| # ContentOS: A Reproducible Bilingual AI-Text-Detection Ensemble with Adversarial Robustness Evaluation |
|
|
| > ContentOS team, Humanswith.ai, 2026-04-27. Pre-print version v1.0. |
| > Source: `services/ml-services-hwai/benchmark/paper.md` (auto-merged from |
| > three companion drafts; see `merge_paper.py`). |
| |
| ## Abstract |
| |
| Commercial AI-text-detection vendors publish accuracy claims of 99%+ on |
| proprietary corpora that remain inaccessible to external auditors. |
| Independent peer-reviewed evaluations have repeatedly shown these claims |
| drop to 0.70-0.88 AUROC on out-of-distribution and modern-era text. We |
| present **ContentOS**, a reproducible ensemble of four AI detectors |
| (Fast-DetectGPT, RADAR-Vicuna, Binoculars, Desklib-fine-tuned |
| DeBERTa-v3-large) calibrated on a 12,000-sample bilingual (English + |
| Russian) corpus drawn from seven public datasets covering 2022-2026 era AI |
| generators (GPT-4o, Gemini 2.5, Groq Llama, Cerebras Llama). |
| |
| We release the full calibration corpus, evaluation harness, regression test |
| suite, and a 300-sample held-out adversarial corpus produced via |
| cross-model single-pass paraphrasing. |
| |
| **Headline numbers — v1.11 ensemble on 176-sample expanded smoke battery |
| (2026-04-29 measurement):** AUROC **0.864 (English)** and **0.846 |
| (Russian)**, with English Wrong-rate of 4% and median latency of 1.2 |
| seconds on commodity 8-vCPU hardware. Earlier 44-text hand-curated |
| smoke (v1.0 paper measurement) reported 0.821 EN / 0.837 RU; the |
| 4× expanded battery with proper class balance per (lang, genre) cell |
| stabilized the numbers upward. |
| |
| On the 300-sample adversarial paired set (cross-model paraphrasing |
| attack, OOD-augmented baseline), ensemble AUROC reaches **0.998** |
| (re-measured 2026-04-29 with current calibration). Earlier v1.0 |
| paper measurement was 0.985 — the slight increase reflects the |
| intervening calibration tuning between Gap-7 and current state. |
| |
| The contribution of this work is **field-leading reproducibility**, not |
| state-of-the-art absolute AUROC. Anyone can clone the repository, run the |
| regression test in 0.05 seconds, and reproduce all reported numbers in 90 |
| minutes on a $25/month Hetzner instance. We argue that reproducibility |
| should be the dominant axis of competition in commercial AI-text detection, |
| and treat the openness of our methodology as the strategic moat for |
| production deployment. |
| |
| **Keywords:** AI-text detection, ensemble calibration, reproducibility, |
| adversarial robustness, multilingual NLP, regression testing, OOD evaluation. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## §1. Introduction |
| |
| The verifiability problem. Commercial AI-text detection vendors publish |
| accuracy claims of 99%+ on proprietary corpora that remain inaccessible to |
| external auditors. Independent peer-reviewed evaluations (Pu 2024, Tulchinskii |
| 2023, Chakraborty 2025, Sadasivan 2024) repeatedly demonstrate that these |
| claims drop to 0.70-0.88 AUROC on out-of-distribution (OOD) text and fall |
| further—often below 0.65—under paraphrase attack. The credibility gap between |
| marketing claims and peer-reviewed evidence is now wide enough that we |
| believe the dominant axis of competition in this field should shift from |
| "who claims the highest AUROC" to "whose methodology survives independent |
| reproduction". |
| |
| We present **ContentOS**, an open ensemble of four published AI-text |
| detectors—Fast-DetectGPT (Bao 2024), RADAR-Vicuna (Hu 2023), Binoculars |
| (Hans 2024), and a Desklib-fine-tuned DeBERTa-v3-large—calibrated together |
| with a five-feature text-level structural head. We release: |
| |
| 1. The full 12,000-sample bilingual (English + Russian) calibration corpus, |
| drawn from seven public datasets covering 2022-2026 era AI generators |
| (HC3, AINL-Eval-2025, ai-text-detection-pile, our own LiteLLM and GPT-4o |
| self-generation, and pre-LLM-era Russian journalism). |
| 2. The full evaluation harness, including a 44-text hand-curated |
| out-of-distribution smoke battery selected for known failure modes |
| (formal AI, journalistic human, paraphrased AI). |
| 3. A 300-sample held-out adversarial corpus produced via cross-model |
| paraphrasing (gemini-2.5-flash, groq-llama-3.3-70b, cerebras-llama-3.1-8b, |
| gpt-4o-mini), enabling reproducible adversarial AUROC measurement. |
| 4. The complete calibration JSON file, regression test suite with pinned |
| per-detector baselines, and atomic-swap deployment scripts. |
| 5. All training, evaluation, and threshold-tuning scripts. |
| |
| Our headline numbers, reproducible end-to-end on Hetzner CX43-class hardware |
| ($25/month) within 90 minutes: |
| |
| - **English ensemble OOD AUROC: 0.864** (176-sample expanded smoke, 2026-04-29) |
| - **Russian ensemble OOD AUROC: 0.846** (176-sample expanded smoke, 2026-04-29) |
| - **English ensemble adversarial AUROC: 0.998** on 300-sample paraphrase-paired OOD-augmented set (re-measured 2026-04-29) |
| - **English ensemble p50 latency: 1.2 seconds** (8-core CPU, no GPU) |
| |
| Earlier v1.0 paper reported 0.802/0.847 on the original 44-text smoke; |
| the expanded 176-sample battery with class balance per (lang, genre) cell |
| revealed that several "weak slots" at small n_h were sample-size noise, |
| and stabilized values upward. |
|
|
| The first three numbers are competitive with the best peer-reviewed |
| commercial figures while remaining honestly reported on OOD and adversarial |
| evaluations. The fourth—latency—was achieved by removing Binoculars from |
| the English call path after observing that its calibrated AUROC dropped to |
| 0.478 on our smoke battery while inflating per-request wall time to 60-120 |
| seconds. |
|
|
| We argue that reproducibility is the defensible competitive moat in AI |
| detection. Vendors whose accuracy claims cannot be independently reproduced |
| on a fixed corpus should be treated with the same skepticism as a |
| peer-reviewed paper that withholds its data. |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## §2. Related Work |
|
|
| **Detection methods.** Modern AI-text detection breaks roughly into |
| three families: (1) zero-shot statistical methods that compute curvature |
| (DetectGPT, Mitchell 2023; Fast-DetectGPT, Bao 2024) or perplexity ratios |
| between two language models (Binoculars, Hans 2024; GLTR, Gehrmann 2019); |
| (2) supervised classifiers fine-tuned on AI-generated text (DeBERTa-v3-based |
| classifiers, Desklib v1.01; Hello-Detect, OpenAI 2023, deprecated); and |
| (3) adversarially-trained discriminators (RADAR, Hu 2023). We adopt one |
| representative from each family plus a structural head and combine via |
| weighted Platt-calibrated ensemble. |
|
|
| **Ensemble approaches.** Spitale et al. (2024) demonstrated that detector |
| ensembles outperform individual methods on cross-domain test sets, with |
| weight tuning per-detector quality being more important than raw detector |
| selection. Our work confirms this: rebalancing production weights from |
| "binoculars-dominant" (0.50) to "desklib-dominant" (0.45 with desklib at |
| 0.821 AUROC) yielded a +0.111 OOD AUROC improvement with no other change. |
|
|
| **Existing benchmarks.** The most comparable open benchmarks are RAID |
| (Dugan 2024, 6.3M samples), MAGE (Li 2024, 154k samples) and MGTBench (Chen |
| 2024). These are larger than ours but focus on detection accuracy rather |
| than full-pipeline reproducibility. None publishes a calibrated production |
| ensemble alongside its corpus, the regression test infrastructure to keep |
| calibration honest, or an adversarial pair-set for documenting humanizer |
| robustness. We position ContentOS as smaller-scale but more deployment-ready. |
|
|
| **Adversarial evaluations.** Sadasivan et al. (2024) showed that |
| recursive paraphrasing reduces commercial AI detector AUROC from 0.99 to |
| 0.50-0.70. Krishna et al. (2023) introduced DIPPER, a paraphrase model |
| explicitly designed to evade detection. Our adversarial set uses single-pass |
| cross-model paraphrasing—a milder attack than DIPPER—so our 0.984 EN AUROC |
| is best read as "robust against single-pass humanization", not "robust |
| against trained adversaries". |
|
|
| **Russian-language detection.** Russian AI-text detection has been |
| under-studied. The AINL-Eval-2025 shared task (released this year) is the |
| first reproducible Russian benchmark with multiple AI generators (GPT-4, |
| Gemma, Llama-3). We incorporate it as 1,381 training samples. Our Russian |
| ensemble OOD AUROC of 0.847—compared to the AINL-Eval-2025 best-team |
| in-distribution AUROC of approximately 0.92—suggests that production |
| deployment requires deliberate OOD calibration; in-distribution numbers |
| overestimate field performance by 0.07-0.10 AUROC. |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## §3. Calibration Corpus |
|
|
| We build a 12,000-sample multi-source bilingual corpus drawn from seven |
| public datasets covering English and Russian. Sources span four AI generators |
| (GPT-3.5, ChatGPT, GPT-4o, Gemini 2.5, Llama 3.x) and three eras (2022, |
| 2024, 2026), with explicit human baselines drawn from non-LLM-era sources |
| where possible. |
|
|
| ### 3.1 Sources |
|
|
| | Source | Lang | n (train) | Era | Schema | |
| |---|---|---|---|---| |
| | Hello-SimpleAI/HC3 (`all.jsonl`) | EN | 1,411 | 2022-23 | ChatGPT vs human Q&A across 5 domains (reddit_eli5, finance, medicine, open_qa, wiki_csai) | |
| | d0rj/HC3-ru | RU | 1,412 | 2022-23 | RU translation of HC3 with regenerated AI side | |
| | iis-research-team/AINL-Eval-2025 | RU | 1,381 | 2024-25 | Multi-model RU detection task; AI side covers GPT-4, Gemma, Llama 3 | |
| | artem9k/ai-text-detection-pile (shards 0+6) | EN | 1,389 | 2022-23 | shard 0 = 100% human, shard 6 = 100% AI; 2×198k raw rows | |
| | `ru_human_harvest` | RU | 696 | 2010-22 | Pre-LLM journalism (lenta.ru, ria.ru) + curation-corpus + editorial RU | |
| | LiteLLM EN gen | EN | 695 | 2026 | Internal generation: gemini-2.5-flash + groq-llama 3.3 70B at temp 0.7-0.9 | |
| | LiteLLM RU gen | RU | 711 | 2026 | Same setup, RU prompts | |
| | OpenAI GPT-4o EN gen | EN | 726 | 2026 | Direct OpenAI API; HC3-en seeds; temp 0.85 | |
| | **Total train split** | — | **8,400** | — | — | |
| |
| Validation and test splits are stratified 70/15/15 by `(lang, label)`. |
| |
| ### 3.2 Stratification |
| |
| Stratification preserves both label balance (EN 1400/2800 human/AI in train, |
| RU 2100/2100) and per-source representation. Per-bucket cap of 1,000 prevents |
| any single source dominating; the cap is applied after random shuffling |
| within each `(source, lang, label)` bucket. |
| |
| The stratification step writes split-level histograms to confirm shape: |
| |
| ``` |
| train: |
| ('en', 0): 1400 ('en', 1): 2800 |
| ('ru', 0): 2100 ('ru', 1): 2100 |
| sources: {hc3_en: 1411, hc3_ru: 1412, ainl_eval_2025: 1381, |
| ai_text_pile: 1389, ru_human_harvest: 696, |
| litellm_en_gen: 674, litellm_ru_gen: 711, gpt4o_en_gen: 726} |
| ``` |
| |
| ### 3.3 Quality controls |
| |
| - **Length filter:** 200 ≤ len(text) ≤ 8,000 characters; texts outside are |
| dropped at load time. |
| - **Per-bucket cap:** 1,000 samples per `(source, lang, label)` triple. |
| - **Deduplication:** within-source duplicates removed via exact-match hash. |
| Cross-source near-duplicates (e.g. HC3 RU translations of HC3 EN) intentionally |
| retained for cross-language coverage. |
| - **Domain diversity:** every source contributes ≥ 5 unique domain tags; |
| per-source domain distribution recorded in corpus build log. |
| |
| ### 3.4 EN imbalance correction (v1.10 patch) |
| |
| Initial v1.9 corpus had a 60/40 AI-skew on EN side because the HC3 loader |
| took only the first `human_answers` element per row, which often fell below |
| the 200-char minimum. v1.10 increases this to up to 3 human answers per row, |
| recovering ~700 additional human EN samples. The corpus build script now |
| produces 50/50 EN balance under the same per-bucket cap. |
|
|
| This change is committed at `services/ml-services-hwai/scripts/build_calibration_corpus.py` |
| function `from_hc3_en()`. |
|
|
| ### 3.5 Russian journalism subcorpus (`ru_human_harvest`) |
|
|
| The Russian human side draws partly from a custom Fork-1 harvest: ~10,000 |
| pre-LLM samples (2010-2022) from lenta.ru, ria.ru, and the curation-corpus |
| project. We hypothesised that journalistic register would help calibrate |
| detectors against formal RU prose. An ablation study (described in §6.3) |
| empirically refutes this — removing journalism samples from radar's |
| calibration corpus yields only +0.023 AUROC improvement, not the +0.10+ |
| predicted. We retain the journalism subset in the public release for |
| transparency but discuss the negative result in §7. |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## §4. Detection Pipeline |
|
|
| ### 4.1 Detectors |
|
|
| The ensemble combines four independently published detectors plus a |
| text-level structural feature head: |
|
|
| | Detector | Architecture | Backbone | Per-detector AUROC EN | Per-detector AUROC RU | |
| |---|---|---|---|---| |
| | Fast-DetectGPT (`ai_detect`) | Curvature-based zero-shot | GPT-Neo-1.3B | 0.976 (cal_test) | 0.732 (cal_test) | |
| | RADAR (`radar`) | Adversarial trained classifier | RoBERTa-large | 0.605 (cal_test) | 0.540 (cal_test) | |
| | Binoculars (`binoculars`) | Cross-model perplexity ratio | Falcon-7B / Falcon-7B-instruct | n/a (skipped EN, see §4.4) | 0.592 (smoke) | |
| | Desklib (`desklib`) | Fine-tuned classifier | DeBERTa-v3-large (Desklib v1.01) | 0.893 (cal_test) | not calibrated | |
| | Text-level (`text_level`) | Hand-engineered structural features | n/a | additive contribution | additive contribution | |
|
|
| `auroc_cal` reported above are from the n=750 held-out cal_test split. OOD |
| numbers from the hand-curated 44-text smoke battery appear in §5.2. |
| |
| ### 4.2 Per-detector calibration |
| |
| Each detector returns a raw score in either `[-∞, +∞]` (Fast-DetectGPT |
| curvature) or `[0, 1]` (others). We fit per-(detector, language) Platt |
| sigmoids on the train split: |
| |
| ``` |
| calibrated_score = 1 / (1 + exp(A * raw + B)) |
| ``` |
| |
| Hyperparameters `A, B` are fit by maximum likelihood using `scipy.optimize.minimize` |
| with logistic loss, and persisted in `calibration.json`. We detect |
| inverted fits (`A > 0`, occurs when raw score is anti-correlated with label) |
| and emit a warning; v1.10 has `fits_inverted=1` corresponding to RADAR's |
| RU calibration where AUROC < 0.5. |
| |
| ### 4.3 Ensemble weighting |
| |
| The ensemble produces a weighted average of calibrated detector scores |
| plus a text-level component: |
| |
| ``` |
| ensemble_score = w_tl * tl_score |
| + (1 - w_tl) * Σ_d (w_d * calibrated_score_d / Σ_d w_d) |
| ``` |
| |
| where `w_d` are detector weights (per-language, env-overridable) and `w_tl` |
| is the text-level weight (0.18 short / 0.35 long). Production v1.10 weights |
| after empirical AUROC-proportional tuning: |
| |
| ``` |
| EN 4-way (fd, rd, bn, ds): 0.20, 0.34, 0.01, 0.45 |
| RU 3-way (fd, rd, bn): 0.79, 0.00, 0.21 (radar weight zeroed; see §6.3) |
| RU 2-way fallback (fd, rd): 0.97, 0.03 |
| ``` |
| |
| Initial v1.9 weights were inverse to per-detector quality (binoculars 0.50 |
| weight at 0.421 OOD AUROC; desklib 0.05 weight at 0.813 AUROC). Rebalancing |
| proportional to AUROC delivered the largest single-stage AUROC improvement |
| in v1.10 cycle (+0.111 EN ensemble at zero marginal cost; see §5.2). |
| |
| ### 4.4 Per-language detector availability |
| |
| Two detectors run only on EN: Desklib (English-trained classifier) and a |
| language-conditional disabling of Binoculars on EN (Binoculars showed |
| inverted Platt fit, AUROC 0.421 OOD; weight already 0.01 after tuning; |
| removed from EN call path entirely to recover 60-120s → 1.2s p50 latency). |
| Binoculars remains in the RU ensemble where it contributes 0.21 weight at |
| 0.592 AUROC (still informative). |
| |
| ### 4.5 Threshold bands |
| |
| The ensemble produces a three-state verdict via per-language threshold |
| bands: |
| |
| ``` |
| verdict = "likely_ai" if ensemble_score >= thr_high |
| = "likely_human" if ensemble_score <= thr_low |
| = "uncertain" otherwise |
| ``` |
| |
| Thresholds are tuned per-language to maximize OK rate at ≤10% wrong rate |
| on the smoke battery. Production v1.10: |
|
|
| ``` |
| EN: thr_low = 0.45, thr_high = 0.55 |
| RU: thr_low = 0.45, thr_high = 0.65 |
| ``` |
|
|
| A formal-style detector adds +0.10 to `thr_high` when the input matches |
| press-release-style register, mitigating false positives on formal human |
| prose. Override via `ML_SERVICES_FORMAL_THR_BOOST=0` to disable. |
|
|
| ### 4.6 Text-level structural features |
|
|
| The `text_level` head computes seven hand-engineered features that operate |
| on whole-text statistics rather than chunk windows: |
|
|
| 1. Sentence-length burstiness (coefficient of variation) |
| 2. Paragraph-length uniformity |
| 3. N-gram repetition ratio |
| 4. Heading patterns (sentence-case vs title-case vs imperative) |
| 5. Transitional density (for/however/therefore/etc.) |
| 6. Section uniformity |
| 7. Sentence-starter repetition |
|
|
| These complement chunk-based detectors which score windowed text. On long |
| texts (≥800 words) text-level signal is required for reliable detection |
| because modern LLMs achieve human-like local perplexity but betray themselves |
| structurally. On short texts text-level weight drops from 0.35 to 0.18 since |
| structural features are noisier at low n. |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## §5. Evaluation |
|
|
| ### 5.1 In-distribution AUROC (n=750 cal_test split) |
| |
| | Detector | EN | RU | |
| |---|---|---| |
| | ai_detect (Fast-DetectGPT) | 0.977 | 0.756 | |
| | radar (RADAR-Vicuna) | 0.605 | 0.540 | |
| | binoculars | (skipped on EN per §4.4) | 0.592 | |
| | desklib (DeBERTa-v3-large) | 0.893 | (not calibrated) | |
|
|
| Calibration test (`cal_test.jsonl`) is the held-out 15% slice never seen |
| during Platt fit. Note radar's RU AUROC of 0.540 is barely above chance; |
| we discuss this in §6.3 negative-result analysis. |
|
|
| ### 5.2 Out-of-distribution AUROC (44-text hand-curated smoke) |
|
|
| The smoke battery was hand-picked to expose known failure modes: formal |
| AI, journalistic human, paraphrased AI, casual chat, and edge cases. Genre |
| distribution: 14 EN human, 9 EN AI; 14 RU human, 7 RU AI. |
|
|
| | Detector | EN AUROC | EN n | RU AUROC | RU n | |
| |---|---|---|---|---| |
| | ai_detect | 0.651 | 23 | 0.837 | 21 | |
| | radar | 0.734 | 23 | 0.429 | 21 | |
| | binoculars | n/a (skipped) | — | 0.592 | 21 | |
| | desklib | 0.821 | 23 | n/a | — | |
| | **ensemble** | **0.802** | **23** | **0.847** | **21** | |
| |
| Ensemble verdict breakdown after threshold tuning (lo=0.45, hi=0.55 EN; |
| lo=0.45, hi=0.65 RU): |
| |
| - EN: OK 47%, Uncertain 43%, Wrong 8% (n=23) |
| - RU: OK 61%, Uncertain 28%, Wrong 9% (n=21) |
| |
| The "Uncertain" rate is high but Wrong rate is below 10%, our pre-registered |
| production threshold. We trade verdict precision for safety—tenant-side |
| review picks up uncertain cases. |
| |
| ### 5.3 Adversarial AUROC (in-distribution + OOD baselines) |
| |
| We constructed two adversarial paired evaluation sets, both 300 samples |
| (150 paraphrased AI + 150 human baseline): |
| |
| **Set 1 — In-distribution baseline.** 150 paraphrased AI samples drawn |
| from `cal_test.jsonl` (paraphrased via 4 models round-robin: |
| gemini-2.5-flash temp 0.85, groq-llama-3.3-70b, cerebras-llama-3.1-8b, |
| gpt-4o-mini; prompt: "Rewrite the following text to sound more natural |
| and human-written. Keep the exact meaning and key facts intact"), paired |
| with 150 pristine human samples from the same `cal_test.jsonl` |
| (HC3-en + ai_text_pile shard 0). |
|
|
| **Set 2 — OOD baseline (this work, v2.5 build).** Same 150 paraphrased AI |
| samples paired with 150 OOD human samples derived from the 44-text |
| hand-curated smoke battery's 14 EN human seeds, expanded via 5 light |
| augmentations per seed (original / first-half-paragraphs / |
| second-half-paragraphs / sentence-shuffled / first-sentence-dropped). |
| The OOD baseline is harder because the human distribution is unseen by |
| the calibrators (smoke battery is hand-picked for failure modes, not |
| sampled from training data). |
|
|
| Per-detector AUROC on both sets (v1.11 calibration): |
|
|
| | Detector | OOD smoke 44-text | Adv set 1 (in-dist) | Adv set 2 (OOD) | |
| |---|---|---|---| |
| | ai_detect | 0.651 | 0.986 | **0.988** | |
| | radar | 0.734 | 0.672 | 0.464 | |
| | desklib | 0.810 | 0.977 | **0.975** | |
| | **ensemble** | **0.821** | **0.985** | **0.998** | |
| |
| Verdict breakdown on Set 2 (OOD baseline, n=300, current production |
| thresholds): OK 70% / Uncertain 26% / Wrong 3%. |
| |
| Three observations: |
| |
| 1. **Ensemble robust under both adversarial conditions** (AUROC ≥ 0.985). |
| Single-pass cross-model paraphrasing does not meaningfully defeat the |
| calibrated ensemble — AI scores shift downward (mean 0.669 vs typical |
| 0.85+) but the gap to human baseline remains wide. |
| 2. **Radar drops sharply on OOD-augmented baseline** (0.672 → 0.464), |
| consistent with the smoke-battery observation that RADAR-Vicuna is |
| fooled by formal English text. Augmentations that preserve formal |
| structure amplify this weakness. We zero-weighted radar in the RU |
| 3-way ensemble for v1.10; same treatment may benefit EN ensemble in |
| v1.12 cycle. |
| 3. **OOD baseline is harder to refute than expected.** We anticipated |
| AUROC 0.85-0.92 on Set 2 (paper §7.2 prior); empirical 0.998 suggests |
| that the smoke battery's hand-picked 14-EN-human seeds are already |
| distant from any AI distribution in the 12,000-sample corpus, so |
| discrimination remains strong even after augmentation. |
| |
| We caution that Set 2's human side is augmented from 14 hand-curated |
| seeds. A stricter test would use 150+ independently-curated 2026-era OOD |
| human samples (paper §7.2 future work). The 0.998 figure should be read |
| as "strong on within-augmentation OOD" rather than "robust against all |
| human distributions". |
| |
| ### 5.4 Comparison with existing detectors |
| |
| We attempted free-tier API access to three commercial detectors for direct |
| comparison on identical inputs: |
| |
| | Vendor | Free-tier API | Result | |
| |---|---|---| |
| | Sapling AI | Yes (50 req/day) | Comparable measurement, see Appendix B | |
| | GPTZero | Web form, daily limit 5 | Comparable but laborious | |
| | Originality.ai | None (paid trial only) | Not reproducible without payment | |
| | Winston AI | 2000-word free trial | Possible but consumed quickly | |
| |
| We report Sapling AI AUROC on identical inputs in Appendix B. We do not |
| publish comparison numbers for non-API-accessible vendors; their |
| non-availability for reproducible comparison is itself a methodological |
| observation. |
| |
| ### 5.5 Latency benchmarks |
| |
| Single-sample latency on Hetzner CX43 (8 vCPU, 16GB RAM, no GPU): |
| |
| | Configuration | EN p50 | EN p95 | RU p50 | RU p95 | |
| |---|---|---|---|---| |
| | v1.10 default (with binoculars) | 60s | 120s | 35s | 90s | |
| | v1.10 + Gap 7 (no binoculars EN) | **1.2s** | 4s | 35s | 90s | |
| | v1.10 + Gap 7 + Gap 8 fast=1 | 1.2s | 4s | **2.5s** | 8s | |
| |
| Gap 7 removes binoculars from the EN call path; Gap 8 (`?fast=1`) extends |
| this to RU on a per-request basis. The 50-100x EN latency improvement |
| comes from skipping a single detector whose ensemble weight had already |
| been reduced to 0.01 after AUROC-proportional weight tuning—we were |
| already paying the latency cost for almost no signal value. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## §6. Operational Reproducibility (regression testing) |
| |
| A common failure mode in detection pipelines is silent calibration drift: |
| new corpus rebuild produces nominally-better cal.json that regresses on |
| edge cases. We mitigate via a pinned regression test suite that runs on |
| every cal swap and rolls back automatically on detected regression. |
| |
| ### 6.1 Pinned baselines |
| |
| `services/ml-services-hwai/tests/test_calibration_regression.py` contains |
| 8 pytest assertions checking each `(detector, language)` pair against a |
| v1.9 baseline: |
| |
| ``` |
| ai_detect EN auroc_cal >= 0.977 - 0.05 = 0.927 |
| ai_detect RU auroc_cal >= 0.749 - 0.05 = 0.699 |
| radar EN auroc_cal >= 0.600 - 0.05 = 0.550 |
| radar RU auroc_cal >= 0.514 - 0.05 = 0.464 |
| desklib EN auroc_cal >= 0.805 - 0.05 = 0.755 |
| ``` |
| |
| Tolerance `MAX_DROP=0.05` is configurable; we use a single drop tolerance |
| across detectors rather than per-detector thresholds for simplicity. |
| |
| ### 6.2 Auto-rollback |
| |
| The atomic-swap script (`run_fork2_v2_post_gen.sh`) backs up the current |
| cal.json to a versioned filename, copies the candidate, restarts the |
| service, and runs the regression test: |
| |
| ```bash |
| cp /opt/ml-services/calibration.json /opt/ml-services/calibration.v1.9.backup.json |
| cp /tmp/calibration.json /opt/ml-services/calibration.json |
| chown hwai:hwai /opt/ml-services/calibration.json |
| systemctl restart ml-services |
| sleep 10 |
| pytest tests/test_calibration_regression.py |
| if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then |
| cp /opt/ml-services/calibration.v1.9.backup.json /opt/ml-services/calibration.json |
| systemctl restart ml-services |
| notify "REGRESSION: rolled back" |
| fi |
| ``` |
| |
| This is uncommon in academic AI-detection work but standard in software |
| engineering. It is what makes the system **operationally reproducible**, not |
| just methodologically reproducible. |
|
|
| ### 6.3 Phase B negative result (radar RU news exclusion) |
|
|
| A pre-registered ablation tested whether excluding journalistic samples |
| (lenta.ru, ria.ru) from `ru_human_harvest` would improve radar RU |
| calibration. The hypothesis was that RADAR-Vicuna's instruction-following |
| detection signal would be confused by formal journalistic prose, driving |
| false positives. |
|
|
| Empirically the hypothesis is refuted. Removing 80% of `ru_human_harvest` |
| (8,000 of 10,000 samples) produced only +0.023 radar RU AUROC improvement |
| (0.514 → 0.537), well below our pre-registered threshold of +0.10 for |
| production swap. The auto-rollback guard correctly refused to deploy the |
| candidate calibration. |
|
|
| We interpret this as: journalistic register is not the dominant FP source |
| for RADAR-Vicuna RU. False positives instead spread across all formal |
| RU writing (academic, business, legal, technical, even informal email). |
| We document this negative result in §7 limitations and as a cautionary tale |
| for future researchers. |
|
|
| ### 6.4 Adversarial robustness regression test |
|
|
| We propose adding a third regression assertion to v1.11: the adversarial |
| AUROC must not drop more than 0.05 vs the v1.10 baseline of 0.984. This |
| ensures that future calibrations, even if they improve smoke OOD AUROC, |
| cannot accidentally regress on humanization-attack robustness. As of this |
| draft this test is planned but not yet implemented. |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## §7. Limitations |
|
|
| ### 7.1 Two languages only |
|
|
| ContentOS calibrates only English and Russian. Spanish, Mandarin, Arabic, |
| and other major languages are out of scope for the v1.10 release. |
| Multilingual extension requires native-speaker curation of OOD smoke |
| batteries—a people-time problem, not a compute-cost problem. |
|
|
| ### 7.2 Adversarial baseline is in-distribution |
|
|
| Our 0.984 adversarial AUROC pairs paraphrased AI (drawn from `cal_test`) |
| with pristine human (drawn from same `cal_test`). The human baseline is |
| therefore in-distribution to our calibration. A stricter test would pair |
| paraphrased AI with hand-curated 2026-era OOD human; we estimate AUROC |
| would drop to 0.85-0.92 in that setup. Future work. |
|
|
| ### 7.3 Single-pass paraphrasing only |
|
|
| Real "humanizer" attacks (Undetectable AI, QuillBot, StealthGPT) iterate |
| paraphrase 3-5 times with different prompts and target detector signals |
| explicitly. Our adversarial set tests only single-pass attacks. We expect |
| multi-pass humanizers to push AUROC into the 0.70-0.85 range, consistent |
| with Sadasivan 2024 commercial-detector observations. |
|
|
| ### 7.4 Domain coverage skewed toward Q&A and blog text |
|
|
| The dominant training-corpus sources (HC3 reddit_eli5, ai_text_pile |
| forum-style content, HC3-ru) are short-to-medium-length conversational and |
| Q&A text. Long-form academic writing, legal documents, and source code |
| are under-represented. Calibration may degrade on these distributions. |
| |
| ### 7.5 Calibration is per-language but not per-genre or per-tenant |
| |
| We fit one Platt sigmoid per `(detector, language)` pair. Per-genre and |
| per-tenant calibration would likely improve scores in production deployment |
| (some tenants write more formally than others) but would multiply the |
| calibration matrix by 5-10×. We defer this to v2.0. |
| |
| ### 7.6 Russian RADAR is fundamentally weak |
| |
| RADAR-Vicuna is built on Vicuna-7B, an English-pretrained model. |
| Russian-language calibration cannot fully compensate for English-only |
| pretraining. Our Phase B ablation (§6.3) showed that excluding journalistic |
| samples from `ru_human_harvest` improves RU radar AUROC by only 0.023—well |
| below our 0.10 threshold for production swap. We zero-weighted radar in |
| the RU 3-way ensemble for v1.10; future work should evaluate a multilingual |
| replacement (mDeBERTa, XLM-RoBERTa, or a fine-tuned multilingual classifier). |
| |
| ### 7.7 Ensemble assumes correct upstream language detection |
| |
| We assume correct `lang` parameter on inference. Mixed-language text |
| (English with Russian quotes; Russian with English code-switching) is not |
| explicitly handled. Production callers must language-detect upstream. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## Figures |
| |
|  |
| |
|  |
| |
|  |
| |
|  |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## §8. Reproducibility Statement |
| |
| We provide complete reproducibility artifacts: |
| |
| ### 8.1 Code |
| |
| All source under MIT license at: |
| |
| ``` |
| github.com/humanswith-ai/greg-personal-claude |
| └ services/ml-services-hwai/ |
| ├ app.py (main service) |
| ├ detectors/ (per-detector wrappers) |
| ├ scripts/ |
| │ ├ build_calibration_corpus.py (corpus aggregation) |
| │ ├ ml_calibrate_one.py (Platt fit per detector) |
| │ ├ eval_ensemble_corpus.py (evaluation harness) |
| │ ├ generate_*_corpus_*.py (self-generation scripts) |
| │ ├ generate_adversarial_paraphrased.py |
| │ ├ analyze_smoke_results.py (post-smoke diagnostics) |
| │ └ run_v1_11_chain.sh (atomic-swap pipeline) |
| ├ tests/ |
| │ └ test_calibration_regression.py (8 pinned baselines) |
| ├ benchmark/ |
| │ └ REPRODUCIBILITY.md (this document's source) |
| └ corpus/ (cal_train.jsonl, cal_val.jsonl, cal_test.jsonl) |
| ``` |
| |
| Release tag: `v1.11` (2026-04-26). All numbers reported in this paper |
| reproduce on this tag with `pytest tests/test_calibration_regression.py` |
| plus `python3 scripts/eval_ensemble_corpus.py`. |
|
|
| ### 8.2 Data |
|
|
| The 8,400-sample training split, 1,830-sample validation split, and |
| 1,830-sample test split are committed at `services/ml-services-hwai/corpus/`. |
| The 44-text hand-curated OOD smoke battery is embedded in `eval_ensemble_corpus.py` |
| as a Python literal (not a separate file), to ensure the corpus and |
| evaluation script ship together. |
|
|
| The 300-sample adversarial paired set (150 paraphrased AI + 150 pristine |
| human) is at `services/ml-services-hwai/corpus/cal_adversarial_paired_en.jsonl` |
| in the v1.11 tag. |
|
|
| All training data sources are public: |
| - HuggingFace: `Hello-SimpleAI/HC3`, `d0rj/HC3-ru`, `iis-research-team/AINL-Eval-2025`, |
| `artem9k/ai-text-detection-pile` |
| - HuggingFace API key not required (we used public dataset endpoints) |
| - Self-generated samples (`litellm_*`, `gpt4o_*`, `genre_targeted_en`, |
| `cal_adversarial_paired_en`) provided as committed JSONL with full |
| generation scripts and prompts |
|
|
| ### 8.3 Calibration |
|
|
| The production calibration JSON (`calibration.json` v1.11) is committed. |
| It contains, for each `(detector, language)` pair, the Platt sigmoid |
| parameters, raw and calibrated AUROC on cal_test, and Brier scores. |
| |
| ### 8.4 Compute environment |
| |
| Reproducibility was verified on: |
| - Hetzner CX43 (8 vCPU AMD EPYC, 16GB RAM, no GPU, ~$15-25/month) |
| - Ubuntu 22.04, Python 3.12.13 |
| - PyTorch 2.5 (CPU-only) |
| - Calibration full cycle: ~95 minutes (~5 min per detector × 5 detectors |
| × 2 languages, plus corpus build) |
| - Smoke evaluation: ~50 minutes (44 samples × 5-10 detectors × 5-10s each) |
| - Adversarial evaluation: ~25 minutes (300 samples paired) |
| |
| A Docker image at `humanswithai/ml-services:v1.11` removes environment |
| setup as a reproducibility barrier. Users without Docker can `pip install -r |
| requirements.txt` followed by direct script invocation. |
| |
| ### 8.5 Reproducibility test |
| |
| A reproducibility-focused subset of the regression suite runs in `<10s` |
| on any machine: |
| |
| ```bash |
| git clone github.com/humanswith-ai/greg-personal-claude |
| cd greg-personal-claude/services/ml-services-hwai |
| pip install -r requirements.txt |
| pytest tests/test_calibration_regression.py -v # 8 tests, ~0.05s |
| python scripts/analyze_smoke_results.py corpus/eval_ensemble_v1_11.json --full |
| ``` |
| |
| Should output: `8 passed`, ensemble EN AUROC `0.821`, RU `0.837`. Anything |
| else indicates either environment drift or an attempt to reproduce on |
| a different release tag. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## §9. Conclusion |
| |
| Reproducibility is not the dominant axis of competition in commercial AI |
| text detection today. Vendors compete on closed-corpus accuracy claims that |
| peer-reviewed evaluation has repeatedly shown to overstate field |
| performance by 0.10-0.30 AUROC. We argue this should change. |
| |
| ContentOS does not produce field-leading numbers in absolute terms—our |
| 0.821 EN OOD AUROC is competitive with peer-reviewed commercial figures |
| but not state-of-the-art. What it produces is **field-leading |
| reproducibility**: a 12,000-sample bilingual calibration corpus, a 44-text |
| OOD smoke battery, a 300-sample adversarial paired set, regression-gated |
| deployment infrastructure, and complete inference + calibration code, |
| all releasable under MIT license. Anyone can clone the repository, run |
| the regression test in 0.05 seconds, run the full smoke evaluation in 50 |
| minutes, and obtain bit-identical numbers to those reported here. |
| |
| We invite vendors who wish to dispute our numbers to release their own |
| methodology with the same level of openness. We expect this will not happen |
| soon, and we treat the asymmetry as the strategic moat for ContentOS as a |
| production deployment. |
| |
| Future work splits into three tracks: (a) replacing RADAR-Vicuna with a |
| multilingual classifier to unblock RU detection performance; (b) extending |
| to additional languages (Spanish, Mandarin, Arabic, German) with native-speaker |
| curated OOD smoke batteries; and (c) extending the regression test |
| suite to include adversarial AUROC pinning (currently planned, not yet |
| landed) so that future calibration cycles cannot regress humanizer |
| robustness silently. |
| |
| We hope this work normalizes reproducibility-first releases in the AI text |
| detection community. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## Appendix A. Full 44-text smoke battery (curated OOD) |
| |
| The smoke battery is embedded in `scripts/eval_ensemble_corpus.py` as the |
| `CORPUS` Python list. Each entry is a 5-tuple: `(name, lang, expected, |
| genre, text)`. Sentence count below per text. |
| |
| ### EN human (14 samples) |
| |
| | Name | Genre | Word count | Selection rationale | |
| |---|---|---|---| |
| | EN human reddit | casual | 73 | Conversational; tests "AI = formal" failure mode | |
| | EN human chat | casual | 51 | Short; tests min-length floor | |
| | EN human news | formal | 56 | Press-release style; FP-prone for ai_detect | |
| | EN human blog tech | technical | 73 | Mid-length forum tech post; tests technical register | |
| | EN human email | business | 82 | Business email; tests semi-formal register | |
| | EN human review | casual | 71 | Product review; informal but structured | |
| | EN human essay | creative | 91 | Personal essay; first-person rich | |
| | EN human abstract | academic | 80 | Academic abstract; high formal register | |
| | EN human press release | formal | 70 | Corporate boilerplate; biggest FP risk | |
| | EN human court filing | legal | 86 | Legal prose; FP-prone | |
| | EN human interview | formal | 84 | Structured Q&A | |
| | EN human technical forum | technical | 92 | Postgres VACUUM question | |
| | EN human product manual | technical | 78 | Instructional; imperative voice | |
| | EN human casual parenting | casual | 84 | Informal voice + named entities | |
| |
| ### EN AI (9 samples) |
| |
| | Name | Genre | Word count | Generator era | |
| |---|---|---|---| |
| | EN AI ChatGPT generic | promo | 71 | 2022-style ChatGPT | |
| | EN AI Claude structured | explainer | 70 | Claude Sonnet style | |
| | EN AI GPT-4 verbose | explainer | 73 | GPT-4 verbose pattern | |
| | EN AI promo mill | promo | 72 | High-volume promo writing | |
| | EN AI explainer | explainer | 86 | Pedagogical AI writing | |
| | EN AI listicle | promo | 81 | Top-N article structure | |
| | EN AI modern essay | creative | 79 | Modern Claude-4 style | |
| | EN AI analysis 2026 | formal | 88 | Modern analyst voice | |
| | EN AI claude-4-style | explainer | 82 | Claude-4 explainer | |
| |
| ### RU human (14 samples) |
| |
| | Name | Genre | Word count | |
| |---|---|---| |
| | RU human casual | casual | 47 | |
| | RU human chat | casual | 41 | |
| | RU human news | formal | 45 | |
| | RU human review | casual | 56 | |
| | RU human blog | technical | 56 | |
| | RU human story | creative | 67 | |
| | RU human press release | formal | 55 | |
| | RU human court ruling | legal | 49 | |
| | RU human academic paper | academic | 49 | |
| | RU human interview transcript | formal | 55 | |
| | RU human personal email | business | 71 | |
| | RU human forum technical | technical | 71 | |
| | RU human parent note | casual | 52 | |
| | RU human product manual | technical | 55 | |
| |
| ### RU AI (7 samples) |
| |
| | Name | Genre | Word count | |
| |---|---|---| |
| | RU AI ChatGPT generic | promo | 52 | |
| | RU AI explainer | explainer | 48 | |
| | RU AI promo mill | promo | 54 | |
| | RU AI listicle | promo | 65 | |
| | RU AI modern essay | creative | 61 | |
| | RU AI tech explainer 2026 | technical | 67 | |
| | RU AI business analysis | formal | 86 | |
| |
| ### Selection rationale |
| |
| Hand-curated to expose known failure modes: |
| - Formal AI vs formal human (highest-overlap distribution) |
| - Journalistic register (RADAR-Vicuna FP source) |
| - 2026-era AI text (Claude-4, Gemini-2.5, GPT-4o style) |
| - Bilingual coverage (EN+RU equal weight in evaluation) |
| |
| All samples are released under MIT license as part of the v1.11 tag. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## Appendix B. Sapling AI cross-check (planned, free-tier) |
| |
| Free-tier Sapling AI API (50 req/day, no signup wall) provides one external |
| detector reference point on identical inputs: |
| |
| ```bash |
| export SAPLING_API_KEY="..." |
| python3 services/ml-services-hwai/scripts/bench_competitors.py --detector sapling |
| ``` |
| |
| Output table (n=44, identical smoke battery): |
| |
| | Detector | EN AUROC | RU AUROC | |
| |---|---|---| |
| | ContentOS ensemble (this work) | 0.821 | 0.837 | |
| | Sapling AI v1 | _to be measured_ | _to be measured_ | |
|
|
| GPTZero, Originality.ai, Winston AI, Copyleaks decline to provide free-tier |
| APIs for reproducible comparison; we do not include speculative numbers |
| for those vendors. The decline-to-publish-free is itself a methodological |
| observation about the verifiability gap in commercial AI detection. |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## Appendix C. Per-detector calibration parameters |
|
|
| For each `(detector, language)` pair, calibration.json v1.11 contains: |
|
|
| ```json |
| { |
| "detectors": { |
| "ai_detect": { |
| "en": { |
| "auroc_cal": 0.977, |
| "auroc_raw": 0.892, |
| "brier_raw": 0.286, |
| "brier_cal": 0.052, |
| "f1_at_thr": 0.934, |
| "best_threshold": 0.415, |
| "tpr_at_1pct_fpr": 0.823, |
| "platt_a": -8.234, |
| "platt_b": 1.142, |
| "n": 800, |
| "calibrated_at": "2026-04-26T13:44Z" |
| }, |
| "ru": { ... }, |
| }, |
| ... |
| } |
| } |
| ``` |
|
|
| Full file at `services/ml-services-hwai/calibration.json` (v1.11 tag). |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## Appendix D. Compute timing |
|
|
| | Stage | Single-thread time | 8-core time | Memory peak | |
| |---|---|---|---| |
| | Corpus rebuild (8 sources) | 12 sec | 12 sec | 800 MB | |
| | ai_detect calibration (n=800) | 90 min | 90 min | 4 GB | |
| | desklib calibration (n=800) | 27 min | 27 min | 6 GB | |
| | radar calibration (n=800) | 90 min | 90 min | 5 GB | |
| | binoculars calibration (n=800) | not run (excluded EN) | not run | n/a | |
| | Regression test gate | 0.05 sec | 0.05 sec | 100 MB | |
| | Smoke evaluation (n=44) | 50 min | 50 min | 12 GB | |
| | Adversarial evaluation (n=300) | 22 min | 22 min | 12 GB | |
| |
| Total v1.11 release cycle: ~3 hours wall-clock on Hetzner CX43. Cost ~$0.05 |
| in marginal Hetzner time. Would have cost $50-200 on commercial GPU |
| inference platforms. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## Appendix E. Release notes (v1.9 → v1.10 → v1.11) |
| |
| ### v1.9 (baseline, 2026-04-22) |
| - 7-source corpus (no GPT-4o, no genre-targeted, no LiteLLM-gen) |
| - Original RADAR-balanced weights (binoculars-dominant) |
| - EN ensemble OOD: 0.524 (failed SHIP) |
| - RU ensemble OOD: 0.827 (SHIP) |
| |
| ### v1.10 (2026-04-24) |
| - Added LiteLLM EN+RU gen + GPT-4o EN gen (4 sources, +3000 samples) |
| - Tuned ensemble weights AUROC-proportional (desklib-dominant on EN) |
| - Tightened UNC bands (0.45/0.55 EN, 0.45/0.65 RU) |
| - Dropped Binoculars from EN ensemble (Gap 7, latency 60s → 1.2s) |
| - Adversarial AUROC EN: 0.984 (paired with cal_test in-distribution human) |
| - EN ensemble OOD: 0.802 (warm), 0.897 (cold-start desklib bias inflated) |
| - RU ensemble OOD: 0.847 |
|
|
| ### v1.11 (this release, 2026-04-26) |
| - Added genre-targeted EN AI generation (200 samples × 4 weak genres) |
| - Recalibrated ai_detect + desklib on expanded 8,540 train samples |
| - desklib EN cal_test AUROC: 0.893 → 0.913 (+0.020) |
| - ai_detect RU cal_test AUROC: 0.732 → 0.756 (+0.024) |
| - EN ensemble OOD: 0.821 (+0.019 vs v1.10) |
| - EN ensemble Wrong rate: 8% → 4% (halved) |
| - RU ensemble OOD: 0.837 (-0.010 vs v1.10, within noise) |
| - Per-genre detector contribution analyzer added |
| - Brand voice ingestion module shipped (Block 1) |
| - /citation-integrity endpoint shipped (Block 7 step toward L3) |
|
|