text
stringlengths
0
1.05M
No, not likely. Misleading statement. The guy he hit might have been doing 120, but for him to hit that guy with a closing speed of 120, he would have had to be in a 240 mph dive. Not likely on a normal group skydive. And if he had, consequences would have been far more severe.
No, not likely. Misleading statement. The guy he hit might have been doing 120, but for him to hit that guy with a closing speed of 120, he would have had to be in a 240 mph dive. Not likely on a normal group skydive. And if he had, consequences would have been far more severe.
477 So.2d 537 (1985)
Walter Gale STEINHORST, Petitioner,
v.
Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.
No. 64755.
Supreme Court of Florida.
September 26, 1985.
Rehearing Denied November 19, 1985.
*538 Stephen D. Alexander and Wendy Snyder of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York City, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Lawrence A. Kaden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
This proceeding is before the Court on the petition of Walter Gale Steinhorst for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner Steinhorst is a state prisoner under sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.
Steinhorst was convicted of four counts of first-degree murder. He received sentences *539 of death on three of the murder convictions and a sentence of life imprisonment on the remaining conviction. On appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions and the sentences of death. Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1982...
We note at the outset that, with regard to each of the issues upon which petitioner contends he received inadequate legal representation, the legal merits of those issues, had they been argued on appeal, are not before us. The principle of finality of judgments, and the requirement that challenges to judgments and sent...
Petitioner first argues that his counsel on appeal was inadequate in not arguing that petitioner was improperly prejudiced by pretrial publicity in violation of his due process rights. This issue, however, was not raised at trial by means of some kind of motion for protection or relief from the effects of publicity. Th...
Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel should not have thought that he was precluded from making the argument concerning publicity because the effects of publicity created such a substantial due process violation as to constitute fundamental error. Thus in effect the petitioner is arguing that his appellate couns...
Petitioner next argues that his counsel on appeal inadequately argued the contention that the trial court had erred in granting the state two challenges of prospective jurors for cause based on expressions of views unfavorable to capital punishment. It should be noted that petitioner's appeal counsel did in fact argue ...
*540 Petitioner argues that the trial court's rulings on the two prospective jurors were susceptible to challenge on appeal on three grounds: (1) violation of the principle of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 368 (1968), with regard to the role of the jury in making a capital sentencing ...
With regard to the Witherspoon issue it is clear to us that appellate counsel did not argue the issue because it did not appear to carry much chance of success. That is, counsel believed that the challenges for cause were properly granted under Florida law and under the Witherspoon principle. When counsel makes a choic...
With regard to the argument that appellate counsel should have attacked the challenges on the ground that they rendered the jury conviction-prone, we observe that appellate counsel could not have raised the issue because it was not raised by objection at trial. See, e.g., Maggard v. State, 399 So.2d 973 (Fla. 1981). Mo...
Regarding the third ground of attack on the jury selection rulings mentioned above, it should be noted that the issue of denial of a representative jury was in fact argued on appeal and rejected on its merits by this Court. Petitioner's contention that it was inadequately argued merely expresses dissatisfaction with th...
Next petitioner argues that his appeal counsel was ineffective in that he did not adequately argue that the trial court had erred in allowing state witnesses to testify after violation of the court's order of witness sequestration. We note that it was in fact argued on appeal that the trial court had committed reversib...
Next petitioner argues that his appeal counsel, although he argued that the trial court had improperly limited cross-examination of a state witness in violation of due process, did not present the issue adequately and properly. Again it appears that petitioner regards the performance of appellate counsel as inadequate ...
As petitioner must acknowledge, appeal counsel did in fact argue that the trial court had violated defendant's rights by refusing to compel a certain witness to answer questions posed by defense counsel on cross examination. At trial state's witness Capo testified concerning a conversation he had with Steinhorst in whi...
On appeal, petitioner's counsel argued that the trial court had erroneously limited the defendant's cross-examination of the witness, preventing the development of a viable theory of defense in violation of due process principles. The theory then argued was that Capo, as one of the main organizers of the smuggling oper...
Petitioner says that rather than arguing prevention of the development of a theory of defense, appellate counsel should have challenged the procedure whereby the objection to defendant's cross examination of the witness was made on behalf of the witness himself rather than by the state. However, as pointed out by this ...
Finally petitioner says that his appeal attorney rendered defective professional service in not arguing that the trial court in sentencing petitioner to death had improperly considered information derived from a source other than the record evidence adduced at petitioner's trial. Petitioner argues that the trial judge ...