakota statute (citation\\nomitted)).\\n\\n Based on Awnings’s obstruction, Officer Fullerton had probable cause to\\narrest. With probable cause, it was unnecessary for Officer Fullerton to issue a\\n“verbal advisement of an attempted arrest”; rather, “actions to effectuate physical\\ncontrol over [the defendant] [are sufficient to] constitute[] an attempt to arrest.” State\\n\\n -15-\\n\\nv. Heath, 838 N.W.2d 4, 17 (Neb. Ct. App. 2013) (first alteration in original) (citation\\nomitted). By grabbing Awnings’s arm, Officer Fullerton attempted to effectuate\\nphysical control over Awnings. Awnings resisted by pulling away. Awnings’s\\nensuing fight with the officers is undisputed.\\n\\n 3. Excessive Force\\n Awnings also faults the district court for granting qualified immunity to\\nOfficers Fullerton and Duncan on his excessive force claim. He argues genuine\\ndisputes of material facts preclude the court’s grant of qualified immunity.\\n\\n “To determine whether a particular use of force was excessive, the court\\nconsiders whether it was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, relying on\\nthe perspective of a reasonable officer present at the scene, rather than the 20/20\\nvision of hindsight.” Ehlers, 846 F.3d at 1011 (cleaned up). “Force is excessive when\\nan officer’s actions are not objectively reasonable in light of the facts and\\ncircumstances confronting him.” Kukla v. Hulm, 310 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2002)\\n(citing Guite v. Wright, 147 F.3d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1998)). “When an arrestee flees\\nor resists, some use of force by the police is reasonable.” Greiner v. City of Champlin,\\n27 F.3d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Foster v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, 914\\nF.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 1990)). “[E]vidence of only de minimis injury [does not]\\nforeclose[] a claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.” Chambers v.\\nPennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 906 (8th Cir. 2011). “[I]t is logically possible to prove an\\nexcessive use of force that caused only a minor injury . . . . ” Id. We “focus instead\\non whether the force applied is reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable\\nofficer on the scene at the time the force is used.” Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490\\nU.S. 386, 396 (1989)).\\n\\n We agree with the district court that Awnings showed no genuine disputes of\\nmaterial fact between his version of events and the officers’ version. Here, the record\\nshows that Officer Fullerton executed a takedown maneuver after Awnings resisted\\n\\n -16-\\n\\narrest for obstruction under Nebraska law. Awnings alleged that officers joined in\\nbeating him, but Officers Fullerton and Duncan’s evidence—uncontroverted by\\nAwnings—showed an uncooperative and bellicose Awnings who resisted arrest by\\nswinging and kicking at the officers.6 Also of note, Awnings contends that at least\\nfour officers physically attacked him. But, according to the proof of record, Awnings\\nsustained only a de minimis injury—a small laceration over his right eyebrow. See\\nEllison v. Lesher, 796 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Our cases characterize\\nrelatively minor scrapes, bruises, and contusions as de minimis.” (citing Ziesmer, 785\\nF.3d at 1236–37; Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062, 1066–67 (8th Cir. 2006))).\\nOfficer Duncan also suffered non-serious injuries during his attempt to subdue\\nAwnings.\\n\\n Here, other than generic assertions, Awnings’s statements “do not give the\\nslightest hint about the amount of force the officer[s] used or why the amount of force\\nwas unreasonable in light of [his] persistent efforts to [resist] the police.” Edwards\\nv. Giles, 51 F.3d 155, 157 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) (concluding that\\nassertions such as the officers “threw [plaintiff] to the ground” or plaintiff “was\\nthrown to the ground forcibly” are “abstract assertions [that] tell us nothing more than\\nthat one officer used some physical power to move [the plaintiff to the ground”).\\nReviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Awnings, he has failed to show that\\nOfficers Fullerton and Duncan used unreasonable force to arrest him. See Ehlers, 846\\nF.3d at 1010–11. Officers Fullerton and Duncan are entitled to qualified immunity.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n Awnings stated that he pulled his arm back when Officer Fullerton first\\ngrabbed his arm; that after Officer Fullerton’s takedown, Awnings tried to get Officer\\nFullerton off and to get away from the officer; that he tried to curl his body into a ball\\n(thereby making it difficult for the officers to handcuff Awnings); and that he jumped\\nout of the police vehicle after having been placed in the back seat. See Qualified\\nImmunity Order at 18–20.\\n\\n -17-\\n\\n C. Motion to Dismiss\\n Awnings contends that the district court erred in dismissing Officer Banks from\\nthe suit. Awnings argues that he adequately stated a claim for deliberate indifference\\nto his serious medical needs. Awnings’s allegation stemmed from Officer Banks’s\\nfailure to inform the jail staff of Awnings’s need for a follow-up visit with the\\nHospital. We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Wong v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 820\\nF.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). We assume the truth of Awnings’s\\nfactual allegations, and “we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the\\nnonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Ritchie v. St. Louis Jewish Light, 630 F.3d 713,\\n715–16 (8th Cir. 2011)).\\n\\n The parties do not dispute that Officer Banks neglected to inform jail personnel\\nof Awnings’s need for a follow-up medical appointment. Awnings argues that his\\ntransport from the Hospital to the jail was part of his arrest; therefore his claim\\nagainst Officer Banks necessarily implicates the Fourth Amendment. But, historically,\\nin this circuit, claims of deliberate indifference to an arrestee’s medical needs are\\n“properly analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”\\nCarpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644, 650 (8th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Unresolved\\nis “the question whether the Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals with\\nprotection against the deliberate use of excessive physical force beyond the point at\\nwhich arrest ends and pretrial detention begins.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10\\n(emphasis added); see also Chambers, 641 F.3d at 905 (“We have noted the existence\\nof a ‘legal twilight zone’ between arrest and sentencing, where it is unclear whether\\nexcessive force claims are governed by the Fourth Amendment or cases decided based\\non the Fourteenth Amendment and substantive due process.” (emphasis added)\\n(quoting Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 2000))). Awnings’s claim\\nagainst Officer Banks is a failure to provide adequate medical services—not an\\nexcessive force claim related to his arrest. Instead, Awnings claim against Officer\\nBanks relates to the sufficiency of his post-arrest, post-medical examination, medical\\n\\n -18-\\n\\ncare. It is true that we have not as yet “resolved whether an arrestee’s claim alleging\\ndenial of medical care is analyzed under the Due Process Clause or the Fourth\\nAmendment. Bailey v. Feltmann, 810 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 2016). We need not do\\nso here. The facts distinguish this case from those arising from an allegation of\\nexcessive force. Factually, any alleged denial of medical care incident to Awnings’s\\narrest ended when he actually received medical attention at the hospital. Awnings’s\\nclaim against Officer Banks relates to Officer Banks’s omission to convey the follow-\\nup medical appointment ordered by the doctor—not from his participation in\\nAwnings’s arrest. In fact, Officer Banks did not participate in the arrest of Awnings.\\nUnlike the plaintiff in Carpenter, Awnings was first transported for medical treatment\\nbefore being taken to jail. On this record, our precedents favor analyzing Awnings’s\\nmedical needs claim under Fourteenth Amendment standards.\\n\\n Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “‘[d]eliberate indifference’ entails a level\\nof culpability equal to the criminal law definition of recklessness, that is, a prison\\nofficial ‘must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a\\nsubstantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Bender\\nv. Regier, 385 F.3d 1133, 1137 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.\\n825, 837 (1994)). “The standard for evaluating a substantive due process claim is\\nwhether the alleged ‘behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so\\noutrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’”\\nSchmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 574 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rogers v.\\nCity of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 1998)). Here, Awnings sustained a\\nsmall laceration, and his examining physician post-arrest declared Awnings fit for\\nincarceration. Further, a chest X-ray showed no fractured ribs or lung damages. Under\\nthese circumstances, it cannot be said that Officer Banks’s failure to inform the jail\\nstaff of Awnings’s follow-up medical visit rises to the level of conduct that “shocks\\nthe contemporary conscience.” Id. The district court correctly dismissed Awnings’s\\nclaim against Officer Banks under Rule 12(b)(6).\\n\\n\\n\\n -19-\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n 7\\n We affirm.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4356169/\", \"author_raw\": \"SMITH, Chief Judge\"}, {\"author\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.\\n\\n I join all but Part II.C of the opinion of the court. As to Awnings’s claim\\nagainst Officer Banks, I disagree with the court’s decision to declare that the claim\\nis governed by the Due Process Clause. Whether the Fourth Amendment or the Due\\nProcess Clause governs the actions of Officer Banks during the period after Awnings\\nwas arrested but before a judicial officer determined probable cause to detain him is\\nimportant doctrinally. The issue was not thoroughly briefed in this case. The answer\\nis unnecessary to resolving this appeal. I would therefore refrain from deciding the\\npoint.\\n\\n We said in Bailey v. Feltmann, 810 F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 2016), that “this court\\nhas not resolved whether an arrestee’s claim alleging denial of medical care is\\nanalyzed under the Due Process Clause or the Fourth Amendment” and noted “a\\nconflict in authority” on the question. The Seventh Circuit draws the line at a judicial\\ndetermination of probable cause: “the Fourth Amendment governs the period of\\nconfinement between arrest without a warrant and the preliminary hearing at which\\na determination of probable cause is made, while due process regulates the period of\\nconfinement after the initial determination of probable cause.” Villanova v. Abrams,\\n972 F.2d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 1992); see Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523, 530\\n(7th Cir. 2011). On the other hand, a divided panel of the Tenth Circuit ruled that a\\nclaim based on alleged failure to prevent a detainee from committing suicide before\\nhe was taken before a magistrate judge was governed by the Due Process Clause,\\nBarrie v. Grand Cty., 119 F.3d 862, 865-69 (10th Cir. 1997), while a concurring\\n\\n\\n 7\\n Prior to oral argument, Officer Banks moved to be dismissed as a party to this\\nappeal. That motion is denied.\\n\\n -20-\\n\\njudge concluded that the Fourth Amendment applied. Id. at 870 (Briscoe, J.,\\nconcurring).\\n\\n In this case, Awnings loses under either approach. An arrestee’s asserted\\nFourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable neglect in communicating a\\nneed for medical care was not clearly established in July 2013 when Awnings was\\nseized, so Banks is entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. See Bailey, 810 F.3d\\nat 593. If the more demanding deliberate indifference standard of the Due Process\\nClause applies, then Awnings’s claim fails for lack of alleged conscience-shocking\\nconduct. Ante, at 19. We need not say more to resolve the appeal.\\n\\n The court goes further, however, and says that “our precedents favor analyzing\\nAwnings’s medical needs claim under Fourteenth Amendment standards.” Id. But\\nour decisions do not resolve which constitutional provision applies. As we explained\\nin Bailey, 810 F.3d at 593, the decision in Carpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644 (8th Cir.\\n2012), applied due process analysis to the claim of an arrestee alleging indifference\\nto medical needs, but the plaintiff did not invoke the more favorable Fourth\\nAmendment standard, so the issue was not joined. Id. at 650. Two earlier cases cited\\nin Carpenter applied due process analysis, but neither suggested that the plaintiff had\\nraised a claim of unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and did not\\naddress that possibility. See McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 979 (8th Cir. 2009);\\nSpencer v. Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d 902, 905 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1999).\\n\\n The court disclaims any decision about whether “an arrestee’s claim alleging\\ndenial of medical care is analyzed under the Due Process Clause or the Fourth\\nAmendment,” ante, at 19 (quoting Bailey, 810 F.3d at 593), but then decides the issue\\nanyway as to an arrestee like Awnings. The doctrinal debate cited in Bailey concerns\\nwhether claims arising after arrest but before a judicial determination of probable\\ncause are governed by the Fourth Amendment. Awnings’s claim against Banks arose\\nbefore a probable-cause determination, so the court necessarily rejects one of the two\\n\\n -21-\\n\\nconflicting lines of authority cited in Bailey by declaring that the Due Process Clause\\ngoverns Awnings’s claim. I would reserve judgment on that significant question\\nwhere it was not thoroughly briefed and is unnecessary to a decision.\\n _________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -22-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4356169/\", \"author_raw\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BEAM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4578916/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Thompson L. AWNINGS, Formerly Known as Tristan Simon, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Joshua FULLERTON; Ryan Duncan, Defendants-Appellees Jeremy Carther; Todd Roberts, Defendants Tarvis Banks; 1-10 Does, Defendants-Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2884\n ___________________________\n\n Thompson L. Awnings, formerly known as Tristan Simon\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Joshua Fullerton; Ryan Duncan\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\n\n Jeremy Carther; Todd Roberts\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\n\n Tarvis Banks; 1-10 Does\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln\n ____________\n\n Submitted: May 16, 2018\n Filed: January 4, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, BEAM and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSMITH, Chief Judge.\n\n Thompson Awnings sued, among others, Officers Joshua Fullerton, Ryan\nDuncan, and Tarvis Banks of the Lincoln Police Department (LPD) under 42 U.S.C.\n§ 1983 in their individual capacities. Awnings’s suit alleged multiple constitutional\nviolations by the officers, including false arrest, excessive force, and denial of\nmedical care. He claims the district court1 erred by: (1) refusing to disqualify the\nentire City of Lincoln Attorney’s Office; (2) granting qualified immunity to Officers\nFullerton and Duncan; and (3) dismissing Officer Banks from Awnings’s suit\npursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). We affirm.\n\n I. Background\n A. Awnings’s Arrest2\n On an early morning in July 2013, Officers Fullerton and Duncan of the LPD\nencountered Damien Wilkins on a sidewalk in Lincoln. The officers questioned\nWilkins about his possible involvement with criminal activity. Awnings, Wilkins’s\ncompanion, inserted himself into the conversation and began asking the officers why\nthey were questioning Wilkins. Officer Fullerton informed Awnings that the officers\nwere conducting law enforcement business with Wilkins. Officer Fullerton then told\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District\nof Nebraska.\n 2\n Although Awnings disputed the defendants’ version of the events, the district\ncourt found that most of the defendants’ statements of material facts did not\ncontrovert Awnings’s own recitation. See Mem. & Order at 7–23, Awnings v.\nFullerton, No. 4:15-cv-03078-RGK-CRZ (D. Neb. Apr. 24, 2017), ECF No. 133\n(“Qualified Immunity Order”). Upon review, we find that the parties’ versions of\nevents largely do not controvert each other, and we recite here only the undisputed\nfacts. See Morris v. City of Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard\nof review) (citation omitted).\n\n -2-\n\nAwnings, who had been drinking, that he could wait for his friend a short distance\naway, if he wished.\n\n Unsatisfied, Awnings—now obviously angry and agitated—refused the\ndirection to step away. Awnings then, in an expletive-laced exclamation, declared that\n“[h]e would protect his buddy” and that he was “not going anywhere.” Qualified\nImmunity Order at 9. Awnings was several feet from Officer Fullerton, and the officer\ninstructed Awnings to step away from the officers. Awnings again refused, asking,\n“Why should I leave?” Id. at 9. Officer Fullerton answered that Awnings was\ninterfering with an investigation and that his behavior distracted them from their\nwork. Awnings uttered another expletive and told the officer, “I am staying right\nhere.” Id. Officer Fullerton—for the third time—asked Awnings to leave the\nimmediate area; Officer Fullerton reinforced his request by warning Awnings that if\nhe refused, he would go to jail. In response, Awnings again blurted out the same\nexpletive, followed by “I’ll kick your ass.” Id.\n\n At that point, Officer Fullerton informed Awnings that he was under arrest and\ncommanded Awnings to place his hands behind his back. Awnings refused, telling\nOfficer Fullerton, “I’m gonna kick your [expletive] ass.” Id. Officer Fullerton then\n“reached out and grabbed onto [Awning’s] arm and wrist, but then [Awnings]\nstiffened his arm and began to pull away. Officer Fullerton again told [Awnings] he\nwas under arrest and to stop resisting and [Awnings] continued to resist and pull\naway.” Id. at 10. The officer then executed a hip toss maneuver, which put Awnings\n“on his back on the ground with Officer Fullerton on top of him.” Id. The two men\nbegan to fight. Officer Jon-Eric Meyer, who had arrived at the scene, joined with\nOfficer Duncan and came to Officer Fullerton’s assistance. As the officers attempted\nto handcuff Awnings, he resisted, “actively kicking and punching at the officers.” Id.\nAwnings then\n hook[ed] his hand under Officer Duncan’s LPD uniform shirt and\n [brought] his hand up to the collar, grabbing onto the body armor and\n\n -3-\n\n undershirt as well as his collar. [Awnings] used this hold . . . to try to\n pull Officer Duncan to the ground with force, causing the collar to cinch\n around Officer Duncan’s neck.\n\nId. Meanwhile, “Officer Duncan gave numerous commands for [Awnings] to let go”\nand to put his hands behind his back. Id. Awnings ignored the directive and continued\nto tighten his grip on Officer Duncan’s shirt collar, and the officer “tried to strike\n[Awnings] a couple of times” to induce Awnings to release his grasp. Id. at 11.\nAwnings pinned Officer Duncan to the ground.\n\n Officer Duncan yelled to his colleagues for help. Awnings eventually released\nOfficer Duncan’s shirt, and the officers then rolled Awnings onto his stomach and\nhandcuffed him. Awnings refused to walk to the police cruiser. Officer Jeremy\nCarther from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln Police Department arrived and\nassisted the LPD officers in placing Awnings on his back in the backseat of the\ncruiser. Awnings continued to resist and yell profanities. Awnings kicked Officer\nCarther in the chest twice. At that point, Officers Fullerton, Meyer, and Carther\nremoved Awnings from the cruiser and called for a vehicle with a “full backseat\ncage.” Id. at 11. Awnings continued to resist the officers, and when a police vehicle\nequipped with the full cage arrived, Officer Chris Howard placed Awnings in leg\nrestraints. The officers then placed Awnings into the police cruiser. Officer Duncan\nsustained minor injuries from the scuffle.\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n\n B. Awnings’s Transport to the Detention Center3\n Awnings sustained visible injuries during his arrest. Because he was bleeding,\nthe LPD officers called for an ambulance to transport Awnings to the Bryan West\nMedical Center (“the Hospital”). Officer Howard accompanied Awnings in the\nambulance. At the Hospital, Awnings told the examining physician that he believed\nhe had one or more fractured ribs. The doctor ordered a chest X-ray, which revealed\nno rib fracture. The doctor pronounced Awnings fit for incarceration, but he ordered\na follow-up examination at the Hospital within one to two days. Officer Banks, who\nhad relieved Officer Howard during Awnings’s examination at the Hospital, then\ntransported Awnings to the Lancaster County Jail. Officer Banks neglected to inform\njail personnel of the doctor’s request for a follow-up appointment with Awnings; he\n“simply informed jail personnel that [Awnings] had been to the emergency room and\nhad been deemed fit for confinement.” Mem. & Order at 3, Awnings v. Fullerton, No.\n4:15-cv-03078-RGK-CRZ (D. Neb. Jan. 20, 2016), ECF No. 40.\n\n C. District Court and Other Proceedings\n Awnings’s scuffle with the LPD led to several, subsequent state criminal\ncharges.4 Awnings pleaded no contest to two of the charges, and the District Court\nof Lancaster County, Nebraska, sentenced him to two consecutive 90-day jail terms.\nThe Nebraska Court of Appeals upheld Awnings’s convictions.\n\n\n\n\n 3\n We recite these facts as alleged in Awnings’s complaint and assume them to\nbe true. See Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1098 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per\ncuriam) (“We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss . . . de novo. We\nassume all facts in the complaint to be true, and draw all reasonable inferences in\nfavor of the non-moving party.” (citations omitted)).\n 4\n These charges included assault on an officer in the third degree, in violation\nof Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-931, assault in the third degree, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat.\n§ 28-310(1), and resisting arrest, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-904(1).\n\n -5-\n\n After his state convictions, Awnings filed a lawsuit in federal court pursuant\nto 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, among other things, that Officer Fullerton arrested\nAwnings without probable cause and that Officers Fullerton and Duncan used\nexcessive force in effecting his arrest. Awnings also alleged that Officer\nBanks—because of his failure to inform jail personnel of the Hospital doctor’s\nrequest for a follow-up examination—deprived him of his right to be free from\nunreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Awnings also claimed that\nOfficer Banks’s conduct amounted to a denial of medical care, violating his due\nprocess rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\n Elizabeth Elliott, an attorney employed by the City of Lincoln Attorney’s\nOffice (CLAO), initially represented the LPD officers. In that capacity, she filed a\nnotice of intent to serve subpoena duces tecum with the district court. Elliott\npreviously had worked in the Lancaster County Public Defender’s Office (LPDO).\nIn fact, Elliott worked as an attorney in that office while the LPDO defended\nAwnings’s state criminal charges. Awnings objected to the notice, and Elliott moved\nto withdraw from the case upon discovering the potential conflict. Awnings then\nmoved to disqualify the entire CLAO, claiming Elliott’s employment at the LPDO\nwhile that office represented Awnings created a conflict of interest that could\nprejudice his civil suit against the officers.\n\n The magistrate judge considered Awnings’s motion and found that while\nemployed with the LPDO, Elliott “did not represent [Awnings], never appeared with\n[Awnings] in court, and never spoke to him about his case. She [did] not recall\n[Awnings] or the underlying facts of his state criminal case. She was never ‘actively\ninvolved’ in [Awnings’s] underlying state criminal case.” Mem. & Order at 3,\nAwnings v. Fullerton, No. 4:15-cv-03078-RGK-CRZ (D. Neb. Oct. 14, 2015), ECF\nNo. 26 (citation omitted). And Awnings pleaded no contest to the criminal charges\nafter Elliott left the LPDO. The CLAO assured the court that “Elliott has no\nconfidential information regarding [Awnings] and as such, has not divulged any\n\n -6-\n\nconfidential information to [the CLAO] about [Awnings] or his criminal case.” Id. at\n4. Further, the CLAO had screened Elliott from any further work in Awnings’s case.\nFinding no imputed conflict of interest stemming from Elliott’s prior employment at\nthe LPDO, the magistrate judge denied Awnings’s motion to disqualify the entire\nCLAO. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge’s order.\n\n Officers Banks, Duncan, and Fullerton moved to dismiss Awnings’s § 1983\nsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). The district court partially\ngranted the motion and dismissed Officer Banks from the suit. Officers Duncan and\nFullerton subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court\ngranted. The court concluded that the Heck5 doctrine barred Awnings from claiming\nfalse arrest. But even if Heck did not foreclose Awnings’s false arrest claim, the\ndistrict court determined that Officers Duncan and Fullerton had probable cause to\narrest Awnings. Further, the court concluded that the officers’ use of force was\n“objectively reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate [Awnings’s]\nconstitutional rights.” Qualified Immunity Order at 34. The district court then granted\nsummary judgment to the officers. The court held that the officers were entitled to\nqualified immunity and dismissed both the false arrest and the excessive force claims.\n\n II. Discussion\n In this appeal, Awnings claims the district court erred by: (1) failing to\ndisqualify the entire CLAO; (2) granting qualified immunity to Officers Duncan and\nFullerton; and (3) granting Officer Banks’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. We disagree and\naffirm.\n\n A. Disqualification of the CLAO Attorneys\n Awnings argues that Elliott’s employment with the LPDO prior to joining the\nCLAO raises a conflict of interest. Furthermore, he contends that Elliott’s conflict\n\n\n 5\n Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).\n\n -7-\n\nshould be imputed to the entire CLAO and that the district court should have granted\nAwnings’s motion to disqualify. We review the district court’s denial of attorney\ndisqualification for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579,\n590 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 605–06\n(8th Cir. 1977)). “Because of the potential for abuse by opposing counsel,\n‘disqualification motions should be subjected to particularly strict scrutiny.’”\nMacheca Transp. Co. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 463 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2006)\n(quoting Harker v. Comm’r, 82 F.3d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 1996)). “[W]e apply the same\nrules governing the professional conduct of attorneys that the district court has\nadopted.” Harker, 82 F.3d at 808 (citing Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1333\n(8th Cir. 1990)). The moving party bears the burden of proving that disqualification\nis required. See A.J. by L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 859 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Duncan\nv. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020, 1028 (5th Cir. 1981)).\n\n Under its general rules, the district court does not “adopt other codes of\nprofessional responsibility or ethics.” NEGenR 1.7(b)(2)(A). But, “the court may\nconsult other codes of professional responsibility or ethics to determine whether a\nlawyer has engaged in conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar.” NEGenR\n1.7(b)(2)(B); cf. Malone v. Kantner Ingredients, Inc., No. 4:12CV3190, 2013 WL\n5524548, at *7 (D. Neb. Oct. 3, 2013) (“When analyzing motions to disqualify, this\ncourt refers to the Nebraska Rules of Professional conduct.”). In this case, the\nmagistrate judge cited State v. Kinkennon, 747 N.W.2d 437 (Neb. 2008), as the basis\nfor denying Awnings’s motion to disqualify the entire CLAO. The district court\nsubsequently affirmed the magistrate judge.\n\n In Kinkennon, a Nebraska court appointed an attorney from a private law firm\nto represent a defendant in a criminal case. Id. at 441. During the pendency of the\ncase, another attorney from the law firm began employment as a deputy county\nattorney. Id. The defendant then moved to disqualify the entire county attorney’s\noffice, asking the state court to appoint a special prosecutor. Id. The state court denied\n\n -8-\n\nthe defendant’s motion. The Nebraska Supreme Court, after rejecting a per se rule of\ndisqualification, affirmed the trial court and explained:\n\n We recognize that complete disqualification of a prosecutor’s office may\n be warranted in cases where the appearance of unfairness or impropriety\n is so great that the public trust and confidence in our judicial system\n simply could not be maintained otherwise. Such an extreme case might\n exist, even where the State has done all in its power to establish an\n effective screening procedure precluding the individual lawyer’s direct\n or indirect participation in the prosecution. But when the disqualified\n attorney is effectively screened from any participation in the prosecution\n of the defendant, the prosecutor’s office may, in general, proceed with\n the prosecution.\n\nId. at 444 (footnote omitted).\n\n Awnings says the district court erroneously relied on Kinkennon and contends\nthat our prior decision, State of Arkansas v. Dean Foods Products Co., 605 F.2d 380\n(8th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim Products Liability\nLitigation, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980), compels reversal of the district court. He is\nwrong. As we explained,\n\n [i]n Dean Foods Products, this court affirmed a district court order\n disqualifying an Assistant Attorney General from taking part in an\n antitrust action against a defendant that was being represented by his\n former law firm. Moreover, the court disqualified those members of the\n Attorney General’s staff who had actively participated in the case under\n the supervision of the disqualified attorney. The court explicitly reserved\n judgment on whether the conflict should have resulted in the imputed\n disqualification of the entire Attorney General’s office.\n\nBlair, 916 F.2d at 1332 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, Dean Foods\nProducts does not command the disqualification of an entire attorney’s office even\n\n -9-\n\nwhen an attorney in that office possesses confidential information about the\ndefendant. Rather, it is satisfactory that the attorney and the staff supervised by the\nattorney be disqualified and appropriately screened.\n\n We find no conflict between Kinkennon and Dean Foods Products, and neither\ndecision supports disqualifying the entire CLAO in Awnings’s civil case. When the\npotential for a conflict became known, Elliott moved to recuse herself from the case\nout of caution. She did not represent Awnings in his state criminal proceedings, did\nnot recall Awnings or his criminal case, and was never actively involved in the\ncriminal proceedings. Awnings pleaded no contest to the criminal charges after Elliott\ndeparted the LPDO. Aside from filing the notice of intent to serve a subpoena duces\ntecum, the CLAO screened Elliott from further participation in Awnings’s case.\nWhile Awnings suggested that Elliott might have imparted confidential information\nregarding his criminal case to the CLAO, see Appellant’s Br. at 16–17, “[g]eneral\nassertions that an attorney possesses knowledge of a party’s ‘trade secrets, trial\nstrategies, negotiation strategies, legal theories or business practices’ are not typically\nsufficient and can be overcome by an attorney affidavit stating the attorney has no\nknowledge of such items.” Infogroup, Inc. v. DatabaseLLC, No. 8:14CV49, 2016 WL\n2350113, at *2 (D. Neb. May 4, 2016) (citing Jacob N. Printing Co. v. Mosley, 779\nN.W.2d 596, 602 (Neb. 2010)). Awnings only presented conjecture to support his\nassertion that Elliott possessed confidential information regarding his case. Elliott,\non the other hand, submitted an affidavit claiming no knowledge of the case from her\nprevious employment.\n\n Because Awnings failed in his burden to show the necessity of disqualifying\nof the entire CLAO, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of\nAwnings’s motion to disqualify. See A.J. by L.B., 56 F.3d at 859 (citation omitted).\n\n\n\n\n -10-\n\n B. Qualified Immunity\n Next, Awnings claims the district court erred when it granted qualified\nimmunity to Officers Duncan and Fullerton because the district court erroneously:\n(1) excluded Awnings’s statements about his medical condition; (2) admitted\naffidavits from the LPD officers; and (3) ignored material fact disputes raised by\nAwnings. “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and\nmay affirm the district court on any basis supported by the record.” Figg v. Russell,\n433 F.3d 593, 597 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 716 (8th Cir.\n2000); Gonzales-Perez v. Harper, 241 F.3d 633, 638 n.6 (8th Cir. 2001)). We review\nthe district court’s admission of evidence for summary judgment purposes under an\nabuse-of-discretion standard. Gannon Int’l., Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 793 (8th\nCir. 2012) (citing Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 591\n(8th Cir. 2011)). We address each of Awnings’s claims in turn.\n\n 1. Evidentiary Rulings\n Awnings claims that the district court erred in excluding statements he made\nabout his medical examination at the Hospital after his release from jail. He also\nasserts that the court erred in admitting affidavits from Officers Fullerton, Duncan,\nMeyer, Howard, and one other officer of the LPD and from Officer Carther from the\nUniversity of Nebraska–Lincoln Police Department.\n\n Awnings submitted a declaration stating that following his release from jail, he\nvisited a physician at the Hospital, who diagnosed him with four broken ribs and a\ncollapsed lung. The district court excluded Awnings’s medical condition statement\nbecause the “[examining] physician [was] not identified, the diagnoses [were]\nhearsay, and there [was] no medical evidence to establish a causal link to” Awning’s\nencounter with the LPD. Qualified Immunity Order at 22 n.22. Awnings says that at\nthe summary judgment stage, he need not present evidence in a trial-ready form. He\ncontends that he could have called the examining physician to testify at trial. Further,\nhe asserts that he was not required to disclose the physician’s name, especially when\n\n -11-\n\nthe doctor’s identity was readily discernible from the record. Lastly, Awnings, citing\nZiesmer v. Hagen, 785 F.3d 1233 (8th Cir. 2015), argues that because his injuries\nwere not sophisticated and within the range of common experience, he was not\nrequired to produce an expert witness to prove causation. We disagree.\n\n In Ziesmer, a police search of an individual turned into a physical altercation.\nId. at 1236. The trooper “tackled the [plaintiff, Ziesmer,] to the ground and dug his\nknee into [Ziesmer’s] back, while pulling Ziesmer’s hands behind his back, causing\nhis shoulder to pop out of its socket. Trooper Hagen popped Ziesmer’s shoulder back\ninto its socket.” Id. “Immediately after the incident Ziesmer reports that he had\nbruising and scrapes on his face and a large knot on the back of his head. He took\npictures of his bruised face when he got home.” Id. Ziesmer also sustained a welt on\nhis head. Id. We reversed the district court’s conclusion that Ziesmer needed to\nproduce a medical expert to opine on Ziesmer’s condition, reasoning:\n\n It is true that “[w]hen an injury is sophisticated, proof of causation\n generally must be established by expert testimony.” Robinson v. Hager,\n 292 F.3d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 2002). However, “[a] causal connection\n between an event and an injury may be inferred in cases in which a\n visible injury or a sudden onset of an injury occurs.” Id. (quoting Turner\n v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1210 (8th Cir. 2000)).\n\n Given that Ziesmer claims he began experiencing neck pain\n shortly after the alleged altercation with Trooper Hagen, and given that\n there is no evidence suggesting he experienced any such pain before [the\n incident with the trooper], a layperson could conclude that Ziesmer’s\n symptoms were caused by the trauma to his neck and back. See also Hill\n v. Gonzalez, 454 F.2d 1201, 1203 (8th Cir. 1972) (noting that “expert\n testimony is not necessary” to prove causation when the “inferences to\n be drawn from the facts are within the range of common experience” of\n the jury members (quotation omitted)); cf. Saunders v. Frost, 124 Fed.\n Appx. 468, 469 (8th Cir. 2005) (agreeing that the plaintiff’s knee injury\n was sophisticated, requiring an expert witness to prove causation,\n\n\n -12-\n\n because his knee “had a long medical history marked by earlier traumas\n and an earlier surgery”). Injuries such as those claimed by Ziesmer are\n “within the range of common experience,” and the lack of a medical\n expert on this issue is not fatal to his claim at this stage of the\n proceedings.\n\nId. at 1239 (first and second alterations in original).\n\n Here, Awnings’s alleged injuries—fractured ribs and a collapsed lung—were\ninternal and required sophisticated medical tools to diagnose accurately. As such,\nAwnings’s non-visible alleged injuries are not within the range of common\nexperience where inferences may be made with confidence. Further, Awnings’s visit\nto the Hospital immediately after his arrest showed no fractured ribs or a collapsed\nlung. In the absence of medical evidence, only Awnings’s own allegations remain.\nBut, “[a] plaintiff may not merely point to unsupported self-serving allegations, but\nmust substantiate allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would permit a\nfinding in the plaintiff’s favor.” Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638 (8th\nCir. 2005) (citing Wilson v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 62 F.3d 237, 241 (8th Cir. 1995));\nsee also Bacon v. Hennepin Cty. Med. Ctr., 550 F.3d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[A]\nproperly supported motion for summary judgment is not defeated by self-serving\naffidavits.” (alteration in original) (quoting Gander Mountain Co. v. Cabela’s, Inc.,\n540 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir. 2008))). Thus, in contrast to Ziesmer, without probative\nmedical evidence, Awnings can establish neither severity of injury nor causation. This\nevidentiary void is fatal to Awnings’s claim. We find no abuse of discretion in the\ndistrict court’s conclusion that Awnings failed to present evidence of a causal link\nbetween his alleged injuries and his encounter with the law enforcement officers.\n\n Awnings also challenges the district court’s decision to admit affidavits from\nthe officers, contending that the affidavits should have been excluded because the\nofficers do not state that they had personal knowledge of “any of the facts [they]\nrecited, and “the affidavit[s] do[] not establish that [the officers] would be competent\n\n -13-\n\nto testify as to the objectionable portions.” Appellant’s Br. at 39. Awnings cites to no\nauthority that the affidavits must expressly state they came from personal knowledge,\nand we decline to endorse the kind of formalism that Awnings propounds. The district\ncourt found that the officers’ statements were based on personal knowledge and\noverruled Awnings’s objections. See Qualified Immunity Order at 4 n.1. In his\nobjections, Awnings presented no arguments or evidence why the officers would not\nbe competent to testify at a trial. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the district\ncourt’s evidentiary rulings.\n\n 2. False Arrest\n Awnings contests the district court’s conclusion that the Heck doctrine barred\nhis false arrest claim. He also challenges the district court’s alternative ruling—that\neven if Heck does not bar Awnings’s claim, Officers Duncan and Fullerton had\nprobable cause to arrest Awnings. We need not address Awnings argument that the\ndistrict court misapplied Heck because the officers had probable cause to arrest him\nfor obstruction of a peace officer.\n\n Awnings argues that at the beginning of his encounter with Officers Fullerton\nand Duncan, he did not resist. The record, however, does not support Awnings’s\ncontention. According to Awnings, Officer Fullerton “yelled at him to shut up and\npointed to a direction behind him.” Qualified Immunity Order at 17. Awnings averred\nthat he could not hear Officer Fullerton and he “yelled back at [Officer] Fullerton.”\nId. at 18. Officer Fullerton then “grabbed [Awnings’s] right arm and started to yank\nit.” Id. “Awnings [then] recoiled and tried to get his arm loose.” Id. Awnings does not\ndispute that Officers Fullerton and Duncan were conducting law enforcement\nbusiness with his companion, that Officer Fullerton pointed Awnings away from the\nscene, or that he refused to comply. At that point, Officer Fullerton grabbed Awnings,\nand Awnings pulled away.\n\n\n\n\n -14-\n\n Under Nebraska law, Awnings’s admitted conduct qualified as obstruction of\na peace officer and resisting arrest. “A person commits the offense of obstructing a\npeace officer, when, by . . . physical interference, or obstacle, he . . . intentionally\nobstructs, impairs, or hinders . . . the enforcement of the penal law or the preservation\nof the peace by a peace officer . . . acting under color of his . . . official authority.”\nNeb. Rev. Stat. § 28-906(1)(a). Here, Awnings acknowledged that Officer Fullerton\nwas initially at least five feet from him, but Officer Fullerton moved closer during\ntheir encounter. Officer Fullerton had previously told Awnings “that it was none of\n[Awnings’s] business, and that if he wanted to wait for Wilkins he could do so at\nsome distance away.” Qualified Immunity Order at 16–17. Awnings refused to move\nback. Officer Fullerton subsequently gestured to Awnings to move away by waving.\nBut Awnings again refused to move and “yelled back at [Officer] Fullerton.” Id. at\n18. Awnings’s does not deny yelling, “[Expletive] you, I am staying right here” and\n“[Expletive] you, I’ll kick your ass.” Id. at 9. Awnings’s conduct constituted\nobstruction of a peace officer. See State v. Rosado, No. A-09-014, 2009 WL 3381652,\nat *2 (Neb. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2009) (holding that pounding chest, saying “shoot me,\n[expletive],” and being in close proximity to peace officer attempting to arrest another\nindividual was obstructing a peace officer under Nebraska law); State v. Chapman,\nNo. A-92-451, 1993 WL 100146, at *5 (Neb. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 1993) (holding that\nunder the Nebraska obstruction statute, a defendant “could ‘threaten to use force or\nviolence’ with words, such as telling [the officer] he ‘was going to kick [his] ass’”\n(second alteration in original)); see also Ehlers v. City of Rapid City, 846 F.3d 1002,\n1009 (8th Cir. 2017) (concluding that “[r]efusing to comply with a police officer’s\norders can constitute obstruction” under a similar South Dakota statute (citation\nomitted)).\n\n Based on Awnings’s obstruction, Officer Fullerton had probable cause to\narrest. With probable cause, it was unnecessary for Officer Fullerton to issue a\n“verbal advisement of an attempted arrest”; rather, “actions to effectuate physical\ncontrol over [the defendant] [are sufficient to] constitute[] an attempt to arrest.” State\n\n -15-\n\nv. Heath, 838 N.W.2d 4, 17 (Neb. Ct. App. 2013) (first alteration in original) (citation\nomitted). By grabbing Awnings’s arm, Officer Fullerton attempted to effectuate\nphysical control over Awnings. Awnings resisted by pulling away. Awnings’s\nensuing fight with the officers is undisputed.\n\n 3. Excessive Force\n Awnings also faults the district court for granting qualified immunity to\nOfficers Fullerton and Duncan on his excessive force claim. He argues genuine\ndisputes of material facts preclude the court’s grant of qualified immunity.\n\n “To determine whether a particular use of force was excessive, the court\nconsiders whether it was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, relying on\nthe perspective of a reasonable officer present at the scene, rather than the 20/20\nvision of hindsight.” Ehlers, 846 F.3d at 1011 (cleaned up). “Force is excessive when\nan officer’s actions are not objectively reasonable in light of the facts and\ncircumstances confronting him.” Kukla v. Hulm, 310 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2002)\n(citing Guite v. Wright, 147 F.3d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1998)). “When an arrestee flees\nor resists, some use of force by the police is reasonable.” Greiner v. City of Champlin,\n27 F.3d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Foster v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, 914\nF.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 1990)). “[E]vidence of only de minimis injury [does not]\nforeclose[] a claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.” Chambers v.\nPennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 906 (8th Cir. 2011). “[I]t is logically possible to prove an\nexcessive use of force that caused only a minor injury . . . . ” Id. We “focus instead\non whether the force applied is reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable\nofficer on the scene at the time the force is used.” Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490\nU.S. 386, 396 (1989)).\n\n We agree with the district court that Awnings showed no genuine disputes of\nmaterial fact between his version of events and the officers’ version. Here, the record\nshows that Officer Fullerton executed a takedown maneuver after Awnings resisted\n\n -16-\n\narrest for obstruction under Nebraska law. Awnings alleged that officers joined in\nbeating him, but Officers Fullerton and Duncan’s evidence—uncontroverted by\nAwnings—showed an uncooperative and bellicose Awnings who resisted arrest by\nswinging and kicking at the officers.6 Also of note, Awnings contends that at least\nfour officers physically attacked him. But, according to the proof of record, Awnings\nsustained only a de minimis injury—a small laceration over his right eyebrow. See\nEllison v. Lesher, 796 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Our cases characterize\nrelatively minor scrapes, bruises, and contusions as de minimis.” (citing Ziesmer, 785\nF.3d at 1236–37; Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062, 1066–67 (8th Cir. 2006))).\nOfficer Duncan also suffered non-serious injuries during his attempt to subdue\nAwnings.\n\n Here, other than generic assertions, Awnings’s statements “do not give the\nslightest hint about the amount of force the officer[s] used or why the amount of force\nwas unreasonable in light of [his] persistent efforts to [resist] the police.” Edwards\nv. Giles, 51 F.3d 155, 157 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) (concluding that\nassertions such as the officers “threw [plaintiff] to the ground” or plaintiff “was\nthrown to the ground forcibly” are “abstract assertions [that] tell us nothing more than\nthat one officer used some physical power to move [the plaintiff to the ground”).\nReviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Awnings, he has failed to show that\nOfficers Fullerton and Duncan used unreasonable force to arrest him. See Ehlers, 846\nF.3d at 1010–11. Officers Fullerton and Duncan are entitled to qualified immunity.\n\n\n\n\n 6\n Awnings stated that he pulled his arm back when Officer Fullerton first\ngrabbed his arm; that after Officer Fullerton’s takedown, Awnings tried to get Officer\nFullerton off and to get away from the officer; that he tried to curl his body into a ball\n(thereby making it difficult for the officers to handcuff Awnings); and that he jumped\nout of the police vehicle after having been placed in the back seat. See Qualified\nImmunity Order at 18–20.\n\n -17-\n\n C. Motion to Dismiss\n Awnings contends that the district court erred in dismissing Officer Banks from\nthe suit. Awnings argues that he adequately stated a claim for deliberate indifference\nto his serious medical needs. Awnings’s allegation stemmed from Officer Banks’s\nfailure to inform the jail staff of Awnings’s need for a follow-up visit with the\nHospital. We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Wong v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 820\nF.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). We assume the truth of Awnings’s\nfactual allegations, and “we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the\nnonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Ritchie v. St. Louis Jewish Light, 630 F.3d 713,\n715–16 (8th Cir. 2011)).\n\n The parties do not dispute that Officer Banks neglected to inform jail personnel\nof Awnings’s need for a follow-up medical appointment. Awnings argues that his\ntransport from the Hospital to the jail was part of his arrest; therefore his claim\nagainst Officer Banks necessarily implicates the Fourth Amendment. But, historically,\nin this circuit, claims of deliberate indifference to an arrestee’s medical needs are\n“properly analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”\nCarpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644, 650 (8th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Unresolved\nis “the question whether the Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals with\nprotection against the deliberate use of excessive physical force beyond the point at\nwhich arrest ends and pretrial detention begins.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10\n(emphasis added); see also Chambers, 641 F.3d at 905 (“We have noted the existence\nof a ‘legal twilight zone’ between arrest and sentencing, where it is unclear whether\nexcessive force claims are governed by the Fourth Amendment or cases decided based\non the Fourteenth Amendment and substantive due process.” (emphasis added)\n(quoting Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 2000))). Awnings’s claim\nagainst Officer Banks is a failure to provide adequate medical services—not an\nexcessive force claim related to his arrest. Instead, Awnings claim against Officer\nBanks relates to the sufficiency of his post-arrest, post-medical examination, medical\n\n -18-\n\ncare. It is true that we have not as yet “resolved whether an arrestee’s claim alleging\ndenial of medical care is analyzed under the Due Process Clause or the Fourth\nAmendment. Bailey v. Feltmann, 810 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 2016). We need not do\nso here. The facts distinguish this case from those arising from an allegation of\nexcessive force. Factually, any alleged denial of medical care incident to Awnings’s\narrest ended when he actually received medical attention at the hospital. Awnings’s\nclaim against Officer Banks relates to Officer Banks’s omission to convey the follow-\nup medical appointment ordered by the doctor—not from his participation in\nAwnings’s arrest. In fact, Officer Banks did not participate in the arrest of Awnings.\nUnlike the plaintiff in Carpenter, Awnings was first transported for medical treatment\nbefore being taken to jail. On this record, our precedents favor analyzing Awnings’s\nmedical needs claim under Fourteenth Amendment standards.\n\n Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “‘[d]eliberate indifference’ entails a level\nof culpability equal to the criminal law definition of recklessness, that is, a prison\nofficial ‘must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a\nsubstantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Bender\nv. Regier, 385 F.3d 1133, 1137 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.\n825, 837 (1994)). “The standard for evaluating a substantive due process claim is\nwhether the alleged ‘behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so\noutrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’”\nSchmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 574 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rogers v.\nCity of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 1998)). Here, Awnings sustained a\nsmall laceration, and his examining physician post-arrest declared Awnings fit for\nincarceration. Further, a chest X-ray showed no fractured ribs or lung damages. Under\nthese circumstances, it cannot be said that Officer Banks’s failure to inform the jail\nstaff of Awnings’s follow-up medical visit rises to the level of conduct that “shocks\nthe contemporary conscience.” Id. The district court correctly dismissed Awnings’s\nclaim against Officer Banks under Rule 12(b)(6).\n\n\n\n -19-\n\n III. Conclusion\n 7\n We affirm.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Thompson L. AWNINGS, Formerly Known as Tristan Simon, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Joshua FULLERTON; Ryan Duncan, Defendants-Appellees Jeremy Carther; Todd Roberts, Defendants Tarvis Banks; 1-10 Does, Defendants-Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2884\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Thompson L. Awnings, formerly known as Tristan Simon\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Joshua Fullerton; Ryan Duncan\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n\\n Jeremy Carther; Todd Roberts\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\\n\\n Tarvis Banks; 1-10 Does\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: May 16, 2018\\n Filed: January 4, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, BEAM and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSMITH, Chief Judge.\\n\\n Thompson Awnings sued, among others, Officers Joshua Fullerton, Ryan\\nDuncan, and Tarvis Banks of the Lincoln Police Department (LPD) under 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983 in their individual capacities. Awnings’s suit alleged multiple constitutional\\nviolations by the officers, including false arrest, excessive force, and denial of\\nmedical care. He claims the district court1 erred by: (1) refusing to disqualify the\\nentire City of Lincoln Attorney’s Office; (2) granting qualified immunity to Officers\\nFullerton and Duncan; and (3) dismissing Officer Banks from Awnings’s suit\\npursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background\\n A. Awnings’s Arrest2\\n On an early morning in July 2013, Officers Fullerton and Duncan of the LPD\\nencountered Damien Wilkins on a sidewalk in Lincoln. The officers questioned\\nWilkins about his possible involvement with criminal activity. Awnings, Wilkins’s\\ncompanion, inserted himself into the conversation and began asking the officers why\\nthey were questioning Wilkins. Officer Fullerton informed Awnings that the officers\\nwere conducting law enforcement business with Wilkins. Officer Fullerton then told\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Nebraska.\\n 2\\n Although Awnings disputed the defendants’ version of the events, the district\\ncourt found that most of the defendants’ statements of material facts did not\\ncontrovert Awnings’s own recitation. See Mem. & Order at 7–23, Awnings v.\\nFullerton, No. 4:15-cv-03078-RGK-CRZ (D. Neb. Apr. 24, 2017), ECF No. 133\\n(“Qualified Immunity Order”). Upon review, we find that the parties’ versions of\\nevents largely do not controvert each other, and we recite here only the undisputed\\nfacts. See Morris v. City of Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard\\nof review) (citation omitted).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\nAwnings, who had been drinking, that he could wait for his friend a short distance\\naway, if he wished.\\n\\n Unsatisfied, Awnings—now obviously angry and agitated—refused the\\ndirection to step away. Awnings then, in an expletive-laced exclamation, declared that\\n“[h]e would protect his buddy” and that he was “not going anywhere.” Qualified\\nImmunity Order at 9. Awnings was several feet from Officer Fullerton, and the officer\\ninstructed Awnings to step away from the officers. Awnings again refused, asking,\\n“Why should I leave?” Id. at 9. Officer Fullerton answered that Awnings was\\ninterfering with an investigation and that his behavior distracted them from their\\nwork. Awnings uttered another expletive and told the officer, “I am staying right\\nhere.” Id. Officer Fullerton—for the third time—asked Awnings to leave the\\nimmediate area; Officer Fullerton reinforced his request by warning Awnings that if\\nhe refused, he would go to jail. In response, Awnings again blurted out the same\\nexpletive, followed by “I’ll kick your ass.” Id.\\n\\n At that point, Officer Fullerton informed Awnings that he was under arrest and\\ncommanded Awnings to place his hands behind his back. Awnings refused, telling\\nOfficer Fullerton, “I’m gonna kick your [expletive] ass.” Id. Officer Fullerton then\\n“reached out and grabbed onto [Awning’s] arm and wrist, but then [Awnings]\\nstiffened his arm and began to pull away. Officer Fullerton again told [Awnings] he\\nwas under arrest and to stop resisting and [Awnings] continued to resist and pull\\naway.” Id. at 10. The officer then executed a hip toss maneuver, which put Awnings\\n“on his back on the ground with Officer Fullerton on top of him.” Id. The two men\\nbegan to fight. Officer Jon-Eric Meyer, who had arrived at the scene, joined with\\nOfficer Duncan and came to Officer Fullerton’s assistance. As the officers attempted\\nto handcuff Awnings, he resisted, “actively kicking and punching at the officers.” Id.\\nAwnings then\\n hook[ed] his hand under Officer Duncan’s LPD uniform shirt and\\n [brought] his hand up to the collar, grabbing onto the body armor and\\n\\n -3-\\n\\n undershirt as well as his collar. [Awnings] used this hold . . . to try to\\n pull Officer Duncan to the ground with force, causing the collar to cinch\\n around Officer Duncan’s neck.\\n\\nId. Meanwhile, “Officer Duncan gave numerous commands for [Awnings] to let go”\\nand to put his hands behind his back. Id. Awnings ignored the directive and continued\\nto tighten his grip on Officer Duncan’s shirt collar, and the officer “tried to strike\\n[Awnings] a couple of times” to induce Awnings to release his grasp. Id. at 11.\\nAwnings pinned Officer Duncan to the ground.\\n\\n Officer Duncan yelled to his colleagues for help. Awnings eventually released\\nOfficer Duncan’s shirt, and the officers then rolled Awnings onto his stomach and\\nhandcuffed him. Awnings refused to walk to the police cruiser. Officer Jeremy\\nCarther from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln Police Department arrived and\\nassisted the LPD officers in placing Awnings on his back in the backseat of the\\ncruiser. Awnings continued to resist and yell profanities. Awnings kicked Officer\\nCarther in the chest twice. At that point, Officers Fullerton, Meyer, and Carther\\nremoved Awnings from the cruiser and called for a vehicle with a “full backseat\\ncage.” Id. at 11. Awnings continued to resist the officers, and when a police vehicle\\nequipped with the full cage arrived, Officer Chris Howard placed Awnings in leg\\nrestraints. The officers then placed Awnings into the police cruiser. Officer Duncan\\nsustained minor injuries from the scuffle.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\n B. Awnings’s Transport to the Detention Center3\\n Awnings sustained visible injuries during his arrest. Because he was bleeding,\\nthe LPD officers called for an ambulance to transport Awnings to the Bryan West\\nMedical Center (“the Hospital”). Officer Howard accompanied Awnings in the\\nambulance. At the Hospital, Awnings told the examining physician that he believed\\nhe had one or more fractured ribs. The doctor ordered a chest X-ray, which revealed\\nno rib fracture. The doctor pronounced Awnings fit for incarceration, but he ordered\\na follow-up examination at the Hospital within one to two days. Officer Banks, who\\nhad relieved Officer Howard during Awnings’s examination at the Hospital, then\\ntransported Awnings to the Lancaster County Jail. Officer Banks neglected to inform\\njail personnel of the doctor’s request for a follow-up appointment with Awnings; he\\n“simply informed jail personnel that [Awnings] had been to the emergency room and\\nhad been deemed fit for confinement.” Mem. & Order at 3, Awnings v. Fullerton, No.\\n4:15-cv-03078-RGK-CRZ (D. Neb. Jan. 20, 2016), ECF No. 40.\\n\\n C. District Court and Other Proceedings\\n Awnings’s scuffle with the LPD led to several, subsequent state criminal\\ncharges.4 Awnings pleaded no contest to two of the charges, and the District Court\\nof Lancaster County, Nebraska, sentenced him to two consecutive 90-day jail terms.\\nThe Nebraska Court of Appeals upheld Awnings’s convictions.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n We recite these facts as alleged in Awnings’s complaint and assume them to\\nbe true. See Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1098 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per\\ncuriam) (“We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss . . . de novo. We\\nassume all facts in the complaint to be true, and draw all reasonable inferences in\\nfavor of the non-moving party.” (citations omitted)).\\n 4\\n These charges included assault on an officer in the third degree, in violation\\nof Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-931, assault in the third degree, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat.\\n§ 28-310(1), and resisting arrest, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-904(1).\\n\\n -5-\\n\\n After his state convictions, Awnings filed a lawsuit in federal court pursuant\\nto 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, among other things, that Officer Fullerton arrested\\nAwnings without probable cause and that Officers Fullerton and Duncan used\\nexcessive force in effecting his arrest. Awnings also alleged that Officer\\nBanks—because of his failure to inform jail personnel of the Hospital doctor’s\\nrequest for a follow-up examination—deprived him of his right to be free from\\nunreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Awnings also claimed that\\nOfficer Banks’s conduct amounted to a denial of medical care, violating his due\\nprocess rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.\\n\\n Elizabeth Elliott, an attorney employed by the City of Lincoln Attorney’s\\nOffice (CLAO), initially represented the LPD officers. In that capacity, she filed a\\nnotice of intent to serve subpoena duces tecum with the district court. Elliott\\npreviously had worked in the Lancaster County Public Defender’s Office (LPDO).\\nIn fact, Elliott worked as an attorney in that office while the LPDO defended\\nAwnings’s state criminal charges. Awnings objected to the notice, and Elliott moved\\nto withdraw from the case upon discovering the potential conflict. Awnings then\\nmoved to disqualify the entire CLAO, claiming Elliott’s employment at the LPDO\\nwhile that office represented Awnings created a conflict of interest that could\\nprejudice his civil suit against the officers.\\n\\n The magistrate judge considered Awnings’s motion and found that while\\nemployed with the LPDO, Elliott “did not represent [Awnings], never appeared with\\n[Awnings] in court, and never spoke to him about his case. She [did] not recall\\n[Awnings] or the underlying facts of his state criminal case. She was never ‘actively\\ninvolved’ in [Awnings’s] underlying state criminal case.” Mem. & Order at 3,\\nAwnings v. Fullerton, No. 4:15-cv-03078-RGK-CRZ (D. Neb. Oct. 14, 2015), ECF\\nNo. 26 (citation omitted). And Awnings pleaded no contest to the criminal charges\\nafter Elliott left the LPDO. The CLAO assured the court that “Elliott has no\\nconfidential information regarding [Awnings] and as such, has not divulged any\\n\\n -6-\\n\\nconfidential information to [the CLAO] about [Awnings] or his criminal case.” Id. at\\n4. Further, the CLAO had screened Elliott from any further work in Awnings’s case.\\nFinding no imputed conflict of interest stemming from Elliott’s prior employment at\\nthe LPDO, the magistrate judge denied Awnings’s motion to disqualify the entire\\nCLAO. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge’s order.\\n\\n Officers Banks, Duncan, and Fullerton moved to dismiss Awnings’s § 1983\\nsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). The district court partially\\ngranted the motion and dismissed Officer Banks from the suit. Officers Duncan and\\nFullerton subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court\\ngranted. The court concluded that the Heck5 doctrine barred Awnings from claiming\\nfalse arrest. But even if Heck did not foreclose Awnings’s false arrest claim, the\\ndistrict court determined that Officers Duncan and Fullerton had probable cause to\\narrest Awnings. Further, the court concluded that the officers’ use of force was\\n“objectively reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate [Awnings’s]\\nconstitutional rights.” Qualified Immunity Order at 34. The district court then granted\\nsummary judgment to the officers. The court held that the officers were entitled to\\nqualified immunity and dismissed both the false arrest and the excessive force claims.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n In this appeal, Awnings claims the district court erred by: (1) failing to\\ndisqualify the entire CLAO; (2) granting qualified immunity to Officers Duncan and\\nFullerton; and (3) granting Officer Banks’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. We disagree and\\naffirm.\\n\\n A. Disqualification of the CLAO Attorneys\\n Awnings argues that Elliott’s employment with the LPDO prior to joining the\\nCLAO raises a conflict of interest. Furthermore, he contends that Elliott’s conflict\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).\\n\\n -7-\\n\\nshould be imputed to the entire CLAO and that the district court should have granted\\nAwnings’s motion to disqualify. We review the district court’s denial of attorney\\ndisqualification for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579,\\n590 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 605–06\\n(8th Cir. 1977)). “Because of the potential for abuse by opposing counsel,\\n‘disqualification motions should be subjected to particularly strict scrutiny.’”\\nMacheca Transp. Co. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 463 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2006)\\n(quoting Harker v. Comm’r, 82 F.3d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 1996)). “[W]e apply the same\\nrules governing the professional conduct of attorneys that the district court has\\nadopted.” Harker, 82 F.3d at 808 (citing Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1333\\n(8th Cir. 1990)). The moving party bears the burden of proving that disqualification\\nis required. See A.J. by L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 859 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Duncan\\nv. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020, 1028 (5th Cir. 1981)).\\n\\n Under its general rules, the district court does not “adopt other codes of\\nprofessional responsibility or ethics.” NEGenR 1.7(b)(2)(A). But, “the court may\\nconsult other codes of professional responsibility or ethics to determine whether a\\nlawyer has engaged in conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar.” NEGenR\\n1.7(b)(2)(B); cf. Malone v. Kantner Ingredients, Inc., No. 4:12CV3190, 2013 WL\\n5524548, at *7 (D. Neb. Oct. 3, 2013) (“When analyzing motions to disqualify, this\\ncourt refers to the Nebraska Rules of Professional conduct.”). In this case, the\\nmagistrate judge cited State v. Kinkennon, 747 N.W.2d 437 (Neb. 2008), as the basis\\nfor denying Awnings’s motion to disqualify the entire CLAO. The district court\\nsubsequently affirmed the magistrate judge.\\n\\n In Kinkennon, a Nebraska court appointed an attorney from a private law firm\\nto represent a defendant in a criminal case. Id. at 441. During the pendency of the\\ncase, another attorney from the law firm began employment as a deputy county\\nattorney. Id. The defendant then moved to disqualify the entire county attorney’s\\noffice, asking the state court to appoint a special prosecutor. Id. The state court denied\\n\\n -8-\\n\\nthe defendant’s motion. The Nebraska Supreme Court, after rejecting a per se rule of\\ndisqualification, affirmed the trial court and explained:\\n\\n We recognize that complete disqualification of a prosecutor’s office may\\n be warranted in cases where the appearance of unfairness or impropriety\\n is so great that the public trust and confidence in our judicial system\\n simply could not be maintained otherwise. Such an extreme case might\\n exist, even where the State has done all in its power to establish an\\n effective screening procedure precluding the individual lawyer’s direct\\n or indirect participation in the prosecution. But when the disqualified\\n attorney is effectively screened from any participation in the prosecution\\n of the defendant, the prosecutor’s office may, in general, proceed with\\n the prosecution.\\n\\nId. at 444 (footnote omitted).\\n\\n Awnings says the district court erroneously relied on Kinkennon and contends\\nthat our prior decision, State of Arkansas v. Dean Foods Products Co., 605 F.2d 380\\n(8th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim Products Liability\\nLitigation, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980), compels reversal of the district court. He is\\nwrong. As we explained,\\n\\n [i]n Dean Foods Products, this court affirmed a district court order\\n disqualifying an Assistant Attorney General from taking part in an\\n antitrust action against a defendant that was being represented by his\\n former law firm. Moreover, the court disqualified those members of the\\n Attorney General’s staff who had actively participated in the case under\\n the supervision of the disqualified attorney. The court explicitly reserved\\n judgment on whether the conflict should have resulted in the imputed\\n disqualification of the entire Attorney General’s office.\\n\\nBlair, 916 F.2d at 1332 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, Dean Foods\\nProducts does not command the disqualification of an entire attorney’s office even\\n\\n -9-\\n\\nwhen an attorney in that office possesses confidential information about the\\ndefendant. Rather, it is satisfactory that the attorney and the staff supervised by the\\nattorney be disqualified and appropriately screened.\\n\\n We find no conflict between Kinkennon and Dean Foods Products, and neither\\ndecision supports disqualifying the entire CLAO in Awnings’s civil case. When the\\npotential for a conflict became known, Elliott moved to recuse herself from the case\\nout of caution. She did not represent Awnings in his state criminal proceedings, did\\nnot recall Awnings or his criminal case, and was never actively involved in the\\ncriminal proceedings. Awnings pleaded no contest to the criminal charges after Elliott\\ndeparted the LPDO. Aside from filing the notice of intent to serve a subpoena duces\\ntecum, the CLAO screened Elliott from further participation in Awnings’s case.\\nWhile Awnings suggested that Elliott might have imparted confidential information\\nregarding his criminal case to the CLAO, see Appellant’s Br. at 16–17, “[g]eneral\\nassertions that an attorney possesses knowledge of a party’s ‘trade secrets, trial\\nstrategies, negotiation strategies, legal theories or business practices’ are not typically\\nsufficient and can be overcome by an attorney affidavit stating the attorney has no\\nknowledge of such items.” Infogroup, Inc. v. DatabaseLLC, No. 8:14CV49, 2016 WL\\n2350113, at *2 (D. Neb. May 4, 2016) (citing Jacob N. Printing Co. v. Mosley, 779\\nN.W.2d 596, 602 (Neb. 2010)). Awnings only presented conjecture to support his\\nassertion that Elliott possessed confidential information regarding his case. Elliott,\\non the other hand, submitted an affidavit claiming no knowledge of the case from her\\nprevious employment.\\n\\n Because Awnings failed in his burden to show the necessity of disqualifying\\nof the entire CLAO, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of\\nAwnings’s motion to disqualify. See A.J. by L.B., 56 F.3d at 859 (citation omitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\n B. Qualified Immunity\\n Next, Awnings claims the district court erred when it granted qualified\\nimmunity to Officers Duncan and Fullerton because the district court erroneously:\\n(1) excluded Awnings’s statements about his medical condition; (2) admitted\\naffidavits from the LPD officers; and (3) ignored material fact disputes raised by\\nAwnings. “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and\\nmay affirm the district court on any basis supported by the record.” Figg v. Russell,\\n433 F.3d 593, 597 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 716 (8th Cir.\\n2000); Gonzales-Perez v. Harper, 241 F.3d 633, 638 n.6 (8th Cir. 2001)). We review\\nthe district court’s admission of evidence for summary judgment purposes under an\\nabuse-of-discretion standard. Gannon Int’l., Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 793 (8th\\nCir. 2012) (citing Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 591\\n(8th Cir. 2011)). We address each of Awnings’s claims in turn.\\n\\n 1. Evidentiary Rulings\\n Awnings claims that the district court erred in excluding statements he made\\nabout his medical examination at the Hospital after his release from jail. He also\\nasserts that the court erred in admitting affidavits from Officers Fullerton, Duncan,\\nMeyer, Howard, and one other officer of the LPD and from Officer Carther from the\\nUniversity of Nebraska–Lincoln Police Department.\\n\\n Awnings submitted a declaration stating that following his release from jail, he\\nvisited a physician at the Hospital, who diagnosed him with four broken ribs and a\\ncollapsed lung. The district court excluded Awnings’s medical condition statement\\nbecause the “[examining] physician [was] not identified, the diagnoses [were]\\nhearsay, and there [was] no medical evidence to establish a causal link to” Awning’s\\nencounter with the LPD. Qualified Immunity Order at 22 n.22. Awnings says that at\\nthe summary judgment stage, he need not present evidence in a trial-ready form. He\\ncontends that he could have called the examining physician to testify at trial. Further,\\nhe asserts that he was not required to disclose the physician’s name, especially when\\n\\n -11-\\n\\nthe doctor’s identity was readily discernible from the record. Lastly, Awnings, citing\\nZiesmer v. Hagen, 785 F.3d 1233 (8th Cir. 2015), argues that because his injuries\\nwere not sophisticated and within the range of common experience, he was not\\nrequired to produce an expert witness to prove causation. We disagree.\\n\\n In Ziesmer, a police search of an individual turned into a physical altercation.\\nId. at 1236. The trooper “tackled the [plaintiff, Ziesmer,] to the ground and dug his\\nknee into [Ziesmer’s] back, while pulling Ziesmer’s hands behind his back, causing\\nhis shoulder to pop out of its socket. Trooper Hagen popped Ziesmer’s shoulder back\\ninto its socket.” Id. “Immediately after the incident Ziesmer reports that he had\\nbruising and scrapes on his face and a large knot on the back of his head. He took\\npictures of his bruised face when he got home.” Id. Ziesmer also sustained a welt on\\nhis head. Id. We reversed the district court’s conclusion that Ziesmer needed to\\nproduce a medical expert to opine on Ziesmer’s condition, reasoning:\\n\\n It is true that “[w]hen an injury is sophisticated, proof of causation\\n generally must be established by expert testimony.” Robinson v. Hager,\\n 292 F.3d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 2002). However, “[a] causal connection\\n between an event and an injury may be inferred in cases in which a\\n visible injury or a sudden onset of an injury occurs.” Id. (quoting Turner\\n v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1210 (8th Cir. 2000)).\\n\\n Given that Ziesmer claims he began experiencing neck pain\\n shortly after the alleged altercation with Trooper Hagen, and given that\\n there is no evidence suggesting he experienced any such pain before [the\\n incident with the trooper], a layperson could conclude that Ziesmer’s\\n symptoms were caused by the trauma to his neck and back. See also Hill\\n v. Gonzalez, 454 F.2d 1201, 1203 (8th Cir. 1972) (noting that “expert\\n testimony is not necessary” to prove causation when the “inferences to\\n be drawn from the facts are within the range of common experience” of\\n the jury members (quotation omitted)); cf. Saunders v. Frost, 124 Fed.\\n Appx. 468, 469 (8th Cir. 2005) (agreeing that the plaintiff’s knee injury\\n was sophisticated, requiring an expert witness to prove causation,\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\n because his knee “had a long medical history marked by earlier traumas\\n and an earlier surgery”). Injuries such as those claimed by Ziesmer are\\n “within the range of common experience,” and the lack of a medical\\n expert on this issue is not fatal to his claim at this stage of the\\n proceedings.\\n\\nId. at 1239 (first and second alterations in original).\\n\\n Here, Awnings’s alleged injuries—fractured ribs and a collapsed lung—were\\ninternal and required sophisticated medical tools to diagnose accurately. As such,\\nAwnings’s non-visible alleged injuries are not within the range of common\\nexperience where inferences may be made with confidence. Further, Awnings’s visit\\nto the Hospital immediately after his arrest showed no fractured ribs or a collapsed\\nlung. In the absence of medical evidence, only Awnings’s own allegations remain.\\nBut, “[a] plaintiff may not merely point to unsupported self-serving allegations, but\\nmust substantiate allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would permit a\\nfinding in the plaintiff’s favor.” Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638 (8th\\nCir. 2005) (citing Wilson v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 62 F.3d 237, 241 (8th Cir. 1995));\\nsee also Bacon v. Hennepin Cty. Med. Ctr., 550 F.3d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[A]\\nproperly supported motion for summary judgment is not defeated by self-serving\\naffidavits.” (alteration in original) (quoting Gander Mountain Co. v. Cabela’s, Inc.,\\n540 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir. 2008))). Thus, in contrast to Ziesmer, without probative\\nmedical evidence, Awnings can establish neither severity of injury nor causation. This\\nevidentiary void is fatal to Awnings’s claim. We find no abuse of discretion in the\\ndistrict court’s conclusion that Awnings failed to present evidence of a causal link\\nbetween his alleged injuries and his encounter with the law enforcement officers.\\n\\n Awnings also challenges the district court’s decision to admit affidavits from\\nthe officers, contending that the affidavits should have been excluded because the\\nofficers do not state that they had personal knowledge of “any of the facts [they]\\nrecited, and “the affidavit[s] do[] not establish that [the officers] would be competent\\n\\n -13-\\n\\nto testify as to the objectionable portions.” Appellant’s Br. at 39. Awnings cites to no\\nauthority that the affidavits must expressly state they came from personal knowledge,\\nand we decline to endorse the kind of formalism that Awnings propounds. The district\\ncourt found that the officers’ statements were based on personal knowledge and\\noverruled Awnings’s objections. See Qualified Immunity Order at 4 n.1. In his\\nobjections, Awnings presented no arguments or evidence why the officers would not\\nbe competent to testify at a trial. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the district\\ncourt’s evidentiary rulings.\\n\\n 2. False Arrest\\n Awnings contests the district court’s conclusion that the Heck doctrine barred\\nhis false arrest claim. He also challenges the district court’s alternative ruling—that\\neven if Heck does not bar Awnings’s claim, Officers Duncan and Fullerton had\\nprobable cause to arrest Awnings. We need not address Awnings argument that the\\ndistrict court misapplied Heck because the officers had probable cause to arrest him\\nfor obstruction of a peace officer.\\n\\n Awnings argues that at the beginning of his encounter with Officers Fullerton\\nand Duncan, he did not resist. The record, however, does not support Awnings’s\\ncontention. According to Awnings, Officer Fullerton “yelled at him to shut up and\\npointed to a direction behind him.” Qualified Immunity Order at 17. Awnings averred\\nthat he could not hear Officer Fullerton and he “yelled back at [Officer] Fullerton.”\\nId. at 18. Officer Fullerton then “grabbed [Awnings’s] right arm and started to yank\\nit.” Id. “Awnings [then] recoiled and tried to get his arm loose.” Id. Awnings does not\\ndispute that Officers Fullerton and Duncan were conducting law enforcement\\nbusiness with his companion, that Officer Fullerton pointed Awnings away from the\\nscene, or that he refused to comply. At that point, Officer Fullerton grabbed Awnings,\\nand Awnings pulled away.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -14-\\n\\n Under Nebraska law, Awnings’s admitted conduct qualified as obstruction of\\na peace officer and resisting arrest. “A person commits the offense of obstructing a\\npeace officer, when, by . . . physical interference, or obstacle, he . . . intentionally\\nobstructs, impairs, or hinders . . . the enforcement of the penal law or the preservation\\nof the peace by a peace officer . . . acting under color of his . . . official authority.”\\nNeb. Rev. Stat. § 28-906(1)(a). Here, Awnings acknowledged that Officer Fullerton\\nwas initially at least five feet from him, but Officer Fullerton moved closer during\\ntheir encounter. Officer Fullerton had previously told Awnings “that it was none of\\n[Awnings’s] business, and that if he wanted to wait for Wilkins he could do so at\\nsome distance away.” Qualified Immunity Order at 16–17. Awnings refused to move\\nback. Officer Fullerton subsequently gestured to Awnings to move away by waving.\\nBut Awnings again refused to move and “yelled back at [Officer] Fullerton.” Id. at\\n18. Awnings’s does not deny yelling, “[Expletive] you, I am staying right here” and\\n“[Expletive] you, I’ll kick your ass.” Id. at 9. Awnings’s conduct constituted\\nobstruction of a peace officer. See State v. Rosado, No. A-09-014, 2009 WL 3381652,\\nat *2 (Neb. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2009) (holding that pounding chest, saying “shoot me,\\n[expletive],” and being in close proximity to peace officer attempting to arrest another\\nindividual was obstructing a peace officer under Nebraska law); State v. Chapman,\\nNo. A-92-451, 1993 WL 100146, at *5 (Neb. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 1993) (holding that\\nunder the Nebraska obstruction statute, a defendant “could ‘threaten to use force or\\nviolence’ with words, such as telling [the officer] he ‘was going to kick [his] ass’”\\n(second alteration in original)); see also Ehlers v. City of Rapid City, 846 F.3d 1002,\\n1009 (8th Cir. 2017) (concluding that “[r]efusing to comply with a police officer’s\\norders can constitute obstruction” under a similar South Dakota statute (citation\\nomitted)).\\n\\n Based on Awnings’s obstruction, Officer Fullerton had probable cause to\\narrest. With probable cause, it was unnecessary for Officer Fullerton to issue a\\n“verbal advisement of an attempted arrest”; rather, “actions to effectuate physical\\ncontrol over [the defendant] [are sufficient to] constitute[] an attempt to arrest.” State\\n\\n -15-\\n\\nv. Heath, 838 N.W.2d 4, 17 (Neb. Ct. App. 2013) (first alteration in original) (citation\\nomitted). By grabbing Awnings’s arm, Officer Fullerton attempted to effectuate\\nphysical control over Awnings. Awnings resisted by pulling away. Awnings’s\\nensuing fight with the officers is undisputed.\\n\\n 3. Excessive Force\\n Awnings also faults the district court for granting qualified immunity to\\nOfficers Fullerton and Duncan on his excessive force claim. He argues genuine\\ndisputes of material facts preclude the court’s grant of qualified immunity.\\n\\n “To determine whether a particular use of force was excessive, the court\\nconsiders whether it was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, relying on\\nthe perspective of a reasonable officer present at the scene, rather than the 20/20\\nvision of hindsight.” Ehlers, 846 F.3d at 1011 (cleaned up). “Force is excessive when\\nan officer’s actions are not objectively reasonable in light of the facts and\\ncircumstances confronting him.” Kukla v. Hulm, 310 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2002)\\n(citing Guite v. Wright, 147 F.3d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1998)). “When an arrestee flees\\nor resists, some use of force by the police is reasonable.” Greiner v. City of Champlin,\\n27 F.3d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Foster v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, 914\\nF.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 1990)). “[E]vidence of only de minimis injury [does not]\\nforeclose[] a claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.” Chambers v.\\nPennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 906 (8th Cir. 2011). “[I]t is logically possible to prove an\\nexcessive use of force that caused only a minor injury . . . . ” Id. We “focus instead\\non whether the force applied is reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable\\nofficer on the scene at the time the force is used.” Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490\\nU.S. 386, 396 (1989)).\\n\\n We agree with the district court that Awnings showed no genuine disputes of\\nmaterial fact between his version of events and the officers’ version. Here, the record\\nshows that Officer Fullerton executed a takedown maneuver after Awnings resisted\\n\\n -16-\\n\\narrest for obstruction under Nebraska law. Awnings alleged that officers joined in\\nbeating him, but Officers Fullerton and Duncan’s evidence—uncontroverted by\\nAwnings—showed an uncooperative and bellicose Awnings who resisted arrest by\\nswinging and kicking at the officers.6 Also of note, Awnings contends that at least\\nfour officers physically attacked him. But, according to the proof of record, Awnings\\nsustained only a de minimis injury—a small laceration over his right eyebrow. See\\nEllison v. Lesher, 796 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Our cases characterize\\nrelatively minor scrapes, bruises, and contusions as de minimis.” (citing Ziesmer, 785\\nF.3d at 1236–37; Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062, 1066–67 (8th Cir. 2006))).\\nOfficer Duncan also suffered non-serious injuries during his attempt to subdue\\nAwnings.\\n\\n Here, other than generic assertions, Awnings’s statements “do not give the\\nslightest hint about the amount of force the officer[s] used or why the amount of force\\nwas unreasonable in light of [his] persistent efforts to [resist] the police.” Edwards\\nv. Giles, 51 F.3d 155, 157 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) (concluding that\\nassertions such as the officers “threw [plaintiff] to the ground” or plaintiff “was\\nthrown to the ground forcibly” are “abstract assertions [that] tell us nothing more than\\nthat one officer used some physical power to move [the plaintiff to the ground”).\\nReviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Awnings, he has failed to show that\\nOfficers Fullerton and Duncan used unreasonable force to arrest him. See Ehlers, 846\\nF.3d at 1010–11. Officers Fullerton and Duncan are entitled to qualified immunity.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n Awnings stated that he pulled his arm back when Officer Fullerton first\\ngrabbed his arm; that after Officer Fullerton’s takedown, Awnings tried to get Officer\\nFullerton off and to get away from the officer; that he tried to curl his body into a ball\\n(thereby making it difficult for the officers to handcuff Awnings); and that he jumped\\nout of the police vehicle after having been placed in the back seat. See Qualified\\nImmunity Order at 18–20.\\n\\n -17-\\n\\n C. Motion to Dismiss\\n Awnings contends that the district court erred in dismissing Officer Banks from\\nthe suit. Awnings argues that he adequately stated a claim for deliberate indifference\\nto his serious medical needs. Awnings’s allegation stemmed from Officer Banks’s\\nfailure to inform the jail staff of Awnings’s need for a follow-up visit with the\\nHospital. We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Wong v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 820\\nF.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). We assume the truth of Awnings’s\\nfactual allegations, and “we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the\\nnonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Ritchie v. St. Louis Jewish Light, 630 F.3d 713,\\n715–16 (8th Cir. 2011)).\\n\\n The parties do not dispute that Officer Banks neglected to inform jail personnel\\nof Awnings’s need for a follow-up medical appointment. Awnings argues that his\\ntransport from the Hospital to the jail was part of his arrest; therefore his claim\\nagainst Officer Banks necessarily implicates the Fourth Amendment. But, historically,\\nin this circuit, claims of deliberate indifference to an arrestee’s medical needs are\\n“properly analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”\\nCarpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644, 650 (8th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Unresolved\\nis “the question whether the Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals with\\nprotection against the deliberate use of excessive physical force beyond the point at\\nwhich arrest ends and pretrial detention begins.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10\\n(emphasis added); see also Chambers, 641 F.3d at 905 (“We have noted the existence\\nof a ‘legal twilight zone’ between arrest and sentencing, where it is unclear whether\\nexcessive force claims are governed by the Fourth Amendment or cases decided based\\non the Fourteenth Amendment and substantive due process.” (emphasis added)\\n(quoting Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 2000))). Awnings’s claim\\nagainst Officer Banks is a failure to provide adequate medical services—not an\\nexcessive force claim related to his arrest. Instead, Awnings claim against Officer\\nBanks relates to the sufficiency of his post-arrest, post-medical examination, medical\\n\\n -18-\\n\\ncare. It is true that we have not as yet “resolved whether an arrestee’s claim alleging\\ndenial of medical care is analyzed under the Due Process Clause or the Fourth\\nAmendment. Bailey v. Feltmann, 810 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 2016). We need not do\\nso here. The facts distinguish this case from those arising from an allegation of\\nexcessive force. Factually, any alleged denial of medical care incident to Awnings’s\\narrest ended when he actually received medical attention at the hospital. Awnings’s\\nclaim against Officer Banks relates to Officer Banks’s omission to convey the follow-\\nup medical appointment ordered by the doctor—not from his participation in\\nAwnings’s arrest. In fact, Officer Banks did not participate in the arrest of Awnings.\\nUnlike the plaintiff in Carpenter, Awnings was first transported for medical treatment\\nbefore being taken to jail. On this record, our precedents favor analyzing Awnings’s\\nmedical needs claim under Fourteenth Amendment standards.\\n\\n Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “‘[d]eliberate indifference’ entails a level\\nof culpability equal to the criminal law definition of recklessness, that is, a prison\\nofficial ‘must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a\\nsubstantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Bender\\nv. Regier, 385 F.3d 1133, 1137 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.\\n825, 837 (1994)). “The standard for evaluating a substantive due process claim is\\nwhether the alleged ‘behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so\\noutrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’”\\nSchmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 574 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rogers v.\\nCity of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 1998)). Here, Awnings sustained a\\nsmall laceration, and his examining physician post-arrest declared Awnings fit for\\nincarceration. Further, a chest X-ray showed no fractured ribs or lung damages. Under\\nthese circumstances, it cannot be said that Officer Banks’s failure to inform the jail\\nstaff of Awnings’s follow-up medical visit rises to the level of conduct that “shocks\\nthe contemporary conscience.” Id. The district court correctly dismissed Awnings’s\\nclaim against Officer Banks under Rule 12(b)(6).\\n\\n\\n\\n -19-\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n 7\\n We affirm.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":286,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4579251,"string":"4,579,251"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Charles EAGLE PIPE, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Charles Eagle Pipe"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-07"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3039"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Loken, Gruender\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"LOKEN, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3039\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Charles Eagle Pipe\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of South Dakota - Aberdeen\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 15, 2018\\n Filed: January 7, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Charles Eagle Pipe pleaded guilty to domestic assault by an habitual offender\\nin violation of 18 U.S.C. § 117. At sentencing, the district court1 determined that\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of South Dakota\\n\\fEagle Pipe’s advisory guidelines range was 30 to 37 months imprisonment. The court\\ndeparted upward because Eagle Pipe’s criminal history category substantially under-\\nrepresented the seriousness of his criminal history, see USSG § 4A1.3(a)(1), and\\nimposed a forty five month sentence, a one month downward variance from the\\nrevised guidelines range. Eagle Pipe appeals the sentence, asserting that the court\\ncommitted procedural and substantive error. We conclude the contentions are\\nwithout merit and therefore affirm.\\n\\n Eagle Pipe’s Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) assigned one criminal\\nhistory point for a single qualifying adult conviction, placing him in Criminal History\\nCategory I. The “Other Criminal Conduct” section listed sixty-nine entries totaling\\none hundred prior convictions in the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court. Many were\\nconvictions for domestic assault of Eagle Pipe’s wife, the victim of the domestic\\nassault offense of conviction. Tribal court convictions are not included in calculating\\na defendant’s Criminal History Category. See USSG § 4A1.2(I). Accordingly, the\\nPSR identified § 4A1.3 as potentially warranting a departure, explaining:\\n\\n In this case, the defendant is in Criminal History Category I: however,\\n he has a significant tribal criminal history that was not accounted for in\\n the determination of the defendant’s Criminal History Category. Had\\n the defendant’s tribal court record been in state or federal court, it would\\n have resulted in 16 criminal history points, placing him in Criminal\\n History Category VI.\\n\\nEagle Pipe filed no objections to the PSR.\\n\\n Prior to sentencing, the district court issued a memorandum to counsel noting\\na possible upward departure. The court explained:\\n\\n The criminal history category is I. If all tribal court convictions\\n were counted, the category would be VI. He has 101 tribal court\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f convictions, many for violence. He has nine pending charges in tribal\\n court. In the 22 + years I have been on the bench, I do not recall anyone\\n with that number of tribal court convictions. He has convictions for\\n assaulting the same victim as the present victim seven previous times.\\n It appears that he has learned nothing from the sentences imposed\\n previously.\\n\\n At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel acknowledged that Eagle Pipe’s\\nvery lengthy criminal history “pushes the sentence up a little bit,” but noted that Eagle\\nPipe had served 365 days in tribal jail for the offense of conviction and urged the\\ncourt to impose a sentence within the 30 to 37 month guidelines range. The district\\ncourt noted that, in addition to his prior convictions, Eagle Pipe “has family violence,\\nsimple assault, disorderly conduct, criminal mischief, domestic violence . . . and\\ncriminal contempt [charges], all pending in Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court.”\\n\\n After lengthy discussion with counsel, the district court found “that an upward\\ndeparture is appropriate here based on the inadequacy of the Criminal History\\nCategory of the Defendant. He is about as far away from a Criminal History Category\\nof I as you could get.” Noting that Eagle Pipe’s tribal court convictions, if they\\ncounted, would place him in Criminal History Category VI, the court ruled:\\n\\n I find that his Criminal History Category is a IV. That’s an\\n upward departure. A criminal History Category of II is not adequate,\\n nor is a Criminal History Category of III adequate, based upon one after\\n another of these acts of violence.\\n\\nThe court found that Eagle Pipe’s revised advisory guidelines range was 46 to 57\\nmonths imprisonment, credited the twelve months he served in tribal custody “on\\ncharges that are relevant conduct,” and imposed a “net sentence” of forty five months.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f On appeal, Eagle Pipe argues the district court committed procedural error\\nbecause it failed to adequately explain why it rejected Criminal History Categories\\nI, II, and III and failed to compare Eagle Pipe’s criminal history with other defendants\\nin Category IV. Eagle Pipe did not object to the PSR’s determination that his tribal\\ncourt convictions would place him in Category VI if they counted. He did not object\\nwhen the district court recited that determination in giving advance notice of a\\npossible upward departure and again at the start of the sentencing hearing. He did not\\nobject or request additional explanation when the district court explicitly stated that\\nCategories II and III were not adequate because of his many acts of violence. This\\nargument was waived in the district court. See United States v. Maxwell, 778 F.3d\\n719, 734 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2827 (2015).\\n\\n Even if we reviewed this issue for plain error, there was none. The Guidelines\\nexpressly state that an upward departure may be based on “[p]rior sentence(s) not\\nused in computing the criminal history category,” including “tribal offenses.” USSG\\n§ 4A1.3(a)(2)(A); see United States v. Shillingstad, 632 F.3d 1031, 1037 (8th Cir.\\n2011). A district court departing upwards under § 4A1.3(a)(1) need not\\n“mechanically discuss[ ] each criminal history category it rejects en route to the\\ncategory that it selects”; it need only provide “sufficient indicia of why the\\nintermediary categories are inappropriate.” United States v. Azure, 536 F.3d 922,\\n931-32 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).\\n\\n Here, the PSR and the district court assigned hypothetical criminal history\\npoints to Eagle Pipe’s tribal convictions, which placed him in Criminal History\\nCategory VI, the highest category. The court specifically stated that it had considered\\neach intermediary criminal history category before selecting Category IV. This\\nprocess necessarily “use[d], as a reference, the criminal history category applicable\\nto defendants whose criminal history or likelihood to recidivate most closely\\nresembles that of the defendant’s.” USSG § 4A1.3(a)(4)(A); see United States v.\\nAzure, 596 F.3d 449, 454-55 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 906 (2010). As in\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fShillingstad, we conclude the district court “sufficiently explained that its decision\\nwas based on [Eagle Pipe’s] extensive criminal record.” 632 F.3d at 1038.\\n\\n Eagle Pipe further argues that the district court committed plain procedural\\nerror by “selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,” namely, the failure\\nto make a finding resolving some confusion in the record whether Eagle Pipe has 69,\\n100, or 101 prior tribal convictions, and the district court’s references to the\\nprevalence of domestic violence on the Standing Rock Sioux reservation. While\\nprocedural error includes “selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,”\\nUnited States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc), this\\ncontention is frivolous. Whether Eagle Pipe has 69 or 101 prior tribal convictions\\nobviously did not affect the district court’s finding that he “is about as far away from\\na Criminal History Category of I as you could get.”\\n\\n Eagle Pipe did not challenge the court’s comments lamenting the prevalence\\nof domestic violence on the Standing Rock reservation and surmising that Eagle Pipe\\nmay have committed other acts of domestic violence because such crimes often go\\nunreported. “As a consequence, the district court had no opportunity to clarify its\\ncomments or to correct any potential error in the first instance. Nor was the district\\ncourt prompted to explain whether the comments had any effect on the ultimate\\ndisposition of the case.” United States v. M.R.M., 513 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir.), cert.\\ndenied, 555 U.S. 871 (2008). Accordingly, there was no error, much less plain error.\\nThe record does not support a conclusion that these remarks were a “principal basis”\\nfor the court’s choice of sentence. United States v. Stokes, 750 F.3d 767, 772 (8th\\nCir. 2014); see United States v. Gant, 663 F.3d 1023, 1030 (8th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n Finally, Eagle Pipe argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing\\na substantively unreasonable sentence because the court gave substantial weight to\\nan improperly determined upward departure and to its comments on domestic\\nviolence the record does not support. As we have explained, the court imposed a\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fwell-supported, fully explained § 4A1.3 upward departure based on Eagle Pipe’s\\nextensive criminal history, and then varied slightly downward from the revised\\nadvisory guidelines range. This is not “the unusual case when we reverse a district\\ncourt sentence -- whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range --\\nas substantively unreasonable.” Feemster, 572 F.3d at 464.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4356504/\", \"author_raw\": \"LOKEN, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4579251/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Charles EAGLE PIPE, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-07\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3039\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Charles Eagle Pipe\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of South Dakota - Aberdeen\n ____________\n\n Submitted: October 15, 2018\n Filed: January 7, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\n\n Charles Eagle Pipe pleaded guilty to domestic assault by an habitual offender\nin violation of 18 U.S.C. § 117. At sentencing, the district court1 determined that\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District Judge for the\nDistrict of South Dakota\n\fEagle Pipe’s advisory guidelines range was 30 to 37 months imprisonment. The court\ndeparted upward because Eagle Pipe’s criminal history category substantially under-\nrepresented the seriousness of his criminal history, see USSG § 4A1.3(a)(1), and\nimposed a forty five month sentence, a one month downward variance from the\nrevised guidelines range. Eagle Pipe appeals the sentence, asserting that the court\ncommitted procedural and substantive error. We conclude the contentions are\nwithout merit and therefore affirm.\n\n Eagle Pipe’s Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) assigned one criminal\nhistory point for a single qualifying adult conviction, placing him in Criminal History\nCategory I. The “Other Criminal Conduct” section listed sixty-nine entries totaling\none hundred prior convictions in the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court. Many were\nconvictions for domestic assault of Eagle Pipe’s wife, the victim of the domestic\nassault offense of conviction. Tribal court convictions are not included in calculating\na defendant’s Criminal History Category. See USSG § 4A1.2(I). Accordingly, the\nPSR identified § 4A1.3 as potentially warranting a departure, explaining:\n\n In this case, the defendant is in Criminal History Category I: however,\n he has a significant tribal criminal history that was not accounted for in\n the determination of the defendant’s Criminal History Category. Had\n the defendant’s tribal court record been in state or federal court, it would\n have resulted in 16 criminal history points, placing him in Criminal\n History Category VI.\n\nEagle Pipe filed no objections to the PSR.\n\n Prior to sentencing, the district court issued a memorandum to counsel noting\na possible upward departure. The court explained:\n\n The criminal history category is I. If all tribal court convictions\n were counted, the category would be VI. He has 101 tribal court\n\n -2-\n\f convictions, many for violence. He has nine pending charges in tribal\n court. In the 22 + years I have been on the bench, I do not recall anyone\n with that number of tribal court convictions. He has convictions for\n assaulting the same victim as the present victim seven previous times.\n It appears that he has learned nothing from the sentences imposed\n previously.\n\n At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel acknowledged that Eagle Pipe’s\nvery lengthy criminal history “pushes the sentence up a little bit,” but noted that Eagle\nPipe had served 365 days in tribal jail for the offense of conviction and urged the\ncourt to impose a sentence within the 30 to 37 month guidelines range. The district\ncourt noted that, in addition to his prior convictions, Eagle Pipe “has family violence,\nsimple assault, disorderly conduct, criminal mischief, domestic violence . . . and\ncriminal contempt [charges], all pending in Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court.”\n\n After lengthy discussion with counsel, the district court found “that an upward\ndeparture is appropriate here based on the inadequacy of the Criminal History\nCategory of the Defendant. He is about as far away from a Criminal History Category\nof I as you could get.” Noting that Eagle Pipe’s tribal court convictions, if they\ncounted, would place him in Criminal History Category VI, the court ruled:\n\n I find that his Criminal History Category is a IV. That’s an\n upward departure. A criminal History Category of II is not adequate,\n nor is a Criminal History Category of III adequate, based upon one after\n another of these acts of violence.\n\nThe court found that Eagle Pipe’s revised advisory guidelines range was 46 to 57\nmonths imprisonment, credited the twelve months he served in tribal custody “on\ncharges that are relevant conduct,” and imposed a “net sentence” of forty five months.\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f On appeal, Eagle Pipe argues the district court committed procedural error\nbecause it failed to adequately explain why it rejected Criminal History Categories\nI, II, and III and failed to compare Eagle Pipe’s criminal history with other defendants\nin Category IV. Eagle Pipe did not object to the PSR’s determination that his tribal\ncourt convictions would place him in Category VI if they counted. He did not object\nwhen the district court recited that determination in giving advance notice of a\npossible upward departure and again at the start of the sentencing hearing. He did not\nobject or request additional explanation when the district court explicitly stated that\nCategories II and III were not adequate because of his many acts of violence. This\nargument was waived in the district court. See United States v. Maxwell, 778 F.3d\n719, 734 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2827 (2015).\n\n Even if we reviewed this issue for plain error, there was none. The Guidelines\nexpressly state that an upward departure may be based on “[p]rior sentence(s) not\nused in computing the criminal history category,” including “tribal offenses.” USSG\n§ 4A1.3(a)(2)(A); see United States v. Shillingstad, 632 F.3d 1031, 1037 (8th Cir.\n2011). A district court departing upwards under § 4A1.3(a)(1) need not\n“mechanically discuss[ ] each criminal history category it rejects en route to the\ncategory that it selects”; it need only provide “sufficient indicia of why the\nintermediary categories are inappropriate.” United States v. Azure, 536 F.3d 922,\n931-32 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).\n\n Here, the PSR and the district court assigned hypothetical criminal history\npoints to Eagle Pipe’s tribal convictions, which placed him in Criminal History\nCategory VI, the highest category. The court specifically stated that it had considered\neach intermediary criminal history category before selecting Category IV. This\nprocess necessarily “use[d], as a reference, the criminal history category applicable\nto defendants whose criminal history or likelihood to recidivate most closely\nresembles that of the defendant’s.” USSG § 4A1.3(a)(4)(A); see United States v.\nAzure, 596 F.3d 449, 454-55 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 906 (2010). As in\n\n -4-\n\fShillingstad, we conclude the district court “sufficiently explained that its decision\nwas based on [Eagle Pipe’s] extensive criminal record.” 632 F.3d at 1038.\n\n Eagle Pipe further argues that the district court committed plain procedural\nerror by “selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,” namely, the failure\nto make a finding resolving some confusion in the record whether Eagle Pipe has 69,\n100, or 101 prior tribal convictions, and the district court’s references to the\nprevalence of domestic violence on the Standing Rock Sioux reservation. While\nprocedural error includes “selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,”\nUnited States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc), this\ncontention is frivolous. Whether Eagle Pipe has 69 or 101 prior tribal convictions\nobviously did not affect the district court’s finding that he “is about as far away from\na Criminal History Category of I as you could get.”\n\n Eagle Pipe did not challenge the court’s comments lamenting the prevalence\nof domestic violence on the Standing Rock reservation and surmising that Eagle Pipe\nmay have committed other acts of domestic violence because such crimes often go\nunreported. “As a consequence, the district court had no opportunity to clarify its\ncomments or to correct any potential error in the first instance. Nor was the district\ncourt prompted to explain whether the comments had any effect on the ultimate\ndisposition of the case.” United States v. M.R.M., 513 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir.), cert.\ndenied, 555 U.S. 871 (2008). Accordingly, there was no error, much less plain error.\nThe record does not support a conclusion that these remarks were a “principal basis”\nfor the court’s choice of sentence. United States v. Stokes, 750 F.3d 767, 772 (8th\nCir. 2014); see United States v. Gant, 663 F.3d 1023, 1030 (8th Cir. 2011).\n\n Finally, Eagle Pipe argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing\na substantively unreasonable sentence because the court gave substantial weight to\nan improperly determined upward departure and to its comments on domestic\nviolence the record does not support. As we have explained, the court imposed a\n\n -5-\n\fwell-supported, fully explained § 4A1.3 upward departure based on Eagle Pipe’s\nextensive criminal history, and then varied slightly downward from the revised\nadvisory guidelines range. This is not “the unusual case when we reverse a district\ncourt sentence -- whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range --\nas substantively unreasonable.” Feemster, 572 F.3d at 464.\n\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Charles EAGLE PIPE, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-07\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3039\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Charles Eagle Pipe\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of South Dakota - Aberdeen\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 15, 2018\\n Filed: January 7, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Charles Eagle Pipe pleaded guilty to domestic assault by an habitual offender\\nin violation of 18 U.S.C. § 117. At sentencing, the district court1 determined that\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of South Dakota\\n\\fEagle Pipe’s advisory guidelines range was 30 to 37 months imprisonment. The court\\ndeparted upward because Eagle Pipe’s criminal history category substantially under-\\nrepresented the seriousness of his criminal history, see USSG § 4A1.3(a)(1), and\\nimposed a forty five month sentence, a one month downward variance from the\\nrevised guidelines range. Eagle Pipe appeals the sentence, asserting that the court\\ncommitted procedural and substantive error. We conclude the contentions are\\nwithout merit and therefore affirm.\\n\\n Eagle Pipe’s Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) assigned one criminal\\nhistory point for a single qualifying adult conviction, placing him in Criminal History\\nCategory I. The “Other Criminal Conduct” section listed sixty-nine entries totaling\\none hundred prior convictions in the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court. Many were\\nconvictions for domestic assault of Eagle Pipe’s wife, the victim of the domestic\\nassault offense of conviction. Tribal court convictions are not included in calculating\\na defendant’s Criminal History Category. See USSG § 4A1.2(I). Accordingly, the\\nPSR identified § 4A1.3 as potentially warranting a departure, explaining:\\n\\n In this case, the defendant is in Criminal History Category I: however,\\n he has a significant tribal criminal history that was not accounted for in\\n the determination of the defendant’s Criminal History Category. Had\\n the defendant’s tribal court record been in state or federal court, it would\\n have resulted in 16 criminal history points, placing him in Criminal\\n History Category VI.\\n\\nEagle Pipe filed no objections to the PSR.\\n\\n Prior to sentencing, the district court issued a memorandum to counsel noting\\na possible upward departure. The court explained:\\n\\n The criminal history category is I. If all tribal court convictions\\n were counted, the category would be VI. He has 101 tribal court\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f convictions, many for violence. He has nine pending charges in tribal\\n court. In the 22 + years I have been on the bench, I do not recall anyone\\n with that number of tribal court convictions. He has convictions for\\n assaulting the same victim as the present victim seven previous times.\\n It appears that he has learned nothing from the sentences imposed\\n previously.\\n\\n At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel acknowledged that Eagle Pipe’s\\nvery lengthy criminal history “pushes the sentence up a little bit,” but noted that Eagle\\nPipe had served 365 days in tribal jail for the offense of conviction and urged the\\ncourt to impose a sentence within the 30 to 37 month guidelines range. The district\\ncourt noted that, in addition to his prior convictions, Eagle Pipe “has family violence,\\nsimple assault, disorderly conduct, criminal mischief, domestic violence . . . and\\ncriminal contempt [charges], all pending in Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court.”\\n\\n After lengthy discussion with counsel, the district court found “that an upward\\ndeparture is appropriate here based on the inadequacy of the Criminal History\\nCategory of the Defendant. He is about as far away from a Criminal History Category\\nof I as you could get.” Noting that Eagle Pipe’s tribal court convictions, if they\\ncounted, would place him in Criminal History Category VI, the court ruled:\\n\\n I find that his Criminal History Category is a IV. That’s an\\n upward departure. A criminal History Category of II is not adequate,\\n nor is a Criminal History Category of III adequate, based upon one after\\n another of these acts of violence.\\n\\nThe court found that Eagle Pipe’s revised advisory guidelines range was 46 to 57\\nmonths imprisonment, credited the twelve months he served in tribal custody “on\\ncharges that are relevant conduct,” and imposed a “net sentence” of forty five months.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f On appeal, Eagle Pipe argues the district court committed procedural error\\nbecause it failed to adequately explain why it rejected Criminal History Categories\\nI, II, and III and failed to compare Eagle Pipe’s criminal history with other defendants\\nin Category IV. Eagle Pipe did not object to the PSR’s determination that his tribal\\ncourt convictions would place him in Category VI if they counted. He did not object\\nwhen the district court recited that determination in giving advance notice of a\\npossible upward departure and again at the start of the sentencing hearing. He did not\\nobject or request additional explanation when the district court explicitly stated that\\nCategories II and III were not adequate because of his many acts of violence. This\\nargument was waived in the district court. See United States v. Maxwell, 778 F.3d\\n719, 734 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2827 (2015).\\n\\n Even if we reviewed this issue for plain error, there was none. The Guidelines\\nexpressly state that an upward departure may be based on “[p]rior sentence(s) not\\nused in computing the criminal history category,” including “tribal offenses.” USSG\\n§ 4A1.3(a)(2)(A); see United States v. Shillingstad, 632 F.3d 1031, 1037 (8th Cir.\\n2011). A district court departing upwards under § 4A1.3(a)(1) need not\\n“mechanically discuss[ ] each criminal history category it rejects en route to the\\ncategory that it selects”; it need only provide “sufficient indicia of why the\\nintermediary categories are inappropriate.” United States v. Azure, 536 F.3d 922,\\n931-32 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).\\n\\n Here, the PSR and the district court assigned hypothetical criminal history\\npoints to Eagle Pipe’s tribal convictions, which placed him in Criminal History\\nCategory VI, the highest category. The court specifically stated that it had considered\\neach intermediary criminal history category before selecting Category IV. This\\nprocess necessarily “use[d], as a reference, the criminal history category applicable\\nto defendants whose criminal history or likelihood to recidivate most closely\\nresembles that of the defendant’s.” USSG § 4A1.3(a)(4)(A); see United States v.\\nAzure, 596 F.3d 449, 454-55 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 906 (2010). As in\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fShillingstad, we conclude the district court “sufficiently explained that its decision\\nwas based on [Eagle Pipe’s] extensive criminal record.” 632 F.3d at 1038.\\n\\n Eagle Pipe further argues that the district court committed plain procedural\\nerror by “selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,” namely, the failure\\nto make a finding resolving some confusion in the record whether Eagle Pipe has 69,\\n100, or 101 prior tribal convictions, and the district court’s references to the\\nprevalence of domestic violence on the Standing Rock Sioux reservation. While\\nprocedural error includes “selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,”\\nUnited States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc), this\\ncontention is frivolous. Whether Eagle Pipe has 69 or 101 prior tribal convictions\\nobviously did not affect the district court’s finding that he “is about as far away from\\na Criminal History Category of I as you could get.”\\n\\n Eagle Pipe did not challenge the court’s comments lamenting the prevalence\\nof domestic violence on the Standing Rock reservation and surmising that Eagle Pipe\\nmay have committed other acts of domestic violence because such crimes often go\\nunreported. “As a consequence, the district court had no opportunity to clarify its\\ncomments or to correct any potential error in the first instance. Nor was the district\\ncourt prompted to explain whether the comments had any effect on the ultimate\\ndisposition of the case.” United States v. M.R.M., 513 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir.), cert.\\ndenied, 555 U.S. 871 (2008). Accordingly, there was no error, much less plain error.\\nThe record does not support a conclusion that these remarks were a “principal basis”\\nfor the court’s choice of sentence. United States v. Stokes, 750 F.3d 767, 772 (8th\\nCir. 2014); see United States v. Gant, 663 F.3d 1023, 1030 (8th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n Finally, Eagle Pipe argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing\\na substantively unreasonable sentence because the court gave substantial weight to\\nan improperly determined upward departure and to its comments on domestic\\nviolence the record does not support. As we have explained, the court imposed a\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fwell-supported, fully explained § 4A1.3 upward departure based on Eagle Pipe’s\\nextensive criminal history, and then varied slightly downward from the revised\\nadvisory guidelines range. This is not “the unusual case when we reverse a district\\ncourt sentence -- whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range --\\nas substantively unreasonable.” Feemster, 572 F.3d at 464.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":287,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4579593,"string":"4,579,593"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. George PATINO, Also Known as Giorgio Paticciano Patino, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. George Patino"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3199"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Gruender, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3199\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n George Patino, also known as Giorgio Paticciano Patino\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 28, 2018\\n Filed: January 8, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n George Patino appeals after the district court1 admitted evidence of a 1998\\nconviction at trial and sentenced him to 40 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’\\nsupervised release following his conviction on three counts relating to a conspiracy\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\fto distribute human growth hormone (“HGH”) for unauthorized purposes and to\\nsmuggle HGH into the United States. We affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Patino operated a clinic and wholesale drug distribution business in Mexico that\\nsold HGH to purchasers in the United States. He obtained HGH from Mexico and\\nAsia and shipped it into the United States via mailed packages. He operated several\\nEnglish-language websites advertising HGH for sale, marketing himself as “an\\naccredited Physician and Surgeon” and a “leader in the field of Human Growth\\nHormone Therapy” though he did not have a medical license from any state. Between\\nApril 2014 and June 2015, Patino sent more than ninety-five HGH packages to the\\nMen’s Medical Institute (“MMI”), a medical clinic in St. Louis County, Missouri. In\\nexchange, Patino received a total of $67,720. Patino shipped HGH to other addressees\\nin the United States through December 2015.\\n\\n In February 2016, a grand jury indicted Patino on three counts: 1) conspiracy\\nto distribute or possess with intent to distribute HGH in violation of 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 333(e)(1) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 371; 2) distribution or possession with intent to\\ndistribute HGH in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and 3)\\nsmuggling goods into the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 545. A jury\\nconvicted Patino on all three counts.\\n\\n Among other evidence at trial, the district court admitted the fact of Patino’s\\n1998 conviction for possession of HGH with intent to distribute as well as statements\\nPatino made at the time of his arrest for that crime to a special agent of the Food and\\nDrug Administration’s (“FDA”) Office of Criminal Investigations. In particular,\\nPatino stated that he was a medical doctor in Mexico but not the United States, that\\nhe was distributing HGH to medical doctors, and that he was aware that it was illegal\\nto bring Mexican HGH into the United States.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f After the guilty verdict, the United States Probation Office prepared a\\npresentence investigation report (“PSR”), which concluded that the offense involved\\nsophisticated means. See United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”)\\n§ 2T3.1(b)(1). This resulted in an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 21 to 27\\nmonths. The Government moved for a sentence above the guidelines range, and the\\ndistrict court sentenced Patino to 40 months’ imprisonment.\\n\\n Patino now appeals the admission at trial of his 1998 conviction pursuant to\\nFed. R. Evid. 404(b), the application of the sophisticated means enhancement at\\nsentencing, and the district court’s alleged failure properly to determine or explain its\\nrationale for the upward departure for understated criminal history at sentencing.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Before trial, the Government timely filed notice under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) that\\nit planned to admit evidence of Patino’s 1998 conviction for knowingly possessing\\nHGH with intent to distribute for unauthorized use by humans. The Government\\nargued that this conviction and Patino’s statements to the FDA were relevant to prove\\nPatino’s intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake in joining the conspiracy to\\ndistribute HGH. Patino objected to the admission of the conviction based on its age\\nand irrelevance and argued that it was more unfairly prejudicial than probative. The\\ndistrict court overruled Patino’s objection, and the Government presented Patino’s\\nconviction and statements to the FDA during trial.\\n\\n “Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of other bad acts that are offered to prove\\nthe character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” United\\nStates v. Hill, 638 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fHowever, prior bad act evidence is admissible when introduced to show knowledge\\nor intent. United States v. Turner, 583 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 2009). The\\n“evidence must be (1) relevant to a material issue; (2) similar in kind and not overly\\nremote in time to the crime charged; (3) supported by sufficient evidence; and (4)\\nhigher in probative value than prejudicial effect.” United States v. Gant, 721 F.3d\\n505, 509 (8th Cir. 2013). “This court reviews a district court’s decision to admit\\nevidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) for abuse of discretion and reverse[s]\\nonly when such evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was introduced solely\\nto prove the defendant’s propensity to commit criminal acts.” United States v.\\nAldridge, 664 F.3d 705, 713 (8th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted).\\n\\n Patino argues on appeal that his 1998 conviction was irrelevant and too remote\\nand that its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value. We conclude that the\\nadmission of Patino’s 1998 conviction was not an abuse of discretion. It was used to\\nprove intent and knowledge and was well supported by evidence. Because Patino\\npleaded not guilty to the charged offenses and contested their mens rea elements,\\nevidence of his prior conviction for distributing HGH was relevant to his intent and\\nknowledge. See United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172, 1178 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding\\nthat “evidence of prior possession of drugs . . . is admissible to show such things as\\nknowledge and intent of a defendant charged with a crime in which intent to distribute\\ndrugs is an element”). The district court gave two limiting instructions, mitigating any\\npotential prejudicial effect. See United States v. Horton, 756 F.3d 569, 580 (8th Cir.\\n2014).\\n\\n Also, the Government successfully demonstrated that Patino’s prior crime was\\n“similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the charged crime.” See United\\nStates v. Williams, 308 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 2002). “To determine if evidence is\\ntoo remote, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and\\ncircumstances of each case.” Aldridge, 664 F.3d at 714. Here, Patino was convicted\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fin 1998 for conduct that occurred in August 1997, approximately sixteen years prior\\nto the offense conduct in the present case. We have been reluctant to uphold the\\nintroduction of evidence relating to acts or crimes which occurred more than thirteen\\nyears prior to the conduct challenged. See id. But whether a conviction is close in\\ntime to the later offense is only “one factor indicating the relevancy of the evidence,”\\nUnited States v. Shoffner, 71 F.3d 1429, 1432 (8th Cir. 1995), and “there is no fixed\\nperiod within which the prior acts must have occurred,” Aldridge, 664 F.3d at 714.\\nWhen, as here, the prior evidence is of conduct “extremely similar to the crime at\\nissue, evidence of the act will usually be rendered irrelevant only by an enormous\\nlapse of time.” United States v. Thomas, 593 F.3d 752, 758 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal\\nquotation omitted). Both in 1997 and 2014, Patino distributed large amounts of\\nmisbranded and unapproved HGH from Mexico into the United States. In fact, in\\n1998 he was convicted of the same crime charged in Count II of the present case.\\nGiven the similarity between both crimes, the 1998 conviction was not so remote in\\ntime as to render its admission an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Strong,\\n415 F.3d 902, 905 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming admission of a sixteen-year-old\\nconviction); United States v. Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 1998)\\n(affirming admission of a nearly eighteen-year-old alien smuggling conviction when\\nboth cases “involved exactly the same crime”).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Patino also argues that the district court improperly applied the sophisticated-\\nmeans enhancement in determining his advisory sentencing guidelines range. See\\nU.S.S.G. § 2T3.1(b)(1). At sentencing, Patino objected only to the PSR’s application\\nof the sophisticated means enhancement, but he raised no objections to any facts in\\nhis PSR. We review de novo whether the district court correctly applied the\\nguidelines when it determined that these facts constituted sophisticated means. United\\nStates v. Finck, 407 F.3d 908, 913 (8th Cir. 2005).\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f The proper application of the sophisticated-means enhancement for smuggling\\nunder U.S.S.G. § 2T3.1(b)(1) is a matter of first impression in this circuit, but the\\ndefinition found in the fraud and tax contexts is similar and offers useful guidance\\nhere. See United States v. Redman, 887 F.3d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2018). Sophisticated\\nmeans are “especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the\\nexecution or concealment of an offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2T3.1(b)(1) cmt. n. 3. Examples\\ninclude “hiding assets or transactions, or both, through the use of fictitious entities,\\ncorporate shells, or offshore financial accounts.” Id. “The sophisticated-means\\nenhancement is proper when the offense conduct, viewed as a whole, was notably\\nmore intricate than that of the garden-variety offense.” United States v. Meadows, 866\\nF.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2017). Repetitive and coordinated conduct can be subject to\\nthe enhancement even if no single step is complicated. United States v. Huston, 744\\nF. 3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n Here, the unchallenged facts in the PSR and evidence at trial show sophisticated\\nmeans. Patino engaged in repetitive and coordinated conduct, shipping more than\\nninety-five packages of HGH from Mexico to the United States for approximately\\nforty patients over the course of more than a year and a half. See United States v.\\nFiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 351 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming application of the sophisticated-\\nmeans enhancement when the basic element of the scheme was simple but “the\\nscheme as a whole spanned three years and at least eleven victims”). Patino mass-\\nmarketed HGH online by operating several English-language websites. See United\\nStates v. Louper-Morris, 672 F.3d 539, 564-65 (8th Cir. 2012) (affirming application\\nof the sophisticated-means enhancement to a “vast marketing scheme” using, among\\nother things, a website). Patino advertised his specialized medical expertise in his\\nmarketing materials and used his medical training in the offense conduct by offering\\nadvice on HGH dosages. See United States v. Stafford, 639 F.3d 270, 276 (6th Cir.\\n2011) (affirming application of the sophisticated-means enhancement when the\\ndefendant “misused his specialized knowledge of the mortgage industry to create and\\nsustain [the] conspiracy”). Patino used multiple email addresses, suggesting the\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fexistence of several different entities, including help@hgh.com.mx,\\ndrgp@doctor.com, clinic@swissmail.com, and sales@rxmedicalwarehouse.com. He\\nattempted to hide transactions by using bank transfers rather than a credit card\\nprocessor, explaining in an email that due to “heat” from United States’ authorities his\\ncredit card processor was no longer accepting transactions for HGH. In addition,\\nPatino packaged and shipped HGH in misleading ways. In some cases, he listed the\\nsender as an individual rather than identify his business. Neither the labeling of the\\npackages nor the customs declarations indicated that the contents contained HGH.\\nBecause of Patino’s repetitive and coordinated conduct, his use of specialized medical\\nknowledge to create and sustain his smuggling operation, his mass online marketing,\\nhis attempts to hide financial transactions from authorities, and his misleading email\\naddresses and packaging, the district court properly applied the sophisticated-means\\nenhancement.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Patino’s PSR calculated a total offense level of 16 and a criminal history\\ncategory of I, resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 21 to 27 months. The\\nGovernment filed a motion requesting a sentence above the guidelines range based in\\npart upon Patino’s understated criminal history. The district court imposed a sentence\\nof 40 months’ imprisonment for each count, to run concurrently. The district court\\npointed to Patino’s understated criminal history as one reason for its sentence above\\nthe guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. Patino argues on appeal that the district\\ncourt did not properly determine or explain its rationale for the extent of its upward\\ndeparture based on understated criminal history.2\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The district court also explained that it was varying under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a), stating that “the danger that the conduct of the Defendant placed purchasers\\nand users of the HGH [in] . . . was significant and shamefully unacceptable.” Patino\\ndoes not challenge any variance on appeal, so he is deemed to have waived this issue.\\nSee United States v. Rice, 699 F.3d 1043, 1050 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Issues not raised in\\n -7-\\n\\f A district court’s sentence above the advisory guidelines range is reviewed for\\nabuse of discretion. United States v. Walking Eagle, 553 F.3d 654, 656-57 (8th Cir.\\n2009). Upward departures are warranted if “reliable information indicates that the\\ndefendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness\\nof the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit\\nother crimes.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1).\\n\\n The PSR assessed zero criminal history points to Patino, but as the Government\\npointed out, he had five uncounted prior convictions, including two for international\\ndrug distribution. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in\\nimposing a sentence above the advisory guidelines range and sufficiently explained\\nwhy Patino’s understated criminal history justified an upward departure to 40 months.\\nSee United States v. Olsen, 716 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 2013) (affirming an\\nupward departure where the defendant showed a substantial history of general\\ndisregard for the law).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\na party’s opening brief are waived . . . .”).\\n -8-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4356846/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4579593/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. George PATINO, Also Known as Giorgio Paticciano Patino, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3199\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n George Patino, also known as Giorgio Paticciano Patino\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: September 28, 2018\n Filed: January 8, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\n\n George Patino appeals after the district court1 admitted evidence of a 1998\nconviction at trial and sentenced him to 40 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’\nsupervised release following his conviction on three counts relating to a conspiracy\n\n 1\n The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern\nDistrict of Missouri.\n\fto distribute human growth hormone (“HGH”) for unauthorized purposes and to\nsmuggle HGH into the United States. We affirm.\n\n I.\n\n Patino operated a clinic and wholesale drug distribution business in Mexico that\nsold HGH to purchasers in the United States. He obtained HGH from Mexico and\nAsia and shipped it into the United States via mailed packages. He operated several\nEnglish-language websites advertising HGH for sale, marketing himself as “an\naccredited Physician and Surgeon” and a “leader in the field of Human Growth\nHormone Therapy” though he did not have a medical license from any state. Between\nApril 2014 and June 2015, Patino sent more than ninety-five HGH packages to the\nMen’s Medical Institute (“MMI”), a medical clinic in St. Louis County, Missouri. In\nexchange, Patino received a total of $67,720. Patino shipped HGH to other addressees\nin the United States through December 2015.\n\n In February 2016, a grand jury indicted Patino on three counts: 1) conspiracy\nto distribute or possess with intent to distribute HGH in violation of 21 U.S.C.\n§ 333(e)(1) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 371; 2) distribution or possession with intent to\ndistribute HGH in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and 3)\nsmuggling goods into the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 545. A jury\nconvicted Patino on all three counts.\n\n Among other evidence at trial, the district court admitted the fact of Patino’s\n1998 conviction for possession of HGH with intent to distribute as well as statements\nPatino made at the time of his arrest for that crime to a special agent of the Food and\nDrug Administration’s (“FDA”) Office of Criminal Investigations. In particular,\nPatino stated that he was a medical doctor in Mexico but not the United States, that\nhe was distributing HGH to medical doctors, and that he was aware that it was illegal\nto bring Mexican HGH into the United States.\n\n -2-\n\f After the guilty verdict, the United States Probation Office prepared a\npresentence investigation report (“PSR”), which concluded that the offense involved\nsophisticated means. See United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”)\n§ 2T3.1(b)(1). This resulted in an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 21 to 27\nmonths. The Government moved for a sentence above the guidelines range, and the\ndistrict court sentenced Patino to 40 months’ imprisonment.\n\n Patino now appeals the admission at trial of his 1998 conviction pursuant to\nFed. R. Evid. 404(b), the application of the sophisticated means enhancement at\nsentencing, and the district court’s alleged failure properly to determine or explain its\nrationale for the upward departure for understated criminal history at sentencing.\n\n\n\n II.\n\n A.\n\n Before trial, the Government timely filed notice under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) that\nit planned to admit evidence of Patino’s 1998 conviction for knowingly possessing\nHGH with intent to distribute for unauthorized use by humans. The Government\nargued that this conviction and Patino’s statements to the FDA were relevant to prove\nPatino’s intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake in joining the conspiracy to\ndistribute HGH. Patino objected to the admission of the conviction based on its age\nand irrelevance and argued that it was more unfairly prejudicial than probative. The\ndistrict court overruled Patino’s objection, and the Government presented Patino’s\nconviction and statements to the FDA during trial.\n\n “Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of other bad acts that are offered to prove\nthe character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” United\nStates v. Hill, 638 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted).\n\n -3-\n\fHowever, prior bad act evidence is admissible when introduced to show knowledge\nor intent. United States v. Turner, 583 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 2009). The\n“evidence must be (1) relevant to a material issue; (2) similar in kind and not overly\nremote in time to the crime charged; (3) supported by sufficient evidence; and (4)\nhigher in probative value than prejudicial effect.” United States v. Gant, 721 F.3d\n505, 509 (8th Cir. 2013). “This court reviews a district court’s decision to admit\nevidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) for abuse of discretion and reverse[s]\nonly when such evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was introduced solely\nto prove the defendant’s propensity to commit criminal acts.” United States v.\nAldridge, 664 F.3d 705, 713 (8th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotation\nmarks omitted).\n\n Patino argues on appeal that his 1998 conviction was irrelevant and too remote\nand that its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value. We conclude that the\nadmission of Patino’s 1998 conviction was not an abuse of discretion. It was used to\nprove intent and knowledge and was well supported by evidence. Because Patino\npleaded not guilty to the charged offenses and contested their mens rea elements,\nevidence of his prior conviction for distributing HGH was relevant to his intent and\nknowledge. See United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172, 1178 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding\nthat “evidence of prior possession of drugs . . . is admissible to show such things as\nknowledge and intent of a defendant charged with a crime in which intent to distribute\ndrugs is an element”). The district court gave two limiting instructions, mitigating any\npotential prejudicial effect. See United States v. Horton, 756 F.3d 569, 580 (8th Cir.\n2014).\n\n Also, the Government successfully demonstrated that Patino’s prior crime was\n“similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the charged crime.” See United\nStates v. Williams, 308 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 2002). “To determine if evidence is\ntoo remote, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and\ncircumstances of each case.” Aldridge, 664 F.3d at 714. Here, Patino was convicted\n\n -4-\n\fin 1998 for conduct that occurred in August 1997, approximately sixteen years prior\nto the offense conduct in the present case. We have been reluctant to uphold the\nintroduction of evidence relating to acts or crimes which occurred more than thirteen\nyears prior to the conduct challenged. See id. But whether a conviction is close in\ntime to the later offense is only “one factor indicating the relevancy of the evidence,”\nUnited States v. Shoffner, 71 F.3d 1429, 1432 (8th Cir. 1995), and “there is no fixed\nperiod within which the prior acts must have occurred,” Aldridge, 664 F.3d at 714.\nWhen, as here, the prior evidence is of conduct “extremely similar to the crime at\nissue, evidence of the act will usually be rendered irrelevant only by an enormous\nlapse of time.” United States v. Thomas, 593 F.3d 752, 758 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal\nquotation omitted). Both in 1997 and 2014, Patino distributed large amounts of\nmisbranded and unapproved HGH from Mexico into the United States. In fact, in\n1998 he was convicted of the same crime charged in Count II of the present case.\nGiven the similarity between both crimes, the 1998 conviction was not so remote in\ntime as to render its admission an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Strong,\n415 F.3d 902, 905 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming admission of a sixteen-year-old\nconviction); United States v. Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 1998)\n(affirming admission of a nearly eighteen-year-old alien smuggling conviction when\nboth cases “involved exactly the same crime”).\n\n B.\n\n Patino also argues that the district court improperly applied the sophisticated-\nmeans enhancement in determining his advisory sentencing guidelines range. See\nU.S.S.G. § 2T3.1(b)(1). At sentencing, Patino objected only to the PSR’s application\nof the sophisticated means enhancement, but he raised no objections to any facts in\nhis PSR. We review de novo whether the district court correctly applied the\nguidelines when it determined that these facts constituted sophisticated means. United\nStates v. Finck, 407 F.3d 908, 913 (8th Cir. 2005).\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f The proper application of the sophisticated-means enhancement for smuggling\nunder U.S.S.G. § 2T3.1(b)(1) is a matter of first impression in this circuit, but the\ndefinition found in the fraud and tax contexts is similar and offers useful guidance\nhere. See United States v. Redman, 887 F.3d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2018). Sophisticated\nmeans are “especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the\nexecution or concealment of an offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2T3.1(b)(1) cmt. n. 3. Examples\ninclude “hiding assets or transactions, or both, through the use of fictitious entities,\ncorporate shells, or offshore financial accounts.” Id. “The sophisticated-means\nenhancement is proper when the offense conduct, viewed as a whole, was notably\nmore intricate than that of the garden-variety offense.” United States v. Meadows, 866\nF.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2017). Repetitive and coordinated conduct can be subject to\nthe enhancement even if no single step is complicated. United States v. Huston, 744\nF. 3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2014).\n\n Here, the unchallenged facts in the PSR and evidence at trial show sophisticated\nmeans. Patino engaged in repetitive and coordinated conduct, shipping more than\nninety-five packages of HGH from Mexico to the United States for approximately\nforty patients over the course of more than a year and a half. See United States v.\nFiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 351 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming application of the sophisticated-\nmeans enhancement when the basic element of the scheme was simple but “the\nscheme as a whole spanned three years and at least eleven victims”). Patino mass-\nmarketed HGH online by operating several English-language websites. See United\nStates v. Louper-Morris, 672 F.3d 539, 564-65 (8th Cir. 2012) (affirming application\nof the sophisticated-means enhancement to a “vast marketing scheme” using, among\nother things, a website). Patino advertised his specialized medical expertise in his\nmarketing materials and used his medical training in the offense conduct by offering\nadvice on HGH dosages. See United States v. Stafford, 639 F.3d 270, 276 (6th Cir.\n2011) (affirming application of the sophisticated-means enhancement when the\ndefendant “misused his specialized knowledge of the mortgage industry to create and\nsustain [the] conspiracy”). Patino used multiple email addresses, suggesting the\n\n -6-\n\fexistence of several different entities, including help@hgh.com.mx,\ndrgp@doctor.com, clinic@swissmail.com, and sales@rxmedicalwarehouse.com. He\nattempted to hide transactions by using bank transfers rather than a credit card\nprocessor, explaining in an email that due to “heat” from United States’ authorities his\ncredit card processor was no longer accepting transactions for HGH. In addition,\nPatino packaged and shipped HGH in misleading ways. In some cases, he listed the\nsender as an individual rather than identify his business. Neither the labeling of the\npackages nor the customs declarations indicated that the contents contained HGH.\nBecause of Patino’s repetitive and coordinated conduct, his use of specialized medical\nknowledge to create and sustain his smuggling operation, his mass online marketing,\nhis attempts to hide financial transactions from authorities, and his misleading email\naddresses and packaging, the district court properly applied the sophisticated-means\nenhancement.\n\n C.\n\n Patino’s PSR calculated a total offense level of 16 and a criminal history\ncategory of I, resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 21 to 27 months. The\nGovernment filed a motion requesting a sentence above the guidelines range based in\npart upon Patino’s understated criminal history. The district court imposed a sentence\nof 40 months’ imprisonment for each count, to run concurrently. The district court\npointed to Patino’s understated criminal history as one reason for its sentence above\nthe guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. Patino argues on appeal that the district\ncourt did not properly determine or explain its rationale for the extent of its upward\ndeparture based on understated criminal history.2\n\n\n 2\n The district court also explained that it was varying under 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3553(a), stating that “the danger that the conduct of the Defendant placed purchasers\nand users of the HGH [in] . . . was significant and shamefully unacceptable.” Patino\ndoes not challenge any variance on appeal, so he is deemed to have waived this issue.\nSee United States v. Rice, 699 F.3d 1043, 1050 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Issues not raised in\n -7-\n\f A district court’s sentence above the advisory guidelines range is reviewed for\nabuse of discretion. United States v. Walking Eagle, 553 F.3d 654, 656-57 (8th Cir.\n2009). Upward departures are warranted if “reliable information indicates that the\ndefendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness\nof the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit\nother crimes.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1).\n\n The PSR assessed zero criminal history points to Patino, but as the Government\npointed out, he had five uncounted prior convictions, including two for international\ndrug distribution. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in\nimposing a sentence above the advisory guidelines range and sufficiently explained\nwhy Patino’s understated criminal history justified an upward departure to 40 months.\nSee United States v. Olsen, 716 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 2013) (affirming an\nupward departure where the defendant showed a substantial history of general\ndisregard for the law).\n\n III.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\na party’s opening brief are waived . . . .”).\n -8-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. George PATINO, Also Known as Giorgio Paticciano Patino, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3199\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n George Patino, also known as Giorgio Paticciano Patino\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 28, 2018\\n Filed: January 8, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n George Patino appeals after the district court1 admitted evidence of a 1998\\nconviction at trial and sentenced him to 40 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’\\nsupervised release following his conviction on three counts relating to a conspiracy\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\fto distribute human growth hormone (“HGH”) for unauthorized purposes and to\\nsmuggle HGH into the United States. We affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Patino operated a clinic and wholesale drug distribution business in Mexico that\\nsold HGH to purchasers in the United States. He obtained HGH from Mexico and\\nAsia and shipped it into the United States via mailed packages. He operated several\\nEnglish-language websites advertising HGH for sale, marketing himself as “an\\naccredited Physician and Surgeon” and a “leader in the field of Human Growth\\nHormone Therapy” though he did not have a medical license from any state. Between\\nApril 2014 and June 2015, Patino sent more than ninety-five HGH packages to the\\nMen’s Medical Institute (“MMI”), a medical clinic in St. Louis County, Missouri. In\\nexchange, Patino received a total of $67,720. Patino shipped HGH to other addressees\\nin the United States through December 2015.\\n\\n In February 2016, a grand jury indicted Patino on three counts: 1) conspiracy\\nto distribute or possess with intent to distribute HGH in violation of 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 333(e)(1) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 371; 2) distribution or possession with intent to\\ndistribute HGH in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and 3)\\nsmuggling goods into the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 545. A jury\\nconvicted Patino on all three counts.\\n\\n Among other evidence at trial, the district court admitted the fact of Patino’s\\n1998 conviction for possession of HGH with intent to distribute as well as statements\\nPatino made at the time of his arrest for that crime to a special agent of the Food and\\nDrug Administration’s (“FDA”) Office of Criminal Investigations. In particular,\\nPatino stated that he was a medical doctor in Mexico but not the United States, that\\nhe was distributing HGH to medical doctors, and that he was aware that it was illegal\\nto bring Mexican HGH into the United States.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f After the guilty verdict, the United States Probation Office prepared a\\npresentence investigation report (“PSR”), which concluded that the offense involved\\nsophisticated means. See United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”)\\n§ 2T3.1(b)(1). This resulted in an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 21 to 27\\nmonths. The Government moved for a sentence above the guidelines range, and the\\ndistrict court sentenced Patino to 40 months’ imprisonment.\\n\\n Patino now appeals the admission at trial of his 1998 conviction pursuant to\\nFed. R. Evid. 404(b), the application of the sophisticated means enhancement at\\nsentencing, and the district court’s alleged failure properly to determine or explain its\\nrationale for the upward departure for understated criminal history at sentencing.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Before trial, the Government timely filed notice under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) that\\nit planned to admit evidence of Patino’s 1998 conviction for knowingly possessing\\nHGH with intent to distribute for unauthorized use by humans. The Government\\nargued that this conviction and Patino’s statements to the FDA were relevant to prove\\nPatino’s intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake in joining the conspiracy to\\ndistribute HGH. Patino objected to the admission of the conviction based on its age\\nand irrelevance and argued that it was more unfairly prejudicial than probative. The\\ndistrict court overruled Patino’s objection, and the Government presented Patino’s\\nconviction and statements to the FDA during trial.\\n\\n “Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of other bad acts that are offered to prove\\nthe character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” United\\nStates v. Hill, 638 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fHowever, prior bad act evidence is admissible when introduced to show knowledge\\nor intent. United States v. Turner, 583 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 2009). The\\n“evidence must be (1) relevant to a material issue; (2) similar in kind and not overly\\nremote in time to the crime charged; (3) supported by sufficient evidence; and (4)\\nhigher in probative value than prejudicial effect.” United States v. Gant, 721 F.3d\\n505, 509 (8th Cir. 2013). “This court reviews a district court’s decision to admit\\nevidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) for abuse of discretion and reverse[s]\\nonly when such evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was introduced solely\\nto prove the defendant’s propensity to commit criminal acts.” United States v.\\nAldridge, 664 F.3d 705, 713 (8th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted).\\n\\n Patino argues on appeal that his 1998 conviction was irrelevant and too remote\\nand that its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value. We conclude that the\\nadmission of Patino’s 1998 conviction was not an abuse of discretion. It was used to\\nprove intent and knowledge and was well supported by evidence. Because Patino\\npleaded not guilty to the charged offenses and contested their mens rea elements,\\nevidence of his prior conviction for distributing HGH was relevant to his intent and\\nknowledge. See United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172, 1178 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding\\nthat “evidence of prior possession of drugs . . . is admissible to show such things as\\nknowledge and intent of a defendant charged with a crime in which intent to distribute\\ndrugs is an element”). The district court gave two limiting instructions, mitigating any\\npotential prejudicial effect. See United States v. Horton, 756 F.3d 569, 580 (8th Cir.\\n2014).\\n\\n Also, the Government successfully demonstrated that Patino’s prior crime was\\n“similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the charged crime.” See United\\nStates v. Williams, 308 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 2002). “To determine if evidence is\\ntoo remote, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and\\ncircumstances of each case.” Aldridge, 664 F.3d at 714. Here, Patino was convicted\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fin 1998 for conduct that occurred in August 1997, approximately sixteen years prior\\nto the offense conduct in the present case. We have been reluctant to uphold the\\nintroduction of evidence relating to acts or crimes which occurred more than thirteen\\nyears prior to the conduct challenged. See id. But whether a conviction is close in\\ntime to the later offense is only “one factor indicating the relevancy of the evidence,”\\nUnited States v. Shoffner, 71 F.3d 1429, 1432 (8th Cir. 1995), and “there is no fixed\\nperiod within which the prior acts must have occurred,” Aldridge, 664 F.3d at 714.\\nWhen, as here, the prior evidence is of conduct “extremely similar to the crime at\\nissue, evidence of the act will usually be rendered irrelevant only by an enormous\\nlapse of time.” United States v. Thomas, 593 F.3d 752, 758 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal\\nquotation omitted). Both in 1997 and 2014, Patino distributed large amounts of\\nmisbranded and unapproved HGH from Mexico into the United States. In fact, in\\n1998 he was convicted of the same crime charged in Count II of the present case.\\nGiven the similarity between both crimes, the 1998 conviction was not so remote in\\ntime as to render its admission an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Strong,\\n415 F.3d 902, 905 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming admission of a sixteen-year-old\\nconviction); United States v. Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 1998)\\n(affirming admission of a nearly eighteen-year-old alien smuggling conviction when\\nboth cases “involved exactly the same crime”).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Patino also argues that the district court improperly applied the sophisticated-\\nmeans enhancement in determining his advisory sentencing guidelines range. See\\nU.S.S.G. § 2T3.1(b)(1). At sentencing, Patino objected only to the PSR’s application\\nof the sophisticated means enhancement, but he raised no objections to any facts in\\nhis PSR. We review de novo whether the district court correctly applied the\\nguidelines when it determined that these facts constituted sophisticated means. United\\nStates v. Finck, 407 F.3d 908, 913 (8th Cir. 2005).\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f The proper application of the sophisticated-means enhancement for smuggling\\nunder U.S.S.G. § 2T3.1(b)(1) is a matter of first impression in this circuit, but the\\ndefinition found in the fraud and tax contexts is similar and offers useful guidance\\nhere. See United States v. Redman, 887 F.3d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2018). Sophisticated\\nmeans are “especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the\\nexecution or concealment of an offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2T3.1(b)(1) cmt. n. 3. Examples\\ninclude “hiding assets or transactions, or both, through the use of fictitious entities,\\ncorporate shells, or offshore financial accounts.” Id. “The sophisticated-means\\nenhancement is proper when the offense conduct, viewed as a whole, was notably\\nmore intricate than that of the garden-variety offense.” United States v. Meadows, 866\\nF.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2017). Repetitive and coordinated conduct can be subject to\\nthe enhancement even if no single step is complicated. United States v. Huston, 744\\nF. 3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n Here, the unchallenged facts in the PSR and evidence at trial show sophisticated\\nmeans. Patino engaged in repetitive and coordinated conduct, shipping more than\\nninety-five packages of HGH from Mexico to the United States for approximately\\nforty patients over the course of more than a year and a half. See United States v.\\nFiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 351 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming application of the sophisticated-\\nmeans enhancement when the basic element of the scheme was simple but “the\\nscheme as a whole spanned three years and at least eleven victims”). Patino mass-\\nmarketed HGH online by operating several English-language websites. See United\\nStates v. Louper-Morris, 672 F.3d 539, 564-65 (8th Cir. 2012) (affirming application\\nof the sophisticated-means enhancement to a “vast marketing scheme” using, among\\nother things, a website). Patino advertised his specialized medical expertise in his\\nmarketing materials and used his medical training in the offense conduct by offering\\nadvice on HGH dosages. See United States v. Stafford, 639 F.3d 270, 276 (6th Cir.\\n2011) (affirming application of the sophisticated-means enhancement when the\\ndefendant “misused his specialized knowledge of the mortgage industry to create and\\nsustain [the] conspiracy”). Patino used multiple email addresses, suggesting the\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fexistence of several different entities, including help@hgh.com.mx,\\ndrgp@doctor.com, clinic@swissmail.com, and sales@rxmedicalwarehouse.com. He\\nattempted to hide transactions by using bank transfers rather than a credit card\\nprocessor, explaining in an email that due to “heat” from United States’ authorities his\\ncredit card processor was no longer accepting transactions for HGH. In addition,\\nPatino packaged and shipped HGH in misleading ways. In some cases, he listed the\\nsender as an individual rather than identify his business. Neither the labeling of the\\npackages nor the customs declarations indicated that the contents contained HGH.\\nBecause of Patino’s repetitive and coordinated conduct, his use of specialized medical\\nknowledge to create and sustain his smuggling operation, his mass online marketing,\\nhis attempts to hide financial transactions from authorities, and his misleading email\\naddresses and packaging, the district court properly applied the sophisticated-means\\nenhancement.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Patino’s PSR calculated a total offense level of 16 and a criminal history\\ncategory of I, resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 21 to 27 months. The\\nGovernment filed a motion requesting a sentence above the guidelines range based in\\npart upon Patino’s understated criminal history. The district court imposed a sentence\\nof 40 months’ imprisonment for each count, to run concurrently. The district court\\npointed to Patino’s understated criminal history as one reason for its sentence above\\nthe guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. Patino argues on appeal that the district\\ncourt did not properly determine or explain its rationale for the extent of its upward\\ndeparture based on understated criminal history.2\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The district court also explained that it was varying under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a), stating that “the danger that the conduct of the Defendant placed purchasers\\nand users of the HGH [in] . . . was significant and shamefully unacceptable.” Patino\\ndoes not challenge any variance on appeal, so he is deemed to have waived this issue.\\nSee United States v. Rice, 699 F.3d 1043, 1050 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Issues not raised in\\n -7-\\n\\f A district court’s sentence above the advisory guidelines range is reviewed for\\nabuse of discretion. United States v. Walking Eagle, 553 F.3d 654, 656-57 (8th Cir.\\n2009). Upward departures are warranted if “reliable information indicates that the\\ndefendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness\\nof the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit\\nother crimes.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1).\\n\\n The PSR assessed zero criminal history points to Patino, but as the Government\\npointed out, he had five uncounted prior convictions, including two for international\\ndrug distribution. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in\\nimposing a sentence above the advisory guidelines range and sufficiently explained\\nwhy Patino’s understated criminal history justified an upward departure to 40 months.\\nSee United States v. Olsen, 716 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 2013) (affirming an\\nupward departure where the defendant showed a substantial history of general\\ndisregard for the law).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\na party’s opening brief are waived . . . .”).\\n -8-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":288,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4579595,"string":"4,579,595"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"SPV-LS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant Nachman Bergman, as Trustee of the N Bergman Insurance Trust Dated December 18, 2006; Malka Silberman, as Successor Trustee of the N Bergman Insurance Trust Dated December 18, 2006; Life Trading Trust, Dated August 8, 2007; T-Leg, LLC, Also Known as TLEG LLC ; Financial Life Services, LLC; SPV II LLC, Third Party Defendants the Representative of the Estate of Nancy Bergman, Third Party Defendant-Appellant SPV-LS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Transamerica Life Insurance Company, Defendant Nachman Bergman, as Trustee of the N Bergman Insurance Trust Dated December 18, 2006; Malka Silberman, as Successor Trustee of the N Bergman Insurance Trust Dated December 18, 2006; Life Trading Trust, Dated August 8, 2007; T-Leg, LLC, Also Known as TLEG LLC ; Financial Life Services, LLC; SPV II LLC, Third Party Defendants the Representative of the Estate of Nancy Bergman, Third Party Defendant-Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"SPV-LS, LLC v. The Estate of Nancy Bergman"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3177; 17-3179"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Shepherd, Kelly, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3177\\n ___________________________\\n\\n SPV-LS, LLC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Transamerica Life Insurance Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant\\n\\nNachman Bergman, as Trustee of The N Bergman Insurance Trust dated December\\n 18, 2006; Malka Silberman, as Successor Trustee of The N Bergman Insurance\\nTrust dated December 18, 2006; Life Trading Trust, dated August 8, 2007; T-Leg,\\n LLC, also known as TLEG LLC; Financial Life Services, LLC; SPV II LLC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendants\\n lllllllllllllllllll\\n The Representative of The Estate of Nancy Bergman\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendant - Appellant\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3179\\n ___________________________\\n\\n SPV-LS, LLC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Transamerica Life Insurance Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant\\n\\fNachman Bergman, as Trustee of The N Bergman Insurance Trust dated December\\n 18, 2006; Malka Silberman, as Successor Trustee of The N Bergman Insurance\\nTrust dated December 18, 2006; Life Trading Trust, dated August 8, 2007; T-Leg,\\n LLC, also known as TLEG LLC; Financial Life Services, LLC; SPV II LLC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendants\\n\\n The Representative of The Estate of Nancy Bergman\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeals from United States District Court\\n for the District of South Dakota - Sioux Falls\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 16, 2018\\n Filed: January 8, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n The Estate of Nancy Bergman (the Estate), through its personal representative,\\nappeals a district court order denying its motion for reconsideration of an adverse\\ngrant of summary judgment. SPV-LS, LLC (SPV) cross-appeals the district court’s\\ndenial of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3) sanctions against the Estate’s\\nattorneys. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have\\njurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the following reasons, we affirm in part\\nand reverse in part, remanding for further consideration the denial of sanctions against\\nattorney Gerald Kroll.\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f I.\\n\\n This case concerns a $10 million life insurance policy (the Policy) issued by\\nTransamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company (Transamerica) on the life of\\noctogenarian Nancy Bergman. While the Estate and SPV differ in their interpretations\\nof the motives underlying much of what happened, the basic facts are as follows.\\n\\n Sometime prior to October 2006, Nancy’s grandson, Nachman Bergman,\\napproached her about procuring life insurance as part of an investment scheme.\\nNachman explained that 82-year-old Nancy would apply for life insurance, which\\nwould be funded by a group of investors led by Jacob Herbst. The investors would\\nthen sell all acquired policies on the secondary market after the two-year contestability\\nperiod expired, giving Nancy a small share of the profits. Nancy agreed to participate\\nand Transamerica issued a $10,000,000 certificate of insurance to her in October\\n2006. In December 2006, Nancy executed a trust instrument establishing the N\\nBergman Insurance Trust (the Trust) and appointing Nachman as its sole trustee and\\nprimary beneficiary. Pursuant to paperwork filed by Nancy and Nachman,\\nTransamerica then issued the Policy in March 2007. The Policy certificate designated\\nthe Trust as the Policy’s intended owner. The investors provided funds for Policy\\npremiums, which were paid through the Trust.\\n\\n In 2009, Financial Life Services (FLS) contracted with the Trust to purchase the\\nPolicy for $1,350,000. FLS is a life settlement provider—a company which purchases\\nlife insurance policies for more than the cash surrender value but less than the amount\\nof death benefits payable under the policy, then collects the death benefits when the\\ninsured individual dies. Shortly after executing the purchase agreement, FLS learned\\nthat the Trust had failed to pay $64,500 in Policy premiums. FLS paid these premiums\\nto prevent the Policy from lapsing. FLS then learned that Nancy’s life expectancy was\\nmaterially longer than represented and that, contrary to the Trust’s representations,\\ninvestor funds, not family funds, had paid for the Policy. FLS found this significant\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fbecause life insurance policies paid for by and intended to benefit strangers (stranger-\\noriginated life insurance policies, or STOLIs), are worth less on the secondary market\\nthan policies funded by the insured individual or her family members. This is\\nbecause, in the secondary insurance market, STOLIs are widely considered to be\\nindicia of fraud.\\n\\n FLS discovered these facts before paying the Trust for the Policy and therefore\\ninvoked a provision of the purchase agreement allowing it to rescind its purchase of\\nthe Policy based on fraud in the procurement of the sale contract. It also requested\\nreimbursement of the premiums it paid. When its efforts to rescind the transaction\\nfailed, FLS instead exercised its contractual right under the purchase agreement to\\ntender a reduced purchase price in light of the Trust’s misrepresentations as to\\nNancy’s life expectancy and the Policy’s funding source. FLS tendered the\\ncontractually-determined alternate purchase price of $610,500, which the Trust\\nrejected. FLS filed a breach of contract suit against the Trust in the Eastern District\\nof New York, seeking rescission of the purchase agreement and reimbursement of\\nadvanced premiums. It continued to pay premiums to prevent the Policy from lapsing.\\n\\n The New York district court ultimately entered judgment in FLS’s favor for\\nover a million dollars, including premium reimbursements, post-judgment interest,\\nand attorneys’ fees. Because the Trust admitted it could not pay, the district court\\nordered a sale of the Policy—the Trust’s only asset—at auction to satisfy that\\njudgment. FLS submitted the winning—and only—bid of $1,194,522 and eventually\\ntransferred the Policy to SPV.\\n\\n Nancy Bergman died on April 6, 2014. SPV submitted a claim for death\\nbenefits under the Policy to Transamerica on May 29, 2014. Transamerica refused to\\npay SPV’s claim because it received competing claims from Nachman Bergman and\\nfrom Jacob Herbst’s wife Malka Silberman, both of whom claimed to be trustee of the\\nTrust. Seeking payment of the Policy proceeds, SPV filed a complaint against\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fTransamerica for breach of contract in the United States District Court for the District\\nof South Dakota.1 In the same action, Transamerica asserted a statutory interpleader\\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1335, deposited the Policy death benefits of $10,000,000 with the\\ndistrict court, and asked the court to determine the respective rights of SPV, the Trust,\\nand Nancy’s Estate. The Estate then asserted a cross-claim to the Policy proceeds\\nunder N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:24-1.1, a New Jersey statute that allows the insured’s\\nestate to disgorge proceeds from the contractual beneficiary of a STOLI.\\n\\n SPV moved for summary judgment on the Estate’s cross-claim on two grounds.\\nFirst, SPV asserted that, under South Dakota choice-of-law analysis, New York law\\ngoverned the case, making the Estate’s statutory claim irrelevant. Second, SPV\\nargued that STOLIs were legal in New York at the time the Policy was procured. The\\nEstate countered that New Jersey law should apply, that New York law was in accord\\nwith New Jersey law, and that the Estate should prevail on public policy grounds.\\n\\n The district court held that New York law applied. It found that, at the time the\\nPolicy was procured, New York allowed STOLIs as long as the policy in question was\\ninitially procured by the insured or someone with an insurable interest in the life of\\nthe insured and that, under Kramer v. Phoenix Life Insurance Co., 940 N.E.2d 535\\n(N.Y. 2010), an insured could procure a policy with the intent to immediately assign\\nit to stranger investors. See id. at 551-52. The district court further found, as a matter\\nof law, that Nachman Bergman had an insurable interest in his grandmother’s life.\\nBased on these facts, the district court granted summary judgment against the Estate\\nand dismissed its claims to the Policy proceeds.\\n\\n The Estate then filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n54(b) and raised a new argument: that Nancy Bergman only acted under nefarious\\n\\n 1\\n SPV filed this action in South Dakota rather than New York because neither\\noriginal party is a New York citizen. SPV’s parent company, South Dakota Trust\\nCompany LLC, is a citizen of South Dakota and Transamerica is a citizen of Iowa.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\finfluence or coercion on the part of the investors. SPV countered that the Estate could\\nhave raised this argument at summary judgment and failed to do so, and that the Estate\\npresented no new evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. The district court\\nnoted that the Estate had failed to raise this argument previously, but it nevertheless\\nheld the Estate’s motion for reconsideration in abeyance and allowed it to conduct\\nlimited further discovery. As the discovery deadline neared, the Estate filed a\\nsupplemental submission in further support of its motion for reconsideration and\\npresented another new argument: judicial estoppel. The Estate contended that SPV\\ncould not argue that the Policy was supported by an insurable interest because FLS,\\nSPV’s predecessor in interest, sought to rescind its purchase of the Policy based on\\nits STOLI status. SPV countered that neither it nor FLS had ever argued the Policy\\nwas unsupported by an insurable interest and that all the information and evidence\\nupon which the Estate relied was available to it at summary judgment.\\n\\n The district court ultimately denied the Estate’s motion for reconsideration\\nbased on lack of evidence. It found that SPV had never argued the Policy lacked an\\ninsurable interest and that all of the testimony from Nancy’s family members and an\\nexamining doctor showed that Nancy was competent, strong-willed, and knew what\\nshe was doing. It further reiterated that New York law, specifically Kramer,\\ncontrolled and that, even if the Policy was a STOLI, such policies were legal in New\\nYork when the Policy was issued. SPV then sought sanctions against the Estate’s\\nattorneys, Brian Donahoe and Gerald Kroll, claiming that both attorneys had\\n“unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings” in violation of 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1927 and that Attorney Kroll had submitted a forged discovery document in\\nviolation of Fed. R. Civ. P 26(g). The district court declined to impose sanctions.\\n\\n The Estate now appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for\\nreconsideration, and SPV cross-appeals the district court’s denial of sanctions against\\nthe Estate’s attorneys. We address each issue in turn.\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f II.\\n\\n The Estate has changed its position numerous times throughout the course of\\nthis litigation. At summary judgment, it argued that New Jersey law, rather than New\\nYork law, should apply, making the Policy an invalid STOLI. Alternatively, it argued\\nthat, under New Jersey law, it should prevail on public policy grounds. However, the\\nEstate has conceded on appeal that New York law applies.\\n\\n The Estate raised its current arguments for the first time in the district court in\\nconnection with its motion for reconsideration, if it raised them at all. We therefore\\ntreat its appeal as an appeal from the district court’s denial of that motion. A district\\ncourt has wide discretion over whether to grant a motion for reconsideration of a prior\\norder, In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 993 (8th Cir. 2006),\\nand “we will reverse a denial of a motion for reconsideration only for a clear abuse of\\ndiscretion.” Paris Limousine of Okla., LLC v. Exec. Coach Builders, Inc., 867 F.3d\\n871, 873 (8th Cir. 2017). “An abuse of discretion will only be found if the district\\ncourt’s judgment was based on clearly erroneous factual findings or erroneous legal\\nconclusions.” Mathenia v. Delo, 99 F.3d 1476, 1480 (8th Cir. 1996). For the reasons\\nset forth below, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in\\ndenying the Estate’s motion for reconsideration.\\n\\n “The scope of the motion for reconsideration is critical in our\\ndetermination . . . . A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to identify facts or\\nlegal arguments that could have been, but were not, raised at the time the relevant\\nmotion was pending.” Julianello v. K-V Pharm. Co., 791 F.3d 915, 923 (8th Cir.\\n2015). Nor may a motion for reconsideration serve to introduce evidence that the\\nmovant could have produced before the district court decided the prior motion. Id. at\\n922; see also Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp., 839 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1988)\\n(stating that motions for reconsideration cannot be used to introduce new evidence or\\nlegal theories that “could have been adduced during pendency of the summary\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fjudgment motion” (quoting Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246,\\n251 (7th Cir. 1987))). A district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a\\nmotion for reconsideration used for such an “impermissible purpose.” Julianello, 791\\nF.3d at 923. This is precisely the situation we find here.\\n\\n The Estate moved for reconsideration based primarily on a new\\nargument—nefarious coercion—and asserted judicial estoppel for the first time in a\\nsupplemental filing.2 However, in its June 23, 2016 order holding the Estate’s motion\\nfor reconsideration in abeyance, the district court correctly recognized that the Estate\\ncould have raised its nefarious coercion argument in response to SPV’s motion for\\nsummary judgment, yet it failed to do so. The same can be said for the Estate’s\\njudicial estoppel argument, which it had not yet raised when the district court issued\\nthe June 23 order. Nevertheless, the district court held the motion for reconsideration\\nin abeyance pending further discovery, giving the Estate an opportunity to uncover\\nand submit new evidence supporting its claims. Instead, the Estate presented an\\nargument to the district court based solely on conjecture and accusations and failed\\nto present new evidence which supported its motion. Because the Estate sought to use\\nits motion for reconsideration for the impermissible purpose of introducing new\\narguments it could have raised earlier, see Hagerman, 839 F.2d at 414 (stating that a\\nmotion for reconsideration should not “serve as the occasion to tender new legal\\ntheories for the first time” (quoting Rothwell, 827 F.2d at 251)), and because the\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The Estate raises several other arguments for the first time before this Court,\\ncontending that Nachman Bergman lacked an insurable interest in his grandmother’s\\nlife and that the district court should have certified the question of whether an\\ninsurable interest existed at procurement of the policy to the New York Court of\\nAppeals. As a general rule, a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal.\\nTrs. of Electricians’ Salary Deferral Plan v. Wright, 688 F.3d 922, 926 (8th Cir.\\n2012). We therefore decline to review the district court’s decision based on these\\narguments. We note, however, that, even if the Estate had preserved these arguments,\\nthe New York Court of Appeals does not accept certified questions from federal\\ndistrict courts. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 500.27(a).\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fEstate then failed to support those arguments with any evidence even after receiving\\nadditional time for discovery, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in\\nrefusing to reconsider its summary judgment ruling. See Julianello, 791 F.3d at 922-\\n23 (finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’\\ncomplaint and denial of their motion to reconsider the scope of leave to amend that\\ncomplaint when all the evidence plaintiffs presented in support of their motion for\\nreconsideration was available to them when they opposed the defendant’s motion to\\ndismiss).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n SPV sought sanctions against the Estate’s attorneys under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and\\nRule 26(g)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It asserts on appeal that the\\ndistrict court improperly failed to impose these sanctions. We affirm the district\\ncourt’s denial of § 1927 sanctions against both attorneys and its denial of Rule 26\\nsanctions against Attorney Donahoe, but we reverse the district court’s denial of Rule\\n26 sanctions against Attorney Kroll and remand that issue for further consideration.\\n\\n “We review the denial of a motion for sanctions for an abuse of discretion,\\naffording the district court substantial deference and finding an abuse of discretion\\nonly if the court ‘bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly\\nerroneous assessment of the evidence.’” C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Lobrano,\\n695 F.3d 758, 763 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Monarch Fire Prot. Dist. v. Freedom\\nConsulting & Auditing Servs., Inc., 644 F.3d 633, 639 (8th Cir. 2011)).\\n\\n A.\\n\\n 28 U.S.C. § 1927 permits courts to impose monetary sanctions on an attorney\\nwho “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” Courts\\nshould construe § 1927 strictly and impose sanctions only “when attorney conduct,\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fviewed objectively, manifests either intentional or reckless disregard of the attorney’s\\nduties to the court.” Lee v. L.B. Sales, Inc., 177 F.3d 714, 718 (8th Cir. 1999). The\\ndistrict court found that any multiplication of proceedings in this case stemmed not\\nfrom the attorneys’ conduct but from their clients’ conduct. SPV fails to argue with\\nany specificity what the Estate’s attorneys did to warrant § 1927 sanctions and, thus,\\ncannot establish that the district court based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law\\nor evidence. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of\\n§ 1927 sanctions.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1) requires attorneys and pro se litigants to certify that\\nevery disclosure is “complete and correct at the time it was made” and that every\\ndiscovery request, response, and objection is consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil\\nProcedure, nonfrivolous, not submitted for an improper purpose, and not unreasonable\\nor unduly burdensome. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3) imposes “appropriate” sanctions on\\nattorneys or parties who violate Rule 26(g)(1). Such sanctions may include monetary\\npenalties, such as expenses and attorneys’ fees, Johnson Int’l Co. v. Jackson Nat. Life\\nIns. Co., 19 F.3d 431, 438 (8th Cir. 1994), and are particularly appropriate when an\\nattorney submits a forged discovery document. See Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp.,\\n965 F.2d 597, 600 n.5 (8th Cir. 1992). Unlike § 1927 sanctions, these sanctions are\\nnondiscretionary. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3); Perkins, 965 F.2d at 600 n.5; see also\\nRojas v. Town of Cicero, 775 F.3d 906, 909 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Rule 26(g)(3) gives the\\njudge discretion over the nature of the sanction but not whether to impose one.”);\\nChudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1372 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The\\ndecision whether to impose sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3) is not discretionary.”).\\n\\n SPV’s key evidence supporting Rule 26(g) sanctions is an allegedly-forged\\ndiscovery document and the associated metadata produced by Attorney Kroll. SPV\\npresents no evidence that Attorney Donahoe participated in this violation of Rule\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f26(g)(1). We therefore decline to find that the district court abused its discretion in\\ndenying Rule 26(g) sanctions against Attorney Donahoe.\\n\\n In response to a discovery request, Attorney Kroll provided SPV with a\\nredacted copy of the retainer agreement between himself and the Estate’s personal\\nrepresentative. After filing a motion to compel production in a related proceeding\\nagainst Attorney Kroll in the United States District Court for the Central District of\\nCalifornia, SPV obtained an unredacted draft of the same retainer agreement. This\\ndraft showed Attorney Kroll would receive a contingency fee if either the Estate or the\\nTrust prevailed in obtaining the death benefits payable under the Policy, supporting\\nSPV’s theory that the Estate and Trust were controlled by the same parties in interest.\\nWhen SPV produced the unredacted draft to the district court, the Estate claimed that\\ndraft was not a correct copy and produced its own unredacted copy of the retainer\\nagreement. The Estate’s copy omitted the provision awarding Attorney Kroll a\\ncontingency fee if the Trust prevailed.\\n\\n SPV requested Rule 26(g)(3) sanctions based on document metadata, taken\\ndirectly from Attorney Kroll’s computer by his e-discovery vendor. The metadata\\nshowed that the retainer agreement produced by the Estate, while purportedly signed\\nby the Estate’s personal representative in August 2015, was not created until July 20,\\n2016—two days before Attorney Kroll produced the document to the court.\\nTherefore, SPV argued, the document was forged. The district court acknowledged\\nthat fabricating discovery documents is grounds for sanctions, see SPV-LS, LLC v.\\nTransamerica Life Ins. Co., No. CIV 14-4092, 2017 WL 3668765, at *3 (Aug. 23,\\n2017), but it denied sanctions against Attorney Kroll. It did so under the mistaken\\nbelief that SPV relied on a document examiner’s report to prove forgery, stating that\\nSPV should have produced that report. However, SPV never claimed that it relied on\\na document examiner’s report; in fact, it indicated that it never consulted a document\\nexaminer and relied solely on the document’s metadata. Because the district court\\nbased its denial of sanctions on SPV’s failure to introduce a nonexistent report into\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fevidence, it clearly conducted an erroneous assessment of the evidence. See, e.g.,\\nMDU Res. Grp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 14 F.3d 1274, 1280 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding the\\ndistrict court clearly conducted an erroneous assessment of evidence when it\\nmisunderstood the purpose for which the evidence was offered). It therefore abused\\nits discretion in denying Rule 26(g) sanctions against Attorney Kroll on this basis.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n The district court’s denial of the Estate’s motion for reconsideration is affirmed.\\nIts denial of § 1927 sanctions against Attorneys Donahoe and Kroll and its denial of\\nRule 26(g) sanctions against Attorney Donahoe are likewise affirmed. The district\\ncourt’s denial of Rule 26(g) sanctions against Attorney Kroll is reversed. The matter\\nis remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the motion for Rule 26(g)\\nsanctions against Attorney Kroll consistent with this opinion.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4356848/\", \"author_raw\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4579595/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: SPV-LS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant Nachman Bergman, as Trustee of the N Bergman Insurance Trust Dated December 18, 2006; Malka Silberman, as Successor Trustee of the N Bergman Insurance Trust Dated December 18, 2006; Life Trading Trust, Dated August 8, 2007; T-Leg, LLC, Also Known as TLEG LLC ; Financial Life Services, LLC; SPV II LLC, Third Party Defendants the Representative of the Estate of Nancy Bergman, Third Party Defendant-Appellant SPV-LS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Transamerica Life Insurance Company, Defendant Nachman Bergman, as Trustee of the N Bergman Insurance Trust Dated December 18, 2006; Malka Silberman, as Successor Trustee of the N Bergman Insurance Trust Dated December 18, 2006; Life Trading Trust, Dated August 8, 2007; T-Leg, LLC, Also Known as TLEG LLC ; Financial Life Services, LLC; SPV II LLC, Third Party Defendants the Representative of the Estate of Nancy Bergman, Third Party Defendant-Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3177\n ___________________________\n\n SPV-LS, LLC\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Transamerica Life Insurance Company\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant\n\nNachman Bergman, as Trustee of The N Bergman Insurance Trust dated December\n 18, 2006; Malka Silberman, as Successor Trustee of The N Bergman Insurance\nTrust dated December 18, 2006; Life Trading Trust, dated August 8, 2007; T-Leg,\n LLC, also known as TLEG LLC; Financial Life Services, LLC; SPV II LLC\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendants\n lllllllllllllllllll\n The Representative of The Estate of Nancy Bergman\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendant - Appellant\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3179\n ___________________________\n\n SPV-LS, LLC\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Transamerica Life Insurance Company\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant\n\fNachman Bergman, as Trustee of The N Bergman Insurance Trust dated December\n 18, 2006; Malka Silberman, as Successor Trustee of The N Bergman Insurance\nTrust dated December 18, 2006; Life Trading Trust, dated August 8, 2007; T-Leg,\n LLC, also known as TLEG LLC; Financial Life Services, LLC; SPV II LLC\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendants\n\n The Representative of The Estate of Nancy Bergman\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeals from United States District Court\n for the District of South Dakota - Sioux Falls\n ____________\n\n Submitted: October 16, 2018\n Filed: January 8, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\n\n The Estate of Nancy Bergman (the Estate), through its personal representative,\nappeals a district court order denying its motion for reconsideration of an adverse\ngrant of summary judgment. SPV-LS, LLC (SPV) cross-appeals the district court’s\ndenial of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3) sanctions against the Estate’s\nattorneys. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have\njurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the following reasons, we affirm in part\nand reverse in part, remanding for further consideration the denial of sanctions against\nattorney Gerald Kroll.\n\n\n\n -2-\n\f I.\n\n This case concerns a $10 million life insurance policy (the Policy) issued by\nTransamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company (Transamerica) on the life of\noctogenarian Nancy Bergman. While the Estate and SPV differ in their interpretations\nof the motives underlying much of what happened, the basic facts are as follows.\n\n Sometime prior to October 2006, Nancy’s grandson, Nachman Bergman,\napproached her about procuring life insurance as part of an investment scheme.\nNachman explained that 82-year-old Nancy would apply for life insurance, which\nwould be funded by a group of investors led by Jacob Herbst. The investors would\nthen sell all acquired policies on the secondary market after the two-year contestability\nperiod expired, giving Nancy a small share of the profits. Nancy agreed to participate\nand Transamerica issued a $10,000,000 certificate of insurance to her in October\n2006. In December 2006, Nancy executed a trust instrument establishing the N\nBergman Insurance Trust (the Trust) and appointing Nachman as its sole trustee and\nprimary beneficiary. Pursuant to paperwork filed by Nancy and Nachman,\nTransamerica then issued the Policy in March 2007. The Policy certificate designated\nthe Trust as the Policy’s intended owner. The investors provided funds for Policy\npremiums, which were paid through the Trust.\n\n In 2009, Financial Life Services (FLS) contracted with the Trust to purchase the\nPolicy for $1,350,000. FLS is a life settlement provider—a company which purchases\nlife insurance policies for more than the cash surrender value but less than the amount\nof death benefits payable under the policy, then collects the death benefits when the\ninsured individual dies. Shortly after executing the purchase agreement, FLS learned\nthat the Trust had failed to pay $64,500 in Policy premiums. FLS paid these premiums\nto prevent the Policy from lapsing. FLS then learned that Nancy’s life expectancy was\nmaterially longer than represented and that, contrary to the Trust’s representations,\ninvestor funds, not family funds, had paid for the Policy. FLS found this significant\n\n -3-\n\fbecause life insurance policies paid for by and intended to benefit strangers (stranger-\noriginated life insurance policies, or STOLIs), are worth less on the secondary market\nthan policies funded by the insured individual or her family members. This is\nbecause, in the secondary insurance market, STOLIs are widely considered to be\nindicia of fraud.\n\n FLS discovered these facts before paying the Trust for the Policy and therefore\ninvoked a provision of the purchase agreement allowing it to rescind its purchase of\nthe Policy based on fraud in the procurement of the sale contract. It also requested\nreimbursement of the premiums it paid. When its efforts to rescind the transaction\nfailed, FLS instead exercised its contractual right under the purchase agreement to\ntender a reduced purchase price in light of the Trust’s misrepresentations as to\nNancy’s life expectancy and the Policy’s funding source. FLS tendered the\ncontractually-determined alternate purchase price of $610,500, which the Trust\nrejected. FLS filed a breach of contract suit against the Trust in the Eastern District\nof New York, seeking rescission of the purchase agreement and reimbursement of\nadvanced premiums. It continued to pay premiums to prevent the Policy from lapsing.\n\n The New York district court ultimately entered judgment in FLS’s favor for\nover a million dollars, including premium reimbursements, post-judgment interest,\nand attorneys’ fees. Because the Trust admitted it could not pay, the district court\nordered a sale of the Policy—the Trust’s only asset—at auction to satisfy that\njudgment. FLS submitted the winning—and only—bid of $1,194,522 and eventually\ntransferred the Policy to SPV.\n\n Nancy Bergman died on April 6, 2014. SPV submitted a claim for death\nbenefits under the Policy to Transamerica on May 29, 2014. Transamerica refused to\npay SPV’s claim because it received competing claims from Nachman Bergman and\nfrom Jacob Herbst’s wife Malka Silberman, both of whom claimed to be trustee of the\nTrust. Seeking payment of the Policy proceeds, SPV filed a complaint against\n\n -4-\n\fTransamerica for breach of contract in the United States District Court for the District\nof South Dakota.1 In the same action, Transamerica asserted a statutory interpleader\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1335, deposited the Policy death benefits of $10,000,000 with the\ndistrict court, and asked the court to determine the respective rights of SPV, the Trust,\nand Nancy’s Estate. The Estate then asserted a cross-claim to the Policy proceeds\nunder N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:24-1.1, a New Jersey statute that allows the insured’s\nestate to disgorge proceeds from the contractual beneficiary of a STOLI.\n\n SPV moved for summary judgment on the Estate’s cross-claim on two grounds.\nFirst, SPV asserted that, under South Dakota choice-of-law analysis, New York law\ngoverned the case, making the Estate’s statutory claim irrelevant. Second, SPV\nargued that STOLIs were legal in New York at the time the Policy was procured. The\nEstate countered that New Jersey law should apply, that New York law was in accord\nwith New Jersey law, and that the Estate should prevail on public policy grounds.\n\n The district court held that New York law applied. It found that, at the time the\nPolicy was procured, New York allowed STOLIs as long as the policy in question was\ninitially procured by the insured or someone with an insurable interest in the life of\nthe insured and that, under Kramer v. Phoenix Life Insurance Co., 940 N.E.2d 535\n(N.Y. 2010), an insured could procure a policy with the intent to immediately assign\nit to stranger investors. See id. at 551-52. The district court further found, as a matter\nof law, that Nachman Bergman had an insurable interest in his grandmother’s life.\nBased on these facts, the district court granted summary judgment against the Estate\nand dismissed its claims to the Policy proceeds.\n\n The Estate then filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.\n54(b) and raised a new argument: that Nancy Bergman only acted under nefarious\n\n 1\n SPV filed this action in South Dakota rather than New York because neither\noriginal party is a New York citizen. SPV’s parent company, South Dakota Trust\nCompany LLC, is a citizen of South Dakota and Transamerica is a citizen of Iowa.\n\n -5-\n\finfluence or coercion on the part of the investors. SPV countered that the Estate could\nhave raised this argument at summary judgment and failed to do so, and that the Estate\npresented no new evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. The district court\nnoted that the Estate had failed to raise this argument previously, but it nevertheless\nheld the Estate’s motion for reconsideration in abeyance and allowed it to conduct\nlimited further discovery. As the discovery deadline neared, the Estate filed a\nsupplemental submission in further support of its motion for reconsideration and\npresented another new argument: judicial estoppel. The Estate contended that SPV\ncould not argue that the Policy was supported by an insurable interest because FLS,\nSPV’s predecessor in interest, sought to rescind its purchase of the Policy based on\nits STOLI status. SPV countered that neither it nor FLS had ever argued the Policy\nwas unsupported by an insurable interest and that all the information and evidence\nupon which the Estate relied was available to it at summary judgment.\n\n The district court ultimately denied the Estate’s motion for reconsideration\nbased on lack of evidence. It found that SPV had never argued the Policy lacked an\ninsurable interest and that all of the testimony from Nancy’s family members and an\nexamining doctor showed that Nancy was competent, strong-willed, and knew what\nshe was doing. It further reiterated that New York law, specifically Kramer,\ncontrolled and that, even if the Policy was a STOLI, such policies were legal in New\nYork when the Policy was issued. SPV then sought sanctions against the Estate’s\nattorneys, Brian Donahoe and Gerald Kroll, claiming that both attorneys had\n“unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings” in violation of 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1927 and that Attorney Kroll had submitted a forged discovery document in\nviolation of Fed. R. Civ. P 26(g). The district court declined to impose sanctions.\n\n The Estate now appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for\nreconsideration, and SPV cross-appeals the district court’s denial of sanctions against\nthe Estate’s attorneys. We address each issue in turn.\n\n\n\n -6-\n\f II.\n\n The Estate has changed its position numerous times throughout the course of\nthis litigation. At summary judgment, it argued that New Jersey law, rather than New\nYork law, should apply, making the Policy an invalid STOLI. Alternatively, it argued\nthat, under New Jersey law, it should prevail on public policy grounds. However, the\nEstate has conceded on appeal that New York law applies.\n\n The Estate raised its current arguments for the first time in the district court in\nconnection with its motion for reconsideration, if it raised them at all. We therefore\ntreat its appeal as an appeal from the district court’s denial of that motion. A district\ncourt has wide discretion over whether to grant a motion for reconsideration of a prior\norder, In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 993 (8th Cir. 2006),\nand “we will reverse a denial of a motion for reconsideration only for a clear abuse of\ndiscretion.” Paris Limousine of Okla., LLC v. Exec. Coach Builders, Inc., 867 F.3d\n871, 873 (8th Cir. 2017). “An abuse of discretion will only be found if the district\ncourt’s judgment was based on clearly erroneous factual findings or erroneous legal\nconclusions.” Mathenia v. Delo, 99 F.3d 1476, 1480 (8th Cir. 1996). For the reasons\nset forth below, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in\ndenying the Estate’s motion for reconsideration.\n\n “The scope of the motion for reconsideration is critical in our\ndetermination . . . . A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to identify facts or\nlegal arguments that could have been, but were not, raised at the time the relevant\nmotion was pending.” Julianello v. K-V Pharm. Co., 791 F.3d 915, 923 (8th Cir.\n2015). Nor may a motion for reconsideration serve to introduce evidence that the\nmovant could have produced before the district court decided the prior motion. Id. at\n922; see also Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp., 839 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1988)\n(stating that motions for reconsideration cannot be used to introduce new evidence or\nlegal theories that “could have been adduced during pendency of the summary\n\n -7-\n\fjudgment motion” (quoting Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246,\n251 (7th Cir. 1987))). A district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a\nmotion for reconsideration used for such an “impermissible purpose.” Julianello, 791\nF.3d at 923. This is precisely the situation we find here.\n\n The Estate moved for reconsideration based primarily on a new\nargument—nefarious coercion—and asserted judicial estoppel for the first time in a\nsupplemental filing.2 However, in its June 23, 2016 order holding the Estate’s motion\nfor reconsideration in abeyance, the district court correctly recognized that the Estate\ncould have raised its nefarious coercion argument in response to SPV’s motion for\nsummary judgment, yet it failed to do so. The same can be said for the Estate’s\njudicial estoppel argument, which it had not yet raised when the district court issued\nthe June 23 order. Nevertheless, the district court held the motion for reconsideration\nin abeyance pending further discovery, giving the Estate an opportunity to uncover\nand submit new evidence supporting its claims. Instead, the Estate presented an\nargument to the district court based solely on conjecture and accusations and failed\nto present new evidence which supported its motion. Because the Estate sought to use\nits motion for reconsideration for the impermissible purpose of introducing new\narguments it could have raised earlier, see Hagerman, 839 F.2d at 414 (stating that a\nmotion for reconsideration should not “serve as the occasion to tender new legal\ntheories for the first time” (quoting Rothwell, 827 F.2d at 251)), and because the\n\n\n 2\n The Estate raises several other arguments for the first time before this Court,\ncontending that Nachman Bergman lacked an insurable interest in his grandmother’s\nlife and that the district court should have certified the question of whether an\ninsurable interest existed at procurement of the policy to the New York Court of\nAppeals. As a general rule, a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal.\nTrs. of Electricians’ Salary Deferral Plan v. Wright, 688 F.3d 922, 926 (8th Cir.\n2012). We therefore decline to review the district court’s decision based on these\narguments. We note, however, that, even if the Estate had preserved these arguments,\nthe New York Court of Appeals does not accept certified questions from federal\ndistrict courts. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 500.27(a).\n\n -8-\n\fEstate then failed to support those arguments with any evidence even after receiving\nadditional time for discovery, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in\nrefusing to reconsider its summary judgment ruling. See Julianello, 791 F.3d at 922-\n23 (finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’\ncomplaint and denial of their motion to reconsider the scope of leave to amend that\ncomplaint when all the evidence plaintiffs presented in support of their motion for\nreconsideration was available to them when they opposed the defendant’s motion to\ndismiss).\n\n III.\n\n SPV sought sanctions against the Estate’s attorneys under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and\nRule 26(g)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It asserts on appeal that the\ndistrict court improperly failed to impose these sanctions. We affirm the district\ncourt’s denial of § 1927 sanctions against both attorneys and its denial of Rule 26\nsanctions against Attorney Donahoe, but we reverse the district court’s denial of Rule\n26 sanctions against Attorney Kroll and remand that issue for further consideration.\n\n “We review the denial of a motion for sanctions for an abuse of discretion,\naffording the district court substantial deference and finding an abuse of discretion\nonly if the court ‘bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly\nerroneous assessment of the evidence.’” C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Lobrano,\n695 F.3d 758, 763 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Monarch Fire Prot. Dist. v. Freedom\nConsulting & Auditing Servs., Inc., 644 F.3d 633, 639 (8th Cir. 2011)).\n\n A.\n\n 28 U.S.C. § 1927 permits courts to impose monetary sanctions on an attorney\nwho “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” Courts\nshould construe § 1927 strictly and impose sanctions only “when attorney conduct,\n\n -9-\n\fviewed objectively, manifests either intentional or reckless disregard of the attorney’s\nduties to the court.” Lee v. L.B. Sales, Inc., 177 F.3d 714, 718 (8th Cir. 1999). The\ndistrict court found that any multiplication of proceedings in this case stemmed not\nfrom the attorneys’ conduct but from their clients’ conduct. SPV fails to argue with\nany specificity what the Estate’s attorneys did to warrant § 1927 sanctions and, thus,\ncannot establish that the district court based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law\nor evidence. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of\n§ 1927 sanctions.\n\n B.\n\n Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1) requires attorneys and pro se litigants to certify that\nevery disclosure is “complete and correct at the time it was made” and that every\ndiscovery request, response, and objection is consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil\nProcedure, nonfrivolous, not submitted for an improper purpose, and not unreasonable\nor unduly burdensome. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3) imposes “appropriate” sanctions on\nattorneys or parties who violate Rule 26(g)(1). Such sanctions may include monetary\npenalties, such as expenses and attorneys’ fees, Johnson Int’l Co. v. Jackson Nat. Life\nIns. Co., 19 F.3d 431, 438 (8th Cir. 1994), and are particularly appropriate when an\nattorney submits a forged discovery document. See Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp.,\n965 F.2d 597, 600 n.5 (8th Cir. 1992). Unlike § 1927 sanctions, these sanctions are\nnondiscretionary. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3); Perkins, 965 F.2d at 600 n.5; see also\nRojas v. Town of Cicero, 775 F.3d 906, 909 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Rule 26(g)(3) gives the\njudge discretion over the nature of the sanction but not whether to impose one.”);\nChudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1372 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The\ndecision whether to impose sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3) is not discretionary.”).\n\n SPV’s key evidence supporting Rule 26(g) sanctions is an allegedly-forged\ndiscovery document and the associated metadata produced by Attorney Kroll. SPV\npresents no evidence that Attorney Donahoe participated in this violation of Rule\n\n -10-\n\f26(g)(1). We therefore decline to find that the district court abused its discretion in\ndenying Rule 26(g) sanctions against Attorney Donahoe.\n\n In response to a discovery request, Attorney Kroll provided SPV with a\nredacted copy of the retainer agreement between himself and the Estate’s personal\nrepresentative. After filing a motion to compel production in a related proceeding\nagainst Attorney Kroll in the United States District Court for the Central District of\nCalifornia, SPV obtained an unredacted draft of the same retainer agreement. This\ndraft showed Attorney Kroll would receive a contingency fee if either the Estate or the\nTrust prevailed in obtaining the death benefits payable under the Policy, supporting\nSPV’s theory that the Estate and Trust were controlled by the same parties in interest.\nWhen SPV produced the unredacted draft to the district court, the Estate claimed that\ndraft was not a correct copy and produced its own unredacted copy of the retainer\nagreement. The Estate’s copy omitted the provision awarding Attorney Kroll a\ncontingency fee if the Trust prevailed.\n\n SPV requested Rule 26(g)(3) sanctions based on document metadata, taken\ndirectly from Attorney Kroll’s computer by his e-discovery vendor. The metadata\nshowed that the retainer agreement produced by the Estate, while purportedly signed\nby the Estate’s personal representative in August 2015, was not created until July 20,\n2016—two days before Attorney Kroll produced the document to the court.\nTherefore, SPV argued, the document was forged. The district court acknowledged\nthat fabricating discovery documents is grounds for sanctions, see SPV-LS, LLC v.\nTransamerica Life Ins. Co., No. CIV 14-4092, 2017 WL 3668765, at *3 (Aug. 23,\n2017), but it denied sanctions against Attorney Kroll. It did so under the mistaken\nbelief that SPV relied on a document examiner’s report to prove forgery, stating that\nSPV should have produced that report. However, SPV never claimed that it relied on\na document examiner’s report; in fact, it indicated that it never consulted a document\nexaminer and relied solely on the document’s metadata. Because the district court\nbased its denial of sanctions on SPV’s failure to introduce a nonexistent report into\n\n -11-\n\fevidence, it clearly conducted an erroneous assessment of the evidence. See, e.g.,\nMDU Res. Grp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 14 F.3d 1274, 1280 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding the\ndistrict court clearly conducted an erroneous assessment of evidence when it\nmisunderstood the purpose for which the evidence was offered). It therefore abused\nits discretion in denying Rule 26(g) sanctions against Attorney Kroll on this basis.\n\n IV.\n\n The district court’s denial of the Estate’s motion for reconsideration is affirmed.\nIts denial of § 1927 sanctions against Attorneys Donahoe and Kroll and its denial of\nRule 26(g) sanctions against Attorney Donahoe are likewise affirmed. The district\ncourt’s denial of Rule 26(g) sanctions against Attorney Kroll is reversed. The matter\nis remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the motion for Rule 26(g)\nsanctions against Attorney Kroll consistent with this opinion.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -12-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: SPV-LS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant Nachman Bergman, as Trustee of the N Bergman Insurance Trust Dated December 18, 2006; Malka Silberman, as Successor Trustee of the N Bergman Insurance Trust Dated December 18, 2006; Life Trading Trust, Dated August 8, 2007; T-Leg, LLC, Also Known as TLEG LLC ; Financial Life Services, LLC; SPV II LLC, Third Party Defendants the Representative of the Estate of Nancy Bergman, Third Party Defendant-Appellant SPV-LS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Transamerica Life Insurance Company, Defendant Nachman Bergman, as Trustee of the N Bergman Insurance Trust Dated December 18, 2006; Malka Silberman, as Successor Trustee of the N Bergman Insurance Trust Dated December 18, 2006; Life Trading Trust, Dated August 8, 2007; T-Leg, LLC, Also Known as TLEG LLC ; Financial Life Services, LLC; SPV II LLC, Third Party Defendants the Representative of the Estate of Nancy Bergman, Third Party Defendant-Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3177\\n ___________________________\\n\\n SPV-LS, LLC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Transamerica Life Insurance Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant\\n\\nNachman Bergman, as Trustee of The N Bergman Insurance Trust dated December\\n 18, 2006; Malka Silberman, as Successor Trustee of The N Bergman Insurance\\nTrust dated December 18, 2006; Life Trading Trust, dated August 8, 2007; T-Leg,\\n LLC, also known as TLEG LLC; Financial Life Services, LLC; SPV II LLC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendants\\n lllllllllllllllllll\\n The Representative of The Estate of Nancy Bergman\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendant - Appellant\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3179\\n ___________________________\\n\\n SPV-LS, LLC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Transamerica Life Insurance Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant\\n\\fNachman Bergman, as Trustee of The N Bergman Insurance Trust dated December\\n 18, 2006; Malka Silberman, as Successor Trustee of The N Bergman Insurance\\nTrust dated December 18, 2006; Life Trading Trust, dated August 8, 2007; T-Leg,\\n LLC, also known as TLEG LLC; Financial Life Services, LLC; SPV II LLC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendants\\n\\n The Representative of The Estate of Nancy Bergman\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeals from United States District Court\\n for the District of South Dakota - Sioux Falls\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 16, 2018\\n Filed: January 8, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n The Estate of Nancy Bergman (the Estate), through its personal representative,\\nappeals a district court order denying its motion for reconsideration of an adverse\\ngrant of summary judgment. SPV-LS, LLC (SPV) cross-appeals the district court’s\\ndenial of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3) sanctions against the Estate’s\\nattorneys. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have\\njurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the following reasons, we affirm in part\\nand reverse in part, remanding for further consideration the denial of sanctions against\\nattorney Gerald Kroll.\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f I.\\n\\n This case concerns a $10 million life insurance policy (the Policy) issued by\\nTransamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company (Transamerica) on the life of\\noctogenarian Nancy Bergman. While the Estate and SPV differ in their interpretations\\nof the motives underlying much of what happened, the basic facts are as follows.\\n\\n Sometime prior to October 2006, Nancy’s grandson, Nachman Bergman,\\napproached her about procuring life insurance as part of an investment scheme.\\nNachman explained that 82-year-old Nancy would apply for life insurance, which\\nwould be funded by a group of investors led by Jacob Herbst. The investors would\\nthen sell all acquired policies on the secondary market after the two-year contestability\\nperiod expired, giving Nancy a small share of the profits. Nancy agreed to participate\\nand Transamerica issued a $10,000,000 certificate of insurance to her in October\\n2006. In December 2006, Nancy executed a trust instrument establishing the N\\nBergman Insurance Trust (the Trust) and appointing Nachman as its sole trustee and\\nprimary beneficiary. Pursuant to paperwork filed by Nancy and Nachman,\\nTransamerica then issued the Policy in March 2007. The Policy certificate designated\\nthe Trust as the Policy’s intended owner. The investors provided funds for Policy\\npremiums, which were paid through the Trust.\\n\\n In 2009, Financial Life Services (FLS) contracted with the Trust to purchase the\\nPolicy for $1,350,000. FLS is a life settlement provider—a company which purchases\\nlife insurance policies for more than the cash surrender value but less than the amount\\nof death benefits payable under the policy, then collects the death benefits when the\\ninsured individual dies. Shortly after executing the purchase agreement, FLS learned\\nthat the Trust had failed to pay $64,500 in Policy premiums. FLS paid these premiums\\nto prevent the Policy from lapsing. FLS then learned that Nancy’s life expectancy was\\nmaterially longer than represented and that, contrary to the Trust’s representations,\\ninvestor funds, not family funds, had paid for the Policy. FLS found this significant\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fbecause life insurance policies paid for by and intended to benefit strangers (stranger-\\noriginated life insurance policies, or STOLIs), are worth less on the secondary market\\nthan policies funded by the insured individual or her family members. This is\\nbecause, in the secondary insurance market, STOLIs are widely considered to be\\nindicia of fraud.\\n\\n FLS discovered these facts before paying the Trust for the Policy and therefore\\ninvoked a provision of the purchase agreement allowing it to rescind its purchase of\\nthe Policy based on fraud in the procurement of the sale contract. It also requested\\nreimbursement of the premiums it paid. When its efforts to rescind the transaction\\nfailed, FLS instead exercised its contractual right under the purchase agreement to\\ntender a reduced purchase price in light of the Trust’s misrepresentations as to\\nNancy’s life expectancy and the Policy’s funding source. FLS tendered the\\ncontractually-determined alternate purchase price of $610,500, which the Trust\\nrejected. FLS filed a breach of contract suit against the Trust in the Eastern District\\nof New York, seeking rescission of the purchase agreement and reimbursement of\\nadvanced premiums. It continued to pay premiums to prevent the Policy from lapsing.\\n\\n The New York district court ultimately entered judgment in FLS’s favor for\\nover a million dollars, including premium reimbursements, post-judgment interest,\\nand attorneys’ fees. Because the Trust admitted it could not pay, the district court\\nordered a sale of the Policy—the Trust’s only asset—at auction to satisfy that\\njudgment. FLS submitted the winning—and only—bid of $1,194,522 and eventually\\ntransferred the Policy to SPV.\\n\\n Nancy Bergman died on April 6, 2014. SPV submitted a claim for death\\nbenefits under the Policy to Transamerica on May 29, 2014. Transamerica refused to\\npay SPV’s claim because it received competing claims from Nachman Bergman and\\nfrom Jacob Herbst’s wife Malka Silberman, both of whom claimed to be trustee of the\\nTrust. Seeking payment of the Policy proceeds, SPV filed a complaint against\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fTransamerica for breach of contract in the United States District Court for the District\\nof South Dakota.1 In the same action, Transamerica asserted a statutory interpleader\\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1335, deposited the Policy death benefits of $10,000,000 with the\\ndistrict court, and asked the court to determine the respective rights of SPV, the Trust,\\nand Nancy’s Estate. The Estate then asserted a cross-claim to the Policy proceeds\\nunder N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:24-1.1, a New Jersey statute that allows the insured’s\\nestate to disgorge proceeds from the contractual beneficiary of a STOLI.\\n\\n SPV moved for summary judgment on the Estate’s cross-claim on two grounds.\\nFirst, SPV asserted that, under South Dakota choice-of-law analysis, New York law\\ngoverned the case, making the Estate’s statutory claim irrelevant. Second, SPV\\nargued that STOLIs were legal in New York at the time the Policy was procured. The\\nEstate countered that New Jersey law should apply, that New York law was in accord\\nwith New Jersey law, and that the Estate should prevail on public policy grounds.\\n\\n The district court held that New York law applied. It found that, at the time the\\nPolicy was procured, New York allowed STOLIs as long as the policy in question was\\ninitially procured by the insured or someone with an insurable interest in the life of\\nthe insured and that, under Kramer v. Phoenix Life Insurance Co., 940 N.E.2d 535\\n(N.Y. 2010), an insured could procure a policy with the intent to immediately assign\\nit to stranger investors. See id. at 551-52. The district court further found, as a matter\\nof law, that Nachman Bergman had an insurable interest in his grandmother’s life.\\nBased on these facts, the district court granted summary judgment against the Estate\\nand dismissed its claims to the Policy proceeds.\\n\\n The Estate then filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n54(b) and raised a new argument: that Nancy Bergman only acted under nefarious\\n\\n 1\\n SPV filed this action in South Dakota rather than New York because neither\\noriginal party is a New York citizen. SPV’s parent company, South Dakota Trust\\nCompany LLC, is a citizen of South Dakota and Transamerica is a citizen of Iowa.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\finfluence or coercion on the part of the investors. SPV countered that the Estate could\\nhave raised this argument at summary judgment and failed to do so, and that the Estate\\npresented no new evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. The district court\\nnoted that the Estate had failed to raise this argument previously, but it nevertheless\\nheld the Estate’s motion for reconsideration in abeyance and allowed it to conduct\\nlimited further discovery. As the discovery deadline neared, the Estate filed a\\nsupplemental submission in further support of its motion for reconsideration and\\npresented another new argument: judicial estoppel. The Estate contended that SPV\\ncould not argue that the Policy was supported by an insurable interest because FLS,\\nSPV’s predecessor in interest, sought to rescind its purchase of the Policy based on\\nits STOLI status. SPV countered that neither it nor FLS had ever argued the Policy\\nwas unsupported by an insurable interest and that all the information and evidence\\nupon which the Estate relied was available to it at summary judgment.\\n\\n The district court ultimately denied the Estate’s motion for reconsideration\\nbased on lack of evidence. It found that SPV had never argued the Policy lacked an\\ninsurable interest and that all of the testimony from Nancy’s family members and an\\nexamining doctor showed that Nancy was competent, strong-willed, and knew what\\nshe was doing. It further reiterated that New York law, specifically Kramer,\\ncontrolled and that, even if the Policy was a STOLI, such policies were legal in New\\nYork when the Policy was issued. SPV then sought sanctions against the Estate’s\\nattorneys, Brian Donahoe and Gerald Kroll, claiming that both attorneys had\\n“unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings” in violation of 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1927 and that Attorney Kroll had submitted a forged discovery document in\\nviolation of Fed. R. Civ. P 26(g). The district court declined to impose sanctions.\\n\\n The Estate now appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for\\nreconsideration, and SPV cross-appeals the district court’s denial of sanctions against\\nthe Estate’s attorneys. We address each issue in turn.\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f II.\\n\\n The Estate has changed its position numerous times throughout the course of\\nthis litigation. At summary judgment, it argued that New Jersey law, rather than New\\nYork law, should apply, making the Policy an invalid STOLI. Alternatively, it argued\\nthat, under New Jersey law, it should prevail on public policy grounds. However, the\\nEstate has conceded on appeal that New York law applies.\\n\\n The Estate raised its current arguments for the first time in the district court in\\nconnection with its motion for reconsideration, if it raised them at all. We therefore\\ntreat its appeal as an appeal from the district court’s denial of that motion. A district\\ncourt has wide discretion over whether to grant a motion for reconsideration of a prior\\norder, In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 993 (8th Cir. 2006),\\nand “we will reverse a denial of a motion for reconsideration only for a clear abuse of\\ndiscretion.” Paris Limousine of Okla., LLC v. Exec. Coach Builders, Inc., 867 F.3d\\n871, 873 (8th Cir. 2017). “An abuse of discretion will only be found if the district\\ncourt’s judgment was based on clearly erroneous factual findings or erroneous legal\\nconclusions.” Mathenia v. Delo, 99 F.3d 1476, 1480 (8th Cir. 1996). For the reasons\\nset forth below, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in\\ndenying the Estate’s motion for reconsideration.\\n\\n “The scope of the motion for reconsideration is critical in our\\ndetermination . . . . A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to identify facts or\\nlegal arguments that could have been, but were not, raised at the time the relevant\\nmotion was pending.” Julianello v. K-V Pharm. Co., 791 F.3d 915, 923 (8th Cir.\\n2015). Nor may a motion for reconsideration serve to introduce evidence that the\\nmovant could have produced before the district court decided the prior motion. Id. at\\n922; see also Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp., 839 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1988)\\n(stating that motions for reconsideration cannot be used to introduce new evidence or\\nlegal theories that “could have been adduced during pendency of the summary\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fjudgment motion” (quoting Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246,\\n251 (7th Cir. 1987))). A district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a\\nmotion for reconsideration used for such an “impermissible purpose.” Julianello, 791\\nF.3d at 923. This is precisely the situation we find here.\\n\\n The Estate moved for reconsideration based primarily on a new\\nargument—nefarious coercion—and asserted judicial estoppel for the first time in a\\nsupplemental filing.2 However, in its June 23, 2016 order holding the Estate’s motion\\nfor reconsideration in abeyance, the district court correctly recognized that the Estate\\ncould have raised its nefarious coercion argument in response to SPV’s motion for\\nsummary judgment, yet it failed to do so. The same can be said for the Estate’s\\njudicial estoppel argument, which it had not yet raised when the district court issued\\nthe June 23 order. Nevertheless, the district court held the motion for reconsideration\\nin abeyance pending further discovery, giving the Estate an opportunity to uncover\\nand submit new evidence supporting its claims. Instead, the Estate presented an\\nargument to the district court based solely on conjecture and accusations and failed\\nto present new evidence which supported its motion. Because the Estate sought to use\\nits motion for reconsideration for the impermissible purpose of introducing new\\narguments it could have raised earlier, see Hagerman, 839 F.2d at 414 (stating that a\\nmotion for reconsideration should not “serve as the occasion to tender new legal\\ntheories for the first time” (quoting Rothwell, 827 F.2d at 251)), and because the\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The Estate raises several other arguments for the first time before this Court,\\ncontending that Nachman Bergman lacked an insurable interest in his grandmother’s\\nlife and that the district court should have certified the question of whether an\\ninsurable interest existed at procurement of the policy to the New York Court of\\nAppeals. As a general rule, a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal.\\nTrs. of Electricians’ Salary Deferral Plan v. Wright, 688 F.3d 922, 926 (8th Cir.\\n2012). We therefore decline to review the district court’s decision based on these\\narguments. We note, however, that, even if the Estate had preserved these arguments,\\nthe New York Court of Appeals does not accept certified questions from federal\\ndistrict courts. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 500.27(a).\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fEstate then failed to support those arguments with any evidence even after receiving\\nadditional time for discovery, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in\\nrefusing to reconsider its summary judgment ruling. See Julianello, 791 F.3d at 922-\\n23 (finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’\\ncomplaint and denial of their motion to reconsider the scope of leave to amend that\\ncomplaint when all the evidence plaintiffs presented in support of their motion for\\nreconsideration was available to them when they opposed the defendant’s motion to\\ndismiss).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n SPV sought sanctions against the Estate’s attorneys under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and\\nRule 26(g)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It asserts on appeal that the\\ndistrict court improperly failed to impose these sanctions. We affirm the district\\ncourt’s denial of § 1927 sanctions against both attorneys and its denial of Rule 26\\nsanctions against Attorney Donahoe, but we reverse the district court’s denial of Rule\\n26 sanctions against Attorney Kroll and remand that issue for further consideration.\\n\\n “We review the denial of a motion for sanctions for an abuse of discretion,\\naffording the district court substantial deference and finding an abuse of discretion\\nonly if the court ‘bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly\\nerroneous assessment of the evidence.’” C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Lobrano,\\n695 F.3d 758, 763 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Monarch Fire Prot. Dist. v. Freedom\\nConsulting & Auditing Servs., Inc., 644 F.3d 633, 639 (8th Cir. 2011)).\\n\\n A.\\n\\n 28 U.S.C. § 1927 permits courts to impose monetary sanctions on an attorney\\nwho “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” Courts\\nshould construe § 1927 strictly and impose sanctions only “when attorney conduct,\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fviewed objectively, manifests either intentional or reckless disregard of the attorney’s\\nduties to the court.” Lee v. L.B. Sales, Inc., 177 F.3d 714, 718 (8th Cir. 1999). The\\ndistrict court found that any multiplication of proceedings in this case stemmed not\\nfrom the attorneys’ conduct but from their clients’ conduct. SPV fails to argue with\\nany specificity what the Estate’s attorneys did to warrant § 1927 sanctions and, thus,\\ncannot establish that the district court based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law\\nor evidence. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of\\n§ 1927 sanctions.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1) requires attorneys and pro se litigants to certify that\\nevery disclosure is “complete and correct at the time it was made” and that every\\ndiscovery request, response, and objection is consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil\\nProcedure, nonfrivolous, not submitted for an improper purpose, and not unreasonable\\nor unduly burdensome. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3) imposes “appropriate” sanctions on\\nattorneys or parties who violate Rule 26(g)(1). Such sanctions may include monetary\\npenalties, such as expenses and attorneys’ fees, Johnson Int’l Co. v. Jackson Nat. Life\\nIns. Co., 19 F.3d 431, 438 (8th Cir. 1994), and are particularly appropriate when an\\nattorney submits a forged discovery document. See Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp.,\\n965 F.2d 597, 600 n.5 (8th Cir. 1992). Unlike § 1927 sanctions, these sanctions are\\nnondiscretionary. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3); Perkins, 965 F.2d at 600 n.5; see also\\nRojas v. Town of Cicero, 775 F.3d 906, 909 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Rule 26(g)(3) gives the\\njudge discretion over the nature of the sanction but not whether to impose one.”);\\nChudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1372 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The\\ndecision whether to impose sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3) is not discretionary.”).\\n\\n SPV’s key evidence supporting Rule 26(g) sanctions is an allegedly-forged\\ndiscovery document and the associated metadata produced by Attorney Kroll. SPV\\npresents no evidence that Attorney Donahoe participated in this violation of Rule\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f26(g)(1). We therefore decline to find that the district court abused its discretion in\\ndenying Rule 26(g) sanctions against Attorney Donahoe.\\n\\n In response to a discovery request, Attorney Kroll provided SPV with a\\nredacted copy of the retainer agreement between himself and the Estate’s personal\\nrepresentative. After filing a motion to compel production in a related proceeding\\nagainst Attorney Kroll in the United States District Court for the Central District of\\nCalifornia, SPV obtained an unredacted draft of the same retainer agreement. This\\ndraft showed Attorney Kroll would receive a contingency fee if either the Estate or the\\nTrust prevailed in obtaining the death benefits payable under the Policy, supporting\\nSPV’s theory that the Estate and Trust were controlled by the same parties in interest.\\nWhen SPV produced the unredacted draft to the district court, the Estate claimed that\\ndraft was not a correct copy and produced its own unredacted copy of the retainer\\nagreement. The Estate’s copy omitted the provision awarding Attorney Kroll a\\ncontingency fee if the Trust prevailed.\\n\\n SPV requested Rule 26(g)(3) sanctions based on document metadata, taken\\ndirectly from Attorney Kroll’s computer by his e-discovery vendor. The metadata\\nshowed that the retainer agreement produced by the Estate, while purportedly signed\\nby the Estate’s personal representative in August 2015, was not created until July 20,\\n2016—two days before Attorney Kroll produced the document to the court.\\nTherefore, SPV argued, the document was forged. The district court acknowledged\\nthat fabricating discovery documents is grounds for sanctions, see SPV-LS, LLC v.\\nTransamerica Life Ins. Co., No. CIV 14-4092, 2017 WL 3668765, at *3 (Aug. 23,\\n2017), but it denied sanctions against Attorney Kroll. It did so under the mistaken\\nbelief that SPV relied on a document examiner’s report to prove forgery, stating that\\nSPV should have produced that report. However, SPV never claimed that it relied on\\na document examiner’s report; in fact, it indicated that it never consulted a document\\nexaminer and relied solely on the document’s metadata. Because the district court\\nbased its denial of sanctions on SPV’s failure to introduce a nonexistent report into\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fevidence, it clearly conducted an erroneous assessment of the evidence. See, e.g.,\\nMDU Res. Grp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 14 F.3d 1274, 1280 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding the\\ndistrict court clearly conducted an erroneous assessment of evidence when it\\nmisunderstood the purpose for which the evidence was offered). It therefore abused\\nits discretion in denying Rule 26(g) sanctions against Attorney Kroll on this basis.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n The district court’s denial of the Estate’s motion for reconsideration is affirmed.\\nIts denial of § 1927 sanctions against Attorneys Donahoe and Kroll and its denial of\\nRule 26(g) sanctions against Attorney Donahoe are likewise affirmed. The district\\ncourt’s denial of Rule 26(g) sanctions against Attorney Kroll is reversed. The matter\\nis remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the motion for Rule 26(g)\\nsanctions against Attorney Kroll consistent with this opinion.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":289,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4579597,"string":"4,579,597"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Ria SCHUMACHER, Individually and on Behalf of All Others, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SC DATA CENTER, INC., Doing Business as Colony Brands, Inc., Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Ria Schumacher v. SC Data Center, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3112"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gruender, Kelly, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3112\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Ria Schumacher, Individually and on Behalf of All Others\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n SC Data Center, Inc., doing business as Colony Brands, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Central Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 14, 2018\\n Filed: January 8, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n After the parties reached a tentative settlement in this purported class action, SC\\nData Center, Inc., moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the class\\nrepresentative, Ria Schumacher, lacked standing. However, the district court enforced\\nthe settlement between the parties without deciding the standing issue. SC Data\\nCenter appeals, arguing the district court erred by not deciding standing first. We\\n\\fagree, vacate the district court’s approval of the settlement agreement, and remand the\\ncase.\\n\\n In February 2016, Schumacher filed a purported class action in the Circuit\\nCourt of Cole County, Missouri, alleging that SC Data Center committed three\\nviolations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x. SC\\nData Center removed the case to federal court. In May 2016, the parties reached a\\ntentative settlement agreement during mediation. Four days later, the Supreme Court\\nreleased its opinion in Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), holding that the\\nNinth Circuit failed to properly analyze Article III standing in assessing a claim\\nbrought under the FCRA.\\n\\n Subsequently, in July 2016, SC Data Center moved to dismiss this action for\\nlack of standing. The district court denied the motion, concluding that “Schumacher’s\\nstanding to bring the FCRA claims underlying this settlement is irrelevant to whether\\nshe has standing to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement.”\\n\\n The district court ordered the parties to submit their settlement agreement for\\napproval under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), and they complied. The district court approved\\nthe settlement, and SC Data Center timely appealed the decision.\\n\\n We agree with SC Data Center that the district court erred by not assessing\\nstanding before enforcing the settlement agreement. “Article III standing must be\\ndecided first by the court and presents a question of justiciability; if it is lacking, a\\nfederal court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim.” Miller v. Redwood\\nToxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 934 (8th Cir. 2012). A district court’s obligation\\nto ensure that standing exists continues throughout the case because “[t]o qualify as\\na case fit for federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual controversy must be extant at all\\nstages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’” Arizonans for\\nOfficial English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fU.S. 395, 401 (1975)). This rule applies to settlements of class actions because “[a]n\\napproved settlement takes the form of a judgment of the court, and without both\\nArticle III power and proper subject-matter jurisdiction, the court cannot act.”\\nRobertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 698 (7th Cir. 2018). Thus, because the\\ndistrict court’s act in approving a class settlement was a court judgment, it erred when\\nit did not first assess standing.\\n\\n Schumacher argues that the district court did not need to reassess standing after\\nSpokeo because SC Data Center cannot escape the settlement agreement based on a\\nchange in the law. Specifically, she relies on Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d\\n590, 596 (3d Cir. 2010), to argue that a party cannot escape a settlement “simply\\nbecause a change in the law confers upon it a benefit that could have altered the\\nsettlement calculus.”\\n\\n Her argument is not persuasive here because Spokeo, even if it was a catalyst\\nfor SC Data Center’s motion to dismiss, was not a change in the substantive law\\nbearing on Schumacher’s claim that would have “altered the settlement calculus.” Id.;\\nsee also Robertson, 902 F.3d at 698 (stating that “changes in the legal background that\\ndo not affect Article III or subject-matter jurisdiction are an entirely different matter”\\nfrom those that do affect jurisdiction). Other circuits have similarly distinguished the\\nEhrheart line of cases when addressing Spokeo because “Spokeo did not change the\\nlaw of standing and thus was not a post-agreement change in the law. It merely\\nreiterated that an Article III injury must be both particular and concrete.” Robertson,\\n902 F.3d at 698. Thus, Ehrheart provides no basis to avoid addressing standing\\nbefore enforcing a settlement agreement.\\n\\n Because there is no finding in the record regarding whether Schumacher had\\nstanding to pursue her claims, we vacate the district court’s approval of the settlement\\nagreement and remand the case for a decision on whether Schumacher has standing.\\nWe express no view on whether the Seventh Circuit’s opinion on FCRA standing or\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fone of the competing approaches in other circuits is best applied to the facts of this\\ncase. Compare Robertson, 902 F.3d at 694–98, with Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto.\\nIns. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1172–76 (9th Cir. 2018), and Long v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,\\n903 F.3d 312, 323–25 (3d Cir. 2018).\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4356850/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4579597/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Ria SCHUMACHER, Individually and on Behalf of All Others, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SC DATA CENTER, INC., Doing Business as Colony Brands, Inc., Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3112\n ___________________________\n\n Ria Schumacher, Individually and on Behalf of All Others\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n SC Data Center, Inc., doing business as Colony Brands, Inc.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Western District of Missouri - Central Division\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 14, 2018\n Filed: January 8, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\n After the parties reached a tentative settlement in this purported class action, SC\nData Center, Inc., moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the class\nrepresentative, Ria Schumacher, lacked standing. However, the district court enforced\nthe settlement between the parties without deciding the standing issue. SC Data\nCenter appeals, arguing the district court erred by not deciding standing first. We\n\fagree, vacate the district court’s approval of the settlement agreement, and remand the\ncase.\n\n In February 2016, Schumacher filed a purported class action in the Circuit\nCourt of Cole County, Missouri, alleging that SC Data Center committed three\nviolations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x. SC\nData Center removed the case to federal court. In May 2016, the parties reached a\ntentative settlement agreement during mediation. Four days later, the Supreme Court\nreleased its opinion in Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), holding that the\nNinth Circuit failed to properly analyze Article III standing in assessing a claim\nbrought under the FCRA.\n\n Subsequently, in July 2016, SC Data Center moved to dismiss this action for\nlack of standing. The district court denied the motion, concluding that “Schumacher’s\nstanding to bring the FCRA claims underlying this settlement is irrelevant to whether\nshe has standing to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement.”\n\n The district court ordered the parties to submit their settlement agreement for\napproval under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), and they complied. The district court approved\nthe settlement, and SC Data Center timely appealed the decision.\n\n We agree with SC Data Center that the district court erred by not assessing\nstanding before enforcing the settlement agreement. “Article III standing must be\ndecided first by the court and presents a question of justiciability; if it is lacking, a\nfederal court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim.” Miller v. Redwood\nToxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 934 (8th Cir. 2012). A district court’s obligation\nto ensure that standing exists continues throughout the case because “[t]o qualify as\na case fit for federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual controversy must be extant at all\nstages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’” Arizonans for\nOfficial English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422\n\n -2-\n\fU.S. 395, 401 (1975)). This rule applies to settlements of class actions because “[a]n\napproved settlement takes the form of a judgment of the court, and without both\nArticle III power and proper subject-matter jurisdiction, the court cannot act.”\nRobertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 698 (7th Cir. 2018). Thus, because the\ndistrict court’s act in approving a class settlement was a court judgment, it erred when\nit did not first assess standing.\n\n Schumacher argues that the district court did not need to reassess standing after\nSpokeo because SC Data Center cannot escape the settlement agreement based on a\nchange in the law. Specifically, she relies on Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d\n590, 596 (3d Cir. 2010), to argue that a party cannot escape a settlement “simply\nbecause a change in the law confers upon it a benefit that could have altered the\nsettlement calculus.”\n\n Her argument is not persuasive here because Spokeo, even if it was a catalyst\nfor SC Data Center’s motion to dismiss, was not a change in the substantive law\nbearing on Schumacher’s claim that would have “altered the settlement calculus.” Id.;\nsee also Robertson, 902 F.3d at 698 (stating that “changes in the legal background that\ndo not affect Article III or subject-matter jurisdiction are an entirely different matter”\nfrom those that do affect jurisdiction). Other circuits have similarly distinguished the\nEhrheart line of cases when addressing Spokeo because “Spokeo did not change the\nlaw of standing and thus was not a post-agreement change in the law. It merely\nreiterated that an Article III injury must be both particular and concrete.” Robertson,\n902 F.3d at 698. Thus, Ehrheart provides no basis to avoid addressing standing\nbefore enforcing a settlement agreement.\n\n Because there is no finding in the record regarding whether Schumacher had\nstanding to pursue her claims, we vacate the district court’s approval of the settlement\nagreement and remand the case for a decision on whether Schumacher has standing.\nWe express no view on whether the Seventh Circuit’s opinion on FCRA standing or\n\n -3-\n\fone of the competing approaches in other circuits is best applied to the facts of this\ncase. Compare Robertson, 902 F.3d at 694–98, with Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto.\nIns. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1172–76 (9th Cir. 2018), and Long v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,\n903 F.3d 312, 323–25 (3d Cir. 2018).\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Ria SCHUMACHER, Individually and on Behalf of All Others, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SC DATA CENTER, INC., Doing Business as Colony Brands, Inc., Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3112\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Ria Schumacher, Individually and on Behalf of All Others\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n SC Data Center, Inc., doing business as Colony Brands, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Central Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 14, 2018\\n Filed: January 8, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n After the parties reached a tentative settlement in this purported class action, SC\\nData Center, Inc., moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the class\\nrepresentative, Ria Schumacher, lacked standing. However, the district court enforced\\nthe settlement between the parties without deciding the standing issue. SC Data\\nCenter appeals, arguing the district court erred by not deciding standing first. We\\n\\fagree, vacate the district court’s approval of the settlement agreement, and remand the\\ncase.\\n\\n In February 2016, Schumacher filed a purported class action in the Circuit\\nCourt of Cole County, Missouri, alleging that SC Data Center committed three\\nviolations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x. SC\\nData Center removed the case to federal court. In May 2016, the parties reached a\\ntentative settlement agreement during mediation. Four days later, the Supreme Court\\nreleased its opinion in Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), holding that the\\nNinth Circuit failed to properly analyze Article III standing in assessing a claim\\nbrought under the FCRA.\\n\\n Subsequently, in July 2016, SC Data Center moved to dismiss this action for\\nlack of standing. The district court denied the motion, concluding that “Schumacher’s\\nstanding to bring the FCRA claims underlying this settlement is irrelevant to whether\\nshe has standing to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement.”\\n\\n The district court ordered the parties to submit their settlement agreement for\\napproval under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), and they complied. The district court approved\\nthe settlement, and SC Data Center timely appealed the decision.\\n\\n We agree with SC Data Center that the district court erred by not assessing\\nstanding before enforcing the settlement agreement. “Article III standing must be\\ndecided first by the court and presents a question of justiciability; if it is lacking, a\\nfederal court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim.” Miller v. Redwood\\nToxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 934 (8th Cir. 2012). A district court’s obligation\\nto ensure that standing exists continues throughout the case because “[t]o qualify as\\na case fit for federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual controversy must be extant at all\\nstages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’” Arizonans for\\nOfficial English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fU.S. 395, 401 (1975)). This rule applies to settlements of class actions because “[a]n\\napproved settlement takes the form of a judgment of the court, and without both\\nArticle III power and proper subject-matter jurisdiction, the court cannot act.”\\nRobertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 698 (7th Cir. 2018). Thus, because the\\ndistrict court’s act in approving a class settlement was a court judgment, it erred when\\nit did not first assess standing.\\n\\n Schumacher argues that the district court did not need to reassess standing after\\nSpokeo because SC Data Center cannot escape the settlement agreement based on a\\nchange in the law. Specifically, she relies on Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d\\n590, 596 (3d Cir. 2010), to argue that a party cannot escape a settlement “simply\\nbecause a change in the law confers upon it a benefit that could have altered the\\nsettlement calculus.”\\n\\n Her argument is not persuasive here because Spokeo, even if it was a catalyst\\nfor SC Data Center’s motion to dismiss, was not a change in the substantive law\\nbearing on Schumacher’s claim that would have “altered the settlement calculus.” Id.;\\nsee also Robertson, 902 F.3d at 698 (stating that “changes in the legal background that\\ndo not affect Article III or subject-matter jurisdiction are an entirely different matter”\\nfrom those that do affect jurisdiction). Other circuits have similarly distinguished the\\nEhrheart line of cases when addressing Spokeo because “Spokeo did not change the\\nlaw of standing and thus was not a post-agreement change in the law. It merely\\nreiterated that an Article III injury must be both particular and concrete.” Robertson,\\n902 F.3d at 698. Thus, Ehrheart provides no basis to avoid addressing standing\\nbefore enforcing a settlement agreement.\\n\\n Because there is no finding in the record regarding whether Schumacher had\\nstanding to pursue her claims, we vacate the district court’s approval of the settlement\\nagreement and remand the case for a decision on whether Schumacher has standing.\\nWe express no view on whether the Seventh Circuit’s opinion on FCRA standing or\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fone of the competing approaches in other circuits is best applied to the facts of this\\ncase. Compare Robertson, 902 F.3d at 694–98, with Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto.\\nIns. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1172–76 (9th Cir. 2018), and Long v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,\\n903 F.3d 312, 323–25 (3d Cir. 2018).\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":290,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4579598,"string":"4,579,598"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Michael SPRADLING, as Personal Representative of the Estate Of, William Collin Spradling, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Clay HASTINGS, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Michael Ford, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Frederick Steve Woodall, \"Steve\" Individually and in His Official Capacity; Aaron Simon, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Stuart Thomas, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Little Rock, City Of, a Municipality, Defendants-Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Michael Spradling v. Clay Hastings"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3573"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Melloy, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SMITH, Chief Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3573\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Michael Spradling, as Personal Representative of the Estate of, William Collin\\n Spradling, Deceased\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Clay Hastings, Individually and in his Official Capacity; Michael Ford,\\n Individually and in his Official Capacity; Frederick Steve Woodall, \\\"Steve\\\"\\n Individually and in his Official Capacity; Aaron Simon, Individually and in his\\nOfficial Capacity; Stuart Thomas, Individually and in his Official Capacity; Little\\n Rock, City of, A Municipality\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 27, 2018\\n Filed: January 8, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, MELLOY and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSMITH, Chief Judge.\\n\\n On July 16, 2008, Officers Clay Hastings, Michael Ford, Steve Woodall, and\\nAaron Simon of the Little Rock Police Department (LRPD) were investigating\\n\\fWilliam Collin Spradling (“Collin”) as a robbery suspect. During the investigation,\\nCollin was shot and killed. Over four years later, on November 5, 2012, Michael\\nSpradling, as the personal representative of Collin’s estate, filed suit pursuant to 42\\nU.S.C. § 1983 against the officers, Little Rock Police Chief Stuart Thomas, and the\\nCity of Little Rock (collectively, “defendants”). Spradling alleged that the officers\\nused excessive force resulting in Collins’s wrongful death. The defendants moved for\\nsummary judgment because Spradling filed his complaint outside of the applicable\\nstatute of limitations. The district court1 granted the motion and dismissed the\\ncomplaint with prejudice.\\n\\n On appeal, Spradling does not contest that he filed his § 1983 lawsuit outside\\nof the applicable statute of limitations. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105. Instead, he\\nargues that he presented evidence of fraudulent concealment and conspiracy sufficient\\nto equitably toll the statute of limitations. Because we conclude that the undisputed\\nfacts placed Spradling on objective notice of the need to investigate the shooting, we\\nhold that the limitations period was not equitably tolled. Therefore, we affirm the\\njudgment of the district court.\\n\\n I. Background\\n On July 16, 2008, Officers Hastings, Ford, Woodall, and Simon responded to\\n621 Gillette Road to investigate Collin as a robbery suspect. During the investigation,\\nCollin was shot and killed.\\n\\n On November 5, 2012, Spradling filed this § 1983 lawsuit against the officers,\\nalleging excessive force, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and\\nwrongful death and negligence, see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-102(a) and (b). In\\naddition, Spradling brought a survival claim. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-101(a)(1).\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable James M. Moody Jr., United States District Judge for the\\nEastern District of Arkansas.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fSpradling voluntarily nonsuited the case and refiled the action on April 23, 2015. In\\nthe refiled action, Spradling added Chief Thomas and the City of Little Rock (“City”)\\nas defendants and added three additional claims: (1) a claim of failure to train,\\nsupervise, or discipline against Chief Thomas and the City; (2) a claim that Chief\\nThomas and the City permitted a widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional\\nconduct; and (3) a civil conspiracy claim against the officers, Chief Thomas, and\\nothers. In the refiled complaint, Spradling alleged that the defendants did not disclose\\nmany pertinent facts and purposefully hid others following Collin’s death.\\n\\n The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for\\nsummary judgment based upon the statute of limitations. In resolving the motion to\\ndismiss, the district court considered attachments and exhibits outside the pleadings.\\nConsequently, it analyzed the defendants’ dismissal motion as a summary-judgment\\nmotion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The district court denied the motion, concluding\\nthat genuine issues of material fact existed as to when the statute of limitations began\\nto run on Spradling’s claims. The court explained:\\n\\n Plaintiff alleges that he obtained the Spradling Use of Force File\\n in 2009. However, that file did not contain certain audio and video\\n recordings which cast doubt on the Defendants’ version of the events\\n leading to Collin’s death. Until August 22, 2012, Plaintiff believed he\\n possessed the complete and accurate file. Plaintiff claims that the\\n Defendants withheld audio and video recordings from the day of the\\n shooting, falsely transcribed witness statements, tampered with portions\\n of video and audio records in order to destroy evidence, and intentionally\\n gave the Plaintiff inaccurate information about the shooting.\\n\\nSpradling v. Hastings, No. 4:15-cv-00238, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 18, 2015),\\nECF No. 14.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f Later, the defendants did move for summary judgment, noting that Spradling\\nfiled his initial complaint outside of the applicable statute of limitations. Based on the\\nsummary-judgment record, the district court granted the motion. The court noted that\\non November 4, 2008, Christina Hatfield, a witness to the shooting and the mother of\\nCollins’s girlfriend, requested a copy of the case file relating to the shooting from the\\nLRPD. She received a 556-page case file in response to her request. Then, in late\\nNovember 2008 or early 2009, Spradling received a copy of the 556-page case file\\nalong with a letter from Hatfield outlining the inconsistencies she believed existed in\\nthe file. Hatfield’s letter provides, in relevant part:\\n\\n As I read through the file, I was struck by so many inconsistencies, that\\n I cannot believe the prosecuting attorney’s office didn’t even call us for\\n an interview before determining that it wasn’t prosecutable, even though\\n I spoke with John Johnson twice, telling him we were available at any\\n time and believed Collin had been murdered.\\n\\n With you not having actually been there, I just wanted to point out a\\n couple of things for you to keep in mind as you go through this, as they\\n try to paint a pretty good case of justifying their actions.\\n\\n In regards to the homicide:\\n\\n First and foremost, they all say Simon was yelling, “Gun, Gun, etc.”\\n including Det. Gassaway who was in the FRONT yard at the time, yet\\n neither myself, Rachael, nor Paul ever heard them say anything about a\\n gun until later, even though we were standing right there. When you read\\n our statements, you’ll see that we were consistent about that, even\\n though we were immediately segregated from each other and never\\n allowed to say a word to each other before our statements were taken.\\n\\n Simon’s Statement:\\n Simon said Collin had his hand in his pocket, but when they first went\\n to ground I saw Collin’s right hand, as did Rachael, and it was open and\\n empty. Afterwards, there were so many men on him I couldn’t see his\\n hands anymore, but if you look at the position of Collin’s right hand in\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fthe picture on page 363, how could Simon have possibly have had his\\nhand on Collin’s in his right pocket? Also, he says the gun “dropped”\\nfrom Collin’s hand, but that when he first saw it, it was about 2 feet\\naway? Lastly, he says he moved it to the brick wall to secure it, but the\\npicture again tells a different story. If the gun had dropped from Collin’s\\nright hand, wouldn’t it have been a lot more secure right where is was,\\nrather than on the wall, since Rachael and I were sitting on the back step\\nand Paul was on the other side of the patio furniture?\\n\\nLundy’s Statement:\\nLundy confirms he has Collin’s left arm, so takes the left out of play.\\nAlso, IF Paul said, “I know he had a gun on him[,”] which he doesn’t\\nbelieve he said . . . he would have been referring to the night before, just\\nas I was in my statement. Paul’s own statement confirms that he hadn’t\\nseen a gun that morning.\\n\\nWoodall Statement:\\nWoodall states that Simon said he was “sure” he had a gun, yet Simon\\nsays he never saw the gun until it was over, and that he felt it and\\n“thought” it was a gun. Again, if you look at the picture on page 363,\\nhow could Collin have possibly pulled a gun in that position with Simon\\nholding his right hand or wrist, and Hastings holding his right arm? Also,\\nWoodall says he saw the gun, but can’t even tell you what hand it was\\nin? Lastly, he admits that he thought Collin had shot at some point.\\n\\nHastings Statement:\\nHastings confirms that he too had Collin’s right arm. So we are to\\nbelieve that Simon has his right hand/wrist and Hastings has his right\\narm, yet Collin managed to reach into his right pocket while laying on\\nhis right arm with 4 men on him . . . pull a gun . . . pull the slide back\\n. . . and raise the barrel? Hastings also says he doesn’t know which hand\\nthe gun was in and that he shot because he thought Collin had shot.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Ford’s Statement:\\n Ford admits he never saw a gun, and only fired because he thought\\n Collin had fired.\\n\\n How is it that myself and my two children, civilians who have never\\n been around guns, could have known that Collin had NOT fired a\\n weapon, yet these three trained law enforcement officers ALL thought\\n he had?\\n\\n How is it that two of the three shooters say they don’t even know which\\n hand Collin’s gun was in, and the third doesn’t even try to hide the fact\\n that he never even saw a gun?\\n\\n ...\\n\\n I hope these notes help you in your attempts to get an attorney for your\\n civil action, so we can all try to get some sort of justice for Collin. I am\\n planning to contact the Attorney General’s office to continue to pursue\\n criminal charges against the detectives, and hopefully the Harris’,\\n although I’m not holding my breath at this point.\\n\\nMot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 5, at 1–3, Spradling v.\\nHastings, No. 4:15-cv-00238 (E.D. Ark. June 26, 2015), ECF No. 5-5 (emphasis\\nadded) (ellipses in original).\\n\\n Before the district court, Spradling argued against summary judgment,\\ncontending that the running of the statute of limitations tolled because the disclosed\\npolice file failed to contain certain audio and video recordings. The absence of these\\nrecordings cast doubt on the defendants’ version of events leading to Collins’s death.\\nThe district court acknowledged the absence of the recordings, but it concluded that\\n“the case file did contain references to both the dash cam video and to taped\\nstatements of witnesses. Further, the file contained transcripts of the taped\\nstatements.” Spradling v. Hastings, No. 4:15-cv-00238, 2017 WL 6816541, at *2\\n(E.D. Ark. Oct. 23, 2017). The court emphasized that “in Ms. Hatfield’s letter to the\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fPlaintiff she told him that she believed Collin had been murdered and outlined\\ninconsistencies she believed existed in the case file.” Id.\\n\\n The court then held, based on the undisputed facts, that “by early 2009 when\\nPlaintiff obtained the case file and the letter of Ms. Hatfield, Plaintiff was placed on\\nobjective notice of the need to investigate the shooting.” Id. at *3. In support of its\\nholding, the court cited (1) the case file’s reference to both the audio and video tapes;\\n(2) Hatfield’s reference to inconsistences she believed existed in the case file and her\\nbelief that Collin was murdered; and (3) Spradling’s admission in his affidavit that\\n“after the shooting, Christina Hatfield told me her opinions that the shooting which\\nshe witnessed, was not justified. She told me that Collin did not do anything that\\nwould have justified the LRPD officers shooting him.” Id. With these considerations,\\nthe district court concluded Spradling’s cause of action was not concealed. The court,\\ntherefore, determined that the statute of limitations on Spradling’s cause of action\\ncommenced at the latest in early 2009 and expired in early 2012. Because Spradling\\ndid not file suit until November 2012, the court held that the suit was beyond the\\nlimitations period.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n On appeal, Spradling argues that the district court erred in granting summary\\njudgment to the defendants. Spradling admits he filed his initial complaint outside of\\nthe applicable statute of limitations, but he argues that he presented sufficient evidence\\nof fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to equitably toll the limitations period.\\n\\n “We review the grant of summary judgment based upon the statute of\\nlimitations de novo and take all facts in the light most favorable to [Spradling].”\\nMahanna v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 747 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n “Arkansas’s three-year personal injury statute of limitations applies to this\\n§ 1983 action filed in Arkansas . . . .” Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir.\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f2001) (first citing Ark. Code. Ann. § 16-56-105(3); and then citing Ketchum v. City\\nof W. Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992)). “The statute begins to run\\nwhen the acts occur.” O’Mara v. Dykema, 942 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Ark. 1997). Collin\\nwas killed on July 16, 2008. If not tolled, the three-year statute of limitations expired\\non July 16, 2011. Spradling’s initial suit was filed on November 5, 2012—nearly 16\\nmonths beyond the limitations period.\\n\\n Spradling does not contest that he filed his § 1983 lawsuit outside of the\\napplicable limitations period; instead, he relies on the principle that “affirmative\\nactions of concealment of a cause of action will toll the statute of limitations.” Id. As\\nwe have previously recognized, Arkansas law provides:\\n\\n In order to toll the statute of limitations, there must be a fact\\n question of some positive act of fraud, something so furtively planned\\n and secretly executed as to keep the plaintiff’s cause of action concealed,\\n or perpetrated in a way that it conceals itself. Where affirmative acts of\\n concealment by the person charged with fraud prevent the discovery of\\n that person’s misrepresentations, the statute of limitations will be tolled\\n until the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered with the\\n exercise of reasonable diligence.\\n\\n Arkansas courts hold that although the question of fraudulent\\n concealment is normally a question of fact that is not suited for summary\\n judgment, when the evidence leaves no room for a reasonable difference\\n of opinion, a trial court may resolve fact issues as a matter of law.\\n Concealment of facts, no matter how fraudulent or otherwise wrongful,\\n has no effect on the running of a statute of limitations if the plaintiffs\\n could have discovered the fraud or sufficient other facts on which to\\n bring their lawsuit, through a reasonable effort on their part.\\n\\n ...\\n\\n The statute-of-limitations inquiry is not subjective—we do not inquire\\n as to when the plaintiffs should have discovered or did discover the\\n alleged fraudulent conduct. Instead, the question is whether the plaintiffs\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f used due diligence to discover the alleged fraud. The burden is on the\\n plaintiff to exercise due diligence to discover the fraud if apprised of\\n facts that should place the plaintiff on notice. The [plaintiff’s] ignorance\\n of [his] rights does not prevent the operation of the statute of limitations.\\n The statute is tolled only when the ignorance is produced by affirmative\\n and fraudulent acts of concealment. The alleged acts of concealment or\\n fraud must have been committed by those invoking the benefit of the\\n statute of limitations.\\n\\nVarner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1016–18 (8th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added)\\n(cleaned up).\\n\\n To summarize, under Arkansas law, “the limitations period could only be tolled\\nuntil such time that [the plaintiff] learned of the wrong or was placed on objective\\nnotice of the need to investigate the matter.” Graham v. Catamaran Health Sols. LLC,\\nNo. 16-1161, 2017 WL 3613328, at *5 (8th Cir. Aug. 23, 2017) (citing Varner, 317\\nF.3d at 1017). “[Spradling], as the plaintiff, bears the burden of establishing the\\napplicability of this tolling theory.” Id. (citing Chalmers v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA,\\nInc., 935 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Ark. 1996)).\\n\\n Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Spradling, the record shows that\\non July 25, 2008, Spradling was appointed administrator of Collin’s estate “for the\\nlimited purpose of performing any and all acts necessary to investigate, and, if\\nwarranted, prosecute a wrongful death claim relative to the circumstances surrounding\\nthe death of William Collin Spradling, which occurred on or about July 16, 2008.”\\nMot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 1, at 1, Spradling v.\\nHastings, No. 4:15-cv-00238 (E.D. Ark. June 26, 2015), ECF No. 5-1. Then, on\\nNovember 4, 2008, Hatfield—who witnessed the shooting—sent a request to the\\nLRPD to obtain a copy of the case file related to the shooting. Hatfield received the\\ncase file in November 2008. A few weeks to a month after receiving the case file from\\nthe LRPD, Hatfield sent the case file to Spradling, along with a letter containing her\\nobservations about the file’s contents.\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f Crucially, Hatfield personally witnessed Collin’s shooting. Reviewing the\\nrecord in the light most favorable to Spradling, we conclude that Hatfield’s detailed\\nletter to Spradling— explaining the “many inconsistencies” that she found in the case\\nfile and expressing her belief that Collin had been murdered—gave Spradling\\n“objective notice of the need to investigate the matter.” Graham, 2017 WL 3613328,\\nat *5. For his part, Spradling argues that he doubted Hatfield’s letter after reading “the\\nofficial LRPD-transcribed statement of Ms. Hatfield” in which she indicated that\\n“Collin had a gun on his person when he shot” despite Hatfield telling Spradling in\\nher letter that Collin did not have a gun. Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for\\nSumm. J., Ex. 33, at 8, Spradling v. Hastings, No. 4:15-cv-00238 (E.D. Ark. July 14,\\n2015), ECF No. 62-25. But Hatfield’s letter to Spradling explained some of the\\nconfusion about her statement that Collin had a gun—she indicated that if she had said\\nit, she was referring to the night prior. For purposes of our inquiry, the key question\\nis whether Hatfield’s letter gave Spradling objective notice that further investigation\\nwas necessary. Hatfield’s first-hand knowledge of events and the inconsistencies\\ndetailed in her description of the events versus the police record placed Spradling on\\nobjective notice that he needed to investigate further.\\n\\n Additionally, as the district court noted, the case file—which Spradling\\npossessed—specifically referenced the audio and video recordings not included in the\\nfile materials provided to Spradling by the defendants. Thus, their existence was not\\nconcealed from Spradling. See Varner, 371 F.3d at 1016 (“In order to toll the statute\\nof limitations, there must be a fact question of ‘some positive act of fraud, something\\nso furtively planned and secretly executed as to keep the plaintiff’s cause of action\\nconcealed, or perpetrated in a way that it conceals itself.’” (quoting Martin v. Arthur,\\n3 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Ark. 1999))). As the district court noted, Spradling “could have\\nobtained the audio and video files by simply requesting them.” Spradling, 2017 WL\\n6816541, at *3.\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f Without question, this case involves a tragic loss of life. Legitimate, serious\\nquestions surrounding the cause of that tragic loss appeared soon after it occurred.\\nBased on the undisputed facts, these questions were present well within the three-year\\nstatute of limitations for the claims alleged. Arkansas law prescribes that an action\\nmust be dismissed when it is filed outside of the applicable limitations period.\\nSpradling was on objective notice of the need to further investigate the circumstances\\nsurrounding Collin’s death. He thus does not satisfy the requirements of equitable\\ntolling.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4356851/\", \"author_raw\": \"SMITH, Chief Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4579598/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Michael SPRADLING, as Personal Representative of the Estate Of, William Collin Spradling, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Clay HASTINGS, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Michael Ford, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Frederick Steve Woodall, \"Steve\" Individually and in His Official Capacity; Aaron Simon, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Stuart Thomas, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Little Rock, City Of, a Municipality, Defendants-Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3573\n ___________________________\n\n Michael Spradling, as Personal Representative of the Estate of, William Collin\n Spradling, Deceased\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Clay Hastings, Individually and in his Official Capacity; Michael Ford,\n Individually and in his Official Capacity; Frederick Steve Woodall, \"Steve\"\n Individually and in his Official Capacity; Aaron Simon, Individually and in his\nOfficial Capacity; Stuart Thomas, Individually and in his Official Capacity; Little\n Rock, City of, A Municipality\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\n ____________\n\n Submitted: September 27, 2018\n Filed: January 8, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, MELLOY and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSMITH, Chief Judge.\n\n On July 16, 2008, Officers Clay Hastings, Michael Ford, Steve Woodall, and\nAaron Simon of the Little Rock Police Department (LRPD) were investigating\n\fWilliam Collin Spradling (“Collin”) as a robbery suspect. During the investigation,\nCollin was shot and killed. Over four years later, on November 5, 2012, Michael\nSpradling, as the personal representative of Collin’s estate, filed suit pursuant to 42\nU.S.C. § 1983 against the officers, Little Rock Police Chief Stuart Thomas, and the\nCity of Little Rock (collectively, “defendants”). Spradling alleged that the officers\nused excessive force resulting in Collins’s wrongful death. The defendants moved for\nsummary judgment because Spradling filed his complaint outside of the applicable\nstatute of limitations. The district court1 granted the motion and dismissed the\ncomplaint with prejudice.\n\n On appeal, Spradling does not contest that he filed his § 1983 lawsuit outside\nof the applicable statute of limitations. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105. Instead, he\nargues that he presented evidence of fraudulent concealment and conspiracy sufficient\nto equitably toll the statute of limitations. Because we conclude that the undisputed\nfacts placed Spradling on objective notice of the need to investigate the shooting, we\nhold that the limitations period was not equitably tolled. Therefore, we affirm the\njudgment of the district court.\n\n I. Background\n On July 16, 2008, Officers Hastings, Ford, Woodall, and Simon responded to\n621 Gillette Road to investigate Collin as a robbery suspect. During the investigation,\nCollin was shot and killed.\n\n On November 5, 2012, Spradling filed this § 1983 lawsuit against the officers,\nalleging excessive force, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and\nwrongful death and negligence, see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-102(a) and (b). In\naddition, Spradling brought a survival claim. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-101(a)(1).\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable James M. Moody Jr., United States District Judge for the\nEastern District of Arkansas.\n\n -2-\n\fSpradling voluntarily nonsuited the case and refiled the action on April 23, 2015. In\nthe refiled action, Spradling added Chief Thomas and the City of Little Rock (“City”)\nas defendants and added three additional claims: (1) a claim of failure to train,\nsupervise, or discipline against Chief Thomas and the City; (2) a claim that Chief\nThomas and the City permitted a widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional\nconduct; and (3) a civil conspiracy claim against the officers, Chief Thomas, and\nothers. In the refiled complaint, Spradling alleged that the defendants did not disclose\nmany pertinent facts and purposefully hid others following Collin’s death.\n\n The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for\nsummary judgment based upon the statute of limitations. In resolving the motion to\ndismiss, the district court considered attachments and exhibits outside the pleadings.\nConsequently, it analyzed the defendants’ dismissal motion as a summary-judgment\nmotion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The district court denied the motion, concluding\nthat genuine issues of material fact existed as to when the statute of limitations began\nto run on Spradling’s claims. The court explained:\n\n Plaintiff alleges that he obtained the Spradling Use of Force File\n in 2009. However, that file did not contain certain audio and video\n recordings which cast doubt on the Defendants’ version of the events\n leading to Collin’s death. Until August 22, 2012, Plaintiff believed he\n possessed the complete and accurate file. Plaintiff claims that the\n Defendants withheld audio and video recordings from the day of the\n shooting, falsely transcribed witness statements, tampered with portions\n of video and audio records in order to destroy evidence, and intentionally\n gave the Plaintiff inaccurate information about the shooting.\n\nSpradling v. Hastings, No. 4:15-cv-00238, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 18, 2015),\nECF No. 14.\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f Later, the defendants did move for summary judgment, noting that Spradling\nfiled his initial complaint outside of the applicable statute of limitations. Based on the\nsummary-judgment record, the district court granted the motion. The court noted that\non November 4, 2008, Christina Hatfield, a witness to the shooting and the mother of\nCollins’s girlfriend, requested a copy of the case file relating to the shooting from the\nLRPD. She received a 556-page case file in response to her request. Then, in late\nNovember 2008 or early 2009, Spradling received a copy of the 556-page case file\nalong with a letter from Hatfield outlining the inconsistencies she believed existed in\nthe file. Hatfield’s letter provides, in relevant part:\n\n As I read through the file, I was struck by so many inconsistencies, that\n I cannot believe the prosecuting attorney’s office didn’t even call us for\n an interview before determining that it wasn’t prosecutable, even though\n I spoke with John Johnson twice, telling him we were available at any\n time and believed Collin had been murdered.\n\n With you not having actually been there, I just wanted to point out a\n couple of things for you to keep in mind as you go through this, as they\n try to paint a pretty good case of justifying their actions.\n\n In regards to the homicide:\n\n First and foremost, they all say Simon was yelling, “Gun, Gun, etc.”\n including Det. Gassaway who was in the FRONT yard at the time, yet\n neither myself, Rachael, nor Paul ever heard them say anything about a\n gun until later, even though we were standing right there. When you read\n our statements, you’ll see that we were consistent about that, even\n though we were immediately segregated from each other and never\n allowed to say a word to each other before our statements were taken.\n\n Simon’s Statement:\n Simon said Collin had his hand in his pocket, but when they first went\n to ground I saw Collin’s right hand, as did Rachael, and it was open and\n empty. Afterwards, there were so many men on him I couldn’t see his\n hands anymore, but if you look at the position of Collin’s right hand in\n\n -4-\n\fthe picture on page 363, how could Simon have possibly have had his\nhand on Collin’s in his right pocket? Also, he says the gun “dropped”\nfrom Collin’s hand, but that when he first saw it, it was about 2 feet\naway? Lastly, he says he moved it to the brick wall to secure it, but the\npicture again tells a different story. If the gun had dropped from Collin’s\nright hand, wouldn’t it have been a lot more secure right where is was,\nrather than on the wall, since Rachael and I were sitting on the back step\nand Paul was on the other side of the patio furniture?\n\nLundy’s Statement:\nLundy confirms he has Collin’s left arm, so takes the left out of play.\nAlso, IF Paul said, “I know he had a gun on him[,”] which he doesn’t\nbelieve he said . . . he would have been referring to the night before, just\nas I was in my statement. Paul’s own statement confirms that he hadn’t\nseen a gun that morning.\n\nWoodall Statement:\nWoodall states that Simon said he was “sure” he had a gun, yet Simon\nsays he never saw the gun until it was over, and that he felt it and\n“thought” it was a gun. Again, if you look at the picture on page 363,\nhow could Collin have possibly pulled a gun in that position with Simon\nholding his right hand or wrist, and Hastings holding his right arm? Also,\nWoodall says he saw the gun, but can’t even tell you what hand it was\nin? Lastly, he admits that he thought Collin had shot at some point.\n\nHastings Statement:\nHastings confirms that he too had Collin’s right arm. So we are to\nbelieve that Simon has his right hand/wrist and Hastings has his right\narm, yet Collin managed to reach into his right pocket while laying on\nhis right arm with 4 men on him . . . pull a gun . . . pull the slide back\n. . . and raise the barrel? Hastings also says he doesn’t know which hand\nthe gun was in and that he shot because he thought Collin had shot.\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f Ford’s Statement:\n Ford admits he never saw a gun, and only fired because he thought\n Collin had fired.\n\n How is it that myself and my two children, civilians who have never\n been around guns, could have known that Collin had NOT fired a\n weapon, yet these three trained law enforcement officers ALL thought\n he had?\n\n How is it that two of the three shooters say they don’t even know which\n hand Collin’s gun was in, and the third doesn’t even try to hide the fact\n that he never even saw a gun?\n\n ...\n\n I hope these notes help you in your attempts to get an attorney for your\n civil action, so we can all try to get some sort of justice for Collin. I am\n planning to contact the Attorney General’s office to continue to pursue\n criminal charges against the detectives, and hopefully the Harris’,\n although I’m not holding my breath at this point.\n\nMot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 5, at 1–3, Spradling v.\nHastings, No. 4:15-cv-00238 (E.D. Ark. June 26, 2015), ECF No. 5-5 (emphasis\nadded) (ellipses in original).\n\n Before the district court, Spradling argued against summary judgment,\ncontending that the running of the statute of limitations tolled because the disclosed\npolice file failed to contain certain audio and video recordings. The absence of these\nrecordings cast doubt on the defendants’ version of events leading to Collins’s death.\nThe district court acknowledged the absence of the recordings, but it concluded that\n“the case file did contain references to both the dash cam video and to taped\nstatements of witnesses. Further, the file contained transcripts of the taped\nstatements.” Spradling v. Hastings, No. 4:15-cv-00238, 2017 WL 6816541, at *2\n(E.D. Ark. Oct. 23, 2017). The court emphasized that “in Ms. Hatfield’s letter to the\n\n -6-\n\fPlaintiff she told him that she believed Collin had been murdered and outlined\ninconsistencies she believed existed in the case file.” Id.\n\n The court then held, based on the undisputed facts, that “by early 2009 when\nPlaintiff obtained the case file and the letter of Ms. Hatfield, Plaintiff was placed on\nobjective notice of the need to investigate the shooting.” Id. at *3. In support of its\nholding, the court cited (1) the case file’s reference to both the audio and video tapes;\n(2) Hatfield’s reference to inconsistences she believed existed in the case file and her\nbelief that Collin was murdered; and (3) Spradling’s admission in his affidavit that\n“after the shooting, Christina Hatfield told me her opinions that the shooting which\nshe witnessed, was not justified. She told me that Collin did not do anything that\nwould have justified the LRPD officers shooting him.” Id. With these considerations,\nthe district court concluded Spradling’s cause of action was not concealed. The court,\ntherefore, determined that the statute of limitations on Spradling’s cause of action\ncommenced at the latest in early 2009 and expired in early 2012. Because Spradling\ndid not file suit until November 2012, the court held that the suit was beyond the\nlimitations period.\n\n II. Discussion\n On appeal, Spradling argues that the district court erred in granting summary\njudgment to the defendants. Spradling admits he filed his initial complaint outside of\nthe applicable statute of limitations, but he argues that he presented sufficient evidence\nof fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to equitably toll the limitations period.\n\n “We review the grant of summary judgment based upon the statute of\nlimitations de novo and take all facts in the light most favorable to [Spradling].”\nMahanna v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 747 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2014).\n\n “Arkansas’s three-year personal injury statute of limitations applies to this\n§ 1983 action filed in Arkansas . . . .” Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir.\n\n -7-\n\f2001) (first citing Ark. Code. Ann. § 16-56-105(3); and then citing Ketchum v. City\nof W. Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992)). “The statute begins to run\nwhen the acts occur.” O’Mara v. Dykema, 942 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Ark. 1997). Collin\nwas killed on July 16, 2008. If not tolled, the three-year statute of limitations expired\non July 16, 2011. Spradling’s initial suit was filed on November 5, 2012—nearly 16\nmonths beyond the limitations period.\n\n Spradling does not contest that he filed his § 1983 lawsuit outside of the\napplicable limitations period; instead, he relies on the principle that “affirmative\nactions of concealment of a cause of action will toll the statute of limitations.” Id. As\nwe have previously recognized, Arkansas law provides:\n\n In order to toll the statute of limitations, there must be a fact\n question of some positive act of fraud, something so furtively planned\n and secretly executed as to keep the plaintiff’s cause of action concealed,\n or perpetrated in a way that it conceals itself. Where affirmative acts of\n concealment by the person charged with fraud prevent the discovery of\n that person’s misrepresentations, the statute of limitations will be tolled\n until the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered with the\n exercise of reasonable diligence.\n\n Arkansas courts hold that although the question of fraudulent\n concealment is normally a question of fact that is not suited for summary\n judgment, when the evidence leaves no room for a reasonable difference\n of opinion, a trial court may resolve fact issues as a matter of law.\n Concealment of facts, no matter how fraudulent or otherwise wrongful,\n has no effect on the running of a statute of limitations if the plaintiffs\n could have discovered the fraud or sufficient other facts on which to\n bring their lawsuit, through a reasonable effort on their part.\n\n ...\n\n The statute-of-limitations inquiry is not subjective—we do not inquire\n as to when the plaintiffs should have discovered or did discover the\n alleged fraudulent conduct. Instead, the question is whether the plaintiffs\n\n -8-\n\f used due diligence to discover the alleged fraud. The burden is on the\n plaintiff to exercise due diligence to discover the fraud if apprised of\n facts that should place the plaintiff on notice. The [plaintiff’s] ignorance\n of [his] rights does not prevent the operation of the statute of limitations.\n The statute is tolled only when the ignorance is produced by affirmative\n and fraudulent acts of concealment. The alleged acts of concealment or\n fraud must have been committed by those invoking the benefit of the\n statute of limitations.\n\nVarner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1016–18 (8th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added)\n(cleaned up).\n\n To summarize, under Arkansas law, “the limitations period could only be tolled\nuntil such time that [the plaintiff] learned of the wrong or was placed on objective\nnotice of the need to investigate the matter.” Graham v. Catamaran Health Sols. LLC,\nNo. 16-1161, 2017 WL 3613328, at *5 (8th Cir. Aug. 23, 2017) (citing Varner, 317\nF.3d at 1017). “[Spradling], as the plaintiff, bears the burden of establishing the\napplicability of this tolling theory.” Id. (citing Chalmers v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA,\nInc., 935 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Ark. 1996)).\n\n Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Spradling, the record shows that\non July 25, 2008, Spradling was appointed administrator of Collin’s estate “for the\nlimited purpose of performing any and all acts necessary to investigate, and, if\nwarranted, prosecute a wrongful death claim relative to the circumstances surrounding\nthe death of William Collin Spradling, which occurred on or about July 16, 2008.”\nMot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 1, at 1, Spradling v.\nHastings, No. 4:15-cv-00238 (E.D. Ark. June 26, 2015), ECF No. 5-1. Then, on\nNovember 4, 2008, Hatfield—who witnessed the shooting—sent a request to the\nLRPD to obtain a copy of the case file related to the shooting. Hatfield received the\ncase file in November 2008. A few weeks to a month after receiving the case file from\nthe LRPD, Hatfield sent the case file to Spradling, along with a letter containing her\nobservations about the file’s contents.\n\n -9-\n\f Crucially, Hatfield personally witnessed Collin’s shooting. Reviewing the\nrecord in the light most favorable to Spradling, we conclude that Hatfield’s detailed\nletter to Spradling— explaining the “many inconsistencies” that she found in the case\nfile and expressing her belief that Collin had been murdered—gave Spradling\n“objective notice of the need to investigate the matter.” Graham, 2017 WL 3613328,\nat *5. For his part, Spradling argues that he doubted Hatfield’s letter after reading “the\nofficial LRPD-transcribed statement of Ms. Hatfield” in which she indicated that\n“Collin had a gun on his person when he shot” despite Hatfield telling Spradling in\nher letter that Collin did not have a gun. Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for\nSumm. J., Ex. 33, at 8, Spradling v. Hastings, No. 4:15-cv-00238 (E.D. Ark. July 14,\n2015), ECF No. 62-25. But Hatfield’s letter to Spradling explained some of the\nconfusion about her statement that Collin had a gun—she indicated that if she had said\nit, she was referring to the night prior. For purposes of our inquiry, the key question\nis whether Hatfield’s letter gave Spradling objective notice that further investigation\nwas necessary. Hatfield’s first-hand knowledge of events and the inconsistencies\ndetailed in her description of the events versus the police record placed Spradling on\nobjective notice that he needed to investigate further.\n\n Additionally, as the district court noted, the case file—which Spradling\npossessed—specifically referenced the audio and video recordings not included in the\nfile materials provided to Spradling by the defendants. Thus, their existence was not\nconcealed from Spradling. See Varner, 371 F.3d at 1016 (“In order to toll the statute\nof limitations, there must be a fact question of ‘some positive act of fraud, something\nso furtively planned and secretly executed as to keep the plaintiff’s cause of action\nconcealed, or perpetrated in a way that it conceals itself.’” (quoting Martin v. Arthur,\n3 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Ark. 1999))). As the district court noted, Spradling “could have\nobtained the audio and video files by simply requesting them.” Spradling, 2017 WL\n6816541, at *3.\n\n\n\n -10-\n\f Without question, this case involves a tragic loss of life. Legitimate, serious\nquestions surrounding the cause of that tragic loss appeared soon after it occurred.\nBased on the undisputed facts, these questions were present well within the three-year\nstatute of limitations for the claims alleged. Arkansas law prescribes that an action\nmust be dismissed when it is filed outside of the applicable limitations period.\nSpradling was on objective notice of the need to further investigate the circumstances\nsurrounding Collin’s death. He thus does not satisfy the requirements of equitable\ntolling.\n\n III. Conclusion\n Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\n\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -11-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Michael SPRADLING, as Personal Representative of the Estate Of, William Collin Spradling, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Clay HASTINGS, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Michael Ford, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Frederick Steve Woodall, \\\"Steve\\\" Individually and in His Official Capacity; Aaron Simon, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Stuart Thomas, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Little Rock, City Of, a Municipality, Defendants-Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3573\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Michael Spradling, as Personal Representative of the Estate of, William Collin\\n Spradling, Deceased\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Clay Hastings, Individually and in his Official Capacity; Michael Ford,\\n Individually and in his Official Capacity; Frederick Steve Woodall, \\\"Steve\\\"\\n Individually and in his Official Capacity; Aaron Simon, Individually and in his\\nOfficial Capacity; Stuart Thomas, Individually and in his Official Capacity; Little\\n Rock, City of, A Municipality\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 27, 2018\\n Filed: January 8, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, MELLOY and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSMITH, Chief Judge.\\n\\n On July 16, 2008, Officers Clay Hastings, Michael Ford, Steve Woodall, and\\nAaron Simon of the Little Rock Police Department (LRPD) were investigating\\n\\fWilliam Collin Spradling (“Collin”) as a robbery suspect. During the investigation,\\nCollin was shot and killed. Over four years later, on November 5, 2012, Michael\\nSpradling, as the personal representative of Collin’s estate, filed suit pursuant to 42\\nU.S.C. § 1983 against the officers, Little Rock Police Chief Stuart Thomas, and the\\nCity of Little Rock (collectively, “defendants”). Spradling alleged that the officers\\nused excessive force resulting in Collins’s wrongful death. The defendants moved for\\nsummary judgment because Spradling filed his complaint outside of the applicable\\nstatute of limitations. The district court1 granted the motion and dismissed the\\ncomplaint with prejudice.\\n\\n On appeal, Spradling does not contest that he filed his § 1983 lawsuit outside\\nof the applicable statute of limitations. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105. Instead, he\\nargues that he presented evidence of fraudulent concealment and conspiracy sufficient\\nto equitably toll the statute of limitations. Because we conclude that the undisputed\\nfacts placed Spradling on objective notice of the need to investigate the shooting, we\\nhold that the limitations period was not equitably tolled. Therefore, we affirm the\\njudgment of the district court.\\n\\n I. Background\\n On July 16, 2008, Officers Hastings, Ford, Woodall, and Simon responded to\\n621 Gillette Road to investigate Collin as a robbery suspect. During the investigation,\\nCollin was shot and killed.\\n\\n On November 5, 2012, Spradling filed this § 1983 lawsuit against the officers,\\nalleging excessive force, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and\\nwrongful death and negligence, see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-102(a) and (b). In\\naddition, Spradling brought a survival claim. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-101(a)(1).\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable James M. Moody Jr., United States District Judge for the\\nEastern District of Arkansas.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fSpradling voluntarily nonsuited the case and refiled the action on April 23, 2015. In\\nthe refiled action, Spradling added Chief Thomas and the City of Little Rock (“City”)\\nas defendants and added three additional claims: (1) a claim of failure to train,\\nsupervise, or discipline against Chief Thomas and the City; (2) a claim that Chief\\nThomas and the City permitted a widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional\\nconduct; and (3) a civil conspiracy claim against the officers, Chief Thomas, and\\nothers. In the refiled complaint, Spradling alleged that the defendants did not disclose\\nmany pertinent facts and purposefully hid others following Collin’s death.\\n\\n The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for\\nsummary judgment based upon the statute of limitations. In resolving the motion to\\ndismiss, the district court considered attachments and exhibits outside the pleadings.\\nConsequently, it analyzed the defendants’ dismissal motion as a summary-judgment\\nmotion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The district court denied the motion, concluding\\nthat genuine issues of material fact existed as to when the statute of limitations began\\nto run on Spradling’s claims. The court explained:\\n\\n Plaintiff alleges that he obtained the Spradling Use of Force File\\n in 2009. However, that file did not contain certain audio and video\\n recordings which cast doubt on the Defendants’ version of the events\\n leading to Collin’s death. Until August 22, 2012, Plaintiff believed he\\n possessed the complete and accurate file. Plaintiff claims that the\\n Defendants withheld audio and video recordings from the day of the\\n shooting, falsely transcribed witness statements, tampered with portions\\n of video and audio records in order to destroy evidence, and intentionally\\n gave the Plaintiff inaccurate information about the shooting.\\n\\nSpradling v. Hastings, No. 4:15-cv-00238, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 18, 2015),\\nECF No. 14.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f Later, the defendants did move for summary judgment, noting that Spradling\\nfiled his initial complaint outside of the applicable statute of limitations. Based on the\\nsummary-judgment record, the district court granted the motion. The court noted that\\non November 4, 2008, Christina Hatfield, a witness to the shooting and the mother of\\nCollins’s girlfriend, requested a copy of the case file relating to the shooting from the\\nLRPD. She received a 556-page case file in response to her request. Then, in late\\nNovember 2008 or early 2009, Spradling received a copy of the 556-page case file\\nalong with a letter from Hatfield outlining the inconsistencies she believed existed in\\nthe file. Hatfield’s letter provides, in relevant part:\\n\\n As I read through the file, I was struck by so many inconsistencies, that\\n I cannot believe the prosecuting attorney’s office didn’t even call us for\\n an interview before determining that it wasn’t prosecutable, even though\\n I spoke with John Johnson twice, telling him we were available at any\\n time and believed Collin had been murdered.\\n\\n With you not having actually been there, I just wanted to point out a\\n couple of things for you to keep in mind as you go through this, as they\\n try to paint a pretty good case of justifying their actions.\\n\\n In regards to the homicide:\\n\\n First and foremost, they all say Simon was yelling, “Gun, Gun, etc.”\\n including Det. Gassaway who was in the FRONT yard at the time, yet\\n neither myself, Rachael, nor Paul ever heard them say anything about a\\n gun until later, even though we were standing right there. When you read\\n our statements, you’ll see that we were consistent about that, even\\n though we were immediately segregated from each other and never\\n allowed to say a word to each other before our statements were taken.\\n\\n Simon’s Statement:\\n Simon said Collin had his hand in his pocket, but when they first went\\n to ground I saw Collin’s right hand, as did Rachael, and it was open and\\n empty. Afterwards, there were so many men on him I couldn’t see his\\n hands anymore, but if you look at the position of Collin’s right hand in\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fthe picture on page 363, how could Simon have possibly have had his\\nhand on Collin’s in his right pocket? Also, he says the gun “dropped”\\nfrom Collin’s hand, but that when he first saw it, it was about 2 feet\\naway? Lastly, he says he moved it to the brick wall to secure it, but the\\npicture again tells a different story. If the gun had dropped from Collin’s\\nright hand, wouldn’t it have been a lot more secure right where is was,\\nrather than on the wall, since Rachael and I were sitting on the back step\\nand Paul was on the other side of the patio furniture?\\n\\nLundy’s Statement:\\nLundy confirms he has Collin’s left arm, so takes the left out of play.\\nAlso, IF Paul said, “I know he had a gun on him[,”] which he doesn’t\\nbelieve he said . . . he would have been referring to the night before, just\\nas I was in my statement. Paul’s own statement confirms that he hadn’t\\nseen a gun that morning.\\n\\nWoodall Statement:\\nWoodall states that Simon said he was “sure” he had a gun, yet Simon\\nsays he never saw the gun until it was over, and that he felt it and\\n“thought” it was a gun. Again, if you look at the picture on page 363,\\nhow could Collin have possibly pulled a gun in that position with Simon\\nholding his right hand or wrist, and Hastings holding his right arm? Also,\\nWoodall says he saw the gun, but can’t even tell you what hand it was\\nin? Lastly, he admits that he thought Collin had shot at some point.\\n\\nHastings Statement:\\nHastings confirms that he too had Collin’s right arm. So we are to\\nbelieve that Simon has his right hand/wrist and Hastings has his right\\narm, yet Collin managed to reach into his right pocket while laying on\\nhis right arm with 4 men on him . . . pull a gun . . . pull the slide back\\n. . . and raise the barrel? Hastings also says he doesn’t know which hand\\nthe gun was in and that he shot because he thought Collin had shot.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Ford’s Statement:\\n Ford admits he never saw a gun, and only fired because he thought\\n Collin had fired.\\n\\n How is it that myself and my two children, civilians who have never\\n been around guns, could have known that Collin had NOT fired a\\n weapon, yet these three trained law enforcement officers ALL thought\\n he had?\\n\\n How is it that two of the three shooters say they don’t even know which\\n hand Collin’s gun was in, and the third doesn’t even try to hide the fact\\n that he never even saw a gun?\\n\\n ...\\n\\n I hope these notes help you in your attempts to get an attorney for your\\n civil action, so we can all try to get some sort of justice for Collin. I am\\n planning to contact the Attorney General’s office to continue to pursue\\n criminal charges against the detectives, and hopefully the Harris’,\\n although I’m not holding my breath at this point.\\n\\nMot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 5, at 1–3, Spradling v.\\nHastings, No. 4:15-cv-00238 (E.D. Ark. June 26, 2015), ECF No. 5-5 (emphasis\\nadded) (ellipses in original).\\n\\n Before the district court, Spradling argued against summary judgment,\\ncontending that the running of the statute of limitations tolled because the disclosed\\npolice file failed to contain certain audio and video recordings. The absence of these\\nrecordings cast doubt on the defendants’ version of events leading to Collins’s death.\\nThe district court acknowledged the absence of the recordings, but it concluded that\\n“the case file did contain references to both the dash cam video and to taped\\nstatements of witnesses. Further, the file contained transcripts of the taped\\nstatements.” Spradling v. Hastings, No. 4:15-cv-00238, 2017 WL 6816541, at *2\\n(E.D. Ark. Oct. 23, 2017). The court emphasized that “in Ms. Hatfield’s letter to the\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fPlaintiff she told him that she believed Collin had been murdered and outlined\\ninconsistencies she believed existed in the case file.” Id.\\n\\n The court then held, based on the undisputed facts, that “by early 2009 when\\nPlaintiff obtained the case file and the letter of Ms. Hatfield, Plaintiff was placed on\\nobjective notice of the need to investigate the shooting.” Id. at *3. In support of its\\nholding, the court cited (1) the case file’s reference to both the audio and video tapes;\\n(2) Hatfield’s reference to inconsistences she believed existed in the case file and her\\nbelief that Collin was murdered; and (3) Spradling’s admission in his affidavit that\\n“after the shooting, Christina Hatfield told me her opinions that the shooting which\\nshe witnessed, was not justified. She told me that Collin did not do anything that\\nwould have justified the LRPD officers shooting him.” Id. With these considerations,\\nthe district court concluded Spradling’s cause of action was not concealed. The court,\\ntherefore, determined that the statute of limitations on Spradling’s cause of action\\ncommenced at the latest in early 2009 and expired in early 2012. Because Spradling\\ndid not file suit until November 2012, the court held that the suit was beyond the\\nlimitations period.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n On appeal, Spradling argues that the district court erred in granting summary\\njudgment to the defendants. Spradling admits he filed his initial complaint outside of\\nthe applicable statute of limitations, but he argues that he presented sufficient evidence\\nof fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to equitably toll the limitations period.\\n\\n “We review the grant of summary judgment based upon the statute of\\nlimitations de novo and take all facts in the light most favorable to [Spradling].”\\nMahanna v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 747 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n “Arkansas’s three-year personal injury statute of limitations applies to this\\n§ 1983 action filed in Arkansas . . . .” Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir.\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f2001) (first citing Ark. Code. Ann. § 16-56-105(3); and then citing Ketchum v. City\\nof W. Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992)). “The statute begins to run\\nwhen the acts occur.” O’Mara v. Dykema, 942 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Ark. 1997). Collin\\nwas killed on July 16, 2008. If not tolled, the three-year statute of limitations expired\\non July 16, 2011. Spradling’s initial suit was filed on November 5, 2012—nearly 16\\nmonths beyond the limitations period.\\n\\n Spradling does not contest that he filed his § 1983 lawsuit outside of the\\napplicable limitations period; instead, he relies on the principle that “affirmative\\nactions of concealment of a cause of action will toll the statute of limitations.” Id. As\\nwe have previously recognized, Arkansas law provides:\\n\\n In order to toll the statute of limitations, there must be a fact\\n question of some positive act of fraud, something so furtively planned\\n and secretly executed as to keep the plaintiff’s cause of action concealed,\\n or perpetrated in a way that it conceals itself. Where affirmative acts of\\n concealment by the person charged with fraud prevent the discovery of\\n that person’s misrepresentations, the statute of limitations will be tolled\\n until the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered with the\\n exercise of reasonable diligence.\\n\\n Arkansas courts hold that although the question of fraudulent\\n concealment is normally a question of fact that is not suited for summary\\n judgment, when the evidence leaves no room for a reasonable difference\\n of opinion, a trial court may resolve fact issues as a matter of law.\\n Concealment of facts, no matter how fraudulent or otherwise wrongful,\\n has no effect on the running of a statute of limitations if the plaintiffs\\n could have discovered the fraud or sufficient other facts on which to\\n bring their lawsuit, through a reasonable effort on their part.\\n\\n ...\\n\\n The statute-of-limitations inquiry is not subjective—we do not inquire\\n as to when the plaintiffs should have discovered or did discover the\\n alleged fraudulent conduct. Instead, the question is whether the plaintiffs\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f used due diligence to discover the alleged fraud. The burden is on the\\n plaintiff to exercise due diligence to discover the fraud if apprised of\\n facts that should place the plaintiff on notice. The [plaintiff’s] ignorance\\n of [his] rights does not prevent the operation of the statute of limitations.\\n The statute is tolled only when the ignorance is produced by affirmative\\n and fraudulent acts of concealment. The alleged acts of concealment or\\n fraud must have been committed by those invoking the benefit of the\\n statute of limitations.\\n\\nVarner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011, 1016–18 (8th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added)\\n(cleaned up).\\n\\n To summarize, under Arkansas law, “the limitations period could only be tolled\\nuntil such time that [the plaintiff] learned of the wrong or was placed on objective\\nnotice of the need to investigate the matter.” Graham v. Catamaran Health Sols. LLC,\\nNo. 16-1161, 2017 WL 3613328, at *5 (8th Cir. Aug. 23, 2017) (citing Varner, 317\\nF.3d at 1017). “[Spradling], as the plaintiff, bears the burden of establishing the\\napplicability of this tolling theory.” Id. (citing Chalmers v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA,\\nInc., 935 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Ark. 1996)).\\n\\n Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Spradling, the record shows that\\non July 25, 2008, Spradling was appointed administrator of Collin’s estate “for the\\nlimited purpose of performing any and all acts necessary to investigate, and, if\\nwarranted, prosecute a wrongful death claim relative to the circumstances surrounding\\nthe death of William Collin Spradling, which occurred on or about July 16, 2008.”\\nMot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 1, at 1, Spradling v.\\nHastings, No. 4:15-cv-00238 (E.D. Ark. June 26, 2015), ECF No. 5-1. Then, on\\nNovember 4, 2008, Hatfield—who witnessed the shooting—sent a request to the\\nLRPD to obtain a copy of the case file related to the shooting. Hatfield received the\\ncase file in November 2008. A few weeks to a month after receiving the case file from\\nthe LRPD, Hatfield sent the case file to Spradling, along with a letter containing her\\nobservations about the file’s contents.\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f Crucially, Hatfield personally witnessed Collin’s shooting. Reviewing the\\nrecord in the light most favorable to Spradling, we conclude that Hatfield’s detailed\\nletter to Spradling— explaining the “many inconsistencies” that she found in the case\\nfile and expressing her belief that Collin had been murdered—gave Spradling\\n“objective notice of the need to investigate the matter.” Graham, 2017 WL 3613328,\\nat *5. For his part, Spradling argues that he doubted Hatfield’s letter after reading “the\\nofficial LRPD-transcribed statement of Ms. Hatfield” in which she indicated that\\n“Collin had a gun on his person when he shot” despite Hatfield telling Spradling in\\nher letter that Collin did not have a gun. Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for\\nSumm. J., Ex. 33, at 8, Spradling v. Hastings, No. 4:15-cv-00238 (E.D. Ark. July 14,\\n2015), ECF No. 62-25. But Hatfield’s letter to Spradling explained some of the\\nconfusion about her statement that Collin had a gun—she indicated that if she had said\\nit, she was referring to the night prior. For purposes of our inquiry, the key question\\nis whether Hatfield’s letter gave Spradling objective notice that further investigation\\nwas necessary. Hatfield’s first-hand knowledge of events and the inconsistencies\\ndetailed in her description of the events versus the police record placed Spradling on\\nobjective notice that he needed to investigate further.\\n\\n Additionally, as the district court noted, the case file—which Spradling\\npossessed—specifically referenced the audio and video recordings not included in the\\nfile materials provided to Spradling by the defendants. Thus, their existence was not\\nconcealed from Spradling. See Varner, 371 F.3d at 1016 (“In order to toll the statute\\nof limitations, there must be a fact question of ‘some positive act of fraud, something\\nso furtively planned and secretly executed as to keep the plaintiff’s cause of action\\nconcealed, or perpetrated in a way that it conceals itself.’” (quoting Martin v. Arthur,\\n3 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Ark. 1999))). As the district court noted, Spradling “could have\\nobtained the audio and video files by simply requesting them.” Spradling, 2017 WL\\n6816541, at *3.\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f Without question, this case involves a tragic loss of life. Legitimate, serious\\nquestions surrounding the cause of that tragic loss appeared soon after it occurred.\\nBased on the undisputed facts, these questions were present well within the three-year\\nstatute of limitations for the claims alleged. Arkansas law prescribes that an action\\nmust be dismissed when it is filed outside of the applicable limitations period.\\nSpradling was on objective notice of the need to further investigate the circumstances\\nsurrounding Collin’s death. He thus does not satisfy the requirements of equitable\\ntolling.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":291,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4579889,"string":"4,579,889"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Yobarri Takie EASON, Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Yobarri Eason v. United States"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3299"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Loken, Gruender\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"LOKEN, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3299\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Yobarri Takie Eason\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 19, 2018\\n Filed: January 9, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In 2008, Yobarri Takie Eason pleaded guilty to one count of distributing\\ncocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), and one count of\\npossessing a firearm as an armed career criminal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)\\nand § 924(e). The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) stated that Eason had\\nprior convictions for aggravated robbery, simple robbery, and second-degree assault\\n\\fwith a dangerous weapon. Eason conceded these convictions made him an armed\\ncareer criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). The district court1\\nadopted the PSR’s findings and imposed concurrent 220-month prison sentences on\\nthe two counts. Eason did not appeal the convictions and sentences.\\n\\n In 2014, Eason filed a post-conviction motion to vacate his sentence on the\\nfirearm count, arguing that his prior juvenile conviction for aggravated robbery was\\nno longer a violent felony after the Supreme Court’s decision in Descamps v. United\\nStates, 570 U.S. 254 (2013). The district court denied the motion as time-barred\\nbecause Descamps did not announce a newly recognized rule that would extend the\\none-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). In September 2016, we\\ngranted Eason authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion challenging\\nhis sentence on the firearm count based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in\\nJohnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Because Eason did not challenge\\nhis concurrent 220-month sentence for distributing cocaine base, the district court\\ndenied the successive motion as precluded by the concurrent sentence doctrine and\\ngranted Eason a certificate of appealability on this issue. On appeal, he argues the\\ndistrict court erred in applying the concurrent sentence doctrine because he faces the\\npossibility of adverse consequences if the merits of his successive § 2255 motion are\\nnot reviewed. Reviewing this issue de novo, we affirm.\\n\\n The concurrent sentence doctrine allows courts to decline to review the validity\\nof a concurrent conviction or sentence when a ruling in the defendant’s favor “would\\nnot reduce the time he is required to serve” or otherwise “prejudice him in any way.”\\nUnited States v. Olunloyo, 10 F.3d 578, 581-82 (8th Cir. 1993). Early cases\\nconsidering the doctrine involved challenges to one or more concurrent convictions,\\nfor example, for violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and courts struggled to\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge of the United States District\\nCourt for the District of Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fdefine the minimal level of prejudice that would preclude application of the\\nconcurrent sentence doctrine. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787-93 (1969).\\nThat was the issue in Logan v. Lockhart, 994 F.2d 1324, 1331-32 (8th Cir. 1993).\\nThe issue was largely eliminated when the Supreme Court ruled that the special\\nassessment imposed “on any person convicted of an offense against the United\\nStates,” 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a), now $100 for a felony offense by an individual, is\\nsufficient prejudice to require § 2255 review of a concurrent conviction’s validity.\\nSee Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 301-03 (1996); United States v. Holmes,\\n620 F.3d 836, 846 n.3 (8th Cir. 2010). However, where a § 2255 motion challenges\\nonly the validity of a concurrent sentence, as in this case, the concurrent sentence\\ndoctrine will apply unless a ruling in Eason’s favor would reduce the time he is\\nrequired to serve or otherwise prejudice him in any way. See United States v.\\nBradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n In denying Eason’s successive § 2255 motion, the district court explained:\\n\\n The Court finds that applying the concurrent-sentence doctrine is\\n justified in this case because Eason’s total sentence, and his sentence on\\n [the drug charge], was not affected by the ACCA enhancement. . . . The\\n ACCA enhancement had no effect on Eason’s overall advisory\\n Guidelines range or his statutory range for [the drug charge]: Eason\\n already had a ten-year mandatory minimum for [the drug charge] and the\\n advisory Guidelines range, with or without the ACCA enhancement,\\n would have been 262- to 327-months imprisonment. Additionally, there\\n is no indication that the ACCA enhancement drove Eason’s sentence\\n because the Court sentenced Eason to 40 additional months, beyond the\\n mandatory minimum, and the record suggests that the advisory\\n Guidelines for career offenders—unaffected by Eason’s ACCA\\n enhancement—drove Eason’s advisory Guidelines range and the Court’s\\n sentencing decision.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fUnited States v. Eason, No. 08-CR-0123, 2017 WL 3381813, at *2-3 (D. Minn. Aug.\\n4, 2017). Eason does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that a successful\\nchallenge to his sentence as an armed career criminal on the firearm count would not\\nreduce his total concurrent sentence on both counts.2 But he argues that failure to\\naddress the merits of his challenge to being sentenced as an armed career criminal\\ncould nonetheless prejudice him in the future.\\n\\n To establish the risk of future prejudice, Eason hypothesizes that, after serving\\nhis 220-month sentence for drug trafficking, he might violate his concurrent\\nsupervised release terms so seriously that the district court would revoke supervised\\nrelease and impose the maximum revocation sentence authorized by 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(e)(3). Under his concurrent 220-month sentences, the maximum revocation\\nsentence would be ten years imprisonment (consecutive five-year sentences on each\\ncount). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(1), 3583(b)(1). But if Eason was not sentenced as\\nan armed career criminal for the firearm count, the maximum revocation sentence\\nwould be only eight years (five years + three years) because the firearm offense\\nwould then be a Class C felony. See §§ 3559(a)(3), 3583(b)(2).\\n\\n Eason cites no case where we refused to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine\\nbased on such “highly speculative” adverse collateral consequences. United States\\nv. Wilson, 671 F.2d 1138, 1139-40 n.2 (8th Cir. 1982). Moreover, the adverse\\ncollateral consequence Eason posits is more than highly speculative. It could not\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Eason does argue that reversal of his sentence on the firearm count under\\nJohnson would result in a resentencing under the “sentencing package” doctrine that\\ncould result in a reduced total sentence. In his Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration\\nto the district court, Eason argued that his “original sentence was the type of\\n‘package’ that must be reconfigured entirely once his ACCA sentence is vacated.”\\nThe district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this contention, which\\nmisconstrued the “sentencing package” doctrine. See Wright v. United States, 902\\nF.3d 868, 872-73 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\foccur unless Eason chooses to commit serious violations of law during his future\\nterm of supervised release. Cf. USSG §§ 7B1.1(a), 7B1.4(a)(2). Thus, the adverse\\nconsequences are entirely within Eason’s control to avoid. “[L]iteral application of\\nsuch speculative consequences, resting upon a supposition of defendant’s continued\\ncriminality, would effectively bar the application of the [concurrent sentence] rule.”\\nUnited States v. Darnell, 545 F.2d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1976). We again decline to\\nagree that this type of speculation precludes district courts from applying this useful\\nrule. Rather, we agree with the district court’s decision to apply the discretionary\\nconcurrent sentence doctrine and deny successive § 2255 relief because sentencing\\nEason as an armed career criminal on the firearm count had no impact on his advisory\\nguidelines range for the drug trafficking charge, and his 220-month sentence was 40\\nmonths above the ACCA’s mandatory 180-month minimum.\\n\\n The Order of the district court dated August 4, 2017, is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4357142/\", \"author_raw\": \"LOKEN, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4579889/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Yobarri Takie EASON, Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3299\n ___________________________\n\n Yobarri Takie Eason\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: October 19, 2018\n Filed: January 9, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\n\n In 2008, Yobarri Takie Eason pleaded guilty to one count of distributing\ncocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), and one count of\npossessing a firearm as an armed career criminal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)\nand § 924(e). The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) stated that Eason had\nprior convictions for aggravated robbery, simple robbery, and second-degree assault\n\fwith a dangerous weapon. Eason conceded these convictions made him an armed\ncareer criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). The district court1\nadopted the PSR’s findings and imposed concurrent 220-month prison sentences on\nthe two counts. Eason did not appeal the convictions and sentences.\n\n In 2014, Eason filed a post-conviction motion to vacate his sentence on the\nfirearm count, arguing that his prior juvenile conviction for aggravated robbery was\nno longer a violent felony after the Supreme Court’s decision in Descamps v. United\nStates, 570 U.S. 254 (2013). The district court denied the motion as time-barred\nbecause Descamps did not announce a newly recognized rule that would extend the\none-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). In September 2016, we\ngranted Eason authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion challenging\nhis sentence on the firearm count based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in\nJohnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Because Eason did not challenge\nhis concurrent 220-month sentence for distributing cocaine base, the district court\ndenied the successive motion as precluded by the concurrent sentence doctrine and\ngranted Eason a certificate of appealability on this issue. On appeal, he argues the\ndistrict court erred in applying the concurrent sentence doctrine because he faces the\npossibility of adverse consequences if the merits of his successive § 2255 motion are\nnot reviewed. Reviewing this issue de novo, we affirm.\n\n The concurrent sentence doctrine allows courts to decline to review the validity\nof a concurrent conviction or sentence when a ruling in the defendant’s favor “would\nnot reduce the time he is required to serve” or otherwise “prejudice him in any way.”\nUnited States v. Olunloyo, 10 F.3d 578, 581-82 (8th Cir. 1993). Early cases\nconsidering the doctrine involved challenges to one or more concurrent convictions,\nfor example, for violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and courts struggled to\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge of the United States District\nCourt for the District of Minnesota.\n\n -2-\n\fdefine the minimal level of prejudice that would preclude application of the\nconcurrent sentence doctrine. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787-93 (1969).\nThat was the issue in Logan v. Lockhart, 994 F.2d 1324, 1331-32 (8th Cir. 1993).\nThe issue was largely eliminated when the Supreme Court ruled that the special\nassessment imposed “on any person convicted of an offense against the United\nStates,” 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a), now $100 for a felony offense by an individual, is\nsufficient prejudice to require § 2255 review of a concurrent conviction’s validity.\nSee Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 301-03 (1996); United States v. Holmes,\n620 F.3d 836, 846 n.3 (8th Cir. 2010). However, where a § 2255 motion challenges\nonly the validity of a concurrent sentence, as in this case, the concurrent sentence\ndoctrine will apply unless a ruling in Eason’s favor would reduce the time he is\nrequired to serve or otherwise prejudice him in any way. See United States v.\nBradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2011).\n\n In denying Eason’s successive § 2255 motion, the district court explained:\n\n The Court finds that applying the concurrent-sentence doctrine is\n justified in this case because Eason’s total sentence, and his sentence on\n [the drug charge], was not affected by the ACCA enhancement. . . . The\n ACCA enhancement had no effect on Eason’s overall advisory\n Guidelines range or his statutory range for [the drug charge]: Eason\n already had a ten-year mandatory minimum for [the drug charge] and the\n advisory Guidelines range, with or without the ACCA enhancement,\n would have been 262- to 327-months imprisonment. Additionally, there\n is no indication that the ACCA enhancement drove Eason’s sentence\n because the Court sentenced Eason to 40 additional months, beyond the\n mandatory minimum, and the record suggests that the advisory\n Guidelines for career offenders—unaffected by Eason’s ACCA\n enhancement—drove Eason’s advisory Guidelines range and the Court’s\n sentencing decision.\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\fUnited States v. Eason, No. 08-CR-0123, 2017 WL 3381813, at *2-3 (D. Minn. Aug.\n4, 2017). Eason does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that a successful\nchallenge to his sentence as an armed career criminal on the firearm count would not\nreduce his total concurrent sentence on both counts.2 But he argues that failure to\naddress the merits of his challenge to being sentenced as an armed career criminal\ncould nonetheless prejudice him in the future.\n\n To establish the risk of future prejudice, Eason hypothesizes that, after serving\nhis 220-month sentence for drug trafficking, he might violate his concurrent\nsupervised release terms so seriously that the district court would revoke supervised\nrelease and impose the maximum revocation sentence authorized by 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3583(e)(3). Under his concurrent 220-month sentences, the maximum revocation\nsentence would be ten years imprisonment (consecutive five-year sentences on each\ncount). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(1), 3583(b)(1). But if Eason was not sentenced as\nan armed career criminal for the firearm count, the maximum revocation sentence\nwould be only eight years (five years + three years) because the firearm offense\nwould then be a Class C felony. See §§ 3559(a)(3), 3583(b)(2).\n\n Eason cites no case where we refused to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine\nbased on such “highly speculative” adverse collateral consequences. United States\nv. Wilson, 671 F.2d 1138, 1139-40 n.2 (8th Cir. 1982). Moreover, the adverse\ncollateral consequence Eason posits is more than highly speculative. It could not\n\n\n 2\n Eason does argue that reversal of his sentence on the firearm count under\nJohnson would result in a resentencing under the “sentencing package” doctrine that\ncould result in a reduced total sentence. In his Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration\nto the district court, Eason argued that his “original sentence was the type of\n‘package’ that must be reconfigured entirely once his ACCA sentence is vacated.”\nThe district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this contention, which\nmisconstrued the “sentencing package” doctrine. See Wright v. United States, 902\nF.3d 868, 872-73 (8th Cir. 2018).\n\n -4-\n\foccur unless Eason chooses to commit serious violations of law during his future\nterm of supervised release. Cf. USSG §§ 7B1.1(a), 7B1.4(a)(2). Thus, the adverse\nconsequences are entirely within Eason’s control to avoid. “[L]iteral application of\nsuch speculative consequences, resting upon a supposition of defendant’s continued\ncriminality, would effectively bar the application of the [concurrent sentence] rule.”\nUnited States v. Darnell, 545 F.2d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1976). We again decline to\nagree that this type of speculation precludes district courts from applying this useful\nrule. Rather, we agree with the district court’s decision to apply the discretionary\nconcurrent sentence doctrine and deny successive § 2255 relief because sentencing\nEason as an armed career criminal on the firearm count had no impact on his advisory\nguidelines range for the drug trafficking charge, and his 220-month sentence was 40\nmonths above the ACCA’s mandatory 180-month minimum.\n\n The Order of the district court dated August 4, 2017, is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Yobarri Takie EASON, Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3299\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Yobarri Takie Eason\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 19, 2018\\n Filed: January 9, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In 2008, Yobarri Takie Eason pleaded guilty to one count of distributing\\ncocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), and one count of\\npossessing a firearm as an armed career criminal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)\\nand § 924(e). The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) stated that Eason had\\nprior convictions for aggravated robbery, simple robbery, and second-degree assault\\n\\fwith a dangerous weapon. Eason conceded these convictions made him an armed\\ncareer criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). The district court1\\nadopted the PSR’s findings and imposed concurrent 220-month prison sentences on\\nthe two counts. Eason did not appeal the convictions and sentences.\\n\\n In 2014, Eason filed a post-conviction motion to vacate his sentence on the\\nfirearm count, arguing that his prior juvenile conviction for aggravated robbery was\\nno longer a violent felony after the Supreme Court’s decision in Descamps v. United\\nStates, 570 U.S. 254 (2013). The district court denied the motion as time-barred\\nbecause Descamps did not announce a newly recognized rule that would extend the\\none-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). In September 2016, we\\ngranted Eason authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion challenging\\nhis sentence on the firearm count based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in\\nJohnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Because Eason did not challenge\\nhis concurrent 220-month sentence for distributing cocaine base, the district court\\ndenied the successive motion as precluded by the concurrent sentence doctrine and\\ngranted Eason a certificate of appealability on this issue. On appeal, he argues the\\ndistrict court erred in applying the concurrent sentence doctrine because he faces the\\npossibility of adverse consequences if the merits of his successive § 2255 motion are\\nnot reviewed. Reviewing this issue de novo, we affirm.\\n\\n The concurrent sentence doctrine allows courts to decline to review the validity\\nof a concurrent conviction or sentence when a ruling in the defendant’s favor “would\\nnot reduce the time he is required to serve” or otherwise “prejudice him in any way.”\\nUnited States v. Olunloyo, 10 F.3d 578, 581-82 (8th Cir. 1993). Early cases\\nconsidering the doctrine involved challenges to one or more concurrent convictions,\\nfor example, for violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and courts struggled to\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge of the United States District\\nCourt for the District of Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fdefine the minimal level of prejudice that would preclude application of the\\nconcurrent sentence doctrine. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787-93 (1969).\\nThat was the issue in Logan v. Lockhart, 994 F.2d 1324, 1331-32 (8th Cir. 1993).\\nThe issue was largely eliminated when the Supreme Court ruled that the special\\nassessment imposed “on any person convicted of an offense against the United\\nStates,” 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a), now $100 for a felony offense by an individual, is\\nsufficient prejudice to require § 2255 review of a concurrent conviction’s validity.\\nSee Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 301-03 (1996); United States v. Holmes,\\n620 F.3d 836, 846 n.3 (8th Cir. 2010). However, where a § 2255 motion challenges\\nonly the validity of a concurrent sentence, as in this case, the concurrent sentence\\ndoctrine will apply unless a ruling in Eason’s favor would reduce the time he is\\nrequired to serve or otherwise prejudice him in any way. See United States v.\\nBradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n In denying Eason’s successive § 2255 motion, the district court explained:\\n\\n The Court finds that applying the concurrent-sentence doctrine is\\n justified in this case because Eason’s total sentence, and his sentence on\\n [the drug charge], was not affected by the ACCA enhancement. . . . The\\n ACCA enhancement had no effect on Eason’s overall advisory\\n Guidelines range or his statutory range for [the drug charge]: Eason\\n already had a ten-year mandatory minimum for [the drug charge] and the\\n advisory Guidelines range, with or without the ACCA enhancement,\\n would have been 262- to 327-months imprisonment. Additionally, there\\n is no indication that the ACCA enhancement drove Eason’s sentence\\n because the Court sentenced Eason to 40 additional months, beyond the\\n mandatory minimum, and the record suggests that the advisory\\n Guidelines for career offenders—unaffected by Eason’s ACCA\\n enhancement—drove Eason’s advisory Guidelines range and the Court’s\\n sentencing decision.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fUnited States v. Eason, No. 08-CR-0123, 2017 WL 3381813, at *2-3 (D. Minn. Aug.\\n4, 2017). Eason does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that a successful\\nchallenge to his sentence as an armed career criminal on the firearm count would not\\nreduce his total concurrent sentence on both counts.2 But he argues that failure to\\naddress the merits of his challenge to being sentenced as an armed career criminal\\ncould nonetheless prejudice him in the future.\\n\\n To establish the risk of future prejudice, Eason hypothesizes that, after serving\\nhis 220-month sentence for drug trafficking, he might violate his concurrent\\nsupervised release terms so seriously that the district court would revoke supervised\\nrelease and impose the maximum revocation sentence authorized by 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(e)(3). Under his concurrent 220-month sentences, the maximum revocation\\nsentence would be ten years imprisonment (consecutive five-year sentences on each\\ncount). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(1), 3583(b)(1). But if Eason was not sentenced as\\nan armed career criminal for the firearm count, the maximum revocation sentence\\nwould be only eight years (five years + three years) because the firearm offense\\nwould then be a Class C felony. See §§ 3559(a)(3), 3583(b)(2).\\n\\n Eason cites no case where we refused to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine\\nbased on such “highly speculative” adverse collateral consequences. United States\\nv. Wilson, 671 F.2d 1138, 1139-40 n.2 (8th Cir. 1982). Moreover, the adverse\\ncollateral consequence Eason posits is more than highly speculative. It could not\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Eason does argue that reversal of his sentence on the firearm count under\\nJohnson would result in a resentencing under the “sentencing package” doctrine that\\ncould result in a reduced total sentence. In his Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration\\nto the district court, Eason argued that his “original sentence was the type of\\n‘package’ that must be reconfigured entirely once his ACCA sentence is vacated.”\\nThe district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this contention, which\\nmisconstrued the “sentencing package” doctrine. See Wright v. United States, 902\\nF.3d 868, 872-73 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\foccur unless Eason chooses to commit serious violations of law during his future\\nterm of supervised release. Cf. USSG §§ 7B1.1(a), 7B1.4(a)(2). Thus, the adverse\\nconsequences are entirely within Eason’s control to avoid. “[L]iteral application of\\nsuch speculative consequences, resting upon a supposition of defendant’s continued\\ncriminality, would effectively bar the application of the [concurrent sentence] rule.”\\nUnited States v. Darnell, 545 F.2d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1976). We again decline to\\nagree that this type of speculation precludes district courts from applying this useful\\nrule. Rather, we agree with the district court’s decision to apply the discretionary\\nconcurrent sentence doctrine and deny successive § 2255 relief because sentencing\\nEason as an armed career criminal on the firearm count had no impact on his advisory\\nguidelines range for the drug trafficking charge, and his 220-month sentence was 40\\nmonths above the ACCA’s mandatory 180-month minimum.\\n\\n The Order of the district court dated August 4, 2017, is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":292,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4579895,"string":"4,579,895"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"MEDTRONIC SOFAMOR DANEK, INC.; Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc.; Medtronic, Inc., Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Patrick B. GANNON, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Patrick B. Gannon"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3302"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Loken, Gruender\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3302\\n ___________________________\\n\\nMedtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.; Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc.; Medtronic,\\n Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Patrick B. Gannon\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 16, 2018\\n Filed: January 9, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Patrick Gannon appeals the grant of a motion to remand filed by his former\\nemployer, Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., and\\n\\fMedtronic, Inc. (collectively, “Medtronic”). The district court1 held that Gannon\\nwaived his right to remove the case to federal court because the employment contract\\nhe signed contained an enforceable forum selection clause. We affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n On March 2, 2015, Gannon signed an Offer Letter, an Employee Agreement,\\nand a Repayment Agreement. He does not dispute that he signed these documents at\\nthe same time to form an employment relationship with Medtronic.\\n\\n The Offer Letter is a “formal offer of employment at Medtronic.” By signing\\nit, Gannon “ACCEPT[ED] THIS OFFER OF EMPLOYMENT” and agreed to the\\nterms set forth in it. The Offer Letter includes basic information about Gannon’s\\nemployment, including his start date, compensation structure, vacation time, and\\ntraining. It is also expressly “contingent upon [Gannon] signing the attached\\nEmployee Agreement and the Sales Guarantee Repayment Agreement.”\\n\\n The Employee Agreement deals with things like confidentiality, proprietary\\ninventions, and restrictions on competition. It also includes a forum selection clause.\\nThat clause says that disputes “arising out of or related to this Agreement” must be\\nlitigated in Minnesota state court and that Gannon “irrevocably consents to the\\npersonal jurisdiction of the state courts in the State of Minnesota for the purposes of\\nany action arising out of or related to this Agreement.” The Employee Agreement\\ndoes not address “compensation, benefits, and other financial terms and conditions,”\\nwhich it says are “set forth in separate documents provided to [Gannon].” In a section\\nentitled “Prior Agreements,” the Employee Agreement says that nothing in it “affects\\nany term or provision of any MEDTRONIC compensation or benefit plan or any\\nagreements related thereto.”\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f The one-page Repayment Agreement states that Medtronic and Gannon “wish\\nto enter into an . . . employment relationship.” Medtronic agreed to pay Gannon\\n$900,000 over a three-year “Guarantee Period,” but “if [Gannon] voluntarily\\nterminates from Medtronic during the Guarantee Period or within one year after the\\nend of the Guarantee Period, [he] must pay back to Medtronic the difference\\nbetween” his earned commissions and payments received. The Offer Letter also\\ndescribes the Guarantee Period and summarizes the condition of repayment should\\nGannon terminate his employment during this period. The Repayment Agreement\\ndoes not include a forum selection clause.\\n\\n In late 2016, Gannon left Medtronic. Medtronic sued him in Minnesota state\\ncourt, alleging that he left during the Guarantee Period and failed to repay Medtronic\\npursuant to the Repayment Agreement. Gannon removed the action to federal court\\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and Medtronic moved to remand pursuant to the forum\\nselection clause in the Employee Agreement. The district court granted Medtronic’s\\nmotion, holding that the forum selection clause in the Employee Agreement applied\\nto actions arising from the Repayment Agreement because, under Minnesota law,\\nboth agreements were different parts of the same contract. It also determined that\\nMedtronic’s suit was “related to” the Employee Agreement and therefore subject to\\nits forum selection clause. Gannon appeals.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion to remand de novo. See\\nFaltermeier v. FCA US LLC, 899 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 2018). “Under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1446, a defendant may remove a case filed in state court to federal court based on\\ndiversity jurisdiction.” PR Group, LLC v. Windmill Intern., Ltd., 792 F.3d 1025,\\n1026 (8th Cir. 2015). This right to remove may be waived by agreement. Id. “Such\\nwaiver must be clear and unequivocal.” Id.\\n\\n The parties do not dispute that Minnesota law applies to the interpretation of\\nthe Employee Agreement, Repayment Agreement, and Offer Letter. They also do not\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fdispute that the forum selection clause in the Employee Agreement is clear and\\nunequivocal. But they disagree about whether the forum selection clause applies to\\nthe present dispute, which arises from the Repayment Agreement. Gannon argues\\nthat the forum selection clause does not apply to the Repayment Agreement because\\nit is a separate contract from the Employee Agreement. But even if they are parts of\\nthe same contract, he claims that language in the Employee Agreement precludes\\napplication of its forum selection clause to the Repayment Agreement.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n As an initial matter, Gannon asserts that a party may waive its right to remove\\nan action for breach of contract only if the contract from which the action arose\\ncontains a clear and unequivocal forum selection clause. See, e.g., City of New\\nOrleans v. Municipal Admin. Servs., 376 F.3d 501, 504 (5th Cir. 2004); Brister v.\\nRomanowski, No. 14-2921, 2015 WL 2090236, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2015).\\nMaintaining that the Employee Agreement and Repayment Agreement are separate\\ncontracts, Gannon concludes that he did not waive his right to remove because this\\naction arose from the Repayment Agreement, a contract that does not contain a forum\\nselection clause.\\n\\n But the Employment Agreement and Repayment Agreement are not separate\\ncontracts. Under Minnesota law, “instruments executed at the same time, for the\\nsame purpose, and in the course of the same transaction are, in the eyes of the law,\\none instrument and will be read and construed together unless the parties stipulate\\notherwise.” Marso v. Mankato Clinic, Ltd., 153 N.W.2d 281, 288-89 (Minn. 1967).\\n“Whether separate documents executed simultaneously should be treated as a single\\ncontract is governed by the intent of the parties manifested at the time of contracting\\nand viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances.” Farrell v. Johnson, 442\\nN.W.2d 805, 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).\\n\\n The Employee Agreement, Repayment Agreement, and Offer Letter were\\nexecuted simultaneously, and the circumstances surrounding their execution indicate\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fthat they should be treated as a single contract. The Offer Letter constitutes a “formal\\noffer of employment” and is contingent upon Gannon’s execution of the Employee\\nAgreement and Repayment Agreement, strong indications that all three documents\\nare part of the same transaction and were executed for the same purpose of forming\\nan employment relationship. See Boston Scientific Corp. v. Kiland, No. 10-4053,\\n2011 WL 3035088, at *3 (D. Minn. July 25, 2011) (applying Minnesota law and\\nholding that employment-related agreements must be read together in part because\\n“entering into both agreements was a condition of guaranteed employment and\\ncompensation”). The Offer Letter also summarizes the key provisions of the\\nRepayment Agreement, and the Repayment Agreement states that “[Gannon] and\\nMedtronic wish to enter into an . . . employment relationship,” which, as Gannon\\nconcedes, was formed by his execution of all three documents. The Repayment\\nAgreement is therefore not a “free-standing contract,” as he claims.\\n\\n Gannon also contends that the Employee Agreement and Repayment\\nAgreement are separate contracts because they do not expressly incorporate each\\nother. But Minnesota courts do not require that separate agreements incorporate each\\nother to be considered parts of the same contract. Marso, 153 N.W.2d at 289 (“Where\\nseveral instruments are made part of one transaction, they will be read together and\\neach will be construed with reference to the others, although the instruments do not\\nin terms refer to each other.”).\\n\\n For these reasons, we hold that the Offer Letter, Employee Agreement, and\\nRepayment Agreement are parts of a single contract.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n We next address Gannon’s argument that language in the Employee Agreement\\nprecludes application of its forum selection clause to this action. The forum selection\\nclause says that disputes “arising out of or related to this Agreement” must be\\nlitigated in Minnesota state court. Gannon contends that the clause is, at the very\\nleast, ambiguous whether it extends to claims arising from the Repayment Agreement,\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fand we should therefore construe it against its drafter, Medtronic. See Hilligoss v.\\nCargill, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 142, 148 (Minn. 2002) (“A fundamental principle of\\ncontract law is that when contract language is reasonably susceptible of more than\\none interpretation it is ambiguous, and ambiguous contract terms must be construed\\nagainst the drafter . . . .”). However, the clause is reasonably susceptible to only one\\ninterpretation.\\n\\n When analyzing the forum selection clause, we must “avoid an interpretation\\nthat renders a clause meaningless.” See Fortune Funding, LLC v. Ceridian Corp.,\\n368 F.3d 985, 987 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying Minnesota law). We agree with the\\ndistrict court that “[b]ecause the words ‘arising out of’ must mean disputes about the\\nterms of the Employee Agreement—that is, confidentiality, restrictive covenant,\\netc.—the words ‘or relating to’ must mean something else.” Medtronic Sofamor\\nDanek, Inc., et al. v. Gannon, No. 0:17-cv-00943, 2017 WL 4685041, at *4 (D. Minn.\\nOct. 16, 2017). Our analysis about whether the Repayment Agreement and Employee\\nAgreement are different parts of the same contract applies here and requires us to\\nconclude that the Repayment Agreement is unambiguously “related to” the Employee\\nAgreement. They were executed at the same time and for the same purpose, and\\nwithout either one of them, the Offer Letter would be unenforceable. The Repayment\\nAgreement and Employee Agreement are also complementary in that they address\\ndifferent aspects of the same employment relationship. The Repayment Agreement\\nfocuses on compensation, and the Employee Agreement on things like confidentiality,\\nproprietary inventions, and restrictions on competition. Indeed, the Employee\\nAgreement expressly saves compensation terms for “separate documents provided to\\n[Gannon],” another indication that any such document (i.e., the Repayment\\nAgreement) is “related to” it.\\n\\n Gannon also relies on the “Prior Agreements” section of the Employee\\nAgreement, which says that “nothing in [the Employee Agreement] affects any term\\nor provision of any MEDTRONIC compensation or benefit plan or any agreements\\nrelated thereto.” He argues that application of the forum selection clause violates the\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f“Prior Agreements” section because doing so “affects” the Repayment Agreement.\\nBut under Minnesota law, “the specific in a writing governs over the general,” and\\ntherefore the “Prior Agreements” section cannot supersede the forum selection clause,\\nwhich is specific to the question of proper venue in this case. See Burgi v. Eckes, 354\\nN.W.2d 514, 519 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). We also note that Gannon’s interpretation\\ncreates a conflict within the Employee Agreement between the “Prior Agreements”\\nsection and the forum selection clause. Such an interpretation is disfavored. See\\nOster v. Medtronic, Inc., 428 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (“Where there\\nis an apparent conflict between two clauses or provisions of a contract, it is the\\ncourt’s duty to find harmony between them and to reconcile them if possible.”).\\nThus, the language of the Employee Agreement does not preclude application of its\\nforum selection clause to this action.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n We conclude that the Employee Agreement contains a clear and unequivocal\\nforum selection clause that unambiguously encompasses the Repayment Agreement,\\nand we affirm the district court’s grant of Medtronic’s motion to remand.\\n\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4357148/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4579895/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: MEDTRONIC SOFAMOR DANEK, INC.; Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc.; Medtronic, Inc., Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Patrick B. GANNON, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3302\n ___________________________\n\nMedtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.; Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc.; Medtronic,\n Inc.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\n\n v.\n\n Patrick B. Gannon\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: October 16, 2018\n Filed: January 9, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\n\n Patrick Gannon appeals the grant of a motion to remand filed by his former\nemployer, Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., and\n\fMedtronic, Inc. (collectively, “Medtronic”). The district court1 held that Gannon\nwaived his right to remove the case to federal court because the employment contract\nhe signed contained an enforceable forum selection clause. We affirm.\n\n I.\n\n On March 2, 2015, Gannon signed an Offer Letter, an Employee Agreement,\nand a Repayment Agreement. He does not dispute that he signed these documents at\nthe same time to form an employment relationship with Medtronic.\n\n The Offer Letter is a “formal offer of employment at Medtronic.” By signing\nit, Gannon “ACCEPT[ED] THIS OFFER OF EMPLOYMENT” and agreed to the\nterms set forth in it. The Offer Letter includes basic information about Gannon’s\nemployment, including his start date, compensation structure, vacation time, and\ntraining. It is also expressly “contingent upon [Gannon] signing the attached\nEmployee Agreement and the Sales Guarantee Repayment Agreement.”\n\n The Employee Agreement deals with things like confidentiality, proprietary\ninventions, and restrictions on competition. It also includes a forum selection clause.\nThat clause says that disputes “arising out of or related to this Agreement” must be\nlitigated in Minnesota state court and that Gannon “irrevocably consents to the\npersonal jurisdiction of the state courts in the State of Minnesota for the purposes of\nany action arising out of or related to this Agreement.” The Employee Agreement\ndoes not address “compensation, benefits, and other financial terms and conditions,”\nwhich it says are “set forth in separate documents provided to [Gannon].” In a section\nentitled “Prior Agreements,” the Employee Agreement says that nothing in it “affects\nany term or provision of any MEDTRONIC compensation or benefit plan or any\nagreements related thereto.”\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Judge for the\nDistrict of Minnesota.\n\n -2-\n\f The one-page Repayment Agreement states that Medtronic and Gannon “wish\nto enter into an . . . employment relationship.” Medtronic agreed to pay Gannon\n$900,000 over a three-year “Guarantee Period,” but “if [Gannon] voluntarily\nterminates from Medtronic during the Guarantee Period or within one year after the\nend of the Guarantee Period, [he] must pay back to Medtronic the difference\nbetween” his earned commissions and payments received. The Offer Letter also\ndescribes the Guarantee Period and summarizes the condition of repayment should\nGannon terminate his employment during this period. The Repayment Agreement\ndoes not include a forum selection clause.\n\n In late 2016, Gannon left Medtronic. Medtronic sued him in Minnesota state\ncourt, alleging that he left during the Guarantee Period and failed to repay Medtronic\npursuant to the Repayment Agreement. Gannon removed the action to federal court\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and Medtronic moved to remand pursuant to the forum\nselection clause in the Employee Agreement. The district court granted Medtronic’s\nmotion, holding that the forum selection clause in the Employee Agreement applied\nto actions arising from the Repayment Agreement because, under Minnesota law,\nboth agreements were different parts of the same contract. It also determined that\nMedtronic’s suit was “related to” the Employee Agreement and therefore subject to\nits forum selection clause. Gannon appeals.\n\n II.\n\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion to remand de novo. See\nFaltermeier v. FCA US LLC, 899 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 2018). “Under 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1446, a defendant may remove a case filed in state court to federal court based on\ndiversity jurisdiction.” PR Group, LLC v. Windmill Intern., Ltd., 792 F.3d 1025,\n1026 (8th Cir. 2015). This right to remove may be waived by agreement. Id. “Such\nwaiver must be clear and unequivocal.” Id.\n\n The parties do not dispute that Minnesota law applies to the interpretation of\nthe Employee Agreement, Repayment Agreement, and Offer Letter. They also do not\n\n -3-\n\fdispute that the forum selection clause in the Employee Agreement is clear and\nunequivocal. But they disagree about whether the forum selection clause applies to\nthe present dispute, which arises from the Repayment Agreement. Gannon argues\nthat the forum selection clause does not apply to the Repayment Agreement because\nit is a separate contract from the Employee Agreement. But even if they are parts of\nthe same contract, he claims that language in the Employee Agreement precludes\napplication of its forum selection clause to the Repayment Agreement.\n\n A.\n\n As an initial matter, Gannon asserts that a party may waive its right to remove\nan action for breach of contract only if the contract from which the action arose\ncontains a clear and unequivocal forum selection clause. See, e.g., City of New\nOrleans v. Municipal Admin. Servs., 376 F.3d 501, 504 (5th Cir. 2004); Brister v.\nRomanowski, No. 14-2921, 2015 WL 2090236, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2015).\nMaintaining that the Employee Agreement and Repayment Agreement are separate\ncontracts, Gannon concludes that he did not waive his right to remove because this\naction arose from the Repayment Agreement, a contract that does not contain a forum\nselection clause.\n\n But the Employment Agreement and Repayment Agreement are not separate\ncontracts. Under Minnesota law, “instruments executed at the same time, for the\nsame purpose, and in the course of the same transaction are, in the eyes of the law,\none instrument and will be read and construed together unless the parties stipulate\notherwise.” Marso v. Mankato Clinic, Ltd., 153 N.W.2d 281, 288-89 (Minn. 1967).\n“Whether separate documents executed simultaneously should be treated as a single\ncontract is governed by the intent of the parties manifested at the time of contracting\nand viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances.” Farrell v. Johnson, 442\nN.W.2d 805, 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).\n\n The Employee Agreement, Repayment Agreement, and Offer Letter were\nexecuted simultaneously, and the circumstances surrounding their execution indicate\n\n -4-\n\fthat they should be treated as a single contract. The Offer Letter constitutes a “formal\noffer of employment” and is contingent upon Gannon’s execution of the Employee\nAgreement and Repayment Agreement, strong indications that all three documents\nare part of the same transaction and were executed for the same purpose of forming\nan employment relationship. See Boston Scientific Corp. v. Kiland, No. 10-4053,\n2011 WL 3035088, at *3 (D. Minn. July 25, 2011) (applying Minnesota law and\nholding that employment-related agreements must be read together in part because\n“entering into both agreements was a condition of guaranteed employment and\ncompensation”). The Offer Letter also summarizes the key provisions of the\nRepayment Agreement, and the Repayment Agreement states that “[Gannon] and\nMedtronic wish to enter into an . . . employment relationship,” which, as Gannon\nconcedes, was formed by his execution of all three documents. The Repayment\nAgreement is therefore not a “free-standing contract,” as he claims.\n\n Gannon also contends that the Employee Agreement and Repayment\nAgreement are separate contracts because they do not expressly incorporate each\nother. But Minnesota courts do not require that separate agreements incorporate each\nother to be considered parts of the same contract. Marso, 153 N.W.2d at 289 (“Where\nseveral instruments are made part of one transaction, they will be read together and\neach will be construed with reference to the others, although the instruments do not\nin terms refer to each other.”).\n\n For these reasons, we hold that the Offer Letter, Employee Agreement, and\nRepayment Agreement are parts of a single contract.\n\n B.\n\n We next address Gannon’s argument that language in the Employee Agreement\nprecludes application of its forum selection clause to this action. The forum selection\nclause says that disputes “arising out of or related to this Agreement” must be\nlitigated in Minnesota state court. Gannon contends that the clause is, at the very\nleast, ambiguous whether it extends to claims arising from the Repayment Agreement,\n\n -5-\n\fand we should therefore construe it against its drafter, Medtronic. See Hilligoss v.\nCargill, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 142, 148 (Minn. 2002) (“A fundamental principle of\ncontract law is that when contract language is reasonably susceptible of more than\none interpretation it is ambiguous, and ambiguous contract terms must be construed\nagainst the drafter . . . .”). However, the clause is reasonably susceptible to only one\ninterpretation.\n\n When analyzing the forum selection clause, we must “avoid an interpretation\nthat renders a clause meaningless.” See Fortune Funding, LLC v. Ceridian Corp.,\n368 F.3d 985, 987 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying Minnesota law). We agree with the\ndistrict court that “[b]ecause the words ‘arising out of’ must mean disputes about the\nterms of the Employee Agreement—that is, confidentiality, restrictive covenant,\netc.—the words ‘or relating to’ must mean something else.” Medtronic Sofamor\nDanek, Inc., et al. v. Gannon, No. 0:17-cv-00943, 2017 WL 4685041, at *4 (D. Minn.\nOct. 16, 2017). Our analysis about whether the Repayment Agreement and Employee\nAgreement are different parts of the same contract applies here and requires us to\nconclude that the Repayment Agreement is unambiguously “related to” the Employee\nAgreement. They were executed at the same time and for the same purpose, and\nwithout either one of them, the Offer Letter would be unenforceable. The Repayment\nAgreement and Employee Agreement are also complementary in that they address\ndifferent aspects of the same employment relationship. The Repayment Agreement\nfocuses on compensation, and the Employee Agreement on things like confidentiality,\nproprietary inventions, and restrictions on competition. Indeed, the Employee\nAgreement expressly saves compensation terms for “separate documents provided to\n[Gannon],” another indication that any such document (i.e., the Repayment\nAgreement) is “related to” it.\n\n Gannon also relies on the “Prior Agreements” section of the Employee\nAgreement, which says that “nothing in [the Employee Agreement] affects any term\nor provision of any MEDTRONIC compensation or benefit plan or any agreements\nrelated thereto.” He argues that application of the forum selection clause violates the\n\n -6-\n\f“Prior Agreements” section because doing so “affects” the Repayment Agreement.\nBut under Minnesota law, “the specific in a writing governs over the general,” and\ntherefore the “Prior Agreements” section cannot supersede the forum selection clause,\nwhich is specific to the question of proper venue in this case. See Burgi v. Eckes, 354\nN.W.2d 514, 519 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). We also note that Gannon’s interpretation\ncreates a conflict within the Employee Agreement between the “Prior Agreements”\nsection and the forum selection clause. Such an interpretation is disfavored. See\nOster v. Medtronic, Inc., 428 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (“Where there\nis an apparent conflict between two clauses or provisions of a contract, it is the\ncourt’s duty to find harmony between them and to reconcile them if possible.”).\nThus, the language of the Employee Agreement does not preclude application of its\nforum selection clause to this action.\n\n III.\n\n We conclude that the Employee Agreement contains a clear and unequivocal\nforum selection clause that unambiguously encompasses the Repayment Agreement,\nand we affirm the district court’s grant of Medtronic’s motion to remand.\n\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: MEDTRONIC SOFAMOR DANEK, INC.; Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc.; Medtronic, Inc., Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Patrick B. GANNON, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3302\\n ___________________________\\n\\nMedtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.; Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc.; Medtronic,\\n Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Patrick B. Gannon\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 16, 2018\\n Filed: January 9, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Patrick Gannon appeals the grant of a motion to remand filed by his former\\nemployer, Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., and\\n\\fMedtronic, Inc. (collectively, “Medtronic”). The district court1 held that Gannon\\nwaived his right to remove the case to federal court because the employment contract\\nhe signed contained an enforceable forum selection clause. We affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n On March 2, 2015, Gannon signed an Offer Letter, an Employee Agreement,\\nand a Repayment Agreement. He does not dispute that he signed these documents at\\nthe same time to form an employment relationship with Medtronic.\\n\\n The Offer Letter is a “formal offer of employment at Medtronic.” By signing\\nit, Gannon “ACCEPT[ED] THIS OFFER OF EMPLOYMENT” and agreed to the\\nterms set forth in it. The Offer Letter includes basic information about Gannon’s\\nemployment, including his start date, compensation structure, vacation time, and\\ntraining. It is also expressly “contingent upon [Gannon] signing the attached\\nEmployee Agreement and the Sales Guarantee Repayment Agreement.”\\n\\n The Employee Agreement deals with things like confidentiality, proprietary\\ninventions, and restrictions on competition. It also includes a forum selection clause.\\nThat clause says that disputes “arising out of or related to this Agreement” must be\\nlitigated in Minnesota state court and that Gannon “irrevocably consents to the\\npersonal jurisdiction of the state courts in the State of Minnesota for the purposes of\\nany action arising out of or related to this Agreement.” The Employee Agreement\\ndoes not address “compensation, benefits, and other financial terms and conditions,”\\nwhich it says are “set forth in separate documents provided to [Gannon].” In a section\\nentitled “Prior Agreements,” the Employee Agreement says that nothing in it “affects\\nany term or provision of any MEDTRONIC compensation or benefit plan or any\\nagreements related thereto.”\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f The one-page Repayment Agreement states that Medtronic and Gannon “wish\\nto enter into an . . . employment relationship.” Medtronic agreed to pay Gannon\\n$900,000 over a three-year “Guarantee Period,” but “if [Gannon] voluntarily\\nterminates from Medtronic during the Guarantee Period or within one year after the\\nend of the Guarantee Period, [he] must pay back to Medtronic the difference\\nbetween” his earned commissions and payments received. The Offer Letter also\\ndescribes the Guarantee Period and summarizes the condition of repayment should\\nGannon terminate his employment during this period. The Repayment Agreement\\ndoes not include a forum selection clause.\\n\\n In late 2016, Gannon left Medtronic. Medtronic sued him in Minnesota state\\ncourt, alleging that he left during the Guarantee Period and failed to repay Medtronic\\npursuant to the Repayment Agreement. Gannon removed the action to federal court\\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and Medtronic moved to remand pursuant to the forum\\nselection clause in the Employee Agreement. The district court granted Medtronic’s\\nmotion, holding that the forum selection clause in the Employee Agreement applied\\nto actions arising from the Repayment Agreement because, under Minnesota law,\\nboth agreements were different parts of the same contract. It also determined that\\nMedtronic’s suit was “related to” the Employee Agreement and therefore subject to\\nits forum selection clause. Gannon appeals.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion to remand de novo. See\\nFaltermeier v. FCA US LLC, 899 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 2018). “Under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1446, a defendant may remove a case filed in state court to federal court based on\\ndiversity jurisdiction.” PR Group, LLC v. Windmill Intern., Ltd., 792 F.3d 1025,\\n1026 (8th Cir. 2015). This right to remove may be waived by agreement. Id. “Such\\nwaiver must be clear and unequivocal.” Id.\\n\\n The parties do not dispute that Minnesota law applies to the interpretation of\\nthe Employee Agreement, Repayment Agreement, and Offer Letter. They also do not\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fdispute that the forum selection clause in the Employee Agreement is clear and\\nunequivocal. But they disagree about whether the forum selection clause applies to\\nthe present dispute, which arises from the Repayment Agreement. Gannon argues\\nthat the forum selection clause does not apply to the Repayment Agreement because\\nit is a separate contract from the Employee Agreement. But even if they are parts of\\nthe same contract, he claims that language in the Employee Agreement precludes\\napplication of its forum selection clause to the Repayment Agreement.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n As an initial matter, Gannon asserts that a party may waive its right to remove\\nan action for breach of contract only if the contract from which the action arose\\ncontains a clear and unequivocal forum selection clause. See, e.g., City of New\\nOrleans v. Municipal Admin. Servs., 376 F.3d 501, 504 (5th Cir. 2004); Brister v.\\nRomanowski, No. 14-2921, 2015 WL 2090236, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2015).\\nMaintaining that the Employee Agreement and Repayment Agreement are separate\\ncontracts, Gannon concludes that he did not waive his right to remove because this\\naction arose from the Repayment Agreement, a contract that does not contain a forum\\nselection clause.\\n\\n But the Employment Agreement and Repayment Agreement are not separate\\ncontracts. Under Minnesota law, “instruments executed at the same time, for the\\nsame purpose, and in the course of the same transaction are, in the eyes of the law,\\none instrument and will be read and construed together unless the parties stipulate\\notherwise.” Marso v. Mankato Clinic, Ltd., 153 N.W.2d 281, 288-89 (Minn. 1967).\\n“Whether separate documents executed simultaneously should be treated as a single\\ncontract is governed by the intent of the parties manifested at the time of contracting\\nand viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances.” Farrell v. Johnson, 442\\nN.W.2d 805, 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).\\n\\n The Employee Agreement, Repayment Agreement, and Offer Letter were\\nexecuted simultaneously, and the circumstances surrounding their execution indicate\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fthat they should be treated as a single contract. The Offer Letter constitutes a “formal\\noffer of employment” and is contingent upon Gannon’s execution of the Employee\\nAgreement and Repayment Agreement, strong indications that all three documents\\nare part of the same transaction and were executed for the same purpose of forming\\nan employment relationship. See Boston Scientific Corp. v. Kiland, No. 10-4053,\\n2011 WL 3035088, at *3 (D. Minn. July 25, 2011) (applying Minnesota law and\\nholding that employment-related agreements must be read together in part because\\n“entering into both agreements was a condition of guaranteed employment and\\ncompensation”). The Offer Letter also summarizes the key provisions of the\\nRepayment Agreement, and the Repayment Agreement states that “[Gannon] and\\nMedtronic wish to enter into an . . . employment relationship,” which, as Gannon\\nconcedes, was formed by his execution of all three documents. The Repayment\\nAgreement is therefore not a “free-standing contract,” as he claims.\\n\\n Gannon also contends that the Employee Agreement and Repayment\\nAgreement are separate contracts because they do not expressly incorporate each\\nother. But Minnesota courts do not require that separate agreements incorporate each\\nother to be considered parts of the same contract. Marso, 153 N.W.2d at 289 (“Where\\nseveral instruments are made part of one transaction, they will be read together and\\neach will be construed with reference to the others, although the instruments do not\\nin terms refer to each other.”).\\n\\n For these reasons, we hold that the Offer Letter, Employee Agreement, and\\nRepayment Agreement are parts of a single contract.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n We next address Gannon’s argument that language in the Employee Agreement\\nprecludes application of its forum selection clause to this action. The forum selection\\nclause says that disputes “arising out of or related to this Agreement” must be\\nlitigated in Minnesota state court. Gannon contends that the clause is, at the very\\nleast, ambiguous whether it extends to claims arising from the Repayment Agreement,\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fand we should therefore construe it against its drafter, Medtronic. See Hilligoss v.\\nCargill, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 142, 148 (Minn. 2002) (“A fundamental principle of\\ncontract law is that when contract language is reasonably susceptible of more than\\none interpretation it is ambiguous, and ambiguous contract terms must be construed\\nagainst the drafter . . . .”). However, the clause is reasonably susceptible to only one\\ninterpretation.\\n\\n When analyzing the forum selection clause, we must “avoid an interpretation\\nthat renders a clause meaningless.” See Fortune Funding, LLC v. Ceridian Corp.,\\n368 F.3d 985, 987 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying Minnesota law). We agree with the\\ndistrict court that “[b]ecause the words ‘arising out of’ must mean disputes about the\\nterms of the Employee Agreement—that is, confidentiality, restrictive covenant,\\netc.—the words ‘or relating to’ must mean something else.” Medtronic Sofamor\\nDanek, Inc., et al. v. Gannon, No. 0:17-cv-00943, 2017 WL 4685041, at *4 (D. Minn.\\nOct. 16, 2017). Our analysis about whether the Repayment Agreement and Employee\\nAgreement are different parts of the same contract applies here and requires us to\\nconclude that the Repayment Agreement is unambiguously “related to” the Employee\\nAgreement. They were executed at the same time and for the same purpose, and\\nwithout either one of them, the Offer Letter would be unenforceable. The Repayment\\nAgreement and Employee Agreement are also complementary in that they address\\ndifferent aspects of the same employment relationship. The Repayment Agreement\\nfocuses on compensation, and the Employee Agreement on things like confidentiality,\\nproprietary inventions, and restrictions on competition. Indeed, the Employee\\nAgreement expressly saves compensation terms for “separate documents provided to\\n[Gannon],” another indication that any such document (i.e., the Repayment\\nAgreement) is “related to” it.\\n\\n Gannon also relies on the “Prior Agreements” section of the Employee\\nAgreement, which says that “nothing in [the Employee Agreement] affects any term\\nor provision of any MEDTRONIC compensation or benefit plan or any agreements\\nrelated thereto.” He argues that application of the forum selection clause violates the\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f“Prior Agreements” section because doing so “affects” the Repayment Agreement.\\nBut under Minnesota law, “the specific in a writing governs over the general,” and\\ntherefore the “Prior Agreements” section cannot supersede the forum selection clause,\\nwhich is specific to the question of proper venue in this case. See Burgi v. Eckes, 354\\nN.W.2d 514, 519 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). We also note that Gannon’s interpretation\\ncreates a conflict within the Employee Agreement between the “Prior Agreements”\\nsection and the forum selection clause. Such an interpretation is disfavored. See\\nOster v. Medtronic, Inc., 428 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (“Where there\\nis an apparent conflict between two clauses or provisions of a contract, it is the\\ncourt’s duty to find harmony between them and to reconcile them if possible.”).\\nThus, the language of the Employee Agreement does not preclude application of its\\nforum selection clause to this action.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n We conclude that the Employee Agreement contains a clear and unequivocal\\nforum selection clause that unambiguously encompasses the Repayment Agreement,\\nand we affirm the district court’s grant of Medtronic’s motion to remand.\\n\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":293,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4580408,"string":"4,580,408"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Joseph L. HILL, Defendant - Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Joseph Hill"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2425"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Gruender, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2425\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Joseph L. Hill,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 24, 2018\\n Filed: January 10, 2019\\n [Published]\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nPER CURIAM.\\n\\n Joseph Hill pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of ammunition as a\\npreviously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court1\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Beth Phillips, United States District Judge for the Western\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\fdetermined that Hill qualified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), because he had sustained three prior convictions\\nfor “a serious drug offense” within the meaning of § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The court\\ntherefore sentenced him to the statutory minimum term of fifteen years’\\nimprisonment. Hill argues on appeal that his prior convictions under Missouri law\\ndo not qualify as serious drug offenses, so he is not an armed career criminal, and that\\nthe maximum punishment for his offense is therefore only ten years’ imprisonment.\\nSee id. § 924(a)(2).\\n\\n In concluding that Hill was an armed career criminal, the district court cited\\nfour prior convictions under Missouri Revised Statutes § 195.211.1 (1989), which\\ncriminalized the distribution, delivery, manufacture, or production of a controlled\\nsubstance. “Delivery” includes both the sale of a controlled substance and the “offer\\ntherefor.” See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 195.010(8) and 195.010(36) (1997). Hill observes\\nthat the definition of “serious drug offense” under § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) requires an\\noffense under state law “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with\\nintent to manufacture or distribute” a controlled substance. He argues that a state\\ncrime involving merely an offer to sell drugs does not qualify.\\n\\n Hill’s argument is foreclosed by the reasoning of United States v. Bynum, 669\\nF.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2012). There, we held that a knowing offer to sell drugs in\\nMinnesota is a crime “involving” the distribution of drugs, because it is “related to\\nor connected with” drug distribution. Id. at 886 (quoting United States v. Vickers,\\n540 F.3d 356, 365 (5th Cir. 2008)). United States v. Wadena, 895 F.3d 1075 (8th Cir.\\n2018), reiterated that an offer to sell drugs is a serious drug offense under the Act.\\nId. at 1077. For the same reasons, the district court properly counted Hill’s\\nconvictions under a Missouri statute that forbade an offer to sell controlled\\nsubstances. With three prior convictions for a serious drug offense, Hill qualified as\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fan armed career criminal and was subject to the mandatory minimum term of fifteen\\nyears’ imprisonment.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4357661/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4580408/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Joseph L. HILL, Defendant - Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2425\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,\n\n v.\n\n Joseph L. Hill,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City\n ____________\n\n Submitted: September 24, 2018\n Filed: January 10, 2019\n [Published]\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nPER CURIAM.\n\n Joseph Hill pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of ammunition as a\npreviously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court1\n\n 1\n The Honorable Beth Phillips, United States District Judge for the Western\nDistrict of Missouri.\n\fdetermined that Hill qualified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career\nCriminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), because he had sustained three prior convictions\nfor “a serious drug offense” within the meaning of § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The court\ntherefore sentenced him to the statutory minimum term of fifteen years’\nimprisonment. Hill argues on appeal that his prior convictions under Missouri law\ndo not qualify as serious drug offenses, so he is not an armed career criminal, and that\nthe maximum punishment for his offense is therefore only ten years’ imprisonment.\nSee id. § 924(a)(2).\n\n In concluding that Hill was an armed career criminal, the district court cited\nfour prior convictions under Missouri Revised Statutes § 195.211.1 (1989), which\ncriminalized the distribution, delivery, manufacture, or production of a controlled\nsubstance. “Delivery” includes both the sale of a controlled substance and the “offer\ntherefor.” See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 195.010(8) and 195.010(36) (1997). Hill observes\nthat the definition of “serious drug offense” under § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) requires an\noffense under state law “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with\nintent to manufacture or distribute” a controlled substance. He argues that a state\ncrime involving merely an offer to sell drugs does not qualify.\n\n Hill’s argument is foreclosed by the reasoning of United States v. Bynum, 669\nF.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2012). There, we held that a knowing offer to sell drugs in\nMinnesota is a crime “involving” the distribution of drugs, because it is “related to\nor connected with” drug distribution. Id. at 886 (quoting United States v. Vickers,\n540 F.3d 356, 365 (5th Cir. 2008)). United States v. Wadena, 895 F.3d 1075 (8th Cir.\n2018), reiterated that an offer to sell drugs is a serious drug offense under the Act.\nId. at 1077. For the same reasons, the district court properly counted Hill’s\nconvictions under a Missouri statute that forbade an offer to sell controlled\nsubstances. With three prior convictions for a serious drug offense, Hill qualified as\n\n\n\n\n -2-\n\fan armed career criminal and was subject to the mandatory minimum term of fifteen\nyears’ imprisonment.\n\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Joseph L. HILL, Defendant - Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2425\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Joseph L. Hill,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 24, 2018\\n Filed: January 10, 2019\\n [Published]\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nPER CURIAM.\\n\\n Joseph Hill pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of ammunition as a\\npreviously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court1\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Beth Phillips, United States District Judge for the Western\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\fdetermined that Hill qualified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), because he had sustained three prior convictions\\nfor “a serious drug offense” within the meaning of § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The court\\ntherefore sentenced him to the statutory minimum term of fifteen years’\\nimprisonment. Hill argues on appeal that his prior convictions under Missouri law\\ndo not qualify as serious drug offenses, so he is not an armed career criminal, and that\\nthe maximum punishment for his offense is therefore only ten years’ imprisonment.\\nSee id. § 924(a)(2).\\n\\n In concluding that Hill was an armed career criminal, the district court cited\\nfour prior convictions under Missouri Revised Statutes § 195.211.1 (1989), which\\ncriminalized the distribution, delivery, manufacture, or production of a controlled\\nsubstance. “Delivery” includes both the sale of a controlled substance and the “offer\\ntherefor.” See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 195.010(8) and 195.010(36) (1997). Hill observes\\nthat the definition of “serious drug offense” under § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) requires an\\noffense under state law “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with\\nintent to manufacture or distribute” a controlled substance. He argues that a state\\ncrime involving merely an offer to sell drugs does not qualify.\\n\\n Hill’s argument is foreclosed by the reasoning of United States v. Bynum, 669\\nF.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2012). There, we held that a knowing offer to sell drugs in\\nMinnesota is a crime “involving” the distribution of drugs, because it is “related to\\nor connected with” drug distribution. Id. at 886 (quoting United States v. Vickers,\\n540 F.3d 356, 365 (5th Cir. 2008)). United States v. Wadena, 895 F.3d 1075 (8th Cir.\\n2018), reiterated that an offer to sell drugs is a serious drug offense under the Act.\\nId. at 1077. For the same reasons, the district court properly counted Hill’s\\nconvictions under a Missouri statute that forbade an offer to sell controlled\\nsubstances. With three prior convictions for a serious drug offense, Hill qualified as\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fan armed career criminal and was subject to the mandatory minimum term of fifteen\\nyears’ imprisonment.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":294,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4580411,"string":"4,580,411"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Jeremy D. TERRELL, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jeremy Terrell"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2929"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wollman, Arnold, Benton\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2929\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Jeremy D. Terrell\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Ft. Dodge\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 19, 2018\\n Filed: January 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Jeremy D. Terrell pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and\\npossession with intent to distribute meth and “a mixture or substance containing a\\ndetectable amount of cocaine” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A),\\n\\f§ 841(b)(1)(C), 846, and 851. The district court1 denied the motion to suppress\\nevidence from the wiretaps. He appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,\\nthis court affirms.\\n\\n In 2014, Nebraska law enforcement began investigating a series of gang-\\nrelated robberies. Terrell, an alleged member of the NIKE gang, was a “target\\nsuspect.” In 2015, the county attorney for Douglas County, Nebraska submitted a\\nwiretap application—not “signed and sworn”—to the Nebraska Attorney General.\\nThe application sought to tap the phones of two members of the NIKE gang (not\\nTerrell). It included extensive information about felony firearms violations, drug use\\nand trafficking, robberies, and gang activity. The Attorney General recommended\\ngranting it. The next day, the state court ordered the wiretap. It later extended it.\\n\\n In August 2015, after the first wiretap ended, the county attorney applied for\\na wiretap on Terrell’s phones. The county attorney submitted another wiretap\\napplication—again not “signed and sworn”—to the Nebraska Attorney General, who\\nrecommended granting it. Four days later, the state court ordered the wiretap. It also\\nwas extended.\\n\\n The second wiretap ended September 15. Terrell learned about the wiretaps\\nfor the first time on October 26 during a proffer interview with law enforcement. He\\nreceived written notice of the wiretaps in January 2016.\\n\\n Terrell contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. This\\ncourt reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its legal\\nconclusions de novo. United States v. Lomeli, 676 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the\\nNorthern District of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f I.\\n\\n Terrell believes the wiretaps and extensions were invalid because they were not\\npreauthorized by the Nebraska Attorney General. The federal wiretap statute requires\\nthat a federal prosecutor, before applying to a federal court for a wiretap, receive\\nauthorization from the United States Attorney General (or a designee). See 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 2516(1). Terrell argues this requirement applies to Nebraska’s state wiretap statute.\\nIt does not.\\n\\n A “wiretap order issued by a state court must comply with state as well as\\nfederal law.” United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 373 n.1 (8th Cir. 1994). When\\nsought by a state prosecuting attorney, the federal statute requires that state-issued\\nwiretaps comply with “applicable State statute.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). Under\\nthe Nebraska wiretap statute, the Attorney General is required to give a\\nrecommendation, not pre-authorization, to the district court. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §\\n86-291 (“Within twenty-four hours of receipt by the office of the Attorney General\\nof the application from the county attorney, the Attorney General or his or her\\ndesignated deputy or assistant, as the case may be, shall state to the district court\\nwhere the order is sought his or her recommendation as to whether the order should\\nbe granted.”). The district court did not err in granting the wiretap applications\\nwithout preauthorization from the Nebraska Attorney General.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Terrell argues the wiretap applications were improper because they were not\\nsworn under oath before submission to the Attorney General and were submitted by\\na deputy county attorney rather than the principal county attorney. Both arguments\\nare without merit.\\n\\n There is no requirement that wiretap applications be sworn under oath before\\nsubmission to the Nebraska Attorney General. The Nebraska statute, like 18 U.S.C.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f§ 2518(1), requires only that a wiretap application be sworn under oath before\\npresentation to the judge, not the Attorney General. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-293(1)\\n(“Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire,\\nelectronic, or oral communication shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation\\nto a judge of a district court and shall state the applicant’s authority to make such\\napplication.”).\\n\\n There also is no requirement that wiretap applications be submitted to the\\nAttorney General by the principal county attorney. Although the federal wiretap\\nstatute requires the “principal prosecuting attorney” of the state to submit the wiretap\\napplication to the judge, there is no similar requirement for submission to the\\nAttorney General. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(2). Nebraska also does not have this\\nrequirement. Nebraska law authorizes a county attorney to appoint one or more\\ndeputies to assist in the discharge of official duties. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 23-1204.\\nNothing in the Nebraska wiretap statute prohibits deputy county attorneys from\\nsubmitting wiretap applications to the Attorney General. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-\\n291. See also Thompson v. O’Grady, 290 N.W. 716, 718 (Neb. 1940) (holding that\\na deputy county attorney has the authority under Nebraska law to sign a criminal\\ninformation for the county attorney). The district court did not err in granting the\\nwiretap applications despite these objections.\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Terrell asserts the first wiretap—which listed him as a target subject—lacked\\nprobable cause. The Nebraska requirement for probable cause matches the federal\\nrequirement. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-293(3)(a)-(d); 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (3)(a)-(d).\\nThe federal wiretap statue does not “prohibit the government from listing someone\\nas a target subject even if probable cause is lacking as to that person.” United States\\nv. Dunn, 723 F.3d 919, 927 (8th Cir. 2013). The district court did not err in finding\\nprobable cause to wiretap Terrell’s co-conspirators: “Law enforcement officers had\\n\\n -4-\\n\\finformation from multiple sources that defendant and other members of a gang were\\ninvolved in bank robberies and narcotics trafficking. The reliability of these sources\\nwas corroborated.” Thus, Terrell properly was listed as a target subject. Id.\\n\\n Terrell also claims that the length of time from gathering the information until\\nordering the wiretap made probable cause stale. The district court said “the mere\\nlapse of time between information and its use in an affidavit is not controlling, a court\\nmust also consider the nature of the criminal activity involved and whether such\\nactivity is continuous or ongoing in nature.” A lapse in time is less significant when\\nthe criminal activity is continuous and ongoing. See United States v. Jeanetta, 533\\nF.3d 651, 655 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[W]here continuing criminal activity is suspected, the\\npassage of time is less significant.”);United States v. Macklin, 902 F.2d 1320, 1326\\n(8th Cir. 1990) (same). Here, because the criminal activity was continuous and\\nongoing, the district court did not err in finding the probable-cause information was\\nnot stale.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Terrell disputes that wiretaps were necessary on his phones and those of his co-\\nconspirators. Under Nebraska law, a judge may approve a wiretap application if the\\napplicant shows that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have\\nfailed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”\\nNeb. Rev. Stat. § 86-293(3)(c). See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (containing similar\\nlanguage). “Whether the statutory requirement is met is to be determined by the\\nissuing judge in a commonsense manner, and the determination is a finding of fact,\\nwhich can be reversed only if clearly erroneous.” United States v. Maxwell, 25 F.3d\\n1389, 1394 (8th Cir. 1994). Terrell believes law enforcement failed to pursue several\\ntraditional procedures before seeking a wiretap. But the necessity requirement does\\nnot require the government to exhaust every available investigative technique.\\nUnited States. v. Losing, 560 F.2d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 1977) (“Congress did not\\nrequire the exhaustion of ‘specific’ or ‘all possible’ investigative techniques before\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fwiretap orders could be issued.”). Instead, “it is sufficient if there is evidence that\\n‘normal investigative techniques . . . reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if\\ntried.’” United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 418 (8th Cir. 1997), quoting 18\\nU.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). The original wiretap affidavit detailed the investigative\\ntechniques police used before applying for the wiretap and reasons why other\\ntraditional procedures would be insufficient. The district did not clearly err in finding\\nthe wiretaps were necessary.\\n\\n V.\\n\\n Terrell maintains the government failed to give him timely notice of the\\nwiretaps. The Nebraska statute, like 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d), requires that “the\\npersons named in the order” receive notice of the wiretap within 90 days after “the\\ntermination of the period of [a wiretap] order or extensions thereof.” See Neb. Rev.\\nStat. § 86-293(9)(a).\\n\\n The county attorney did not give Terrell written notice of the wiretaps on his\\nphones until 120 days after their termination. Terrell did, however, receive actual\\nnotice of the wiretaps within the 90 days required by state statute. During a proffer\\ninterview with law enforcement—86 days after the first wiretap ended—agents told\\nTerrell they had intercepted his calls. This was sufficient. See Dunn, 723 F.3d at 927\\n(holding that “actual notice” of interception is adequate). The district court did not\\nerr when it found the government provided timely notice of the wiretaps.\\n\\n\\n\\n *******\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4357664/\", \"author_raw\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ARNOLD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4580411/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Jeremy D. TERRELL, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2929\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Jeremy D. Terrell\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Ft. Dodge\n ____________\n\n Submitted: October 19, 2018\n Filed: January 10, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Jeremy D. Terrell pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and\npossession with intent to distribute meth and “a mixture or substance containing a\ndetectable amount of cocaine” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A),\n\f§ 841(b)(1)(C), 846, and 851. The district court1 denied the motion to suppress\nevidence from the wiretaps. He appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,\nthis court affirms.\n\n In 2014, Nebraska law enforcement began investigating a series of gang-\nrelated robberies. Terrell, an alleged member of the NIKE gang, was a “target\nsuspect.” In 2015, the county attorney for Douglas County, Nebraska submitted a\nwiretap application—not “signed and sworn”—to the Nebraska Attorney General.\nThe application sought to tap the phones of two members of the NIKE gang (not\nTerrell). It included extensive information about felony firearms violations, drug use\nand trafficking, robberies, and gang activity. The Attorney General recommended\ngranting it. The next day, the state court ordered the wiretap. It later extended it.\n\n In August 2015, after the first wiretap ended, the county attorney applied for\na wiretap on Terrell’s phones. The county attorney submitted another wiretap\napplication—again not “signed and sworn”—to the Nebraska Attorney General, who\nrecommended granting it. Four days later, the state court ordered the wiretap. It also\nwas extended.\n\n The second wiretap ended September 15. Terrell learned about the wiretaps\nfor the first time on October 26 during a proffer interview with law enforcement. He\nreceived written notice of the wiretaps in January 2016.\n\n Terrell contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. This\ncourt reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its legal\nconclusions de novo. United States v. Lomeli, 676 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2012).\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the\nNorthern District of Iowa.\n\n -2-\n\f I.\n\n Terrell believes the wiretaps and extensions were invalid because they were not\npreauthorized by the Nebraska Attorney General. The federal wiretap statute requires\nthat a federal prosecutor, before applying to a federal court for a wiretap, receive\nauthorization from the United States Attorney General (or a designee). See 18 U.S.C.\n§ 2516(1). Terrell argues this requirement applies to Nebraska’s state wiretap statute.\nIt does not.\n\n A “wiretap order issued by a state court must comply with state as well as\nfederal law.” United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 373 n.1 (8th Cir. 1994). When\nsought by a state prosecuting attorney, the federal statute requires that state-issued\nwiretaps comply with “applicable State statute.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). Under\nthe Nebraska wiretap statute, the Attorney General is required to give a\nrecommendation, not pre-authorization, to the district court. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §\n86-291 (“Within twenty-four hours of receipt by the office of the Attorney General\nof the application from the county attorney, the Attorney General or his or her\ndesignated deputy or assistant, as the case may be, shall state to the district court\nwhere the order is sought his or her recommendation as to whether the order should\nbe granted.”). The district court did not err in granting the wiretap applications\nwithout preauthorization from the Nebraska Attorney General.\n\n II.\n\n Terrell argues the wiretap applications were improper because they were not\nsworn under oath before submission to the Attorney General and were submitted by\na deputy county attorney rather than the principal county attorney. Both arguments\nare without merit.\n\n There is no requirement that wiretap applications be sworn under oath before\nsubmission to the Nebraska Attorney General. The Nebraska statute, like 18 U.S.C.\n\n -3-\n\f§ 2518(1), requires only that a wiretap application be sworn under oath before\npresentation to the judge, not the Attorney General. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-293(1)\n(“Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire,\nelectronic, or oral communication shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation\nto a judge of a district court and shall state the applicant’s authority to make such\napplication.”).\n\n There also is no requirement that wiretap applications be submitted to the\nAttorney General by the principal county attorney. Although the federal wiretap\nstatute requires the “principal prosecuting attorney” of the state to submit the wiretap\napplication to the judge, there is no similar requirement for submission to the\nAttorney General. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(2). Nebraska also does not have this\nrequirement. Nebraska law authorizes a county attorney to appoint one or more\ndeputies to assist in the discharge of official duties. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 23-1204.\nNothing in the Nebraska wiretap statute prohibits deputy county attorneys from\nsubmitting wiretap applications to the Attorney General. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-\n291. See also Thompson v. O’Grady, 290 N.W. 716, 718 (Neb. 1940) (holding that\na deputy county attorney has the authority under Nebraska law to sign a criminal\ninformation for the county attorney). The district court did not err in granting the\nwiretap applications despite these objections.\n\n\n\n III.\n\n Terrell asserts the first wiretap—which listed him as a target subject—lacked\nprobable cause. The Nebraska requirement for probable cause matches the federal\nrequirement. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-293(3)(a)-(d); 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (3)(a)-(d).\nThe federal wiretap statue does not “prohibit the government from listing someone\nas a target subject even if probable cause is lacking as to that person.” United States\nv. Dunn, 723 F.3d 919, 927 (8th Cir. 2013). The district court did not err in finding\nprobable cause to wiretap Terrell’s co-conspirators: “Law enforcement officers had\n\n -4-\n\finformation from multiple sources that defendant and other members of a gang were\ninvolved in bank robberies and narcotics trafficking. The reliability of these sources\nwas corroborated.” Thus, Terrell properly was listed as a target subject. Id.\n\n Terrell also claims that the length of time from gathering the information until\nordering the wiretap made probable cause stale. The district court said “the mere\nlapse of time between information and its use in an affidavit is not controlling, a court\nmust also consider the nature of the criminal activity involved and whether such\nactivity is continuous or ongoing in nature.” A lapse in time is less significant when\nthe criminal activity is continuous and ongoing. See United States v. Jeanetta, 533\nF.3d 651, 655 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[W]here continuing criminal activity is suspected, the\npassage of time is less significant.”);United States v. Macklin, 902 F.2d 1320, 1326\n(8th Cir. 1990) (same). Here, because the criminal activity was continuous and\nongoing, the district court did not err in finding the probable-cause information was\nnot stale.\n\n IV.\n\n Terrell disputes that wiretaps were necessary on his phones and those of his co-\nconspirators. Under Nebraska law, a judge may approve a wiretap application if the\napplicant shows that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have\nfailed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”\nNeb. Rev. Stat. § 86-293(3)(c). See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (containing similar\nlanguage). “Whether the statutory requirement is met is to be determined by the\nissuing judge in a commonsense manner, and the determination is a finding of fact,\nwhich can be reversed only if clearly erroneous.” United States v. Maxwell, 25 F.3d\n1389, 1394 (8th Cir. 1994). Terrell believes law enforcement failed to pursue several\ntraditional procedures before seeking a wiretap. But the necessity requirement does\nnot require the government to exhaust every available investigative technique.\nUnited States. v. Losing, 560 F.2d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 1977) (“Congress did not\nrequire the exhaustion of ‘specific’ or ‘all possible’ investigative techniques before\n\n -5-\n\fwiretap orders could be issued.”). Instead, “it is sufficient if there is evidence that\n‘normal investigative techniques . . . reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if\ntried.’” United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 418 (8th Cir. 1997), quoting 18\nU.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). The original wiretap affidavit detailed the investigative\ntechniques police used before applying for the wiretap and reasons why other\ntraditional procedures would be insufficient. The district did not clearly err in finding\nthe wiretaps were necessary.\n\n V.\n\n Terrell maintains the government failed to give him timely notice of the\nwiretaps. The Nebraska statute, like 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d), requires that “the\npersons named in the order” receive notice of the wiretap within 90 days after “the\ntermination of the period of [a wiretap] order or extensions thereof.” See Neb. Rev.\nStat. § 86-293(9)(a).\n\n The county attorney did not give Terrell written notice of the wiretaps on his\nphones until 120 days after their termination. Terrell did, however, receive actual\nnotice of the wiretaps within the 90 days required by state statute. During a proffer\ninterview with law enforcement—86 days after the first wiretap ended—agents told\nTerrell they had intercepted his calls. This was sufficient. See Dunn, 723 F.3d at 927\n(holding that “actual notice” of interception is adequate). The district court did not\nerr when it found the government provided timely notice of the wiretaps.\n\n\n\n *******\n\n The judgment is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Jeremy D. TERRELL, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2929\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Jeremy D. Terrell\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Ft. Dodge\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 19, 2018\\n Filed: January 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Jeremy D. Terrell pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and\\npossession with intent to distribute meth and “a mixture or substance containing a\\ndetectable amount of cocaine” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A),\\n\\f§ 841(b)(1)(C), 846, and 851. The district court1 denied the motion to suppress\\nevidence from the wiretaps. He appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,\\nthis court affirms.\\n\\n In 2014, Nebraska law enforcement began investigating a series of gang-\\nrelated robberies. Terrell, an alleged member of the NIKE gang, was a “target\\nsuspect.” In 2015, the county attorney for Douglas County, Nebraska submitted a\\nwiretap application—not “signed and sworn”—to the Nebraska Attorney General.\\nThe application sought to tap the phones of two members of the NIKE gang (not\\nTerrell). It included extensive information about felony firearms violations, drug use\\nand trafficking, robberies, and gang activity. The Attorney General recommended\\ngranting it. The next day, the state court ordered the wiretap. It later extended it.\\n\\n In August 2015, after the first wiretap ended, the county attorney applied for\\na wiretap on Terrell’s phones. The county attorney submitted another wiretap\\napplication—again not “signed and sworn”—to the Nebraska Attorney General, who\\nrecommended granting it. Four days later, the state court ordered the wiretap. It also\\nwas extended.\\n\\n The second wiretap ended September 15. Terrell learned about the wiretaps\\nfor the first time on October 26 during a proffer interview with law enforcement. He\\nreceived written notice of the wiretaps in January 2016.\\n\\n Terrell contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. This\\ncourt reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its legal\\nconclusions de novo. United States v. Lomeli, 676 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the\\nNorthern District of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f I.\\n\\n Terrell believes the wiretaps and extensions were invalid because they were not\\npreauthorized by the Nebraska Attorney General. The federal wiretap statute requires\\nthat a federal prosecutor, before applying to a federal court for a wiretap, receive\\nauthorization from the United States Attorney General (or a designee). See 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 2516(1). Terrell argues this requirement applies to Nebraska’s state wiretap statute.\\nIt does not.\\n\\n A “wiretap order issued by a state court must comply with state as well as\\nfederal law.” United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 373 n.1 (8th Cir. 1994). When\\nsought by a state prosecuting attorney, the federal statute requires that state-issued\\nwiretaps comply with “applicable State statute.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). Under\\nthe Nebraska wiretap statute, the Attorney General is required to give a\\nrecommendation, not pre-authorization, to the district court. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §\\n86-291 (“Within twenty-four hours of receipt by the office of the Attorney General\\nof the application from the county attorney, the Attorney General or his or her\\ndesignated deputy or assistant, as the case may be, shall state to the district court\\nwhere the order is sought his or her recommendation as to whether the order should\\nbe granted.”). The district court did not err in granting the wiretap applications\\nwithout preauthorization from the Nebraska Attorney General.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Terrell argues the wiretap applications were improper because they were not\\nsworn under oath before submission to the Attorney General and were submitted by\\na deputy county attorney rather than the principal county attorney. Both arguments\\nare without merit.\\n\\n There is no requirement that wiretap applications be sworn under oath before\\nsubmission to the Nebraska Attorney General. The Nebraska statute, like 18 U.S.C.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f§ 2518(1), requires only that a wiretap application be sworn under oath before\\npresentation to the judge, not the Attorney General. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-293(1)\\n(“Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire,\\nelectronic, or oral communication shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation\\nto a judge of a district court and shall state the applicant’s authority to make such\\napplication.”).\\n\\n There also is no requirement that wiretap applications be submitted to the\\nAttorney General by the principal county attorney. Although the federal wiretap\\nstatute requires the “principal prosecuting attorney” of the state to submit the wiretap\\napplication to the judge, there is no similar requirement for submission to the\\nAttorney General. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(2). Nebraska also does not have this\\nrequirement. Nebraska law authorizes a county attorney to appoint one or more\\ndeputies to assist in the discharge of official duties. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 23-1204.\\nNothing in the Nebraska wiretap statute prohibits deputy county attorneys from\\nsubmitting wiretap applications to the Attorney General. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-\\n291. See also Thompson v. O’Grady, 290 N.W. 716, 718 (Neb. 1940) (holding that\\na deputy county attorney has the authority under Nebraska law to sign a criminal\\ninformation for the county attorney). The district court did not err in granting the\\nwiretap applications despite these objections.\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Terrell asserts the first wiretap—which listed him as a target subject—lacked\\nprobable cause. The Nebraska requirement for probable cause matches the federal\\nrequirement. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-293(3)(a)-(d); 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (3)(a)-(d).\\nThe federal wiretap statue does not “prohibit the government from listing someone\\nas a target subject even if probable cause is lacking as to that person.” United States\\nv. Dunn, 723 F.3d 919, 927 (8th Cir. 2013). The district court did not err in finding\\nprobable cause to wiretap Terrell’s co-conspirators: “Law enforcement officers had\\n\\n -4-\\n\\finformation from multiple sources that defendant and other members of a gang were\\ninvolved in bank robberies and narcotics trafficking. The reliability of these sources\\nwas corroborated.” Thus, Terrell properly was listed as a target subject. Id.\\n\\n Terrell also claims that the length of time from gathering the information until\\nordering the wiretap made probable cause stale. The district court said “the mere\\nlapse of time between information and its use in an affidavit is not controlling, a court\\nmust also consider the nature of the criminal activity involved and whether such\\nactivity is continuous or ongoing in nature.” A lapse in time is less significant when\\nthe criminal activity is continuous and ongoing. See United States v. Jeanetta, 533\\nF.3d 651, 655 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[W]here continuing criminal activity is suspected, the\\npassage of time is less significant.”);United States v. Macklin, 902 F.2d 1320, 1326\\n(8th Cir. 1990) (same). Here, because the criminal activity was continuous and\\nongoing, the district court did not err in finding the probable-cause information was\\nnot stale.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Terrell disputes that wiretaps were necessary on his phones and those of his co-\\nconspirators. Under Nebraska law, a judge may approve a wiretap application if the\\napplicant shows that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have\\nfailed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”\\nNeb. Rev. Stat. § 86-293(3)(c). See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (containing similar\\nlanguage). “Whether the statutory requirement is met is to be determined by the\\nissuing judge in a commonsense manner, and the determination is a finding of fact,\\nwhich can be reversed only if clearly erroneous.” United States v. Maxwell, 25 F.3d\\n1389, 1394 (8th Cir. 1994). Terrell believes law enforcement failed to pursue several\\ntraditional procedures before seeking a wiretap. But the necessity requirement does\\nnot require the government to exhaust every available investigative technique.\\nUnited States. v. Losing, 560 F.2d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 1977) (“Congress did not\\nrequire the exhaustion of ‘specific’ or ‘all possible’ investigative techniques before\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fwiretap orders could be issued.”). Instead, “it is sufficient if there is evidence that\\n‘normal investigative techniques . . . reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if\\ntried.’” United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 418 (8th Cir. 1997), quoting 18\\nU.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). The original wiretap affidavit detailed the investigative\\ntechniques police used before applying for the wiretap and reasons why other\\ntraditional procedures would be insufficient. The district did not clearly err in finding\\nthe wiretaps were necessary.\\n\\n V.\\n\\n Terrell maintains the government failed to give him timely notice of the\\nwiretaps. The Nebraska statute, like 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d), requires that “the\\npersons named in the order” receive notice of the wiretap within 90 days after “the\\ntermination of the period of [a wiretap] order or extensions thereof.” See Neb. Rev.\\nStat. § 86-293(9)(a).\\n\\n The county attorney did not give Terrell written notice of the wiretaps on his\\nphones until 120 days after their termination. Terrell did, however, receive actual\\nnotice of the wiretaps within the 90 days required by state statute. During a proffer\\ninterview with law enforcement—86 days after the first wiretap ended—agents told\\nTerrell they had intercepted his calls. This was sufficient. See Dunn, 723 F.3d at 927\\n(holding that “actual notice” of interception is adequate). The district court did not\\nerr when it found the government provided timely notice of the wiretaps.\\n\\n\\n\\n *******\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":295,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4580413,"string":"4,580,413"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Shondel CHURCH; Randall Lee Dalton; Dorian Samuels; Viola Bowman; Brian Richman, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. State of MISSOURI; Michael L. Parson, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Missouri, Defendants - Appellants Michael Barrett; H. Riley Bock; Charles R. Jackson; Craig Chval; A. Crista Hogan, Defendants"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Shondel Church v. State of Missouri"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2857"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gruender, Melloy, Benton\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2857\\n ___________________________\\n\\nShondel Church; Randall Lee Dalton; Dorian Samuels; Viola Bowman; Brian Richman\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n State of Missouri; Michael L. Parson,1 in his official capacity as Governor of the\\n State of Missouri\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants\\n\\nMichael Barrett; H. Riley Bock; Charles R. Jackson; Craig Chval; A. Crista Hogan\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 10, 2018\\n Filed: January 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\n\\n 1\\n While this appeal was pending, Eric R. Greitens resigned as governor of\\nMissouri. His successor, Michael L. Parson, is automatically substituted under\\nFederal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2). See Digital Recognition Network, Inc.\\nv. Hutchinson, 803 F.3d 952, 952 n.1 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\fBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n This is a class action against the State and governor of Missouri, the director of\\nthe Missouri State Public Defender office, and the commissioners of the Missouri\\nState Public Defender Commission. The plaintiffs alleged that the State “has failed\\nto meet its constitutional obligation to provide indigent defendants with meaningful\\nrepresentation.” Invoking sovereign immunity, the State and governor moved to\\ndismiss. The governor also invoked legislative immunity. The district court denied\\nthe motion. Church v. Missouri, 268 F. Supp. 3d 992 (W.D. Mo. 2017). The director\\nand commissioners do not appeal. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291\\nthrough the collateral order doctrine,2 this court reverses and remands.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n The Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent defendants in criminal cases the\\nright to appointed counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).\\nBecause the right to counsel is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial,” it is\\n“protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth\\nAmendment.” Id. at 341-42.\\n\\n The State usually provides counsel through the Missouri State Public Defender.\\nSee State ex rel. Missouri Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 875 (Mo.\\nbanc 2009) (indigent defense is “a duty which constitutionally is the burden of the\\nState,” and “[w]hen a defendant is found to be indigent in Missouri, the defendant’s\\nSixth Amendment right to counsel is usually met by the judge appointing the ‘Office\\nof State Public Defender’”) (citation omitted). Here, the plaintiffs “were all charged\\n\\n 2\\n See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.\\n139, 147 (1993); Fryberger v. University of Ark., 889 F.3d 471, 473 (8th Cir. 2018);\\nMcDonough Assocs., Inc. v. Grunloh, 722 F.3d 1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 2013); Scott v.\\nTaylor, 405 F.3d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 2005).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fwith crimes in Missouri state court and, as a result of their indigency, were entitled to\\nrepresentation by the MSPD.” They bring this lawsuit “on behalf of themselves and\\na putative class of all indigent defendants in criminal and juvenile proceedings in\\nMissouri who are eligible for representation by the MSPD.” The putative class does\\nnot include individuals seeking post-conviction relief. See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(e),\\n29.15(e) (requiring appointment of counsel for all pro se, indigent, post-conviction\\nmovants).\\n\\n The plaintiffs allege: “The State’s indigent defense budget is shockingly\\ninadequate. . . . Without sufficient funding, overstretched and under-resourced\\n[MSPD] attorneys are forced to handle far too many cases and to devote far too few\\nhours to each case.” They argue they “have suffered and continue to suffer the denial\\nof adequate counsel at critical stages of their criminal cases due to these systemic\\ncaseload problems among MSPD attorney.” They seek “a declaratory judgment\\nstating that their right to counsel is being violated and an order enjoining the ongoing\\nviolation of their rights and requiring Defendants to propose a remedial plan to the\\ncourt.”\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The State of Missouri invokes sovereign immunity for itself. “This court\\nreviews de novo questions of sovereign immunity.” Fryberger, 889 F.3d at 473.\\n“Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its\\nconsent.” Virginia Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011).\\nThe Eleventh Amendment is “one particular exemplification of that immunity.”\\nFederal Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753\\n(2002). The State removed this case to federal court, waiving its Eleventh\\nAmendment immunity. See Lapides v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535\\nU.S. 613, 624 (2002) (“We conclude that the State’s action joining the removing of\\nthis case to federal court waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity”).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f But “[s]tates also enjoy a broader sovereign immunity, which applies against\\nall private suits, whether in state or federal court.” Beaulieu v. Vermont, 807 F.3d\\n478, 483 (2d Cir. 2015), citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“We have\\n. . . sometimes referred to the States’ immunity from suit as ‘Eleventh Amendment\\nimmunity.’ The phrase is convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the\\nsovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of\\nthe Eleventh Amendment.”). The Supreme Court “has repeatedly held that the\\nsovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text of the\\nEleventh Amendment.” Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 754.\\n\\n “The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the\\ndignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.” Id. at 760.\\nDeveloped at common law, “immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the\\nsovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution.”\\nAlden, 527 U.S. at 713. See also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414-16 (1979)\\n(explaining sovereign immunity’s common-law origins). “States entered the Union\\nwith their sovereign immunity intact, unlimited by Article III’s jurisdictional grant.”\\nStewart, 563 U.S. at 253. “The leading advocates of the Constitution assured the\\npeople in no uncertain terms that the Constitution would not strip the States of\\nsovereign immunity.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 716. “The founding generation thought it\\n‘neither becoming nor convenient that the several States of the Union, invested with\\nthat large residuum of sovereignty which had not been delegated to the United States,\\nshould be summoned as defendants to answer the complaints of private persons.’” Id.\\nat 748, quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887).\\n\\n “[N]either logic nor precedent supports the proposition that a state waives its\\ngeneral state sovereign immunity by removing an action from state court to federal\\ncourt.” Beaulieu, 807 F.3d at 486. Missouri’s state sovereign immunity applies\\nunless “it is waived or a statutory or recognized common law exception, such as\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fconsent, is applicable.” Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. City of Bellefontaine\\nNeighbors, 476 S.W.3d 913, 914 (Mo. banc 2016). The plaintiffs assert both a waiver\\nand a common-law exception, contending that sovereign immunity does not apply in\\nMissouri when a plaintiff seeks prospective equitable relief to enforce the State’s\\naffirmative duty or obligation.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Courts “give effect” to a state’s waiver of sovereign immunity “only where\\nstated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the\\ntext as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’” Port Auth.\\nTrans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305 (1990), quoting Atascadero State\\nHosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1985). Express language does appear in\\nsection 537.600, RSMo 2016, which “carve[s] out limited exceptions [for negligent\\noperation of motor vehicles and dangerous conditions of public property] to a general\\nrule of immunity.” Bellefontaine, 476 S.W.3d at 921.\\n\\n Emphasizing two Missouri Court of Appeals opinions, the plaintiffs argue that\\nsovereign immunity does not bar a claim for equitable relief to enforce the State’s\\naffirmative “duty or obligation.” In Wyman v. Missouri Department of Mental Health,\\n376 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Mo. App. 2012), the court of appeals said it “found no case which\\napplies § 537.600 to a claim seeking only equitable relief.” The Court of Appeals then\\nstated that “sovereign immunity does not necessarily bar a claim for injunctive relief\\nwhich seeks to reverse a state agency’s prior violation of its statutory obligations, or\\nto prevent future violations.” Wyman, 376 S.W.3d at 23. In 2018, the Court of\\nAppeals–citing the district court’s decision here–quoted and followed Wyman.\\nMissouri State Conf. of NAACP v. State, 2018 WL 5492832, at *6 (Mo. App. Oct.\\n30, 2018).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Both the Wyman and NAACP opinions fail to address the abundant contrary\\nMissouri authority on sovereign immunity. In 2016 and 2017, the Supreme Court of\\nMissouri stated: “Sovereign immunity is the rule, not the exception.” Bellefontaine,\\n476 S.W.3d at 914; Newsome v. Kansas City Mo. Sch. Dist., 520 S.W.3d 769, 775\\n(Mo. banc 2017). Of critical importance here, the Missouri Supreme Court held that\\n\\n in the absence of an express statutory exception to sovereign immunity,\\n or a recognized common law exception such as the proprietary function\\n and consent exceptions, sovereign immunity is the rule and applies to all\\n suits against public entities.\\n\\nBellefontaine, 476 S.W.3d at 921-22 (emphasis added). Because—except for\\nstatutory and common-law exceptions—sovereign immunity bars all suits against the\\nState, it bars suits for prospective equitable relief.\\n\\n The plaintiffs claim that Bellefontaine covers only suits for damages because\\nthat is all the plaintiff there sought. To the contrary, Bellefontaine follows the long-\\nestablished Missouri precedent on sovereign immunity. Granting injunctive relief\\nagainst an unconstitutional law in 1908, the Missouri Supreme Court held:\\n\\n That the sovereign state may not be sued is a truism . . . . But\\n defendants . . . . ministerial officers, charged to be about to do irreparable\\n injury . . . . are not beyond the strong arm of a court of equity.\\n\\nMerchants’ Exchange of St. Louis v. Knott, 111 S.W. 565, 574 (Mo. banc 1908)\\n(agreeing with the Ex parte Young doctrine for state injunction cases just two months\\nafter the United States Supreme Court’s decision). The Missouri Supreme Court has\\nrepeatedly followed this approach.\\n\\n The amenability of respondents as executive or administrative officers\\n of the State to the restrictive power of the courts in a proceeding of this\\n character has been frequently declared in a number of cases . . . . It is not\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f to be understood from these cases that the state itself can be enjoined;\\n but, when its officers act in an unconstitutional or illegal manner they are\\n not to be regarded as acting for the state, and they may be enjoined.\\n\\nCarson v. Sullivan, 223 S.W. 571, 571 (Mo. banc 1920) (citing several cases\\nincluding Merchants’ Exchange and Ex parte Young). See, e.g., Nacy v. Le Page,\\n111 S.W.2d 25, 25–26 (Mo. banc 1937) (“because the state may not be sued without\\nits consent” and because a garnishment “seeks to compel action on the part of the\\nstate,” a state court may not require the State to submit to a legal writ of garnishment)\\n(changed by § 525.310, RSMo 1943); State ex rel. Eagleton v. Hall, 389 S.W.2d 798,\\n801 (Mo. banc 1965) (a will-contest suit affecting residuary estate left to state is a suit\\nagainst the state, thus barred by sovereign immunity) , quoted in Bellefontaine, 476\\nS.W.3d at 921; Garland v. Ruhl, 455 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Mo. banc 2015) (even when\\na statute authorizes award of attorney fees against the state, sovereign immunity\\nprevents ordering the state to do so, due to strict construction of the statute).\\n\\n Because the two Court of Appeals opinions have a limited consideration of\\ncontrolling Missouri Supreme Court cases and fail even to address contrary authority,\\nthe Wyman and NAACP cases are not instructive as to how the Missouri Supreme\\nCourt would decide the sovereign immunity issue in this case. See United Fire &\\nCas. Co. v. Titan Contractors Serv., Inc., 751 F.3d 880, 885 n.2 (8th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n The plaintiffs cite five cases where the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed\\ninjunctions directed at the State. See Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Mo.\\nbanc 2006); Brooks v. State, 128 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Mo. banc 2004); Rolla 31 Sch.\\nDist. v. State, 837 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. banc 1992); Pohl v. State Highway Comm’n, 431\\nS.W.2d 99, 107 (Mo. banc 1968); Koplar v. State Tax Comm’n, 321 S.W.2d 686, 697\\n(Mo. 1959). These five cases, plaintiffs assert, show it is “perfectly ordinary” to\\nenjoin the State itself to force compliance with its obligations.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f First, in the three most recent cases, state officials–subject to Missouri’s Ex\\nparte Young doctrine–were also named as defendants. Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at\\n204 n.1 (secretary of state); Brooks, 128 S.W.3d at 846 (attorney general); Rolla, 837\\nS.W.2d at 2 & n. 2 (naming the “various state officials” who were defendants). The\\nPohl case is an “injunction suit by taxpayers.” Pohl, 431 S.W.2d at 100. See\\nManzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 656, 658-59 (Mo. banc 2011) (reviewing history of\\ntaxpayer suits since 1873 and holding “when a public interest is involved and public\\nmonies are being expended for an illegal purpose, taxpayers have the right to enjoin\\nthe action” so “government officials conform to the dictates of the law”). The Koplar\\ncase is a judicial review of administrative decisions under the Missouri Administrative\\nProcedure Act–specifically held to be a “waiver of sovereign immunity.” See St.\\nLouis County v. State, 424 S.W.3d 450, 454 n.3 (Mo. banc 2014) (statute authorizing\\njudicial review of administrative decisions is a waiver of sovereign immunity). As a\\nresult, none of these five cases even hint at the threshold question presented here:\\nwhether Missouri’s sovereign immunity covers suits for prospective equitable relief.\\n“Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the\\ncourt nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to\\nconstitute precedents.” Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170\\n(2004). See also Byrne & Jones Enters., Inc. v. Monroe City R-1 Sch. Dist., 493\\nS.W.3d 847, 855 (Mo. banc 2016) (“Judicial decisions must be construed with\\nreference to the facts and issues of the particular case, and that the authority of the\\ndecision as a precedent is limited to those points of law which are raised by the record,\\nconsidered by the court, and necessary to a decision.”) (citation omitted).\\n\\n Second, adopting the plaintiffs’ view creates a judicial exception to sovereign\\nimmunity. But Bellefontaine rejects that, explaining it would “not judicially create an\\nexception to the common law rule of sovereign immunity” to address the specific\\nsituation there because the issue presented “policy concerns . . . for the legislature.”\\nBellefontaine, 476 S.W.3d at 923. The legislature—not the judiciary—must waive\\nsovereign immunity. Id. at 921 (“This Court cannot read into the statute an exception\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fto sovereign immunity or imply waivers not explicitly created in the statute.”). See\\nalso Winston v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, Lawrence Cnty., 636 S.W.2d 324, 328\\n(Mo. banc 1982) (“[W]e are mindful of the oft repeated principle that, within\\nconstitutional limits, a sovereign may prescribe the terms and conditions under which\\nit may be sued, and the decision to waive immunity, and to what extent it is waived,\\nlies within the legislature’s purview.”). The parties have not cited a Missouri statute\\nthat waives sovereign immunity for prospective equitable relief. The five cases they\\ncite, Wyman/NAACP, or other states’ decisions cannot serve as a substitute.\\n\\n True, Bellefontaine does not address the precise issue here. But it says that\\nsovereign immunity “is the rule—not the exception—even in the absence of prior\\ncases specifically addressing this issue.” Bellefontaine, 476 S.W.3d at 922. “When\\nthere is no state supreme court case directly on point, our role is to predict how the\\nstate supreme court would rule if faced with the [same issue] before us.” Blankenship\\nv. USA Truck, Inc., 601 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (citation\\nomitted). See also Craven v. University of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 260 F.3d 1218, 1231\\n(10th Cir. 2001) (applying the same rule to a sovereign immunity issue). This court\\npredicts that the Missouri Supreme Court would apply Bellefontaine’s long-\\nestablished principles to cases involving prospective equitable relief. Missouri does\\nnot have a waiver of sovereign immunity for prospective equitable relief “stated by\\nthe most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will]\\nleave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Plaintiffs also assert a recognized common law exception to sovereign\\nimmunity. See Bellefontaine, 476 S.W.3d at 921-22 (stating sovereign immunity\\napplies to all suits, in the absence of a recognized common law exception). The\\nBellefontaine case notes two such exceptions, consent and “proprietary function” (of\\nmunicipalities). Id. Neither of these apply here.\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f Citing Blackstone, law review articles, a common-law case, and other state\\ncourts, the plaintiffs argue that “even at common law, courts of equity enforced the\\nCrown’s obligations.” See generally Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135\\nS. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015) (“It is true enough that we have long held that federal courts\\nmay in some circumstances grant injunctive relief against state officers who are\\nviolating, or planning to violate, federal law. . . . The ability to sue to enjoin\\nunconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity,\\nand reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back\\nto England.”) (emphasis added), citing Young, 209 U.S. at 150-51 (other citations\\nomitted).\\n\\n The State counters, with arguments based on the “law or equity” phrase in the\\nEleventh Amendment and the Supreme Court’s words in an Eleventh Amendment\\ncase that\\n\\n sovereign immunity applies regardless of whether a private plaintiff’s\\n suit is for monetary damages or some other type of relief. See [Seminole\\n Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996)] (“[W]e have often made\\n it clear that the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to\\n the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment”).\\n\\n\\nFed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 765-66 (emphasis added).\\n\\n These expertly briefed arguments are beside the point. The Missouri Supreme\\nCourt is the “custodian” of the common law in Missouri. Townsend v. Townsend,\\n708 S.W.2d 646, 649-50 (Mo. banc 1986). That Court has rejected that “the state\\nitself can be enjoined.” Carson, 223 S.W. at 571, following Merchants’ Exchange,\\n111 S.W. at 574. A recognized common law exception to Missouri’s sovereign\\nimmunity does not apply here.\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f III.\\n\\n The plaintiffs argue that even if sovereign immunity bars prospective injunctive\\nrelief, the State “can be sued directly for equitable relief for failing to comply with a\\nfederal constitutional obligation, here, the Sixth Amendment.” They stress First\\nEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987),\\nand Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994).\\n\\n In First English, the Supreme Court stated it “has frequently repeated the view\\nthat, in the event of a taking, the compensation remedy is required by the\\nConstitution.” First English, 482 U.S. at 316. It footnoted:\\n\\n The Solicitor General urges that the prohibitory nature of the Fifth\\n Amendment, combined with principles of sovereign immunity,\\n establishes that the Amendment itself is only a limitation on the power\\n of the Government to act, not a remedial provision. The cases cited in\\n the text, we think, refute the argument of the United States that “the\\n Constitution does not, of its own force, furnish a basis for a court to\\n award money damages against the government.”\\n\\nId. at 316 n.9 (citations omitted). In Reich, the Court explained that “a long line of\\ncases” establishes that “due process requires a ‘clear and certain’ remedy for taxes\\ncollected in violation of federal law,” and that “a denial by a state court of a recovery\\nof taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States by\\ncompulsion is itself in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment, the sovereign\\nimmunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts notwithstanding.” Reich, 513\\nU.S. at 108, 109-110 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n According to the plaintiffs, these cases (particularly the footnote in First\\nEnglish) mean that “where the Constitution places an affirmative obligation on the\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fState itself, the State cannot rely on state sovereign immunity to defeat a suit that aims\\nto force it to comply with that obligation.” But that is too broad a reading. Instead,\\nthe cases mean that “where the Constitution requires a particular remedy, such as\\nthrough the Due Process Clause for the tax monies at issue in Reich, or through the\\nTakings Clause as indicated in First English, the state is required to provide that\\nremedy in its own courts, notwithstanding sovereign immunity.” DLX, Inc. v.\\nKentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 528 (6th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). For the situation at\\nissue here, the Constitution does not require a “particular” or “clear and certain”\\nremedy.\\n\\n Congress may also abrogate state sovereign immunity by providing an\\nenforcement mechanism for constitutional violations:\\n\\n We have held also that in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the\\n people required the States to surrender a portion of the sovereignty that\\n had been preserved to them by the original Constitution, so that Congress\\n may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States pursuant to its\\n § 5 enforcement power. By imposing explicit limits on the powers of the\\n States and granting Congress the power to enforce them, the Amendment\\n fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by\\n the Constitution. When Congress enacts appropriate legislation to\\n enforce this Amendment, federal interests are paramount, and Congress\\n may assert an authority over the States which would be otherwise\\n unauthorized by the Constitution.\\n\\nAlden, 527 U.S. at 756 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also\\nUnited States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (“insofar as Title II [of the ADA]\\ncreates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that\\nactually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign\\nimmunity.”). No statutory enforcement mechanism exists here.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\f IV.\\n\\n The governor asserts sovereign immunity. The plaintiffs argue that sovereign\\nimmunity does not shield the governor because he is an Ex parte Young defendant.\\n“Under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, a private party can sue a state officer in his\\nofficial capacity to enjoin a prospective action that would violate federal law.” 281\\nCare, 638 F.3d at 632. The doctrine “rests on the premise—less delicately called a\\n‘fiction’—that when a federal court commands a state official to do nothing more than\\nrefrain from violating federal law, he is not the State for sovereign-immunity\\npurposes.” Stewart, 563 U.S. at 255 (internal citation omitted). See also Hutchinson,\\n803 F.3d at 957 (“Enforcement of unconstitutional legislation ‘is simply an illegal act\\nupon the part of [the] state official,’ and the State may not immunize officials from\\nsuit for such violations of the Constitution.”), quoting Young, 209 U.S. at 159.\\n\\n “In determining whether this exception applies, a court conducts ‘a\\nstraightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges [1] an ongoing violation\\nof federal law and [2] seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” 281 Care,\\n638 F.3d at 632, quoting Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of\\nMaryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (alterations added). On the first inquiry, the\\nofficial must have “some connection to the enforcement of the challenged laws.”\\nCalzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2017), citing Young, 209 U.S. at 157.\\nSee also 281 Care, 638 F.3d at 632. “Without that connection, the officer would be\\nsued merely ‘as a representative of the state’ in an impermissible attempt to ‘make the\\nstate a party.’” Hutchinson, 803 F.3d at 960, quoting Young, 209 U.S. at 157.\\n“[T]hat connection does not need to be primary authority to enforce the challenged\\nlaw.” 281 Care, 638 F.3d at 632. “Nor does the [state officer] need to have the full\\npower to redress a plaintiff’s injury in order to have ‘some connection’ with the\\nchallenged law.” Id. at 633.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -13-\\n\\f Ruling that the governor is an Ex parte Young defendant, the district court\\nidentified three connections to the enforcement of the State’s Sixth Amendment\\nobligation to provide indigent defendants with adequate counsel.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n The district court noted the governor’s general-enforcement authority. The\\nMissouri Constitution says, “The supreme executive power shall be vested in a\\ngovernor,” and “The governor shall take care that the laws are distributed and\\nfaithfully executed, and shall be a conservator of the peace throughout the state.” Mo.\\nConst. art. IV, §§ 1-2. The district court also cited a Missouri statute: “When\\ndirected by the governor, the attorney general, or one of his assistants, shall aid any\\nprosecuting or circuit attorney in the discharge of their respective duties in the trial\\ncourts and in examinations before grand juries . . . .” § 27.030, RSMo.\\n\\n The district court concluded that these provisions make the Missouri governor\\nlike the Georgia governor in Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988). There,\\nindigent defendants sought injunctive relief against a governor to remedy Sixth\\nAmendment violations. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1013. The Eleventh Circuit held that\\nGeorgia’s governor had “some connection” and was an “appropriate part[y] against\\nwhom prospective relief could be ordered” because:\\n\\n According to the Georgia constitution, the governor is responsible for\\n law enforcement in that state and is charged with executing the laws\\n faithfully. The governor further has the residual power to commence\\n criminal prosecutions, and has the final authority to direct the Attorney\\n General to “institute and prosecute” on behalf of the state.\\n\\nId. at 1016 (internal citations omitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -14-\\n\\f The governor here argues that this court’s Calzone decision trumps Luckey.\\nThe Calzone plaintiff sought an injunction against the Missouri governor in a\\nchallenge to the constitutionality of a state statute. Calzone, 866 F.3d at 869. This\\ncourt held that neither the statute nor the Missouri Constitution’s general-enforcement\\nprovision make the governor an Ex parte Young defendant:\\n\\n No provision in Chapter 304 or the statutes defining his executive\\n authority specifically authorizes the governor to enforce the vehicle\\n inspection statutes. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 26.010-.225. The Missouri\\n Constitution confers upon the governor the duty to “take care that the\\n laws are distributed and faithfully executed,” Mo. Const. art. IV, § 2, but\\n such a general executive responsibility is an insufficient connection to\\n the enforcement of a statute to avoid the Eleventh Amendment. See Fitts\\n v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 530 (1899).\\n\\nId. at 870.\\n\\n The plaintiffs try to distinguish Calzone because the statute there “delegated\\nenforcement exclusively to the superintendent of the highway patrol,” meaning “[t]he\\nGovernor was not a proper defendant because he has no connection to the statute. . . .\\nUnlike the statute in Calzone, the State’s constitutional obligation to provide adequate\\ncounsel—and the Governor’s role in its failure to do so—cannot be delegated\\nexclusively to the MSPD.”\\n\\n Although Calzone is factually distinguishable, its guidance on the Missouri\\ngovernor’s general-enforcement authority is consistent with this court’s precedent.\\nSee Hutchinson, 803 F.3d at 961; Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d\\n859 (8th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.\\n2584 (2015).\\n\\n In Bruning, the Nebraska governor and attorney general were Ex parte Young\\ndefendants in a suit to enjoin enforcement of a state constitutional amendment.\\n\\n -15-\\n\\fBruning, 455 F.3d at 864. This court found a sufficient connection to the\\nenforcement of the amendment because “the Governor and the Attorney General have\\nbroad powers to enforce the State’s Constitution and statutes.” Id. The Hutchinson\\ndecision clarifies that statement from Bruning:\\n\\n [T]he court’s statement [in Bruning] must be read in context. In\\n Bruning, the “broad powers” of the officials included authority to\\n enforce the constitutional amendment at issue. The Nebraska attorney\\n general has power to enforce the Nebraska Constitution by bringing suit\\n for a declaratory judgment that a state statute is unconstitutional, or for\\n an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of a state statute on the\\n grounds that it is unconstitutional. The Nebraska governor has some\\n connection to the enforcement of the Nebraska Constitution because he\\n may direct the attorney general to file suit to enjoin application of an\\n unconstitutional state statute. That sort of enforcement authority is\\n lacking with respect to [the] statute [at issue in Hutchinson] that provides\\n only for private civil enforcement.\\n\\nHutchinson, 803 F.3d at 961 (internal citations omitted).\\n\\n The Bruning and Hutchinson decisions mean that a governor’s general-\\nenforcement authority is “some connection” if that authority gives the governor\\nmethods of enforcement. The governor in Bruning had a method of enforcement\\nbecause he could direct the attorney general to seek equitable relief. But the\\ngovernors in Calzone and Hutchinson did not have a comparable enforcement\\nmechanism.\\n\\n Nor does the governor here. The district court’s reliance on section 27.030 is\\ninsufficient because that provision covers aiding prosecution, not defense. The\\ngovernor’s general-enforcement authority is not “some connection” to enforcement\\nof the State’s Sixth Amendment obligation. See Calzone, 866 F.3d at 870. See also\\nAir Evac EMS, Inc. v. Texas, Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp., 851 F.3d 507,\\n\\n\\n -16-\\n\\f517 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[A] state governor with a broad duty to uphold state law is not\\na proper defendant.”); Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th\\nCir. 1992) (“[A] generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory power\\nover the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision will not subject\\nan official to suit.”); Shell Oil Co. v. Noel, 608 F.2d 208, 211 (1st Cir. 1979) (“The\\nmere fact that a governor is under a general duty to enforce state laws does not make\\nhim a proper defendant in every action attacking the constitutionality of a state\\nstatute.”).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n The district court ruled the governor had “some connection” because he\\n“appoints all seven members of the MSPD Commission.” Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d\\nat 1013, citing § 600.015.1, RSMo (“The commission shall be composed of seven\\nmembers . . . appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate.”).\\nThe district court cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Eu, where a bar association sued\\na governor to challenge a state statute that limited the number of judges in a county.\\nEu, 979 F.2d at 699. The governor had “a duty to appoint judges to any\\nnewly-created judicial positions,” which the Ninth Circuit considered to be “a specific\\nconnection to the challenged statute,” placing the governor within Ex parte Young’s\\nscope. Id. at 704.\\n\\n Invoking Eu, the plaintiffs argue: “although the Governor alone cannot solve\\nthe indigent defense crisis in this state, his role in the ongoing violation of those Sixth\\nAmendment rights through his appointment of MSPD Commissioners, in addition to\\nhis ability to profoundly affect MSPD caseload, is sufficient for Ex parte Young\\npurposes.” The governor counters with this court’s decision in Balogh v. Lombardi,\\n816 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 2016).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -17-\\n\\f In Balogh, a Missouri statute gave a private right of action against anyone who,\\nwithout the approval of the Director of Corrections, knowingly discloses the identity\\nof an execution-team member. Balogh, 816 F.3d at 539. The statute also gave the\\ndirector authority to select those members. Id. This court ruled that the director’s\\nselection authority is only “administrative or ministerial,” and not “some connection”\\nto the statute’s enforcement:\\n\\n Although the director’s authority to delineate the members of the\\n execution team does affect who might have a private right of action\\n against [someone disclosing the identity of execution team members], it\\n has nothing to do with an execution team member’s potential prosecution\\n of such an action. Selection of the execution team constitutes\\n implementation of the statute in an administrative or ministerial sense\\n and is not analogous to enforcing the statute’s non-disclosure provision\\n through a civil or criminal prosecution. The director’s authority to\\n define the members of the execution team is not an enforcement action\\n within the meaning of Ex Parte Young and its progeny.\\n\\nId. at 546.\\n\\n Like in Balogh, appointing members of the MSPD Commission is an\\nadministrative act. See State ex rel. Sikes v. Williams, 121 S.W. 64, 65 (Mo. banc\\n1909) (“The confirmations by the Senate of appointments made by the Governor are\\nnot legislative acts . . . . Such acts by the Governor concerning appointments are\\nmerely administrative . . . .”). It does not give the governor some connection to the\\nState’s Sixth Amendment obligation. The Balogh decision, not Eu, binds this court.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n The district court concluded the governor met the “some connection”\\nrequirement because of his appropriation-reduction authority:\\n\\n\\n\\n -18-\\n\\f Governor Greitens’s predecessor, Governor Nixon, affirmatively used\\n his executive authority to withhold roughly $7 million in funding\\n allocated by the Missouri Legislature to the MSPD, thereby\\n demonstrating an even more direct “connection” to the challenged\\n conduct. Governor Greitens has since upheld Governor Nixon's\\n withholding of funds allocated to the MSPD.\\n\\nChurch, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 1012-13 (internal citation omitted). In addition to arguing\\nthat his appropriation-reduction authority is not “some connection”, the governor\\nasserts legislative immunity.\\n\\n “[S]tate legislators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their\\nlegislative acts.” Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 446 U.S.\\n719, 732 (1980). “[O]fficials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative\\nimmunity when they perform legislative functions.” Bogan v. Scott–Harris, 523 U.S.\\n44, 55 (1998). “Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than\\non the motive or intent of the official performing it.” Id. at 54. The act must be\\nlegislative “in substance,” bearing “all the hallmarks of traditional legislation,” and\\n“in form,” involving “integral steps in the legislative process.” Id. at 55.\\n\\n The district court suggested that the governor’s “withholding of funds is a\\nlegislative function entitled to legislative immunity.” Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at\\n1020. It emphasized Abbey v. Rowland, 359 F. Supp. 2d 94, 100 (D. Conn. 2005):\\n\\n Nothing could be more integral to the legislative process than [proposing\\n a budget]. The Governor’s choices of exactly how to cut the budget may\\n have been discretionary, but they were policy choices of broad import.\\n The fact that any budget reduction would necessarily have an adverse\\n impact on some employment does not change the budgetary decision\\n from a legislative to an administrative function.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -19-\\n\\f Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that a “discretionary, policymaking decision\\nimplicating the budgetary priorities of the [government] and the services the\\n[government] provides to its constituents” is a “hallmark[] of traditional legislation.”\\nBogan, 523 U.S. at 55-56. And in Missouri, “the budget process . . . begins and ends\\nwith the Governor,” making the governor’s appropriation reduction legislative in\\nform. See Missouri Health Care Ass’n v. Holden, 89 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Mo. banc\\n2002). The Missouri Constitution “does not permit the state to spend money it does\\nnot have” and “broadly authorizes the Governor to balance the state’s budget in the\\nevent that state revenues fall below the revenue expectations.” Id. at 506-07, citing\\nMo. Const. art. IV, § 27. A Missouri governor’s appropriation reduction is a\\nlegislative act.\\n\\n The district court, however, ruled that it was premature to apply legislative\\nimmunity “because it is unclear what the terms of any injunction entered would\\ninclude. . . . That finding is subject to change should the Plaintiffs request any\\nremedies that would violate Gov. Greitens’ immunity from acts ‘integral’ to the\\nlegislative process.” Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 1020. By that rationale, the\\nremedy—not the challenged act—guides whether legislative immunity applies.\\n\\n The governor counters: “legislative immunity is an immunity from suit, not\\nmerely an immunity from the award of certain types of relief. The district court’s\\nrationale would enable any plaintiff to defeat legislative immunity merely by making\\na vague and indefinite request for ‘injunctive and declaratory relief.’”\\n\\n The Supreme Court’s decision in Consumers Union addresses this issue. There,\\nthe Supreme Court of Virginia, in addition to its inherent authority, used its statutory\\nauthority to promulgate a professional ethics code. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at\\n721. The Virginia legislature “vested in the court virtually its entire legislative or\\nregulatory power over the legal profession.” Id. at 722. The court also had the power\\nto enforce its professional ethics code. Id. at 722-24.\\n\\n -20-\\n\\f The plaintiffs believed that the code’s provision on attorney advertisement\\nviolated the First Amendment. Id. at 726. They sued the Virginia Court and its chief\\njustice in his personal and official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking a\\ndeclaration that the provision was unconstitutional and an injunction against its\\nenforcement. Id. at 725-26. The chief justice and the court asserted legislative\\nimmunity. Id. at 730. The Supreme Court concluded (1) the Virginia court’s\\npromulgation of the professional ethics code was a legislative act, (2) “the Virginia\\nCourt and its members are immune from suit when acting in their legislative\\ncapacity,” and (3) legislative immunity applies to suits for equitable relief. Id. at 731-\\n32, 734.\\n\\n The Supreme Court, however, did not apply legislative immunity: “If the sole\\nbasis for appellees’ § 1983 action against the Virginia Court and its chief justice were\\nthe issuance of, or failure to amend, the challenged rules, legislative immunity would\\nforeclose suit against appellants.” Id. at 734 (emphasis added). But the Court\\nconcluded that the Virginia court’s enforcement authority was a non-legislative act:\\n“the Virginia Court performs more than a legislative role with respect to the State Bar\\nCode. It also hears appeals from lower court decisions in disciplinary cases, a\\ntraditional adjudicative task; and in addition, it has independent enforcement authority\\nof its own.” Id. “For this reason the Virginia Court and its members were proper\\ndefendants in a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief.” Id. at 736.\\n\\n Under Consumers Union, the “basis” for suit governs whether legislative\\nimmunity “foreclose[s] suit.” The Second Circuit, however, has a different\\ninterpretation of Consumers Union: legislators “must still show, before they are\\nafforded the protections of legislative immunity as to claims for injunctive relief, that\\nthe requested relief would enjoin them in their legislative capacities.” State\\nEmployees Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 93 (2d Cir. 2007).\\nAccording to the Second Circuit, the Consumers Union decision\\n\\n -21-\\n\\f applied legislative immunity to bar plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief\\n insofar as the relief sought would compel the defendants to perform a\\n legislative act—the repeal or amendment of the state’s bar code to\\n conform with constitutional requirements. The Court concluded,\\n however, that legislative immunity did not bar claims for injunctive\\n relief that would enjoin the defendant justices from committing a\\n distinctly non-legislative act—independent enforcement of the\\n unconstitutional provisions of the bar code against particular individuals.\\n\\n\\n\\nId. at 88, citing Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 733-36. The Second Circuit assumed\\nthat the Consumers Union plaintiffs sought “declaratory and injunctive relief that\\nwould have forced the Supreme Court [of Virginia] to amend or repeal the code.” Id.\\nat 83-84. Through that assumption, the Second Circuit appears to interpret Consumers\\nUnion’s enforcement discussion to mean that if the suit sought only amendment or\\nrepeal, then that suit would have been barred by legislative immunity. Id. By the\\nSecond Circuit’s reading of the case, the suit also sought an injunction against\\nenforcement, meaning legislative immunity was not a bar in Consumers Union.\\n\\n But Consumers Union does not say that the plaintiffs there sought to amend or\\nrepeal the code. The Court’s only reference to amendment or repeal was as a “basis”\\nfor suit—the Virginia court’s “issuance of, or failure to amend, the challenged rules.”\\nConsumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734. True, the Consumers Union plaintiffs did seek\\nan injunction against enforcement. But the Virginia’s court’s enforcement of the\\nprofessional ethics code also was a basis for suit: “[M]ere enforcement authority does\\nnot create a case or controversy with the enforcement official; but in the circumstances\\nof this case, a sufficiently concrete dispute is as well made out against the Virginia\\nCourt as an enforcer . . . .” Id. at 736 n.15. In other words, the Virginia court’s\\nenforcement—in addition to its promulgation—of the professional ethics code was a\\nnon-legislative act that violated the First Amendment, providing a separate basis for\\nsuit not barred by legislative immunity. See Alia v. Michigan Supreme Court, 906\\n\\n -22-\\n\\fF.2d 1100, 1107 (6th Cir. 1990) (Wellford, J., dissenting) (analyzing Consumers\\nUnion and concluding “to the extent the individual justices acted in a rulemaking\\ncapacity, they are entitled to legislative immunity, but to the extent they acted in an\\nenforcement capacity, they are not entitled to claim legislative immunity”) (underlines\\nadded).\\n\\n In the end, these ambiguities do not impact the result here. In Consumers\\nUnion, the Supreme Court states: “If the sole basis for appellees’ § 1983 action\\nagainst the Virginia Court and its chief justice were the issuance of, or failure to\\namend, the challenged rules, legislative immunity would foreclose suit against\\nappellants.” Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734 (emphasis added). In the complaint\\nhere, the plaintiffs allege:\\n\\n As chief executive of the State, Governor Greitens bears ultimate\\n responsibility for the provision of constitutionally mandated services,\\n including indigent defense, to the people of Missouri. The Governor of\\n Missouri appoints the members of the Missouri State Public Defender\\n Commission, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Governor\\n has claimed the authority to withhold money budgeted to the Missouri\\n State Public Defender’s Office and has exercised that claimed authority\\n in recent years, including fiscal year 2017.\\n\\nAs discussed above, to the extent the plaintiffs claim that the governor’s general-\\nenforcement authority and appointment authority are non-legislative acts that lead to\\na constitutional violation, the governor is subject to sovereign immunity for those acts\\nbecause they do not satisfy Ex parte Young.\\n\\n That leaves as “the sole basis” for the plaintiffs’ action against the governor his\\nappropriation reduction—a legislative act—meaning legislative immunity\\n“foreclose[s] suit” against him. See id. at 734. The Supreme Court used the word\\n“suit,” not “remedy.” This approach is consistent with how the Supreme Court treats\\nsovereign immunity: “Sovereign immunity does not merely constitute a defense to\\n\\n -23-\\n\\fmonetary liability or even to all types of liability. Rather, it provides an immunity\\nfrom suit.” Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 766 (emphasis added).\\n\\n Even if the governor’s appropriation-reduction authority is not shielded by\\nsovereign immunity through Ex parte Young, legislative immunity, a separate defense,\\nforecloses suit against the governor. See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734. See\\nalso Tolman v. Finneran, 171 F. Supp. 2d 31, 37-38 (D. Mass. 2001) (“Short of the\\nexceptional case, it is unlikely that Ex Parte Young is broad enough to abrogate\\nlegislative immunity and authorize suit against a legislator acting in a purely\\nlegislative capacity.”).3\\n\\n *******\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The plaintiffs argue that legislative immunity is a personal defense that does\\nnot apply to official-capacity suits, like the one here. They cite Roach v. Stouffer, 560\\nF.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2009), quoting a Second Circuit decision: “immunity, either\\nabsolute or qualified, is a personal defense that is available only when officials are\\nsued in their individual capacities; the immunities officials enjoy when sued\\npersonally do not extend to instances where they are sued in their official capacities.”\\nRoach, 560 F.3d at 870, quoting Almonte v. City of Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100, 106\\n(2d Cir. 2007). But under Consumers Union, legislative immunity applies to official-\\ncapacity suits. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 725-26, 734. See also Scott v. Taylor,\\n405 F.3d 1251, 1254 n.4, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005) (analyzing Consumers Union and\\nKentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985), and “hold[ing] that the legislator\\ndefendants in the instant official capacity suit for prospective relief are entitled to\\nabsolute immunity.”). The Second Circuit–recognizing the tension between Almonte\\nand Consumers Union–limited Almonte to “claims against local-level officials, rather\\nthan state officials.” Rowland, 494 F.3d at 86, 88 (“claims for injunctive relief against\\ndefendant state officials, sued in their official capacities, may be barred by the\\ndoctrine of legislative immunity”). To the extent Roach conflicts with Consumers\\nUnion, this court is bound by Consumers Union.\\n\\n -24-\\n\\f The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion.4\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n This court grants the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a sur-reply. In reaching\\nthis decision, this court considered the sur-reply attached to the motion.\\n\\n -25-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4357666/\", \"author_raw\": \"BENTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4580413/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Shondel CHURCH; Randall Lee Dalton; Dorian Samuels; Viola Bowman; Brian Richman, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. State of MISSOURI; Michael L. Parson, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Missouri, Defendants - Appellants Michael Barrett; H. Riley Bock; Charles R. Jackson; Craig Chval; A. Crista Hogan, Defendants\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2857\n ___________________________\n\nShondel Church; Randall Lee Dalton; Dorian Samuels; Viola Bowman; Brian Richman\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\n\n v.\n\n State of Missouri; Michael L. Parson,1 in his official capacity as Governor of the\n State of Missouri\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants\n\nMichael Barrett; H. Riley Bock; Charles R. Jackson; Craig Chval; A. Crista Hogan\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City\n ____________\n\n Submitted: April 10, 2018\n Filed: January 10, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore GRUENDER, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\n\n 1\n While this appeal was pending, Eric R. Greitens resigned as governor of\nMissouri. His successor, Michael L. Parson, is automatically substituted under\nFederal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2). See Digital Recognition Network, Inc.\nv. Hutchinson, 803 F.3d 952, 952 n.1 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\fBENTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n This is a class action against the State and governor of Missouri, the director of\nthe Missouri State Public Defender office, and the commissioners of the Missouri\nState Public Defender Commission. The plaintiffs alleged that the State “has failed\nto meet its constitutional obligation to provide indigent defendants with meaningful\nrepresentation.” Invoking sovereign immunity, the State and governor moved to\ndismiss. The governor also invoked legislative immunity. The district court denied\nthe motion. Church v. Missouri, 268 F. Supp. 3d 992 (W.D. Mo. 2017). The director\nand commissioners do not appeal. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291\nthrough the collateral order doctrine,2 this court reverses and remands.\n\n I.\n\n The Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent defendants in criminal cases the\nright to appointed counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).\nBecause the right to counsel is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial,” it is\n“protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth\nAmendment.” Id. at 341-42.\n\n The State usually provides counsel through the Missouri State Public Defender.\nSee State ex rel. Missouri Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 875 (Mo.\nbanc 2009) (indigent defense is “a duty which constitutionally is the burden of the\nState,” and “[w]hen a defendant is found to be indigent in Missouri, the defendant’s\nSixth Amendment right to counsel is usually met by the judge appointing the ‘Office\nof State Public Defender’”) (citation omitted). Here, the plaintiffs “were all charged\n\n 2\n See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.\n139, 147 (1993); Fryberger v. University of Ark., 889 F.3d 471, 473 (8th Cir. 2018);\nMcDonough Assocs., Inc. v. Grunloh, 722 F.3d 1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 2013); Scott v.\nTaylor, 405 F.3d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 2005).\n\n -2-\n\fwith crimes in Missouri state court and, as a result of their indigency, were entitled to\nrepresentation by the MSPD.” They bring this lawsuit “on behalf of themselves and\na putative class of all indigent defendants in criminal and juvenile proceedings in\nMissouri who are eligible for representation by the MSPD.” The putative class does\nnot include individuals seeking post-conviction relief. See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(e),\n29.15(e) (requiring appointment of counsel for all pro se, indigent, post-conviction\nmovants).\n\n The plaintiffs allege: “The State’s indigent defense budget is shockingly\ninadequate. . . . Without sufficient funding, overstretched and under-resourced\n[MSPD] attorneys are forced to handle far too many cases and to devote far too few\nhours to each case.” They argue they “have suffered and continue to suffer the denial\nof adequate counsel at critical stages of their criminal cases due to these systemic\ncaseload problems among MSPD attorney.” They seek “a declaratory judgment\nstating that their right to counsel is being violated and an order enjoining the ongoing\nviolation of their rights and requiring Defendants to propose a remedial plan to the\ncourt.”\n\n II.\n\n The State of Missouri invokes sovereign immunity for itself. “This court\nreviews de novo questions of sovereign immunity.” Fryberger, 889 F.3d at 473.\n“Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its\nconsent.” Virginia Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011).\nThe Eleventh Amendment is “one particular exemplification of that immunity.”\nFederal Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753\n(2002). The State removed this case to federal court, waiving its Eleventh\nAmendment immunity. See Lapides v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535\nU.S. 613, 624 (2002) (“We conclude that the State’s action joining the removing of\nthis case to federal court waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity”).\n\n -3-\n\f But “[s]tates also enjoy a broader sovereign immunity, which applies against\nall private suits, whether in state or federal court.” Beaulieu v. Vermont, 807 F.3d\n478, 483 (2d Cir. 2015), citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“We have\n. . . sometimes referred to the States’ immunity from suit as ‘Eleventh Amendment\nimmunity.’ The phrase is convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the\nsovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of\nthe Eleventh Amendment.”). The Supreme Court “has repeatedly held that the\nsovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text of the\nEleventh Amendment.” Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 754.\n\n “The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the\ndignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.” Id. at 760.\nDeveloped at common law, “immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the\nsovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution.”\nAlden, 527 U.S. at 713. See also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414-16 (1979)\n(explaining sovereign immunity’s common-law origins). “States entered the Union\nwith their sovereign immunity intact, unlimited by Article III’s jurisdictional grant.”\nStewart, 563 U.S. at 253. “The leading advocates of the Constitution assured the\npeople in no uncertain terms that the Constitution would not strip the States of\nsovereign immunity.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 716. “The founding generation thought it\n‘neither becoming nor convenient that the several States of the Union, invested with\nthat large residuum of sovereignty which had not been delegated to the United States,\nshould be summoned as defendants to answer the complaints of private persons.’” Id.\nat 748, quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887).\n\n “[N]either logic nor precedent supports the proposition that a state waives its\ngeneral state sovereign immunity by removing an action from state court to federal\ncourt.” Beaulieu, 807 F.3d at 486. Missouri’s state sovereign immunity applies\nunless “it is waived or a statutory or recognized common law exception, such as\n\n -4-\n\fconsent, is applicable.” Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. City of Bellefontaine\nNeighbors, 476 S.W.3d 913, 914 (Mo. banc 2016). The plaintiffs assert both a waiver\nand a common-law exception, contending that sovereign immunity does not apply in\nMissouri when a plaintiff seeks prospective equitable relief to enforce the State’s\naffirmative duty or obligation.\n\n A.\n\n Courts “give effect” to a state’s waiver of sovereign immunity “only where\nstated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the\ntext as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’” Port Auth.\nTrans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305 (1990), quoting Atascadero State\nHosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1985). Express language does appear in\nsection 537.600, RSMo 2016, which “carve[s] out limited exceptions [for negligent\noperation of motor vehicles and dangerous conditions of public property] to a general\nrule of immunity.” Bellefontaine, 476 S.W.3d at 921.\n\n Emphasizing two Missouri Court of Appeals opinions, the plaintiffs argue that\nsovereign immunity does not bar a claim for equitable relief to enforce the State’s\naffirmative “duty or obligation.” In Wyman v. Missouri Department of Mental Health,\n376 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Mo. App. 2012), the court of appeals said it “found no case which\napplies § 537.600 to a claim seeking only equitable relief.” The Court of Appeals then\nstated that “sovereign immunity does not necessarily bar a claim for injunctive relief\nwhich seeks to reverse a state agency’s prior violation of its statutory obligations, or\nto prevent future violations.” Wyman, 376 S.W.3d at 23. In 2018, the Court of\nAppeals–citing the district court’s decision here–quoted and followed Wyman.\nMissouri State Conf. of NAACP v. State, 2018 WL 5492832, at *6 (Mo. App. Oct.\n30, 2018).\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f Both the Wyman and NAACP opinions fail to address the abundant contrary\nMissouri authority on sovereign immunity. In 2016 and 2017, the Supreme Court of\nMissouri stated: “Sovereign immunity is the rule, not the exception.” Bellefontaine,\n476 S.W.3d at 914; Newsome v. Kansas City Mo. Sch. Dist., 520 S.W.3d 769, 775\n(Mo. banc 2017). Of critical importance here, the Missouri Supreme Court held that\n\n in the absence of an express statutory exception to sovereign immunity,\n or a recognized common law exception such as the proprietary function\n and consent exceptions, sovereign immunity is the rule and applies to all\n suits against public entities.\n\nBellefontaine, 476 S.W.3d at 921-22 (emphasis added). Because—except for\nstatutory and common-law exceptions—sovereign immunity bars all suits against the\nState, it bars suits for prospective equitable relief.\n\n The plaintiffs claim that Bellefontaine covers only suits for damages because\nthat is all the plaintiff there sought. To the contrary, Bellefontaine follows the long-\nestablished Missouri precedent on sovereign immunity. Granting injunctive relief\nagainst an unconstitutional law in 1908, the Missouri Supreme Court held:\n\n That the sovereign state may not be sued is a truism . . . . But\n defendants . . . . ministerial officers, charged to be about to do irreparable\n injury . . . . are not beyond the strong arm of a court of equity.\n\nMerchants’ Exchange of St. Louis v. Knott, 111 S.W. 565, 574 (Mo. banc 1908)\n(agreeing with the Ex parte Young doctrine for state injunction cases just two months\nafter the United States Supreme Court’s decision). The Missouri Supreme Court has\nrepeatedly followed this approach.\n\n The amenability of respondents as executive or administrative officers\n of the State to the restrictive power of the courts in a proceeding of this\n character has been frequently declared in a number of cases . . . . It is not\n\n -6-\n\f to be understood from these cases that the state itself can be enjoined;\n but, when its officers act in an unconstitutional or illegal manner they are\n not to be regarded as acting for the state, and they may be enjoined.\n\nCarson v. Sullivan, 223 S.W. 571, 571 (Mo. banc 1920) (citing several cases\nincluding Merchants’ Exchange and Ex parte Young). See, e.g., Nacy v. Le Page,\n111 S.W.2d 25, 25–26 (Mo. banc 1937) (“because the state may not be sued without\nits consent” and because a garnishment “seeks to compel action on the part of the\nstate,” a state court may not require the State to submit to a legal writ of garnishment)\n(changed by § 525.310, RSMo 1943); State ex rel. Eagleton v. Hall, 389 S.W.2d 798,\n801 (Mo. banc 1965) (a will-contest suit affecting residuary estate left to state is a suit\nagainst the state, thus barred by sovereign immunity) , quoted in Bellefontaine, 476\nS.W.3d at 921; Garland v. Ruhl, 455 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Mo. banc 2015) (even when\na statute authorizes award of attorney fees against the state, sovereign immunity\nprevents ordering the state to do so, due to strict construction of the statute).\n\n Because the two Court of Appeals opinions have a limited consideration of\ncontrolling Missouri Supreme Court cases and fail even to address contrary authority,\nthe Wyman and NAACP cases are not instructive as to how the Missouri Supreme\nCourt would decide the sovereign immunity issue in this case. See United Fire &\nCas. Co. v. Titan Contractors Serv., Inc., 751 F.3d 880, 885 n.2 (8th Cir. 2014).\n\n The plaintiffs cite five cases where the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed\ninjunctions directed at the State. See Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Mo.\nbanc 2006); Brooks v. State, 128 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Mo. banc 2004); Rolla 31 Sch.\nDist. v. State, 837 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. banc 1992); Pohl v. State Highway Comm’n, 431\nS.W.2d 99, 107 (Mo. banc 1968); Koplar v. State Tax Comm’n, 321 S.W.2d 686, 697\n(Mo. 1959). These five cases, plaintiffs assert, show it is “perfectly ordinary” to\nenjoin the State itself to force compliance with its obligations.\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n\f First, in the three most recent cases, state officials–subject to Missouri’s Ex\nparte Young doctrine–were also named as defendants. Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at\n204 n.1 (secretary of state); Brooks, 128 S.W.3d at 846 (attorney general); Rolla, 837\nS.W.2d at 2 & n. 2 (naming the “various state officials” who were defendants). The\nPohl case is an “injunction suit by taxpayers.” Pohl, 431 S.W.2d at 100. See\nManzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 656, 658-59 (Mo. banc 2011) (reviewing history of\ntaxpayer suits since 1873 and holding “when a public interest is involved and public\nmonies are being expended for an illegal purpose, taxpayers have the right to enjoin\nthe action” so “government officials conform to the dictates of the law”). The Koplar\ncase is a judicial review of administrative decisions under the Missouri Administrative\nProcedure Act–specifically held to be a “waiver of sovereign immunity.” See St.\nLouis County v. State, 424 S.W.3d 450, 454 n.3 (Mo. banc 2014) (statute authorizing\njudicial review of administrative decisions is a waiver of sovereign immunity). As a\nresult, none of these five cases even hint at the threshold question presented here:\nwhether Missouri’s sovereign immunity covers suits for prospective equitable relief.\n“Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the\ncourt nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to\nconstitute precedents.” Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170\n(2004). See also Byrne & Jones Enters., Inc. v. Monroe City R-1 Sch. Dist., 493\nS.W.3d 847, 855 (Mo. banc 2016) (“Judicial decisions must be construed with\nreference to the facts and issues of the particular case, and that the authority of the\ndecision as a precedent is limited to those points of law which are raised by the record,\nconsidered by the court, and necessary to a decision.”) (citation omitted).\n\n Second, adopting the plaintiffs’ view creates a judicial exception to sovereign\nimmunity. But Bellefontaine rejects that, explaining it would “not judicially create an\nexception to the common law rule of sovereign immunity” to address the specific\nsituation there because the issue presented “policy concerns . . . for the legislature.”\nBellefontaine, 476 S.W.3d at 923. The legislature—not the judiciary—must waive\nsovereign immunity. Id. at 921 (“This Court cannot read into the statute an exception\n\n -8-\n\fto sovereign immunity or imply waivers not explicitly created in the statute.”). See\nalso Winston v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, Lawrence Cnty., 636 S.W.2d 324, 328\n(Mo. banc 1982) (“[W]e are mindful of the oft repeated principle that, within\nconstitutional limits, a sovereign may prescribe the terms and conditions under which\nit may be sued, and the decision to waive immunity, and to what extent it is waived,\nlies within the legislature’s purview.”). The parties have not cited a Missouri statute\nthat waives sovereign immunity for prospective equitable relief. The five cases they\ncite, Wyman/NAACP, or other states’ decisions cannot serve as a substitute.\n\n True, Bellefontaine does not address the precise issue here. But it says that\nsovereign immunity “is the rule—not the exception—even in the absence of prior\ncases specifically addressing this issue.” Bellefontaine, 476 S.W.3d at 922. “When\nthere is no state supreme court case directly on point, our role is to predict how the\nstate supreme court would rule if faced with the [same issue] before us.” Blankenship\nv. USA Truck, Inc., 601 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (citation\nomitted). See also Craven v. University of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 260 F.3d 1218, 1231\n(10th Cir. 2001) (applying the same rule to a sovereign immunity issue). This court\npredicts that the Missouri Supreme Court would apply Bellefontaine’s long-\nestablished principles to cases involving prospective equitable relief. Missouri does\nnot have a waiver of sovereign immunity for prospective equitable relief “stated by\nthe most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will]\nleave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305.\n\n B.\n\n Plaintiffs also assert a recognized common law exception to sovereign\nimmunity. See Bellefontaine, 476 S.W.3d at 921-22 (stating sovereign immunity\napplies to all suits, in the absence of a recognized common law exception). The\nBellefontaine case notes two such exceptions, consent and “proprietary function” (of\nmunicipalities). Id. Neither of these apply here.\n\n -9-\n\f Citing Blackstone, law review articles, a common-law case, and other state\ncourts, the plaintiffs argue that “even at common law, courts of equity enforced the\nCrown’s obligations.” See generally Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135\nS. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015) (“It is true enough that we have long held that federal courts\nmay in some circumstances grant injunctive relief against state officers who are\nviolating, or planning to violate, federal law. . . . The ability to sue to enjoin\nunconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity,\nand reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back\nto England.”) (emphasis added), citing Young, 209 U.S. at 150-51 (other citations\nomitted).\n\n The State counters, with arguments based on the “law or equity” phrase in the\nEleventh Amendment and the Supreme Court’s words in an Eleventh Amendment\ncase that\n\n sovereign immunity applies regardless of whether a private plaintiff’s\n suit is for monetary damages or some other type of relief. See [Seminole\n Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996)] (“[W]e have often made\n it clear that the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to\n the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment”).\n\n\nFed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 765-66 (emphasis added).\n\n These expertly briefed arguments are beside the point. The Missouri Supreme\nCourt is the “custodian” of the common law in Missouri. Townsend v. Townsend,\n708 S.W.2d 646, 649-50 (Mo. banc 1986). That Court has rejected that “the state\nitself can be enjoined.” Carson, 223 S.W. at 571, following Merchants’ Exchange,\n111 S.W. at 574. A recognized common law exception to Missouri’s sovereign\nimmunity does not apply here.\n\n\n -10-\n\f III.\n\n The plaintiffs argue that even if sovereign immunity bars prospective injunctive\nrelief, the State “can be sued directly for equitable relief for failing to comply with a\nfederal constitutional obligation, here, the Sixth Amendment.” They stress First\nEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987),\nand Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994).\n\n In First English, the Supreme Court stated it “has frequently repeated the view\nthat, in the event of a taking, the compensation remedy is required by the\nConstitution.” First English, 482 U.S. at 316. It footnoted:\n\n The Solicitor General urges that the prohibitory nature of the Fifth\n Amendment, combined with principles of sovereign immunity,\n establishes that the Amendment itself is only a limitation on the power\n of the Government to act, not a remedial provision. The cases cited in\n the text, we think, refute the argument of the United States that “the\n Constitution does not, of its own force, furnish a basis for a court to\n award money damages against the government.”\n\nId. at 316 n.9 (citations omitted). In Reich, the Court explained that “a long line of\ncases” establishes that “due process requires a ‘clear and certain’ remedy for taxes\ncollected in violation of federal law,” and that “a denial by a state court of a recovery\nof taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States by\ncompulsion is itself in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment, the sovereign\nimmunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts notwithstanding.” Reich, 513\nU.S. at 108, 109-110 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n According to the plaintiffs, these cases (particularly the footnote in First\nEnglish) mean that “where the Constitution places an affirmative obligation on the\n\n\n -11-\n\fState itself, the State cannot rely on state sovereign immunity to defeat a suit that aims\nto force it to comply with that obligation.” But that is too broad a reading. Instead,\nthe cases mean that “where the Constitution requires a particular remedy, such as\nthrough the Due Process Clause for the tax monies at issue in Reich, or through the\nTakings Clause as indicated in First English, the state is required to provide that\nremedy in its own courts, notwithstanding sovereign immunity.” DLX, Inc. v.\nKentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 528 (6th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). For the situation at\nissue here, the Constitution does not require a “particular” or “clear and certain”\nremedy.\n\n Congress may also abrogate state sovereign immunity by providing an\nenforcement mechanism for constitutional violations:\n\n We have held also that in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the\n people required the States to surrender a portion of the sovereignty that\n had been preserved to them by the original Constitution, so that Congress\n may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States pursuant to its\n § 5 enforcement power. By imposing explicit limits on the powers of the\n States and granting Congress the power to enforce them, the Amendment\n fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by\n the Constitution. When Congress enacts appropriate legislation to\n enforce this Amendment, federal interests are paramount, and Congress\n may assert an authority over the States which would be otherwise\n unauthorized by the Constitution.\n\nAlden, 527 U.S. at 756 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also\nUnited States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (“insofar as Title II [of the ADA]\ncreates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that\nactually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign\nimmunity.”). No statutory enforcement mechanism exists here.\n\n\n\n\n -12-\n\f IV.\n\n The governor asserts sovereign immunity. The plaintiffs argue that sovereign\nimmunity does not shield the governor because he is an Ex parte Young defendant.\n“Under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, a private party can sue a state officer in his\nofficial capacity to enjoin a prospective action that would violate federal law.” 281\nCare, 638 F.3d at 632. The doctrine “rests on the premise—less delicately called a\n‘fiction’—that when a federal court commands a state official to do nothing more than\nrefrain from violating federal law, he is not the State for sovereign-immunity\npurposes.” Stewart, 563 U.S. at 255 (internal citation omitted). See also Hutchinson,\n803 F.3d at 957 (“Enforcement of unconstitutional legislation ‘is simply an illegal act\nupon the part of [the] state official,’ and the State may not immunize officials from\nsuit for such violations of the Constitution.”), quoting Young, 209 U.S. at 159.\n\n “In determining whether this exception applies, a court conducts ‘a\nstraightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges [1] an ongoing violation\nof federal law and [2] seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” 281 Care,\n638 F.3d at 632, quoting Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of\nMaryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (alterations added). On the first inquiry, the\nofficial must have “some connection to the enforcement of the challenged laws.”\nCalzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2017), citing Young, 209 U.S. at 157.\nSee also 281 Care, 638 F.3d at 632. “Without that connection, the officer would be\nsued merely ‘as a representative of the state’ in an impermissible attempt to ‘make the\nstate a party.’” Hutchinson, 803 F.3d at 960, quoting Young, 209 U.S. at 157.\n“[T]hat connection does not need to be primary authority to enforce the challenged\nlaw.” 281 Care, 638 F.3d at 632. “Nor does the [state officer] need to have the full\npower to redress a plaintiff’s injury in order to have ‘some connection’ with the\nchallenged law.” Id. at 633.\n\n\n\n\n -13-\n\f Ruling that the governor is an Ex parte Young defendant, the district court\nidentified three connections to the enforcement of the State’s Sixth Amendment\nobligation to provide indigent defendants with adequate counsel.\n\n A.\n\n The district court noted the governor’s general-enforcement authority. The\nMissouri Constitution says, “The supreme executive power shall be vested in a\ngovernor,” and “The governor shall take care that the laws are distributed and\nfaithfully executed, and shall be a conservator of the peace throughout the state.” Mo.\nConst. art. IV, §§ 1-2. The district court also cited a Missouri statute: “When\ndirected by the governor, the attorney general, or one of his assistants, shall aid any\nprosecuting or circuit attorney in the discharge of their respective duties in the trial\ncourts and in examinations before grand juries . . . .” § 27.030, RSMo.\n\n The district court concluded that these provisions make the Missouri governor\nlike the Georgia governor in Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988). There,\nindigent defendants sought injunctive relief against a governor to remedy Sixth\nAmendment violations. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1013. The Eleventh Circuit held that\nGeorgia’s governor had “some connection” and was an “appropriate part[y] against\nwhom prospective relief could be ordered” because:\n\n According to the Georgia constitution, the governor is responsible for\n law enforcement in that state and is charged with executing the laws\n faithfully. The governor further has the residual power to commence\n criminal prosecutions, and has the final authority to direct the Attorney\n General to “institute and prosecute” on behalf of the state.\n\nId. at 1016 (internal citations omitted).\n\n\n\n\n -14-\n\f The governor here argues that this court’s Calzone decision trumps Luckey.\nThe Calzone plaintiff sought an injunction against the Missouri governor in a\nchallenge to the constitutionality of a state statute. Calzone, 866 F.3d at 869. This\ncourt held that neither the statute nor the Missouri Constitution’s general-enforcement\nprovision make the governor an Ex parte Young defendant:\n\n No provision in Chapter 304 or the statutes defining his executive\n authority specifically authorizes the governor to enforce the vehicle\n inspection statutes. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 26.010-.225. The Missouri\n Constitution confers upon the governor the duty to “take care that the\n laws are distributed and faithfully executed,” Mo. Const. art. IV, § 2, but\n such a general executive responsibility is an insufficient connection to\n the enforcement of a statute to avoid the Eleventh Amendment. See Fitts\n v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 530 (1899).\n\nId. at 870.\n\n The plaintiffs try to distinguish Calzone because the statute there “delegated\nenforcement exclusively to the superintendent of the highway patrol,” meaning “[t]he\nGovernor was not a proper defendant because he has no connection to the statute. . . .\nUnlike the statute in Calzone, the State’s constitutional obligation to provide adequate\ncounsel—and the Governor’s role in its failure to do so—cannot be delegated\nexclusively to the MSPD.”\n\n Although Calzone is factually distinguishable, its guidance on the Missouri\ngovernor’s general-enforcement authority is consistent with this court’s precedent.\nSee Hutchinson, 803 F.3d at 961; Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d\n859 (8th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.\n2584 (2015).\n\n In Bruning, the Nebraska governor and attorney general were Ex parte Young\ndefendants in a suit to enjoin enforcement of a state constitutional amendment.\n\n -15-\n\fBruning, 455 F.3d at 864. This court found a sufficient connection to the\nenforcement of the amendment because “the Governor and the Attorney General have\nbroad powers to enforce the State’s Constitution and statutes.” Id. The Hutchinson\ndecision clarifies that statement from Bruning:\n\n [T]he court’s statement [in Bruning] must be read in context. In\n Bruning, the “broad powers” of the officials included authority to\n enforce the constitutional amendment at issue. The Nebraska attorney\n general has power to enforce the Nebraska Constitution by bringing suit\n for a declaratory judgment that a state statute is unconstitutional, or for\n an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of a state statute on the\n grounds that it is unconstitutional. The Nebraska governor has some\n connection to the enforcement of the Nebraska Constitution because he\n may direct the attorney general to file suit to enjoin application of an\n unconstitutional state statute. That sort of enforcement authority is\n lacking with respect to [the] statute [at issue in Hutchinson] that provides\n only for private civil enforcement.\n\nHutchinson, 803 F.3d at 961 (internal citations omitted).\n\n The Bruning and Hutchinson decisions mean that a governor’s general-\nenforcement authority is “some connection” if that authority gives the governor\nmethods of enforcement. The governor in Bruning had a method of enforcement\nbecause he could direct the attorney general to seek equitable relief. But the\ngovernors in Calzone and Hutchinson did not have a comparable enforcement\nmechanism.\n\n Nor does the governor here. The district court’s reliance on section 27.030 is\ninsufficient because that provision covers aiding prosecution, not defense. The\ngovernor’s general-enforcement authority is not “some connection” to enforcement\nof the State’s Sixth Amendment obligation. See Calzone, 866 F.3d at 870. See also\nAir Evac EMS, Inc. v. Texas, Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp., 851 F.3d 507,\n\n\n -16-\n\f517 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[A] state governor with a broad duty to uphold state law is not\na proper defendant.”); Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th\nCir. 1992) (“[A] generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory power\nover the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision will not subject\nan official to suit.”); Shell Oil Co. v. Noel, 608 F.2d 208, 211 (1st Cir. 1979) (“The\nmere fact that a governor is under a general duty to enforce state laws does not make\nhim a proper defendant in every action attacking the constitutionality of a state\nstatute.”).\n\n B.\n\n The district court ruled the governor had “some connection” because he\n“appoints all seven members of the MSPD Commission.” Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d\nat 1013, citing § 600.015.1, RSMo (“The commission shall be composed of seven\nmembers . . . appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate.”).\nThe district court cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Eu, where a bar association sued\na governor to challenge a state statute that limited the number of judges in a county.\nEu, 979 F.2d at 699. The governor had “a duty to appoint judges to any\nnewly-created judicial positions,” which the Ninth Circuit considered to be “a specific\nconnection to the challenged statute,” placing the governor within Ex parte Young’s\nscope. Id. at 704.\n\n Invoking Eu, the plaintiffs argue: “although the Governor alone cannot solve\nthe indigent defense crisis in this state, his role in the ongoing violation of those Sixth\nAmendment rights through his appointment of MSPD Commissioners, in addition to\nhis ability to profoundly affect MSPD caseload, is sufficient for Ex parte Young\npurposes.” The governor counters with this court’s decision in Balogh v. Lombardi,\n816 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 2016).\n\n\n\n\n -17-\n\f In Balogh, a Missouri statute gave a private right of action against anyone who,\nwithout the approval of the Director of Corrections, knowingly discloses the identity\nof an execution-team member. Balogh, 816 F.3d at 539. The statute also gave the\ndirector authority to select those members. Id. This court ruled that the director’s\nselection authority is only “administrative or ministerial,” and not “some connection”\nto the statute’s enforcement:\n\n Although the director’s authority to delineate the members of the\n execution team does affect who might have a private right of action\n against [someone disclosing the identity of execution team members], it\n has nothing to do with an execution team member’s potential prosecution\n of such an action. Selection of the execution team constitutes\n implementation of the statute in an administrative or ministerial sense\n and is not analogous to enforcing the statute’s non-disclosure provision\n through a civil or criminal prosecution. The director’s authority to\n define the members of the execution team is not an enforcement action\n within the meaning of Ex Parte Young and its progeny.\n\nId. at 546.\n\n Like in Balogh, appointing members of the MSPD Commission is an\nadministrative act. See State ex rel. Sikes v. Williams, 121 S.W. 64, 65 (Mo. banc\n1909) (“The confirmations by the Senate of appointments made by the Governor are\nnot legislative acts . . . . Such acts by the Governor concerning appointments are\nmerely administrative . . . .”). It does not give the governor some connection to the\nState’s Sixth Amendment obligation. The Balogh decision, not Eu, binds this court.\n\n C.\n\n The district court concluded the governor met the “some connection”\nrequirement because of his appropriation-reduction authority:\n\n\n\n -18-\n\f Governor Greitens’s predecessor, Governor Nixon, affirmatively used\n his executive authority to withhold roughly $7 million in funding\n allocated by the Missouri Legislature to the MSPD, thereby\n demonstrating an even more direct “connection” to the challenged\n conduct. Governor Greitens has since upheld Governor Nixon's\n withholding of funds allocated to the MSPD.\n\nChurch, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 1012-13 (internal citation omitted). In addition to arguing\nthat his appropriation-reduction authority is not “some connection”, the governor\nasserts legislative immunity.\n\n “[S]tate legislators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their\nlegislative acts.” Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 446 U.S.\n719, 732 (1980). “[O]fficials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative\nimmunity when they perform legislative functions.” Bogan v. Scott–Harris, 523 U.S.\n44, 55 (1998). “Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than\non the motive or intent of the official performing it.” Id. at 54. The act must be\nlegislative “in substance,” bearing “all the hallmarks of traditional legislation,” and\n“in form,” involving “integral steps in the legislative process.” Id. at 55.\n\n The district court suggested that the governor’s “withholding of funds is a\nlegislative function entitled to legislative immunity.” Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at\n1020. It emphasized Abbey v. Rowland, 359 F. Supp. 2d 94, 100 (D. Conn. 2005):\n\n Nothing could be more integral to the legislative process than [proposing\n a budget]. The Governor’s choices of exactly how to cut the budget may\n have been discretionary, but they were policy choices of broad import.\n The fact that any budget reduction would necessarily have an adverse\n impact on some employment does not change the budgetary decision\n from a legislative to an administrative function.\n\n\n\n\n -19-\n\f Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that a “discretionary, policymaking decision\nimplicating the budgetary priorities of the [government] and the services the\n[government] provides to its constituents” is a “hallmark[] of traditional legislation.”\nBogan, 523 U.S. at 55-56. And in Missouri, “the budget process . . . begins and ends\nwith the Governor,” making the governor’s appropriation reduction legislative in\nform. See Missouri Health Care Ass’n v. Holden, 89 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Mo. banc\n2002). The Missouri Constitution “does not permit the state to spend money it does\nnot have” and “broadly authorizes the Governor to balance the state’s budget in the\nevent that state revenues fall below the revenue expectations.” Id. at 506-07, citing\nMo. Const. art. IV, § 27. A Missouri governor’s appropriation reduction is a\nlegislative act.\n\n The district court, however, ruled that it was premature to apply legislative\nimmunity “because it is unclear what the terms of any injunction entered would\ninclude. . . . That finding is subject to change should the Plaintiffs request any\nremedies that would violate Gov. Greitens’ immunity from acts ‘integral’ to the\nlegislative process.” Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 1020. By that rationale, the\nremedy—not the challenged act—guides whether legislative immunity applies.\n\n The governor counters: “legislative immunity is an immunity from suit, not\nmerely an immunity from the award of certain types of relief. The district court’s\nrationale would enable any plaintiff to defeat legislative immunity merely by making\na vague and indefinite request for ‘injunctive and declaratory relief.’”\n\n The Supreme Court’s decision in Consumers Union addresses this issue. There,\nthe Supreme Court of Virginia, in addition to its inherent authority, used its statutory\nauthority to promulgate a professional ethics code. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at\n721. The Virginia legislature “vested in the court virtually its entire legislative or\nregulatory power over the legal profession.” Id. at 722. The court also had the power\nto enforce its professional ethics code. Id. at 722-24.\n\n -20-\n\f The plaintiffs believed that the code’s provision on attorney advertisement\nviolated the First Amendment. Id. at 726. They sued the Virginia Court and its chief\njustice in his personal and official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking a\ndeclaration that the provision was unconstitutional and an injunction against its\nenforcement. Id. at 725-26. The chief justice and the court asserted legislative\nimmunity. Id. at 730. The Supreme Court concluded (1) the Virginia court’s\npromulgation of the professional ethics code was a legislative act, (2) “the Virginia\nCourt and its members are immune from suit when acting in their legislative\ncapacity,” and (3) legislative immunity applies to suits for equitable relief. Id. at 731-\n32, 734.\n\n The Supreme Court, however, did not apply legislative immunity: “If the sole\nbasis for appellees’ § 1983 action against the Virginia Court and its chief justice were\nthe issuance of, or failure to amend, the challenged rules, legislative immunity would\nforeclose suit against appellants.” Id. at 734 (emphasis added). But the Court\nconcluded that the Virginia court’s enforcement authority was a non-legislative act:\n“the Virginia Court performs more than a legislative role with respect to the State Bar\nCode. It also hears appeals from lower court decisions in disciplinary cases, a\ntraditional adjudicative task; and in addition, it has independent enforcement authority\nof its own.” Id. “For this reason the Virginia Court and its members were proper\ndefendants in a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief.” Id. at 736.\n\n Under Consumers Union, the “basis” for suit governs whether legislative\nimmunity “foreclose[s] suit.” The Second Circuit, however, has a different\ninterpretation of Consumers Union: legislators “must still show, before they are\nafforded the protections of legislative immunity as to claims for injunctive relief, that\nthe requested relief would enjoin them in their legislative capacities.” State\nEmployees Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 93 (2d Cir. 2007).\nAccording to the Second Circuit, the Consumers Union decision\n\n -21-\n\f applied legislative immunity to bar plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief\n insofar as the relief sought would compel the defendants to perform a\n legislative act—the repeal or amendment of the state’s bar code to\n conform with constitutional requirements. The Court concluded,\n however, that legislative immunity did not bar claims for injunctive\n relief that would enjoin the defendant justices from committing a\n distinctly non-legislative act—independent enforcement of the\n unconstitutional provisions of the bar code against particular individuals.\n\n\n\nId. at 88, citing Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 733-36. The Second Circuit assumed\nthat the Consumers Union plaintiffs sought “declaratory and injunctive relief that\nwould have forced the Supreme Court [of Virginia] to amend or repeal the code.” Id.\nat 83-84. Through that assumption, the Second Circuit appears to interpret Consumers\nUnion’s enforcement discussion to mean that if the suit sought only amendment or\nrepeal, then that suit would have been barred by legislative immunity. Id. By the\nSecond Circuit’s reading of the case, the suit also sought an injunction against\nenforcement, meaning legislative immunity was not a bar in Consumers Union.\n\n But Consumers Union does not say that the plaintiffs there sought to amend or\nrepeal the code. The Court’s only reference to amendment or repeal was as a “basis”\nfor suit—the Virginia court’s “issuance of, or failure to amend, the challenged rules.”\nConsumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734. True, the Consumers Union plaintiffs did seek\nan injunction against enforcement. But the Virginia’s court’s enforcement of the\nprofessional ethics code also was a basis for suit: “[M]ere enforcement authority does\nnot create a case or controversy with the enforcement official; but in the circumstances\nof this case, a sufficiently concrete dispute is as well made out against the Virginia\nCourt as an enforcer . . . .” Id. at 736 n.15. In other words, the Virginia court’s\nenforcement—in addition to its promulgation—of the professional ethics code was a\nnon-legislative act that violated the First Amendment, providing a separate basis for\nsuit not barred by legislative immunity. See Alia v. Michigan Supreme Court, 906\n\n -22-\n\fF.2d 1100, 1107 (6th Cir. 1990) (Wellford, J., dissenting) (analyzing Consumers\nUnion and concluding “to the extent the individual justices acted in a rulemaking\ncapacity, they are entitled to legislative immunity, but to the extent they acted in an\nenforcement capacity, they are not entitled to claim legislative immunity”) (underlines\nadded).\n\n In the end, these ambiguities do not impact the result here. In Consumers\nUnion, the Supreme Court states: “If the sole basis for appellees’ § 1983 action\nagainst the Virginia Court and its chief justice were the issuance of, or failure to\namend, the challenged rules, legislative immunity would foreclose suit against\nappellants.” Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734 (emphasis added). In the complaint\nhere, the plaintiffs allege:\n\n As chief executive of the State, Governor Greitens bears ultimate\n responsibility for the provision of constitutionally mandated services,\n including indigent defense, to the people of Missouri. The Governor of\n Missouri appoints the members of the Missouri State Public Defender\n Commission, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Governor\n has claimed the authority to withhold money budgeted to the Missouri\n State Public Defender’s Office and has exercised that claimed authority\n in recent years, including fiscal year 2017.\n\nAs discussed above, to the extent the plaintiffs claim that the governor’s general-\nenforcement authority and appointment authority are non-legislative acts that lead to\na constitutional violation, the governor is subject to sovereign immunity for those acts\nbecause they do not satisfy Ex parte Young.\n\n That leaves as “the sole basis” for the plaintiffs’ action against the governor his\nappropriation reduction—a legislative act—meaning legislative immunity\n“foreclose[s] suit” against him. See id. at 734. The Supreme Court used the word\n“suit,” not “remedy.” This approach is consistent with how the Supreme Court treats\nsovereign immunity: “Sovereign immunity does not merely constitute a defense to\n\n -23-\n\fmonetary liability or even to all types of liability. Rather, it provides an immunity\nfrom suit.” Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 766 (emphasis added).\n\n Even if the governor’s appropriation-reduction authority is not shielded by\nsovereign immunity through Ex parte Young, legislative immunity, a separate defense,\nforecloses suit against the governor. See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734. See\nalso Tolman v. Finneran, 171 F. Supp. 2d 31, 37-38 (D. Mass. 2001) (“Short of the\nexceptional case, it is unlikely that Ex Parte Young is broad enough to abrogate\nlegislative immunity and authorize suit against a legislator acting in a purely\nlegislative capacity.”).3\n\n *******\n\n\n\n\n 3\n The plaintiffs argue that legislative immunity is a personal defense that does\nnot apply to official-capacity suits, like the one here. They cite Roach v. Stouffer, 560\nF.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2009), quoting a Second Circuit decision: “immunity, either\nabsolute or qualified, is a personal defense that is available only when officials are\nsued in their individual capacities; the immunities officials enjoy when sued\npersonally do not extend to instances where they are sued in their official capacities.”\nRoach, 560 F.3d at 870, quoting Almonte v. City of Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100, 106\n(2d Cir. 2007). But under Consumers Union, legislative immunity applies to official-\ncapacity suits. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 725-26, 734. See also Scott v. Taylor,\n405 F.3d 1251, 1254 n.4, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005) (analyzing Consumers Union and\nKentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985), and “hold[ing] that the legislator\ndefendants in the instant official capacity suit for prospective relief are entitled to\nabsolute immunity.”). The Second Circuit–recognizing the tension between Almonte\nand Consumers Union–limited Almonte to “claims against local-level officials, rather\nthan state officials.” Rowland, 494 F.3d at 86, 88 (“claims for injunctive relief against\ndefendant state officials, sued in their official capacities, may be barred by the\ndoctrine of legislative immunity”). To the extent Roach conflicts with Consumers\nUnion, this court is bound by Consumers Union.\n\n -24-\n\f The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for proceedings consistent\nwith this opinion.4\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n 4\n This court grants the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a sur-reply. In reaching\nthis decision, this court considered the sur-reply attached to the motion.\n\n -25-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Shondel CHURCH; Randall Lee Dalton; Dorian Samuels; Viola Bowman; Brian Richman, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. State of MISSOURI; Michael L. Parson, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Missouri, Defendants - Appellants Michael Barrett; H. Riley Bock; Charles R. Jackson; Craig Chval; A. Crista Hogan, Defendants\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2857\\n ___________________________\\n\\nShondel Church; Randall Lee Dalton; Dorian Samuels; Viola Bowman; Brian Richman\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n State of Missouri; Michael L. Parson,1 in his official capacity as Governor of the\\n State of Missouri\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants\\n\\nMichael Barrett; H. Riley Bock; Charles R. Jackson; Craig Chval; A. Crista Hogan\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 10, 2018\\n Filed: January 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\n\\n 1\\n While this appeal was pending, Eric R. Greitens resigned as governor of\\nMissouri. His successor, Michael L. Parson, is automatically substituted under\\nFederal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2). See Digital Recognition Network, Inc.\\nv. Hutchinson, 803 F.3d 952, 952 n.1 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\fBENTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n This is a class action against the State and governor of Missouri, the director of\\nthe Missouri State Public Defender office, and the commissioners of the Missouri\\nState Public Defender Commission. The plaintiffs alleged that the State “has failed\\nto meet its constitutional obligation to provide indigent defendants with meaningful\\nrepresentation.” Invoking sovereign immunity, the State and governor moved to\\ndismiss. The governor also invoked legislative immunity. The district court denied\\nthe motion. Church v. Missouri, 268 F. Supp. 3d 992 (W.D. Mo. 2017). The director\\nand commissioners do not appeal. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291\\nthrough the collateral order doctrine,2 this court reverses and remands.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n The Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent defendants in criminal cases the\\nright to appointed counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).\\nBecause the right to counsel is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial,” it is\\n“protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth\\nAmendment.” Id. at 341-42.\\n\\n The State usually provides counsel through the Missouri State Public Defender.\\nSee State ex rel. Missouri Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 875 (Mo.\\nbanc 2009) (indigent defense is “a duty which constitutionally is the burden of the\\nState,” and “[w]hen a defendant is found to be indigent in Missouri, the defendant’s\\nSixth Amendment right to counsel is usually met by the judge appointing the ‘Office\\nof State Public Defender’”) (citation omitted). Here, the plaintiffs “were all charged\\n\\n 2\\n See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.\\n139, 147 (1993); Fryberger v. University of Ark., 889 F.3d 471, 473 (8th Cir. 2018);\\nMcDonough Assocs., Inc. v. Grunloh, 722 F.3d 1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 2013); Scott v.\\nTaylor, 405 F.3d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 2005).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fwith crimes in Missouri state court and, as a result of their indigency, were entitled to\\nrepresentation by the MSPD.” They bring this lawsuit “on behalf of themselves and\\na putative class of all indigent defendants in criminal and juvenile proceedings in\\nMissouri who are eligible for representation by the MSPD.” The putative class does\\nnot include individuals seeking post-conviction relief. See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(e),\\n29.15(e) (requiring appointment of counsel for all pro se, indigent, post-conviction\\nmovants).\\n\\n The plaintiffs allege: “The State’s indigent defense budget is shockingly\\ninadequate. . . . Without sufficient funding, overstretched and under-resourced\\n[MSPD] attorneys are forced to handle far too many cases and to devote far too few\\nhours to each case.” They argue they “have suffered and continue to suffer the denial\\nof adequate counsel at critical stages of their criminal cases due to these systemic\\ncaseload problems among MSPD attorney.” They seek “a declaratory judgment\\nstating that their right to counsel is being violated and an order enjoining the ongoing\\nviolation of their rights and requiring Defendants to propose a remedial plan to the\\ncourt.”\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The State of Missouri invokes sovereign immunity for itself. “This court\\nreviews de novo questions of sovereign immunity.” Fryberger, 889 F.3d at 473.\\n“Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its\\nconsent.” Virginia Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011).\\nThe Eleventh Amendment is “one particular exemplification of that immunity.”\\nFederal Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753\\n(2002). The State removed this case to federal court, waiving its Eleventh\\nAmendment immunity. See Lapides v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535\\nU.S. 613, 624 (2002) (“We conclude that the State’s action joining the removing of\\nthis case to federal court waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity”).\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f But “[s]tates also enjoy a broader sovereign immunity, which applies against\\nall private suits, whether in state or federal court.” Beaulieu v. Vermont, 807 F.3d\\n478, 483 (2d Cir. 2015), citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“We have\\n. . . sometimes referred to the States’ immunity from suit as ‘Eleventh Amendment\\nimmunity.’ The phrase is convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the\\nsovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of\\nthe Eleventh Amendment.”). The Supreme Court “has repeatedly held that the\\nsovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text of the\\nEleventh Amendment.” Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 754.\\n\\n “The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the\\ndignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.” Id. at 760.\\nDeveloped at common law, “immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the\\nsovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution.”\\nAlden, 527 U.S. at 713. See also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414-16 (1979)\\n(explaining sovereign immunity’s common-law origins). “States entered the Union\\nwith their sovereign immunity intact, unlimited by Article III’s jurisdictional grant.”\\nStewart, 563 U.S. at 253. “The leading advocates of the Constitution assured the\\npeople in no uncertain terms that the Constitution would not strip the States of\\nsovereign immunity.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 716. “The founding generation thought it\\n‘neither becoming nor convenient that the several States of the Union, invested with\\nthat large residuum of sovereignty which had not been delegated to the United States,\\nshould be summoned as defendants to answer the complaints of private persons.’” Id.\\nat 748, quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887).\\n\\n “[N]either logic nor precedent supports the proposition that a state waives its\\ngeneral state sovereign immunity by removing an action from state court to federal\\ncourt.” Beaulieu, 807 F.3d at 486. Missouri’s state sovereign immunity applies\\nunless “it is waived or a statutory or recognized common law exception, such as\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fconsent, is applicable.” Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. City of Bellefontaine\\nNeighbors, 476 S.W.3d 913, 914 (Mo. banc 2016). The plaintiffs assert both a waiver\\nand a common-law exception, contending that sovereign immunity does not apply in\\nMissouri when a plaintiff seeks prospective equitable relief to enforce the State’s\\naffirmative duty or obligation.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Courts “give effect” to a state’s waiver of sovereign immunity “only where\\nstated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the\\ntext as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’” Port Auth.\\nTrans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305 (1990), quoting Atascadero State\\nHosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1985). Express language does appear in\\nsection 537.600, RSMo 2016, which “carve[s] out limited exceptions [for negligent\\noperation of motor vehicles and dangerous conditions of public property] to a general\\nrule of immunity.” Bellefontaine, 476 S.W.3d at 921.\\n\\n Emphasizing two Missouri Court of Appeals opinions, the plaintiffs argue that\\nsovereign immunity does not bar a claim for equitable relief to enforce the State’s\\naffirmative “duty or obligation.” In Wyman v. Missouri Department of Mental Health,\\n376 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Mo. App. 2012), the court of appeals said it “found no case which\\napplies § 537.600 to a claim seeking only equitable relief.” The Court of Appeals then\\nstated that “sovereign immunity does not necessarily bar a claim for injunctive relief\\nwhich seeks to reverse a state agency’s prior violation of its statutory obligations, or\\nto prevent future violations.” Wyman, 376 S.W.3d at 23. In 2018, the Court of\\nAppeals–citing the district court’s decision here–quoted and followed Wyman.\\nMissouri State Conf. of NAACP v. State, 2018 WL 5492832, at *6 (Mo. App. Oct.\\n30, 2018).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Both the Wyman and NAACP opinions fail to address the abundant contrary\\nMissouri authority on sovereign immunity. In 2016 and 2017, the Supreme Court of\\nMissouri stated: “Sovereign immunity is the rule, not the exception.” Bellefontaine,\\n476 S.W.3d at 914; Newsome v. Kansas City Mo. Sch. Dist., 520 S.W.3d 769, 775\\n(Mo. banc 2017). Of critical importance here, the Missouri Supreme Court held that\\n\\n in the absence of an express statutory exception to sovereign immunity,\\n or a recognized common law exception such as the proprietary function\\n and consent exceptions, sovereign immunity is the rule and applies to all\\n suits against public entities.\\n\\nBellefontaine, 476 S.W.3d at 921-22 (emphasis added). Because—except for\\nstatutory and common-law exceptions—sovereign immunity bars all suits against the\\nState, it bars suits for prospective equitable relief.\\n\\n The plaintiffs claim that Bellefontaine covers only suits for damages because\\nthat is all the plaintiff there sought. To the contrary, Bellefontaine follows the long-\\nestablished Missouri precedent on sovereign immunity. Granting injunctive relief\\nagainst an unconstitutional law in 1908, the Missouri Supreme Court held:\\n\\n That the sovereign state may not be sued is a truism . . . . But\\n defendants . . . . ministerial officers, charged to be about to do irreparable\\n injury . . . . are not beyond the strong arm of a court of equity.\\n\\nMerchants’ Exchange of St. Louis v. Knott, 111 S.W. 565, 574 (Mo. banc 1908)\\n(agreeing with the Ex parte Young doctrine for state injunction cases just two months\\nafter the United States Supreme Court’s decision). The Missouri Supreme Court has\\nrepeatedly followed this approach.\\n\\n The amenability of respondents as executive or administrative officers\\n of the State to the restrictive power of the courts in a proceeding of this\\n character has been frequently declared in a number of cases . . . . It is not\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f to be understood from these cases that the state itself can be enjoined;\\n but, when its officers act in an unconstitutional or illegal manner they are\\n not to be regarded as acting for the state, and they may be enjoined.\\n\\nCarson v. Sullivan, 223 S.W. 571, 571 (Mo. banc 1920) (citing several cases\\nincluding Merchants’ Exchange and Ex parte Young). See, e.g., Nacy v. Le Page,\\n111 S.W.2d 25, 25–26 (Mo. banc 1937) (“because the state may not be sued without\\nits consent” and because a garnishment “seeks to compel action on the part of the\\nstate,” a state court may not require the State to submit to a legal writ of garnishment)\\n(changed by § 525.310, RSMo 1943); State ex rel. Eagleton v. Hall, 389 S.W.2d 798,\\n801 (Mo. banc 1965) (a will-contest suit affecting residuary estate left to state is a suit\\nagainst the state, thus barred by sovereign immunity) , quoted in Bellefontaine, 476\\nS.W.3d at 921; Garland v. Ruhl, 455 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Mo. banc 2015) (even when\\na statute authorizes award of attorney fees against the state, sovereign immunity\\nprevents ordering the state to do so, due to strict construction of the statute).\\n\\n Because the two Court of Appeals opinions have a limited consideration of\\ncontrolling Missouri Supreme Court cases and fail even to address contrary authority,\\nthe Wyman and NAACP cases are not instructive as to how the Missouri Supreme\\nCourt would decide the sovereign immunity issue in this case. See United Fire &\\nCas. Co. v. Titan Contractors Serv., Inc., 751 F.3d 880, 885 n.2 (8th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n The plaintiffs cite five cases where the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed\\ninjunctions directed at the State. See Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Mo.\\nbanc 2006); Brooks v. State, 128 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Mo. banc 2004); Rolla 31 Sch.\\nDist. v. State, 837 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. banc 1992); Pohl v. State Highway Comm’n, 431\\nS.W.2d 99, 107 (Mo. banc 1968); Koplar v. State Tax Comm’n, 321 S.W.2d 686, 697\\n(Mo. 1959). These five cases, plaintiffs assert, show it is “perfectly ordinary” to\\nenjoin the State itself to force compliance with its obligations.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f First, in the three most recent cases, state officials–subject to Missouri’s Ex\\nparte Young doctrine–were also named as defendants. Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at\\n204 n.1 (secretary of state); Brooks, 128 S.W.3d at 846 (attorney general); Rolla, 837\\nS.W.2d at 2 & n. 2 (naming the “various state officials” who were defendants). The\\nPohl case is an “injunction suit by taxpayers.” Pohl, 431 S.W.2d at 100. See\\nManzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 656, 658-59 (Mo. banc 2011) (reviewing history of\\ntaxpayer suits since 1873 and holding “when a public interest is involved and public\\nmonies are being expended for an illegal purpose, taxpayers have the right to enjoin\\nthe action” so “government officials conform to the dictates of the law”). The Koplar\\ncase is a judicial review of administrative decisions under the Missouri Administrative\\nProcedure Act–specifically held to be a “waiver of sovereign immunity.” See St.\\nLouis County v. State, 424 S.W.3d 450, 454 n.3 (Mo. banc 2014) (statute authorizing\\njudicial review of administrative decisions is a waiver of sovereign immunity). As a\\nresult, none of these five cases even hint at the threshold question presented here:\\nwhether Missouri’s sovereign immunity covers suits for prospective equitable relief.\\n“Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the\\ncourt nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to\\nconstitute precedents.” Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170\\n(2004). See also Byrne & Jones Enters., Inc. v. Monroe City R-1 Sch. Dist., 493\\nS.W.3d 847, 855 (Mo. banc 2016) (“Judicial decisions must be construed with\\nreference to the facts and issues of the particular case, and that the authority of the\\ndecision as a precedent is limited to those points of law which are raised by the record,\\nconsidered by the court, and necessary to a decision.”) (citation omitted).\\n\\n Second, adopting the plaintiffs’ view creates a judicial exception to sovereign\\nimmunity. But Bellefontaine rejects that, explaining it would “not judicially create an\\nexception to the common law rule of sovereign immunity” to address the specific\\nsituation there because the issue presented “policy concerns . . . for the legislature.”\\nBellefontaine, 476 S.W.3d at 923. The legislature—not the judiciary—must waive\\nsovereign immunity. Id. at 921 (“This Court cannot read into the statute an exception\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fto sovereign immunity or imply waivers not explicitly created in the statute.”). See\\nalso Winston v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, Lawrence Cnty., 636 S.W.2d 324, 328\\n(Mo. banc 1982) (“[W]e are mindful of the oft repeated principle that, within\\nconstitutional limits, a sovereign may prescribe the terms and conditions under which\\nit may be sued, and the decision to waive immunity, and to what extent it is waived,\\nlies within the legislature’s purview.”). The parties have not cited a Missouri statute\\nthat waives sovereign immunity for prospective equitable relief. The five cases they\\ncite, Wyman/NAACP, or other states’ decisions cannot serve as a substitute.\\n\\n True, Bellefontaine does not address the precise issue here. But it says that\\nsovereign immunity “is the rule—not the exception—even in the absence of prior\\ncases specifically addressing this issue.” Bellefontaine, 476 S.W.3d at 922. “When\\nthere is no state supreme court case directly on point, our role is to predict how the\\nstate supreme court would rule if faced with the [same issue] before us.” Blankenship\\nv. USA Truck, Inc., 601 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (citation\\nomitted). See also Craven v. University of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 260 F.3d 1218, 1231\\n(10th Cir. 2001) (applying the same rule to a sovereign immunity issue). This court\\npredicts that the Missouri Supreme Court would apply Bellefontaine’s long-\\nestablished principles to cases involving prospective equitable relief. Missouri does\\nnot have a waiver of sovereign immunity for prospective equitable relief “stated by\\nthe most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will]\\nleave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Plaintiffs also assert a recognized common law exception to sovereign\\nimmunity. See Bellefontaine, 476 S.W.3d at 921-22 (stating sovereign immunity\\napplies to all suits, in the absence of a recognized common law exception). The\\nBellefontaine case notes two such exceptions, consent and “proprietary function” (of\\nmunicipalities). Id. Neither of these apply here.\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f Citing Blackstone, law review articles, a common-law case, and other state\\ncourts, the plaintiffs argue that “even at common law, courts of equity enforced the\\nCrown’s obligations.” See generally Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135\\nS. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015) (“It is true enough that we have long held that federal courts\\nmay in some circumstances grant injunctive relief against state officers who are\\nviolating, or planning to violate, federal law. . . . The ability to sue to enjoin\\nunconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity,\\nand reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back\\nto England.”) (emphasis added), citing Young, 209 U.S. at 150-51 (other citations\\nomitted).\\n\\n The State counters, with arguments based on the “law or equity” phrase in the\\nEleventh Amendment and the Supreme Court’s words in an Eleventh Amendment\\ncase that\\n\\n sovereign immunity applies regardless of whether a private plaintiff’s\\n suit is for monetary damages or some other type of relief. See [Seminole\\n Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996)] (“[W]e have often made\\n it clear that the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to\\n the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment”).\\n\\n\\nFed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 765-66 (emphasis added).\\n\\n These expertly briefed arguments are beside the point. The Missouri Supreme\\nCourt is the “custodian” of the common law in Missouri. Townsend v. Townsend,\\n708 S.W.2d 646, 649-50 (Mo. banc 1986). That Court has rejected that “the state\\nitself can be enjoined.” Carson, 223 S.W. at 571, following Merchants’ Exchange,\\n111 S.W. at 574. A recognized common law exception to Missouri’s sovereign\\nimmunity does not apply here.\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f III.\\n\\n The plaintiffs argue that even if sovereign immunity bars prospective injunctive\\nrelief, the State “can be sued directly for equitable relief for failing to comply with a\\nfederal constitutional obligation, here, the Sixth Amendment.” They stress First\\nEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987),\\nand Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994).\\n\\n In First English, the Supreme Court stated it “has frequently repeated the view\\nthat, in the event of a taking, the compensation remedy is required by the\\nConstitution.” First English, 482 U.S. at 316. It footnoted:\\n\\n The Solicitor General urges that the prohibitory nature of the Fifth\\n Amendment, combined with principles of sovereign immunity,\\n establishes that the Amendment itself is only a limitation on the power\\n of the Government to act, not a remedial provision. The cases cited in\\n the text, we think, refute the argument of the United States that “the\\n Constitution does not, of its own force, furnish a basis for a court to\\n award money damages against the government.”\\n\\nId. at 316 n.9 (citations omitted). In Reich, the Court explained that “a long line of\\ncases” establishes that “due process requires a ‘clear and certain’ remedy for taxes\\ncollected in violation of federal law,” and that “a denial by a state court of a recovery\\nof taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States by\\ncompulsion is itself in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment, the sovereign\\nimmunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts notwithstanding.” Reich, 513\\nU.S. at 108, 109-110 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n According to the plaintiffs, these cases (particularly the footnote in First\\nEnglish) mean that “where the Constitution places an affirmative obligation on the\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fState itself, the State cannot rely on state sovereign immunity to defeat a suit that aims\\nto force it to comply with that obligation.” But that is too broad a reading. Instead,\\nthe cases mean that “where the Constitution requires a particular remedy, such as\\nthrough the Due Process Clause for the tax monies at issue in Reich, or through the\\nTakings Clause as indicated in First English, the state is required to provide that\\nremedy in its own courts, notwithstanding sovereign immunity.” DLX, Inc. v.\\nKentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 528 (6th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). For the situation at\\nissue here, the Constitution does not require a “particular” or “clear and certain”\\nremedy.\\n\\n Congress may also abrogate state sovereign immunity by providing an\\nenforcement mechanism for constitutional violations:\\n\\n We have held also that in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the\\n people required the States to surrender a portion of the sovereignty that\\n had been preserved to them by the original Constitution, so that Congress\\n may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States pursuant to its\\n § 5 enforcement power. By imposing explicit limits on the powers of the\\n States and granting Congress the power to enforce them, the Amendment\\n fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by\\n the Constitution. When Congress enacts appropriate legislation to\\n enforce this Amendment, federal interests are paramount, and Congress\\n may assert an authority over the States which would be otherwise\\n unauthorized by the Constitution.\\n\\nAlden, 527 U.S. at 756 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also\\nUnited States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (“insofar as Title II [of the ADA]\\ncreates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that\\nactually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign\\nimmunity.”). No statutory enforcement mechanism exists here.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\f IV.\\n\\n The governor asserts sovereign immunity. The plaintiffs argue that sovereign\\nimmunity does not shield the governor because he is an Ex parte Young defendant.\\n“Under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, a private party can sue a state officer in his\\nofficial capacity to enjoin a prospective action that would violate federal law.” 281\\nCare, 638 F.3d at 632. The doctrine “rests on the premise—less delicately called a\\n‘fiction’—that when a federal court commands a state official to do nothing more than\\nrefrain from violating federal law, he is not the State for sovereign-immunity\\npurposes.” Stewart, 563 U.S. at 255 (internal citation omitted). See also Hutchinson,\\n803 F.3d at 957 (“Enforcement of unconstitutional legislation ‘is simply an illegal act\\nupon the part of [the] state official,’ and the State may not immunize officials from\\nsuit for such violations of the Constitution.”), quoting Young, 209 U.S. at 159.\\n\\n “In determining whether this exception applies, a court conducts ‘a\\nstraightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges [1] an ongoing violation\\nof federal law and [2] seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” 281 Care,\\n638 F.3d at 632, quoting Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of\\nMaryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (alterations added). On the first inquiry, the\\nofficial must have “some connection to the enforcement of the challenged laws.”\\nCalzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2017), citing Young, 209 U.S. at 157.\\nSee also 281 Care, 638 F.3d at 632. “Without that connection, the officer would be\\nsued merely ‘as a representative of the state’ in an impermissible attempt to ‘make the\\nstate a party.’” Hutchinson, 803 F.3d at 960, quoting Young, 209 U.S. at 157.\\n“[T]hat connection does not need to be primary authority to enforce the challenged\\nlaw.” 281 Care, 638 F.3d at 632. “Nor does the [state officer] need to have the full\\npower to redress a plaintiff’s injury in order to have ‘some connection’ with the\\nchallenged law.” Id. at 633.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -13-\\n\\f Ruling that the governor is an Ex parte Young defendant, the district court\\nidentified three connections to the enforcement of the State’s Sixth Amendment\\nobligation to provide indigent defendants with adequate counsel.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n The district court noted the governor’s general-enforcement authority. The\\nMissouri Constitution says, “The supreme executive power shall be vested in a\\ngovernor,” and “The governor shall take care that the laws are distributed and\\nfaithfully executed, and shall be a conservator of the peace throughout the state.” Mo.\\nConst. art. IV, §§ 1-2. The district court also cited a Missouri statute: “When\\ndirected by the governor, the attorney general, or one of his assistants, shall aid any\\nprosecuting or circuit attorney in the discharge of their respective duties in the trial\\ncourts and in examinations before grand juries . . . .” § 27.030, RSMo.\\n\\n The district court concluded that these provisions make the Missouri governor\\nlike the Georgia governor in Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988). There,\\nindigent defendants sought injunctive relief against a governor to remedy Sixth\\nAmendment violations. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1013. The Eleventh Circuit held that\\nGeorgia’s governor had “some connection” and was an “appropriate part[y] against\\nwhom prospective relief could be ordered” because:\\n\\n According to the Georgia constitution, the governor is responsible for\\n law enforcement in that state and is charged with executing the laws\\n faithfully. The governor further has the residual power to commence\\n criminal prosecutions, and has the final authority to direct the Attorney\\n General to “institute and prosecute” on behalf of the state.\\n\\nId. at 1016 (internal citations omitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -14-\\n\\f The governor here argues that this court’s Calzone decision trumps Luckey.\\nThe Calzone plaintiff sought an injunction against the Missouri governor in a\\nchallenge to the constitutionality of a state statute. Calzone, 866 F.3d at 869. This\\ncourt held that neither the statute nor the Missouri Constitution’s general-enforcement\\nprovision make the governor an Ex parte Young defendant:\\n\\n No provision in Chapter 304 or the statutes defining his executive\\n authority specifically authorizes the governor to enforce the vehicle\\n inspection statutes. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 26.010-.225. The Missouri\\n Constitution confers upon the governor the duty to “take care that the\\n laws are distributed and faithfully executed,” Mo. Const. art. IV, § 2, but\\n such a general executive responsibility is an insufficient connection to\\n the enforcement of a statute to avoid the Eleventh Amendment. See Fitts\\n v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 530 (1899).\\n\\nId. at 870.\\n\\n The plaintiffs try to distinguish Calzone because the statute there “delegated\\nenforcement exclusively to the superintendent of the highway patrol,” meaning “[t]he\\nGovernor was not a proper defendant because he has no connection to the statute. . . .\\nUnlike the statute in Calzone, the State’s constitutional obligation to provide adequate\\ncounsel—and the Governor’s role in its failure to do so—cannot be delegated\\nexclusively to the MSPD.”\\n\\n Although Calzone is factually distinguishable, its guidance on the Missouri\\ngovernor’s general-enforcement authority is consistent with this court’s precedent.\\nSee Hutchinson, 803 F.3d at 961; Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d\\n859 (8th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.\\n2584 (2015).\\n\\n In Bruning, the Nebraska governor and attorney general were Ex parte Young\\ndefendants in a suit to enjoin enforcement of a state constitutional amendment.\\n\\n -15-\\n\\fBruning, 455 F.3d at 864. This court found a sufficient connection to the\\nenforcement of the amendment because “the Governor and the Attorney General have\\nbroad powers to enforce the State’s Constitution and statutes.” Id. The Hutchinson\\ndecision clarifies that statement from Bruning:\\n\\n [T]he court’s statement [in Bruning] must be read in context. In\\n Bruning, the “broad powers” of the officials included authority to\\n enforce the constitutional amendment at issue. The Nebraska attorney\\n general has power to enforce the Nebraska Constitution by bringing suit\\n for a declaratory judgment that a state statute is unconstitutional, or for\\n an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of a state statute on the\\n grounds that it is unconstitutional. The Nebraska governor has some\\n connection to the enforcement of the Nebraska Constitution because he\\n may direct the attorney general to file suit to enjoin application of an\\n unconstitutional state statute. That sort of enforcement authority is\\n lacking with respect to [the] statute [at issue in Hutchinson] that provides\\n only for private civil enforcement.\\n\\nHutchinson, 803 F.3d at 961 (internal citations omitted).\\n\\n The Bruning and Hutchinson decisions mean that a governor’s general-\\nenforcement authority is “some connection” if that authority gives the governor\\nmethods of enforcement. The governor in Bruning had a method of enforcement\\nbecause he could direct the attorney general to seek equitable relief. But the\\ngovernors in Calzone and Hutchinson did not have a comparable enforcement\\nmechanism.\\n\\n Nor does the governor here. The district court’s reliance on section 27.030 is\\ninsufficient because that provision covers aiding prosecution, not defense. The\\ngovernor’s general-enforcement authority is not “some connection” to enforcement\\nof the State’s Sixth Amendment obligation. See Calzone, 866 F.3d at 870. See also\\nAir Evac EMS, Inc. v. Texas, Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp., 851 F.3d 507,\\n\\n\\n -16-\\n\\f517 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[A] state governor with a broad duty to uphold state law is not\\na proper defendant.”); Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th\\nCir. 1992) (“[A] generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory power\\nover the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision will not subject\\nan official to suit.”); Shell Oil Co. v. Noel, 608 F.2d 208, 211 (1st Cir. 1979) (“The\\nmere fact that a governor is under a general duty to enforce state laws does not make\\nhim a proper defendant in every action attacking the constitutionality of a state\\nstatute.”).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n The district court ruled the governor had “some connection” because he\\n“appoints all seven members of the MSPD Commission.” Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d\\nat 1013, citing § 600.015.1, RSMo (“The commission shall be composed of seven\\nmembers . . . appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate.”).\\nThe district court cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Eu, where a bar association sued\\na governor to challenge a state statute that limited the number of judges in a county.\\nEu, 979 F.2d at 699. The governor had “a duty to appoint judges to any\\nnewly-created judicial positions,” which the Ninth Circuit considered to be “a specific\\nconnection to the challenged statute,” placing the governor within Ex parte Young’s\\nscope. Id. at 704.\\n\\n Invoking Eu, the plaintiffs argue: “although the Governor alone cannot solve\\nthe indigent defense crisis in this state, his role in the ongoing violation of those Sixth\\nAmendment rights through his appointment of MSPD Commissioners, in addition to\\nhis ability to profoundly affect MSPD caseload, is sufficient for Ex parte Young\\npurposes.” The governor counters with this court’s decision in Balogh v. Lombardi,\\n816 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 2016).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -17-\\n\\f In Balogh, a Missouri statute gave a private right of action against anyone who,\\nwithout the approval of the Director of Corrections, knowingly discloses the identity\\nof an execution-team member. Balogh, 816 F.3d at 539. The statute also gave the\\ndirector authority to select those members. Id. This court ruled that the director’s\\nselection authority is only “administrative or ministerial,” and not “some connection”\\nto the statute’s enforcement:\\n\\n Although the director’s authority to delineate the members of the\\n execution team does affect who might have a private right of action\\n against [someone disclosing the identity of execution team members], it\\n has nothing to do with an execution team member’s potential prosecution\\n of such an action. Selection of the execution team constitutes\\n implementation of the statute in an administrative or ministerial sense\\n and is not analogous to enforcing the statute’s non-disclosure provision\\n through a civil or criminal prosecution. The director’s authority to\\n define the members of the execution team is not an enforcement action\\n within the meaning of Ex Parte Young and its progeny.\\n\\nId. at 546.\\n\\n Like in Balogh, appointing members of the MSPD Commission is an\\nadministrative act. See State ex rel. Sikes v. Williams, 121 S.W. 64, 65 (Mo. banc\\n1909) (“The confirmations by the Senate of appointments made by the Governor are\\nnot legislative acts . . . . Such acts by the Governor concerning appointments are\\nmerely administrative . . . .”). It does not give the governor some connection to the\\nState’s Sixth Amendment obligation. The Balogh decision, not Eu, binds this court.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n The district court concluded the governor met the “some connection”\\nrequirement because of his appropriation-reduction authority:\\n\\n\\n\\n -18-\\n\\f Governor Greitens’s predecessor, Governor Nixon, affirmatively used\\n his executive authority to withhold roughly $7 million in funding\\n allocated by the Missouri Legislature to the MSPD, thereby\\n demonstrating an even more direct “connection” to the challenged\\n conduct. Governor Greitens has since upheld Governor Nixon's\\n withholding of funds allocated to the MSPD.\\n\\nChurch, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 1012-13 (internal citation omitted). In addition to arguing\\nthat his appropriation-reduction authority is not “some connection”, the governor\\nasserts legislative immunity.\\n\\n “[S]tate legislators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their\\nlegislative acts.” Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 446 U.S.\\n719, 732 (1980). “[O]fficials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative\\nimmunity when they perform legislative functions.” Bogan v. Scott–Harris, 523 U.S.\\n44, 55 (1998). “Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than\\non the motive or intent of the official performing it.” Id. at 54. The act must be\\nlegislative “in substance,” bearing “all the hallmarks of traditional legislation,” and\\n“in form,” involving “integral steps in the legislative process.” Id. at 55.\\n\\n The district court suggested that the governor’s “withholding of funds is a\\nlegislative function entitled to legislative immunity.” Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at\\n1020. It emphasized Abbey v. Rowland, 359 F. Supp. 2d 94, 100 (D. Conn. 2005):\\n\\n Nothing could be more integral to the legislative process than [proposing\\n a budget]. The Governor’s choices of exactly how to cut the budget may\\n have been discretionary, but they were policy choices of broad import.\\n The fact that any budget reduction would necessarily have an adverse\\n impact on some employment does not change the budgetary decision\\n from a legislative to an administrative function.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -19-\\n\\f Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that a “discretionary, policymaking decision\\nimplicating the budgetary priorities of the [government] and the services the\\n[government] provides to its constituents” is a “hallmark[] of traditional legislation.”\\nBogan, 523 U.S. at 55-56. And in Missouri, “the budget process . . . begins and ends\\nwith the Governor,” making the governor’s appropriation reduction legislative in\\nform. See Missouri Health Care Ass’n v. Holden, 89 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Mo. banc\\n2002). The Missouri Constitution “does not permit the state to spend money it does\\nnot have” and “broadly authorizes the Governor to balance the state’s budget in the\\nevent that state revenues fall below the revenue expectations.” Id. at 506-07, citing\\nMo. Const. art. IV, § 27. A Missouri governor’s appropriation reduction is a\\nlegislative act.\\n\\n The district court, however, ruled that it was premature to apply legislative\\nimmunity “because it is unclear what the terms of any injunction entered would\\ninclude. . . . That finding is subject to change should the Plaintiffs request any\\nremedies that would violate Gov. Greitens’ immunity from acts ‘integral’ to the\\nlegislative process.” Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 1020. By that rationale, the\\nremedy—not the challenged act—guides whether legislative immunity applies.\\n\\n The governor counters: “legislative immunity is an immunity from suit, not\\nmerely an immunity from the award of certain types of relief. The district court’s\\nrationale would enable any plaintiff to defeat legislative immunity merely by making\\na vague and indefinite request for ‘injunctive and declaratory relief.’”\\n\\n The Supreme Court’s decision in Consumers Union addresses this issue. There,\\nthe Supreme Court of Virginia, in addition to its inherent authority, used its statutory\\nauthority to promulgate a professional ethics code. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at\\n721. The Virginia legislature “vested in the court virtually its entire legislative or\\nregulatory power over the legal profession.” Id. at 722. The court also had the power\\nto enforce its professional ethics code. Id. at 722-24.\\n\\n -20-\\n\\f The plaintiffs believed that the code’s provision on attorney advertisement\\nviolated the First Amendment. Id. at 726. They sued the Virginia Court and its chief\\njustice in his personal and official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking a\\ndeclaration that the provision was unconstitutional and an injunction against its\\nenforcement. Id. at 725-26. The chief justice and the court asserted legislative\\nimmunity. Id. at 730. The Supreme Court concluded (1) the Virginia court’s\\npromulgation of the professional ethics code was a legislative act, (2) “the Virginia\\nCourt and its members are immune from suit when acting in their legislative\\ncapacity,” and (3) legislative immunity applies to suits for equitable relief. Id. at 731-\\n32, 734.\\n\\n The Supreme Court, however, did not apply legislative immunity: “If the sole\\nbasis for appellees’ § 1983 action against the Virginia Court and its chief justice were\\nthe issuance of, or failure to amend, the challenged rules, legislative immunity would\\nforeclose suit against appellants.” Id. at 734 (emphasis added). But the Court\\nconcluded that the Virginia court’s enforcement authority was a non-legislative act:\\n“the Virginia Court performs more than a legislative role with respect to the State Bar\\nCode. It also hears appeals from lower court decisions in disciplinary cases, a\\ntraditional adjudicative task; and in addition, it has independent enforcement authority\\nof its own.” Id. “For this reason the Virginia Court and its members were proper\\ndefendants in a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief.” Id. at 736.\\n\\n Under Consumers Union, the “basis” for suit governs whether legislative\\nimmunity “foreclose[s] suit.” The Second Circuit, however, has a different\\ninterpretation of Consumers Union: legislators “must still show, before they are\\nafforded the protections of legislative immunity as to claims for injunctive relief, that\\nthe requested relief would enjoin them in their legislative capacities.” State\\nEmployees Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 93 (2d Cir. 2007).\\nAccording to the Second Circuit, the Consumers Union decision\\n\\n -21-\\n\\f applied legislative immunity to bar plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief\\n insofar as the relief sought would compel the defendants to perform a\\n legislative act—the repeal or amendment of the state’s bar code to\\n conform with constitutional requirements. The Court concluded,\\n however, that legislative immunity did not bar claims for injunctive\\n relief that would enjoin the defendant justices from committing a\\n distinctly non-legislative act—independent enforcement of the\\n unconstitutional provisions of the bar code against particular individuals.\\n\\n\\n\\nId. at 88, citing Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 733-36. The Second Circuit assumed\\nthat the Consumers Union plaintiffs sought “declaratory and injunctive relief that\\nwould have forced the Supreme Court [of Virginia] to amend or repeal the code.” Id.\\nat 83-84. Through that assumption, the Second Circuit appears to interpret Consumers\\nUnion’s enforcement discussion to mean that if the suit sought only amendment or\\nrepeal, then that suit would have been barred by legislative immunity. Id. By the\\nSecond Circuit’s reading of the case, the suit also sought an injunction against\\nenforcement, meaning legislative immunity was not a bar in Consumers Union.\\n\\n But Consumers Union does not say that the plaintiffs there sought to amend or\\nrepeal the code. The Court’s only reference to amendment or repeal was as a “basis”\\nfor suit—the Virginia court’s “issuance of, or failure to amend, the challenged rules.”\\nConsumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734. True, the Consumers Union plaintiffs did seek\\nan injunction against enforcement. But the Virginia’s court’s enforcement of the\\nprofessional ethics code also was a basis for suit: “[M]ere enforcement authority does\\nnot create a case or controversy with the enforcement official; but in the circumstances\\nof this case, a sufficiently concrete dispute is as well made out against the Virginia\\nCourt as an enforcer . . . .” Id. at 736 n.15. In other words, the Virginia court’s\\nenforcement—in addition to its promulgation—of the professional ethics code was a\\nnon-legislative act that violated the First Amendment, providing a separate basis for\\nsuit not barred by legislative immunity. See Alia v. Michigan Supreme Court, 906\\n\\n -22-\\n\\fF.2d 1100, 1107 (6th Cir. 1990) (Wellford, J., dissenting) (analyzing Consumers\\nUnion and concluding “to the extent the individual justices acted in a rulemaking\\ncapacity, they are entitled to legislative immunity, but to the extent they acted in an\\nenforcement capacity, they are not entitled to claim legislative immunity”) (underlines\\nadded).\\n\\n In the end, these ambiguities do not impact the result here. In Consumers\\nUnion, the Supreme Court states: “If the sole basis for appellees’ § 1983 action\\nagainst the Virginia Court and its chief justice were the issuance of, or failure to\\namend, the challenged rules, legislative immunity would foreclose suit against\\nappellants.” Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734 (emphasis added). In the complaint\\nhere, the plaintiffs allege:\\n\\n As chief executive of the State, Governor Greitens bears ultimate\\n responsibility for the provision of constitutionally mandated services,\\n including indigent defense, to the people of Missouri. The Governor of\\n Missouri appoints the members of the Missouri State Public Defender\\n Commission, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Governor\\n has claimed the authority to withhold money budgeted to the Missouri\\n State Public Defender’s Office and has exercised that claimed authority\\n in recent years, including fiscal year 2017.\\n\\nAs discussed above, to the extent the plaintiffs claim that the governor’s general-\\nenforcement authority and appointment authority are non-legislative acts that lead to\\na constitutional violation, the governor is subject to sovereign immunity for those acts\\nbecause they do not satisfy Ex parte Young.\\n\\n That leaves as “the sole basis” for the plaintiffs’ action against the governor his\\nappropriation reduction—a legislative act—meaning legislative immunity\\n“foreclose[s] suit” against him. See id. at 734. The Supreme Court used the word\\n“suit,” not “remedy.” This approach is consistent with how the Supreme Court treats\\nsovereign immunity: “Sovereign immunity does not merely constitute a defense to\\n\\n -23-\\n\\fmonetary liability or even to all types of liability. Rather, it provides an immunity\\nfrom suit.” Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 766 (emphasis added).\\n\\n Even if the governor’s appropriation-reduction authority is not shielded by\\nsovereign immunity through Ex parte Young, legislative immunity, a separate defense,\\nforecloses suit against the governor. See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734. See\\nalso Tolman v. Finneran, 171 F. Supp. 2d 31, 37-38 (D. Mass. 2001) (“Short of the\\nexceptional case, it is unlikely that Ex Parte Young is broad enough to abrogate\\nlegislative immunity and authorize suit against a legislator acting in a purely\\nlegislative capacity.”).3\\n\\n *******\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The plaintiffs argue that legislative immunity is a personal defense that does\\nnot apply to official-capacity suits, like the one here. They cite Roach v. Stouffer, 560\\nF.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2009), quoting a Second Circuit decision: “immunity, either\\nabsolute or qualified, is a personal defense that is available only when officials are\\nsued in their individual capacities; the immunities officials enjoy when sued\\npersonally do not extend to instances where they are sued in their official capacities.”\\nRoach, 560 F.3d at 870, quoting Almonte v. City of Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100, 106\\n(2d Cir. 2007). But under Consumers Union, legislative immunity applies to official-\\ncapacity suits. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 725-26, 734. See also Scott v. Taylor,\\n405 F.3d 1251, 1254 n.4, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005) (analyzing Consumers Union and\\nKentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985), and “hold[ing] that the legislator\\ndefendants in the instant official capacity suit for prospective relief are entitled to\\nabsolute immunity.”). The Second Circuit–recognizing the tension between Almonte\\nand Consumers Union–limited Almonte to “claims against local-level officials, rather\\nthan state officials.” Rowland, 494 F.3d at 86, 88 (“claims for injunctive relief against\\ndefendant state officials, sued in their official capacities, may be barred by the\\ndoctrine of legislative immunity”). To the extent Roach conflicts with Consumers\\nUnion, this court is bound by Consumers Union.\\n\\n -24-\\n\\f The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion.4\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n This court grants the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a sur-reply. In reaching\\nthis decision, this court considered the sur-reply attached to the motion.\\n\\n -25-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":296,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4580414,"string":"4,580,414"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"RYAN DATA EXCHANGE, LTD.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, Doing Business as Rydex, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. GRACO, INC., Defendant - Appellant Ryan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, Doing Business as Rydex, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. Graco, Inc., Defendant - Appellee Ryan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, Doing Business as Rydex, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Graco, Inc., Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Ryan Data Exchange, Ltd. v. Graco, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-1451; 17-1746; 17-1772"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Beam, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BEAM, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-1451\\n ___________________________\\n\\nRyan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, doing business as Rydex\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Graco, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-1746\\n ___________________________\\n\\nRyan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, doing business as Rydex\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Graco, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-1772\\n ___________________________\\n\\nRyan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, doing business as Rydex\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\f Graco, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeals from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 26, 2018\\n Filed: January 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, BEAM, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBEAM, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n After a jury found in favor of Ryan Data Exchange (Rydex) in its breach of\\ncontract claim against Graco,1 and against Graco in its counterclaims against Rydex,\\nGraco sought to set the jury's verdict aside, renewed its motion for judgment as a\\nmatter of law, and moved for new trial, all of which the district court2 denied. The\\ndistrict court further awarded $204,221.50 in attorney's fees to Rydex. Graco appeals.\\nRydex also appeals, challenging the district court's reduction of its requested amount\\nof attorney's fees. We affirm.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The district court disposed of Rydex's claim for patent infringement against\\nGraco ruling on a motion in limine prior to trial.\\n 2\\n The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern\\nDistrict of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fI. BACKGROUND\\n\\n On September 13, 2005, Rydex and Graco entered into a Settlement and\\nLicense Agreement (Agreement) in which Rydex granted Graco a patent license. In\\nthe instant action, the parties litigated three provisions of the Agreement at trial: (1)\\nthe provision wherein Rydex granted Graco an exclusive license to make, have made,\\nuse, and sell articles covered by the patent (§ 3.0); (2) the Agreement's provision that\\nif a third party were to infringe the patent, Rydex would have the initial choice and\\nobligation to prosecute the infringement (§ 11); and (3) a provision stating that Graco\\nwould pay Rydex royalties of 5% of the net selling price of its product using the\\npatent (§ 4.1).\\n\\n Relevant to the instant litigation, in 2011, years after the parties entered into the\\nAgreement, Rydex initiated a lawsuit alleging patent infringement against Badger\\nMeter, Inc., Balcrank Corp., and Lincoln Industrial Corp. (collectively, Badger). The\\ndistrict court found, and the trial evidence revealed, a unique set of circumstances\\nregarding Badger's infringement, in that at the time Rydex and Graco entered into the\\n2005 Agreement, both parties were aware that Badger was allegedly already\\ninfringing the patent, and yet the Agreement purported to give Graco an exclusive\\nright to the patent. In 2012 Rydex and Badger filed a stipulation of dismissal and\\nagreed that Rydex's claims and Badger's counterclaims in the matter would be\\ndismissed with prejudice. This dismissal between Rydex and Badger is the source of\\nGraco's claim against Rydex for failure to prosecute infringement under the\\nAgreement.\\n\\n Graco stopped paying royalties to Rydex as of December 31, 2013, as Graco\\nbelieved that Rydex had breached the Agreement's exclusivity provision and the\\npatent infringement prosecution provision (§§ 3 and 11) by allowing Badger to\\ncontinue its infringement and by failing to fully prosecute the infringement claim\\nagainst Badger. In May 2014, Rydex filed the instant complaint alleging breach of\\ncontract and patent infringement by Graco. Graco countersued, also alleging breach\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fof contract and seeking declaratory judgments that the patent was invalid and that\\nRydex had lost its right to receive royalty payments under the Agreement due to its\\nalleged breaches.\\n\\n A jury trial was held in November 2016 on all of the contract claims then\\npending. During trial Graco moved pursuant to Rule 50(a) for judgment as a matter\\nof law at the close of Rydex's case-in-chief, claiming in part that it had established\\nthrough cross-examination that Rydex had breached its duty under the Agreement to\\nprosecute the Badger litigation, and that Rydex had breached the exclusivity provision\\nof the Agreement. In ruling on Graco's motions from the bench, the district court held\\nas a matter of law that Rydex had breached its duty to prosecute infringement as of\\nthe date of the dismissal of the Badger litigation in 2012, and that Rydex was in\\nbreach of the exclusivity provision of the Agreement from the date of the dismissal\\nof the Badger litigation until the expiration of the patent on March 10, 2015.\\nAccordingly, the court granted Graco's Rule 50 motion to that extent. There was no\\nruling by the court as to whether Rydex breached the Agreement by failing to provide\\nGraco an exclusive license from the date the parties entered into the Agreement in\\n2005 until the dismissal of the Badger litigation in 2012.\\n\\n In that same colloquy, the district court additionally ruled as a matter of law that\\nby way of Rydex's dismissal of the case against Badger and by failing to fully\\nprosecute the matter, Rydex necessarily created an implied license (i.e., there existed\\na reasonable inference that Rydex consented to Badger's use of the patent), at the very\\nleast, with regard to Badger's past infringement, at the time of the dismissal of the\\nlitigation against Badger. In a seeming attempt to correct any potential\\nmisunderstanding of its rulings, the district court clarified that despite the terms of the\\nAgreement, the record was clear that both parties operated under the Agreement with\\nthe knowledge and understanding that there was some threat to either the validity of\\nthe patent altogether, or the existence of potential infringing third parties, over a\\nperiod of several years before Rydex ever initiated the action against Badger. Because\\nof that knowledge on both sides, the court held it could not rule as a matter of law on\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fthe issue of Rydex's alleged breach of the Agreement at any time prior to the dismissal\\nof the Badger litigation. The court held that particular issue of contract interpretation\\nand breach was a matter for the jury.\\n\\n The parties discussed throughout, and after trial, how to \\\"package\\\" this case for\\nthe jury in light of the court's Rule 50 rulings. Accordingly, the case was presented\\nto the jury for very particular determinations with a verdict form consisting of five\\nnarrow questions for the jury. Instruction 7, titled \\\"Elements of Breach of Contract,\\\"\\nstated the elements required to prove a breach of contract under Iowa law, and also\\ninstructed the jury regarding the district court's prior grant of judgment as a matter of\\nlaw in favor of Graco:\\n\\n Regarding the Rydex Parties' breach of contract claim, it is for you to\\n decide whether Graco breached the License Agreement by failing to pay\\n royalties to the Rydex Parties for the period ending December 31, 2013,\\n through the date of the expiration of the '180 patent on March 10, 2015.\\n\\n Regarding Graco's breach of contract claim, the Court has found as a\\n matter of law that the Rydex Parties were not required to commence an\\n infringement action prior to the filing of the Badger Litigation. The\\n Court has also found as a matter of law that the Rydex Parties were in\\n breach of the duty to prosecute infringement as of the date of the\\n dismissal of the Badger Litigation on August 15, 2012. The Court has\\n further found as a matter of law that the Rydex Parties were in breach of\\n the exclusivity provision of the License Agreement from the date of the\\n dismissal of the Badger Litigation on August 15, 2012, until the\\n expiration of the '180 patent on March 10, 2015. You must accept these\\n facts as having been proved. It is for you to decide whether the Rydex\\n Parties were in breach of the exclusivity provision of the License\\n Agreement from the date the parties entered into that license agreement\\n on September 13, 2005, through the dismissal of the Badger Litigation\\n on August 15, 2012.\\n\\n Instruction 8 informed the jury as to how to interpret the contract, including\\nhow to consider the intent of the parties gleaned from surrounding circumstances and\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fthe contract language itself, how to give meaning to the contract language, and how\\nto handle potentially ambiguous language, etc. Additionally, Instruction 11 instructed\\nthe jury on the definition of an implied license, and specifically instructed that \\\"the\\nCourt has ruled an implied license was created as to the Badger litigation when that\\ncase was dismissed with prejudice on August 15, 2012, as to any Badger use of the\\n'180 Patent prior to that date.\\\" There was no direct discussion of materiality in the\\njury instructions or verdict form.\\n\\n Upon deliberation, the jury found, first, that Rydex proved at trial that Graco\\nbreached the Agreement by failing to pay royalties to Rydex from December 31, 2013,\\nthrough the date of the expiration of the patent on March 10, 2015; and awarded\\nRydex $313,000 in damages. Next, in response to the query regarding the amount of\\ndamages due Graco as a result of Rydex's breaches already determined by the court\\nas a matter of law and laid out for the jury in Instruction 7 (i.e., its breach of duty to\\nprosecute infringement and the breach of the exclusivity provision of the Agreement\\nat the time of the Badger litigation dismissal), the jury answered \\\"$0.00.\\\" As to the\\nquestion to the jury as to whether Graco proved that Rydex breached the Agreement\\nby failing to provide Graco an exclusive license from the date the parties entered into\\nthe Agreement on September 13, 2005, until the dismissal of the Badger litigation on\\nAugust 15, 2012, the jury answered \\\"no.\\\"\\n\\n Post-trial, Graco, pursuant to Rule 50(b), renewed its motion for judgment as\\na matter of law, asking the district court to grant judgment in its favor and to rule that\\nRydex was not entitled to damages given the court's earlier ruling that Rydex breached\\nthe Agreement. In its order on the post-trial requests, the district court made clear that\\nalthough it had determined as a matter of law that Rydex breached the Agreement, it\\nhad not made any determination as to materiality–the legal finding the court held was\\nnecessary in order to preclude Rydex's recovery of the royalty payments. The court\\nclarified that the materiality of a breach is a factual issue for the jury and reviewed the\\ninstructions given the jury, the evidence presented at trial, and the verdict itself to\\narrive at its determination that the jury necessarily determined that Rydex had not\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fmaterially breached the Agreement, as Rydex's breaches did not deprive Graco of a\\nbenefit it justifiably expected. Too, the court additionally noted that evidence of\\nGraco's continued use of the patent after Rydex's breaches in 2012 supported the jury's\\nverdict, as Graco's continued exploitation of its license after what it now claims was\\na breach of the terms of the Agreement, precluded Graco's nonperformance in\\nwithholding royalty payments from Rydex. The district court likewise denied Graco's\\nmotions to alter or amend the judgment, its motion for new trial, and its motion for\\nremittitur upon similar reasoning. The district court subsequently awarded attorney's\\nfees. These appeals ensued.\\n\\nII. DISCUSSION\\n\\n We review the district court's denial of Graco's motion for judgment as a matter\\nof law de novo, viewing the record in a light most favorable to the verdict. Sturgis\\nMotorcycle Rally, Inc. v. Rushmore Photo & Gifts, Inc., 908 F.3d 313, 322 (8th Cir.\\n2018). \\\"We review a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion.\\\" Washington v.\\nDenney, 900 F.3d 549, 558 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Smiley v. Gary Crossley Ford,\\nInc., 859 F.3d 545, 552 (8th Cir. 2017)). \\\"[T]he law places a high standard on\\noverturning a jury verdict because of the danger that the jury's rightful province will\\nbe invaded when judgment as a matter of law is misused.\\\" Id. (alteration in original)\\n(quoting Bavlsik v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 870 F.3d 800, 805 (8th Cir. 2017), cert.\\ndenied, 138 S. Ct. 1991 (2018)). \\\"We are hesitant 'to interfere with a jury verdict,' as\\nreflected in the 'analysis for considering renewed JML motions.'\\\" Id. (quoting\\nBavlsik, 870 F.3d at 805, cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 1991 (2018)).\\n\\n In ruling on a motion for [judgment as a matter of law], the district court\\n must (1) consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the\\n prevailing party, (2) assume that all conflicts in the evidence were\\n resolved in favor of the prevailing party, (3) assume as proved all facts\\n that the prevailing party's evidence tended to prove, and (4) give the\\n prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may\\n reasonably be drawn from the facts proved. That done, the court must\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f then deny the motion if reasonable persons could differ as to the\\n conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.\\n\\nId., 900 F.3d at 558-59 (alteration in original) (quoting Haynes v. Bee-Line Trucking\\nCo., 80 F.3d 1235, 1238 (8th Cir. 1996)).\\n\\n A. Materiality Requirement under Iowa Contract Law\\n\\n On appeal, Graco argues, as it did to the district court in its Rule 50(a) and\\n50(b) motions, that under Iowa law when a party breaches a contract it cannot enforce\\nthe terms of the agreement or recover any damages under a breach of contract claim.\\nGraco focuses on the element in Instruction 7–that to establish a breach of contract,\\nthe party alleging breach must prove that it has done what the contract\\nrequires–claiming that because it is undisputed that Rydex breached two provisions\\nof the Agreement (its duty to provide exclusivity, and its duty to prosecute the\\ninfringement), and that it did so prior to Graco's alleged breach on December 31,\\n2013, (when it stopped making royalty payments), Rydex is not entitled to damages\\nbecause it failed to prove it had \\\"done what the contract requires.\\\" Accordingly,\\nGraco claims that the district court's finding of Rydex's breaches should have\\nprecluded recovery for Rydex under Iowa law. Rydex counters that under Iowa law,\\nfor a breach to excuse the performance of the non-breaching party and preclude\\nrecovery, the breach must be material.\\n\\n This issue of materiality, as well as Graco's choice to continue receiving\\nbenefits under the Agreement despite Rydex's breaches, were raised at myriad times\\nthroughout this litigation including, but not limited to, the parties' pre-trial summary\\njudgment filings, during trial by the district court and the parties in the discussion\\nregarding Graco's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Rydex's case-\\nin-chief, and again post-trial in Graco's renewed motions. Too, on multiple occasions,\\nthe district court discussed the unusual set of circumstances resulting from the facts\\npresented in this case. We agree with the court's assessment. Despite the terms of the\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fAgreement, the record established that from the outset the parties were operating\\nunder this Agreement with the knowledge and understanding that there was some\\nthreat to either the validity of the patent or the existence of potential infringing third\\nparties over a period of several years before the Badger litigation ensued, Rydex\\nbreached the Agreement when it failed to fully prosecute the Badger litigation matter\\nafter it filed suit, and there was a continuing period of time when Graco stopped\\nmaking royalty payments and yet functioned under the Agreement with regard to the\\nuse of the patent. These various points in time during the relationship of these\\ncontracting parties were delineated by the district court's rulings, drove the parties'\\nclosing arguments to the jury, and were the focus of the verdict form adopted by the\\nparties.\\n\\n Under Iowa law, only a material breach could excuse Graco's nonperformance.\\nKelly v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Iowa 2000); Van Oort Constr. Co.\\nv. Nuckoll's Concrete Serv., Inc., 599 N.W.2d 684, 692 (Iowa 1999). Indeed, in Van\\nOort, a similar question presented itself when a party to a contract discontinued\\nmaking agreed-upon payments based on its belief that the other contracting party had\\nbreached, thereby excusing performance. 599 N.W.2d at 687-88. Thus, the only\\nremaining dispute for the court was whether the breach at issue was material. Id. at\\n692. \\\"[Subject to an exception not applicable here], it is a condition of each party's\\nremaining duties to render performances to be exchanged under an exchange of\\npromises that there be no uncured material failure by the other party to render any\\nsuch performance due at an earlier time.\\\" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting\\nRestatement (Second) of Contracts, § 237, at 215 (1981)). In Van Oort, the court,\\nreviewing materiality as a mixed question of law and fact, held that the breach at issue\\nwas material and thus the party was justified in suspending its performance under the\\ncontract until such time when the breach was cured. 599 N.W.2d at 693.\\n\\n Applying Iowa law in the instant case, the district court's finding that Rydex\\nhad, indeed, breached the contract did not end the inquiry as Graco now argues.\\nRather, it is ultimately the materiality of the breaches that was determinative of the\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fissue and, indeed, is necessarily the reason the matters were presented to the jury\\ndespite the district court's previous rulings. Although the jury was not presented with\\nan instruction on materiality, given the parties' discussions throughout the trial, the\\ndistrict court's rulings on the various motions throughout these proceedings, the\\nevidence presented, the arguments made to the jury, and the jury instructions read in\\ntheir entirety, the verdict can be characterized as one determining materiality. The\\nmateriality concept was front and center in Rydex's closing arguments; and in fact, the\\nparties discussed issues obviously addressing materiality throughout trial and\\nsubmitted the district court's holdings regarding Rydex's breaches to the jury,\\nindicating in fact that those holdings did not carry the day in the contract dispute. The\\njury's conclusion that Graco be awarded $0.00 in damages as a result of Rydex's\\nbreaches, viewed under our favorable standard of review lens, indicates the jury did\\nnot find a material failing on the part of Rydex.3\\n\\n While Graco argues that the findings by the district court as a matter of law\\nresolve this case in its favor, it is the jury's determinations in the face of these rulings\\nthat determinatively resolve the materiality issue. These factual determinations were\\nuniquely in the jury's purview and will not be upset on appeal. There was no error.4\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n A fortiori, even with the district court's determination as a matter of law that\\nRydex gave Badger an implied license to this patent from the date of the Agreement\\nuntil the date the Badger litigation was dismissed, the jury still held that Rydex did not\\nbreach the Agreement's exclusivity provision. As to that particular breach of contract\\nclaim, the matter of materiality does not arise because the jury found no breach in the\\nfirst instance.\\n 4\\n Given our de novo review and finding no error in the district court's denial of\\nGraco's motion for judgment as a matter of law, it is axiomatic the district court did\\nnot abuse its discretion in denying Graco's motion for new trial for the same reasons.\\nDespite Graco's insistence the jury should have ruled differently, there was no\\nmiscarriage of justice. Washington, 900 F.3d at 558.\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f B. Jury Instructions\\n\\n Graco additionally argues that the district court erred by failing to give\\nadditional jury instructions it requested at conference, particularly its proffered\\n\\\"conditions precedent-definition,\\\" which would have included directions regarding\\nmateriality, and a \\\"duty of good faith and fair dealing\\\" instruction. This court's review\\nis limited on jury instructions, reviewing only whether, taken as a whole, the\\ninstructions given fairly and adequately represented the evidence and applicable law\\nin light of the issues presented to the jury in a particular case. Zebley v. Heartland\\nIndus. of Dawson, Inc., 625 F.3d 449, 455 (8th Cir. 2010). \\\"[A] district court's\\ndecision to reject a proposed jury instruction also is reviewed for an abuse of\\ndiscretion.\\\" Retz v. Seaton, 741 F.3d 913, 919 (8th Cir. 2014). We reverse \\\"when the\\nerrors misled the jury or had a probable effect on the jury's verdict.\\\" United States v.\\nThompson, 686 F.3d 575, 579 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Slagg, 651\\nF.3d 832, 848 (8th Cir. 2011)). \\\"A district court has broad discretion in instructing\\nthe jury, and jury instructions do not need to be technically perfect or even a model\\nof clarity.\\\" United States v. Garcia-Gonon, 433 F.3d 587, 591 (8th Cir. 2006)\\n(quoting United States v. Gianakos, 415 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 2005)).\\n\\n Graco did not object to the district court's exclusion of the two particular\\ninstructions now discussed. Even if it had, after reviewing the arguments presented\\non appeal in light of the manner in which this case was submitted to the jury, the\\ninstructions on whole were an adequate statement of the law, reflected the theories of\\nrecovery argued to the jury, and fairly and adequately represented the evidence and\\napplicable law. Although a particular instruction regarding materiality was not\\npresented to the jury, the arguments made to the jury accurately reflected Iowa\\ncontract law and any error in omitting such an instruction, were we to assume error\\noccurred at all, did not mislead the jury or effect the jury's verdict in this instance.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\f C. Attorney's Fees\\n\\n There are two standards of review at play on the issue of attorney's fees. On the\\none hand, this court reviews de novo a district court's \\\"prevailing party\\\" determination\\nin a contractual context. Johnson Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Halterman, 867 F.3d 1013, 1020\\n(8th Cir. 2017). On the other hand, the court of appeals reviews an award of attorney's\\nfees for an abuse of discretion, which review occurs when the district court commits\\na clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant factors. Id.; FutureFuel Chem. Co.\\nv. Lonza, Inc., 756 F.3d 641, 649-50 (8th Cir. 2014). So, the determination as to who\\nprevails is reviewed de novo and \\\"how much\\\" is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.\\n\\n The award of attorney's fees in this case arises from the Agreement itself, which\\nprovided that \\\"[i]f litigation under this Agreement ensues because of a material\\nbreach, the prevailing party shall be awarded its reasonable attorney's fees.\\\" \\\"[S]tate\\nlaw governs the availability of attorney fees in diversity cases where no conflicting\\nfederal statute or court rule applies.\\\" Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Farmers Union Oil\\nCo. of Rolla, 207 F.3d 526, 534 (8th Cir. 2000). The Iowa Code provides: \\\"When\\njudgment is recovered upon a written contract containing an agreement to pay an\\nattorney fee, the court shall allow and tax as a part of the costs a reasonable attorney\\nfee to be determined by the court.\\\" Iowa Code Ann. § 625.22. An applicant for\\nattorney's fees has the burden to prove that the services were reasonably necessary and\\nthat the charges were reasonable in amount. Ales v. Anderson, Gabelmann, Lower &\\nWhitlow, P.C., 728 N.W.2d 832, 842 (Iowa 2007). In making this reasonableness\\ndetermination, the district court considers the time necessarily spent, the nature and\\nextent of the service, the amount involved, the difficulty of handling and importance\\nof the issues, the responsibility assumed and results obtained, the standing and\\nexperience of the attorney in the profession, and the customary charges for similar\\nservices. Id. \\\"Reductions may be made . . . for such things as partial success,\\nduplicative hours or hours not reasonably expended.\\\" Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., 773\\nN.W.2d 829, 833 (Iowa 2009) (quoting Sherman v. Kasotakis, 314 F. Supp. 2d 843,\\n881 (N.D. Iowa 2004)). Reductions may also be made for \\\"block billing\\\" or poor\\n\\n -12-\\n\\frecord-keeping. Sherman, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 881. In the end, however, the award of\\nattorney's fees rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.\\n\\n After trial, the district court determined that Rydex was the prevailing party\\nand, based upon its analysis of the bills presented, awarded $204,221.50. In its\\nreasonableness determination, the district court attributed the reduction of the\\nremaining attorney's fees to its\\n\\n inability to discern separation between the infringement and contract\\n claims, lack of sufficient billing records to precisely grasp the nature of\\n work done, [Rydex's] success solely on a portion of the contract claim,\\n the amount of the judgment in relation to amounts claimed, the\\n complexity of the case which was essentially a straight forward contract\\n dispute, and the Court's understanding of customary charges in the\\n jurisdiction, in search of the 'reasonable attorney's fee' contemplated by\\n the license Agreement.\\n\\nReviewing the district court's analysis of the Agreement as to attorney's fees in light\\nof the filings by the parties and briefing on appeal as well as the jury verdict, we agree\\nwith the court's determination that Rydex prevailed in this action and find no clear\\nerror of judgment in the court's application of Iowa law in arriving at the adjusted\\nfigure awarded. Contrary to Rydex's claim, nothing in our review of the record\\nindicates the district court applied an arithmetically simplistic fee or mathematical\\nformula, nor are we persuaded by Graco that a further reduction is warranted. Too,\\nwe decline the invitation to apply a cap based on the alleged contingent fee agreement\\nbetween Rydex and its counsel as advanced by Graco. While the record contains an\\nacknowledgment that such an agreement exists, Iowa courts have not yet spoken on\\nthe matter as presented. Applying a review of reasonableness as our guide, there was\\nno abuse of discretion and the attorney's fees awarded stand as calculated.\\n\\nIII. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -13-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4357667/\", \"author_raw\": \"BEAM, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BEAM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4580414/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: RYAN DATA EXCHANGE, LTD.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, Doing Business as Rydex, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. GRACO, INC., Defendant - Appellant Ryan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, Doing Business as Rydex, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. Graco, Inc., Defendant - Appellee Ryan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, Doing Business as Rydex, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Graco, Inc., Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-1451\n ___________________________\n\nRyan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, doing business as Rydex\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\n\n v.\n\n Graco, Inc.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-1746\n ___________________________\n\nRyan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, doing business as Rydex\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\n\n v.\n\n Graco, Inc.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-1772\n ___________________________\n\nRyan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, doing business as Rydex\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\n\n v.\n\f Graco, Inc.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeals from United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\n ____________\n\n Submitted: September 26, 2018\n Filed: January 10, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, BEAM, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nBEAM, Circuit Judge.\n\n After a jury found in favor of Ryan Data Exchange (Rydex) in its breach of\ncontract claim against Graco,1 and against Graco in its counterclaims against Rydex,\nGraco sought to set the jury's verdict aside, renewed its motion for judgment as a\nmatter of law, and moved for new trial, all of which the district court2 denied. The\ndistrict court further awarded $204,221.50 in attorney's fees to Rydex. Graco appeals.\nRydex also appeals, challenging the district court's reduction of its requested amount\nof attorney's fees. We affirm.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n The district court disposed of Rydex's claim for patent infringement against\nGraco ruling on a motion in limine prior to trial.\n 2\n The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern\nDistrict of Iowa.\n\n -2-\n\fI. BACKGROUND\n\n On September 13, 2005, Rydex and Graco entered into a Settlement and\nLicense Agreement (Agreement) in which Rydex granted Graco a patent license. In\nthe instant action, the parties litigated three provisions of the Agreement at trial: (1)\nthe provision wherein Rydex granted Graco an exclusive license to make, have made,\nuse, and sell articles covered by the patent (§ 3.0); (2) the Agreement's provision that\nif a third party were to infringe the patent, Rydex would have the initial choice and\nobligation to prosecute the infringement (§ 11); and (3) a provision stating that Graco\nwould pay Rydex royalties of 5% of the net selling price of its product using the\npatent (§ 4.1).\n\n Relevant to the instant litigation, in 2011, years after the parties entered into the\nAgreement, Rydex initiated a lawsuit alleging patent infringement against Badger\nMeter, Inc., Balcrank Corp., and Lincoln Industrial Corp. (collectively, Badger). The\ndistrict court found, and the trial evidence revealed, a unique set of circumstances\nregarding Badger's infringement, in that at the time Rydex and Graco entered into the\n2005 Agreement, both parties were aware that Badger was allegedly already\ninfringing the patent, and yet the Agreement purported to give Graco an exclusive\nright to the patent. In 2012 Rydex and Badger filed a stipulation of dismissal and\nagreed that Rydex's claims and Badger's counterclaims in the matter would be\ndismissed with prejudice. This dismissal between Rydex and Badger is the source of\nGraco's claim against Rydex for failure to prosecute infringement under the\nAgreement.\n\n Graco stopped paying royalties to Rydex as of December 31, 2013, as Graco\nbelieved that Rydex had breached the Agreement's exclusivity provision and the\npatent infringement prosecution provision (§§ 3 and 11) by allowing Badger to\ncontinue its infringement and by failing to fully prosecute the infringement claim\nagainst Badger. In May 2014, Rydex filed the instant complaint alleging breach of\ncontract and patent infringement by Graco. Graco countersued, also alleging breach\n\n -3-\n\fof contract and seeking declaratory judgments that the patent was invalid and that\nRydex had lost its right to receive royalty payments under the Agreement due to its\nalleged breaches.\n\n A jury trial was held in November 2016 on all of the contract claims then\npending. During trial Graco moved pursuant to Rule 50(a) for judgment as a matter\nof law at the close of Rydex's case-in-chief, claiming in part that it had established\nthrough cross-examination that Rydex had breached its duty under the Agreement to\nprosecute the Badger litigation, and that Rydex had breached the exclusivity provision\nof the Agreement. In ruling on Graco's motions from the bench, the district court held\nas a matter of law that Rydex had breached its duty to prosecute infringement as of\nthe date of the dismissal of the Badger litigation in 2012, and that Rydex was in\nbreach of the exclusivity provision of the Agreement from the date of the dismissal\nof the Badger litigation until the expiration of the patent on March 10, 2015.\nAccordingly, the court granted Graco's Rule 50 motion to that extent. There was no\nruling by the court as to whether Rydex breached the Agreement by failing to provide\nGraco an exclusive license from the date the parties entered into the Agreement in\n2005 until the dismissal of the Badger litigation in 2012.\n\n In that same colloquy, the district court additionally ruled as a matter of law that\nby way of Rydex's dismissal of the case against Badger and by failing to fully\nprosecute the matter, Rydex necessarily created an implied license (i.e., there existed\na reasonable inference that Rydex consented to Badger's use of the patent), at the very\nleast, with regard to Badger's past infringement, at the time of the dismissal of the\nlitigation against Badger. In a seeming attempt to correct any potential\nmisunderstanding of its rulings, the district court clarified that despite the terms of the\nAgreement, the record was clear that both parties operated under the Agreement with\nthe knowledge and understanding that there was some threat to either the validity of\nthe patent altogether, or the existence of potential infringing third parties, over a\nperiod of several years before Rydex ever initiated the action against Badger. Because\nof that knowledge on both sides, the court held it could not rule as a matter of law on\n\n -4-\n\fthe issue of Rydex's alleged breach of the Agreement at any time prior to the dismissal\nof the Badger litigation. The court held that particular issue of contract interpretation\nand breach was a matter for the jury.\n\n The parties discussed throughout, and after trial, how to \"package\" this case for\nthe jury in light of the court's Rule 50 rulings. Accordingly, the case was presented\nto the jury for very particular determinations with a verdict form consisting of five\nnarrow questions for the jury. Instruction 7, titled \"Elements of Breach of Contract,\"\nstated the elements required to prove a breach of contract under Iowa law, and also\ninstructed the jury regarding the district court's prior grant of judgment as a matter of\nlaw in favor of Graco:\n\n Regarding the Rydex Parties' breach of contract claim, it is for you to\n decide whether Graco breached the License Agreement by failing to pay\n royalties to the Rydex Parties for the period ending December 31, 2013,\n through the date of the expiration of the '180 patent on March 10, 2015.\n\n Regarding Graco's breach of contract claim, the Court has found as a\n matter of law that the Rydex Parties were not required to commence an\n infringement action prior to the filing of the Badger Litigation. The\n Court has also found as a matter of law that the Rydex Parties were in\n breach of the duty to prosecute infringement as of the date of the\n dismissal of the Badger Litigation on August 15, 2012. The Court has\n further found as a matter of law that the Rydex Parties were in breach of\n the exclusivity provision of the License Agreement from the date of the\n dismissal of the Badger Litigation on August 15, 2012, until the\n expiration of the '180 patent on March 10, 2015. You must accept these\n facts as having been proved. It is for you to decide whether the Rydex\n Parties were in breach of the exclusivity provision of the License\n Agreement from the date the parties entered into that license agreement\n on September 13, 2005, through the dismissal of the Badger Litigation\n on August 15, 2012.\n\n Instruction 8 informed the jury as to how to interpret the contract, including\nhow to consider the intent of the parties gleaned from surrounding circumstances and\n\n\n -5-\n\fthe contract language itself, how to give meaning to the contract language, and how\nto handle potentially ambiguous language, etc. Additionally, Instruction 11 instructed\nthe jury on the definition of an implied license, and specifically instructed that \"the\nCourt has ruled an implied license was created as to the Badger litigation when that\ncase was dismissed with prejudice on August 15, 2012, as to any Badger use of the\n'180 Patent prior to that date.\" There was no direct discussion of materiality in the\njury instructions or verdict form.\n\n Upon deliberation, the jury found, first, that Rydex proved at trial that Graco\nbreached the Agreement by failing to pay royalties to Rydex from December 31, 2013,\nthrough the date of the expiration of the patent on March 10, 2015; and awarded\nRydex $313,000 in damages. Next, in response to the query regarding the amount of\ndamages due Graco as a result of Rydex's breaches already determined by the court\nas a matter of law and laid out for the jury in Instruction 7 (i.e., its breach of duty to\nprosecute infringement and the breach of the exclusivity provision of the Agreement\nat the time of the Badger litigation dismissal), the jury answered \"$0.00.\" As to the\nquestion to the jury as to whether Graco proved that Rydex breached the Agreement\nby failing to provide Graco an exclusive license from the date the parties entered into\nthe Agreement on September 13, 2005, until the dismissal of the Badger litigation on\nAugust 15, 2012, the jury answered \"no.\"\n\n Post-trial, Graco, pursuant to Rule 50(b), renewed its motion for judgment as\na matter of law, asking the district court to grant judgment in its favor and to rule that\nRydex was not entitled to damages given the court's earlier ruling that Rydex breached\nthe Agreement. In its order on the post-trial requests, the district court made clear that\nalthough it had determined as a matter of law that Rydex breached the Agreement, it\nhad not made any determination as to materiality–the legal finding the court held was\nnecessary in order to preclude Rydex's recovery of the royalty payments. The court\nclarified that the materiality of a breach is a factual issue for the jury and reviewed the\ninstructions given the jury, the evidence presented at trial, and the verdict itself to\narrive at its determination that the jury necessarily determined that Rydex had not\n\n -6-\n\fmaterially breached the Agreement, as Rydex's breaches did not deprive Graco of a\nbenefit it justifiably expected. Too, the court additionally noted that evidence of\nGraco's continued use of the patent after Rydex's breaches in 2012 supported the jury's\nverdict, as Graco's continued exploitation of its license after what it now claims was\na breach of the terms of the Agreement, precluded Graco's nonperformance in\nwithholding royalty payments from Rydex. The district court likewise denied Graco's\nmotions to alter or amend the judgment, its motion for new trial, and its motion for\nremittitur upon similar reasoning. The district court subsequently awarded attorney's\nfees. These appeals ensued.\n\nII. DISCUSSION\n\n We review the district court's denial of Graco's motion for judgment as a matter\nof law de novo, viewing the record in a light most favorable to the verdict. Sturgis\nMotorcycle Rally, Inc. v. Rushmore Photo & Gifts, Inc., 908 F.3d 313, 322 (8th Cir.\n2018). \"We review a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion.\" Washington v.\nDenney, 900 F.3d 549, 558 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Smiley v. Gary Crossley Ford,\nInc., 859 F.3d 545, 552 (8th Cir. 2017)). \"[T]he law places a high standard on\noverturning a jury verdict because of the danger that the jury's rightful province will\nbe invaded when judgment as a matter of law is misused.\" Id. (alteration in original)\n(quoting Bavlsik v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 870 F.3d 800, 805 (8th Cir. 2017), cert.\ndenied, 138 S. Ct. 1991 (2018)). \"We are hesitant 'to interfere with a jury verdict,' as\nreflected in the 'analysis for considering renewed JML motions.'\" Id. (quoting\nBavlsik, 870 F.3d at 805, cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 1991 (2018)).\n\n In ruling on a motion for [judgment as a matter of law], the district court\n must (1) consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the\n prevailing party, (2) assume that all conflicts in the evidence were\n resolved in favor of the prevailing party, (3) assume as proved all facts\n that the prevailing party's evidence tended to prove, and (4) give the\n prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may\n reasonably be drawn from the facts proved. That done, the court must\n\n -7-\n\f then deny the motion if reasonable persons could differ as to the\n conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.\n\nId., 900 F.3d at 558-59 (alteration in original) (quoting Haynes v. Bee-Line Trucking\nCo., 80 F.3d 1235, 1238 (8th Cir. 1996)).\n\n A. Materiality Requirement under Iowa Contract Law\n\n On appeal, Graco argues, as it did to the district court in its Rule 50(a) and\n50(b) motions, that under Iowa law when a party breaches a contract it cannot enforce\nthe terms of the agreement or recover any damages under a breach of contract claim.\nGraco focuses on the element in Instruction 7–that to establish a breach of contract,\nthe party alleging breach must prove that it has done what the contract\nrequires–claiming that because it is undisputed that Rydex breached two provisions\nof the Agreement (its duty to provide exclusivity, and its duty to prosecute the\ninfringement), and that it did so prior to Graco's alleged breach on December 31,\n2013, (when it stopped making royalty payments), Rydex is not entitled to damages\nbecause it failed to prove it had \"done what the contract requires.\" Accordingly,\nGraco claims that the district court's finding of Rydex's breaches should have\nprecluded recovery for Rydex under Iowa law. Rydex counters that under Iowa law,\nfor a breach to excuse the performance of the non-breaching party and preclude\nrecovery, the breach must be material.\n\n This issue of materiality, as well as Graco's choice to continue receiving\nbenefits under the Agreement despite Rydex's breaches, were raised at myriad times\nthroughout this litigation including, but not limited to, the parties' pre-trial summary\njudgment filings, during trial by the district court and the parties in the discussion\nregarding Graco's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Rydex's case-\nin-chief, and again post-trial in Graco's renewed motions. Too, on multiple occasions,\nthe district court discussed the unusual set of circumstances resulting from the facts\npresented in this case. We agree with the court's assessment. Despite the terms of the\n\n -8-\n\fAgreement, the record established that from the outset the parties were operating\nunder this Agreement with the knowledge and understanding that there was some\nthreat to either the validity of the patent or the existence of potential infringing third\nparties over a period of several years before the Badger litigation ensued, Rydex\nbreached the Agreement when it failed to fully prosecute the Badger litigation matter\nafter it filed suit, and there was a continuing period of time when Graco stopped\nmaking royalty payments and yet functioned under the Agreement with regard to the\nuse of the patent. These various points in time during the relationship of these\ncontracting parties were delineated by the district court's rulings, drove the parties'\nclosing arguments to the jury, and were the focus of the verdict form adopted by the\nparties.\n\n Under Iowa law, only a material breach could excuse Graco's nonperformance.\nKelly v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Iowa 2000); Van Oort Constr. Co.\nv. Nuckoll's Concrete Serv., Inc., 599 N.W.2d 684, 692 (Iowa 1999). Indeed, in Van\nOort, a similar question presented itself when a party to a contract discontinued\nmaking agreed-upon payments based on its belief that the other contracting party had\nbreached, thereby excusing performance. 599 N.W.2d at 687-88. Thus, the only\nremaining dispute for the court was whether the breach at issue was material. Id. at\n692. \"[Subject to an exception not applicable here], it is a condition of each party's\nremaining duties to render performances to be exchanged under an exchange of\npromises that there be no uncured material failure by the other party to render any\nsuch performance due at an earlier time.\" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting\nRestatement (Second) of Contracts, § 237, at 215 (1981)). In Van Oort, the court,\nreviewing materiality as a mixed question of law and fact, held that the breach at issue\nwas material and thus the party was justified in suspending its performance under the\ncontract until such time when the breach was cured. 599 N.W.2d at 693.\n\n Applying Iowa law in the instant case, the district court's finding that Rydex\nhad, indeed, breached the contract did not end the inquiry as Graco now argues.\nRather, it is ultimately the materiality of the breaches that was determinative of the\n\n -9-\n\fissue and, indeed, is necessarily the reason the matters were presented to the jury\ndespite the district court's previous rulings. Although the jury was not presented with\nan instruction on materiality, given the parties' discussions throughout the trial, the\ndistrict court's rulings on the various motions throughout these proceedings, the\nevidence presented, the arguments made to the jury, and the jury instructions read in\ntheir entirety, the verdict can be characterized as one determining materiality. The\nmateriality concept was front and center in Rydex's closing arguments; and in fact, the\nparties discussed issues obviously addressing materiality throughout trial and\nsubmitted the district court's holdings regarding Rydex's breaches to the jury,\nindicating in fact that those holdings did not carry the day in the contract dispute. The\njury's conclusion that Graco be awarded $0.00 in damages as a result of Rydex's\nbreaches, viewed under our favorable standard of review lens, indicates the jury did\nnot find a material failing on the part of Rydex.3\n\n While Graco argues that the findings by the district court as a matter of law\nresolve this case in its favor, it is the jury's determinations in the face of these rulings\nthat determinatively resolve the materiality issue. These factual determinations were\nuniquely in the jury's purview and will not be upset on appeal. There was no error.4\n\n\n\n\n 3\n A fortiori, even with the district court's determination as a matter of law that\nRydex gave Badger an implied license to this patent from the date of the Agreement\nuntil the date the Badger litigation was dismissed, the jury still held that Rydex did not\nbreach the Agreement's exclusivity provision. As to that particular breach of contract\nclaim, the matter of materiality does not arise because the jury found no breach in the\nfirst instance.\n 4\n Given our de novo review and finding no error in the district court's denial of\nGraco's motion for judgment as a matter of law, it is axiomatic the district court did\nnot abuse its discretion in denying Graco's motion for new trial for the same reasons.\nDespite Graco's insistence the jury should have ruled differently, there was no\nmiscarriage of justice. Washington, 900 F.3d at 558.\n\n -10-\n\f B. Jury Instructions\n\n Graco additionally argues that the district court erred by failing to give\nadditional jury instructions it requested at conference, particularly its proffered\n\"conditions precedent-definition,\" which would have included directions regarding\nmateriality, and a \"duty of good faith and fair dealing\" instruction. This court's review\nis limited on jury instructions, reviewing only whether, taken as a whole, the\ninstructions given fairly and adequately represented the evidence and applicable law\nin light of the issues presented to the jury in a particular case. Zebley v. Heartland\nIndus. of Dawson, Inc., 625 F.3d 449, 455 (8th Cir. 2010). \"[A] district court's\ndecision to reject a proposed jury instruction also is reviewed for an abuse of\ndiscretion.\" Retz v. Seaton, 741 F.3d 913, 919 (8th Cir. 2014). We reverse \"when the\nerrors misled the jury or had a probable effect on the jury's verdict.\" United States v.\nThompson, 686 F.3d 575, 579 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Slagg, 651\nF.3d 832, 848 (8th Cir. 2011)). \"A district court has broad discretion in instructing\nthe jury, and jury instructions do not need to be technically perfect or even a model\nof clarity.\" United States v. Garcia-Gonon, 433 F.3d 587, 591 (8th Cir. 2006)\n(quoting United States v. Gianakos, 415 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 2005)).\n\n Graco did not object to the district court's exclusion of the two particular\ninstructions now discussed. Even if it had, after reviewing the arguments presented\non appeal in light of the manner in which this case was submitted to the jury, the\ninstructions on whole were an adequate statement of the law, reflected the theories of\nrecovery argued to the jury, and fairly and adequately represented the evidence and\napplicable law. Although a particular instruction regarding materiality was not\npresented to the jury, the arguments made to the jury accurately reflected Iowa\ncontract law and any error in omitting such an instruction, were we to assume error\noccurred at all, did not mislead the jury or effect the jury's verdict in this instance.\n\n\n\n\n -11-\n\f C. Attorney's Fees\n\n There are two standards of review at play on the issue of attorney's fees. On the\none hand, this court reviews de novo a district court's \"prevailing party\" determination\nin a contractual context. Johnson Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Halterman, 867 F.3d 1013, 1020\n(8th Cir. 2017). On the other hand, the court of appeals reviews an award of attorney's\nfees for an abuse of discretion, which review occurs when the district court commits\na clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant factors. Id.; FutureFuel Chem. Co.\nv. Lonza, Inc., 756 F.3d 641, 649-50 (8th Cir. 2014). So, the determination as to who\nprevails is reviewed de novo and \"how much\" is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.\n\n The award of attorney's fees in this case arises from the Agreement itself, which\nprovided that \"[i]f litigation under this Agreement ensues because of a material\nbreach, the prevailing party shall be awarded its reasonable attorney's fees.\" \"[S]tate\nlaw governs the availability of attorney fees in diversity cases where no conflicting\nfederal statute or court rule applies.\" Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Farmers Union Oil\nCo. of Rolla, 207 F.3d 526, 534 (8th Cir. 2000). The Iowa Code provides: \"When\njudgment is recovered upon a written contract containing an agreement to pay an\nattorney fee, the court shall allow and tax as a part of the costs a reasonable attorney\nfee to be determined by the court.\" Iowa Code Ann. § 625.22. An applicant for\nattorney's fees has the burden to prove that the services were reasonably necessary and\nthat the charges were reasonable in amount. Ales v. Anderson, Gabelmann, Lower &\nWhitlow, P.C., 728 N.W.2d 832, 842 (Iowa 2007). In making this reasonableness\ndetermination, the district court considers the time necessarily spent, the nature and\nextent of the service, the amount involved, the difficulty of handling and importance\nof the issues, the responsibility assumed and results obtained, the standing and\nexperience of the attorney in the profession, and the customary charges for similar\nservices. Id. \"Reductions may be made . . . for such things as partial success,\nduplicative hours or hours not reasonably expended.\" Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., 773\nN.W.2d 829, 833 (Iowa 2009) (quoting Sherman v. Kasotakis, 314 F. Supp. 2d 843,\n881 (N.D. Iowa 2004)). Reductions may also be made for \"block billing\" or poor\n\n -12-\n\frecord-keeping. Sherman, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 881. In the end, however, the award of\nattorney's fees rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.\n\n After trial, the district court determined that Rydex was the prevailing party\nand, based upon its analysis of the bills presented, awarded $204,221.50. In its\nreasonableness determination, the district court attributed the reduction of the\nremaining attorney's fees to its\n\n inability to discern separation between the infringement and contract\n claims, lack of sufficient billing records to precisely grasp the nature of\n work done, [Rydex's] success solely on a portion of the contract claim,\n the amount of the judgment in relation to amounts claimed, the\n complexity of the case which was essentially a straight forward contract\n dispute, and the Court's understanding of customary charges in the\n jurisdiction, in search of the 'reasonable attorney's fee' contemplated by\n the license Agreement.\n\nReviewing the district court's analysis of the Agreement as to attorney's fees in light\nof the filings by the parties and briefing on appeal as well as the jury verdict, we agree\nwith the court's determination that Rydex prevailed in this action and find no clear\nerror of judgment in the court's application of Iowa law in arriving at the adjusted\nfigure awarded. Contrary to Rydex's claim, nothing in our review of the record\nindicates the district court applied an arithmetically simplistic fee or mathematical\nformula, nor are we persuaded by Graco that a further reduction is warranted. Too,\nwe decline the invitation to apply a cap based on the alleged contingent fee agreement\nbetween Rydex and its counsel as advanced by Graco. While the record contains an\nacknowledgment that such an agreement exists, Iowa courts have not yet spoken on\nthe matter as presented. Applying a review of reasonableness as our guide, there was\nno abuse of discretion and the attorney's fees awarded stand as calculated.\n\nIII. CONCLUSION\n\n For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.\n ______________________________\n\n -13-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: RYAN DATA EXCHANGE, LTD.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, Doing Business as Rydex, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. GRACO, INC., Defendant - Appellant Ryan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, Doing Business as Rydex, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. Graco, Inc., Defendant - Appellee Ryan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, Doing Business as Rydex, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Graco, Inc., Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-1451\\n ___________________________\\n\\nRyan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, doing business as Rydex\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Graco, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-1746\\n ___________________________\\n\\nRyan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, doing business as Rydex\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Graco, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-1772\\n ___________________________\\n\\nRyan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, doing business as Rydex\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\f Graco, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeals from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 26, 2018\\n Filed: January 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, BEAM, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nBEAM, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n After a jury found in favor of Ryan Data Exchange (Rydex) in its breach of\\ncontract claim against Graco,1 and against Graco in its counterclaims against Rydex,\\nGraco sought to set the jury's verdict aside, renewed its motion for judgment as a\\nmatter of law, and moved for new trial, all of which the district court2 denied. The\\ndistrict court further awarded $204,221.50 in attorney's fees to Rydex. Graco appeals.\\nRydex also appeals, challenging the district court's reduction of its requested amount\\nof attorney's fees. We affirm.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The district court disposed of Rydex's claim for patent infringement against\\nGraco ruling on a motion in limine prior to trial.\\n 2\\n The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern\\nDistrict of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fI. BACKGROUND\\n\\n On September 13, 2005, Rydex and Graco entered into a Settlement and\\nLicense Agreement (Agreement) in which Rydex granted Graco a patent license. In\\nthe instant action, the parties litigated three provisions of the Agreement at trial: (1)\\nthe provision wherein Rydex granted Graco an exclusive license to make, have made,\\nuse, and sell articles covered by the patent (§ 3.0); (2) the Agreement's provision that\\nif a third party were to infringe the patent, Rydex would have the initial choice and\\nobligation to prosecute the infringement (§ 11); and (3) a provision stating that Graco\\nwould pay Rydex royalties of 5% of the net selling price of its product using the\\npatent (§ 4.1).\\n\\n Relevant to the instant litigation, in 2011, years after the parties entered into the\\nAgreement, Rydex initiated a lawsuit alleging patent infringement against Badger\\nMeter, Inc., Balcrank Corp., and Lincoln Industrial Corp. (collectively, Badger). The\\ndistrict court found, and the trial evidence revealed, a unique set of circumstances\\nregarding Badger's infringement, in that at the time Rydex and Graco entered into the\\n2005 Agreement, both parties were aware that Badger was allegedly already\\ninfringing the patent, and yet the Agreement purported to give Graco an exclusive\\nright to the patent. In 2012 Rydex and Badger filed a stipulation of dismissal and\\nagreed that Rydex's claims and Badger's counterclaims in the matter would be\\ndismissed with prejudice. This dismissal between Rydex and Badger is the source of\\nGraco's claim against Rydex for failure to prosecute infringement under the\\nAgreement.\\n\\n Graco stopped paying royalties to Rydex as of December 31, 2013, as Graco\\nbelieved that Rydex had breached the Agreement's exclusivity provision and the\\npatent infringement prosecution provision (§§ 3 and 11) by allowing Badger to\\ncontinue its infringement and by failing to fully prosecute the infringement claim\\nagainst Badger. In May 2014, Rydex filed the instant complaint alleging breach of\\ncontract and patent infringement by Graco. Graco countersued, also alleging breach\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fof contract and seeking declaratory judgments that the patent was invalid and that\\nRydex had lost its right to receive royalty payments under the Agreement due to its\\nalleged breaches.\\n\\n A jury trial was held in November 2016 on all of the contract claims then\\npending. During trial Graco moved pursuant to Rule 50(a) for judgment as a matter\\nof law at the close of Rydex's case-in-chief, claiming in part that it had established\\nthrough cross-examination that Rydex had breached its duty under the Agreement to\\nprosecute the Badger litigation, and that Rydex had breached the exclusivity provision\\nof the Agreement. In ruling on Graco's motions from the bench, the district court held\\nas a matter of law that Rydex had breached its duty to prosecute infringement as of\\nthe date of the dismissal of the Badger litigation in 2012, and that Rydex was in\\nbreach of the exclusivity provision of the Agreement from the date of the dismissal\\nof the Badger litigation until the expiration of the patent on March 10, 2015.\\nAccordingly, the court granted Graco's Rule 50 motion to that extent. There was no\\nruling by the court as to whether Rydex breached the Agreement by failing to provide\\nGraco an exclusive license from the date the parties entered into the Agreement in\\n2005 until the dismissal of the Badger litigation in 2012.\\n\\n In that same colloquy, the district court additionally ruled as a matter of law that\\nby way of Rydex's dismissal of the case against Badger and by failing to fully\\nprosecute the matter, Rydex necessarily created an implied license (i.e., there existed\\na reasonable inference that Rydex consented to Badger's use of the patent), at the very\\nleast, with regard to Badger's past infringement, at the time of the dismissal of the\\nlitigation against Badger. In a seeming attempt to correct any potential\\nmisunderstanding of its rulings, the district court clarified that despite the terms of the\\nAgreement, the record was clear that both parties operated under the Agreement with\\nthe knowledge and understanding that there was some threat to either the validity of\\nthe patent altogether, or the existence of potential infringing third parties, over a\\nperiod of several years before Rydex ever initiated the action against Badger. Because\\nof that knowledge on both sides, the court held it could not rule as a matter of law on\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fthe issue of Rydex's alleged breach of the Agreement at any time prior to the dismissal\\nof the Badger litigation. The court held that particular issue of contract interpretation\\nand breach was a matter for the jury.\\n\\n The parties discussed throughout, and after trial, how to \\\"package\\\" this case for\\nthe jury in light of the court's Rule 50 rulings. Accordingly, the case was presented\\nto the jury for very particular determinations with a verdict form consisting of five\\nnarrow questions for the jury. Instruction 7, titled \\\"Elements of Breach of Contract,\\\"\\nstated the elements required to prove a breach of contract under Iowa law, and also\\ninstructed the jury regarding the district court's prior grant of judgment as a matter of\\nlaw in favor of Graco:\\n\\n Regarding the Rydex Parties' breach of contract claim, it is for you to\\n decide whether Graco breached the License Agreement by failing to pay\\n royalties to the Rydex Parties for the period ending December 31, 2013,\\n through the date of the expiration of the '180 patent on March 10, 2015.\\n\\n Regarding Graco's breach of contract claim, the Court has found as a\\n matter of law that the Rydex Parties were not required to commence an\\n infringement action prior to the filing of the Badger Litigation. The\\n Court has also found as a matter of law that the Rydex Parties were in\\n breach of the duty to prosecute infringement as of the date of the\\n dismissal of the Badger Litigation on August 15, 2012. The Court has\\n further found as a matter of law that the Rydex Parties were in breach of\\n the exclusivity provision of the License Agreement from the date of the\\n dismissal of the Badger Litigation on August 15, 2012, until the\\n expiration of the '180 patent on March 10, 2015. You must accept these\\n facts as having been proved. It is for you to decide whether the Rydex\\n Parties were in breach of the exclusivity provision of the License\\n Agreement from the date the parties entered into that license agreement\\n on September 13, 2005, through the dismissal of the Badger Litigation\\n on August 15, 2012.\\n\\n Instruction 8 informed the jury as to how to interpret the contract, including\\nhow to consider the intent of the parties gleaned from surrounding circumstances and\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fthe contract language itself, how to give meaning to the contract language, and how\\nto handle potentially ambiguous language, etc. Additionally, Instruction 11 instructed\\nthe jury on the definition of an implied license, and specifically instructed that \\\"the\\nCourt has ruled an implied license was created as to the Badger litigation when that\\ncase was dismissed with prejudice on August 15, 2012, as to any Badger use of the\\n'180 Patent prior to that date.\\\" There was no direct discussion of materiality in the\\njury instructions or verdict form.\\n\\n Upon deliberation, the jury found, first, that Rydex proved at trial that Graco\\nbreached the Agreement by failing to pay royalties to Rydex from December 31, 2013,\\nthrough the date of the expiration of the patent on March 10, 2015; and awarded\\nRydex $313,000 in damages. Next, in response to the query regarding the amount of\\ndamages due Graco as a result of Rydex's breaches already determined by the court\\nas a matter of law and laid out for the jury in Instruction 7 (i.e., its breach of duty to\\nprosecute infringement and the breach of the exclusivity provision of the Agreement\\nat the time of the Badger litigation dismissal), the jury answered \\\"$0.00.\\\" As to the\\nquestion to the jury as to whether Graco proved that Rydex breached the Agreement\\nby failing to provide Graco an exclusive license from the date the parties entered into\\nthe Agreement on September 13, 2005, until the dismissal of the Badger litigation on\\nAugust 15, 2012, the jury answered \\\"no.\\\"\\n\\n Post-trial, Graco, pursuant to Rule 50(b), renewed its motion for judgment as\\na matter of law, asking the district court to grant judgment in its favor and to rule that\\nRydex was not entitled to damages given the court's earlier ruling that Rydex breached\\nthe Agreement. In its order on the post-trial requests, the district court made clear that\\nalthough it had determined as a matter of law that Rydex breached the Agreement, it\\nhad not made any determination as to materiality–the legal finding the court held was\\nnecessary in order to preclude Rydex's recovery of the royalty payments. The court\\nclarified that the materiality of a breach is a factual issue for the jury and reviewed the\\ninstructions given the jury, the evidence presented at trial, and the verdict itself to\\narrive at its determination that the jury necessarily determined that Rydex had not\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fmaterially breached the Agreement, as Rydex's breaches did not deprive Graco of a\\nbenefit it justifiably expected. Too, the court additionally noted that evidence of\\nGraco's continued use of the patent after Rydex's breaches in 2012 supported the jury's\\nverdict, as Graco's continued exploitation of its license after what it now claims was\\na breach of the terms of the Agreement, precluded Graco's nonperformance in\\nwithholding royalty payments from Rydex. The district court likewise denied Graco's\\nmotions to alter or amend the judgment, its motion for new trial, and its motion for\\nremittitur upon similar reasoning. The district court subsequently awarded attorney's\\nfees. These appeals ensued.\\n\\nII. DISCUSSION\\n\\n We review the district court's denial of Graco's motion for judgment as a matter\\nof law de novo, viewing the record in a light most favorable to the verdict. Sturgis\\nMotorcycle Rally, Inc. v. Rushmore Photo & Gifts, Inc., 908 F.3d 313, 322 (8th Cir.\\n2018). \\\"We review a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion.\\\" Washington v.\\nDenney, 900 F.3d 549, 558 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Smiley v. Gary Crossley Ford,\\nInc., 859 F.3d 545, 552 (8th Cir. 2017)). \\\"[T]he law places a high standard on\\noverturning a jury verdict because of the danger that the jury's rightful province will\\nbe invaded when judgment as a matter of law is misused.\\\" Id. (alteration in original)\\n(quoting Bavlsik v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 870 F.3d 800, 805 (8th Cir. 2017), cert.\\ndenied, 138 S. Ct. 1991 (2018)). \\\"We are hesitant 'to interfere with a jury verdict,' as\\nreflected in the 'analysis for considering renewed JML motions.'\\\" Id. (quoting\\nBavlsik, 870 F.3d at 805, cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 1991 (2018)).\\n\\n In ruling on a motion for [judgment as a matter of law], the district court\\n must (1) consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the\\n prevailing party, (2) assume that all conflicts in the evidence were\\n resolved in favor of the prevailing party, (3) assume as proved all facts\\n that the prevailing party's evidence tended to prove, and (4) give the\\n prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may\\n reasonably be drawn from the facts proved. That done, the court must\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f then deny the motion if reasonable persons could differ as to the\\n conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.\\n\\nId., 900 F.3d at 558-59 (alteration in original) (quoting Haynes v. Bee-Line Trucking\\nCo., 80 F.3d 1235, 1238 (8th Cir. 1996)).\\n\\n A. Materiality Requirement under Iowa Contract Law\\n\\n On appeal, Graco argues, as it did to the district court in its Rule 50(a) and\\n50(b) motions, that under Iowa law when a party breaches a contract it cannot enforce\\nthe terms of the agreement or recover any damages under a breach of contract claim.\\nGraco focuses on the element in Instruction 7–that to establish a breach of contract,\\nthe party alleging breach must prove that it has done what the contract\\nrequires–claiming that because it is undisputed that Rydex breached two provisions\\nof the Agreement (its duty to provide exclusivity, and its duty to prosecute the\\ninfringement), and that it did so prior to Graco's alleged breach on December 31,\\n2013, (when it stopped making royalty payments), Rydex is not entitled to damages\\nbecause it failed to prove it had \\\"done what the contract requires.\\\" Accordingly,\\nGraco claims that the district court's finding of Rydex's breaches should have\\nprecluded recovery for Rydex under Iowa law. Rydex counters that under Iowa law,\\nfor a breach to excuse the performance of the non-breaching party and preclude\\nrecovery, the breach must be material.\\n\\n This issue of materiality, as well as Graco's choice to continue receiving\\nbenefits under the Agreement despite Rydex's breaches, were raised at myriad times\\nthroughout this litigation including, but not limited to, the parties' pre-trial summary\\njudgment filings, during trial by the district court and the parties in the discussion\\nregarding Graco's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Rydex's case-\\nin-chief, and again post-trial in Graco's renewed motions. Too, on multiple occasions,\\nthe district court discussed the unusual set of circumstances resulting from the facts\\npresented in this case. We agree with the court's assessment. Despite the terms of the\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fAgreement, the record established that from the outset the parties were operating\\nunder this Agreement with the knowledge and understanding that there was some\\nthreat to either the validity of the patent or the existence of potential infringing third\\nparties over a period of several years before the Badger litigation ensued, Rydex\\nbreached the Agreement when it failed to fully prosecute the Badger litigation matter\\nafter it filed suit, and there was a continuing period of time when Graco stopped\\nmaking royalty payments and yet functioned under the Agreement with regard to the\\nuse of the patent. These various points in time during the relationship of these\\ncontracting parties were delineated by the district court's rulings, drove the parties'\\nclosing arguments to the jury, and were the focus of the verdict form adopted by the\\nparties.\\n\\n Under Iowa law, only a material breach could excuse Graco's nonperformance.\\nKelly v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Iowa 2000); Van Oort Constr. Co.\\nv. Nuckoll's Concrete Serv., Inc., 599 N.W.2d 684, 692 (Iowa 1999). Indeed, in Van\\nOort, a similar question presented itself when a party to a contract discontinued\\nmaking agreed-upon payments based on its belief that the other contracting party had\\nbreached, thereby excusing performance. 599 N.W.2d at 687-88. Thus, the only\\nremaining dispute for the court was whether the breach at issue was material. Id. at\\n692. \\\"[Subject to an exception not applicable here], it is a condition of each party's\\nremaining duties to render performances to be exchanged under an exchange of\\npromises that there be no uncured material failure by the other party to render any\\nsuch performance due at an earlier time.\\\" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting\\nRestatement (Second) of Contracts, § 237, at 215 (1981)). In Van Oort, the court,\\nreviewing materiality as a mixed question of law and fact, held that the breach at issue\\nwas material and thus the party was justified in suspending its performance under the\\ncontract until such time when the breach was cured. 599 N.W.2d at 693.\\n\\n Applying Iowa law in the instant case, the district court's finding that Rydex\\nhad, indeed, breached the contract did not end the inquiry as Graco now argues.\\nRather, it is ultimately the materiality of the breaches that was determinative of the\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fissue and, indeed, is necessarily the reason the matters were presented to the jury\\ndespite the district court's previous rulings. Although the jury was not presented with\\nan instruction on materiality, given the parties' discussions throughout the trial, the\\ndistrict court's rulings on the various motions throughout these proceedings, the\\nevidence presented, the arguments made to the jury, and the jury instructions read in\\ntheir entirety, the verdict can be characterized as one determining materiality. The\\nmateriality concept was front and center in Rydex's closing arguments; and in fact, the\\nparties discussed issues obviously addressing materiality throughout trial and\\nsubmitted the district court's holdings regarding Rydex's breaches to the jury,\\nindicating in fact that those holdings did not carry the day in the contract dispute. The\\njury's conclusion that Graco be awarded $0.00 in damages as a result of Rydex's\\nbreaches, viewed under our favorable standard of review lens, indicates the jury did\\nnot find a material failing on the part of Rydex.3\\n\\n While Graco argues that the findings by the district court as a matter of law\\nresolve this case in its favor, it is the jury's determinations in the face of these rulings\\nthat determinatively resolve the materiality issue. These factual determinations were\\nuniquely in the jury's purview and will not be upset on appeal. There was no error.4\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n A fortiori, even with the district court's determination as a matter of law that\\nRydex gave Badger an implied license to this patent from the date of the Agreement\\nuntil the date the Badger litigation was dismissed, the jury still held that Rydex did not\\nbreach the Agreement's exclusivity provision. As to that particular breach of contract\\nclaim, the matter of materiality does not arise because the jury found no breach in the\\nfirst instance.\\n 4\\n Given our de novo review and finding no error in the district court's denial of\\nGraco's motion for judgment as a matter of law, it is axiomatic the district court did\\nnot abuse its discretion in denying Graco's motion for new trial for the same reasons.\\nDespite Graco's insistence the jury should have ruled differently, there was no\\nmiscarriage of justice. Washington, 900 F.3d at 558.\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f B. Jury Instructions\\n\\n Graco additionally argues that the district court erred by failing to give\\nadditional jury instructions it requested at conference, particularly its proffered\\n\\\"conditions precedent-definition,\\\" which would have included directions regarding\\nmateriality, and a \\\"duty of good faith and fair dealing\\\" instruction. This court's review\\nis limited on jury instructions, reviewing only whether, taken as a whole, the\\ninstructions given fairly and adequately represented the evidence and applicable law\\nin light of the issues presented to the jury in a particular case. Zebley v. Heartland\\nIndus. of Dawson, Inc., 625 F.3d 449, 455 (8th Cir. 2010). \\\"[A] district court's\\ndecision to reject a proposed jury instruction also is reviewed for an abuse of\\ndiscretion.\\\" Retz v. Seaton, 741 F.3d 913, 919 (8th Cir. 2014). We reverse \\\"when the\\nerrors misled the jury or had a probable effect on the jury's verdict.\\\" United States v.\\nThompson, 686 F.3d 575, 579 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Slagg, 651\\nF.3d 832, 848 (8th Cir. 2011)). \\\"A district court has broad discretion in instructing\\nthe jury, and jury instructions do not need to be technically perfect or even a model\\nof clarity.\\\" United States v. Garcia-Gonon, 433 F.3d 587, 591 (8th Cir. 2006)\\n(quoting United States v. Gianakos, 415 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 2005)).\\n\\n Graco did not object to the district court's exclusion of the two particular\\ninstructions now discussed. Even if it had, after reviewing the arguments presented\\non appeal in light of the manner in which this case was submitted to the jury, the\\ninstructions on whole were an adequate statement of the law, reflected the theories of\\nrecovery argued to the jury, and fairly and adequately represented the evidence and\\napplicable law. Although a particular instruction regarding materiality was not\\npresented to the jury, the arguments made to the jury accurately reflected Iowa\\ncontract law and any error in omitting such an instruction, were we to assume error\\noccurred at all, did not mislead the jury or effect the jury's verdict in this instance.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\f C. Attorney's Fees\\n\\n There are two standards of review at play on the issue of attorney's fees. On the\\none hand, this court reviews de novo a district court's \\\"prevailing party\\\" determination\\nin a contractual context. Johnson Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Halterman, 867 F.3d 1013, 1020\\n(8th Cir. 2017). On the other hand, the court of appeals reviews an award of attorney's\\nfees for an abuse of discretion, which review occurs when the district court commits\\na clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant factors. Id.; FutureFuel Chem. Co.\\nv. Lonza, Inc., 756 F.3d 641, 649-50 (8th Cir. 2014). So, the determination as to who\\nprevails is reviewed de novo and \\\"how much\\\" is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.\\n\\n The award of attorney's fees in this case arises from the Agreement itself, which\\nprovided that \\\"[i]f litigation under this Agreement ensues because of a material\\nbreach, the prevailing party shall be awarded its reasonable attorney's fees.\\\" \\\"[S]tate\\nlaw governs the availability of attorney fees in diversity cases where no conflicting\\nfederal statute or court rule applies.\\\" Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Farmers Union Oil\\nCo. of Rolla, 207 F.3d 526, 534 (8th Cir. 2000). The Iowa Code provides: \\\"When\\njudgment is recovered upon a written contract containing an agreement to pay an\\nattorney fee, the court shall allow and tax as a part of the costs a reasonable attorney\\nfee to be determined by the court.\\\" Iowa Code Ann. § 625.22. An applicant for\\nattorney's fees has the burden to prove that the services were reasonably necessary and\\nthat the charges were reasonable in amount. Ales v. Anderson, Gabelmann, Lower &\\nWhitlow, P.C., 728 N.W.2d 832, 842 (Iowa 2007). In making this reasonableness\\ndetermination, the district court considers the time necessarily spent, the nature and\\nextent of the service, the amount involved, the difficulty of handling and importance\\nof the issues, the responsibility assumed and results obtained, the standing and\\nexperience of the attorney in the profession, and the customary charges for similar\\nservices. Id. \\\"Reductions may be made . . . for such things as partial success,\\nduplicative hours or hours not reasonably expended.\\\" Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., 773\\nN.W.2d 829, 833 (Iowa 2009) (quoting Sherman v. Kasotakis, 314 F. Supp. 2d 843,\\n881 (N.D. Iowa 2004)). Reductions may also be made for \\\"block billing\\\" or poor\\n\\n -12-\\n\\frecord-keeping. Sherman, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 881. In the end, however, the award of\\nattorney's fees rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.\\n\\n After trial, the district court determined that Rydex was the prevailing party\\nand, based upon its analysis of the bills presented, awarded $204,221.50. In its\\nreasonableness determination, the district court attributed the reduction of the\\nremaining attorney's fees to its\\n\\n inability to discern separation between the infringement and contract\\n claims, lack of sufficient billing records to precisely grasp the nature of\\n work done, [Rydex's] success solely on a portion of the contract claim,\\n the amount of the judgment in relation to amounts claimed, the\\n complexity of the case which was essentially a straight forward contract\\n dispute, and the Court's understanding of customary charges in the\\n jurisdiction, in search of the 'reasonable attorney's fee' contemplated by\\n the license Agreement.\\n\\nReviewing the district court's analysis of the Agreement as to attorney's fees in light\\nof the filings by the parties and briefing on appeal as well as the jury verdict, we agree\\nwith the court's determination that Rydex prevailed in this action and find no clear\\nerror of judgment in the court's application of Iowa law in arriving at the adjusted\\nfigure awarded. Contrary to Rydex's claim, nothing in our review of the record\\nindicates the district court applied an arithmetically simplistic fee or mathematical\\nformula, nor are we persuaded by Graco that a further reduction is warranted. Too,\\nwe decline the invitation to apply a cap based on the alleged contingent fee agreement\\nbetween Rydex and its counsel as advanced by Graco. While the record contains an\\nacknowledgment that such an agreement exists, Iowa courts have not yet spoken on\\nthe matter as presented. Applying a review of reasonableness as our guide, there was\\nno abuse of discretion and the attorney's fees awarded stand as calculated.\\n\\nIII. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -13-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":297,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4580415,"string":"4,580,415"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"R.J. ZAYED, in His Capacity as Court-Appointed Receiver for the Oxford Global Partners, LLC, Universal Brokerage FX, and Other Receiver Entities, Plaintiff - Appellant v. ASSOCIATED BANK, N.A., Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"R.J. Zayed v. Associated Bank, N.A."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-1250"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Shepherd, Kelly, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9887838/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"040dissent\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9887839/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-1250\\n ___________________________\\n\\nR.J. Zayed, In His Capacity As Court-Appointed Receiver For The Oxford Global\\n Partners, LLC, Universal Brokerage FX, and Other Receiver Entities\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Associated Bank, N.A.\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: May 17, 2018\\n Filed: January 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Over a period of several years, a group of scammers based in Minnesota\\nswindled investors out of more than one hundred million dollars in a prolific Ponzi\\n\\nscheme utilizing numerous business entities. A receiver1 was appointed to take\\ncharge of what assets remained in the business entities that were used to perpetrate\\nthe scheme and to recover any assets he could for the victims of the fraud. The\\nReceiver sued Associated Bank, N.A., which provided banking services to some of\\nthe scammers’ entities, accusing the bank of aiding and abetting the Ponzi scheme.\\nAt issue in this appeal is whether the district court2 correctly concluded there was not\\nsufficient evidence to reasonably infer the bank knew about and assisted the\\nscammers’ tortious conduct. Because a conclusion that the bank aided and abetted\\nthe Ponzi scheme could only be reached through considerable conjecture and\\nspeculation, we affirm the district court.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n From 2006 to 2009, five individuals — Trevor Cook, Christopher Pettengill,\\nJason Beckman, Gerald Durand, and Patrick Kiley (“the scammers”) — perpetrated\\na Ponzi scheme that took in over $193 million from investors and returned only $49\\nmillion (all from new investors’ money). See United States v. Beckman, 787 F.3d\\n466, 474 (8th Cir. 2015) (discussing the scheme in an appeal from some of the\\nscammers’ criminal convictions). The scammers used a number of business entities\\nthat went by several variations of names that included “UBS,” “Universal Brokerage,”\\n“Oxford,” “Crown Forex,” and “Basel Group.” See id. at 475, 488; Zayed v.\\nAssociated Bank, N.A. (“Zayed I”), 779 F.3d 727, 730 (8th Cir. 2015). They told\\npotential investors that their investments would be held in segregated accounts,\\n\\n 1\\n After this case was filed, the receiver, R.J. Zayed, was granted leave to recuse\\nhimself from the case and withdrew; three other attorneys were appointed to act in his\\ncapacity as receiver in this litigation. As in our prior opinion in this case, “the\\nReceiver” is used to refer to the office of receiver and not any particular person.\\nZayed v. Associated Bank, N.A. (“Zayed I”), 779 F.3d 727, 729 n.1 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n 2\\n The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of\\nMinnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\ncompletely liquid, and invested in a currency exchange program through a Swiss\\ncompany, Crown Forex, S.A. Zayed I, 779 F.3d at 730. Eventually, the scammers\\nwere caught and ultimately sentenced to lengthy prison terms for various crimes\\nincluding wire and mail fraud and money laundering. See Beckman, 787 F.3d at 477.\\n\\n When the fraud was uncovered in 2009, the U.S. Securities and Exchange\\nCommission and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission filed civil actions\\nagainst the scammers and their entities. In those civil actions, the district court\\nappointed a receiver, granting him the power to take control over the scammers’\\nentities and assets and to bring legal actions in order to discharge his duties.\\n\\n In 2013, the Receiver filed suit against Associated Bank for allegedly aiding\\nand abetting the torts of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and negligent\\nmisrepresentation. The allegations underlying these claims centered on one former\\nAssociated Bank employee, Lien Sarles. Sarles helped open accounts for the\\nscammers and then serviced those accounts at the bank. The Receiver alleged Sarles\\nknew about and assisted in the scheme.\\n\\n Later that year, the district court granted Associated Bank’s motion to dismiss,\\nconcluding that the Receiver had not sufficiently pled a plausible claim that the bank\\naided and abetted the scammers’ tortious conduct. On appeal, this Court reversed the\\ndistrict court’s dismissal, concluding the Receiver’s pleadings were sufficient to\\nsurvive a motion to dismiss. See Zayed I, 779 F.3d 737.\\n\\n After remand and discovery, Associated Bank moved for summary judgment.\\nThe district court granted the motion, concluding there was insufficient evidence that\\nAssociated Bank knew of and provided substantial assistance to the scammers’\\ntortious conduct. The Receiver filed a timely appeal.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n The Receiver argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting summary\\njudgment to Associated Bank. Summary judgment is appropriate where a party\\nshows “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the party “is entitled\\nto judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is “genuine”\\nif a factfinder could reasonably determine the issue in the non-moving party’s favor.\\nSee Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factfinder’s\\ndecision is reasonable if it is based on “sufficient probative evidence” and not on\\n“mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” See Williams v. Mannis, 889 F.3d 926,\\n931 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782,\\n801 (8th Cir. 2011). “We review an order granting summary judgment de novo.”\\nOppedahl v. Mobile Drill Int'l, Inc., 899 F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n The Receiver’s claims against Associated Bank are for aiding and abetting the\\ntorts of conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation\\n— all under Minnesota law. Aiding and abetting is not an independent tort, but a\\ntheory of liability under which a party may be held jointly and severally liable for the\\nunderlying tort. See Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minnesota, 848 N.W.2d\\n224, 228 n.2 (Minn. 2014); Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179,\\n185–86 (Minn. 1999).\\n\\n Under Minnesota law, a plaintiff must show three things to hold a defendant\\nliable for aiding and abetting a tort: first “the primary tortfeasor must commit a tort\\nthat causes an injury to the plaintiff,” second “the defendant must know that the\\nprimary tortfeasor's conduct constitutes a breach of duty,” and third “the defendant\\nmust substantially assist or encourage the primary tortfeasor in the achievement of the\\nbreach.” Zayed I, 779 F.3d at 733 (quoting Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 187).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\n The parties do not dispute the first element, that the scammers committed torts.\\nThe question in this case is whether Associated Bank knew that the scammers were\\nengaged in the tortious Ponzi scheme, and substantially assisted the scammers in\\nachieving that scheme. See id. at 733.\\n\\n A. Knowledge of the Ponzi Scheme\\n\\n 1. Actual Knowledge\\n\\n Under Minnesota law, the scienter (knowledge requirement) for aiding and\\nabetting is “actual knowledge.” Varga v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 952 F. Supp. 2d 850,\\n857 (D. Minn. 2013) aff’d, 764 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2014) (applying Minnesota law).\\nThe evidence necessary to sufficiently show actual knowledge “depends in part on\\nthe particular facts and circumstances of each case.” Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188.\\n“[W]here there is a minimal showing of substantial assistance, a greater showing of\\nscienter is required.” Id. (quoting Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459 (8th Cir.1991)).\\nCourts consider “[f]actors such as the relationship between the defendant and the\\nprimary tortfeasor, the nature of the primary tortfeasor’s activity, the nature of the\\nassistance provided by the defendant, and the defendant’s state of mind.” Id.\\n\\n “While knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence, ‘courts stress that\\nthe requirement is actual knowledge and the circumstantial evidence must\\ndemonstrate that the aider-and-abettor actually knew of the underlying wrongs\\ncommitted.’” Varga, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (quoting Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank,\\nN.A., 938 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1244 (M.D. Fla. 2013)). A plaintiff must show more than\\n“awareness of the conduct in question . . ., that it raised ‘red flags,’ . . . or even that\\nit amounted to gross negligence,” but must show that the defendant “was aware of the\\nwrongfulness of the challenged conduct.” Id. at 858 (citing Camp, 948 F.2d at 459,\\n463; Wiand, 938 F. Supp. 2d at 1244; Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188).\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\n The summary judgment record contains no direct evidence Sarles or anyone at\\nAssociated Bank knew of the Ponzi scheme. In fact, all of the direct evidence was\\nto the contrary. The Receiver’s own expert witness agreed that “[there was] nobody\\nat the bank who put this information together and determined there was a Ponzi\\nscheme going on.” Associated Bank’s expert stated that he agreed with the\\nReceiver’s expert that “there is no one at Associated Bank who actually concluded\\n. . . that the [scammers’ entities] were engaged in a Ponzi scheme.” David Martens,\\nAssociated Bank’s regional security officer, testified based on his extensive law\\nenforcement experience that he believed Sarles’s actions were attributable to “sloppy\\nbanking” rather than anything “nefarious.” Two of Sarles’s coworkers testified that\\nthey did not observe anything that would indicate to them that Sarles knew about the\\nPonzi scheme. Ryan Rasske, Associated Bank’s Director of Risk and Financial\\nCrimes, testified that he had not uncovered any evidence that Sarles or anyone at\\nAssociated Bank knew of the Ponzi scheme. Furthermore, an employee of one of the\\nscammers testified that she had no evidence Sarles knew of the Ponzi scheme. One\\nof the scammers, Pettengill, said that Sarles was not part of the fraud. Another\\nscammer, Cook, testified that Sarles “knew nothing about what was going on.”\\n\\n Given this absence of direct evidence, the Receiver attempted to amass\\ncircumstantial evidence that he claimed showed that Sarles had actual knowledge of\\nthe Ponzi scheme. But none of the circumstantial evidence compiled by the Receiver\\npoints to anything more than “sloppy banking” by Sarles or “red flags” that, with the\\nbenefit of hindsight, should have prompted further investigation or inquiry. Even on\\nthis twenty-seven volume, six-thousand page record, the leap cannot be made to infer\\nthat Sarles or anyone at Associated Bank actually knew about the Ponzi scheme\\nwithout resorting to speculation and conjecture. See Williams, 889 F.3d at 931\\n(discussing the summary judgment standard).\\n\\n Sarles first met Kiley, one of the scammers, around December 2007 when\\nSarles pitched him on switching his business’s banking services to Associated Bank.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\nSarles, who held the position of assistant vice president at Associated Bank, had the\\nprimary job duties of “marketing, opening new commercial accounts, and providing\\naccount management and services to new and existing commercial customers.”\\nSarles first opened an account for Kiley for the entity Universal Brokerage FX\\nManagement, LLC in January 2008. Between then and June 2009, Sarles opened a\\ntotal of eight accounts at Associated Bank for Kiley and fellow scammer Cook for\\ndifferent entities.\\n\\n In June 2008, Sarles opened an account for “Crown Forex LLC” for Cook. The\\nReceiver argues that the fact this account was opened in the name of a domestic entity\\nshows that Sarles knew about the Ponzi scheme and was attempting to help the\\nscammers avoid detection. According to Cook, he intended to open an account for\\nCrown Forex, S.A., the Swiss investing entity, but Sarles suggested that he open it\\nunder the name of a domestic limited liability company. Cook explained that he did\\nnot think Sarles thought this was improper or fraudulent:\\n\\n [Sarles] certainly understood it was . . . a different entity, but . . . I don’t\\n think that he thought there was a fraud going on. . . . I think it’s common\\n that businesses have all kinds of holding companies and sub entities and\\n different entities. . . . [W]e told him that . . . the Crown Forex, LLC\\n account was part of Crown Forex, and it was on their books, so I’m not\\n so sure I’d say [Sarles] knew something, you know, fishy was going on.\\n\\nSarles himself testified that he believed that in order for foreign business entities to\\nopen a bank account, “they have to have a domestic entity.” He was merely following\\npolicy for foreign-owned corporations, and nothing in the record suggests Sarles\\nthought that it was in any way illegitimate or fraudulent to open the Crown Forex\\naccount under the name of a domestic entity.\\n\\n The Crown Forex LLC account was opened as a “checking/money market”\\naccount. The Receiver argues that opening this type of account was intended by\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\nSarles to help the scammers avoid detection. He claims that Sarles should have\\nselected an account type that indicated fiduciary status or that it held investor funds.\\nBut the Receiver has not pointed to anything in the record that shows that Associated\\nBank had such specific types of accounts, much less policies requiring their use. In\\nfact, the portfolio specialist who actually prepared the account opening form selected3\\nthe “checking/money market” option from a list of account types that also included\\n“savings, time deposit, [and] loan account.” The record does not support the claim\\nthat the Crown Forex account was nefariously opened as a checking account by Sarles\\nor anyone else at Associated Bank to avoid detection and further the Ponzi scheme.\\n\\n The Receiver also places great emphasis on the fact that Sarles opened the\\nCrown Forex LLC account for Cook without receiving proof that the company was\\nregistered with the Minnesota Secretary of State. Sarles received all the necessary\\ndocumentation, except for the proof of registration, but did receive an application for\\narticles of incorporation which he was told was being submitted to the state. Sarles\\ntestified that he:\\n\\n receiv[ed] the application that was completed that was en route to be\\n filed with the Secretary of State, therefore, the rapport and trust that I\\n believed I had, I was providing above and beyond customer service to\\n execute the client’s request by opening up the account with the\\n assumption I’d be receiving the state certificate within that two week\\n period or so it takes to generate from the Secretary of State.\\n\\nThe account opening form, under the section for “documentation provided,” listed\\n“[r]eport from a state registration information website,” although the specialist who\\nopened the account was not sure if she typed that response or selected it from a drop-\\n\\n\\n 3\\n There is some evidence that Sarles directed (or that a banker in his position\\nwould typically direct) the selection of the account type. Assuming Sarles was\\nresponsible for the choice of account type, this fact still does not support the\\nReceiver’s allegation of actual knowledge.\\n\\n -8-\\n\\ndown menu as “the one option that closest describe[d] the one item [of\\ndocumentation] that we ha[d].” Sarles did not follow up on the missing paperwork.\\nHe said that after the Ponzi scheme was uncovered, he learned that Crown Forex LLC\\nwas never registered with the state. Of the eight accounts opened by the scammers\\nat Associated Bank, only the Crown Forex LLC account and an account for Basel\\nGroup LLC were opened without certifying that the entities were registered with the\\nstate. Concluding that Sarles opened the Crown Forex and Basel Group accounts\\nbecause he knew that Cook and others were engaged in a Ponzi scheme, rather than\\nsimply out of an effort to please an important client, would require speculation and\\nis not a reasonable inference.\\n\\n The Receiver also emphasizes that Sarles socialized with the scammers. The\\nprecise extent of that socialization is disputed, but none of the evidence supports an\\ninference that Sarles learned about the Ponzi scheme through it. Interestingly, the\\nReceiver also resorts to arguing that Sarles had knowledge of the Ponzi scheme\\nbecause the scammers would sometimes quote lines about greed from movies like\\nWall Street and Boiler Room. This argument borders on absurdity and illustrates the\\nlack of meaningful evidence that Sarles had knowledge of the Ponzi scheme. Quoting\\nlines from movies about greed and scheming does not reveal one to be running a\\nPonzi scheme any more than quoting lines from The Godfather reveals one to be a\\nmobster.\\n\\n The receiver also claimed that Sarles duped a contractor who worked for the\\nscammers into signing a blank account opening form. This assertion is unsupported\\nby the record. The contractor never claimed the form was blank or that he was\\nmisled. The form he signed made him a signatory so he could cash checks and get\\na company credit card, as he had with their Wells Fargo account, in order to purchase\\nsupplies for the maintenance of the mansion in which the scammers conducted their\\nbusiness.\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\n Another basis for the Receiver’s claim that Sarles knew about the Ponzi scheme\\nis the allegations by one of the scammers that Sarles was present at certain meetings.\\nPettengill claimed that around April 2008 he saw Sarles in attendance at an\\ninvestment seminar at the Van Dusen mansion, although Sarles testified that he never\\nattended any such seminars. The Receiver claims that a sophisticated banker like\\nSarles must have known that the investment pitch was a scam. But Pettengill\\nadmitted that Sarles did not say or do anything that would lead him to believe that\\nSarles did not believe the investment pitch or knew it was fraudulent.\\n\\n Pettengill also claimed that Sarles attended a meeting in April or May 2008 at\\nwhich the scammers discussed segregating client accounts. A closer look at this\\nclaim shows that it does not support an inference that Sarles knew the scammers were\\nengaged in fraud. Pettengill himself said that he did not know client funds were\\nbeing used to make up the shortfall in money until months after this meeting. Prior\\nto the meeting, the scammers had been advised by their attorneys to “repaper” their\\nclient accounts by segregating their single, pooled bank account into separate client\\naccounts. According to Pettengill, it was discussed that Associated Bank would\\nfacilitate the wire transfers from the Swiss Crown Forex account, back to the U.S.\\nCrown Forex account, then back again into segregated client accounts in Switzerland.\\nBut Pettengill admitted in his deposition that the manner in which the transfers were\\nto be done — by performing multiple transfers in order to cover up the shortfall of\\nmoney in the Swiss account — was never disclosed to Sarles. Pettengill claimed that\\nit was “implied” that they were covering up a shortfall of money, although he\\nprovides no support for this assertion. Even assuming Sarles knew there was a\\nshortfall in the Swiss Crown Forex entity, and that the scammers wanted to avoid\\ndisclosing that, it does not follow that Sarles knew their enterprise was a Ponzi\\nscheme or that they were engaged in tortious conduct. If true, this should have been\\na red flag, but it does not show actual knowledge. Moreover, Pettengill never\\nclaimed the scammers discussed in Sarles’s presence using new clients’ money to\\nmake up for the shortfall in the Swiss Crown Forex account. Pettengill’s testimony\\n\\n -10-\\n\\nis insufficient to support an inference that Sarles knew the scammers were engaged\\nin tortious conduct.\\n\\n The Receiver also claimed Sarles improperly approved transfers of money\\nbetween bank accounts for the scammers. Specifically, he claims that Sarles\\napproved transfers at Cook’s behest from the Crown Forex accounts, on which Kiley\\nand Smith — but not Cook — were signatories, into accounts on which Cook was\\na signatory. Only three of the transfer forms cited by the Receiver, however, actually\\nreference Cook. Assuming that Sarles authorized these transfers for Cook, there is\\nstill no evidence that the account signatories did not approve of these transfers. Smith\\nwould at times transfer money by forwarding emailed directions from Cook to the\\nbank. Even if Sarles had transferred money at Cook’s behest on an account on which\\nSmith was the signatory, this would only show that he was being sloppy with\\nformalities when he knew that Cook and Smith (and the other scammers) were\\nworking together — it would not show that Sarles knew there was a Ponzi scheme\\nafoot. Additionally, in June 2009, Cook requested a $600,000 withdrawal from the\\nOxford Global account, on which he was a signatory. The withdrawal was approved\\nonly after Sarles contacted his supervisor and the bank ensured that all procedures\\nhad been properly followed. Nothing about these transfers or the withdrawal suggest\\nthat Sarles knew about the Ponzi scheme.\\n\\n The Receiver argues that in 2009, money continued to flow in and out of the\\nCrown Forex account, even “after Sarles had learned that Swiss authorities had shut\\ndown Crown Forex, S.A., rendering the sole investment vehicle of the scheme\\nobviously impossible.” But the record contains no evidence to support the claim that\\nSarles knew the Swiss entity had been shut down. In fact, the Receiver’s own expert\\nreport states that if Associated Bank had the proper due diligence procedures, it\\nwould have learned of this information, but does not claim that anyone at the bank\\nactually did learn of it.\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\n Finally, the Receiver argues in his brief that just before Sarles was fired, “the\\nBank itself began a drumbeat of instructions to Sarles to delete emails – prohibiting\\nhim from using the email account unless he did so,” and that “[n]othing indicates that\\nSarles failed to destroy these documents, as the Bank instructed him to do.”\\nExamination of these emails shows they are not the nefarious messages the Receiver\\nmakes them out to be. Rather, they are standard notifications that the storage on\\nSarles’s email inbox was full, sent by the bank’s Microsoft Exchange Server.\\nMoreover, prior to these notifications and Sarles’s termination, his email inbox was\\npreserved and reviewed by a bank security officer, which revealed “[n]othing out of\\nthe ordinary.” The characterization of these emails by the Receiver to this Court is,\\nat best, misleading. Sarles’s full inbox does not show him to be aware of the Ponzi\\nscheme or that the bank was attempting to cover anything up.\\n\\n In sum, the evidence cited by the Receiver simply does not support a\\nreasonable inference that Sarles or anyone at Associated Bank had actual knowledge\\nof the scammers’ torts. Nor does looking to all the circumstantial evidence\\ncollectively allow for such a conclusion without resorting to speculation and\\nconjecture. After all, “in law as in mathematics zero plus zero equals zero.”\\nHenderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).\\n\\n 2. Constructive Knowledge\\n\\n The Receiver alternatively argues that he need not show that Associated Bank\\nhad actual knowledge of the scammers’ torts to impose aiding and abetting liability,\\nbut that “constructive knowledge” is sufficient. We disagree, but in any event, the\\nsummary judgment record here is insufficient to support a finding of constructive\\nknowledge.\\n\\n The Receiver rests his constructive knowledge argument on a single reference\\nin the Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion in Witzman, in which the Court stated\\n\\n -12-\\n\\nwhile discussing aiding and abetting liability that “some courts” have found that a\\ndefendant may be deemed to have constructive knowledge of a tort “where the\\nprimary tortfeasor’s conduct is clearly tortious or illegal,” where “[the] defendant\\n[has] a long-term or in-depth relationship with that tortfeasor,” and “where the\\nconduct is [] a facial breach of duty.” 601 N.W.2d at 188. After making this\\nobservation, however, the Court in Witzman applied an actual knowledge test. Id.\\nWe agree with the district court in Varga, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 857, that under\\nMinnesota law, “[c]onstructive knowledge will not suffice.”\\n\\n Even assuming that constructive knowledge could be sufficient, it cannot be\\nimputed to Sarles and Associated Bank on this record. The actions of the scammers\\nknown to Associated Bank were not “clearly tortious or illegal.” Rather, what was\\nlater revealed to be a fraud was a sophisticated Ponzi scheme that went undetected for\\nyears. Nor did Sarles or Associated Bank have “a long-term or in-depth relationship”\\nwith the scammers. The professional relationship between the scammers and Sarles\\nand the bank, even with Sarles’s socializing, does not meet this standard. Nor was\\nthe Ponzi scheme “a facial breach of duty.” On its face, it appeared to be a legitimate\\ninvesting business. Thus, a finding of constructive knowledge could not be supported\\nby this record, even if constructive knowledge was sufficient under Minnesota law\\nto impose aiding and abetting liability.\\n\\n B. Substantial Assistance in the Scheme\\n\\n In addition to showing actual knowledge, a plaintiff must show that a defendant\\nprovided substantial assistance to the primary tortfeasor in order to impose aiding and\\nabetting liability. Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188–89. This element is evaluated in\\ntandem with the knowledge requirement. Id. Thus, the weaker the evidence of\\nknowledge is, the greater the showing of substantial assistance must be. See id.\\n“[C]onduct that inadvertently advances the [underlying tort] does not amount to\\nsubstantial assistance.” Varga, 764 F.3d at (quoting Camp, 948 F.2d at 460). In\\n\\n -13-\\n\\naddition, “‘[s]ome element of blameworthiness’ must be present in the defendant’s\\nassistance.” Id.\\n\\n The Minnesota Supreme Court has said that in the context of professionals,\\n“‘substantial assistance’ means something more than the provision of routine\\nprofessional services.” Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 189. The Court in Witzman said that\\nallegations against the defendant, an accounting firm, involved nothing more than the\\n“performance of routine accounting duties,” and went on to say: “If we were to\\nrecognize that such routine services constitute substantial assistance, then it would\\nbe the rare accountant indeed who would not be subject to automatic liability merely\\nbecause his client happened to be a tortfeasor.” Id. The same could easily be said of\\nbanks.\\n\\n While the Receiver’s claim fails because of the lack of evidence of actual\\nknowledge, we also conclude that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that\\nAssociated Bank provided substantial assistance to the scammers in the commission\\nof their torts. The evidence that the Receiver claims shows substantial assistance is\\nlargely the same evidence it claims shows knowledge. The substantial assistance\\nelement is found wanting for many of the same reasons as the knowledge element.\\nThe record shows nothing beyond the provision of routine banking services or, at\\nworst, sloppy banking. The bank provided nothing beyond its standard professional\\nservices to assist the scammers in perpetrating their Ponzi scheme. No reasonable\\nfactfinder could conclude that Associated Bank provided substantial assistance to the\\nscammers’ tortious conduct.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -14-\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n To show a genuine dispute of material fact, a party must provide more than\\nconjecture and speculation. The Receiver has not done so. We affirm.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4357668/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}, {\"author\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.\\n\\n “[A] ‘judge’s function’ at summary judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and\\ndetermine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for\\ntrial.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Anderson,\\n477 U.S. at 249). And it is “axiom[atic] that in ruling on a motion for summary\\njudgment, ‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable\\ninferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Id. at 651 (second alteration in original)\\n(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Our task at summary judgment is particularly\\ndelicate where, as here, the record is fact-intensive and much of the evidence is\\ncircumstantial. After all, we have explained that “[a] given piece of circumstantial\\nevidence may equally support many inferences,” and it is a “fallacy” to “assum[e] that\\nonly inferences that are more probable than other inferences may be drawn from\\n[such] evidence.” Grinder v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 590 F.2d 741, 744 (8th\\nCir. 1979). The “drawing of legitimate inferences”—that is, deciding which of the\\npermissible inferences ultimately to draw—is a function for the jury. Anderson, 477\\nU.S. at 255. Our task here is simply to assess “whether the evidence presents a\\nsufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided\\nthat one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251–52. In my view, the\\nevidence here is not “so one-sided,” and I would reverse the judgment of the district\\ncourt and allow the Receiver’s claims to proceed to trial.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -15-\\n\\n When properly viewed in the light most favorable to the Receiver, the record\\nreveals a genuine dispute of material fact as to both (1) whether Sarles actually\\n“kn[ew] that the primary tortfeasor[s’] conduct constitute[d] a breach of duty;”4 and\\n(2) whether he “substantially assist[ed] or encourage[d] the primary tortfeasor[s] in\\nthe achievement of the breach.” Zayed I, 779 F.3d at 733 (quoting Witzman, 601\\nN.W.2d at 187). As the court notes, we evaluate these elements in tandem, Witzman,\\n601 N.W.2d at 188, and both can be proved by circumstantial evidence, K & S P’ship\\nv. Cont’l Bank, N.A., 952 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1991); Ariola v. City of Stillwater,\\n889 N.W.2d 340, 356–57 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), review denied (Apr. 18, 2017).\\n“[W]here there is a minimal showing of substantial assistance, a greater showing of\\nscienter is required.” Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting\\nMetge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985)). “Factors such as the\\nrelationship between the defendant and the primary tortfeasor, the nature of the\\nprimary tortfeasor’s activity, the nature of the assistance provided by the defendant,\\nand the defendant’s state of mind all come into play.” Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Here, the Receiver has “present[ed] evidence from which a jury might”\\nconclude that Sarles knew that the principals were committing the torts of conversion,\\nbreach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and false representations, and that he substantially\\nassisted them in committing those torts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. Viewed in the\\nlight most favorable to the Receiver, the record demonstrates that Sarles was\\nintimately aware of the principals’ business (which was a fraud); took action to assist\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Were it necessary to reach the issue, I would be inclined to agree with the\\ncourt that Minnesota does not recognize a “constructive knowledge” standard. But\\nit is unnecessary to resolve that issue now because there is substantial circumstantial\\nevidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Sarles had actual\\nknowledge of the principals’ tortious conduct.\\n\\n -16-\\n\\nthem in furthering their tortious conduct; and was unusually close with the principals,\\nand with Cook in particular.\\n\\n For instance, a jury could reasonably conclude that Sarles knew of the tortious\\nconduct based in part on his attendance at several key meetings in 2008. Pettengill\\ntestified that around April 2008, he saw Sarles at an investment seminar, which Sarles\\nattended to “see what [the principals] did.” As we have previously described, the\\nprincipals would pitch a “risk-free,” “completely safe” investment scheme that duped\\ninvestors into believing that “they would be investing in foreign currency trading,\\nwhich was guaranteed and had a fixed rate every month.” Beckman, 787 F.3d at 475\\n(cleaned up). Sarles was an experienced banker who had received bank secrecy and\\nanti-money laundering training. At the very least, a jury could reasonably conclude\\nthat from this point on, Sarles began to gather sufficient information to know that the\\nprincipals were dishonest and pitching a scam. The court, however, dismisses this\\nevidence because Pettengill agreed that Sarles said nothing at the seminar to indicate\\nhe (Sarles) knew the pitch was fraudulent. But Pettengill said that his only interaction\\nwith Sarles at the seminar was to exchange a simple greeting, and that it was before\\nthe seminar even began.\\n\\n After the investment seminar, Sarles attended a critical meeting where,\\naccording to Pettengill, the principals made Sarles aware of two key facts: (1) that the\\nSwiss Crown Forex S.A. account had a $2 million balance that they needed to make\\nappear as a $15 million balance through a “repapering” effort involving wire transfers\\nfrom the insolvent Swiss account to a U.S. account; and (2) that they needed a\\n“friendly banker” to “make it look clean” and “get around Wells Fargo’s questioning\\nall the wire transfers” and that bank’s growing suspicions. According to Pettengill,\\nSarles “agree[d] to the process,” which was impliedly illegal, and said something\\nalong the lines of, “Yes, I can move the money in this way.” Again according to\\nPettengill, Cook said that Sarles “[is] going to be our new banker. . . . And he will do\\nwhatever we need to do to open accounts and do the wire transfer and do whatever\\n\\n -17-\\n\\nwe need[] to have done.” Pettengill’s impression was that Cook chose to work\\nspecifically with Sarles because Sarles “was our guy and . . . would do whatever Cook\\nwanted, even if it was legal or illegal.”\\n\\n The timing of these events is important. It was after attending the seminar and\\nthe above-described meeting that Sarles helped the principals open several accounts\\nthat became central to the principals’ torts. The first was the U.S. Crown Forex LLC\\naccount. Kiley and Smith were the only signatories on the account, but Sarles opened\\nit at Cook’s direction. Sarles knew that the account was supposed to hold investor\\nfunds, yet evidence in the record indicates that it was opened as a “Checking/Money\\nMarket” account. Moreover, although the account-opening form states that a\\n“[r]eport from a state registration information website” had been received to verify\\nLLC status, Sarles admitted that “when [he] opened the Crown Forex LLC account,\\n[he] was not provided with Secretary of State registration documentation,” in\\nviolation of Associated Bank’s procedures. It is true, as the court notes, that Sarles\\ntestified that all he was doing by opening the account without proper documentation\\nwas providing “above and beyond customer service.” But it is not up to us to\\ndefinitively credit this testimony where there is conflicting evidence in the record.5\\nAlthough Sarles claims he expected to receive the required documents at a later date,\\n\\n\\n 5\\n There is plenty of evidence impeaching Sarles’s credibility, including his\\nconflicting testimony about the nature of his social interactions with the principals.\\nSee Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) (noting\\nthat at summary judgment, courts “must disregard all evidence favorable to the\\nmoving party that the jury is not required to believe. That is, the court should give\\ncredence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that ‘evidence supporting\\nthe moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that\\nthat evidence comes from disinterested witnesses’” (citation omitted) (quoting 9A\\nCharles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2529 (2d\\ned.1995))). Moreover, at least two witnesses suggested that Sarles asked them to sign\\nblank bank forms—or, in other words, that he opened accounts without required\\ndocumentation.\\n\\n -18-\\n\\nhe never received them and he never followed up. After assessing the credibility of\\nthose involved, a jury could reasonably conclude that this evidence supports a finding\\nthat Sarles had knowledge of the principals’ tortious conduct. See Anderson, 477\\nU.S. at 255 (“[C]redibility determinations . . . and the drawing of legitimate\\ninferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . .”).\\n\\n After opening the Crown Forex LLC account, Sarles opened four more\\naccounts associated with the scheme. These accounts contained a variant of the name\\n“Oxford,”6 had the same address, and were opened within a three-month period.\\nAccording to Sarles, Cook told him that one of these accounts, Oxford Global FX, on\\nwhich Cook was the sole signatory, would not hold investor funds. Leo\\nDomenichetti, a contractor hired to perform general maintenance on Cook’s\\nproperties, was also a signatory on one of the Oxford Global accounts. This was so\\neven though he had no substantive role in the principals’ “business.” According to\\nDomenichetti, Sarles directed him to sign an account form that he had not read.\\nDomenichetti also said that, when he signed it, portions of the form were covered up,\\nand the other signatories’ lines were blank. Domenichetti also testified that the\\n“Administrative Assistant” title that was next to his name on the form—a title\\nDomenichetti characterized as “baloney”—was added after he signed it.\\n\\n The circumstances surrounding the opening of the Oxford accounts are not\\ninsignificant.7 A jury, of course, would be entitled to give this evidence little weight,\\n\\n 6\\n For example, Oxford Global Investments Inc., Oxford Global Partners LLC,\\nand Oxford Global FX, LLC.\\n 7\\n In fact, David Martens, who was employed in bank security at Associated\\nBank while the fraud unfolded, testified that the opening, within a short time period,\\nof multiple bank accounts with similar names listing the same address might evince\\nfraud. Although he characterized Sarles’s conduct as nothing but “sloppy banking,”\\nthe drawing of ultimate conclusions from Martens’s testimony is a function for the\\njury.\\n\\n -19-\\n\\nor to decline to draw an inference of knowledge from these facts. But at this juncture,\\nwe can do neither.\\n\\n A reasonable jury could also consider the evidence that Sarles personally\\nassisted Cook in improperly transferring millions of dollars from investor accounts\\nto Cook’s account. For instance, on April 30, 2009, Sarles approved Cook’s request\\nto transfer $1.7 million of investor funds from the Crown Forex LLC account (on\\nwhich Cook was not a signatory) to Cook’s Oxford Global FX account (on which he\\nwas the sole signatory).8 Substantial record evidence, including from Associated\\nBank security employees, indicates that Sarles’s approval of that transfer violated\\nbank policy and industry standards. This improper transfer went undetected until\\nCook sought to withdraw $600,000 of that $1.7 million, in cash, to buy a yacht. At\\nthat point, the transfer caught the attention of other bankers. Associated Bank Senior\\nVice President Steven Bianchi halted the $600,000 withdrawal. He explained that\\nCook could not withdraw the money because the funds came from the $1.7 million\\nthat had been improperly transferred by Sarles. He explained:\\n\\n The [$1.7 million] should have been transferred by Crown Forex with\\n an internal wire transfer instead of [the] internal bank transfer [approved\\n by Sarles]. Because ownership and signers are not the same or\\n overlapping, the money should be deposited into Oxford Global via\\n check or wire. The accounts are not related. Therefore, the transfer\\n will be reversed (money taken out of Oxford Global and returned to\\n Crown Forex) and Crown Forex will be instructed to transfer via internal\\n wire transfer the $600,000 in question. After this internal wire has been\\n verified, I will provide approval for this order to purchase cash.\\n\\n(emphasis added).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n Smith initiated the request, but the record shows Cook directed her to do so.\\n\\n -20-\\n\\n Associated Bank ultimately permitted Cook to leave the bank with $600,000\\nof investor funds, but the process leading up to that withdrawal is relevant to the\\nanalysis. I respectfully disagree with the court’s conclusion that this evidence\\nsuggests Sarles “contacted his supervisor” to ensure that “all procedures had been\\nproperly followed” before Cook could withdraw the $600,000. To the contrary, when\\nviewed in the light most favorable to the Receiver, this evidence suggests that Sarles\\ndirectly assisted Cook—in violation of bank policy and industry standards—in\\nwithdrawing investor funds for Cook’s own use. Moreover, this improper transfer\\n(and withdrawal) is not an outlier. Record evidence shows Sarles approved additional\\ntransfers of $1 and $2 million of investor funds from the Crown Forex LLC account\\nto Cook’s own Oxford Global FX account. The jury—not judges—must evaluate and\\nweigh this evidence.\\n\\n In determining whether there is sufficient evidence of knowledge, both the\\nrelationship between Sarles and the “primary tortfeasor[s]” and Sarles’s “state of\\nmind . . . come into play.” Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188. Repeatedly, Pettengill\\nindicated that the principals created an environment where the “operation” was seen\\nas a “‘game’ to get people’s money.” Pettengill “knew that things weren’t right from\\nthe beginning,” even if he did not know the precise “details” and “extent” of the fraud\\nuntil later. According to Pettengill, Sarles too was immersed in this environment.\\nPettengill stated that he saw Sarles at the Van Dusen mansion “perhaps a dozen\\ntimes,” and with Cook “around six times discussing business and drinking.”9 As to\\nthese interactions, Pettengill said, “[m]any times we would just hang out in Cook’s\\noffice and we . . . would just be drinking and [Cook] would spout off on, you know,\\n‘Greed is good’” and quote movie lines about greed and money. The point of this\\nevidence is not whether Sarles knew about the tortious conduct simply because he\\nheard the principals recite movie lines. The point is whether a jury could reasonably\\n\\n\\n 9\\n Sarles himself testified that he spoke to Cook on the phone at a “minimum”\\nonce a week, and often more frequently than that.\\n\\n -21-\\n\\ninfer that Sarles knew of the tortious conduct based, at least in part, on his active\\nparticipation in an atmosphere where greed was openly glorified and getting people’s\\nmoney was viewed as a game—a 193-million-dollar game that cost some victims their\\nentire life savings. See Beckman, 787 F.3d at 474.\\n\\n To be sure, each individual piece of evidence described above, standing alone,\\nmay not be sufficient to indicate Sarles knew of every detail of the Ponzi scheme and\\nits full extent. But the case before us is for aiding and abetting the specific torts of\\nbreach of fiduciary duty, conversion, false representation, and fraud. Associated\\nBank, in fact, concedes that these specific torts were “committed by the operators of\\na Ponzi scheme who stole investors’ money from 2006 until 2009.” When viewed as\\na whole, see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to\\nconclude that Sarles knew that the principals’ conduct constituted each of the alleged\\ntorts.10 A jury could conclude that Sarles knew of the principals’ breach of fiduciary\\nduty because, among other things, he helped Cook withdraw hundreds of thousands\\nof dollars of investor funds for use inconsistent with the funds’ intended purpose and\\nhelped the principals implement an illegal scheme designed to mask a $13 million\\nshortfall of investor funds. Cf. Reisdorf v. i3, LLC, 129 F. Supp. 3d 751, 767 (D.\\nMinn. 2015) (Under Minnesota law, “[f]iduciary duty requires officers and directors\\n‘to act in good faith, with honesty in fact, with loyalty, in the best interests of the\\n[beneficiary].’”); Vacinek v. First Nat’l Bank of Pine City, 416 N.W.2d 795, 799\\n(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that fiduciary relationships are characterized by\\ntwo attributes: “superiority of knowledge of one party and confidence reposed by the\\nother”).\\n\\n\\n\\n 10\\n Regrettably, the Receiver fails to engage in the required tort-by-tort analysis\\nin its brief, even though he argues that the district court erred in failing to analyze the\\nclaims individually. The fact that Associated Bank concedes the principals\\ncommitted the torts, but neither party elaborates on this point, further complicates our\\ntask at summary judgment.\\n\\n -22-\\n\\n A jury could also conclude that Sarles had knowledge of the tort of conversion\\nbased on this same evidence, that is, that he personally assisted the principals in\\ntransferring (and withdrawing) at least $600,000 of investor funds for Cook’s own\\nuse. See Rudnitski v. Seely, 452 N.W.2d 664, 668 (Minn. 1990) (“Conversion is the\\nexercise of dominion and control over goods inconsistent with, and in repudiation of,\\nthe owner’s rights in those goods.”). Similarly, a jury could find that Sarles had\\nknowledge of the tort of false representations because he knew what the principals\\npromised investors, but also knew that investor funds were being misused. See\\nSpecialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392 N.W.2d 520, 532 (Minn. 1986) (listing the\\nelements of an affirmative misrepresentation claim in Minnesota as requiring that:\\n“(1) there was a false representation by a party of a past or existing material fact\\nsusceptible of knowledge; (2) made with knowledge of the falsity of the\\nrepresentation . . . ; (3) with the intention to induce another to act in reliance thereon;\\n(4) that the representation caused the other party to act in reliance thereon; and (5)\\nthat the party suffer pecuniary damage as a result of the reliance”).\\n\\n Sarles’s knowledge of the fraud claim presents a closer call. The Receiver’s\\ncomplaint alleges the fraud claim specifically as a “Ponzi scheme”—a type of fraud\\nin which “the operator promises investors returns on their investment which the\\noperator intends to pay from funds provided by new investors, rather than from\\nprofits generated by the underlying business venture.” In re Armstrong, 285 F.3d\\n1092, 1093 n.3 (8th Cir. 2002). In my view, however, Sarles’s willingness to help the\\nprincipals open accounts to make a $2 million balance appear as a $15 million\\nbalance coupled with the other evidence of banking improprieties prevents us from\\nconcluding, as a matter of law, that he had no knowledge of the Ponzi scheme.\\n\\n As the court notes, the evidence in this case is largely circumstantial. But\\nrefusing to submit to a jury circumstantial evidence of the type found here comes far\\ntoo close to impermissibly requiring direct evidence of actual knowledge even where\\ncircumstantial evidence in fact can and may suffice. See United States v. Hirani, 824\\n\\n -23-\\n\\nF.3d 741, 747 (8th Cir. 2016) (“In both civil and criminal cases, circumstantial\\nevidence is considered just as probative as direct evidence . . . .”). Moreover, as we\\nhave often explained, fact-intensive inquiries, in particular those containing a\\nknowledge component, “[are] generally inappropriate for summary judgment.” Best\\nBuy Stores, L.P. v. Benderson-Wainberg Assocs., L.P., 668 F.3d 1019, 1030 (8th Cir.\\n2012) (reversing grant of summary judgment on affirmative defenses containing\\nknowledge as an element). “[A] non-moving party survives summary judgment when\\nthe facts, while thin, enable a jury to draw a reasonable inference for its claim.” Hill\\nv. Sw. Energy Co., 858 F.3d 481, 487 (8th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The above-described circumstantial evidence could also lead a jury reasonably\\nto conclude that Sarles substantially assisted the principals’ torts. To qualify under\\nMinnesota law, “[a]ssitance must further the [tort] itself, and not merely constitute\\ngeneral aid to the tortfeasor.” Zayed I, 779 F.3d at 735 (cleaned up). “‘[S]ubstantial\\nassistance’ means something more than the provision of routine professional\\nservices.” Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 189. Viewing the evidence in the light most\\nfavorable to the Receiver, a jury could reasonably conclude that Sarles did more than\\nprovide the principals with ordinary banking services. He opened accounts—without\\nthe proper documentation—to assist them in an illegal “repapering” effort after Wells\\nFargo had grown suspicious of the principals’ banking activity. He helped Cook\\ntransfer and withdraw large sums of investor funds for his own use and in violation\\nof Associated Bank’s policies and industry standards. Cf id. (holding that the\\nplaintiff failed to state a claim when “[t]he only ‘assistance’” she alleged was\\n“performance of routine accounting duties—i.e., preparing financial statements,”\\netc.). Assessed in tandem with the evidence of Sarles’s knowledge of the principals’\\n“business model” promising risk-free and guaranteed returns, and viewed in the light\\nmost favorable to the Receiver, this evidence suggests that Sarles was far more than\\na mere bystander. Cf id. (“The mere presence of the particular defendant at the\\n\\n -24-\\n\\ncommission of the wrong, or his failure to object to it, is not enough to charge him\\nwith responsibility.” (cleaned up)).\\n\\n In sum, I believe the Receiver has presented sufficient evidence to defeat\\nsummary judgment. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.\\n\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -25-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4357668/\", \"author_raw\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4580415/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: R.J. ZAYED, in His Capacity as Court-Appointed Receiver for the Oxford Global Partners, LLC, Universal Brokerage FX, and Other Receiver Entities, Plaintiff - Appellant v. ASSOCIATED BANK, N.A., Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-1250\n ___________________________\n\nR.J. Zayed, In His Capacity As Court-Appointed Receiver For The Oxford Global\n Partners, LLC, Universal Brokerage FX, and Other Receiver Entities\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Associated Bank, N.A.\n\n Defendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota\n ____________\n\n Submitted: May 17, 2018\n Filed: January 10, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\n Over a period of several years, a group of scammers based in Minnesota\nswindled investors out of more than one hundred million dollars in a prolific Ponzi\n\nscheme utilizing numerous business entities. A receiver1 was appointed to take\ncharge of what assets remained in the business entities that were used to perpetrate\nthe scheme and to recover any assets he could for the victims of the fraud. The\nReceiver sued Associated Bank, N.A., which provided banking services to some of\nthe scammers’ entities, accusing the bank of aiding and abetting the Ponzi scheme.\nAt issue in this appeal is whether the district court2 correctly concluded there was not\nsufficient evidence to reasonably infer the bank knew about and assisted the\nscammers’ tortious conduct. Because a conclusion that the bank aided and abetted\nthe Ponzi scheme could only be reached through considerable conjecture and\nspeculation, we affirm the district court.\n\n I. Background\n\n From 2006 to 2009, five individuals — Trevor Cook, Christopher Pettengill,\nJason Beckman, Gerald Durand, and Patrick Kiley (“the scammers”) — perpetrated\na Ponzi scheme that took in over $193 million from investors and returned only $49\nmillion (all from new investors’ money). See United States v. Beckman, 787 F.3d\n466, 474 (8th Cir. 2015) (discussing the scheme in an appeal from some of the\nscammers’ criminal convictions). The scammers used a number of business entities\nthat went by several variations of names that included “UBS,” “Universal Brokerage,”\n“Oxford,” “Crown Forex,” and “Basel Group.” See id. at 475, 488; Zayed v.\nAssociated Bank, N.A. (“Zayed I”), 779 F.3d 727, 730 (8th Cir. 2015). They told\npotential investors that their investments would be held in segregated accounts,\n\n 1\n After this case was filed, the receiver, R.J. Zayed, was granted leave to recuse\nhimself from the case and withdrew; three other attorneys were appointed to act in his\ncapacity as receiver in this litigation. As in our prior opinion in this case, “the\nReceiver” is used to refer to the office of receiver and not any particular person.\nZayed v. Associated Bank, N.A. (“Zayed I”), 779 F.3d 727, 729 n.1 (8th Cir. 2015).\n 2\n The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of\nMinnesota.\n\n -2-\n\ncompletely liquid, and invested in a currency exchange program through a Swiss\ncompany, Crown Forex, S.A. Zayed I, 779 F.3d at 730. Eventually, the scammers\nwere caught and ultimately sentenced to lengthy prison terms for various crimes\nincluding wire and mail fraud and money laundering. See Beckman, 787 F.3d at 477.\n\n When the fraud was uncovered in 2009, the U.S. Securities and Exchange\nCommission and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission filed civil actions\nagainst the scammers and their entities. In those civil actions, the district court\nappointed a receiver, granting him the power to take control over the scammers’\nentities and assets and to bring legal actions in order to discharge his duties.\n\n In 2013, the Receiver filed suit against Associated Bank for allegedly aiding\nand abetting the torts of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and negligent\nmisrepresentation. The allegations underlying these claims centered on one former\nAssociated Bank employee, Lien Sarles. Sarles helped open accounts for the\nscammers and then serviced those accounts at the bank. The Receiver alleged Sarles\nknew about and assisted in the scheme.\n\n Later that year, the district court granted Associated Bank’s motion to dismiss,\nconcluding that the Receiver had not sufficiently pled a plausible claim that the bank\naided and abetted the scammers’ tortious conduct. On appeal, this Court reversed the\ndistrict court’s dismissal, concluding the Receiver’s pleadings were sufficient to\nsurvive a motion to dismiss. See Zayed I, 779 F.3d 737.\n\n After remand and discovery, Associated Bank moved for summary judgment.\nThe district court granted the motion, concluding there was insufficient evidence that\nAssociated Bank knew of and provided substantial assistance to the scammers’\ntortious conduct. The Receiver filed a timely appeal.\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\n II. Discussion\n\n The Receiver argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting summary\njudgment to Associated Bank. Summary judgment is appropriate where a party\nshows “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the party “is entitled\nto judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is “genuine”\nif a factfinder could reasonably determine the issue in the non-moving party’s favor.\nSee Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factfinder’s\ndecision is reasonable if it is based on “sufficient probative evidence” and not on\n“mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” See Williams v. Mannis, 889 F.3d 926,\n931 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782,\n801 (8th Cir. 2011). “We review an order granting summary judgment de novo.”\nOppedahl v. Mobile Drill Int'l, Inc., 899 F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 2018).\n\n The Receiver’s claims against Associated Bank are for aiding and abetting the\ntorts of conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation\n— all under Minnesota law. Aiding and abetting is not an independent tort, but a\ntheory of liability under which a party may be held jointly and severally liable for the\nunderlying tort. See Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minnesota, 848 N.W.2d\n224, 228 n.2 (Minn. 2014); Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179,\n185–86 (Minn. 1999).\n\n Under Minnesota law, a plaintiff must show three things to hold a defendant\nliable for aiding and abetting a tort: first “the primary tortfeasor must commit a tort\nthat causes an injury to the plaintiff,” second “the defendant must know that the\nprimary tortfeasor's conduct constitutes a breach of duty,” and third “the defendant\nmust substantially assist or encourage the primary tortfeasor in the achievement of the\nbreach.” Zayed I, 779 F.3d at 733 (quoting Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 187).\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n\n The parties do not dispute the first element, that the scammers committed torts.\nThe question in this case is whether Associated Bank knew that the scammers were\nengaged in the tortious Ponzi scheme, and substantially assisted the scammers in\nachieving that scheme. See id. at 733.\n\n A. Knowledge of the Ponzi Scheme\n\n 1. Actual Knowledge\n\n Under Minnesota law, the scienter (knowledge requirement) for aiding and\nabetting is “actual knowledge.” Varga v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 952 F. Supp. 2d 850,\n857 (D. Minn. 2013) aff’d, 764 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2014) (applying Minnesota law).\nThe evidence necessary to sufficiently show actual knowledge “depends in part on\nthe particular facts and circumstances of each case.” Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188.\n“[W]here there is a minimal showing of substantial assistance, a greater showing of\nscienter is required.” Id. (quoting Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459 (8th Cir.1991)).\nCourts consider “[f]actors such as the relationship between the defendant and the\nprimary tortfeasor, the nature of the primary tortfeasor’s activity, the nature of the\nassistance provided by the defendant, and the defendant’s state of mind.” Id.\n\n “While knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence, ‘courts stress that\nthe requirement is actual knowledge and the circumstantial evidence must\ndemonstrate that the aider-and-abettor actually knew of the underlying wrongs\ncommitted.’” Varga, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (quoting Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank,\nN.A., 938 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1244 (M.D. Fla. 2013)). A plaintiff must show more than\n“awareness of the conduct in question . . ., that it raised ‘red flags,’ . . . or even that\nit amounted to gross negligence,” but must show that the defendant “was aware of the\nwrongfulness of the challenged conduct.” Id. at 858 (citing Camp, 948 F.2d at 459,\n463; Wiand, 938 F. Supp. 2d at 1244; Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188).\n\n\n\n -5-\n\n The summary judgment record contains no direct evidence Sarles or anyone at\nAssociated Bank knew of the Ponzi scheme. In fact, all of the direct evidence was\nto the contrary. The Receiver’s own expert witness agreed that “[there was] nobody\nat the bank who put this information together and determined there was a Ponzi\nscheme going on.” Associated Bank’s expert stated that he agreed with the\nReceiver’s expert that “there is no one at Associated Bank who actually concluded\n. . . that the [scammers’ entities] were engaged in a Ponzi scheme.” David Martens,\nAssociated Bank’s regional security officer, testified based on his extensive law\nenforcement experience that he believed Sarles’s actions were attributable to “sloppy\nbanking” rather than anything “nefarious.” Two of Sarles’s coworkers testified that\nthey did not observe anything that would indicate to them that Sarles knew about the\nPonzi scheme. Ryan Rasske, Associated Bank’s Director of Risk and Financial\nCrimes, testified that he had not uncovered any evidence that Sarles or anyone at\nAssociated Bank knew of the Ponzi scheme. Furthermore, an employee of one of the\nscammers testified that she had no evidence Sarles knew of the Ponzi scheme. One\nof the scammers, Pettengill, said that Sarles was not part of the fraud. Another\nscammer, Cook, testified that Sarles “knew nothing about what was going on.”\n\n Given this absence of direct evidence, the Receiver attempted to amass\ncircumstantial evidence that he claimed showed that Sarles had actual knowledge of\nthe Ponzi scheme. But none of the circumstantial evidence compiled by the Receiver\npoints to anything more than “sloppy banking” by Sarles or “red flags” that, with the\nbenefit of hindsight, should have prompted further investigation or inquiry. Even on\nthis twenty-seven volume, six-thousand page record, the leap cannot be made to infer\nthat Sarles or anyone at Associated Bank actually knew about the Ponzi scheme\nwithout resorting to speculation and conjecture. See Williams, 889 F.3d at 931\n(discussing the summary judgment standard).\n\n Sarles first met Kiley, one of the scammers, around December 2007 when\nSarles pitched him on switching his business’s banking services to Associated Bank.\n\n -6-\n\nSarles, who held the position of assistant vice president at Associated Bank, had the\nprimary job duties of “marketing, opening new commercial accounts, and providing\naccount management and services to new and existing commercial customers.”\nSarles first opened an account for Kiley for the entity Universal Brokerage FX\nManagement, LLC in January 2008. Between then and June 2009, Sarles opened a\ntotal of eight accounts at Associated Bank for Kiley and fellow scammer Cook for\ndifferent entities.\n\n In June 2008, Sarles opened an account for “Crown Forex LLC” for Cook. The\nReceiver argues that the fact this account was opened in the name of a domestic entity\nshows that Sarles knew about the Ponzi scheme and was attempting to help the\nscammers avoid detection. According to Cook, he intended to open an account for\nCrown Forex, S.A., the Swiss investing entity, but Sarles suggested that he open it\nunder the name of a domestic limited liability company. Cook explained that he did\nnot think Sarles thought this was improper or fraudulent:\n\n [Sarles] certainly understood it was . . . a different entity, but . . . I don’t\n think that he thought there was a fraud going on. . . . I think it’s common\n that businesses have all kinds of holding companies and sub entities and\n different entities. . . . [W]e told him that . . . the Crown Forex, LLC\n account was part of Crown Forex, and it was on their books, so I’m not\n so sure I’d say [Sarles] knew something, you know, fishy was going on.\n\nSarles himself testified that he believed that in order for foreign business entities to\nopen a bank account, “they have to have a domestic entity.” He was merely following\npolicy for foreign-owned corporations, and nothing in the record suggests Sarles\nthought that it was in any way illegitimate or fraudulent to open the Crown Forex\naccount under the name of a domestic entity.\n\n The Crown Forex LLC account was opened as a “checking/money market”\naccount. The Receiver argues that opening this type of account was intended by\n\n\n -7-\n\nSarles to help the scammers avoid detection. He claims that Sarles should have\nselected an account type that indicated fiduciary status or that it held investor funds.\nBut the Receiver has not pointed to anything in the record that shows that Associated\nBank had such specific types of accounts, much less policies requiring their use. In\nfact, the portfolio specialist who actually prepared the account opening form selected3\nthe “checking/money market” option from a list of account types that also included\n“savings, time deposit, [and] loan account.” The record does not support the claim\nthat the Crown Forex account was nefariously opened as a checking account by Sarles\nor anyone else at Associated Bank to avoid detection and further the Ponzi scheme.\n\n The Receiver also places great emphasis on the fact that Sarles opened the\nCrown Forex LLC account for Cook without receiving proof that the company was\nregistered with the Minnesota Secretary of State. Sarles received all the necessary\ndocumentation, except for the proof of registration, but did receive an application for\narticles of incorporation which he was told was being submitted to the state. Sarles\ntestified that he:\n\n receiv[ed] the application that was completed that was en route to be\n filed with the Secretary of State, therefore, the rapport and trust that I\n believed I had, I was providing above and beyond customer service to\n execute the client’s request by opening up the account with the\n assumption I’d be receiving the state certificate within that two week\n period or so it takes to generate from the Secretary of State.\n\nThe account opening form, under the section for “documentation provided,” listed\n“[r]eport from a state registration information website,” although the specialist who\nopened the account was not sure if she typed that response or selected it from a drop-\n\n\n 3\n There is some evidence that Sarles directed (or that a banker in his position\nwould typically direct) the selection of the account type. Assuming Sarles was\nresponsible for the choice of account type, this fact still does not support the\nReceiver’s allegation of actual knowledge.\n\n -8-\n\ndown menu as “the one option that closest describe[d] the one item [of\ndocumentation] that we ha[d].” Sarles did not follow up on the missing paperwork.\nHe said that after the Ponzi scheme was uncovered, he learned that Crown Forex LLC\nwas never registered with the state. Of the eight accounts opened by the scammers\nat Associated Bank, only the Crown Forex LLC account and an account for Basel\nGroup LLC were opened without certifying that the entities were registered with the\nstate. Concluding that Sarles opened the Crown Forex and Basel Group accounts\nbecause he knew that Cook and others were engaged in a Ponzi scheme, rather than\nsimply out of an effort to please an important client, would require speculation and\nis not a reasonable inference.\n\n The Receiver also emphasizes that Sarles socialized with the scammers. The\nprecise extent of that socialization is disputed, but none of the evidence supports an\ninference that Sarles learned about the Ponzi scheme through it. Interestingly, the\nReceiver also resorts to arguing that Sarles had knowledge of the Ponzi scheme\nbecause the scammers would sometimes quote lines about greed from movies like\nWall Street and Boiler Room. This argument borders on absurdity and illustrates the\nlack of meaningful evidence that Sarles had knowledge of the Ponzi scheme. Quoting\nlines from movies about greed and scheming does not reveal one to be running a\nPonzi scheme any more than quoting lines from The Godfather reveals one to be a\nmobster.\n\n The receiver also claimed that Sarles duped a contractor who worked for the\nscammers into signing a blank account opening form. This assertion is unsupported\nby the record. The contractor never claimed the form was blank or that he was\nmisled. The form he signed made him a signatory so he could cash checks and get\na company credit card, as he had with their Wells Fargo account, in order to purchase\nsupplies for the maintenance of the mansion in which the scammers conducted their\nbusiness.\n\n\n\n -9-\n\n Another basis for the Receiver’s claim that Sarles knew about the Ponzi scheme\nis the allegations by one of the scammers that Sarles was present at certain meetings.\nPettengill claimed that around April 2008 he saw Sarles in attendance at an\ninvestment seminar at the Van Dusen mansion, although Sarles testified that he never\nattended any such seminars. The Receiver claims that a sophisticated banker like\nSarles must have known that the investment pitch was a scam. But Pettengill\nadmitted that Sarles did not say or do anything that would lead him to believe that\nSarles did not believe the investment pitch or knew it was fraudulent.\n\n Pettengill also claimed that Sarles attended a meeting in April or May 2008 at\nwhich the scammers discussed segregating client accounts. A closer look at this\nclaim shows that it does not support an inference that Sarles knew the scammers were\nengaged in fraud. Pettengill himself said that he did not know client funds were\nbeing used to make up the shortfall in money until months after this meeting. Prior\nto the meeting, the scammers had been advised by their attorneys to “repaper” their\nclient accounts by segregating their single, pooled bank account into separate client\naccounts. According to Pettengill, it was discussed that Associated Bank would\nfacilitate the wire transfers from the Swiss Crown Forex account, back to the U.S.\nCrown Forex account, then back again into segregated client accounts in Switzerland.\nBut Pettengill admitted in his deposition that the manner in which the transfers were\nto be done — by performing multiple transfers in order to cover up the shortfall of\nmoney in the Swiss account — was never disclosed to Sarles. Pettengill claimed that\nit was “implied” that they were covering up a shortfall of money, although he\nprovides no support for this assertion. Even assuming Sarles knew there was a\nshortfall in the Swiss Crown Forex entity, and that the scammers wanted to avoid\ndisclosing that, it does not follow that Sarles knew their enterprise was a Ponzi\nscheme or that they were engaged in tortious conduct. If true, this should have been\na red flag, but it does not show actual knowledge. Moreover, Pettengill never\nclaimed the scammers discussed in Sarles’s presence using new clients’ money to\nmake up for the shortfall in the Swiss Crown Forex account. Pettengill’s testimony\n\n -10-\n\nis insufficient to support an inference that Sarles knew the scammers were engaged\nin tortious conduct.\n\n The Receiver also claimed Sarles improperly approved transfers of money\nbetween bank accounts for the scammers. Specifically, he claims that Sarles\napproved transfers at Cook’s behest from the Crown Forex accounts, on which Kiley\nand Smith — but not Cook — were signatories, into accounts on which Cook was\na signatory. Only three of the transfer forms cited by the Receiver, however, actually\nreference Cook. Assuming that Sarles authorized these transfers for Cook, there is\nstill no evidence that the account signatories did not approve of these transfers. Smith\nwould at times transfer money by forwarding emailed directions from Cook to the\nbank. Even if Sarles had transferred money at Cook’s behest on an account on which\nSmith was the signatory, this would only show that he was being sloppy with\nformalities when he knew that Cook and Smith (and the other scammers) were\nworking together — it would not show that Sarles knew there was a Ponzi scheme\nafoot. Additionally, in June 2009, Cook requested a $600,000 withdrawal from the\nOxford Global account, on which he was a signatory. The withdrawal was approved\nonly after Sarles contacted his supervisor and the bank ensured that all procedures\nhad been properly followed. Nothing about these transfers or the withdrawal suggest\nthat Sarles knew about the Ponzi scheme.\n\n The Receiver argues that in 2009, money continued to flow in and out of the\nCrown Forex account, even “after Sarles had learned that Swiss authorities had shut\ndown Crown Forex, S.A., rendering the sole investment vehicle of the scheme\nobviously impossible.” But the record contains no evidence to support the claim that\nSarles knew the Swiss entity had been shut down. In fact, the Receiver’s own expert\nreport states that if Associated Bank had the proper due diligence procedures, it\nwould have learned of this information, but does not claim that anyone at the bank\nactually did learn of it.\n\n\n\n -11-\n\n Finally, the Receiver argues in his brief that just before Sarles was fired, “the\nBank itself began a drumbeat of instructions to Sarles to delete emails – prohibiting\nhim from using the email account unless he did so,” and that “[n]othing indicates that\nSarles failed to destroy these documents, as the Bank instructed him to do.”\nExamination of these emails shows they are not the nefarious messages the Receiver\nmakes them out to be. Rather, they are standard notifications that the storage on\nSarles’s email inbox was full, sent by the bank’s Microsoft Exchange Server.\nMoreover, prior to these notifications and Sarles’s termination, his email inbox was\npreserved and reviewed by a bank security officer, which revealed “[n]othing out of\nthe ordinary.” The characterization of these emails by the Receiver to this Court is,\nat best, misleading. Sarles’s full inbox does not show him to be aware of the Ponzi\nscheme or that the bank was attempting to cover anything up.\n\n In sum, the evidence cited by the Receiver simply does not support a\nreasonable inference that Sarles or anyone at Associated Bank had actual knowledge\nof the scammers’ torts. Nor does looking to all the circumstantial evidence\ncollectively allow for such a conclusion without resorting to speculation and\nconjecture. After all, “in law as in mathematics zero plus zero equals zero.”\nHenderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).\n\n 2. Constructive Knowledge\n\n The Receiver alternatively argues that he need not show that Associated Bank\nhad actual knowledge of the scammers’ torts to impose aiding and abetting liability,\nbut that “constructive knowledge” is sufficient. We disagree, but in any event, the\nsummary judgment record here is insufficient to support a finding of constructive\nknowledge.\n\n The Receiver rests his constructive knowledge argument on a single reference\nin the Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion in Witzman, in which the Court stated\n\n -12-\n\nwhile discussing aiding and abetting liability that “some courts” have found that a\ndefendant may be deemed to have constructive knowledge of a tort “where the\nprimary tortfeasor’s conduct is clearly tortious or illegal,” where “[the] defendant\n[has] a long-term or in-depth relationship with that tortfeasor,” and “where the\nconduct is [] a facial breach of duty.” 601 N.W.2d at 188. After making this\nobservation, however, the Court in Witzman applied an actual knowledge test. Id.\nWe agree with the district court in Varga, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 857, that under\nMinnesota law, “[c]onstructive knowledge will not suffice.”\n\n Even assuming that constructive knowledge could be sufficient, it cannot be\nimputed to Sarles and Associated Bank on this record. The actions of the scammers\nknown to Associated Bank were not “clearly tortious or illegal.” Rather, what was\nlater revealed to be a fraud was a sophisticated Ponzi scheme that went undetected for\nyears. Nor did Sarles or Associated Bank have “a long-term or in-depth relationship”\nwith the scammers. The professional relationship between the scammers and Sarles\nand the bank, even with Sarles’s socializing, does not meet this standard. Nor was\nthe Ponzi scheme “a facial breach of duty.” On its face, it appeared to be a legitimate\ninvesting business. Thus, a finding of constructive knowledge could not be supported\nby this record, even if constructive knowledge was sufficient under Minnesota law\nto impose aiding and abetting liability.\n\n B. Substantial Assistance in the Scheme\n\n In addition to showing actual knowledge, a plaintiff must show that a defendant\nprovided substantial assistance to the primary tortfeasor in order to impose aiding and\nabetting liability. Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188–89. This element is evaluated in\ntandem with the knowledge requirement. Id. Thus, the weaker the evidence of\nknowledge is, the greater the showing of substantial assistance must be. See id.\n“[C]onduct that inadvertently advances the [underlying tort] does not amount to\nsubstantial assistance.” Varga, 764 F.3d at (quoting Camp, 948 F.2d at 460). In\n\n -13-\n\naddition, “‘[s]ome element of blameworthiness’ must be present in the defendant’s\nassistance.” Id.\n\n The Minnesota Supreme Court has said that in the context of professionals,\n“‘substantial assistance’ means something more than the provision of routine\nprofessional services.” Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 189. The Court in Witzman said that\nallegations against the defendant, an accounting firm, involved nothing more than the\n“performance of routine accounting duties,” and went on to say: “If we were to\nrecognize that such routine services constitute substantial assistance, then it would\nbe the rare accountant indeed who would not be subject to automatic liability merely\nbecause his client happened to be a tortfeasor.” Id. The same could easily be said of\nbanks.\n\n While the Receiver’s claim fails because of the lack of evidence of actual\nknowledge, we also conclude that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that\nAssociated Bank provided substantial assistance to the scammers in the commission\nof their torts. The evidence that the Receiver claims shows substantial assistance is\nlargely the same evidence it claims shows knowledge. The substantial assistance\nelement is found wanting for many of the same reasons as the knowledge element.\nThe record shows nothing beyond the provision of routine banking services or, at\nworst, sloppy banking. The bank provided nothing beyond its standard professional\nservices to assist the scammers in perpetrating their Ponzi scheme. No reasonable\nfactfinder could conclude that Associated Bank provided substantial assistance to the\nscammers’ tortious conduct.\n\n\n\n\n -14-\n\n III. Conclusion\n\n To show a genuine dispute of material fact, a party must provide more than\nconjecture and speculation. The Receiver has not done so. We affirm.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: R.J. ZAYED, in His Capacity as Court-Appointed Receiver for the Oxford Global Partners, LLC, Universal Brokerage FX, and Other Receiver Entities, Plaintiff - Appellant v. ASSOCIATED BANK, N.A., Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-1250\\n ___________________________\\n\\nR.J. Zayed, In His Capacity As Court-Appointed Receiver For The Oxford Global\\n Partners, LLC, Universal Brokerage FX, and Other Receiver Entities\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Associated Bank, N.A.\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: May 17, 2018\\n Filed: January 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Over a period of several years, a group of scammers based in Minnesota\\nswindled investors out of more than one hundred million dollars in a prolific Ponzi\\n\\nscheme utilizing numerous business entities. A receiver1 was appointed to take\\ncharge of what assets remained in the business entities that were used to perpetrate\\nthe scheme and to recover any assets he could for the victims of the fraud. The\\nReceiver sued Associated Bank, N.A., which provided banking services to some of\\nthe scammers’ entities, accusing the bank of aiding and abetting the Ponzi scheme.\\nAt issue in this appeal is whether the district court2 correctly concluded there was not\\nsufficient evidence to reasonably infer the bank knew about and assisted the\\nscammers’ tortious conduct. Because a conclusion that the bank aided and abetted\\nthe Ponzi scheme could only be reached through considerable conjecture and\\nspeculation, we affirm the district court.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n From 2006 to 2009, five individuals — Trevor Cook, Christopher Pettengill,\\nJason Beckman, Gerald Durand, and Patrick Kiley (“the scammers”) — perpetrated\\na Ponzi scheme that took in over $193 million from investors and returned only $49\\nmillion (all from new investors’ money). See United States v. Beckman, 787 F.3d\\n466, 474 (8th Cir. 2015) (discussing the scheme in an appeal from some of the\\nscammers’ criminal convictions). The scammers used a number of business entities\\nthat went by several variations of names that included “UBS,” “Universal Brokerage,”\\n“Oxford,” “Crown Forex,” and “Basel Group.” See id. at 475, 488; Zayed v.\\nAssociated Bank, N.A. (“Zayed I”), 779 F.3d 727, 730 (8th Cir. 2015). They told\\npotential investors that their investments would be held in segregated accounts,\\n\\n 1\\n After this case was filed, the receiver, R.J. Zayed, was granted leave to recuse\\nhimself from the case and withdrew; three other attorneys were appointed to act in his\\ncapacity as receiver in this litigation. As in our prior opinion in this case, “the\\nReceiver” is used to refer to the office of receiver and not any particular person.\\nZayed v. Associated Bank, N.A. (“Zayed I”), 779 F.3d 727, 729 n.1 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n 2\\n The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of\\nMinnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\ncompletely liquid, and invested in a currency exchange program through a Swiss\\ncompany, Crown Forex, S.A. Zayed I, 779 F.3d at 730. Eventually, the scammers\\nwere caught and ultimately sentenced to lengthy prison terms for various crimes\\nincluding wire and mail fraud and money laundering. See Beckman, 787 F.3d at 477.\\n\\n When the fraud was uncovered in 2009, the U.S. Securities and Exchange\\nCommission and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission filed civil actions\\nagainst the scammers and their entities. In those civil actions, the district court\\nappointed a receiver, granting him the power to take control over the scammers’\\nentities and assets and to bring legal actions in order to discharge his duties.\\n\\n In 2013, the Receiver filed suit against Associated Bank for allegedly aiding\\nand abetting the torts of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and negligent\\nmisrepresentation. The allegations underlying these claims centered on one former\\nAssociated Bank employee, Lien Sarles. Sarles helped open accounts for the\\nscammers and then serviced those accounts at the bank. The Receiver alleged Sarles\\nknew about and assisted in the scheme.\\n\\n Later that year, the district court granted Associated Bank’s motion to dismiss,\\nconcluding that the Receiver had not sufficiently pled a plausible claim that the bank\\naided and abetted the scammers’ tortious conduct. On appeal, this Court reversed the\\ndistrict court’s dismissal, concluding the Receiver’s pleadings were sufficient to\\nsurvive a motion to dismiss. See Zayed I, 779 F.3d 737.\\n\\n After remand and discovery, Associated Bank moved for summary judgment.\\nThe district court granted the motion, concluding there was insufficient evidence that\\nAssociated Bank knew of and provided substantial assistance to the scammers’\\ntortious conduct. The Receiver filed a timely appeal.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n The Receiver argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting summary\\njudgment to Associated Bank. Summary judgment is appropriate where a party\\nshows “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the party “is entitled\\nto judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is “genuine”\\nif a factfinder could reasonably determine the issue in the non-moving party’s favor.\\nSee Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factfinder’s\\ndecision is reasonable if it is based on “sufficient probative evidence” and not on\\n“mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” See Williams v. Mannis, 889 F.3d 926,\\n931 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782,\\n801 (8th Cir. 2011). “We review an order granting summary judgment de novo.”\\nOppedahl v. Mobile Drill Int'l, Inc., 899 F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n The Receiver’s claims against Associated Bank are for aiding and abetting the\\ntorts of conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation\\n— all under Minnesota law. Aiding and abetting is not an independent tort, but a\\ntheory of liability under which a party may be held jointly and severally liable for the\\nunderlying tort. See Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minnesota, 848 N.W.2d\\n224, 228 n.2 (Minn. 2014); Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179,\\n185–86 (Minn. 1999).\\n\\n Under Minnesota law, a plaintiff must show three things to hold a defendant\\nliable for aiding and abetting a tort: first “the primary tortfeasor must commit a tort\\nthat causes an injury to the plaintiff,” second “the defendant must know that the\\nprimary tortfeasor's conduct constitutes a breach of duty,” and third “the defendant\\nmust substantially assist or encourage the primary tortfeasor in the achievement of the\\nbreach.” Zayed I, 779 F.3d at 733 (quoting Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 187).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\n The parties do not dispute the first element, that the scammers committed torts.\\nThe question in this case is whether Associated Bank knew that the scammers were\\nengaged in the tortious Ponzi scheme, and substantially assisted the scammers in\\nachieving that scheme. See id. at 733.\\n\\n A. Knowledge of the Ponzi Scheme\\n\\n 1. Actual Knowledge\\n\\n Under Minnesota law, the scienter (knowledge requirement) for aiding and\\nabetting is “actual knowledge.” Varga v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 952 F. Supp. 2d 850,\\n857 (D. Minn. 2013) aff’d, 764 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2014) (applying Minnesota law).\\nThe evidence necessary to sufficiently show actual knowledge “depends in part on\\nthe particular facts and circumstances of each case.” Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188.\\n“[W]here there is a minimal showing of substantial assistance, a greater showing of\\nscienter is required.” Id. (quoting Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459 (8th Cir.1991)).\\nCourts consider “[f]actors such as the relationship between the defendant and the\\nprimary tortfeasor, the nature of the primary tortfeasor’s activity, the nature of the\\nassistance provided by the defendant, and the defendant’s state of mind.” Id.\\n\\n “While knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence, ‘courts stress that\\nthe requirement is actual knowledge and the circumstantial evidence must\\ndemonstrate that the aider-and-abettor actually knew of the underlying wrongs\\ncommitted.’” Varga, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (quoting Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank,\\nN.A., 938 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1244 (M.D. Fla. 2013)). A plaintiff must show more than\\n“awareness of the conduct in question . . ., that it raised ‘red flags,’ . . . or even that\\nit amounted to gross negligence,” but must show that the defendant “was aware of the\\nwrongfulness of the challenged conduct.” Id. at 858 (citing Camp, 948 F.2d at 459,\\n463; Wiand, 938 F. Supp. 2d at 1244; Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188).\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\n The summary judgment record contains no direct evidence Sarles or anyone at\\nAssociated Bank knew of the Ponzi scheme. In fact, all of the direct evidence was\\nto the contrary. The Receiver’s own expert witness agreed that “[there was] nobody\\nat the bank who put this information together and determined there was a Ponzi\\nscheme going on.” Associated Bank’s expert stated that he agreed with the\\nReceiver’s expert that “there is no one at Associated Bank who actually concluded\\n. . . that the [scammers’ entities] were engaged in a Ponzi scheme.” David Martens,\\nAssociated Bank’s regional security officer, testified based on his extensive law\\nenforcement experience that he believed Sarles’s actions were attributable to “sloppy\\nbanking” rather than anything “nefarious.” Two of Sarles’s coworkers testified that\\nthey did not observe anything that would indicate to them that Sarles knew about the\\nPonzi scheme. Ryan Rasske, Associated Bank’s Director of Risk and Financial\\nCrimes, testified that he had not uncovered any evidence that Sarles or anyone at\\nAssociated Bank knew of the Ponzi scheme. Furthermore, an employee of one of the\\nscammers testified that she had no evidence Sarles knew of the Ponzi scheme. One\\nof the scammers, Pettengill, said that Sarles was not part of the fraud. Another\\nscammer, Cook, testified that Sarles “knew nothing about what was going on.”\\n\\n Given this absence of direct evidence, the Receiver attempted to amass\\ncircumstantial evidence that he claimed showed that Sarles had actual knowledge of\\nthe Ponzi scheme. But none of the circumstantial evidence compiled by the Receiver\\npoints to anything more than “sloppy banking” by Sarles or “red flags” that, with the\\nbenefit of hindsight, should have prompted further investigation or inquiry. Even on\\nthis twenty-seven volume, six-thousand page record, the leap cannot be made to infer\\nthat Sarles or anyone at Associated Bank actually knew about the Ponzi scheme\\nwithout resorting to speculation and conjecture. See Williams, 889 F.3d at 931\\n(discussing the summary judgment standard).\\n\\n Sarles first met Kiley, one of the scammers, around December 2007 when\\nSarles pitched him on switching his business’s banking services to Associated Bank.\\n\\n -6-\\n\\nSarles, who held the position of assistant vice president at Associated Bank, had the\\nprimary job duties of “marketing, opening new commercial accounts, and providing\\naccount management and services to new and existing commercial customers.”\\nSarles first opened an account for Kiley for the entity Universal Brokerage FX\\nManagement, LLC in January 2008. Between then and June 2009, Sarles opened a\\ntotal of eight accounts at Associated Bank for Kiley and fellow scammer Cook for\\ndifferent entities.\\n\\n In June 2008, Sarles opened an account for “Crown Forex LLC” for Cook. The\\nReceiver argues that the fact this account was opened in the name of a domestic entity\\nshows that Sarles knew about the Ponzi scheme and was attempting to help the\\nscammers avoid detection. According to Cook, he intended to open an account for\\nCrown Forex, S.A., the Swiss investing entity, but Sarles suggested that he open it\\nunder the name of a domestic limited liability company. Cook explained that he did\\nnot think Sarles thought this was improper or fraudulent:\\n\\n [Sarles] certainly understood it was . . . a different entity, but . . . I don’t\\n think that he thought there was a fraud going on. . . . I think it’s common\\n that businesses have all kinds of holding companies and sub entities and\\n different entities. . . . [W]e told him that . . . the Crown Forex, LLC\\n account was part of Crown Forex, and it was on their books, so I’m not\\n so sure I’d say [Sarles] knew something, you know, fishy was going on.\\n\\nSarles himself testified that he believed that in order for foreign business entities to\\nopen a bank account, “they have to have a domestic entity.” He was merely following\\npolicy for foreign-owned corporations, and nothing in the record suggests Sarles\\nthought that it was in any way illegitimate or fraudulent to open the Crown Forex\\naccount under the name of a domestic entity.\\n\\n The Crown Forex LLC account was opened as a “checking/money market”\\naccount. The Receiver argues that opening this type of account was intended by\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\nSarles to help the scammers avoid detection. He claims that Sarles should have\\nselected an account type that indicated fiduciary status or that it held investor funds.\\nBut the Receiver has not pointed to anything in the record that shows that Associated\\nBank had such specific types of accounts, much less policies requiring their use. In\\nfact, the portfolio specialist who actually prepared the account opening form selected3\\nthe “checking/money market” option from a list of account types that also included\\n“savings, time deposit, [and] loan account.” The record does not support the claim\\nthat the Crown Forex account was nefariously opened as a checking account by Sarles\\nor anyone else at Associated Bank to avoid detection and further the Ponzi scheme.\\n\\n The Receiver also places great emphasis on the fact that Sarles opened the\\nCrown Forex LLC account for Cook without receiving proof that the company was\\nregistered with the Minnesota Secretary of State. Sarles received all the necessary\\ndocumentation, except for the proof of registration, but did receive an application for\\narticles of incorporation which he was told was being submitted to the state. Sarles\\ntestified that he:\\n\\n receiv[ed] the application that was completed that was en route to be\\n filed with the Secretary of State, therefore, the rapport and trust that I\\n believed I had, I was providing above and beyond customer service to\\n execute the client’s request by opening up the account with the\\n assumption I’d be receiving the state certificate within that two week\\n period or so it takes to generate from the Secretary of State.\\n\\nThe account opening form, under the section for “documentation provided,” listed\\n“[r]eport from a state registration information website,” although the specialist who\\nopened the account was not sure if she typed that response or selected it from a drop-\\n\\n\\n 3\\n There is some evidence that Sarles directed (or that a banker in his position\\nwould typically direct) the selection of the account type. Assuming Sarles was\\nresponsible for the choice of account type, this fact still does not support the\\nReceiver’s allegation of actual knowledge.\\n\\n -8-\\n\\ndown menu as “the one option that closest describe[d] the one item [of\\ndocumentation] that we ha[d].” Sarles did not follow up on the missing paperwork.\\nHe said that after the Ponzi scheme was uncovered, he learned that Crown Forex LLC\\nwas never registered with the state. Of the eight accounts opened by the scammers\\nat Associated Bank, only the Crown Forex LLC account and an account for Basel\\nGroup LLC were opened without certifying that the entities were registered with the\\nstate. Concluding that Sarles opened the Crown Forex and Basel Group accounts\\nbecause he knew that Cook and others were engaged in a Ponzi scheme, rather than\\nsimply out of an effort to please an important client, would require speculation and\\nis not a reasonable inference.\\n\\n The Receiver also emphasizes that Sarles socialized with the scammers. The\\nprecise extent of that socialization is disputed, but none of the evidence supports an\\ninference that Sarles learned about the Ponzi scheme through it. Interestingly, the\\nReceiver also resorts to arguing that Sarles had knowledge of the Ponzi scheme\\nbecause the scammers would sometimes quote lines about greed from movies like\\nWall Street and Boiler Room. This argument borders on absurdity and illustrates the\\nlack of meaningful evidence that Sarles had knowledge of the Ponzi scheme. Quoting\\nlines from movies about greed and scheming does not reveal one to be running a\\nPonzi scheme any more than quoting lines from The Godfather reveals one to be a\\nmobster.\\n\\n The receiver also claimed that Sarles duped a contractor who worked for the\\nscammers into signing a blank account opening form. This assertion is unsupported\\nby the record. The contractor never claimed the form was blank or that he was\\nmisled. The form he signed made him a signatory so he could cash checks and get\\na company credit card, as he had with their Wells Fargo account, in order to purchase\\nsupplies for the maintenance of the mansion in which the scammers conducted their\\nbusiness.\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\n Another basis for the Receiver’s claim that Sarles knew about the Ponzi scheme\\nis the allegations by one of the scammers that Sarles was present at certain meetings.\\nPettengill claimed that around April 2008 he saw Sarles in attendance at an\\ninvestment seminar at the Van Dusen mansion, although Sarles testified that he never\\nattended any such seminars. The Receiver claims that a sophisticated banker like\\nSarles must have known that the investment pitch was a scam. But Pettengill\\nadmitted that Sarles did not say or do anything that would lead him to believe that\\nSarles did not believe the investment pitch or knew it was fraudulent.\\n\\n Pettengill also claimed that Sarles attended a meeting in April or May 2008 at\\nwhich the scammers discussed segregating client accounts. A closer look at this\\nclaim shows that it does not support an inference that Sarles knew the scammers were\\nengaged in fraud. Pettengill himself said that he did not know client funds were\\nbeing used to make up the shortfall in money until months after this meeting. Prior\\nto the meeting, the scammers had been advised by their attorneys to “repaper” their\\nclient accounts by segregating their single, pooled bank account into separate client\\naccounts. According to Pettengill, it was discussed that Associated Bank would\\nfacilitate the wire transfers from the Swiss Crown Forex account, back to the U.S.\\nCrown Forex account, then back again into segregated client accounts in Switzerland.\\nBut Pettengill admitted in his deposition that the manner in which the transfers were\\nto be done — by performing multiple transfers in order to cover up the shortfall of\\nmoney in the Swiss account — was never disclosed to Sarles. Pettengill claimed that\\nit was “implied” that they were covering up a shortfall of money, although he\\nprovides no support for this assertion. Even assuming Sarles knew there was a\\nshortfall in the Swiss Crown Forex entity, and that the scammers wanted to avoid\\ndisclosing that, it does not follow that Sarles knew their enterprise was a Ponzi\\nscheme or that they were engaged in tortious conduct. If true, this should have been\\na red flag, but it does not show actual knowledge. Moreover, Pettengill never\\nclaimed the scammers discussed in Sarles’s presence using new clients’ money to\\nmake up for the shortfall in the Swiss Crown Forex account. Pettengill’s testimony\\n\\n -10-\\n\\nis insufficient to support an inference that Sarles knew the scammers were engaged\\nin tortious conduct.\\n\\n The Receiver also claimed Sarles improperly approved transfers of money\\nbetween bank accounts for the scammers. Specifically, he claims that Sarles\\napproved transfers at Cook’s behest from the Crown Forex accounts, on which Kiley\\nand Smith — but not Cook — were signatories, into accounts on which Cook was\\na signatory. Only three of the transfer forms cited by the Receiver, however, actually\\nreference Cook. Assuming that Sarles authorized these transfers for Cook, there is\\nstill no evidence that the account signatories did not approve of these transfers. Smith\\nwould at times transfer money by forwarding emailed directions from Cook to the\\nbank. Even if Sarles had transferred money at Cook’s behest on an account on which\\nSmith was the signatory, this would only show that he was being sloppy with\\nformalities when he knew that Cook and Smith (and the other scammers) were\\nworking together — it would not show that Sarles knew there was a Ponzi scheme\\nafoot. Additionally, in June 2009, Cook requested a $600,000 withdrawal from the\\nOxford Global account, on which he was a signatory. The withdrawal was approved\\nonly after Sarles contacted his supervisor and the bank ensured that all procedures\\nhad been properly followed. Nothing about these transfers or the withdrawal suggest\\nthat Sarles knew about the Ponzi scheme.\\n\\n The Receiver argues that in 2009, money continued to flow in and out of the\\nCrown Forex account, even “after Sarles had learned that Swiss authorities had shut\\ndown Crown Forex, S.A., rendering the sole investment vehicle of the scheme\\nobviously impossible.” But the record contains no evidence to support the claim that\\nSarles knew the Swiss entity had been shut down. In fact, the Receiver’s own expert\\nreport states that if Associated Bank had the proper due diligence procedures, it\\nwould have learned of this information, but does not claim that anyone at the bank\\nactually did learn of it.\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\n Finally, the Receiver argues in his brief that just before Sarles was fired, “the\\nBank itself began a drumbeat of instructions to Sarles to delete emails – prohibiting\\nhim from using the email account unless he did so,” and that “[n]othing indicates that\\nSarles failed to destroy these documents, as the Bank instructed him to do.”\\nExamination of these emails shows they are not the nefarious messages the Receiver\\nmakes them out to be. Rather, they are standard notifications that the storage on\\nSarles’s email inbox was full, sent by the bank’s Microsoft Exchange Server.\\nMoreover, prior to these notifications and Sarles’s termination, his email inbox was\\npreserved and reviewed by a bank security officer, which revealed “[n]othing out of\\nthe ordinary.” The characterization of these emails by the Receiver to this Court is,\\nat best, misleading. Sarles’s full inbox does not show him to be aware of the Ponzi\\nscheme or that the bank was attempting to cover anything up.\\n\\n In sum, the evidence cited by the Receiver simply does not support a\\nreasonable inference that Sarles or anyone at Associated Bank had actual knowledge\\nof the scammers’ torts. Nor does looking to all the circumstantial evidence\\ncollectively allow for such a conclusion without resorting to speculation and\\nconjecture. After all, “in law as in mathematics zero plus zero equals zero.”\\nHenderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).\\n\\n 2. Constructive Knowledge\\n\\n The Receiver alternatively argues that he need not show that Associated Bank\\nhad actual knowledge of the scammers’ torts to impose aiding and abetting liability,\\nbut that “constructive knowledge” is sufficient. We disagree, but in any event, the\\nsummary judgment record here is insufficient to support a finding of constructive\\nknowledge.\\n\\n The Receiver rests his constructive knowledge argument on a single reference\\nin the Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion in Witzman, in which the Court stated\\n\\n -12-\\n\\nwhile discussing aiding and abetting liability that “some courts” have found that a\\ndefendant may be deemed to have constructive knowledge of a tort “where the\\nprimary tortfeasor’s conduct is clearly tortious or illegal,” where “[the] defendant\\n[has] a long-term or in-depth relationship with that tortfeasor,” and “where the\\nconduct is [] a facial breach of duty.” 601 N.W.2d at 188. After making this\\nobservation, however, the Court in Witzman applied an actual knowledge test. Id.\\nWe agree with the district court in Varga, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 857, that under\\nMinnesota law, “[c]onstructive knowledge will not suffice.”\\n\\n Even assuming that constructive knowledge could be sufficient, it cannot be\\nimputed to Sarles and Associated Bank on this record. The actions of the scammers\\nknown to Associated Bank were not “clearly tortious or illegal.” Rather, what was\\nlater revealed to be a fraud was a sophisticated Ponzi scheme that went undetected for\\nyears. Nor did Sarles or Associated Bank have “a long-term or in-depth relationship”\\nwith the scammers. The professional relationship between the scammers and Sarles\\nand the bank, even with Sarles’s socializing, does not meet this standard. Nor was\\nthe Ponzi scheme “a facial breach of duty.” On its face, it appeared to be a legitimate\\ninvesting business. Thus, a finding of constructive knowledge could not be supported\\nby this record, even if constructive knowledge was sufficient under Minnesota law\\nto impose aiding and abetting liability.\\n\\n B. Substantial Assistance in the Scheme\\n\\n In addition to showing actual knowledge, a plaintiff must show that a defendant\\nprovided substantial assistance to the primary tortfeasor in order to impose aiding and\\nabetting liability. Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188–89. This element is evaluated in\\ntandem with the knowledge requirement. Id. Thus, the weaker the evidence of\\nknowledge is, the greater the showing of substantial assistance must be. See id.\\n“[C]onduct that inadvertently advances the [underlying tort] does not amount to\\nsubstantial assistance.” Varga, 764 F.3d at (quoting Camp, 948 F.2d at 460). In\\n\\n -13-\\n\\naddition, “‘[s]ome element of blameworthiness’ must be present in the defendant’s\\nassistance.” Id.\\n\\n The Minnesota Supreme Court has said that in the context of professionals,\\n“‘substantial assistance’ means something more than the provision of routine\\nprofessional services.” Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 189. The Court in Witzman said that\\nallegations against the defendant, an accounting firm, involved nothing more than the\\n“performance of routine accounting duties,” and went on to say: “If we were to\\nrecognize that such routine services constitute substantial assistance, then it would\\nbe the rare accountant indeed who would not be subject to automatic liability merely\\nbecause his client happened to be a tortfeasor.” Id. The same could easily be said of\\nbanks.\\n\\n While the Receiver’s claim fails because of the lack of evidence of actual\\nknowledge, we also conclude that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that\\nAssociated Bank provided substantial assistance to the scammers in the commission\\nof their torts. The evidence that the Receiver claims shows substantial assistance is\\nlargely the same evidence it claims shows knowledge. The substantial assistance\\nelement is found wanting for many of the same reasons as the knowledge element.\\nThe record shows nothing beyond the provision of routine banking services or, at\\nworst, sloppy banking. The bank provided nothing beyond its standard professional\\nservices to assist the scammers in perpetrating their Ponzi scheme. No reasonable\\nfactfinder could conclude that Associated Bank provided substantial assistance to the\\nscammers’ tortious conduct.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -14-\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n To show a genuine dispute of material fact, a party must provide more than\\nconjecture and speculation. The Receiver has not done so. We affirm.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":298,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4580416,"string":"4,580,416"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"In RE: MIRAPEX PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION Marc Mancini, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Et Al., Defendants - Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Mancini v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc. (In Re Mirapex Prods. Liab. Litig.)"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2204"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Loken, Gruender\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"LOKEN, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2204\\n ___________________________\\n\\n In re: Mirapex Products Liability Litigation\\n\\n ------------------------------\\n\\n Marc Mancini\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 16, 2018\\n Filed: January 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Mirapex is a dopamine agonist that is FDA-approved for treating adults with\\nParkinson’s disease and movement disorders. On December 30, 2010, Marc Mancini\\n\\ffiled this action against the defendant pharmaceutical companies, alleging they are\\nliable for substantial gambling and other financial losses that resulted from obsessive\\ncompulsive behavior, a side effect of taking Mirapex. The action was filed in the\\nDistrict of Minnesota as part of the multi-district Mirapex Products Liability\\nLitigation. Mancini appeals the district court’s1 grant of summary judgment\\ndismissing all claims as barred by the applicable California statute of limitations. He\\nargues the district court erred in not tolling the statute of limitations because he was\\n“insane” and in rejecting his “continuing violations” theory, issues we review de\\nnovo, and abused its discretion in denying his motion to stay defendants’ motion for\\nsummary judgment pending discovery. We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background.\\n\\n Mancini is a resident of California and a successful educator and travel\\nindustry speaker and consultant. In June 2004, doctors noted symptoms consistent\\nwith mild idiopathic Parkinson’s disease. In January 2006, Dr. Mark Lew, Mancini’s\\ntreating neurologist, prescribed Mirapex to treat worsening symptoms.\\n\\n On January 3, 2008, Mancini reported to Dr. Lew that he experienced increased\\ngambling and other compulsive behaviors after taking Mirapex. Dr. Lew’s notes\\nstated that Mancini reported “gambling and winning but not excessively.” Dr. Lew\\ninformed Mancini of a possible association between Mirapex and compulsive\\nbehaviors such as gambling. On April 23, 2008, Mancini again reported gambling\\nand other compulsive behaviors. Dr. Lew’s notes from this visit stated that Mancini\\n“has increasing stress at work” and “has become a bit more compulsive.” “He tells\\nme that this is controlled, and he does not have any significant problems,” Dr. Lew\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Franklin\\nL. Noel, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fwrote, “but with the stress, he has noted the compulsions to be a bit more intense.\\nOn occasion he . . . described it as ‘driving a car without brakes.’” Dr. Lew told\\nMancini he had “substantial and significant concerns” about Mancini’s gambling and\\nimpulsive behavior. “We talked about the potential of simply cutting back on his\\nMirapex . . . . Currently he is quite resistant to this. He will return to see me in 3\\nmonths’ time.”\\n\\n Mancini continued to take Mirapex until mid-July 2010, when his family\\nlearned of substantial debts resulting from gambling. Three days after stopping\\nMirapex, Mancini saw Dr. Lew, who noted worsening tremors but advised that\\nMancini “needs to stay off his Mirapex” and turn to other “therapeutic options.” Dr.\\nLew’s notes stated that “every visit I have had since [Mancini] has been on Mirapex\\nfor better than 5 years, we discuss[ed] the potential for compulsive behaviors, and he\\nflat out denied any significant problem.”\\n\\n II. Discussion.\\n\\n In reviewing whether Mancini’s claims are time-barred, important issues are\\nnot disputed. The parties agree that California law governs the statute of limitations\\nissue, and that California’s two year statute of limitations for personal injury claims\\nresulting from the ingestion of pharmaceutical drugs applies. See Cal. Code Civ. P.\\n§§ 335.1, 340.8(a). The district court found, and Mancini does not dispute on appeal,\\nthat his claims initially accrued no later than April 23, 2008, because he suspected or\\nshould have suspected that he had been wronged by defendants as a result of his visits\\nto Dr. Lew in January and April 2008. Thus, the claims filed in December 2010\\nappear to be time-barred. But Mancini argues the district court erred in granting\\nsummary judgment because the statute of limitations was tolled until July 2010, and\\nbecause continuing violations are not time-barrred.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f A. The Tolling Issue. As relevant here, section 352(a) of the California Code\\nof Civil Procedure provides that, “[i]f a person entitled to bring an action . . . is, at the\\ntime the cause of action accrued . . . insane, the time of the disability is not part of the\\ntime limited for the commencement of the action.”2 Consistent with the statute’s\\nplain language, it applies even if the plaintiff’s insanity is caused by the wrongful act\\nof the defendant. See Feeley v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 285 Cal. Rptr. 666, 667 (Cal.\\nApp. 1991). Thus, if Mancini was “insane” within the meaning of § 352(a) when his\\nclaim accrued in early 2008, the two-year statute of limitations would be tolled,\\npresumably until he stopped taking Mirapex in July 2010. Mancini argues the district\\ncourt erred in granting defendants summary judgment on this issue.\\n\\n The statute, first enacted in 1872, does not define the word “insane.” In an\\nearly case, the Supreme Court of California affirmed a jury verdict that the plaintiff\\nwas insane when the cause of action accrued:\\n\\n It is true that the complaint and findings . . . do not use the words\\n “unsound” or “insane,” but the finding that he was incapable of caring\\n for his property or transacting business or understanding the nature or\\n effects of his acts was equivalent to a finding in express terms that the\\n deceased was insane within the meaning of the statute of limitations.\\n\\nPearl v. Pearl, 177 P. 845, 846 (Cal. 1918). Many years later, in the leading case of\\nHsu v. Mt. Zion Hospital, 66 Cal. Rptr. 659, 664-67 (Cal. App. 1968), the California\\nCourt of Appeal affirmed a jury verdict that plaintiff’s claims were time-barred\\nbecause she was not “insane” when the claims accrued, even though she was\\n\\n\\n 2\\n In 2014, the California Legislature amended § 352(a) to replace the term\\n“insane” with the phrase “lacking the legal capacity to make decisions.” 2014 Cal.\\nStat. ch. 144, § 4. Courts continue to rely on pre-2014 case law in interpreting the\\namended statute. See, e.g., Lang v. Sacramento Sheriff Dep’t, No. 2:14-cv-0777,\\n2017 WL 1093838, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2017).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fcommitted to a state hospital for the mentally disturbed shortly after the incident. The\\njury was instructed that, “to find that plaintiff was insane, you must find that she was\\nincapable of caring for her property, or transacting business or understanding the\\nnature or effects of her acts.” Id. at 666. The Court of Appeal ruled that this\\ninstruction “is taken directly from Pearl v. Pearl . . . and is a definition of insanity\\nrecognized by [other Court of Appeal] decisions.” Id. The Court further explained:\\n\\n The cases cited above, such as Pearl . . . do not purport to hold that this\\n language is the sole definition of insanity or that the three conditions\\n there set forth are the exclusive tests of mental incompetence for\\n purposes of tolling the statute of limitations. As we understand these\\n cases, the basic question to be resolved by the jury is whether the\\n allegedly insane plaintiff is sufficiently aware of the nature or effects of\\n his acts to be able to comprehend such business transactions as the\\n hiring of an attorney and the instigation of a legal action.\\n\\nId. (emphasis added). The Court concluded that the claim was time-barred because\\nthe jury reasonably found that the statute of limitations began to run when plaintiff\\n“was released from the hospital, managed a sixteen-unit apartment building, and took\\ncare of her two minor children during March through May 1959.” Id.\\n\\n In this case, undisputed evidence established that, when his cause of action\\naccrued in early 2008, Mancini was a full-time college professor, serving as the chair\\nof his department. He earned $57,800 from speaking engagements in 2008, $7,600\\nbefore April. He owned and operated two rental properties. He had never been\\ndiagnosed with or treated for mental illness or psychological disorder. Mancini\\nreported his gambling and other compulsive behaviors to Dr. Lew in January and\\nApril 2008. Dr. Lew advised that this behavior may be a side effect of taking\\nMirapex and suggested Mancini consider “cutting back,” a suggestion he “resisted”\\nfor more than two years. At no point did Dr. Lew question Mancini’s competence to\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fcare for himself or manage his affairs, nor is there evidence that anyone questioned\\nhis legal competence.\\n\\n Mancini relies on two documents to support his claim of insanity. First, when\\nMancini visited Dr. Lew two weeks after he stopped taking Mirapex and over two\\nyears after his cause of action accrued. Dr. Lew’s visit notes reported:\\n\\n [Mancini] is dramatically insightful into the problems that have evolved\\n over the last several years. He feels that he was somewhat disconnected\\n from the potential effects of his actions while he was taking Mirapex.\\n At that time . . . he covered his activities and did not confide in his\\n significant other, and basically lied to me each time I asked him about\\n how he was doing. This was all related to his lack of insight caused by\\n behavioral changes from his Mirapex . . . . He appears today to be\\n dramatically improved with regard to his insight and understanding of\\n his compulsions and behavioral change. He appears to be much more\\n firmly based in reality today.\\n\\nSecond, Mancini submitted a December 2012 affidavit averring that, while taking\\nMirapex, he was “not firmly based in reality, lacked insight into [his] actions, was\\ndisconnected from reality, was incapable of transacting business in a competent\\nmanner and generally could not understand or appreciate the nature, effects or\\nconsequences of [his] acts.” The affidavit listed ways his gambling and “unreliable\\nbehavior” had injured client relations, hastened his retirement as a college professor,\\n“tarnished my reputation as a speaker,” and caused him to make a poor investment in\\nJune 2007 without his customary “exhaustive research and due diligence.”\\n\\n The district court concluded that the July 2010 opinion of Dr. Lew, who was\\na treating neurologist, not a psychiatrist, and the assertions in Mancini’s affidavit\\nfailed to meet his burden of showing that he was insane at the time his cause of action\\naccrued. “The court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that Mancini was\\nincapable of caring for his property, transacting business, or understanding the nature\\n\\n -6-\\n\\for effects of his acts in January or April 2008.” After careful review of the summary\\njudgment record, we agree. Mancini must provide more than a scintilla of evidence\\nto carry his burden. Nuacke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2002).\\nThe undisputed evidence of his business and financial success well into 2008, his\\ncontemporaneous recognition of increasingly compulsive behaviors, and his\\nunderstanding from Dr. Lew that taking Mirapex may be their cause, establish that\\nhe was not insane when the cause of action accrued because he was “sufficiently\\naware of the nature or effects of his acts to be able to comprehend such business\\ntransactions as the hiring of an attorney and the instigation of a legal action.” Hsu,\\n66 Cal. Rptr. at 666; see also Gazal v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 647 F.3d\\n833, 840 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that a similar tolling provision in the Texas\\nCivil Practice and Remedies Code did not apply because plaintiff managed a\\nprofitable company and sought treatment for the side effects of Mirapex, and no one\\nquestioned his competence to care for himself); Sommer v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of\\nAm., 173 F.3d 861 (table), 1999 WL 173570 at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 1999)\\n(plaintiff’s “own actions, continued employment, and substantial income indicate that\\nhe was not ‘insane’”).\\n\\n B. The Continuing Violations Issue. Mancini next argues that each ingestion\\nof Mirapex gives rise to a separate and distinct claim. Therefore, even if the statute\\nof limitations initially accrued in early 2008 and was not tolled by insanity, damages\\nfor injuries suffered due to dosages of Mirapex taken within two years of December\\n30, 2010, are not barred by the statute of limitations. In effect, he argues that taking\\neach dose of Mirapex gave rise to nearly 5,000 distinct and separate claims against\\ndefendants from January 2006 to July 2010. We agree with the district court that this\\ncounter-intuitive argument is without merit.\\n\\n “The longstanding rule in California is that a single tort can be the foundation\\nfor but one claim for damages.” Grisham v. Phillip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 151 P.3d\\n1151, 1161 (Cal. 2007) (cleaned up). However, the Supreme Court of California, like\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fother jurisdictions, has adopted what it calls a “continuing accrual” principle that it\\napplies to breaches of continuing or recurring obligations:\\n\\n When an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of\\n action accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new\\n limitations period. Because each new breach of such an obligation\\n provides all the elements of a claim -- wrongdoing, harm, and causation\\n -- each may be treated as an independently actionable wrong with its\\n own time limit for recovery.\\n\\nAryeh v. Canon Bus. Sols., Inc., 292 P.3d 871, 880 (Cal. 2013) (citations omitted).\\nWe have applied the same principle under federal law, calling it a “continuing\\nviolations” doctrine and noting that “[t]he critical question is whether a present\\nviolation exists.” Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 168 (8th\\nCir. 1995) (en banc) (emphasis in original), quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,\\n431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).\\n\\n Though Mancini invoked this principle in arguing to the district court and on\\nappeal, he failed to identify what present, ongoing violation existed after his cause\\nof action accrued. His claims are based on the theory that defendants’ failure to\\nadequately warn him of the behavioral side effects of taking Mirapex led to\\ncompulsive gambling and financial ruin. Mirapex was FDA-approved for treating\\nParkinson’s disease, and was prescribed by Mancini’s treating neurologist for this\\npurpose. Thus, as the district court observed when the summary judgment motion\\nwas argued, “here, the wrongdoing isn’t taking the pill.”\\n\\n In these circumstances, it is logical to conclude there was a single wrongdoing\\nthat ended -- accrued -- in early 2008 when Mancini learned that his compulsive\\nbehaviors may have been caused by taking Mirapex. He presented no evidence or\\nargument refuting that conclusion. Thus, though his alleged injuries increased when\\nhe persisted in voluntarily taking Mirapex for another two years, those later injuries\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fare time-barred. “[T]he infliction of appreciable and actual harm, however uncertain\\nin amount, will commence the running of the statute of limitations.” Grisham, 151\\nP.3d at 1162 (quotation omitted). Mancini’s gambling losses in 2006 and 2007 were\\n“appreciable and actual harm” that triggered accrual of the statute of limitations in\\nearly 2008. See DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 370-77 (Cal. App. 1987),\\nsuperseded on other grounds, Quarry v. Doe I, 272 P.3d 977, 987 (Cal. 2012).\\n\\n C. The Procedural Issue. Mancini argues the district court abused its\\ndiscretion by denying his motion to stay defendants’ motion for summary judgment\\npending discovery as to whether defendants knew that Mirapex rendered its users\\nunable to understand the nature or effects of their acts. When a motion for summary\\njudgment is filed before the completion of discovery, as in this case, Rule 56(d) of the\\nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure (formerly Rule 56(f)) provides that the district court\\nmay grant such relief if the nonmovant shows “it cannot present facts essential to\\njustify its opposition.” It is not enough to present a list of facts sought to be\\ndiscovered. The nonmovant must “articulate how those facts [a]re relevant to rebut\\nthe movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” Ray v. American\\nAirlines, Inc., 609 F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).\\n\\n Here, the district court concluded that “whether Defendants knew that Mirapex\\ncaused such a condition does not shed any light on whether this particular plaintiff,\\nMancini, himself, was or was not insane at the time his cause of action accrued.” We\\nagree. At the time the district court ruled, the case had been pending for over two\\nyears, numerous companion cases had settled, and nothing had prevented Mancini\\nfrom conducting discovery or obtaining an expert opinion addressing whether he was\\ninsane within the meaning of § 352(a) when the cause of action accrued in early 2008.\\nThere was no abuse of discretion. See id. at 922 (standard of review).\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -9-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4357669/\", \"author_raw\": \"LOKEN, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4580416/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: In RE: MIRAPEX PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION Marc Mancini, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Et Al., Defendants - Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2204\n ___________________________\n\n In re: Mirapex Products Liability Litigation\n\n ------------------------------\n\n Marc Mancini\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: October 16, 2018\n Filed: January 10, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\n\n Mirapex is a dopamine agonist that is FDA-approved for treating adults with\nParkinson’s disease and movement disorders. On December 30, 2010, Marc Mancini\n\ffiled this action against the defendant pharmaceutical companies, alleging they are\nliable for substantial gambling and other financial losses that resulted from obsessive\ncompulsive behavior, a side effect of taking Mirapex. The action was filed in the\nDistrict of Minnesota as part of the multi-district Mirapex Products Liability\nLitigation. Mancini appeals the district court’s1 grant of summary judgment\ndismissing all claims as barred by the applicable California statute of limitations. He\nargues the district court erred in not tolling the statute of limitations because he was\n“insane” and in rejecting his “continuing violations” theory, issues we review de\nnovo, and abused its discretion in denying his motion to stay defendants’ motion for\nsummary judgment pending discovery. We affirm.\n\n I. Background.\n\n Mancini is a resident of California and a successful educator and travel\nindustry speaker and consultant. In June 2004, doctors noted symptoms consistent\nwith mild idiopathic Parkinson’s disease. In January 2006, Dr. Mark Lew, Mancini’s\ntreating neurologist, prescribed Mirapex to treat worsening symptoms.\n\n On January 3, 2008, Mancini reported to Dr. Lew that he experienced increased\ngambling and other compulsive behaviors after taking Mirapex. Dr. Lew’s notes\nstated that Mancini reported “gambling and winning but not excessively.” Dr. Lew\ninformed Mancini of a possible association between Mirapex and compulsive\nbehaviors such as gambling. On April 23, 2008, Mancini again reported gambling\nand other compulsive behaviors. Dr. Lew’s notes from this visit stated that Mancini\n“has increasing stress at work” and “has become a bit more compulsive.” “He tells\nme that this is controlled, and he does not have any significant problems,” Dr. Lew\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District\nof Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Franklin\nL. Noel, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.\n\n -2-\n\fwrote, “but with the stress, he has noted the compulsions to be a bit more intense.\nOn occasion he . . . described it as ‘driving a car without brakes.’” Dr. Lew told\nMancini he had “substantial and significant concerns” about Mancini’s gambling and\nimpulsive behavior. “We talked about the potential of simply cutting back on his\nMirapex . . . . Currently he is quite resistant to this. He will return to see me in 3\nmonths’ time.”\n\n Mancini continued to take Mirapex until mid-July 2010, when his family\nlearned of substantial debts resulting from gambling. Three days after stopping\nMirapex, Mancini saw Dr. Lew, who noted worsening tremors but advised that\nMancini “needs to stay off his Mirapex” and turn to other “therapeutic options.” Dr.\nLew’s notes stated that “every visit I have had since [Mancini] has been on Mirapex\nfor better than 5 years, we discuss[ed] the potential for compulsive behaviors, and he\nflat out denied any significant problem.”\n\n II. Discussion.\n\n In reviewing whether Mancini’s claims are time-barred, important issues are\nnot disputed. The parties agree that California law governs the statute of limitations\nissue, and that California’s two year statute of limitations for personal injury claims\nresulting from the ingestion of pharmaceutical drugs applies. See Cal. Code Civ. P.\n§§ 335.1, 340.8(a). The district court found, and Mancini does not dispute on appeal,\nthat his claims initially accrued no later than April 23, 2008, because he suspected or\nshould have suspected that he had been wronged by defendants as a result of his visits\nto Dr. Lew in January and April 2008. Thus, the claims filed in December 2010\nappear to be time-barred. But Mancini argues the district court erred in granting\nsummary judgment because the statute of limitations was tolled until July 2010, and\nbecause continuing violations are not time-barrred.\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f A. The Tolling Issue. As relevant here, section 352(a) of the California Code\nof Civil Procedure provides that, “[i]f a person entitled to bring an action . . . is, at the\ntime the cause of action accrued . . . insane, the time of the disability is not part of the\ntime limited for the commencement of the action.”2 Consistent with the statute’s\nplain language, it applies even if the plaintiff’s insanity is caused by the wrongful act\nof the defendant. See Feeley v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 285 Cal. Rptr. 666, 667 (Cal.\nApp. 1991). Thus, if Mancini was “insane” within the meaning of § 352(a) when his\nclaim accrued in early 2008, the two-year statute of limitations would be tolled,\npresumably until he stopped taking Mirapex in July 2010. Mancini argues the district\ncourt erred in granting defendants summary judgment on this issue.\n\n The statute, first enacted in 1872, does not define the word “insane.” In an\nearly case, the Supreme Court of California affirmed a jury verdict that the plaintiff\nwas insane when the cause of action accrued:\n\n It is true that the complaint and findings . . . do not use the words\n “unsound” or “insane,” but the finding that he was incapable of caring\n for his property or transacting business or understanding the nature or\n effects of his acts was equivalent to a finding in express terms that the\n deceased was insane within the meaning of the statute of limitations.\n\nPearl v. Pearl, 177 P. 845, 846 (Cal. 1918). Many years later, in the leading case of\nHsu v. Mt. Zion Hospital, 66 Cal. Rptr. 659, 664-67 (Cal. App. 1968), the California\nCourt of Appeal affirmed a jury verdict that plaintiff’s claims were time-barred\nbecause she was not “insane” when the claims accrued, even though she was\n\n\n 2\n In 2014, the California Legislature amended § 352(a) to replace the term\n“insane” with the phrase “lacking the legal capacity to make decisions.” 2014 Cal.\nStat. ch. 144, § 4. Courts continue to rely on pre-2014 case law in interpreting the\namended statute. See, e.g., Lang v. Sacramento Sheriff Dep’t, No. 2:14-cv-0777,\n2017 WL 1093838, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2017).\n\n -4-\n\fcommitted to a state hospital for the mentally disturbed shortly after the incident. The\njury was instructed that, “to find that plaintiff was insane, you must find that she was\nincapable of caring for her property, or transacting business or understanding the\nnature or effects of her acts.” Id. at 666. The Court of Appeal ruled that this\ninstruction “is taken directly from Pearl v. Pearl . . . and is a definition of insanity\nrecognized by [other Court of Appeal] decisions.” Id. The Court further explained:\n\n The cases cited above, such as Pearl . . . do not purport to hold that this\n language is the sole definition of insanity or that the three conditions\n there set forth are the exclusive tests of mental incompetence for\n purposes of tolling the statute of limitations. As we understand these\n cases, the basic question to be resolved by the jury is whether the\n allegedly insane plaintiff is sufficiently aware of the nature or effects of\n his acts to be able to comprehend such business transactions as the\n hiring of an attorney and the instigation of a legal action.\n\nId. (emphasis added). The Court concluded that the claim was time-barred because\nthe jury reasonably found that the statute of limitations began to run when plaintiff\n“was released from the hospital, managed a sixteen-unit apartment building, and took\ncare of her two minor children during March through May 1959.” Id.\n\n In this case, undisputed evidence established that, when his cause of action\naccrued in early 2008, Mancini was a full-time college professor, serving as the chair\nof his department. He earned $57,800 from speaking engagements in 2008, $7,600\nbefore April. He owned and operated two rental properties. He had never been\ndiagnosed with or treated for mental illness or psychological disorder. Mancini\nreported his gambling and other compulsive behaviors to Dr. Lew in January and\nApril 2008. Dr. Lew advised that this behavior may be a side effect of taking\nMirapex and suggested Mancini consider “cutting back,” a suggestion he “resisted”\nfor more than two years. At no point did Dr. Lew question Mancini’s competence to\n\n\n\n -5-\n\fcare for himself or manage his affairs, nor is there evidence that anyone questioned\nhis legal competence.\n\n Mancini relies on two documents to support his claim of insanity. First, when\nMancini visited Dr. Lew two weeks after he stopped taking Mirapex and over two\nyears after his cause of action accrued. Dr. Lew’s visit notes reported:\n\n [Mancini] is dramatically insightful into the problems that have evolved\n over the last several years. He feels that he was somewhat disconnected\n from the potential effects of his actions while he was taking Mirapex.\n At that time . . . he covered his activities and did not confide in his\n significant other, and basically lied to me each time I asked him about\n how he was doing. This was all related to his lack of insight caused by\n behavioral changes from his Mirapex . . . . He appears today to be\n dramatically improved with regard to his insight and understanding of\n his compulsions and behavioral change. He appears to be much more\n firmly based in reality today.\n\nSecond, Mancini submitted a December 2012 affidavit averring that, while taking\nMirapex, he was “not firmly based in reality, lacked insight into [his] actions, was\ndisconnected from reality, was incapable of transacting business in a competent\nmanner and generally could not understand or appreciate the nature, effects or\nconsequences of [his] acts.” The affidavit listed ways his gambling and “unreliable\nbehavior” had injured client relations, hastened his retirement as a college professor,\n“tarnished my reputation as a speaker,” and caused him to make a poor investment in\nJune 2007 without his customary “exhaustive research and due diligence.”\n\n The district court concluded that the July 2010 opinion of Dr. Lew, who was\na treating neurologist, not a psychiatrist, and the assertions in Mancini’s affidavit\nfailed to meet his burden of showing that he was insane at the time his cause of action\naccrued. “The court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that Mancini was\nincapable of caring for his property, transacting business, or understanding the nature\n\n -6-\n\for effects of his acts in January or April 2008.” After careful review of the summary\njudgment record, we agree. Mancini must provide more than a scintilla of evidence\nto carry his burden. Nuacke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2002).\nThe undisputed evidence of his business and financial success well into 2008, his\ncontemporaneous recognition of increasingly compulsive behaviors, and his\nunderstanding from Dr. Lew that taking Mirapex may be their cause, establish that\nhe was not insane when the cause of action accrued because he was “sufficiently\naware of the nature or effects of his acts to be able to comprehend such business\ntransactions as the hiring of an attorney and the instigation of a legal action.” Hsu,\n66 Cal. Rptr. at 666; see also Gazal v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 647 F.3d\n833, 840 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that a similar tolling provision in the Texas\nCivil Practice and Remedies Code did not apply because plaintiff managed a\nprofitable company and sought treatment for the side effects of Mirapex, and no one\nquestioned his competence to care for himself); Sommer v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of\nAm., 173 F.3d 861 (table), 1999 WL 173570 at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 1999)\n(plaintiff’s “own actions, continued employment, and substantial income indicate that\nhe was not ‘insane’”).\n\n B. The Continuing Violations Issue. Mancini next argues that each ingestion\nof Mirapex gives rise to a separate and distinct claim. Therefore, even if the statute\nof limitations initially accrued in early 2008 and was not tolled by insanity, damages\nfor injuries suffered due to dosages of Mirapex taken within two years of December\n30, 2010, are not barred by the statute of limitations. In effect, he argues that taking\neach dose of Mirapex gave rise to nearly 5,000 distinct and separate claims against\ndefendants from January 2006 to July 2010. We agree with the district court that this\ncounter-intuitive argument is without merit.\n\n “The longstanding rule in California is that a single tort can be the foundation\nfor but one claim for damages.” Grisham v. Phillip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 151 P.3d\n1151, 1161 (Cal. 2007) (cleaned up). However, the Supreme Court of California, like\n\n -7-\n\fother jurisdictions, has adopted what it calls a “continuing accrual” principle that it\napplies to breaches of continuing or recurring obligations:\n\n When an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of\n action accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new\n limitations period. Because each new breach of such an obligation\n provides all the elements of a claim -- wrongdoing, harm, and causation\n -- each may be treated as an independently actionable wrong with its\n own time limit for recovery.\n\nAryeh v. Canon Bus. Sols., Inc., 292 P.3d 871, 880 (Cal. 2013) (citations omitted).\nWe have applied the same principle under federal law, calling it a “continuing\nviolations” doctrine and noting that “[t]he critical question is whether a present\nviolation exists.” Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 168 (8th\nCir. 1995) (en banc) (emphasis in original), quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,\n431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).\n\n Though Mancini invoked this principle in arguing to the district court and on\nappeal, he failed to identify what present, ongoing violation existed after his cause\nof action accrued. His claims are based on the theory that defendants’ failure to\nadequately warn him of the behavioral side effects of taking Mirapex led to\ncompulsive gambling and financial ruin. Mirapex was FDA-approved for treating\nParkinson’s disease, and was prescribed by Mancini’s treating neurologist for this\npurpose. Thus, as the district court observed when the summary judgment motion\nwas argued, “here, the wrongdoing isn’t taking the pill.”\n\n In these circumstances, it is logical to conclude there was a single wrongdoing\nthat ended -- accrued -- in early 2008 when Mancini learned that his compulsive\nbehaviors may have been caused by taking Mirapex. He presented no evidence or\nargument refuting that conclusion. Thus, though his alleged injuries increased when\nhe persisted in voluntarily taking Mirapex for another two years, those later injuries\n\n -8-\n\fare time-barred. “[T]he infliction of appreciable and actual harm, however uncertain\nin amount, will commence the running of the statute of limitations.” Grisham, 151\nP.3d at 1162 (quotation omitted). Mancini’s gambling losses in 2006 and 2007 were\n“appreciable and actual harm” that triggered accrual of the statute of limitations in\nearly 2008. See DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 370-77 (Cal. App. 1987),\nsuperseded on other grounds, Quarry v. Doe I, 272 P.3d 977, 987 (Cal. 2012).\n\n C. The Procedural Issue. Mancini argues the district court abused its\ndiscretion by denying his motion to stay defendants’ motion for summary judgment\npending discovery as to whether defendants knew that Mirapex rendered its users\nunable to understand the nature or effects of their acts. When a motion for summary\njudgment is filed before the completion of discovery, as in this case, Rule 56(d) of the\nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure (formerly Rule 56(f)) provides that the district court\nmay grant such relief if the nonmovant shows “it cannot present facts essential to\njustify its opposition.” It is not enough to present a list of facts sought to be\ndiscovered. The nonmovant must “articulate how those facts [a]re relevant to rebut\nthe movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” Ray v. American\nAirlines, Inc., 609 F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).\n\n Here, the district court concluded that “whether Defendants knew that Mirapex\ncaused such a condition does not shed any light on whether this particular plaintiff,\nMancini, himself, was or was not insane at the time his cause of action accrued.” We\nagree. At the time the district court ruled, the case had been pending for over two\nyears, numerous companion cases had settled, and nothing had prevented Mancini\nfrom conducting discovery or obtaining an expert opinion addressing whether he was\ninsane within the meaning of § 352(a) when the cause of action accrued in early 2008.\nThere was no abuse of discretion. See id. at 922 (standard of review).\n\n For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n -9-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: In RE: MIRAPEX PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION Marc Mancini, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Et Al., Defendants - Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-2204\\n ___________________________\\n\\n In re: Mirapex Products Liability Litigation\\n\\n ------------------------------\\n\\n Marc Mancini\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: October 16, 2018\\n Filed: January 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Mirapex is a dopamine agonist that is FDA-approved for treating adults with\\nParkinson’s disease and movement disorders. On December 30, 2010, Marc Mancini\\n\\ffiled this action against the defendant pharmaceutical companies, alleging they are\\nliable for substantial gambling and other financial losses that resulted from obsessive\\ncompulsive behavior, a side effect of taking Mirapex. The action was filed in the\\nDistrict of Minnesota as part of the multi-district Mirapex Products Liability\\nLitigation. Mancini appeals the district court’s1 grant of summary judgment\\ndismissing all claims as barred by the applicable California statute of limitations. He\\nargues the district court erred in not tolling the statute of limitations because he was\\n“insane” and in rejecting his “continuing violations” theory, issues we review de\\nnovo, and abused its discretion in denying his motion to stay defendants’ motion for\\nsummary judgment pending discovery. We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background.\\n\\n Mancini is a resident of California and a successful educator and travel\\nindustry speaker and consultant. In June 2004, doctors noted symptoms consistent\\nwith mild idiopathic Parkinson’s disease. In January 2006, Dr. Mark Lew, Mancini’s\\ntreating neurologist, prescribed Mirapex to treat worsening symptoms.\\n\\n On January 3, 2008, Mancini reported to Dr. Lew that he experienced increased\\ngambling and other compulsive behaviors after taking Mirapex. Dr. Lew’s notes\\nstated that Mancini reported “gambling and winning but not excessively.” Dr. Lew\\ninformed Mancini of a possible association between Mirapex and compulsive\\nbehaviors such as gambling. On April 23, 2008, Mancini again reported gambling\\nand other compulsive behaviors. Dr. Lew’s notes from this visit stated that Mancini\\n“has increasing stress at work” and “has become a bit more compulsive.” “He tells\\nme that this is controlled, and he does not have any significant problems,” Dr. Lew\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Franklin\\nL. Noel, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fwrote, “but with the stress, he has noted the compulsions to be a bit more intense.\\nOn occasion he . . . described it as ‘driving a car without brakes.’” Dr. Lew told\\nMancini he had “substantial and significant concerns” about Mancini’s gambling and\\nimpulsive behavior. “We talked about the potential of simply cutting back on his\\nMirapex . . . . Currently he is quite resistant to this. He will return to see me in 3\\nmonths’ time.”\\n\\n Mancini continued to take Mirapex until mid-July 2010, when his family\\nlearned of substantial debts resulting from gambling. Three days after stopping\\nMirapex, Mancini saw Dr. Lew, who noted worsening tremors but advised that\\nMancini “needs to stay off his Mirapex” and turn to other “therapeutic options.” Dr.\\nLew’s notes stated that “every visit I have had since [Mancini] has been on Mirapex\\nfor better than 5 years, we discuss[ed] the potential for compulsive behaviors, and he\\nflat out denied any significant problem.”\\n\\n II. Discussion.\\n\\n In reviewing whether Mancini’s claims are time-barred, important issues are\\nnot disputed. The parties agree that California law governs the statute of limitations\\nissue, and that California’s two year statute of limitations for personal injury claims\\nresulting from the ingestion of pharmaceutical drugs applies. See Cal. Code Civ. P.\\n§§ 335.1, 340.8(a). The district court found, and Mancini does not dispute on appeal,\\nthat his claims initially accrued no later than April 23, 2008, because he suspected or\\nshould have suspected that he had been wronged by defendants as a result of his visits\\nto Dr. Lew in January and April 2008. Thus, the claims filed in December 2010\\nappear to be time-barred. But Mancini argues the district court erred in granting\\nsummary judgment because the statute of limitations was tolled until July 2010, and\\nbecause continuing violations are not time-barrred.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f A. The Tolling Issue. As relevant here, section 352(a) of the California Code\\nof Civil Procedure provides that, “[i]f a person entitled to bring an action . . . is, at the\\ntime the cause of action accrued . . . insane, the time of the disability is not part of the\\ntime limited for the commencement of the action.”2 Consistent with the statute’s\\nplain language, it applies even if the plaintiff’s insanity is caused by the wrongful act\\nof the defendant. See Feeley v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 285 Cal. Rptr. 666, 667 (Cal.\\nApp. 1991). Thus, if Mancini was “insane” within the meaning of § 352(a) when his\\nclaim accrued in early 2008, the two-year statute of limitations would be tolled,\\npresumably until he stopped taking Mirapex in July 2010. Mancini argues the district\\ncourt erred in granting defendants summary judgment on this issue.\\n\\n The statute, first enacted in 1872, does not define the word “insane.” In an\\nearly case, the Supreme Court of California affirmed a jury verdict that the plaintiff\\nwas insane when the cause of action accrued:\\n\\n It is true that the complaint and findings . . . do not use the words\\n “unsound” or “insane,” but the finding that he was incapable of caring\\n for his property or transacting business or understanding the nature or\\n effects of his acts was equivalent to a finding in express terms that the\\n deceased was insane within the meaning of the statute of limitations.\\n\\nPearl v. Pearl, 177 P. 845, 846 (Cal. 1918). Many years later, in the leading case of\\nHsu v. Mt. Zion Hospital, 66 Cal. Rptr. 659, 664-67 (Cal. App. 1968), the California\\nCourt of Appeal affirmed a jury verdict that plaintiff’s claims were time-barred\\nbecause she was not “insane” when the claims accrued, even though she was\\n\\n\\n 2\\n In 2014, the California Legislature amended § 352(a) to replace the term\\n“insane” with the phrase “lacking the legal capacity to make decisions.” 2014 Cal.\\nStat. ch. 144, § 4. Courts continue to rely on pre-2014 case law in interpreting the\\namended statute. See, e.g., Lang v. Sacramento Sheriff Dep’t, No. 2:14-cv-0777,\\n2017 WL 1093838, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2017).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fcommitted to a state hospital for the mentally disturbed shortly after the incident. The\\njury was instructed that, “to find that plaintiff was insane, you must find that she was\\nincapable of caring for her property, or transacting business or understanding the\\nnature or effects of her acts.” Id. at 666. The Court of Appeal ruled that this\\ninstruction “is taken directly from Pearl v. Pearl . . . and is a definition of insanity\\nrecognized by [other Court of Appeal] decisions.” Id. The Court further explained:\\n\\n The cases cited above, such as Pearl . . . do not purport to hold that this\\n language is the sole definition of insanity or that the three conditions\\n there set forth are the exclusive tests of mental incompetence for\\n purposes of tolling the statute of limitations. As we understand these\\n cases, the basic question to be resolved by the jury is whether the\\n allegedly insane plaintiff is sufficiently aware of the nature or effects of\\n his acts to be able to comprehend such business transactions as the\\n hiring of an attorney and the instigation of a legal action.\\n\\nId. (emphasis added). The Court concluded that the claim was time-barred because\\nthe jury reasonably found that the statute of limitations began to run when plaintiff\\n“was released from the hospital, managed a sixteen-unit apartment building, and took\\ncare of her two minor children during March through May 1959.” Id.\\n\\n In this case, undisputed evidence established that, when his cause of action\\naccrued in early 2008, Mancini was a full-time college professor, serving as the chair\\nof his department. He earned $57,800 from speaking engagements in 2008, $7,600\\nbefore April. He owned and operated two rental properties. He had never been\\ndiagnosed with or treated for mental illness or psychological disorder. Mancini\\nreported his gambling and other compulsive behaviors to Dr. Lew in January and\\nApril 2008. Dr. Lew advised that this behavior may be a side effect of taking\\nMirapex and suggested Mancini consider “cutting back,” a suggestion he “resisted”\\nfor more than two years. At no point did Dr. Lew question Mancini’s competence to\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fcare for himself or manage his affairs, nor is there evidence that anyone questioned\\nhis legal competence.\\n\\n Mancini relies on two documents to support his claim of insanity. First, when\\nMancini visited Dr. Lew two weeks after he stopped taking Mirapex and over two\\nyears after his cause of action accrued. Dr. Lew’s visit notes reported:\\n\\n [Mancini] is dramatically insightful into the problems that have evolved\\n over the last several years. He feels that he was somewhat disconnected\\n from the potential effects of his actions while he was taking Mirapex.\\n At that time . . . he covered his activities and did not confide in his\\n significant other, and basically lied to me each time I asked him about\\n how he was doing. This was all related to his lack of insight caused by\\n behavioral changes from his Mirapex . . . . He appears today to be\\n dramatically improved with regard to his insight and understanding of\\n his compulsions and behavioral change. He appears to be much more\\n firmly based in reality today.\\n\\nSecond, Mancini submitted a December 2012 affidavit averring that, while taking\\nMirapex, he was “not firmly based in reality, lacked insight into [his] actions, was\\ndisconnected from reality, was incapable of transacting business in a competent\\nmanner and generally could not understand or appreciate the nature, effects or\\nconsequences of [his] acts.” The affidavit listed ways his gambling and “unreliable\\nbehavior” had injured client relations, hastened his retirement as a college professor,\\n“tarnished my reputation as a speaker,” and caused him to make a poor investment in\\nJune 2007 without his customary “exhaustive research and due diligence.”\\n\\n The district court concluded that the July 2010 opinion of Dr. Lew, who was\\na treating neurologist, not a psychiatrist, and the assertions in Mancini’s affidavit\\nfailed to meet his burden of showing that he was insane at the time his cause of action\\naccrued. “The court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that Mancini was\\nincapable of caring for his property, transacting business, or understanding the nature\\n\\n -6-\\n\\for effects of his acts in January or April 2008.” After careful review of the summary\\njudgment record, we agree. Mancini must provide more than a scintilla of evidence\\nto carry his burden. Nuacke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2002).\\nThe undisputed evidence of his business and financial success well into 2008, his\\ncontemporaneous recognition of increasingly compulsive behaviors, and his\\nunderstanding from Dr. Lew that taking Mirapex may be their cause, establish that\\nhe was not insane when the cause of action accrued because he was “sufficiently\\naware of the nature or effects of his acts to be able to comprehend such business\\ntransactions as the hiring of an attorney and the instigation of a legal action.” Hsu,\\n66 Cal. Rptr. at 666; see also Gazal v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 647 F.3d\\n833, 840 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that a similar tolling provision in the Texas\\nCivil Practice and Remedies Code did not apply because plaintiff managed a\\nprofitable company and sought treatment for the side effects of Mirapex, and no one\\nquestioned his competence to care for himself); Sommer v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of\\nAm., 173 F.3d 861 (table), 1999 WL 173570 at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 1999)\\n(plaintiff’s “own actions, continued employment, and substantial income indicate that\\nhe was not ‘insane’”).\\n\\n B. The Continuing Violations Issue. Mancini next argues that each ingestion\\nof Mirapex gives rise to a separate and distinct claim. Therefore, even if the statute\\nof limitations initially accrued in early 2008 and was not tolled by insanity, damages\\nfor injuries suffered due to dosages of Mirapex taken within two years of December\\n30, 2010, are not barred by the statute of limitations. In effect, he argues that taking\\neach dose of Mirapex gave rise to nearly 5,000 distinct and separate claims against\\ndefendants from January 2006 to July 2010. We agree with the district court that this\\ncounter-intuitive argument is without merit.\\n\\n “The longstanding rule in California is that a single tort can be the foundation\\nfor but one claim for damages.” Grisham v. Phillip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 151 P.3d\\n1151, 1161 (Cal. 2007) (cleaned up). However, the Supreme Court of California, like\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fother jurisdictions, has adopted what it calls a “continuing accrual” principle that it\\napplies to breaches of continuing or recurring obligations:\\n\\n When an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of\\n action accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new\\n limitations period. Because each new breach of such an obligation\\n provides all the elements of a claim -- wrongdoing, harm, and causation\\n -- each may be treated as an independently actionable wrong with its\\n own time limit for recovery.\\n\\nAryeh v. Canon Bus. Sols., Inc., 292 P.3d 871, 880 (Cal. 2013) (citations omitted).\\nWe have applied the same principle under federal law, calling it a “continuing\\nviolations” doctrine and noting that “[t]he critical question is whether a present\\nviolation exists.” Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 168 (8th\\nCir. 1995) (en banc) (emphasis in original), quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,\\n431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).\\n\\n Though Mancini invoked this principle in arguing to the district court and on\\nappeal, he failed to identify what present, ongoing violation existed after his cause\\nof action accrued. His claims are based on the theory that defendants’ failure to\\nadequately warn him of the behavioral side effects of taking Mirapex led to\\ncompulsive gambling and financial ruin. Mirapex was FDA-approved for treating\\nParkinson’s disease, and was prescribed by Mancini’s treating neurologist for this\\npurpose. Thus, as the district court observed when the summary judgment motion\\nwas argued, “here, the wrongdoing isn’t taking the pill.”\\n\\n In these circumstances, it is logical to conclude there was a single wrongdoing\\nthat ended -- accrued -- in early 2008 when Mancini learned that his compulsive\\nbehaviors may have been caused by taking Mirapex. He presented no evidence or\\nargument refuting that conclusion. Thus, though his alleged injuries increased when\\nhe persisted in voluntarily taking Mirapex for another two years, those later injuries\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fare time-barred. “[T]he infliction of appreciable and actual harm, however uncertain\\nin amount, will commence the running of the statute of limitations.” Grisham, 151\\nP.3d at 1162 (quotation omitted). Mancini’s gambling losses in 2006 and 2007 were\\n“appreciable and actual harm” that triggered accrual of the statute of limitations in\\nearly 2008. See DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 370-77 (Cal. App. 1987),\\nsuperseded on other grounds, Quarry v. Doe I, 272 P.3d 977, 987 (Cal. 2012).\\n\\n C. The Procedural Issue. Mancini argues the district court abused its\\ndiscretion by denying his motion to stay defendants’ motion for summary judgment\\npending discovery as to whether defendants knew that Mirapex rendered its users\\nunable to understand the nature or effects of their acts. When a motion for summary\\njudgment is filed before the completion of discovery, as in this case, Rule 56(d) of the\\nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure (formerly Rule 56(f)) provides that the district court\\nmay grant such relief if the nonmovant shows “it cannot present facts essential to\\njustify its opposition.” It is not enough to present a list of facts sought to be\\ndiscovered. The nonmovant must “articulate how those facts [a]re relevant to rebut\\nthe movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” Ray v. American\\nAirlines, Inc., 609 F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).\\n\\n Here, the district court concluded that “whether Defendants knew that Mirapex\\ncaused such a condition does not shed any light on whether this particular plaintiff,\\nMancini, himself, was or was not insane at the time his cause of action accrued.” We\\nagree. At the time the district court ruled, the case had been pending for over two\\nyears, numerous companion cases had settled, and nothing had prevented Mancini\\nfrom conducting discovery or obtaining an expert opinion addressing whether he was\\ninsane within the meaning of § 352(a) when the cause of action accrued in early 2008.\\nThere was no abuse of discretion. See id. at 922 (standard of review).\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -9-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":299,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4580417,"string":"4,580,417"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Keilee FANT, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated; Roelif Carter; Allison Nelson ; Herbert Nelson, Jr.; Alfred Morris ; Anthony Kimble ; Donyale Thomas; Shameika Morris; Daniel Jenkins ; Ronnie Tucker ; Tonya DeBerry, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. CITY OF FERGUSON, MISSOURI, Defendant - Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Keilee Fant v. City of Ferguson, MO"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-01-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1472"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Gruender, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1472\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Keilee Fant, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Roelif\\n Carter; Allison Nelson; Herbert Nelson, Jr.; Alfred Morris; Anthony Kimble;\\nDonyale Thomas; Shameika Morris; Daniel Jenkins; Ronnie Tucker; Tonya DeBerry,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n City of Ferguson, Missouri,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 28, 2018\\n Filed: January 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Keilee Fant and ten others brought a putative class action against the City of\\nFerguson, alleging several constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The City\\nmoved to dismiss six of seven counts based on sovereign immunity. The district\\n\\fcourt1 denied the motion, and the City seeks interlocutory review of this decision.\\nBecause the City disclaims any sovereign immunity for itself, and seeks only to\\ninvoke the sovereign immunity of a nonparty, we dismiss the appeal for lack of\\njurisdiction.\\n\\n The six counts at issue stem from the City’s alleged detention of plaintiffs for\\ntheir inability to pay traffic fines. The City’s motion to dismiss argued that sovereign\\nimmunity barred those claims because the alleged injuries are attributable to the\\nFerguson Municipal Court, which the City says is an arm of the State of Missouri.\\nThe district court denied the motion, concluding the City is not entitled to sovereign\\nimmunity, and that the amended complaint sufficiently alleges that the plaintiffs’\\ninjuries are attributable to the City.\\n\\n Given that the litigation continues in the district court, the parties dispute\\nwhether there is a “final decision” over which this court has appellate jurisdiction.\\nSee 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The City invokes the well-established principle that an order\\ndenying a claim of sovereign immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal under the\\ncollateral order doctrine. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,\\n506 U.S. 139, 141 (1993). That principle, however, does not apply where the party\\nappealing disclaims any immunity of its own and instead seeks to invoke the\\nimmunity of a nonparty. Sovereign immunity protects certain entities against the\\nindignity of suit and the burdens of litigation, see id. at 143-44, 146, but this\\njustification for an exception to the final order rule is inapplicable where the claimed\\nsovereign is not a party to the action. The City here does not claim an immunity of\\nits own and instead asserts immunity of the Ferguson Municipal Court. The\\nmunicipal court is not a party to the action, and we lack jurisdiction on this appeal to\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig, United States District Judge for the\\nEastern District of Missouri.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\faddress any potential claim of immunity by the municipal court that might arise in\\nfuture litigation.\\n\\n The City points out that this court exercised jurisdiction in Webb v. City of\\nMaplewood, 889 F.3d 483 (8th Cir. 2018), where a city claimed sovereign immunity\\non the ground that a municipal court—allegedly an arm of the State—was the real\\nparty in interest. Id. at 485-86. In Webb, however, the city asserted its own alleged\\nsovereign immunity. We exercised jurisdiction to determine whether there was merit\\nto the city’s claim that it was immune from suit. Here, by contrast, the City does not\\nassert sovereign immunity of its own.\\n\\n For these reasons, the City’s interlocutory appeal is dismissed for lack of\\njurisdiction. The City’s motion for judicial notice and conditional motion to remand\\nare denied.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4357670/\", \"author_raw\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4580417/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Keilee FANT, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated; Roelif Carter; Allison Nelson ; Herbert Nelson, Jr.; Alfred Morris ; Anthony Kimble ; Donyale Thomas; Shameika Morris; Daniel Jenkins ; Ronnie Tucker ; Tonya DeBerry, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. CITY OF FERGUSON, MISSOURI, Defendant - Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-01-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1472\n ___________________________\n\n Keilee Fant, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Roelif\n Carter; Allison Nelson; Herbert Nelson, Jr.; Alfred Morris; Anthony Kimble;\nDonyale Thomas; Shameika Morris; Daniel Jenkins; Ronnie Tucker; Tonya DeBerry,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees,\n\n v.\n\n City of Ferguson, Missouri,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: September 28, 2018\n Filed: January 10, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Keilee Fant and ten others brought a putative class action against the City of\nFerguson, alleging several constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The City\nmoved to dismiss six of seven counts based on sovereign immunity. The district\n\fcourt1 denied the motion, and the City seeks interlocutory review of this decision.\nBecause the City disclaims any sovereign immunity for itself, and seeks only to\ninvoke the sovereign immunity of a nonparty, we dismiss the appeal for lack of\njurisdiction.\n\n The six counts at issue stem from the City’s alleged detention of plaintiffs for\ntheir inability to pay traffic fines. The City’s motion to dismiss argued that sovereign\nimmunity barred those claims because the alleged injuries are attributable to the\nFerguson Municipal Court, which the City says is an arm of the State of Missouri.\nThe district court denied the motion, concluding the City is not entitled to sovereign\nimmunity, and that the amended complaint sufficiently alleges that the plaintiffs’\ninjuries are attributable to the City.\n\n Given that the litigation continues in the district court, the parties dispute\nwhether there is a “final decision” over which this court has appellate jurisdiction.\nSee 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The City invokes the well-established principle that an order\ndenying a claim of sovereign immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal under the\ncollateral order doctrine. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,\n506 U.S. 139, 141 (1993). That principle, however, does not apply where the party\nappealing disclaims any immunity of its own and instead seeks to invoke the\nimmunity of a nonparty. Sovereign immunity protects certain entities against the\nindignity of suit and the burdens of litigation, see id. at 143-44, 146, but this\njustification for an exception to the final order rule is inapplicable where the claimed\nsovereign is not a party to the action. The City here does not claim an immunity of\nits own and instead asserts immunity of the Ferguson Municipal Court. The\nmunicipal court is not a party to the action, and we lack jurisdiction on this appeal to\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig, United States District Judge for the\nEastern District of Missouri.\n\n -2-\n\faddress any potential claim of immunity by the municipal court that might arise in\nfuture litigation.\n\n The City points out that this court exercised jurisdiction in Webb v. City of\nMaplewood, 889 F.3d 483 (8th Cir. 2018), where a city claimed sovereign immunity\non the ground that a municipal court—allegedly an arm of the State—was the real\nparty in interest. Id. at 485-86. In Webb, however, the city asserted its own alleged\nsovereign immunity. We exercised jurisdiction to determine whether there was merit\nto the city’s claim that it was immune from suit. Here, by contrast, the City does not\nassert sovereign immunity of its own.\n\n For these reasons, the City’s interlocutory appeal is dismissed for lack of\njurisdiction. The City’s motion for judicial notice and conditional motion to remand\nare denied.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Keilee FANT, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated; Roelif Carter; Allison Nelson ; Herbert Nelson, Jr.; Alfred Morris ; Anthony Kimble ; Donyale Thomas; Shameika Morris; Daniel Jenkins ; Ronnie Tucker ; Tonya DeBerry, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. CITY OF FERGUSON, MISSOURI, Defendant - Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-01-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1472\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Keilee Fant, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Roelif\\n Carter; Allison Nelson; Herbert Nelson, Jr.; Alfred Morris; Anthony Kimble;\\nDonyale Thomas; Shameika Morris; Daniel Jenkins; Ronnie Tucker; Tonya DeBerry,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n City of Ferguson, Missouri,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: September 28, 2018\\n Filed: January 10, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Keilee Fant and ten others brought a putative class action against the City of\\nFerguson, alleging several constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The City\\nmoved to dismiss six of seven counts based on sovereign immunity. The district\\n\\fcourt1 denied the motion, and the City seeks interlocutory review of this decision.\\nBecause the City disclaims any sovereign immunity for itself, and seeks only to\\ninvoke the sovereign immunity of a nonparty, we dismiss the appeal for lack of\\njurisdiction.\\n\\n The six counts at issue stem from the City’s alleged detention of plaintiffs for\\ntheir inability to pay traffic fines. The City’s motion to dismiss argued that sovereign\\nimmunity barred those claims because the alleged injuries are attributable to the\\nFerguson Municipal Court, which the City says is an arm of the State of Missouri.\\nThe district court denied the motion, concluding the City is not entitled to sovereign\\nimmunity, and that the amended complaint sufficiently alleges that the plaintiffs’\\ninjuries are attributable to the City.\\n\\n Given that the litigation continues in the district court, the parties dispute\\nwhether there is a “final decision” over which this court has appellate jurisdiction.\\nSee 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The City invokes the well-established principle that an order\\ndenying a claim of sovereign immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal under the\\ncollateral order doctrine. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,\\n506 U.S. 139, 141 (1993). That principle, however, does not apply where the party\\nappealing disclaims any immunity of its own and instead seeks to invoke the\\nimmunity of a nonparty. Sovereign immunity protects certain entities against the\\nindignity of suit and the burdens of litigation, see id. at 143-44, 146, but this\\njustification for an exception to the final order rule is inapplicable where the claimed\\nsovereign is not a party to the action. The City here does not claim an immunity of\\nits own and instead asserts immunity of the Ferguson Municipal Court. The\\nmunicipal court is not a party to the action, and we lack jurisdiction on this appeal to\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig, United States District Judge for the\\nEastern District of Missouri.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\faddress any potential claim of immunity by the municipal court that might arise in\\nfuture litigation.\\n\\n The City points out that this court exercised jurisdiction in Webb v. City of\\nMaplewood, 889 F.3d 483 (8th Cir. 2018), where a city claimed sovereign immunity\\non the ground that a municipal court—allegedly an arm of the State—was the real\\nparty in interest. Id. at 485-86. In Webb, however, the city asserted its own alleged\\nsovereign immunity. We exercised jurisdiction to determine whether there was merit\\nto the city’s claim that it was immune from suit. Here, by contrast, the City does not\\nassert sovereign immunity of its own.\\n\\n For these reasons, the City’s interlocutory appeal is dismissed for lack of\\njurisdiction. The City’s motion for judicial notice and conditional motion to remand\\nare denied.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}}],"truncated":false,"partial":false},"paginationData":{"pageIndex":2,"numItemsPerPage":100,"numTotalItems":31175,"offset":200,"length":100}},"jwt":"eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSJ9.eyJyZWFkIjp0cnVlLCJwZXJtaXNzaW9ucyI6eyJyZXBvLmNvbnRlbnQucmVhZCI6dHJ1ZX0sImlhdCI6MTc3NjQ5OTg3NSwic3ViIjoiL2RhdGFzZXRzL2VpdGFucy1wdS9jbC1jb2RpbmctaW5wdXQiLCJleHAiOjE3NzY1MDM0NzUsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaHVnZ2luZ2ZhY2UuY28ifQ.K1yI4kVgH33h_xUKZr_OoSETCDFDr2n1B7U0BnkXIBXKctVgICDqBrM70Jpyjvd6XhwEQGTeBQxK2JG_92pcAQ","displayUrls":true,"splitSizeSummaries":[{"config":"default","split":"train","numRows":31175,"numBytesParquet":1629387251}]},"discussionsStats":{"closed":0,"open":1,"total":1},"fullWidth":true,"hasGatedAccess":true,"hasFullAccess":true,"isEmbedded":false,"savedQueries":{"community":[],"user":[]}}">
id int64 | name string | name_abbreviation string | decision_date string | docket_number string | court string | casebody string | judge1 string | judge2 string | judge3 string | exactly_three_caps int64 | extra_judges string | judge_designations string | opinions_count int64 | majority_count int64 | dissent_count int64 | concurrence_count int64 | other_count int64 | primary_citation string | reporter string | volume null | resource_url string | precedential_status string | 010combined_count int64 | 020lead_count int64 | 030concurrence_count int64 | 035concurrenceinpart_count int64 | 040dissent_count int64 | year int64 | month int64 | messages list |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4,580,989 | Michael Thomas v. Raymond Anderson | 2019-01-11 | 15-2830 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 15-2830\nMICHAEL N. THOMAS,\n ... | BAUER | ROVNER | SYKES | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4580989/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,581,017 | Michael Thomas v. Raymond Anderson | 2019-01-11 | 15-2830 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 15-2830\nMICHAEL N. THOMAS,\n ... | BAUER | ROVNER | SYKES | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4581017/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,581,018 | Donald MAIER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Judy P. SMITH, Respondent-Appellee. | Donald Maier v. Judy Smith | 2019-01-11 | 18-2151 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Kanne, Rovner, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2151\nDONALD MAIER,\n ... | KANNE | ROVNER | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4581018/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,581,068 | Donald Maier v. Judy Smith | 2019-01-11 | 18-2151 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2151\nDONALD MAIER,\n... | KANNE | ROVNER | BARRETT | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4581068/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,581,202 | KEEP CHICAGO LIVABLE, an Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee. | Keep Chicago Livable v. City of Chicago | 2019-01-14 | 17-1656 & 17-2846 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Easterbrook, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-1656 & 17-2846\nKEEP CHICAGO LIVABLE, an Ill... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4581202/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,581,362 | Keep Chicago Livable v. City of Chicago | 2019-01-14 | 17-2846 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-1656 & 17-2846\n... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4581362/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,581,364 | Daniel Rivera v. Allstate Insurance Company | 2019-01-14 | 17-1649 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and DARROW, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo... | KANNE | SYKES | DARROW | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "DARROW": ", District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4581364/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,581,419 | Daniel Rivera v. Allstate Insurance Company | 2019-01-14 | 17-1649 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and DARROW, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo... | KANNE | SYKES | DARROW | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "DARROW": ", District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4581419/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,581,681 | Mark MITTELSTADT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sonny PERDUE, Secretary of Agriculture, Defendant-Appellee. | Mark Mittelstadt v. Sonny Perdue | 2019-01-15 | 17-2447 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Sykes, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2447\nMARK MITTELSTADT,\n ... | RIPPLE | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4581681/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,581,698 | William Rainsberger v. Charles Benner | 2019-01-15 | 17-2521 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐2521... | WOOD | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4581698/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,581,701 | Mark Mittelstadt v. Sonny Perdue | 2019-01-15 | 17-2447 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2447\nMARK MITTELSTADT... | RIPPLE | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4581701/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,581,740 | William Rainsberger v. Charles Benner | 2019-01-15 | 17-2521 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐2521... | WOOD | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4581740/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,581,743 | Mark Mittelstadt v. Sonny Perdue | 2019-01-15 | 17-2447 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2447\nMARK MITTELSTADT... | RIPPLE | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4581743/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,581,818 | William Rainsberger v. Charles Benner | 2019-01-15 | 17-2521 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐2521... | WOOD | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4581818/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,847 | William RAINSBERGER v. Charles BENNER | Rainsberger v. Benner | 2019-01-15 | No. 17-2521 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Barrett, Hamilton, Wood", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415273/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BARRETT | HAMILTON | WOOD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443847/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,582,207 | EOR Energy, LLC v. Illinois Environmental Protec | 2019-01-16 | 17-3107 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and HAMILTON, Cir‐ cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \n No. ... | WOOD | FLAUM | HAMILTON | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "FLAUM": ", Cir cuit", "HAMILTON": ", Cir cuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4582207/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,582,215 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nathan DRIGGERS, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Nathan Driggers | 2019-01-16 | 17-2994 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Flaum, Hamilton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2994\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | WOOD | FLAUM | HAMILTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4582215/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,582,217 | EOR Energy, LLC v. Illinois Environmental Protec | 2019-01-16 | 17-3107 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and HAMILTON, Cir‐ cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \n No. ... | WOOD | FLAUM | HAMILTON | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "FLAUM": ", Cir cuit", "HAMILTON": ", Cir cuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4582217/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,582,263 | United States v. Nathan Driggers | 2019-01-16 | 17-2994 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and HAMILTON, Cir- cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2994\nUN... | WOOD | FLAUM | HAMILTON | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "FLAUM": ", Cir cuit", "HAMILTON": ", Cir cuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4582263/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,582,264 | EOR Energy, LLC v. Illinois Environmental Protec | 2019-01-16 | 17-3107 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and HAMILTON, Cir‐ cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \n No. ... | WOOD | FLAUM | HAMILTON | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "FLAUM": ", Cir cuit", "HAMILTON": ", Cir cuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4582264/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,848 | EOR ENERGY LLC v. ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY | EOR Energy LLC v. Ill. Envtl. Prot. Agency | 2019-01-16 | No. 17-3107 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Hamilton, Wood", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415274/", "author_raw": ""}]} | FLAUM | HAMILTON | WOOD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443848/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,582,700 | The CHURCH OF OUR LORD AND SAVIOR JESUS CHRIST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF MARKHAM, ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellee. | Church of Our Lord & Savior Jesus Christ v. City of Markham | 2019-01-17 | 18-1432 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Easterbrook, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1432\nTHE CHURCH OF OUR LORD AND SAVIOR JES... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4582700/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,582,709 | Jason M. LUND, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. | Jason Lund v. United States | 2019-01-17 | 16-2381 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Kanne, Sykes, Darrow", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "trict Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 16-2381\nJASON M. LUND,\n ... | KANNE | SYKES | DARROW | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4582709/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,582,710 | Church of Our Lord and Savior v. City of Markham, Illinois | 2019-01-17 | 18-1432 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1432\nTHE CHURC... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | BRENNAN | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4582710/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,582,805 | Jason Lund v. United States | 2019-01-17 | 16-2381 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and DARROW, Dis- trict Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "trict Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 16-2... | KANNE | SYKES | DARROW | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "DARROW": ", Dis trict"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4582805/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,582,806 | Church of Our Lord and Savior v. City of Markham, Illinois | 2019-01-17 | 18-1432 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1432\nTHE CHURC... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | BRENNAN | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4582806/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,582,954 | Jason Lund v. United States | 2019-01-17 | 16-2381 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and DARROW, Dis- trict Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "trict Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 16-2... | KANNE | SYKES | DARROW | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "DARROW": ", Dis trict"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4582954/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,582,953 | Floyd MAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sylvia MAHONE, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Floyd May v. Sylvia Mahone | 2019-01-18 | 15-3395 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 15-3395\nFLOYD MAY,\n ... | FLAUM | RIPPLE | ROVNER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4582953/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,583,045 | Floyd May v. Sylvia Mahone | 2019-01-18 | 15-3395 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 15-3395\nFLOYD MAY,\n ... | FLAUM | RIPPLE | ROVNER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583045/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,583,445 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Scott B. GRIFFITH, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Scott Griffith | 2019-01-22 | 18-1310 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Rovner, Sykes, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1310\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n P... | ROVNER | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583445/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,583,537 | United States v. Scott Griffith | 2019-01-22 | 18-1310 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1310\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | ROVNER | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583537/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,583,538 | Charlotte ROBINSON and Bobby Don Bowersock as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Georgia J. Bowersock, Deceased, and Mark Bowersock, Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DAVOL INC. and C.R. Bard, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. | Charlotte Robinson v. Davol, Inc. | 2019-01-22 | 17-2068 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Sykes, Barrett, Griesbach", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2068\nCHARLOTTE ROBINSON and\nBOBBY DON... | SYKES | BARRETT | GRIESBACH | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583538/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,583,601 | United States v. Scott Griffith | 2019-01-22 | 18-1310 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1310\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | ROVNER | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583601/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,583,603 | P.F., a Minor, BY A.F., His Parent, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. Carolyn Stanford TAYLOR, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | P.F., a minor, by A.F. v. Carolyn S. Taylor | 2019-01-22 | 17-3266 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Sykes, Barrett, Durkin", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3266\nP.F., a minor, by A.F.,\nhis parent,... | SYKES | BARRETT | DURKIN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583603/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,583,605 | Charlotte Robinson v. Davol, Inc. | 2019-01-22 | 17-2068 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and GRIESBACH, Chief District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n _______________... | SYKES | BARRETT | GRIESBACH | 1 | {"SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "GRIESBACH": ", Chief District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583605/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,583,615 | United States v. Scott Griffith | 2019-01-22 | 18-1310 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1310\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | ROVNER | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583615/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,583,617 | P.F., a minor, by A.F. v. Carolyn S. Taylor | 2019-01-22 | 17-3266 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and DURKIN, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo... | SYKES | BARRETT | DURKIN | 1 | {"SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "DURKIN": ", District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583617/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,583,618 | NLRB v. Edward L. Calvert | 2019-01-22 | 17-1895 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and BUCKLO, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ___________________... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BUCKLO | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BUCKLO": ", District"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583618/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,583,620 | Charlotte Robinson v. Davol, Inc. | 2019-01-22 | 17-2068 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and GRIESBACH, Chief District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n _______________... | SYKES | BARRETT | GRIESBACH | 1 | {"SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "GRIESBACH": ", Chief District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583620/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,583,628 | United States v. Scott Griffith | 2019-01-22 | 18-1310 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1310\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | ROVNER | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583628/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,583,630 | NLRB v. Edward L. Calvert | 2019-01-22 | 17-1895 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and BUCKLO, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ___________________... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BUCKLO | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BUCKLO": ", District"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583630/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,583,975 | United States v. Scott Griffith | 2019-01-22 | 18-1310 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1310\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | ROVNER | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583975/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,849 | IN RE: Edward L. CALVERT, Debtor-Appellee. Appeal of: National Labor Relations Board | In re Calvert | 2019-01-22 | No. 17-1895 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bucklo, Easterbrook, Sykes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415275/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4... | BUCKLO | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443849/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,583,973 | Ray FULLER, Petitioner, v. Matthew G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. | Ray Fuller v. Matthew G. Whitaker | 2019-01-23 | 17-3176 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Manion, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9887900/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opini... | WOOD | MANION | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583973/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,583,974 | Maurice LEWIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Maurice Lewis v. City of Chicago | 2019-01-23 | 17-1510 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Sykes, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-1510\nMAURICE LEWIS,\n ... | RIPPLE | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4583974/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,584,013 | Ray Fuller v. Matthew G. Whitaker | 2019-01-23 | 17-3176 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and MANION and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 17-3176\n\nRAY FULLER,\n ... | WOOD | MANION | ROVNER | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "MANION": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4584013/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,584,015 | Maurice Lewis v. City of Chicago | 2019-01-23 | 17-1510 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-1510\nMAURICE LEWIS,\n ... | RIPPLE | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4584015/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,584,016 | Dale E. KLEBER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAREFUSION CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. | Dale Kleber v. CareFusion Corporation | 2019-01-23 | 17-1206 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Bauer, Flaum, Easterbrook, Kanne, Rovner, Sykes, Hamilton, Barrett, Brennan, Scudder, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9887902/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "... | WOOD | BAUER | FLAUM | 2 | EASTERBROOK; KANNE; ROVNER; SYKES; HAMILTON; BARRETT; BRENNAN; SCUDDER | {} | 5 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4584016/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||
4,584,034 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald T. COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Ronald Coleman | 2019-01-23 | 17-3636 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Easterbrook, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3636\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4584034/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,584,035 | Ray Fuller v. Matthew G. Whitaker | 2019-01-23 | 17-3176 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and MANION and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 17-3176\n\nRAY FULLER,\n ... | WOOD | MANION | ROVNER | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "MANION": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4584035/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,584,037 | Maurice Lewis v. City of Chicago | 2019-01-23 | 17-1510 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-1510\nMAURICE LEWIS,\n ... | RIPPLE | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4584037/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,584,038 | Dale Kleber v. CareFusion Corporation | 2019-01-23 | 17-1206 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER, FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, KANNE, ROVNER, SYKES, HAMILTON, BARRETT, BRENNAN, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "by EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | FLAUM | 2 | EASTERBROOK; KANNE; ROVNER; SYKES; HAMILTON; BARRETT; BRENNAN; SCUDDER; ST EVE | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4584038/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,584,054 | United States v. Ronald Coleman | 2019-01-23 | 17-3636 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3636\nU... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | BRENNAN | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4584054/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,584,056 | Dale Kleber v. CareFusion Corporation | 2019-01-23 | 17-1206 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER, FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, KANNE, ROVNER, SYKES, HAMILTON, BARRETT, BRENNAN, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "by EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | FLAUM | 2 | EASTERBROOK; KANNE; ROVNER; SYKES; HAMILTON; BARRETT; BRENNAN; SCUDDER; ST EVE | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4584056/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,584,266 | Susan NIELEN-THOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONCORDE INVESTMENT SERVICES, LLC, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Susan Nielen-Thomas v. Concorde Investment Services | 2019-01-24 | 18-2875 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Kanne, Hamilton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2875\nSUSAN NIELEN-THOMAS,\n ... | FLAUM | KANNE | HAMILTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4584266/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,584,635 | Susan Nielen-Thomas v. Concorde Investment Services | 2019-01-24 | 18-2875 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2875\nSUSAN NIELEN-THOMAS... | FLAUM | KANNE | HAMILTON | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4584635/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,584,978 | Anthony D. Lee, Sr. v. Kevin Kink | 2019-01-25 | 18-1005 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judg- es.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-10... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4584978/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,584,991 | Brenda Lear SCHEIDLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of INDIANA, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Brenda Scheidler v. State of Indiana | 2019-01-25 | 17-2543 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Manion, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2543\nBRENDA LEAR SCHEIDLER,\n ... | BAUER | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4584991/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,584,993 | Anthony D. Lee, Sr. v. Kevin Kink | 2019-01-25 | 18-1005 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judg- es.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-10... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4584993/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,585,036 | Brenda Scheidler v. State of Indiana | 2019-01-25 | 17-2543 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2543\nBRENDA LEAR SCHE... | BAUER | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585036/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,585,192 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Blair COOK, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Blair Cook | 2019-01-28 | 18-1343 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Manion, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1343\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Pla... | FLAUM | MANION | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585192/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,585,316 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Derrick PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Derrick Phillips | 2019-01-28 | 18-1372 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Easterbrook, Kanne", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1372\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585316/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,585,317 | United States v. Blair Cook | 2019-01-28 | 18-1343 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1343\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | FLAUM | MANION | ROVNER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585317/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,585,329 | United States v. Derrick Phillips | 2019-01-28 | 18-1372 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and KANNE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1372\nU... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585329/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,585,416 | Juan Cervantes v. Ardagh Group | 2019-01-29 | 17-3536 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐... | WOOD | RIPPLE | BARRETT | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585416/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,585,455 | TRUSTEES OF the SUBURBAN TEAMSTERS OF NORTHERN ILLINOIS PENSION FUND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. the E COMPANY, a Dissolved Illinois Corporation, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants. | Trs. of the Suburban Teamsters of N. Ill. Pension Fund v. E Co. | 2019-01-29 | 18-2273 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Barrett, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2273\nTRUSTEES OF THE SUBURBAN TEAMSTERS OF... | EASTERBROOK | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585455/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,585,456 | Juan Cervantes v. Ardagh Group | 2019-01-29 | 17-3536 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐... | WOOD | RIPPLE | BARRETT | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585456/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,585,523 | Trustees of the Suburban Teams v. The E Company | 2019-01-29 | 18-2273 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2273\nTRUSTEES ... | EASTERBROOK | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585523/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,585,524 | Juan Cervantes v. Ardagh Group | 2019-01-29 | 17-3536 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 17‐... | WOOD | RIPPLE | BARRETT | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585524/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,585,525 | Aleksey Ruderman v. Matthew G. Whitaker | 2019-01-29 | 17-1689 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 1... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | BARRETT | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585525/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,585,546 | Bruce GILES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Salvador A. GODINEZ, Acting Director, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Bruce Giles v. Salvador Godinez | 2019-01-29 | 15-3077 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Manion, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 15-3077\nBRUCE GILES,\n ... | FLAUM | MANION | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585546/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,585,547 | Aleksey Ruderman v. Matthew G. Whitaker | 2019-01-29 | 17-1689 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 1... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | BARRETT | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585547/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,585,618 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Scott BOOKS, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Scott Books | 2019-01-29 | 17-3493 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Brennan, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3493\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | BAUER | BRENNAN | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585618/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,585,620 | Bruce Giles v. Salvador Godinez | 2019-01-29 | 15-3077 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, MANION, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 15-3077\nBRUCE GILES,\n ... | FLAUM | MANION | ST EVE | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585620/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,585,621 | Aleksey Ruderman v. Matthew G. Whitaker | 2019-01-29 | 17-1689 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 1... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | BARRETT | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585621/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,585,624 | United States v. Scott Books | 2019-01-29 | 17-3493 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3493\nUNITED STATES... | BAUER | BRENNAN | SCUDDER | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585624/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,585,676 | United States v. Scott Books | 2019-01-29 | 17-3493 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3493\nUNITED STATES... | BAUER | BRENNAN | SCUDDER | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4585676/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,857 | Juan CERVANTES v. ARDAGH GROUP | Cervantes v. Ardagh Grp. | 2019-01-29 | No. 17-3536 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Barrett, Ripple, Wood", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415284/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BARRETT | RIPPLE | WOOD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443857/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,858 | Aleksey Arkadyevich RUDERMAN v. Matthew G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General of the United States | Ruderman v. Whitaker | 2019-01-29 | No. 17-1689 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Barrett, Easterbrook, Wood", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415285/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BARRETT | EASTERBROOK | WOOD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443858/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,866 | ABS GLOBAL, INC., Plaintiff/Counterclaim and Genus PLC, Counterclaim v. INGURAN, LLC, Doing Business as Sexing Technologies, Defendant/Counterclaim and XY, LLC, Intervening Defendant/Counterclaim | ABS Global, Inc. v. Inguran, LLC | 2019-01-29 | No. 17-1873 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Barrett, Easterbrook, Wood", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415293/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BARRETT | EASTERBROOK | WOOD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443866/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,578,284 | Matthew Wade PARRISH, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Jason DINGMAN, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Hamilton County Jailer; Dennis Hagenson, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Hamilton County Sheriff; Hamilton County, Iowa, Defendants - Appellees | Matthew Parrish v. Jason Dingman | 2019-01-02 | 17-3705 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Wollman, Colloton, Benton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3705\n ... | WOLLMAN | COLLOTON | BENTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4578284/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,578,576 | Eva Angelica LUCKE, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Andrew SOLSVIG, Individually and in His Capacity as Director, Minot International Airport ; City of Minot, a North Dakota Municipal Corporation, Defendants - Appellees | Eva Angelica Lucke v. Andrew Solsvig | 2019-01-03 | 17-3618 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Kelly, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-361... | SHEPHERD | KELLY | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4578576/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,578,577 | E. D., a Minor, BY AND THROUGH His Parents and Next Friends Anthony DOUGHERTY and Katherine D. Dougherty; Anthony Dougherty, Individually and as Parent of E.D.; Katherine D. Dougherty, Individually and as Parent of E.D. Plaintiffs - Appellants v. PALMYRA R-I SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant - Appellee | E. Dougherty D. v. Palmyra R-I Sch. Dist. | 2019-01-03 | 18-1095 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Melloy, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STRAS, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1095\n ... | SMITH | MELLOY | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4578577/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,578,578 | AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff - Appellee v. VEIN CENTERS FOR EXCELLENCE, INC., Defendant St. Louis Heart Center, Inc., Defendant - Appellant | American Family Mutual Ins. Co v. St. Louis Heart Center, Inc. | 2019-01-03 | 17-3266 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Beam, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3266\n ... | COLLOTON | BEAM | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4578578/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,578,915 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Lynn Alisa ESPEJO, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Lynn Espejo | 2019-01-04 | 17-3562 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Gruender, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-356... | COLLOTON | GRUENDER | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4578915/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,578,916 | Thompson L. AWNINGS, Formerly Known as Tristan Simon, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Joshua FULLERTON; Ryan Duncan, Defendants-Appellees Jeremy Carther; Todd Roberts, Defendants Tarvis Banks; 1-10 Does, Defendants-Appellees | Thompson Awnings v. Joshua Fullerton | 2019-01-04 | 17-2884 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Beam, Colloton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2884\n ... | SMITH | BEAM | COLLOTON | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4578916/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,579,251 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Charles EAGLE PIPE, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Charles Eagle Pipe | 2019-01-07 | 17-3039 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Loken, Gruender", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LOKEN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3039\n ... | SMITH | LOKEN | GRUENDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4579251/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,579,593 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. George PATINO, Also Known as Giorgio Paticciano Patino, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. George Patino | 2019-01-08 | 17-3199 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Gruender, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-319... | COLLOTON | GRUENDER | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4579593/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,579,595 | SPV-LS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant Nachman Bergman, as Trustee of the N Bergman Insurance Trust Dated December 18, 2006; Malka Silberman, as Successor Trustee of the N Bergman Insurance Trust Dated December 18, 2006; Life Trading Trust, Dated August 8, 2007; T-Leg, LLC, Al... | SPV-LS, LLC v. The Estate of Nancy Bergman | 2019-01-08 | 17-3177; 17-3179 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Kelly, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3177\n... | SHEPHERD | KELLY | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4579595/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,579,597 | Ria SCHUMACHER, Individually and on Behalf of All Others, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SC DATA CENTER, INC., Doing Business as Colony Brands, Inc., Defendant - Appellant | Ria Schumacher v. SC Data Center, Inc. | 2019-01-08 | 17-3112 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Kelly, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-311... | GRUENDER | KELLY | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4579597/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,579,598 | Michael SPRADLING, as Personal Representative of the Estate Of, William Collin Spradling, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Clay HASTINGS, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Michael Ford, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Frederick Steve Woodall, "Steve" Individually and in His Official Capacity; Aaron ... | Michael Spradling v. Clay Hastings | 2019-01-08 | 17-3573 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Melloy, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3573\n ... | SMITH | MELLOY | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4579598/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,579,889 | Yobarri Takie EASON, Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee | Yobarri Eason v. United States | 2019-01-09 | 17-3299 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Loken, Gruender", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LOKEN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3299\n... | SMITH | LOKEN | GRUENDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4579889/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,579,895 | MEDTRONIC SOFAMOR DANEK, INC.; Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc.; Medtronic, Inc., Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Patrick B. GANNON, Defendant - Appellant | Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Patrick B. Gannon | 2019-01-09 | 17-3302 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Loken, Gruender", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3302\n ... | SMITH | LOKEN | GRUENDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4579895/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,580,408 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Joseph L. HILL, Defendant - Appellant. | United States v. Joseph Hill | 2019-01-10 | 17-2425 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Gruender, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2425\n ... | COLLOTON | GRUENDER | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4580408/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,580,411 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Jeremy D. TERRELL, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Jeremy Terrell | 2019-01-10 | 17-2929 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Wollman, Arnold, Benton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2929\n ... | WOLLMAN | ARNOLD | BENTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4580411/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,580,413 | Shondel CHURCH; Randall Lee Dalton; Dorian Samuels; Viola Bowman; Brian Richman, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. State of MISSOURI; Michael L. Parson, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Missouri, Defendants - Appellants Michael Barrett; H. Riley Bock; Charles R. Jackson; Craig Chval; A. Crista Hogan, Defend... | Shondel Church v. State of Missouri | 2019-01-10 | 17-2857 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Melloy, Benton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2857\n... | GRUENDER | MELLOY | BENTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4580413/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,580,414 | RYAN DATA EXCHANGE, LTD.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, Doing Business as Rydex, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. GRACO, INC., Defendant - Appellant Ryan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, LLC, Doing Business as Rydex, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. Graco, Inc., Defendant - Appellee Ryan Data Exchange, Ltd.; Rydex Technologies, ... | Ryan Data Exchange, Ltd. v. Graco, Inc. | 2019-01-10 | 17-1451; 17-1746; 17-1772 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Beam, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BEAM, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-1451\n ... | COLLOTON | BEAM | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4580414/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,580,415 | R.J. ZAYED, in His Capacity as Court-Appointed Receiver for the Oxford Global Partners, LLC, Universal Brokerage FX, and Other Receiver Entities, Plaintiff - Appellant v. ASSOCIATED BANK, N.A., Defendant - Appellee | R.J. Zayed v. Associated Bank, N.A. | 2019-01-10 | 17-1250 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Kelly, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9887838/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opi... | SHEPHERD | KELLY | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4580415/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,580,416 | In RE: MIRAPEX PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION Marc Mancini, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Et Al., Defendants - Appellees | Mancini v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc. (In Re Mirapex Prods. Liab. Litig.) | 2019-01-10 | 17-2204 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Loken, Gruender", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LOKEN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2204\n ... | SMITH | LOKEN | GRUENDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4580416/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,580,417 | Keilee FANT, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated; Roelif Carter; Allison Nelson ; Herbert Nelson, Jr.; Alfred Morris ; Anthony Kimble ; Donyale Thomas; Shameika Morris; Daniel Jenkins ; Ronnie Tucker ; Tonya DeBerry, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. CITY OF FERGUSON, MISSOURI, Defendant - Appellant. | Keilee Fant v. City of Ferguson, MO | 2019-01-10 | 18-1472 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Gruender, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-... | COLLOTON | GRUENDER | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4580417/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 1 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.