idx int64 0 25.4k | project stringclasses 707
values | project_url stringclasses 735
values | filepath stringlengths 4 100 | commit_id stringlengths 7 40 | commit_message stringlengths 0 18.3k ⌀ | is_vulnerable bool 2
classes | hash stringlengths 32 32 | func_name stringlengths 3 112 | func_body stringlengths 23 235k | changed_lines stringlengths 2 27.6k | changed_statements stringlengths 2 161k | cve_list listlengths 1 19 | cwe_list listlengths 1 6 | fixed_func_idx int64 1 25.4k ⌀ | context dict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c | 005145378c9ad7575a01b6ce1ba118fb427f583a | [media] dvb-usb-v2: avoid use-after-free
I ran into a stack frame size warning because of the on-stack copy of
the USB device structure:
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c: In function 'dvb_usbv2_disconnect':
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:1029:1: error: the frame size of 1104 bytes is larger th... | true | 5eed13a1f22c5a961ab0b4dcab91a1a7 | dvb_usbv2_disconnect | void dvb_usbv2_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
const char *name = d->name;
struct device dev = d->udev->dev;
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s: bInterfaceNumber=%d\n", __func__,
intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber);
if (d->props->exit)
d->props->e... | [[1015, "\tconst char *name = d->name;\n"], [1016, "\tstruct device dev = d->udev->dev;\n"], [1026, "\tdev_info(&dev, \"%s: '%s' successfully deinitialized and disconnected\\n\",\n"], [1027, "\t\t\tKBUILD_MODNAME, name);\n"]] | [[1015, "const char *name = d->name;"], [1016, "struct device dev = d->udev->dev;"], [1026, "dev_info(&dev, \"%s: '%s' successfully deinitialized and disconnected\\n\",\n\t\t\tKBUILD_MODNAME, name);"]] | [
"CVE-2017-8064"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 1 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"CONFIG_VMAP_STACK"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"usb_get_intfdata",
"dev_info"
],
"Function Argument": [
"intf"
],
"Globals": [
"KBUILD_MODNAME"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct dvb_usb_device",
"struct device"
]... |
1 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c | 005145378c9ad7575a01b6ce1ba118fb427f583a | [media] dvb-usb-v2: avoid use-after-free
I ran into a stack frame size warning because of the on-stack copy of
the USB device structure:
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c: In function 'dvb_usbv2_disconnect':
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:1029:1: error: the frame size of 1104 bytes is larger th... | false | 1adb6cd316c6ed00994b824a788e5c69 | dvb_usbv2_disconnect | void dvb_usbv2_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
const char *devname = kstrdup(dev_name(&d->udev->dev), GFP_KERNEL);
const char *drvname = d->name;
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s: bInterfaceNumber=%d\n", __func__,
intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber)... | [[1015, "\tconst char *devname = kstrdup(dev_name(&d->udev->dev), GFP_KERNEL);\n"], [1016, "\tconst char *drvname = d->name;\n"], [1026, "\tpr_info(\"%s: '%s:%s' successfully deinitialized and disconnected\\n\",\n"], [1027, "\t\tKBUILD_MODNAME, drvname, devname);\n"], [1028, "\tkfree(devname);\n"]] | [[1015, "const char *devname = kstrdup(dev_name(&d->udev->dev), GFP_KERNEL);"], [1016, "const char *drvname = d->name;"], [1026, "pr_info(\"%s: '%s:%s' successfully deinitialized and disconnected\\n\",\n\t\tKBUILD_MODNAME, drvname, devname);"], [1028, "kfree(devname);"]] | [
"CVE-2017-8064"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 1 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"CONFIG_VMAP_STACK"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"usb_get_intfdata",
"dev_info"
],
"Function Argument": [
"intf"
],
"Globals": [
"KBUILD_MODNAME"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct dvb_usb_device",
"struct device"
]... |
2 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfpcore/nfp_cppcore.c | 02e1a114fdb71e59ee6770294166c30d437bf86a | nfp: fix use-after-free in area_cache_get()
area_cache_get() is used to distribute cache->area and set cache->id,
and if cache->id is not 0 and cache->area->kref refcount is 0, it will
release the cache->area by nfp_cpp_area_release(). area_cache_get()
set cache->id before cpp->op->area_init() and nfp_cpp_area_acqu... | true | b09c47a4db6314a9ae2201fbee26ee43 | area_cache_get | static struct nfp_cpp_area_cache *
area_cache_get(struct nfp_cpp *cpp, u32 id,
u64 addr, unsigned long *offset, size_t length)
{
struct nfp_cpp_area_cache *cache;
int err;
/* Early exit when length == 0, which prevents
* the need for special case code below when
* checking against available cache size.
... | [[877, "\tcache->id = id;\n"]] | [[877, "cache->id = id;"]] | [
"CVE-2022-3545"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 3 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"nfp_cpp_area_release",
"cpp->op->area_init",
"nfp_cpp_area_acquire"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
3 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfpcore/nfp_cppcore.c | 02e1a114fdb71e59ee6770294166c30d437bf86a | nfp: fix use-after-free in area_cache_get()
area_cache_get() is used to distribute cache->area and set cache->id,
and if cache->id is not 0 and cache->area->kref refcount is 0, it will
release the cache->area by nfp_cpp_area_release(). area_cache_get()
set cache->id before cpp->op->area_init() and nfp_cpp_area_acqu... | false | 6eb6e5761715e630d11c438f0e0f15e5 | area_cache_get | static struct nfp_cpp_area_cache *
area_cache_get(struct nfp_cpp *cpp, u32 id,
u64 addr, unsigned long *offset, size_t length)
{
struct nfp_cpp_area_cache *cache;
int err;
/* Early exit when length == 0, which prevents
* the need for special case code below when
* checking against available cache size.
... | [[896, "\tcache->id = id;\n"], [897, "\n"]] | [[896, "cache->id = id;"], [897, "\n"]] | [
"CVE-2022-3545"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 3 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"nfp_cpp_area_release",
"cpp->op->area_init",
"nfp_cpp_area_acquire"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
4 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 04bcef2a83f40c6db24222b27a52892cba39dffb | ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing fo... | true | 4142c8c9b956090ae535f2e0dfa2b660 | do_ip_vs_get_ctl | static int
do_ip_vs_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
{
unsigned char arg[128];
int ret = 0;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (*len < get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]) {
pr_err("get_ctl: len %u < %u\n",
*len, get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]);
return -EINVAL;
}
if ... | [[2365, "\tif (copy_from_user(arg, user, get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]) != 0)\n"]] | [[2365, "if (copy_from_user(arg, user, get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]) != 0)"]] | [
"CVE-2013-4588"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 6 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"GET_CMDID"
],
"Function Argument": [
"cmd"
],
"Globals": [
"get_arglen"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
5 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 04bcef2a83f40c6db24222b27a52892cba39dffb | ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing fo... | false | 3952069a1f9b3d417354575f7e77abec | do_ip_vs_set_ctl | static int
do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
unsigned char arg[MAX_ARG_LEN];
struct ip_vs_service_user *usvc_compat;
struct ip_vs_service_user_kern usvc;
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
struct ip_vs_dest_user *udest_compat;
struct ip_vs_dest_user_kern udest;
... | [[2080, "\tif (cmd < IP_VS_BASE_CTL || cmd > IP_VS_SO_SET_MAX)\n"], [2081, "\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n"], [2082, "\tif (len < 0 || len > MAX_ARG_LEN)\n"], [2083, "\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n"]] | [[2080, "if (cmd < IP_VS_BASE_CTL || cmd > IP_VS_SO_SET_MAX)"], [2081, "return -EINVAL;"], [2082, "if (len < 0 || len > MAX_ARG_LEN)"], [2083, "return -EINVAL;"]] | [
"CVE-2013-4588"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | null | {
"Execution Environment": null,
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": null,
"Function Argument": null,
"Globals": null,
"Type Execution Declaration": null
} |
6 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 04bcef2a83f40c6db24222b27a52892cba39dffb | ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing fo... | false | cb91c5bff7f5d1bc520dfb0a8a207efb | do_ip_vs_get_ctl | static int
do_ip_vs_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
{
unsigned char arg[128];
int ret = 0;
unsigned int copylen;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (cmd < IP_VS_BASE_CTL || cmd > IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if (*len < get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]) {
pr_err("... | [[2359, "\tunsigned int copylen;\n"], [2364, "\tif (cmd < IP_VS_BASE_CTL || cmd > IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX)\n"], [2365, "\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n"], [2366, "\n"], [2373, "\tcopylen = get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)];\n"], [2374, "\tif (copylen > 128)\n"], [2375, "\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n"], [2376, "\n"], [2377, "\tif (copy_from_user(arg, ... | [[2359, "unsigned int copylen;"], [2364, "if (cmd < IP_VS_BASE_CTL || cmd > IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX)"], [2365, "return -EINVAL;"], [2366, "\n"], [2373, "copylen = get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)];"], [2374, "if (copylen > 128)"], [2375, "return -EINVAL;"], [2376, "\n"], [2377, "if (copy_from_user(arg, user, copylen) != 0)"]] | [
"CVE-2013-4588"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 6 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"GET_CMDID"
],
"Function Argument": [
"cmd"
],
"Globals": [
"get_arglen"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
7 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 05692d7005a364add85c6e25a6c4447ce08f913a | vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element... | true | a049777f01d743bcf5935c70c207b35e | vfio_pci_ioctl | static long vfio_pci_ioctl(void *device_data,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct vfio_pci_device *vdev = device_data;
unsigned long minsz;
if (cmd == VFIO_DEVICE_GET_INFO) {
struct vfio_device_info info;
minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_device_info, num_irqs);
if (copy_from_user(&info, (void... | [[833, "\t\tint ret = 0;\n"], [845, "\t\tif (!(hdr.flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE)) {\n"], [846, "\t\t\tsize_t size;\n"], [847, "\t\t\tint max = vfio_pci_get_irq_count(vdev, hdr.index);\n"], [849, "\t\t\tif (hdr.flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_BOOL)\n"], [850, "\t\t\t\tsize = sizeof(uint8_t);\n"], [851, "\t\t\telse if (hdr.f... | [[833, "int ret = 0;"], [845, "if (!(hdr.flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE))"], [846, "size_t size;"], [847, "int max = vfio_pci_get_irq_count(vdev, hdr.index);"], [849, "if (hdr.flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_BOOL)"], [850, "size = sizeof(uint8_t);"], [851, "else if (hdr.flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_EVENTFD)"], [852, "size = siz... | [
"CVE-2016-9083",
"CVE-2016-9084"
] | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-119"
] | 8 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"vfio_pci_get_irq_count"
],
"Function Argument": [
"device_data",
"cmd",
"arg"
],
"Globals": [
"VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE",
"VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_BOOL",
"VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_EVENTFD",
"VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE... |
8 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 05692d7005a364add85c6e25a6c4447ce08f913a | vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element... | false | a868d284be988ce6b14e3074a510fdcf | vfio_pci_ioctl | static long vfio_pci_ioctl(void *device_data,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct vfio_pci_device *vdev = device_data;
unsigned long minsz;
if (cmd == VFIO_DEVICE_GET_INFO) {
struct vfio_device_info info;
minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_device_info, num_irqs);
if (copy_from_user(&info, (void... | [[832, "\t\tsize_t size;\n"], [834, "\t\tint max, ret = 0;\n"], [842, "\t\t hdr.count >= (U32_MAX - hdr.start) ||\n"], [847, "\t\tmax = vfio_pci_get_irq_count(vdev, hdr.index);\n"], [848, "\t\tif (hdr.start >= max || hdr.start + hdr.count > max)\n"], [849, "\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n"], [851, "\t\tswitch (hdr.flags & V... | [[832, "size_t size;"], [834, "int max, ret = 0;"], [841, "if (hdr.argsz < minsz || hdr.index >= VFIO_PCI_NUM_IRQS ||\n\t\t hdr.count >= (U32_MAX - hdr.start) ||\n\t\t hdr.flags & ~(VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK |\n\t\t\t\t VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK))"], [847, "max = vfio_pci_get_irq_count(vdev, hdr.index);"],... | [
"CVE-2016-9083",
"CVE-2016-9084"
] | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-119"
] | 8 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"vfio_pci_get_irq_count"
],
"Function Argument": [
"device_data",
"cmd",
"arg"
],
"Globals": [
"VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE",
"VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_BOOL",
"VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_EVENTFD",
"VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE... |
9 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c | 05692d7005a364add85c6e25a6c4447ce08f913a | vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element... | true | 4e082208eaeda7cf04e95dca1377d293 | vfio_msi_enable | static int vfio_msi_enable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int nvec, bool msix)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev;
unsigned int flag = msix ? PCI_IRQ_MSIX : PCI_IRQ_MSI;
int ret;
if (!is_irq_none(vdev))
return -EINVAL;
vdev->ctx = kzalloc(nvec * sizeof(struct vfio_pci_irq_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vdev->ctx)
... | [[259, "\tvdev->ctx = kzalloc(nvec * sizeof(struct vfio_pci_irq_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);\n"]] | [[259, "vdev->ctx = kzalloc(nvec * sizeof(struct vfio_pci_irq_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);"]] | [
"CVE-2016-9083",
"CVE-2016-9084"
] | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-119"
] | 10 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"nvec"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
10 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c | 05692d7005a364add85c6e25a6c4447ce08f913a | vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element... | false | 7e49e89feb2e97fdd27fd1dc9883d202 | vfio_msi_enable | static int vfio_msi_enable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int nvec, bool msix)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev;
unsigned int flag = msix ? PCI_IRQ_MSIX : PCI_IRQ_MSI;
int ret;
if (!is_irq_none(vdev))
return -EINVAL;
vdev->ctx = kcalloc(nvec, sizeof(struct vfio_pci_irq_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vdev->ctx)
r... | [[259, "\tvdev->ctx = kcalloc(nvec, sizeof(struct vfio_pci_irq_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);\n"]] | [[259, "vdev->ctx = kcalloc(nvec, sizeof(struct vfio_pci_irq_ctx), GFP_KERNEL);"]] | [
"CVE-2016-9083",
"CVE-2016-9084"
] | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-119"
] | 10 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"nvec"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
11 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c | 0625b4ba1a5d4703c7fb01c497bd6c156908af00 | IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <... | true | 4f14403d1b00e2825b924f7bae6f799d | create_qp_common | static int create_qp_common(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct ib_pd *pd,
struct ib_qp_init_attr *init_attr,
struct ib_udata *udata, struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp)
{
struct mlx5_ib_resources *devr = &dev->devr;
int inlen = MLX5_ST_SZ_BYTES(create_qp_in);
struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = dev->mdev;
struct mlx5_ib_cre... | [[1610, "\tstruct mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp resp;\n"]] | [[1610, "struct mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp resp;"]] | [
"CVE-2018-20855"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 12 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp"
]
} |
12 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c | 0625b4ba1a5d4703c7fb01c497bd6c156908af00 | IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <... | false | 0e311cfeb93cc5603699cbf680d9734f | create_qp_common | static int create_qp_common(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct ib_pd *pd,
struct ib_qp_init_attr *init_attr,
struct ib_udata *udata, struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp)
{
struct mlx5_ib_resources *devr = &dev->devr;
int inlen = MLX5_ST_SZ_BYTES(create_qp_in);
struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = dev->mdev;
struct mlx5_ib_cre... | [[1610, "\tstruct mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp resp = {};\n"]] | [[1610, "struct mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp resp = {};"]] | [
"CVE-2018-20855"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 12 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp"
]
} |
13 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/cifs/smbencrypt.c | 06deeec77a5a689cc94b21a8a91a76e42176685d | cifs: Fix smbencrypt() to stop pointing a scatterlist at the stack
smbencrypt() points a scatterlist to the stack, which is breaks if
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.
Fix it by switching to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(). The new code
should be considerably faster as an added benefit.
This code is nearly identical to some code th... | true | a89228b9e70e6c1f4dc50bcf2932a2f1 | smbhash | static int
smbhash(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *key)
{
int rc;
unsigned char key2[8];
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm_des;
struct scatterlist sgin, sgout;
struct skcipher_request *req;
str_to_key(key, key2);
tfm_des = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(des)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ER... | [[72, "\tint rc;\n"], [74, "\tstruct crypto_skcipher *tfm_des;\n"], [75, "\tstruct scatterlist sgin, sgout;\n"], [76, "\tstruct skcipher_request *req;\n"], [80, "\ttfm_des = crypto_alloc_skcipher(\"ecb(des)\", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);\n"], [82, "\t\trc = PTR_ERR(tfm_des);\n"], [83, "\t\tcifs_dbg(VFS, \"could not allocate ... | [[72, "int rc;"], [74, "struct crypto_skcipher *tfm_des;"], [75, "struct scatterlist sgin, sgout;"], [76, "struct skcipher_request *req;"], [80, "tfm_des = crypto_alloc_skcipher(\"ecb(des)\", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);"], [82, "rc = PTR_ERR(tfm_des);"], [83, "cifs_dbg(VFS, \"could not allocate des crypto API\\n\");"], [84, ... | [
"CVE-2016-10154"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 14 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"CONFIG_VMAP_STACK"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"sg_init_one"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
14 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/cifs/smbencrypt.c | 06deeec77a5a689cc94b21a8a91a76e42176685d | cifs: Fix smbencrypt() to stop pointing a scatterlist at the stack
smbencrypt() points a scatterlist to the stack, which is breaks if
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.
Fix it by switching to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(). The new code
should be considerably faster as an added benefit.
This code is nearly identical to some code th... | false | e8cc2fd6bec0fed306d2adce2c782f6f | smbhash | static int
smbhash(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *key)
{
unsigned char key2[8];
struct crypto_cipher *tfm_des;
str_to_key(key, key2);
tfm_des = crypto_alloc_cipher("des", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm_des)) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate des crypto API\n");
return PTR_ERR(tfm_des);
... | [[73, "\tstruct crypto_cipher *tfm_des;\n"], [77, "\ttfm_des = crypto_alloc_cipher(\"des\", 0, 0);\n"], [80, "\t\treturn PTR_ERR(tfm_des);\n"], [83, "\tcrypto_cipher_setkey(tfm_des, key2, 8);\n"], [84, "\tcrypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm_des, out, in);\n"], [85, "\tcrypto_free_cipher(tfm_des);\n"], [87, "\treturn 0;\n"]] | [[73, "struct crypto_cipher *tfm_des;"], [77, "tfm_des = crypto_alloc_cipher(\"des\", 0, 0);"], [80, "return PTR_ERR(tfm_des);"], [83, "crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm_des, key2, 8);"], [84, "crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm_des, out, in);"], [85, "crypto_free_cipher(tfm_des);"], [87, "return 0;"]] | [
"CVE-2016-10154"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 14 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"CONFIG_VMAP_STACK"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"sg_init_one"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
15 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/mlx4/port.c | 0926f91083f34d047abc74f1ca4fa6a9c161f7db | mlx4_en: Fix out of bounds array access
When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or
mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without
updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. Fix
this by adding a proper check outside the loop.
Signed-of... | true | 0bb0fd17cb0d592e6c0241114adba3b5 | mlx4_register_mac | int mlx4_register_mac(struct mlx4_dev *dev, u8 port, u64 mac, int *index)
{
struct mlx4_mac_table *table = &mlx4_priv(dev)->port[port].mac_table;
int i, err = 0;
int free = -1;
mlx4_dbg(dev, "Registering MAC: 0x%llx\n", (unsigned long long) mac);
mutex_lock(&table->mutex);
for (i = 0; i < MLX4_MAX_MAC_NUM - 1; i... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2010-5332"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 17 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"mlx4_priv"
],
"Function Argument": [
"dev",
"port"
],
"Globals": [
"MLX4_MAX_MAC_NUM"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
16 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/mlx4/port.c | 0926f91083f34d047abc74f1ca4fa6a9c161f7db | mlx4_en: Fix out of bounds array access
When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or
mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without
updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. Fix
this by adding a proper check outside the loop.
Signed-of... | true | b34d08283adbc51bc2a8ac9fef1d47d8 | mlx4_register_vlan | int mlx4_register_vlan(struct mlx4_dev *dev, u8 port, u16 vlan, int *index)
{
struct mlx4_vlan_table *table = &mlx4_priv(dev)->port[port].vlan_table;
int i, err = 0;
int free = -1;
mutex_lock(&table->mutex);
for (i = MLX4_VLAN_REGULAR; i < MLX4_MAX_VLAN_NUM; i++) {
if (free < 0 && (table->refs[i] == 0)) {
fr... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2010-5332"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 18 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"mlx4_priv",
"be32_to_cpu",
"cpu_to_be32",
"mlx4_set_port_vlan_table",
"mlx4_warn"
],
"Function Argument": [
"dev",
"port",
"vlan",
"index"
],
"Globals": [
"MLX4_VLAN_REGULAR",
"MLX4_MAX_... |
17 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/mlx4/port.c | 0926f91083f34d047abc74f1ca4fa6a9c161f7db | mlx4_en: Fix out of bounds array access
When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or
mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without
updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. Fix
this by adding a proper check outside the loop.
Signed-of... | false | 5e384db2b5bcf28504943915f4e0feff | mlx4_register_mac | int mlx4_register_mac(struct mlx4_dev *dev, u8 port, u64 mac, int *index)
{
struct mlx4_mac_table *table = &mlx4_priv(dev)->port[port].mac_table;
int i, err = 0;
int free = -1;
mlx4_dbg(dev, "Registering MAC: 0x%llx\n", (unsigned long long) mac);
mutex_lock(&table->mutex);
for (i = 0; i < MLX4_MAX_MAC_NUM - 1; i... | [[114, "\n"], [115, "\tif (free < 0) {\n"], [116, "\t\terr = -ENOMEM;\n"], [117, "\t\tgoto out;\n"], [118, "\t}\n"], [119, "\n"]] | [[114, "\n"], [115, "if (free < 0)"], [116, "err = -ENOMEM;"], [117, "goto out;"], [118, "\t}\n"], [119, "\n"]] | [
"CVE-2010-5332"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 17 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"mlx4_priv"
],
"Function Argument": [
"dev",
"port"
],
"Globals": [
"MLX4_MAX_MAC_NUM"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
18 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/mlx4/port.c | 0926f91083f34d047abc74f1ca4fa6a9c161f7db | mlx4_en: Fix out of bounds array access
When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or
mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without
updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. Fix
this by adding a proper check outside the loop.
Signed-of... | false | d2d908a7f0431e5675baba44caaafa0c | mlx4_register_vlan | int mlx4_register_vlan(struct mlx4_dev *dev, u8 port, u16 vlan, int *index)
{
struct mlx4_vlan_table *table = &mlx4_priv(dev)->port[port].vlan_table;
int i, err = 0;
int free = -1;
mutex_lock(&table->mutex);
for (i = MLX4_VLAN_REGULAR; i < MLX4_MAX_VLAN_NUM; i++) {
if (free < 0 && (table->refs[i] == 0)) {
fr... | [[214, "\tif (free < 0) {\n"], [215, "\t\terr = -ENOMEM;\n"], [216, "\t\tgoto out;\n"], [217, "\t}\n"], [218, "\n"]] | [[214, "if (free < 0)"], [215, "err = -ENOMEM;"], [216, "goto out;"], [217, "\t}\n"], [218, "\n"]] | [
"CVE-2010-5332"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 18 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"mlx4_priv",
"be32_to_cpu",
"cpu_to_be32",
"mlx4_set_port_vlan_table",
"mlx4_warn"
],
"Function Argument": [
"dev",
"port",
"vlan",
"index"
],
"Globals": [
"MLX4_VLAN_REGULAR",
"MLX4_MAX_... |
19 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/nvme/target/fc.c | 0c319d3a144d4b8f1ea2047fd614d2149b68f889 | nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> | true | c05ae774ee57b0ad442f8c36f38916df | nvmet_fc_find_target_queue | static struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue *
nvmet_fc_find_target_queue(struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport,
u64 connection_id)
{
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *assoc;
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue *queue;
u64 association_id = nvmet_fc_getassociationid(connection_id);
u16 qid = nvmet_fc_getqueueid(connection_id);
unsigned long fla... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2017-18379"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 20 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"nvmet_fc_getqueueid"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"NVMET_NR_QUEUES"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc",
"struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue"
]
} |
20 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/nvme/target/fc.c | 0c319d3a144d4b8f1ea2047fd614d2149b68f889 | nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> | false | ae5fb548fe28f4fb4cdb0151e82cf8e2 | nvmet_fc_find_target_queue | static struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue *
nvmet_fc_find_target_queue(struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport,
u64 connection_id)
{
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *assoc;
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue *queue;
u64 association_id = nvmet_fc_getassociationid(connection_id);
u16 qid = nvmet_fc_getqueueid(connection_id);
unsigned long fla... | [[786, "\tif (qid > NVMET_NR_QUEUES)\n"], [787, "\t\treturn NULL;\n"], [788, "\n"]] | [[786, "if (qid > NVMET_NR_QUEUES)"], [787, "return NULL;"], [788, "\n"]] | [
"CVE-2017-18379"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 20 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"nvmet_fc_getqueueid"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"NVMET_NR_QUEUES"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc",
"struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue"
]
} |
21 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/ioctl.c | 10eec60ce79187686e052092e5383c99b4420a20 | vfs: ioctl: prevent double-fetch in dedupe ioctl
This prevents a double-fetch from user space that can lead to to an
undersized allocation and heap overflow.
Fixes: 54dbc1517237 ("vfs: hoist the btrfs deduplication ioctl to the vfs")
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <to... | true | 88ed0b07f2f93f508fcb10ea0454b747 | ioctl_file_dedupe_range | static long ioctl_file_dedupe_range(struct file *file, void __user *arg)
{
struct file_dedupe_range __user *argp = arg;
struct file_dedupe_range *same = NULL;
int ret;
unsigned long size;
u16 count;
if (get_user(count, &argp->dest_count)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
size = offsetof(struct file_dedupe_ran... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2016-6516"
] | [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-119"
] | 22 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"get_user",
"memdup_user",
"copy_to_user"
],
"Function Argument": [
"arg"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct file_dedupe_range __user",
"struct file_dedupe_range"
]
} |
22 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/ioctl.c | 10eec60ce79187686e052092e5383c99b4420a20 | vfs: ioctl: prevent double-fetch in dedupe ioctl
This prevents a double-fetch from user space that can lead to to an
undersized allocation and heap overflow.
Fixes: 54dbc1517237 ("vfs: hoist the btrfs deduplication ioctl to the vfs")
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <to... | false | ad737bed6069921506d9ce434712bad7 | ioctl_file_dedupe_range | static long ioctl_file_dedupe_range(struct file *file, void __user *arg)
{
struct file_dedupe_range __user *argp = arg;
struct file_dedupe_range *same = NULL;
int ret;
unsigned long size;
u16 count;
if (get_user(count, &argp->dest_count)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
size = offsetof(struct file_dedupe_ran... | [[593, "\tsame->dest_count = count;\n"]] | [[593, "same->dest_count = count;"]] | [
"CVE-2016-6516"
] | [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-119"
] | 22 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"get_user",
"memdup_user",
"copy_to_user"
],
"Function Argument": [
"arg"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct file_dedupe_range __user",
"struct file_dedupe_range"
]
} |
23 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/ethernet/sunplus/spl2sw_driver.c | 12aece8b01507a2d357a1861f470e83621fbb6f2 | eth: sp7021: fix use after free bug in spl2sw_nvmem_get_mac_address
This frees "mac" and tries to display its address as part of the error
message on the next line. Swap the order.
Fixes: fd3040b9394c ("net: ethernet: Add driver for Sunplus SP7021")
Signed-off-by: Zheng Wang <zyytlz.wz@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David ... | true | edf98bb67e48bc2765e89283212bb2a6 | spl2sw_nvmem_get_mac_address | static int spl2sw_nvmem_get_mac_address(struct device *dev, struct device_node *np,
void *addrbuf)
{
struct nvmem_cell *cell;
ssize_t len;
u8 *mac;
/* Get nvmem cell of mac-address from dts. */
cell = of_nvmem_cell_get(np, "mac-address");
if (IS_ERR(cell))
return PTR_ERR(cell);
/* Read mac address from ... | [[251, "\t\tkfree(mac);\n"]] | [[251, "kfree(mac);"]] | [
"CVE-2022-3541"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 24 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"of_nvmem_cell_get",
"nvmem_cell_read",
"nvmem_cell_put",
"is_valid_ether_addr",
"dev_info"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
24 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/ethernet/sunplus/spl2sw_driver.c | 12aece8b01507a2d357a1861f470e83621fbb6f2 | eth: sp7021: fix use after free bug in spl2sw_nvmem_get_mac_address
This frees "mac" and tries to display its address as part of the error
message on the next line. Swap the order.
Fixes: fd3040b9394c ("net: ethernet: Add driver for Sunplus SP7021")
Signed-off-by: Zheng Wang <zyytlz.wz@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David ... | false | b9422cbb5d31e8e69bf752bd7a6c6ed5 | spl2sw_nvmem_get_mac_address | static int spl2sw_nvmem_get_mac_address(struct device *dev, struct device_node *np,
void *addrbuf)
{
struct nvmem_cell *cell;
ssize_t len;
u8 *mac;
/* Get nvmem cell of mac-address from dts. */
cell = of_nvmem_cell_get(np, "mac-address");
if (IS_ERR(cell))
return PTR_ERR(cell);
/* Read mac address from ... | [[252, "\t\tkfree(mac);\n"]] | [[252, "kfree(mac);"]] | [
"CVE-2022-3541"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 24 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"of_nvmem_cell_get",
"nvmem_cell_read",
"nvmem_cell_put",
"is_valid_ether_addr",
"dev_info"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
25 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/target/loopback/tcm_loop.c | 12f09ccb4612734a53e47ed5302e0479c10a50f8 | loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org> | true | bb10218e4db9527815edd9343f459cff | tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg | struct se_portal_group *tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg(
struct se_wwn *wwn,
struct config_group *group,
const char *name)
{
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba = container_of(wwn,
struct tcm_loop_hba, tl_hba_wwn);
struct tcm_loop_tpg *tl_tpg;
char *tpgt_str, *end_ptr;
int ret;
unsigned short int tpgt;
tpgt_str = strstr(nam... | [[1208, "\tif (tpgt > TL_TPGS_PER_HBA) {\n"]] | [[1208, "if (tpgt > TL_TPGS_PER_HBA)"]] | [
"CVE-2011-5327"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 26 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"TL_TPGS_PER_HBA"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct tcm_loop_hba",
"struct tcm_loop_tpg"
]
} |
26 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/target/loopback/tcm_loop.c | 12f09ccb4612734a53e47ed5302e0479c10a50f8 | loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org> | false | ba9488c551927f9c924adb9bcb8fce29 | tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg | struct se_portal_group *tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg(
struct se_wwn *wwn,
struct config_group *group,
const char *name)
{
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba = container_of(wwn,
struct tcm_loop_hba, tl_hba_wwn);
struct tcm_loop_tpg *tl_tpg;
char *tpgt_str, *end_ptr;
int ret;
unsigned short int tpgt;
tpgt_str = strstr(nam... | [[1208, "\tif (tpgt >= TL_TPGS_PER_HBA) {\n"]] | [[1208, "if (tpgt >= TL_TPGS_PER_HBA)"]] | [
"CVE-2011-5327"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 26 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"TL_TPGS_PER_HBA"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct tcm_loop_hba",
"struct tcm_loop_tpg"
]
} |
27 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c | 13bf9fbff0e5e099e2b6f003a0ab8ae145436309 | nfsd: stricter decoding of write-like NFSv2/v3 ops
The NFSv2/v3 code does not systematically check whether we decode past
the end of the buffer. This generally appears to be harmless, but there
are a few places where we do arithmetic on the pointers involved and
don't account for the possibility that a length could b... | true | 312254bef4649bf3181c0060b93bc490 | nfssvc_decode_writeargs | int
nfssvc_decode_writeargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_writeargs *args)
{
unsigned int len, hdr, dlen;
struct kvec *head = rqstp->rq_arg.head;
int v;
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p++; /* beginoffset */
args->offset = ntohl(*p++); /* offset */
p++; /* totalcou... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2017-7895"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 28 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"decode_fh",
"page_address"
],
"Function Argument": [
"rqstp"
],
"Globals": [
"NFSSVC_MAXBLKSIZE_V2",
"PAGE_SIZE",
"XDR_QUADLEN"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
28 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c | 13bf9fbff0e5e099e2b6f003a0ab8ae145436309 | nfsd: stricter decoding of write-like NFSv2/v3 ops
The NFSv2/v3 code does not systematically check whether we decode past
the end of the buffer. This generally appears to be harmless, but there
are a few places where we do arithmetic on the pointers involved and
don't account for the possibility that a length could b... | false | e0616d42a55dbbc6ea9361716131ed66 | nfssvc_decode_writeargs | int
nfssvc_decode_writeargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_writeargs *args)
{
unsigned int len, hdr, dlen;
struct kvec *head = rqstp->rq_arg.head;
int v;
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p++; /* beginoffset */
args->offset = ntohl(*p++); /* offset */
p++; /* totalcou... | [[305, "\tif (hdr > head->iov_len)\n"], [306, "\t\treturn 0;\n"]] | [[305, "if (hdr > head->iov_len)"], [306, "return 0;"]] | [
"CVE-2017-7895"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 28 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"decode_fh",
"page_address"
],
"Function Argument": [
"rqstp"
],
"Globals": [
"NFSSVC_MAXBLKSIZE_V2",
"PAGE_SIZE",
"XDR_QUADLEN"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
29 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/jbd2/transaction.c | 15291164b22a357cb211b618adfef4fa82fc0de3 | jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a ... | true | 1708a3552db849780aa5aa7df12f8b7a | journal_unmap_buffer | static int journal_unmap_buffer(journal_t *journal, struct buffer_head *bh)
{
transaction_t *transaction;
struct journal_head *jh;
int may_free = 1;
int ret;
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "entry");
/*
* It is safe to proceed here without the j_list_lock because the
* buffers cannot be stolen by try_to_free_buffers as lo... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2011-4086"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 30 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"the ext4 filesystem must be mounted with a journal"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
30 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/jbd2/transaction.c | 15291164b22a357cb211b618adfef4fa82fc0de3 | jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a ... | false | e85e99d5d65ba40f87a83bf83e2677ee | journal_unmap_buffer | static int journal_unmap_buffer(journal_t *journal, struct buffer_head *bh)
{
transaction_t *transaction;
struct journal_head *jh;
int may_free = 1;
int ret;
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "entry");
/*
* It is safe to proceed here without the j_list_lock because the
* buffers cannot be stolen by try_to_free_buffers as lo... | [[1952, "\tclear_buffer_delay(bh);\n"], [1953, "\tclear_buffer_unwritten(bh);\n"]] | [[1952, "clear_buffer_delay(bh);"], [1953, "clear_buffer_unwritten(bh);"]] | [
"CVE-2011-4086"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 30 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"the ext4 filesystem must be mounted with a journal"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
31 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | mm/memory.c | 16ce101db85db694a91380aa4c89b25530871d33 | mm/memory.c: fix race when faulting a device private page
Patch series "Fix several device private page reference counting issues",
v2
This series aims to fix a number of page reference counting issues in
drivers dealing with device private ZONE_DEVICE pages. These result in
use-after-free type bugs, either from acc... | true | 6c3324ccd98e2b9019df7554fdfc4e67 | do_swap_page | vm_fault_t do_swap_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
struct folio *swapcache, *folio = NULL;
struct page *page;
struct swap_info_struct *si = NULL;
rmap_t rmap_flags = RMAP_NONE;
bool exclusive = false;
swp_entry_t entry;
pte_t pte;
int locked;
vm_fault_t ret = 0;
void *shad... | [[3753, "\t\t\tret = vmf->page->pgmap->ops->migrate_to_ram(vmf);\n"]] | [[3753, "ret = vmf->page->pgmap->ops->migrate_to_ram(vmf);"]] | [
"CVE-2022-3523"
] | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-119"
] | 32 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"vmf->page->pgmap->ops->migrate_to_ram"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct vm_fault",
"struct page",
"struct dev_pagemap_ops"
]
} |
32 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | mm/memory.c | 16ce101db85db694a91380aa4c89b25530871d33 | mm/memory.c: fix race when faulting a device private page
Patch series "Fix several device private page reference counting issues",
v2
This series aims to fix a number of page reference counting issues in
drivers dealing with device private ZONE_DEVICE pages. These result in
use-after-free type bugs, either from acc... | false | b2a6dcd0780f4ef35d80208cafe62d51 | do_swap_page | vm_fault_t do_swap_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
struct folio *swapcache, *folio = NULL;
struct page *page;
struct swap_info_struct *si = NULL;
rmap_t rmap_flags = RMAP_NONE;
bool exclusive = false;
swp_entry_t entry;
pte_t pte;
int locked;
vm_fault_t ret = 0;
void *shad... | [[3753, "\t\t\tvmf->pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd,\n"], [3754, "\t\t\t\t\tvmf->address, &vmf->ptl);\n"], [3755, "\t\t\tif (unlikely(!pte_same(*vmf->pte, vmf->orig_pte))) {\n"], [3756, "\t\t\t\tspin_unlock(vmf->ptl);\n"], [3757, "\t\t\t\tgoto out;\n"], [3758, "\t\t\t}\n"], [3759, "\n"], [3760, "\t\t\t/*... | [[3753, "vmf->pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd,\n\t\t\t\t\tvmf->address, &vmf->ptl);"], [3755, "if (unlikely(!pte_same(*vmf->pte, vmf->orig_pte)))"], [3756, "spin_unlock(vmf->ptl);"], [3757, "goto out;"], [3758, "\t\t\t}\n"], [3759, "\n"], [3760, "/*\n\t\t\t * Get a page reference while we know the page c... | [
"CVE-2022-3523"
] | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-119"
] | 32 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"vmf->page->pgmap->ops->migrate_to_ram"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct vm_fault",
"struct page",
"struct dev_pagemap_ops"
]
} |
33 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 179d1c5602997fef5a940c6ddcf31212cbfebd14 | bpf: don't prune branches when a scalar is replaced with a pointer
This could be made safe by passing through a reference to env and checking
for env->allow_ptr_leaks, but it would only work one way and is probably
not worth the hassle - not doing it will not directly lead to program
rejection.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("... | true | efa1225f12ed754b1dcae072082ed9ca | regsafe | static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
struct idpair *idmap)
{
if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ))
/* explored state didn't use this */
return true;
if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, live)) == 0)
return true;
if (rold->type == NOT_INIT)
/* explo... | [[3470, "\t\t\t/* if we knew anything about the old value, we're not\n"], [3471, "\t\t\t * equal, because we can't know anything about the\n"], [3472, "\t\t\t * scalar value of the pointer in the new value.\n"], [3474, "\t\t\treturn rold->umin_value == 0 &&\n"], [3475, "\t\t\t rold->umax_value == U64_MAX &&\n"], ... | [[3470, "/* if we knew anything about the old value, we're not\n\t\t\t * equal, because we can't know anything about the\n\t\t\t * scalar value of the pointer in the new value.\n\t\t\t */"], [3474, "return rold->umin_value == 0 &&\n\t\t\t rold->umax_value == U64_MAX &&\n\t\t\t rold->smin_value == S64_MIN &&... | [
"CVE-2017-17855"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 34 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"tnum_is_unknown"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"U64_MAX",
"S64_MIN"
]
} |
34 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 179d1c5602997fef5a940c6ddcf31212cbfebd14 | bpf: don't prune branches when a scalar is replaced with a pointer
This could be made safe by passing through a reference to env and checking
for env->allow_ptr_leaks, but it would only work one way and is probably
not worth the hassle - not doing it will not directly lead to program
rejection.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("... | false | 5f6d745208838c9654712c9620472a78 | regsafe | static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
struct idpair *idmap)
{
if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ))
/* explored state didn't use this */
return true;
if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, live)) == 0)
return true;
if (rold->type == NOT_INIT)
/* explo... | [[3470, "\t\t\t/* We're trying to use a pointer in place of a scalar.\n"], [3471, "\t\t\t * Even if the scalar was unbounded, this could lead to\n"], [3472, "\t\t\t * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak\n"], [3473, "\t\t\t * while pointers are not. We could make this safe in\n"], [3474, "\t\t\t * special ... | [[3470, "/* We're trying to use a pointer in place of a scalar.\n\t\t\t * Even if the scalar was unbounded, this could lead to\n\t\t\t * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak\n\t\t\t * while pointers are not. We could make this safe in\n\t\t\t * special cases if root is calling us, but it's\n\t\t\t * probab... | [
"CVE-2017-17855"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 34 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"tnum_is_unknown"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"U64_MAX",
"S64_MIN"
]
} |
35 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_ppe.c | 17a5f6a78dc7b8db385de346092d7d9f9dc24df6 | net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: use after free in __mtk_ppe_check_skb()
The __mtk_foe_entry_clear() function frees "entry" so we have to use
the _safe() version of hlist_for_each_entry() to prevent a use after
free.
Fixes: 33fc42de3327 ("net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: support creating mac address based offload entries")
Sig... | true | 854ecd98b68ec4fcd7d7f1340b7fa1f0 | __mtk_ppe_check_skb | void __mtk_ppe_check_skb(struct mtk_ppe *ppe, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 hash)
{
struct hlist_head *head = &ppe->foe_flow[hash / 2];
struct mtk_foe_entry *hwe = &ppe->foe_table[hash];
struct mtk_flow_entry *entry;
struct mtk_foe_bridge key = {};
struct ethhdr *eh;
bool found = false;
u8 *tag;
spin_lock_bh(&ppe_l... | [[612, "\thlist_for_each_entry(entry, head, list) {\n"]] | [[612, "\thlist_for_each_entry(entry, head, list) {\n"]] | [
"CVE-2022-3636"
] | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-119"
] | 36 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"__mtk_foe_entry_clear"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
36 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_ppe.c | 17a5f6a78dc7b8db385de346092d7d9f9dc24df6 | net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: use after free in __mtk_ppe_check_skb()
The __mtk_foe_entry_clear() function frees "entry" so we have to use
the _safe() version of hlist_for_each_entry() to prevent a use after
free.
Fixes: 33fc42de3327 ("net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: support creating mac address based offload entries")
Sig... | false | 0eab16ac49e9ae77017812443475b94a | __mtk_ppe_check_skb | void __mtk_ppe_check_skb(struct mtk_ppe *ppe, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 hash)
{
struct hlist_head *head = &ppe->foe_flow[hash / 2];
struct mtk_foe_entry *hwe = &ppe->foe_table[hash];
struct mtk_flow_entry *entry;
struct mtk_foe_bridge key = {};
struct hlist_node *n;
struct ethhdr *eh;
bool found = false;
u8 *tag... | [[603, "\tstruct hlist_node *n;\n"], [613, "\thlist_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, head, list) {\n"]] | [[603, "struct hlist_node *n;"], [613, "\thlist_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, head, list) {\n"]] | [
"CVE-2022-3636"
] | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-119"
] | 36 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"__mtk_foe_entry_clear"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
37 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/mtd/spi-nor/cadence-quadspi.c | 193e87143c290ec16838f5368adc0e0bc94eb931 | mtd: spi-nor: Off by one in cqspi_setup_flash()
There are CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT elements in the ->f_pdata array so the >
should be >=.
Fixes: 140623410536 ('mtd: spi-nor: Add driver for Cadence Quad SPI Flash Controller')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
... | true | 0b477c06c2026d64a183015547046464 | cqspi_setup_flash | static int cqspi_setup_flash(struct cqspi_st *cqspi, struct device_node *np)
{
struct platform_device *pdev = cqspi->pdev;
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
struct cqspi_flash_pdata *f_pdata;
struct spi_nor *nor;
struct mtd_info *mtd;
unsigned int cs;
int i, ret;
/* Get flash device data */
for_each_available_... | [[1085, "\t\tif (cs > CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT) {\n"]] | [[1085, "if (cs > CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT)"]] | [
"CVE-2016-10764"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 38 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct cqspi_st"
]
} |
38 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/mtd/spi-nor/cadence-quadspi.c | 193e87143c290ec16838f5368adc0e0bc94eb931 | mtd: spi-nor: Off by one in cqspi_setup_flash()
There are CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT elements in the ->f_pdata array so the >
should be >=.
Fixes: 140623410536 ('mtd: spi-nor: Add driver for Cadence Quad SPI Flash Controller')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
... | false | 189ced77266d4818ff184322a3931409 | cqspi_setup_flash | static int cqspi_setup_flash(struct cqspi_st *cqspi, struct device_node *np)
{
struct platform_device *pdev = cqspi->pdev;
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
struct cqspi_flash_pdata *f_pdata;
struct spi_nor *nor;
struct mtd_info *mtd;
unsigned int cs;
int i, ret;
/* Get flash device data */
for_each_available_... | [[1085, "\t\tif (cs >= CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT) {\n"]] | [[1085, "if (cs >= CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT)"]] | [
"CVE-2016-10764"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 38 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct cqspi_st"
]
} |
39 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/udf/super.c | 1df2ae31c724e57be9d7ac00d78db8a5dabdd050 | udf: Fortify loading of sparing table
Add sanity checks when loading sparing table from disk to avoid accessing
unallocated memory or writing to it.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> | true | b247c8b050141105ac9dbfe5e55b7bfd | udf_load_logicalvol | static int udf_load_logicalvol(struct super_block *sb, sector_t block,
struct kernel_lb_addr *fileset)
{
struct logicalVolDesc *lvd;
int i, j, offset;
uint8_t type;
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb);
struct genericPartitionMap *gpm;
uint16_t ident;
struct buffer_head *bh;
unsigned int table_len;
i... | [[1222, "\tint i, j, offset;\n"], [1284, "\t\t\t\tuint32_t loc;\n"], [1285, "\t\t\t\tstruct sparingTable *st;\n"], [1286, "\t\t\t\tstruct sparablePartitionMap *spm =\n"], [1287, "\t\t\t\t\t(struct sparablePartitionMap *)gpm;\n"], [1288, "\n"], [1289, "\t\t\t\tmap->s_partition_type = UDF_SPARABLE_MAP15;\n"], [1290, "\t\... | [[1222, "int i, j, offset;"], [1284, "uint32_t loc;"], [1285, "struct sparingTable *st;"], [1286, "struct sparablePartitionMap *spm =\n\t\t\t\t\t(struct sparablePartitionMap *)gpm;"], [1288, "\n"], [1289, "map->s_partition_type = UDF_SPARABLE_MAP15;"], [1290, "map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.s_packet_len =\n\t\t\t\t\t\t... | [
"CVE-2012-3400"
] | [
"CWE-787"
] | 40 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"udf_read_tagged"
],
"Function Argument": [
"sb"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
40 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | fs/udf/super.c | 1df2ae31c724e57be9d7ac00d78db8a5dabdd050 | udf: Fortify loading of sparing table
Add sanity checks when loading sparing table from disk to avoid accessing
unallocated memory or writing to it.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> | false | e02f163864e3bca32c2530599656b6e9 | udf_load_logicalvol | static int udf_load_logicalvol(struct super_block *sb, sector_t block,
struct kernel_lb_addr *fileset)
{
struct logicalVolDesc *lvd;
int i, offset;
uint8_t type;
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb);
struct genericPartitionMap *gpm;
uint16_t ident;
struct buffer_head *bh;
unsigned int table_len;
int ... | [[1271, "\tint i, offset;\n"], [1333, "\t\t\t\tif (udf_load_sparable_map(sb, map,\n"], [1334, "\t\t\t\t (struct sparablePartitionMap *)gpm) < 0)\n"], [1335, "\t\t\t\t\tgoto out_bh;\n"]] | [[1271, "int i, offset;"], [1333, "if (udf_load_sparable_map(sb, map,\n\t\t\t\t (struct sparablePartitionMap *)gpm) < 0)"], [1335, "goto out_bh;"]] | [
"CVE-2012-3400"
] | [
"CWE-787"
] | 40 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"udf_read_tagged"
],
"Function Argument": [
"sb"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
41 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | mm/hugetlb.c | 1e3921471354244f70fe268586ff94a97a6dd4df | userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x18... | true | 4cfc89b5450fdc127cd532d6296ec224 | hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte | int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm,
pte_t *dst_pte,
struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma,
unsigned long dst_addr,
unsigned long src_addr,
struct page **pagep)
{
int vm_shared = dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED;
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(dst_vma);
pte_t _dst_pte;
spin... | [[4028, "\t\tstruct address_space *mapping = dst_vma->vm_file->f_mapping;\n"], [4029, "\t\tpgoff_t idx = vma_hugecache_offset(h, dst_vma, dst_addr);\n"]] | [[4028, "struct address_space *mapping = dst_vma->vm_file->f_mapping;"], [4029, "pgoff_t idx = vma_hugecache_offset(h, dst_vma, dst_addr);"]] | [
"CVE-2017-15128"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 42 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"vma_hugecache_offset",
"i_size_read",
"huge_page_shift"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
42 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | mm/hugetlb.c | 1e3921471354244f70fe268586ff94a97a6dd4df | userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x18... | false | 0074ab9caf4d6acfdfd6c7aa2e999b42 | hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte | int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm,
pte_t *dst_pte,
struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma,
unsigned long dst_addr,
unsigned long src_addr,
struct page **pagep)
{
struct address_space *mapping;
pgoff_t idx;
unsigned long size;
int vm_shared = dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHAR... | [[3987, "\tstruct address_space *mapping;\n"], [3988, "\tpgoff_t idx;\n"], [3989, "\tunsigned long size;\n"], [4027, "\tmapping = dst_vma->vm_file->f_mapping;\n"], [4028, "\tidx = vma_hugecache_offset(h, dst_vma, dst_addr);\n"], [4029, "\n"], [4034, "\t\tsize = i_size_read(mapping->host) >> huge_page_shift(h);\n"], [40... | [[3987, "struct address_space *mapping;"], [3988, "pgoff_t idx;"], [3989, "unsigned long size;"], [4027, "mapping = dst_vma->vm_file->f_mapping;"], [4028, "idx = vma_hugecache_offset(h, dst_vma, dst_addr);"], [4029, "\n"], [4034, "size = i_size_read(mapping->host) >> huge_page_shift(h);"], [4035, "ret = -EFAULT;"], [40... | [
"CVE-2017-15128"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 42 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"vma_hugecache_offset",
"i_size_read",
"huge_page_shift"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
43 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | arch/um/kernel/exitcode.c | 201f99f170df14ba52ea4c52847779042b7a623b | uml: check length in exitcode_proc_write()
We don't cap the size of buffer from the user so we could write past the
end of the array here. Only root can write to this file.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
... | true | 7328e354f5509ce7bd2b4b7485e9bd59 | exitcode_proc_write | static ssize_t exitcode_proc_write(struct file *file,
const char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
{
char *end, buf[sizeof("nnnnn\0")];
int tmp;
if (copy_from_user(buf, buffer, count))
return -EFAULT;
tmp = simple_strtol(buf, &end, 0);
if ((*end != '\0') && !isspace(*end))
return -EINVAL;
uml_ex... | [[45, "\tif (copy_from_user(buf, buffer, count))\n"]] | [[45, "if (copy_from_user(buf, buffer, count))"]] | [
"CVE-2013-4512"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 44 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
44 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | arch/um/kernel/exitcode.c | 201f99f170df14ba52ea4c52847779042b7a623b | uml: check length in exitcode_proc_write()
We don't cap the size of buffer from the user so we could write past the
end of the array here. Only root can write to this file.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
... | false | 6638d3a83d07900c8f306ab882a3e827 | exitcode_proc_write | static ssize_t exitcode_proc_write(struct file *file,
const char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
{
char *end, buf[sizeof("nnnnn\0")];
size_t size;
int tmp;
size = min(count, sizeof(buf));
if (copy_from_user(buf, buffer, size))
return -EFAULT;
tmp = simple_strtol(buf, &end, 0);
if ((*end != '\0')... | [[43, "\tsize_t size;\n"], [46, "\tsize = min(count, sizeof(buf));\n"], [47, "\tif (copy_from_user(buf, buffer, size))\n"]] | [[43, "size_t size;"], [46, "size = min(count, sizeof(buf));"], [47, "if (copy_from_user(buf, buffer, size))"]] | [
"CVE-2013-4512"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 44 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
45 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 22c7fa171a02d310e3a3f6ed46a698ca8a0060ed | bpf: Reject variable offset alu on PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS
For PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS, check_flow_keys_access() only uses fixed off
for validation. However, variable offset ptr alu is not prohibited
for this ptr kind. So the variable offset is not checked.
The following prog is accepted:
func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
0: (b... | true | 6baddb16d0d1405bbb7b352baeb779ce | adjust_ptr_min_max_vals | static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
struct bpf_reg_s... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2024-26589"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 46 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"base_type",
"check_flow_keys_access"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS"
]
} |
46 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 22c7fa171a02d310e3a3f6ed46a698ca8a0060ed | bpf: Reject variable offset alu on PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS
For PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS, check_flow_keys_access() only uses fixed off
for validation. However, variable offset ptr alu is not prohibited
for this ptr kind. So the variable offset is not checked.
The following prog is accepted:
func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
0: (b... | false | cfdd482284e53513277e2607d71373e7 | adjust_ptr_min_max_vals | static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
struct bpf_reg_s... | [[12829, "\tcase PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:\n"], [12830, "\t\tif (known)\n"], [12831, "\t\t\tbreak;\n"], [12832, "\t\tfallthrough;\n"]] | [[12829, "case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:"], [12830, "if (known)"], [12831, "break;"], [12832, "fallthrough;"]] | [
"CVE-2024-26589"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 46 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"base_type",
"check_flow_keys_access"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS"
]
} |
47 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/core/skbuff.c | 23d05d563b7e7b0314e65c8e882bc27eac2da8e7 | net: prevent mss overflow in skb_segment()
Once again syzbot is able to crash the kernel in skb_segment() [1]
GSO_BY_FRAGS is a forbidden value, but unfortunately the following
computation in skb_segment() can reach it quite easily :
mss = mss * partial_segs;
65535 = 3 * 5 * 17 * 257, so many initial values of mss... | true | f4a6beb6c8f04d99adc7754ff5a865bc | skb_segment | struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = NULL;
struct sk_buff *tail = NULL;
struct sk_buff *list_skb = skb_shinfo(head_skb)->frag_list;
unsigned int mss = skb_shinfo(head_skb)->gso_size;
unsigned int doffset = head_skb->data - skb_mac_header(... | [[4526, "\t\tpartial_segs = len / mss;\n"]] | [[4526, "partial_segs = len / mss;"]] | [
"CVE-2023-52435"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 48 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"GSO_BY_FRAGS"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
48 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/core/skbuff.c | 23d05d563b7e7b0314e65c8e882bc27eac2da8e7 | net: prevent mss overflow in skb_segment()
Once again syzbot is able to crash the kernel in skb_segment() [1]
GSO_BY_FRAGS is a forbidden value, but unfortunately the following
computation in skb_segment() can reach it quite easily :
mss = mss * partial_segs;
65535 = 3 * 5 * 17 * 257, so many initial values of mss... | false | 70d5997a37d55526b7145ec1ac92a699 | skb_segment | struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = NULL;
struct sk_buff *tail = NULL;
struct sk_buff *list_skb = skb_shinfo(head_skb)->frag_list;
unsigned int mss = skb_shinfo(head_skb)->gso_size;
unsigned int doffset = head_skb->data - skb_mac_header(... | [[4525, "\t\t * Cap len to not accidentally hit GSO_BY_FRAGS.\n"], [4527, "\t\tpartial_segs = min(len, GSO_BY_FRAGS - 1) / mss;\n"]] | [[4522, "/* GSO partial only requires that we trim off any excess that\n\t\t * doesn't fit into an MSS sized block, so take care of that\n\t\t * now.\n\t\t * Cap len to not accidentally hit GSO_BY_FRAGS.\n\t\t */"], [4527, "partial_segs = min(len, GSO_BY_FRAGS - 1) / mss;"]] | [
"CVE-2023-52435"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 48 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"GSO_BY_FRAGS"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
49 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47 | ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO
In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the alread... | true | b3f215a3ecde0c9ee380b673673eb026 | ip6_ufo_append_data | static inline int ip6_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int mtu,unsigned int flags,
struct rt6_info *rt)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* The... | [[1039, "\t}\n"], [1040, "\n"], [1041, "\terr = skb_append_datato_frags(sk,skb, getfrag, from,\n"], [1042, "\t\t\t\t (length - transhdrlen));\n"], [1043, "\tif (!err) {\n"], [1044, "\t\tstruct frag_hdr fhdr;\n"], [1055, "\n"], [1056, "\t\treturn 0;\n"], [1058, "\t/* There is not enough support do UPD LSO,\n"], [10... | [[1039, "\t}\n"], [1040, "\n"], [1041, "err = skb_append_datato_frags(sk,skb, getfrag, from,\n\t\t\t\t (length - transhdrlen));"], [1043, "if (!err)"], [1044, "struct frag_hdr fhdr;"], [1055, "\n"], [1056, "return 0;"], [1058, "/* There is not enough support do UPD LSO,\n\t * so follow normal path\n\t */"], [1061,... | [
"CVE-2013-4387"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 51 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"skb_peek_tail",
"sock_alloc_send_skb",
"skb_reserve",
"skb_put",
"skb_reset_network_header",
"skb_append_datato_frags",
"ipv6_select_ident"
],
"Function Argument": [
"sk",
"getfrag",
"from",
... |
50 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47 | ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO
In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the alread... | true | 0d93ed0dca48b146b6caaa5774fe9256 | ip6_append_data | int ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, int getfrag(void *from, char *to,
int offset, int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int transhdrlen,
int hlimit, int tclass, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt, struct flowi6 *fl6,
struct rt6_info *rt, unsigned int flags, int dontfrag)
{
struct inet_sock *inet... | [[1230, "\tcork->length += length;\n"], [1231, "\tif (length > mtu) {\n"], [1232, "\t\tint proto = sk->sk_protocol;\n"], [1233, "\t\tif (dontfrag && (proto == IPPROTO_UDP || proto == IPPROTO_RAW)){\n"], [1234, "\t\t\tipv6_local_rxpmtu(sk, fl6, mtu-exthdrlen);\n"], [1235, "\t\t\treturn -EMSGSIZE;\n"], [1236, "\t\t}\n"],... | [[1230, "cork->length += length;"], [1231, "if (length > mtu)"], [1232, "int proto = sk->sk_protocol;"], [1233, "if (dontfrag && (proto == IPPROTO_UDP || proto == IPPROTO_RAW))"], [1234, "ipv6_local_rxpmtu(sk, fl6, mtu-exthdrlen);"], [1235, "return -EMSGSIZE;"], [1236, "\t\t}\n"], [1237, "\n"], [1238, "if (proto == IPP... | [
"CVE-2013-4387"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 52 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"skb_is_gso",
"ip6_ufo_append_data",
"skb_peek_tail"
],
"Function Argument": [
"struct sock *sk",
"struct ipv6_txoptions *opt",
"struct flowi6 *fl6",
"struct rt6_info *rt",
"int dontfrag"
],
"Globals... |
51 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47 | ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO
In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the alread... | false | ff07229fc5a6a24a8c1fd54c05d03321 | ip6_ufo_append_data | static inline int ip6_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int mtu,unsigned int flags,
struct rt6_info *rt)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* The... | [[1018, "\t\tstruct frag_hdr fhdr;\n"], [1019, "\n"], [1053, "\treturn skb_append_datato_frags(sk, skb, getfrag, from,\n"], [1054, "\t\t\t\t (length - transhdrlen));\n"]] | [[1018, "struct frag_hdr fhdr;"], [1019, "\n"], [1053, "return skb_append_datato_frags(sk, skb, getfrag, from,\n\t\t\t\t (length - transhdrlen));"]] | [
"CVE-2013-4387"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 51 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"skb_peek_tail",
"sock_alloc_send_skb",
"skb_reserve",
"skb_put",
"skb_reset_network_header",
"skb_append_datato_frags",
"ipv6_select_ident"
],
"Function Argument": [
"sk",
"getfrag",
"from",
... |
52 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47 | ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO
In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the alread... | false | d8548966db5ac5d31cb35aca029bc88c | ip6_append_data | int ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, int getfrag(void *from, char *to,
int offset, int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int transhdrlen,
int hlimit, int tclass, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt, struct flowi6 *fl6,
struct rt6_info *rt, unsigned int flags, int dontfrag)
{
struct inet_sock *inet... | [[1221, "\tif ((length > mtu) && dontfrag && (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP ||\n"], [1222, "\t\t\t\t\t sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_RAW)) {\n"], [1223, "\t\tipv6_local_rxpmtu(sk, fl6, mtu-exthdrlen);\n"], [1224, "\t\treturn -EMSGSIZE;\n"], [1225, "\t}\n"], [1227, "\tskb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue);\n"], [1228... | [[1221, "if ((length > mtu) && dontfrag && (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP ||\n\t\t\t\t\t sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_RAW))"], [1223, "ipv6_local_rxpmtu(sk, fl6, mtu-exthdrlen);"], [1224, "return -EMSGSIZE;"], [1225, "\t}\n"], [1227, "skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue);"], [1228, "cork->length += length;"], [122... | [
"CVE-2013-4387"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 52 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"skb_is_gso",
"ip6_ufo_append_data",
"skb_peek_tail"
],
"Function Argument": [
"struct sock *sk",
"struct ipv6_txoptions *opt",
"struct flowi6 *fl6",
"struct rt6_info *rt",
"int dontfrag"
],
"Globals... |
53 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 281d464a34f540de166cee74b723e97ac2515ec3 | bpf: Fix DEVMAP_HASH overflow check on 32-bit arches
The devmap code allocates a number hash buckets equal to the next power
of two of the max_entries value provided when creating the map. When
rounding up to the next power of two, the 32-bit variable storing the
number of buckets can overflow, and the code checks for... | true | 5ccca320aeb25f8c7892ddc54d010fe5 | dev_map_init_map | static int dev_map_init_map(struct bpf_dtab *dtab, union bpf_attr *attr)
{
u32 valsize = attr->value_size;
/* check sanity of attributes. 2 value sizes supported:
* 4 bytes: ifindex
* 8 bytes: ifindex + prog fd
*/
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
(valsize != offsetofend(struct bpf_dev... | [[133, "\t\tdtab->n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(dtab->map.max_entries);\n"], [134, "\n"], [135, "\t\tif (!dtab->n_buckets) /* Overflow check */\n"], [137, "\t}\n"], [139, "\tif (attr->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH) {\n"]] | [[133, "dtab->n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(dtab->map.max_entries);"], [134, "\n"], [135, "if (!dtab->n_buckets) /* Overflow check */"], [137, "\t}\n"], [139, "if (attr->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH)"]] | [
"CVE-2024-26885"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 54 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"Size of unsigned long on the target architecture (32-bit vs 64-bit)"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"roundup_pow_of_two"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
54 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 281d464a34f540de166cee74b723e97ac2515ec3 | bpf: Fix DEVMAP_HASH overflow check on 32-bit arches
The devmap code allocates a number hash buckets equal to the next power
of two of the max_entries value provided when creating the map. When
rounding up to the next power of two, the 32-bit variable storing the
number of buckets can overflow, and the code checks for... | false | e8f9ecae3cc00ea898e1a067d4768776 | dev_map_init_map | static int dev_map_init_map(struct bpf_dtab *dtab, union bpf_attr *attr)
{
u32 valsize = attr->value_size;
/* check sanity of attributes. 2 value sizes supported:
* 4 bytes: ifindex
* 8 bytes: ifindex + prog fd
*/
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
(valsize != offsetofend(struct bpf_dev... | [[133, "\t\t/* hash table size must be power of 2; roundup_pow_of_two() can\n"], [134, "\t\t * overflow into UB on 32-bit arches, so check that first\n"], [135, "\t\t */\n"], [136, "\t\tif (dtab->map.max_entries > 1UL << 31)\n"], [139, "\t\tdtab->n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(dtab->map.max_entries);\n"], [140, "\n"]] | [[133, "/* hash table size must be power of 2; roundup_pow_of_two() can\n\t\t * overflow into UB on 32-bit arches, so check that first\n\t\t */"], [136, "if (dtab->map.max_entries > 1UL << 31)"], [139, "dtab->n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(dtab->map.max_entries);"], [140, "\n"]] | [
"CVE-2024-26885"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 54 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"Size of unsigned long on the target architecture (32-bit vs 64-bit)"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"roundup_pow_of_two"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
55 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c | 2a2f11c227bdf292b3a2900ad04139d301b56ac4 | NetLabel: correct CIPSO tag handling when adding new DOI definitions
The current netlbl_cipsov4_add_common() function has two problems which are
fixed with this patch. The first is an off-by-one bug where it is possibile to
overflow the doi_def->tags[] array. The second is a bug where the same
doi_def->tags[] array ... | true | 4c9fd8131014712f7144f68bd5c6ddd7 | netlbl_cipsov4_add_common | static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_common(struct genl_info *info,
struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def)
{
struct nlattr *nla;
int nla_rem;
u32 iter = 0;
doi_def->doi = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI]);
if (nla_validate_nested(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAGLST],
NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MAX,
netlbl_cipsov4_... | [[133, "\t\t\tif (iter > CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)\n"], [137, "\tif (iter < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)\n"], [138, "\t\tdoi_def->tags[iter] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID;\n"]] | [[133, "if (iter > CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)"], [137, "if (iter < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)"], [138, "doi_def->tags[iter] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID;"]] | [
"CVE-2007-6762"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 56 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def"
],
"Globals": [
"CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct cipso_v4_doi"
]
} |
56 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c | 2a2f11c227bdf292b3a2900ad04139d301b56ac4 | NetLabel: correct CIPSO tag handling when adding new DOI definitions
The current netlbl_cipsov4_add_common() function has two problems which are
fixed with this patch. The first is an off-by-one bug where it is possibile to
overflow the doi_def->tags[] array. The second is a bug where the same
doi_def->tags[] array ... | false | d04467fa7dd237b22455c6cb93a5f448 | netlbl_cipsov4_add_common | static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_common(struct genl_info *info,
struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def)
{
struct nlattr *nla;
int nla_rem;
u32 iter = 0;
doi_def->doi = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI]);
if (nla_validate_nested(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAGLST],
NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MAX,
netlbl_cipsov4_... | [[133, "\t\t\tif (iter >= CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)\n"], [137, "\twhile (iter < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)\n"], [138, "\t\tdoi_def->tags[iter++] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID;\n"]] | [[133, "if (iter >= CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)"], [137, "while (iter < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)"], [138, "doi_def->tags[iter++] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID;"]] | [
"CVE-2007-6762"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 56 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def"
],
"Globals": [
"CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct cipso_v4_doi"
]
} |
57 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/packet/af_packet.c | 2b6867c2ce76c596676bec7d2d525af525fdc6e2 | net/packet: fix overflow in check for priv area size
Subtracting tp_sizeof_priv from tp_block_size and casting to int
to check whether one is less then the other doesn't always work
(both of them are unsigned ints).
Compare them as is instead.
Also cast tp_sizeof_priv to u64 before using BLK_PLUS_PRIV, as
it can ove... | true | 444a6ab864c27b2bc29b69291705f480 | packet_set_ring | static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
int closing, int tx_ring)
{
struct pgv *pg_vec = NULL;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
int was_running, order = 0;
struct packet_ring_buffer *rb;
struct sk_buff_head *rb_queue;
__be16 num;
int err = -EINVAL;
/* Added to avoid minimal... | [[4196, "\t\t (int)(req->tp_block_size -\n"], [4197, "\t\t\t BLK_PLUS_PRIV(req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv)) <= 0)\n"]] | [[4195, "if (po->tp_version >= TPACKET_V3 &&\n\t\t (int)(req->tp_block_size -\n\t\t\t BLK_PLUS_PRIV(req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv)) <= 0)"]] | [
"CVE-2017-7308"
] | [
"CWE-787"
] | 58 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"BLK_PLUS_PRIV"
],
"Function Argument": [
"req_u"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
58 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | net/packet/af_packet.c | 2b6867c2ce76c596676bec7d2d525af525fdc6e2 | net/packet: fix overflow in check for priv area size
Subtracting tp_sizeof_priv from tp_block_size and casting to int
to check whether one is less then the other doesn't always work
(both of them are unsigned ints).
Compare them as is instead.
Also cast tp_sizeof_priv to u64 before using BLK_PLUS_PRIV, as
it can ove... | false | d6c8f0d1d148fbd942e8b6aa7987ec8f | packet_set_ring | static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
int closing, int tx_ring)
{
struct pgv *pg_vec = NULL;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
int was_running, order = 0;
struct packet_ring_buffer *rb;
struct sk_buff_head *rb_queue;
__be16 num;
int err = -EINVAL;
/* Added to avoid minimal... | [[4196, "\t\t req->tp_block_size <=\n"], [4197, "\t\t\t BLK_PLUS_PRIV((u64)req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv))\n"]] | [[4195, "if (po->tp_version >= TPACKET_V3 &&\n\t\t req->tp_block_size <=\n\t\t\t BLK_PLUS_PRIV((u64)req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv))"]] | [
"CVE-2017-7308"
] | [
"CWE-787"
] | 58 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"BLK_PLUS_PRIV"
],
"Function Argument": [
"req_u"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
59 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/usb/catc.c | 2d6a0e9de03ee658a9adc3bfb2f0ca55dff1e478 | catc: Use heap buffer for memory size test
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | true | 22f939f3ee45d3ab7a523cf5b27ed1f2 | catc_probe | static int catc_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct device *dev = &intf->dev;
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
struct net_device *netdev;
struct catc *catc;
u8 broadcast[ETH_ALEN];
int i, pktsz, ret;
if (usb_set_interface(usbdev,
intf->altsetting->... | [[779, "\tint i, pktsz, ret;\n"], [845, "\t\ti = 0x12345678;\n"], [846, "\t\tcatc_write_mem(catc, 0x7a80, &i, 4);\n"], [847, "\t\ti = 0x87654321;\t\n"], [848, "\t\tcatc_write_mem(catc, 0xfa80, &i, 4);\n"], [849, "\t\tcatc_read_mem(catc, 0x7a80, &i, 4);\n"], [851, "\t\tswitch (i) {\n"]] | [[779, "int i, pktsz, ret;"], [845, "i = 0x12345678;"], [846, "catc_write_mem(catc, 0x7a80, &i, 4);"], [847, "i = 0x87654321;"], [848, "catc_write_mem(catc, 0xfa80, &i, 4);"], [849, "catc_read_mem(catc, 0x7a80, &i, 4);"], [851, "switch (i) {"]] | [
"CVE-2017-8070"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 60 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"CONFIG_VMAP_STACK"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"catc_write_mem",
"catc_read_mem"
],
"Function Argument": [
"struct usb_interface *intf",
"const struct usb_device_id *id"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
60 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/usb/catc.c | 2d6a0e9de03ee658a9adc3bfb2f0ca55dff1e478 | catc: Use heap buffer for memory size test
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | false | f4d160e73f9201211d263585dd4f503c | catc_probe | static int catc_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct device *dev = &intf->dev;
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
struct net_device *netdev;
struct catc *catc;
u8 broadcast[ETH_ALEN];
int pktsz, ret;
if (usb_set_interface(usbdev,
intf->altsetting->des... | [[779, "\tint pktsz, ret;\n"], [843, "\t\tu32 *buf;\n"], [844, "\t\tint i;\n"], [845, "\n"], [848, "\t\tbuf = kmalloc(4, GFP_KERNEL);\n"], [849, "\t\tif (!buf) {\n"], [850, "\t\t\tret = -ENOMEM;\n"], [851, "\t\t\tgoto fail_free;\n"], [852, "\t\t}\n"], [853, "\n"], [854, "\t\t*buf = 0x12345678;\n"], [855, "\t\tcatc_writ... | [[779, "int pktsz, ret;"], [843, "u32 *buf;"], [844, "int i;"], [845, "\n"], [848, "buf = kmalloc(4, GFP_KERNEL);"], [849, "if (!buf)"], [850, "ret = -ENOMEM;"], [851, "goto fail_free;"], [852, "\t\t}\n"], [853, "\n"], [854, "*buf = 0x12345678;"], [855, "catc_write_mem(catc, 0x7a80, buf, 4);"], [856, "*buf = 0x87654321... | [
"CVE-2017-8070"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 60 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"CONFIG_VMAP_STACK"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"catc_write_mem",
"catc_read_mem"
],
"Function Argument": [
"struct usb_interface *intf",
"const struct usb_device_id *id"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
61 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/iwl-agn-sta.c | 2da424b0773cea3db47e1e81db71eeebde8269d4 | iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but ... | true | 9ad2deb6b4d8a8bc03cf87ed9776a3b6 | iwl_sta_ucode_activate | static void iwl_sta_ucode_activate(struct iwl_priv *priv, u8 sta_id)
{
if (!(priv->stations[sta_id].used & IWL_STA_DRIVER_ACTIVE))
IWL_ERR(priv, "ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id %u "
"addr %pM\n",
sta_id, priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.addr);
if (priv->stations[sta_id].used & IWL_STA_UCODE_ACTIVE) {... | [[38, "static void iwl_sta_ucode_activate(struct iwl_priv *priv, u8 sta_id)\n"], [40, "\n"]] | [[38, "static void iwl_sta_ucode_activate(struct iwl_priv *priv, u8 sta_id)"], [40, "\n"]] | [
"CVE-2012-6712"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 62 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"IWLAGN_STATION_COUNT"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct iwl_priv",
"IWL_STA_DRIVER_ACTIVE",
"IWL_STA_UCODE_ACTIVE"
]
} |
62 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/iwl-agn-sta.c | 2da424b0773cea3db47e1e81db71eeebde8269d4 | iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but ... | false | 4fe4f98d31c4ee36521adc11f4aa90ea | iwl_sta_ucode_activate | static int iwl_sta_ucode_activate(struct iwl_priv *priv, u8 sta_id)
{
if (sta_id >= IWLAGN_STATION_COUNT) {
IWL_ERR(priv, "invalid sta_id %u", sta_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(priv->stations[sta_id].used & IWL_STA_DRIVER_ACTIVE))
IWL_ERR(priv, "ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id %u "
"addr %pM\n",
s... | [[38, "static int iwl_sta_ucode_activate(struct iwl_priv *priv, u8 sta_id)\n"], [40, "\tif (sta_id >= IWLAGN_STATION_COUNT) {\n"], [41, "\t\tIWL_ERR(priv, \"invalid sta_id %u\", sta_id);\n"], [42, "\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n"], [43, "\t}\n"], [59, "\treturn 0;\n"]] | [[38, "static int iwl_sta_ucode_activate(struct iwl_priv *priv, u8 sta_id)"], [40, "if (sta_id >= IWLAGN_STATION_COUNT)"], [41, "IWL_ERR(priv, \"invalid sta_id %u\", sta_id);"], [42, "return -EINVAL;"], [43, "\t}\n"], [59, "return 0;"]] | [
"CVE-2012-6712"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 62 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"IWLAGN_STATION_COUNT"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct iwl_priv",
"IWL_STA_DRIVER_ACTIVE",
"IWL_STA_UCODE_ACTIVE"
]
} |
63 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/usb/core/message.c | 2e1c42391ff2556387b3cb6308b24f6f65619feb | USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix thi... | true | 67cccb2edbdbcaa7b6d975bc930769e3 | cdc_parse_cdc_header | int cdc_parse_cdc_header(struct usb_cdc_parsed_header *hdr,
struct usb_interface *intf,
u8 *buffer,
int buflen)
{
/* duplicates are ignored */
struct usb_cdc_union_desc *union_header = NULL;
/* duplicates are not tolerated */
struct usb_cdc_header_desc *header = NULL;
struct usb_cdc_ether_desc *ether ... | [] | [] | [
"CVE-2017-16534"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 64 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE",
"USB_CDC_UNION_TYPE",
"USB_CDC_COUNTRY_TYPE",
"USB_CDC_HEADER_TYPE",
"USB_CDC_ACM_TYPE",
"USB_CDC_ETHERNET_TYPE",
"USB_CDC_CALL_MANAGEMENT_TYPE"... |
64 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/usb/core/message.c | 2e1c42391ff2556387b3cb6308b24f6f65619feb | USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix thi... | false | b882c8014dc9c7f1f0b707ef47655e4f | cdc_parse_cdc_header | int cdc_parse_cdc_header(struct usb_cdc_parsed_header *hdr,
struct usb_interface *intf,
u8 *buffer,
int buflen)
{
/* duplicates are ignored */
struct usb_cdc_union_desc *union_header = NULL;
/* duplicates are not tolerated */
struct usb_cdc_header_desc *header = NULL;
struct usb_cdc_ether_desc *ether ... | [[2072, "\t\tif ((buflen < elength) || (elength < 3)) {\n"], [2073, "\t\t\tdev_err(&intf->dev, \"invalid descriptor buffer length\\n\");\n"], [2074, "\t\t\tbreak;\n"], [2075, "\t\t}\n"]] | [[2072, "if ((buflen < elength) || (elength < 3))"], [2073, "dev_err(&intf->dev, \"invalid descriptor buffer length\\n\");"], [2074, "break;"], [2075, "\t\t}\n"]] | [
"CVE-2017-16534"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 64 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE",
"USB_CDC_UNION_TYPE",
"USB_CDC_COUNTRY_TYPE",
"USB_CDC_HEADER_TYPE",
"USB_CDC_ACM_TYPE",
"USB_CDC_ETHERNET_TYPE",
"USB_CDC_CALL_MANAGEMENT_TYPE"... |
65 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 30a46a4647fd1df9cf52e43bf467f0d9265096ca | apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject... | true | 2aa205d4471b524745a6ff7b07ec87e5 | apparmor_setprocattr | static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
char *command, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
int error;
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requ... | [[503, "\tchar *command, *args = value;\n"], [509, "\t/* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that\n"], [510, "\t * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1\n"], [511, "\t * so that AppArmor can null terminate them\n"], [512, "\t */\n"], [513, "\tif (args[size - 1] != '\\0') {\n"]... | [[503, "char *command, *args = value;"], [509, "/* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that\n\t * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1\n\t * so that AppArmor can null terminate them\n\t */"], [513, "if (args[size - 1] != '\\0')"], [514, "if (size == PAGE_SIZE)"], [515, "retur... | [
"CVE-2016-6187"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 66 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"value",
"size"
],
"Globals": [
"PAGE_SIZE"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
66 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 30a46a4647fd1df9cf52e43bf467f0d9265096ca | apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject... | false | c9f7da81394639484c3d759435eb4307 | apparmor_setprocattr | static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
int error;
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* task can only write its own attri... | [[503, "\tchar *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;\n"], [513, "\t/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */\n"], [514, "\tif (args[size - 1] != '\\0') {\n"], [515, "\t\t/* null terminate */\n"], [516, "\t\tlargs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);\n"], [517, "\t\tif (!args)\n"], [518, "... | [[503, "char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;"], [513, "/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */"], [514, "if (args[size - 1] != '\\0')"], [515, "/* null terminate */"], [516, "largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);"], [517, "if (!args)"], [518, "return -ENOMEM;"], [519, "memcpy... | [
"CVE-2016-6187"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 66 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"value",
"size"
],
"Globals": [
"PAGE_SIZE"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
67 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c | 36a87385e31c9343af9a4756598e704741250a67 | LoongArch: BPF: Prevent out-of-bounds memory access
The test_tag test triggers an unhandled page fault:
# ./test_tag
[ 130.640218] CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80001b898004, era == 9000000003137f7c, ra == 9000000003139e70
[ 130.640501] Oops[#3]:
[ 130.640553] CPU: 0 P... | true | 719fda17f6dc069f936d58796841734c | build_insn | static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool extra_pass)
{
u8 tm = -1;
u64 func_addr;
bool func_addr_fixed, sign_extend;
int i = insn - ctx->prog->insnsi;
int ret, jmp_offset;
const u8 code = insn->code;
const u8 cond = BPF_OP(code);
const u8 t1 = LOONGARCH_GPR_T1;
const u8 t2 =... | [[473, "\tconst u64 imm64 = (u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32 | (u32)insn->imm;\n"]] | [[473, "const u64 imm64 = (u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32 | (u32)insn->imm;"]] | [
"CVE-2024-26588"
] | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-119"
] | 68 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"insn",
"ctx"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
68 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c | 36a87385e31c9343af9a4756598e704741250a67 | LoongArch: BPF: Prevent out-of-bounds memory access
The test_tag test triggers an unhandled page fault:
# ./test_tag
[ 130.640218] CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80001b898004, era == 9000000003137f7c, ra == 9000000003139e70
[ 130.640501] Oops[#3]:
[ 130.640553] CPU: 0 P... | false | d0de32374eb64f45e7c908076a8d3536 | build_insn | static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool extra_pass)
{
u8 tm = -1;
u64 func_addr;
bool func_addr_fixed, sign_extend;
int i = insn - ctx->prog->insnsi;
int ret, jmp_offset;
const u8 code = insn->code;
const u8 cond = BPF_OP(code);
const u8 t1 = LOONGARCH_GPR_T1;
const u8 t2 =... | [[930, "\t{\n"], [931, "\t\tconst u64 imm64 = (u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32 | (u32)insn->imm;\n"], [932, "\n"], [935, "\t}\n"]] | [[930, "\t{\n"], [931, "const u64 imm64 = (u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32 | (u32)insn->imm;"], [932, "\n"], [935, "\t}\n"]] | [
"CVE-2024-26588"
] | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-119"
] | 68 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"insn",
"ctx"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
69 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | crypto/ccm.c | 3b30460c5b0ed762be75a004e924ec3f8711e032 | crypto: ccm - move cbcmac input off the stack
Commit f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
refactored the CCM driver to allow separate implementations of the
underlying MAC to be provided by a platform. However, in doing so, it
moved some data from the linear region to the stack, which violat... | true | 8be0a748ac85cea79753205e3e8bda1f | crypto_ccm_auth | static int crypto_ccm_auth(struct aead_request *req, struct scatterlist *plain,
unsigned int cryptlen)
{
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx(req);
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_ccm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACK(ahreq, ctx->mac... | [[186, "\tu8 odata[16];\n"], [187, "\tu8 idata[16];\n"]] | [[186, "u8 odata[16];"], [187, "u8 idata[16];"]] | [
"CVE-2017-8065"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 70 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"CONFIG_VMAP_STACK"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"crypto_ccm_reqctx"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx"
]
} |
70 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | crypto/ccm.c | 3b30460c5b0ed762be75a004e924ec3f8711e032 | crypto: ccm - move cbcmac input off the stack
Commit f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
refactored the CCM driver to allow separate implementations of the
underlying MAC to be provided by a platform. However, in doing so, it
moved some data from the linear region to the stack, which violat... | false | fc74134563bc6b3f9a0492a49919c45c | crypto_ccm_auth | static int crypto_ccm_auth(struct aead_request *req, struct scatterlist *plain,
unsigned int cryptlen)
{
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx(req);
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_ccm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACK(ahreq, ctx->mac... | [[187, "\tu8 *odata = pctx->odata;\n"], [188, "\tu8 *idata = pctx->idata;\n"]] | [[187, "u8 *odata = pctx->odata;"], [188, "u8 *idata = pctx->idata;"]] | [
"CVE-2017-8065"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 70 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"CONFIG_VMAP_STACK"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"crypto_ccm_reqctx"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx"
]
} |
71 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | virt/kvm/iommu.c | 3d32e4dbe71374a6780eaf51d719d76f9a9bf22f | kvm: fix excessive pages un-pinning in kvm_iommu_map error path.
The third parameter of kvm_unpin_pages() when called from
kvm_iommu_map_pages() is wrong, it should be the number of pages to un-pin
and not the page size.
This error was facilitated with an inconsistent API: kvm_pin_pages() takes
a size, but kvn_unpin_... | true | 025055e371ed3d112a45d2a56ee88c2a | kvm_pin_pages | static pfn_t kvm_pin_pages(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
unsigned long size)
{
gfn_t end_gfn;
pfn_t pfn;
pfn = gfn_to_pfn_memslot(slot, gfn);
end_gfn = gfn + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
gfn += 1;
if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn))
return pfn;
while (gfn < end_gfn)
gfn_to_pfn_memslot(slot, gfn... | [[46, "\t\t\t unsigned long size)\n"], [52, "\tend_gfn = gfn + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT);\n"]] | [[45, "static pfn_t kvm_pin_pages(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,\n\t\t\t unsigned long size)"], [52, "end_gfn = gfn + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT);"]] | [
"CVE-2014-8369"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 73 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"gfn_to_pfn_memslot",
"is_error_noslot_pfn"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"PAGE_SHIFT"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"gfn_t",
"pfn_t"
]
} |
72 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | virt/kvm/iommu.c | 3d32e4dbe71374a6780eaf51d719d76f9a9bf22f | kvm: fix excessive pages un-pinning in kvm_iommu_map error path.
The third parameter of kvm_unpin_pages() when called from
kvm_iommu_map_pages() is wrong, it should be the number of pages to un-pin
and not the page size.
This error was facilitated with an inconsistent API: kvm_pin_pages() takes
a size, but kvn_unpin_... | true | a0427e269f02ecb7a6151653d483872c | kvm_iommu_map_pages | int kvm_iommu_map_pages(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
gfn_t gfn, end_gfn;
pfn_t pfn;
int r = 0;
struct iommu_domain *domain = kvm->arch.iommu_domain;
int flags;
/* check if iommu exists and in use */
if (!domain)
return 0;
gfn = slot->base_gfn;
end_gfn = gfn + slot->npages;
flags =... | [[122, "\t\tpfn = kvm_pin_pages(slot, gfn, page_size);\n"], [134, "\t\t\tkvm_unpin_pages(kvm, pfn, page_size);\n"]] | [[122, "pfn = kvm_pin_pages(slot, gfn, page_size);"], [134, "kvm_unpin_pages(kvm, pfn, page_size);"]] | [
"CVE-2014-8369"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 74 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"kvm_pin_pages",
"kvm_unpin_pages"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"PAGE_SHIFT"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
73 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | virt/kvm/iommu.c | 3d32e4dbe71374a6780eaf51d719d76f9a9bf22f | kvm: fix excessive pages un-pinning in kvm_iommu_map error path.
The third parameter of kvm_unpin_pages() when called from
kvm_iommu_map_pages() is wrong, it should be the number of pages to un-pin
and not the page size.
This error was facilitated with an inconsistent API: kvm_pin_pages() takes
a size, but kvn_unpin_... | false | ba8be0d9d9f3ec211da15b296457e183 | kvm_pin_pages | static pfn_t kvm_pin_pages(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
unsigned long npages)
{
gfn_t end_gfn;
pfn_t pfn;
pfn = gfn_to_pfn_memslot(slot, gfn);
end_gfn = gfn + npages;
gfn += 1;
if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn))
return pfn;
while (gfn < end_gfn)
gfn_to_pfn_memslot(slot, gfn++);
retur... | [[46, "\t\t\t unsigned long npages)\n"], [52, "\tend_gfn = gfn + npages;\n"]] | [[45, "static pfn_t kvm_pin_pages(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,\n\t\t\t unsigned long npages)"], [52, "end_gfn = gfn + npages;"]] | [
"CVE-2014-8369"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 73 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"gfn_to_pfn_memslot",
"is_error_noslot_pfn"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"PAGE_SHIFT"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"gfn_t",
"pfn_t"
]
} |
74 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | virt/kvm/iommu.c | 3d32e4dbe71374a6780eaf51d719d76f9a9bf22f | kvm: fix excessive pages un-pinning in kvm_iommu_map error path.
The third parameter of kvm_unpin_pages() when called from
kvm_iommu_map_pages() is wrong, it should be the number of pages to un-pin
and not the page size.
This error was facilitated with an inconsistent API: kvm_pin_pages() takes
a size, but kvn_unpin_... | false | 39fe2d1da52c0b34e9ae57deacceb7b5 | kvm_iommu_map_pages | int kvm_iommu_map_pages(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
gfn_t gfn, end_gfn;
pfn_t pfn;
int r = 0;
struct iommu_domain *domain = kvm->arch.iommu_domain;
int flags;
/* check if iommu exists and in use */
if (!domain)
return 0;
gfn = slot->base_gfn;
end_gfn = gfn + slot->npages;
flags =... | [[122, "\t\tpfn = kvm_pin_pages(slot, gfn, page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT);\n"], [134, "\t\t\tkvm_unpin_pages(kvm, pfn, page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT);\n"]] | [[122, "pfn = kvm_pin_pages(slot, gfn, page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT);"], [134, "kvm_unpin_pages(kvm, pfn, page_size >> PAGE_SHIFT);"]] | [
"CVE-2014-8369"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 74 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"kvm_pin_pages",
"kvm_unpin_pages"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"PAGE_SHIFT"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
75 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/cxusb.c | 3f190e3aec212fc8c61e202c51400afa7384d4bc | [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a re... | true | 77bd1536c3fe6c3a9de9751f3f548310 | cxusb_ctrl_msg | static int cxusb_ctrl_msg(struct dvb_usb_device *d,
u8 cmd, u8 *wbuf, int wlen, u8 *rbuf, int rlen)
{
struct cxusb_state *st = d->priv;
int ret, wo;
if (1 + wlen > MAX_XFER_SIZE) {
warn("i2c wr: len=%d is too big!\n", wlen);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
wo = (rbuf == NULL || rlen == 0); /* write-only */
mute... | [[62, "\tint ret, wo;\n"], [69, "\two = (rbuf == NULL || rlen == 0); /* write-only */\n"], [74, "\tif (wo)\n"], [75, "\t\tret = dvb_usb_generic_write(d, st->data, 1 + wlen);\n"], [76, "\telse\n"], [77, "\t\tret = dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, st->data, 1 + wlen,\n"], [78, "\t\t\t\t\t rbuf, rlen, 0);\n"]] | [[62, "int ret, wo;"], [69, "\two = (rbuf == NULL || rlen == 0); /* write-only */\n"], [74, "if (wo)"], [75, "ret = dvb_usb_generic_write(d, st->data, 1 + wlen);"], [76, "else"], [77, "ret = dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, st->data, 1 + wlen,\n\t\t\t\t\t rbuf, rlen, 0);"]] | [
"CVE-2017-8063"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 76 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"CONFIG_VMAP_STACK"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"dvb_usb_generic_write",
"dvb_usb_generic_rw"
],
"Function Argument": [
"d"
],
"Globals": [
"MAX_XFER_SIZE"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct dvb_usb_device",
"struct ... |
76 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/cxusb.c | 3f190e3aec212fc8c61e202c51400afa7384d4bc | [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a re... | false | 5e2dd1cfc640cb73671b7b85a6699623 | cxusb_ctrl_msg | static int cxusb_ctrl_msg(struct dvb_usb_device *d,
u8 cmd, u8 *wbuf, int wlen, u8 *rbuf, int rlen)
{
struct cxusb_state *st = d->priv;
int ret;
if (1 + wlen > MAX_XFER_SIZE) {
warn("i2c wr: len=%d is too big!\n", wlen);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (rlen > MAX_XFER_SIZE) {
warn("i2c rd: len=%d is too big... | [[62, "\tint ret;\n"], [69, "\tif (rlen > MAX_XFER_SIZE) {\n"], [70, "\t\twarn(\"i2c rd: len=%d is too big!\\n\", rlen);\n"], [71, "\t\treturn -EOPNOTSUPP;\n"], [72, "\t}\n"], [77, "\tret = dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, st->data, 1 + wlen, st->data, rlen, 0);\n"], [78, "\tif (!ret && rbuf && rlen)\n"], [79, "\t\tmemcpy(rbuf, s... | [[62, "int ret;"], [69, "if (rlen > MAX_XFER_SIZE)"], [70, "warn(\"i2c rd: len=%d is too big!\\n\", rlen);"], [71, "return -EOPNOTSUPP;"], [72, "\t}\n"], [77, "ret = dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, st->data, 1 + wlen, st->data, rlen, 0);"], [78, "if (!ret && rbuf && rlen)"], [79, "memcpy(rbuf, st->data, rlen);"]] | [
"CVE-2017-8063"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 76 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"CONFIG_VMAP_STACK"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"dvb_usb_generic_write",
"dvb_usb_generic_rw"
],
"Function Argument": [
"d"
],
"Globals": [
"MAX_XFER_SIZE"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct dvb_usb_device",
"struct ... |
77 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_gmac.c | 412b65d15a7f8a93794653968308fc100f2aa87c | net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed ... | true | 81976ee8c5029d5374310f4f35fc5cf2 | hns_gmac_get_sset_count | static int hns_gmac_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)
return ARRAY_SIZE(g_gmac_stats_string);
return 0;
}
| [[669, "\tif (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)\n"]] | [[669, "if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)"]] | [
"CVE-2017-18222"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 78 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"g_gmac_stats_string"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"ETH_SS_STATS",
"ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS"
]
} |
78 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_gmac.c | 412b65d15a7f8a93794653968308fc100f2aa87c | net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed ... | false | 79daacf53ed59201efb9d51805defa72 | hns_gmac_get_sset_count | static int hns_gmac_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)
return ARRAY_SIZE(g_gmac_stats_string);
return 0;
}
| [[669, "\tif (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)\n"]] | [[669, "if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)"]] | [
"CVE-2017-18222"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 78 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"g_gmac_stats_string"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"ETH_SS_STATS",
"ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS"
]
} |
79 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_ppe.c | 412b65d15a7f8a93794653968308fc100f2aa87c | net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed ... | true | b59067e2d17a1f9970488c10efed433f | hns_ppe_get_sset_count | int hns_ppe_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)
return ETH_PPE_STATIC_NUM;
return 0;
}
| [[425, "\tif (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)\n"]] | [[425, "if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)"]] | [
"CVE-2017-18222"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 80 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"ETH_SS_STATS",
"ETH_PPE_STATIC_NUM",
"ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
80 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_ppe.c | 412b65d15a7f8a93794653968308fc100f2aa87c | net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed ... | false | 9053b2b06696eb0116dd4c9dafae5f6d | hns_ppe_get_sset_count | int hns_ppe_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)
return ETH_PPE_STATIC_NUM;
return 0;
}
| [[425, "\tif (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)\n"]] | [[425, "if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)"]] | [
"CVE-2017-18222"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 80 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"ETH_SS_STATS",
"ETH_PPE_STATIC_NUM",
"ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
81 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_rcb.c | 412b65d15a7f8a93794653968308fc100f2aa87c | net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed ... | true | 35ff2b49ab41e4c4f4abee26d65269ca | hns_rcb_get_ring_sset_count | int hns_rcb_get_ring_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)
return HNS_RING_STATIC_REG_NUM;
return 0;
}
| [[879, "\tif (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)\n"]] | [[879, "if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)"]] | [
"CVE-2017-18222"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 82 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"ETH_SS_STATS",
"HNS_RING_STATIC_REG_NUM",
"ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
82 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_rcb.c | 412b65d15a7f8a93794653968308fc100f2aa87c | net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed ... | false | f7b732abd3325dd0a1cc35264c521e37 | hns_rcb_get_ring_sset_count | int hns_rcb_get_ring_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)
return HNS_RING_STATIC_REG_NUM;
return 0;
}
| [[879, "\tif (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)\n"]] | [[879, "if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)"]] | [
"CVE-2017-18222"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 82 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"ETH_SS_STATS",
"HNS_RING_STATIC_REG_NUM",
"ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
83 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_xgmac.c | 412b65d15a7f8a93794653968308fc100f2aa87c | net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed ... | true | 5db2f03c13fc70c46b700867894a85b8 | hns_xgmac_get_sset_count | static int hns_xgmac_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)
return ARRAY_SIZE(g_xgmac_stats_string);
return 0;
}
| [[784, "\tif (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)\n"]] | [[784, "if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)"]] | [
"CVE-2017-18222"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 84 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"ETH_SS_STATS",
"ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"g_xgmac_stats_string"
]
} |
84 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns/hns_dsaf_xgmac.c | 412b65d15a7f8a93794653968308fc100f2aa87c | net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed ... | false | 504fc68b1907b2c93c7bf4b86676bf57 | hns_xgmac_get_sset_count | static int hns_xgmac_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)
return ARRAY_SIZE(g_xgmac_stats_string);
return 0;
}
| [[784, "\tif (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)\n"]] | [[784, "if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)"]] | [
"CVE-2017-18222"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 84 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"ETH_SS_STATS",
"ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"g_xgmac_stats_string"
]
} |
85 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4374f256ce8182019353c0c639bb8d0695b4c941 | bpf/verifier: fix bounds calculation on BPF_RSH
Incorrect signed bounds were being computed.
If the old upper signed bound was positive and the old lower signed bound was
negative, this could cause the new upper signed bound to be too low,
leading to security issues.
Fixes: b03c9f9fdc37 ("bpf/verifier: track signed a... | true | 968bc8c291b749db2a3e05e97a26a40f | adjust_scalar_min_max_vals | static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bool src_known, dst_known;
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
u64 ... | [[2193, "\t\t/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift, so make the appropriate casts */\n"], [2194, "\t\tif (dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {\n"], [2195, "\t\t\tif (umin_val) {\n"], [2196, "\t\t\t\t/* Sign bit will be cleared */\n"], [2197, "\t\t\t\tdst_reg->smin_value = 0;\n"], [2198, "\t\t\t} else {\n"], [2199, "\t\t\t\t/* Lost sig... | [[2193, "/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift, so make the appropriate casts */"], [2194, "if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0)"], [2195, "if (umin_val)"], [2196, "/* Sign bit will be cleared */"], [2197, "dst_reg->smin_value = 0;"], [2198, "else"], [2199, "/* Lost sign bit information */"], [2200, "dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;"]... | [
"CVE-2017-17853"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 86 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"cur_regs"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"S64_MIN",
"S64_MAX",
"U64_MAX"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct bpf_reg_state",
"struct bpf_verifier_env",
"struct bpf_insn"
]
} |
86 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4374f256ce8182019353c0c639bb8d0695b4c941 | bpf/verifier: fix bounds calculation on BPF_RSH
Incorrect signed bounds were being computed.
If the old upper signed bound was positive and the old lower signed bound was
negative, this could cause the new upper signed bound to be too low,
leading to security issues.
Fixes: b03c9f9fdc37 ("bpf/verifier: track signed a... | false | e6c61340dd642843d207cbd96de86c35 | adjust_scalar_min_max_vals | static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bool src_known, dst_known;
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
u64 ... | [[2193, "\t\t/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might\n"], [2194, "\t\t * be negative, then either:\n"], [2195, "\t\t * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is\n"], [2196, "\t\t * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds\n"], [2197, "\t\t * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsi... | [[2193, "/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might\n\t\t * be negative, then either:\n\t\t * 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is\n\t\t * unknown, so we lose our signed bounds\n\t\t * 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the\n\t\t * signed bounds\n\t... | [
"CVE-2017-17853"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 86 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"cur_regs"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"S64_MIN",
"S64_MAX",
"U64_MAX"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct bpf_reg_state",
"struct bpf_verifier_env",
"struct bpf_insn"
]
} |
87 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 468f6eafa6c44cb2c5d8aad35e12f06c240a812a | bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification
32-bit ALU ops operate on 32-bit values and have 32-bit outputs.
Adjust the verifier accordingly.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkman... | true | ec2babadd00a8fdcf6292cc95449f524 | adjust_scalar_min_max_vals | static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bool src_known, dst_known;
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
u64 ... | [[2031, "\tif (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {\n"], [2032, "\t\t/* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->64 */\n"], [2033, "\t\tcoerce_reg_to_size(dst_reg, 4);\n"], [2034, "\t\tcoerce_reg_to_size(&src_reg, 4);\n"], [2035, "\t}\n"], [2171, "\t\tif (umax_val > 63) {\n"], [2172, "\t\t\t/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined.... | [[2031, "if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64)"], [2032, "/* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->64 */"], [2033, "coerce_reg_to_size(dst_reg, 4);"], [2034, "coerce_reg_to_size(&src_reg, 4);"], [2035, "\t}\n"], [2171, "if (umax_val > 63)"], [2172, "/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes\n\t\t\t * shifts by a ... | [
"CVE-2017-17852"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 88 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"cur_regs",
"BPF_CLASS",
"BPF_OP",
"coerce_reg_to_size",
"signed_add_overflows",
"signed_sub_overflows",
"tnum_is_const",
"tnum_add",
"tnum_sub",
"tnum_mul",
"tnum_and",
"tnum_or",
"tnum_... |
88 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 468f6eafa6c44cb2c5d8aad35e12f06c240a812a | bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification
32-bit ALU ops operate on 32-bit values and have 32-bit outputs.
Adjust the verifier accordingly.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkman... | false | e9b0ca2149ac8dcfaabfdeb364bddd26 | adjust_scalar_min_max_vals | static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bool src_known, dst_known;
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
u64 ... | [[2034, "\tu64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32;\n"], [2171, "\t\tif (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {\n"], [2172, "\t\t\t/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.\n"], [2173, "\t\t\t * This includes shifts by a negative number.\n"], [2199, "\t\tif (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {\n"], [2200, "... | [[2034, "u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32;"], [2171, "if (umax_val >= insn_bitness)"], [2172, "/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.\n\t\t\t * This includes shifts by a negative number.\n\t\t\t */"], [2199, "if (umax_val >= insn_bitness)"], [2200, "/* Shifts greater than 31 or ... | [
"CVE-2017-17852"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 88 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"cur_regs",
"BPF_CLASS",
"BPF_OP",
"coerce_reg_to_size",
"signed_add_overflows",
"signed_sub_overflows",
"tnum_is_const",
"tnum_add",
"tnum_sub",
"tnum_mul",
"tnum_and",
"tnum_or",
"tnum_... |
89 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/edac/thunderx_edac.c | 475c58e1a471e9b873e3e39958c64a2d278275c8 | EDAC/thunderx: Fix possible out-of-bounds string access
Enabling -Wstringop-overflow globally exposes a warning for a common bug
in the usage of strncat():
drivers/edac/thunderx_edac.c: In function 'thunderx_ocx_com_threaded_isr':
drivers/edac/thunderx_edac.c:1136:17: error: 'strncat' specified bound 1024 equals ... | true | 613329b4c8f761ef99c76a284ecf07de | thunderx_ocx_com_threaded_isr | static irqreturn_t thunderx_ocx_com_threaded_isr(int irq, void *irq_id)
{
struct msix_entry *msix = irq_id;
struct thunderx_ocx *ocx = container_of(msix, struct thunderx_ocx,
msix_ent[msix->entry]);
irqreturn_t ret = IRQ_NONE;
unsigned long tail;
struct ocx_com_err_ctx *ctx;
int lane;
char *msg;
char *o... | [[1136, "\t\tstrncat(msg, other, OCX_MESSAGE_SIZE);\n"], [1145, "\t\t\t\tstrncat(msg, other, OCX_MESSAGE_SIZE);\n"], [1150, "\t\t\t\tstrncat(msg, other, OCX_MESSAGE_SIZE);\n"]] | [[1136, "strncat(msg, other, OCX_MESSAGE_SIZE);"], [1145, "strncat(msg, other, OCX_MESSAGE_SIZE);"], [1150, "strncat(msg, other, OCX_MESSAGE_SIZE);"]] | [
"CVE-2023-52464"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 90 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"decode_register"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"OCX_MESSAGE_SIZE",
"OCX_OTHER_SIZE"
]
} |
90 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/edac/thunderx_edac.c | 475c58e1a471e9b873e3e39958c64a2d278275c8 | EDAC/thunderx: Fix possible out-of-bounds string access
Enabling -Wstringop-overflow globally exposes a warning for a common bug
in the usage of strncat():
drivers/edac/thunderx_edac.c: In function 'thunderx_ocx_com_threaded_isr':
drivers/edac/thunderx_edac.c:1136:17: error: 'strncat' specified bound 1024 equals ... | false | 820b4c2c3b4ba8e47d2e7ae7274444c4 | thunderx_ocx_com_threaded_isr | static irqreturn_t thunderx_ocx_com_threaded_isr(int irq, void *irq_id)
{
struct msix_entry *msix = irq_id;
struct thunderx_ocx *ocx = container_of(msix, struct thunderx_ocx,
msix_ent[msix->entry]);
irqreturn_t ret = IRQ_NONE;
unsigned long tail;
struct ocx_com_err_ctx *ctx;
int lane;
char *msg;
char *o... | [[1136, "\t\tstrlcat(msg, other, OCX_MESSAGE_SIZE);\n"], [1145, "\t\t\t\tstrlcat(msg, other, OCX_MESSAGE_SIZE);\n"], [1150, "\t\t\t\tstrlcat(msg, other, OCX_MESSAGE_SIZE);\n"]] | [[1136, "strlcat(msg, other, OCX_MESSAGE_SIZE);"], [1145, "strlcat(msg, other, OCX_MESSAGE_SIZE);"], [1150, "strlcat(msg, other, OCX_MESSAGE_SIZE);"]] | [
"CVE-2023-52464"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 90 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"decode_register"
],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"OCX_MESSAGE_SIZE",
"OCX_OTHER_SIZE"
]
} |
91 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 48900cb6af4282fa0fb6ff4d72a81aa3dadb5c39 | virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRA... | true | 4ee5395c83acadd472a234db87a1f0ca | virtnet_probe | static int virtnet_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev)
{
int i, err;
struct net_device *dev;
struct virtnet_info *vi;
u16 max_queue_pairs;
if (!vdev->config->get) {
dev_err(&vdev->dev, "%s failure: config access disabled\n",
__func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!virtnet_validate_features(vdev))
return -EINV... | [[1759, "\t\tdev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM|NETIF_F_SG|NETIF_F_FRAGLIST;\n"], [1761, "\t\t\tdev->features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM|NETIF_F_SG|NETIF_F_FRAGLIST;\n"]] | [[1759, "dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM|NETIF_F_SG|NETIF_F_FRAGLIST;"], [1761, "dev->features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM|NETIF_F_SG|NETIF_F_FRAGLIST;"]] | [
"CVE-2015-5156"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 92 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"NETIF_F_FRAGLIST",
"MAX_SKB_FRAGS"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
92 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 48900cb6af4282fa0fb6ff4d72a81aa3dadb5c39 | virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRA... | false | 39c937d46c5354959db4476bca14afc8 | virtnet_probe | static int virtnet_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev)
{
int i, err;
struct net_device *dev;
struct virtnet_info *vi;
u16 max_queue_pairs;
if (!vdev->config->get) {
dev_err(&vdev->dev, "%s failure: config access disabled\n",
__func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!virtnet_validate_features(vdev))
return -EINV... | [[1759, "\t\tdev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_SG;\n"], [1761, "\t\t\tdev->features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_SG;\n"]] | [[1759, "dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_SG;"], [1761, "dev->features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_SG;"]] | [
"CVE-2015-5156"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 92 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [
"NETIF_F_FRAGLIST",
"MAX_SKB_FRAGS"
],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
93 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/hid/hid-cherry.c | 4ab25786c87eb20857bbb715c3ae34ec8fd6a214 | HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jir... | true | 7078cb37d711fc277f8f0139fea12d59 | ch_report_fixup | static __u8 *ch_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 17 && rdesc[11] == 0x3c && rdesc[12] == 0x02) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Cherry Cymotion report descriptor\n");
rdesc[11] = rdesc[16] = 0xff;
rdesc[12] = rdesc[17] = 0x03;
}
return rdesc;
}
| [[31, "\tif (*rsize >= 17 && rdesc[11] == 0x3c && rdesc[12] == 0x02) {\n"]] | [[31, "if (*rsize >= 17 && rdesc[11] == 0x3c && rdesc[12] == 0x02)"]] | [
"CVE-2014-3184"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 94 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"rdesc",
"rsize"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
94 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/hid/hid-cherry.c | 4ab25786c87eb20857bbb715c3ae34ec8fd6a214 | HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jir... | false | dd46fe8afcfdd405f35ff039f320b512 | ch_report_fixup | static __u8 *ch_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 18 && rdesc[11] == 0x3c && rdesc[12] == 0x02) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Cherry Cymotion report descriptor\n");
rdesc[11] = rdesc[16] = 0xff;
rdesc[12] = rdesc[17] = 0x03;
}
return rdesc;
}
| [[31, "\tif (*rsize >= 18 && rdesc[11] == 0x3c && rdesc[12] == 0x02) {\n"]] | [[31, "if (*rsize >= 18 && rdesc[11] == 0x3c && rdesc[12] == 0x02)"]] | [
"CVE-2014-3184"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 94 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"rdesc",
"rsize"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
95 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/hid/hid-kye.c | 4ab25786c87eb20857bbb715c3ae34ec8fd6a214 | HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jir... | true | d3d0680a256c71e6969ed7e2635dbb00 | kye_report_fixup | static __u8 *kye_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
switch (hdev->product) {
case USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_ERGO_525V:
/* the fixups that need to be done:
* - change led usage page to button for extra buttons
* - report size 8 count 1 must be size 1 count 8 for button
*... | [[303, "\t\tif (*rsize >= 74 &&\n"]] | [[303, "if (*rsize >= 74 &&\n\t\t\trdesc[61] == 0x05 && rdesc[62] == 0x08 &&\n\t\t\trdesc[63] == 0x19 && rdesc[64] == 0x08 &&\n\t\t\trdesc[65] == 0x29 && rdesc[66] == 0x0f &&\n\t\t\trdesc[71] == 0x75 && rdesc[72] == 0x08 &&\n\t\t\trdesc[73] == 0x95 && rdesc[74] == 0x01)"]] | [
"CVE-2014-3184"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 96 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"hdev",
"rdesc",
"rsize"
],
"Globals": [
"USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_ERGO_525V",
"USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_EASYPEN_I405X",
"EASYPEN_I405X_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE",
"easypen_i405x_rdesc_fixed",
"USB_DE... |
96 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/hid/hid-kye.c | 4ab25786c87eb20857bbb715c3ae34ec8fd6a214 | HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jir... | false | ed2f31685d1c495df1c0a4476a6ff055 | kye_report_fixup | static __u8 *kye_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
switch (hdev->product) {
case USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_ERGO_525V:
/* the fixups that need to be done:
* - change led usage page to button for extra buttons
* - report size 8 count 1 must be size 1 count 8 for button
*... | [[303, "\t\tif (*rsize >= 75 &&\n"]] | [[303, "if (*rsize >= 75 &&\n\t\t\trdesc[61] == 0x05 && rdesc[62] == 0x08 &&\n\t\t\trdesc[63] == 0x19 && rdesc[64] == 0x08 &&\n\t\t\trdesc[65] == 0x29 && rdesc[66] == 0x0f &&\n\t\t\trdesc[71] == 0x75 && rdesc[72] == 0x08 &&\n\t\t\trdesc[73] == 0x95 && rdesc[74] == 0x01)"]] | [
"CVE-2014-3184"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 96 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [
"hdev",
"rdesc",
"rsize"
],
"Globals": [
"USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_ERGO_525V",
"USB_DEVICE_ID_KYE_EASYPEN_I405X",
"EASYPEN_I405X_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE",
"easypen_i405x_rdesc_fixed",
"USB_DE... |
97 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/hid/hid-lg.c | 4ab25786c87eb20857bbb715c3ae34ec8fd6a214 | HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jir... | true | d51dad61fb3100872f7f341d0ef36499 | lg_report_fixup | static __u8 *lg_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
struct lg_drv_data *drv_data = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct usb_device_descriptor *udesc;
__u16 bcdDevice, rev_maj, rev_min;
if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC) && *rsize >= 90 && rdesc[83] == 0x26 &&
rdesc[84] == 0x8c &&... | [[348, "\tif ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC) && *rsize >= 90 && rdesc[83] == 0x26 &&\n"], [355, "\tif ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC_REL_ABS) && *rsize >= 50 &&\n"]] | [[348, "if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC) && *rsize >= 90 && rdesc[83] == 0x26 &&\n\t\t\trdesc[84] == 0x8c && rdesc[85] == 0x02)"], [355, "if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC_REL_ABS) && *rsize >= 50 &&\n\t\t\trdesc[32] == 0x81 && rdesc[33] == 0x06 &&\n\t\t\trdesc[49] == 0x81 && rdesc[50] == 0x06)"]] | [
"CVE-2014-3184"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 98 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"hid_get_drvdata"
],
"Function Argument": [
"hdev",
"rdesc",
"rsize"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct lg_drv_data"
]
} |
98 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/hid/hid-lg.c | 4ab25786c87eb20857bbb715c3ae34ec8fd6a214 | HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jir... | false | 9791b14637d65a92a90693945cfc6a99 | lg_report_fixup | static __u8 *lg_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
struct lg_drv_data *drv_data = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct usb_device_descriptor *udesc;
__u16 bcdDevice, rev_maj, rev_min;
if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC) && *rsize >= 91 && rdesc[83] == 0x26 &&
rdesc[84] == 0x8c &&... | [[348, "\tif ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC) && *rsize >= 91 && rdesc[83] == 0x26 &&\n"], [355, "\tif ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC_REL_ABS) && *rsize >= 51 &&\n"]] | [[348, "if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC) && *rsize >= 91 && rdesc[83] == 0x26 &&\n\t\t\trdesc[84] == 0x8c && rdesc[85] == 0x02)"], [355, "if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC_REL_ABS) && *rsize >= 51 &&\n\t\t\trdesc[32] == 0x81 && rdesc[33] == 0x06 &&\n\t\t\trdesc[49] == 0x81 && rdesc[50] == 0x06)"]] | [
"CVE-2014-3184"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 98 | {
"Execution Environment": [],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [
"hid_get_drvdata"
],
"Function Argument": [
"hdev",
"rdesc",
"rsize"
],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": [
"struct lg_drv_data"
]
} |
99 | linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | drivers/hid/hid-monterey.c | 4ab25786c87eb20857bbb715c3ae34ec8fd6a214 | HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jir... | true | 26c10232845901f7ab1d88218fe046c4 | mr_report_fixup | static __u8 *mr_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 30 && rdesc[29] == 0x05 && rdesc[30] == 0x09) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up button/consumer in HID report descriptor\n");
rdesc[30] = 0x0c;
}
return rdesc;
}
| [[27, "\tif (*rsize >= 30 && rdesc[29] == 0x05 && rdesc[30] == 0x09) {\n"]] | [[27, "if (*rsize >= 30 && rdesc[29] == 0x05 && rdesc[30] == 0x09)"]] | [
"CVE-2014-3184"
] | [
"CWE-119"
] | 100 | {
"Execution Environment": [
"HID device with user-controlled/bad report descriptor"
],
"Explanation": null,
"External Function": [],
"Function Argument": [],
"Globals": [],
"Type Execution Declaration": []
} |
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Top 200 CWE-863
Retrieves 200 samples from the dataset where the CWE list includes CWE-863, providing basic filtering of specific security vulnerabilities.