metadata
language:
- en
license: apache-2.0
tags:
- sentence-transformers
- sentence-similarity
- feature-extraction
- dense
- generated_from_trainer
- dataset_size:1580
- loss:MatryoshkaLoss
- loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
base_model: intfloat/multilingual-e5-large
widget:
- source_sentence: >-
What types of data processing allow for derogations from certain rights
under Union or Member State law?
sentences:
- >-
1.Where personal data relating to a data subject are collected from the
data subject, the controller shall, at the time when personal data are
obtained, provide the data subject with all of the following
information: (a) the identity and the contact details of the controller
and, where applicable, of the controller's representative; (b) the
contact details of the data protection officer, where applicable; (c)
the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended
as well as the legal basis for the processing; 4.5.2016 L 119/40 (d)
where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 6(1), the
legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party; (e)
the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data, if any;
(f) where applicable, the fact that the controller intends to transfer
personal data to a third country or international organisation and the
existence or absence of an adequacy decision by the Commission, or in
the case of transfers referred to in Article 46 or 47, or the second
subparagraph of Article 49(1), reference to the appropriate or suitable
safeguards and the means by which to obtain a copy of them or where they
have been made available.
2.In addition to the information referred to in paragraph 1, the
controller shall, at the time when personal data are obtained, provide
the data subject with the following further information necessary to
ensure fair and transparent processing: (a) the period for which the
personal data will be stored, or if that is not possible, the criteria
used to determine that period; (b) the existence of the right to
request from the controller access to and rectification or erasure of
personal data or restriction of processing concerning the data subject
or to object to processing as well as the right to data portability;
(c) where the processing is based on point (a) of Article 6(1) or point
(a) of Article 9(2), the existence of the right to withdraw consent at
any time, without affecting the lawfulness of processing based on
consent before its withdrawal; (d) the right to lodge a complaint with
a supervisory authority; (e) whether the provision of personal data is
a statutory or contractual requirement, or a requirement necessary to
enter into a contract, as well as whether the data subject is obliged to
provide the personal data and of the possible consequences of failure to
provide such data; (f) the existence of automated decision-making,
including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least
in those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well
as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing
for the data subject.
3.Where the controller intends to further process the personal data for
a purpose other than that for which the personal data were collected,
the controller shall provide the data subject prior to that further
processing with information on that other purpose and with any relevant
further information as referred to in paragraph 2
4.Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall not apply where and insofar as the data
subject already has the information.
- >-
The processing of personal data should also be regarded to be lawful
where it is necessary to protect an interest which is essential for the
life of the data subject or that of another natural person. Processing
of personal data 4.5.2016 L 119/8 Official Journal of the European Union
EN
- >-
1.Processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific
or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, shall be
subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation,
for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall
ensure that technical and organisational measures are in place in
particular in 4.5.2016 L 119/84 order to ensure respect for the
principle of data minimisation. Those measures may include
pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that
manner. Where those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing
which does not permit or no longer permits the identification of data
subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner.
2.Where personal data are processed for scientific or historical
research purposes or statistical purposes, Union or Member State law may
provide for derogations from the rights referred to in Articles 15, 16,
18 and 21 subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in
paragraph 1 of this Article in so far as such rights are likely to
render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the specific
purposes, and such derogations are necessary for the fulfilment of those
purposes.
3.Where personal data are processed for archiving purposes in the public
interest, Union or Member State law may provide for derogations from the
rights referred to in Articles 15, 16, 18, 19, 20 and 21 subject to the
conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article in
so far as such rights are likely to render impossible or seriously
impair the achievement of the specific purposes, and such derogations
are necessary for the fulfilment of those purposes.
4.Where processing referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 serves at the same
time another purpose, the derogations shall apply only to processing for
the purposes referred to in those paragraphs.
- source_sentence: What is the specific date mentioned in the text?
sentences:
- >-
1.Processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific
or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, shall be
subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation,
for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall
ensure that technical and organisational measures are in place in
particular in 4.5.2016 L 119/84 order to ensure respect for the
principle of data minimisation. Those measures may include
pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that
manner. Where those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing
which does not permit or no longer permits the identification of data
subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner.
2.Where personal data are processed for scientific or historical
research purposes or statistical purposes, Union or Member State law may
provide for derogations from the rights referred to in Articles 15, 16,
18 and 21 subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in
paragraph 1 of this Article in so far as such rights are likely to
render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the specific
purposes, and such derogations are necessary for the fulfilment of those
purposes.
3.Where personal data are processed for archiving purposes in the public
interest, Union or Member State law may provide for derogations from the
rights referred to in Articles 15, 16, 18, 19, 20 and 21 subject to the
conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article in
so far as such rights are likely to render impossible or seriously
impair the achievement of the specific purposes, and such derogations
are necessary for the fulfilment of those purposes.
4.Where processing referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 serves at the same
time another purpose, the derogations shall apply only to processing for
the purposes referred to in those paragraphs.
- >-
1) 'personal data' means any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable natural
person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an
identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or
more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;
(2) ‘processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not
by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation,
structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation,
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or
destruction;
(3) ‘restriction of processing’ means the marking of stored personal
data with the aim of limiting their processing in the future;
(4) ‘profiling’ means any form of automated processing of personal data
consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal
aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or
predict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work,
economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests,
reliability, behaviour, location or movements;
(5) ‘pseudonymisation’ means the processing of personal data in such a
manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific
data subject without the use of additional information, provided that
such additional information is kept separately and is subject to
technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data
are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person;
(6) ‘filing system’ means any structured set of personal data which are
accessible according to specific criteria, whether centralised,
decentralised or dispersed on a functional or geographical basis;
(7) ‘controller’ means the natural or legal person, public authority,
agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the
purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the
purposes and means of such processing are determined by Union or Member
State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination
may be provided for by Union or Member State law;
(8) ‘processor’ means a natural or legal person, public authority,
agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf of the
controller;
(9) ‘recipient’ means a natural or legal person, public authority,
agency or another body, to which the personal data are disclosed,
whether a third party or not. However, public authorities which may
receive personal data in the framework of a particular inquiry in
accordance with Union or Member State law shall not be regarded as
recipients; the processing of those data by those public authorities
shall be in compliance with the applicable data protection rules
according to the purposes of the processing;
(10) ‘third party’ means a natural or legal person, public authority,
agency or body other than the data subject, controller, processor and
persons who, under the direct authority of the controller or processor,
are authorised to process personal data;
(11) ‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific,
informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by
which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action,
signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him
or her;
(12) ‘personal data breach’ means a breach of security leading to the
accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised
disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or
otherwise processed;
(13) ‘genetic data’ means personal data relating to the inherited or
acquired genetic characteristics of a natural person which give unique
information about the physiology or the health of that natural person
and which result, in particular, from an analysis of a biological sample
from the natural person in question;
(14) ‘biometric data’ means personal data resulting from specific
technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or
behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm
the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images
or dactyloscopic data;
(15) ‘data concerning health’ means personal data related to the
physical or mental health of a natural person, including the provision
of health care services, which reveal information about his or her
health status;
(16) ‘main establishment’ means: (a) as regards a controller with
establishments in more than one Member State, the place of its central
administration in the Union, unless the decisions on the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data are taken in another
establishment of the controller in the Union and the latter
establishment has the power to have such decisions implemented, in which
case the establishment having taken such decisions is to be considered
to be the main establishment; (b) as regards a processor with
establishments in more than one Member State, the place of its central
administration in the Union, or, if the processor has no central
administration in the Union, the establishment of the processor in the
Union where the main processing activities in the context of the
activities of an establishment of the processor take place to the extent
that the processor is subject to specific obligations under this
Regulation;
(17) ‘representative’ means a natural or legal person established in the
Union who, designated by the controller or processor in writing pursuant
to Article 27, represents the controller or processor with regard to
their respective obligations under this Regulation;
(18) ‘enterprise’ means a natural or legal person engaged in an economic
activity, irrespective of its legal form, including partnerships or
associations regularly engaged in an economic activity;
(19) ‘group of undertakings’ means a controlling undertaking and its
controlled undertakings;
(20) ‘binding corporate rules’ means personal data protection policies
which are adhered to by a controller or processor established on the
territory of a Member State for transfers or a set of transfers of
personal data to a controller or processor in one or more third
countries within a group of undertakings, or group of enterprises
engaged in a joint economic activity;
(21) ‘supervisory authority’ means an independent public authority which
is established by a Member State pursuant to Article 51;
(22) ‘supervisory authority concerned’ means a supervisory authority
which is concerned by the processing of personal data because: (a) the
controller or processor is established on the territory of the Member
State of that supervisory authority; (b) data subjects residing in the
Member State of that supervisory authority are substantially affected or
likely to be substantially affected by the processing; or (c) a
complaint has been lodged with that supervisory authority;
(23) ‘cross-border processing’ means either: (a) processing of personal
data which takes place in the context of the activities of
establishments in more than one Member State of a controller or
processor in the Union where the controller or processor is established
in more than one Member State; or (b) processing of personal data which
takes place in the context of the activities of a single establishment
of a controller or processor in the Union but which substantially
affects or is likely to substantially affect data subjects in more than
one Member State.
(24) ‘relevant and reasoned objection’ means an objection to a draft
decision as to whether there is an infringement of this Regulation, or
whether envisaged action in relation to the controller or processor
complies with this Regulation, which clearly demonstrates the
significance of the risks posed by the draft decision as regards the
fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects and, where applicable,
the free flow of personal data within the Union;
(25) ‘information society service’ means a service as defined in point
(b) of Article 1(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European
Parliament and of the Council (1);
(26) ‘international organisation’ means an organisation and its
subordinate bodies governed by public international law, or any other
body which is set up by, or on the basis of, an agreement between two or
more countries.
- >-
1.A transfer of personal data to a third country or an international
organisation may take place where the Commission has decided that the
third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within that
third country, or the international organisation in question ensures an
adequate level of protection. Such a transfer shall not require any
specific authorisation.
2.When assessing the adequacy of the level of protection, the Commission
shall, in particular, take account of the following elements: (a) the
rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant
legislation, both general and sectoral, including concerning public
security, defence, national security and criminal law and the access of
public authorities to personal data, as well as the implementation of
such legislation, data protection rules, professional rules and security
measures, including rules for the onward transfer of personal data to
another third country or international organisation which are complied
with in that country or international organisation, case-law, as well as
effective and enforceable data subject rights and effective
administrative and judicial redress for the data subjects whose personal
data are being transferred; (b) the existence and effective functioning
of one or more independent supervisory authorities in the third country
or to which an international organisation is subject, with
responsibility for ensuring and enforcing compliance with the data
protection rules, including adequate enforcement powers, for assisting
and advising the data subjects in exercising their rights and for
cooperation with the supervisory authorities of the Member States; and
(c) the international commitments the third country or international
organisation concerned has entered into, or other obligations arising
from legally binding conventions or instruments as well as from its
participation in multilateral or regional systems, in particular in
relation to the protection of personal data.
3.The Commission, after assessing the adequacy of the level of
protection, may decide, by means of implementing act, that a third
country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within a third
country, or an international organisation ensures an adequate level of
protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article. The
implementing act shall provide for a mechanism for a periodic review, at
least every four years, which shall take into account all relevant
developments in the third country or international organisation. The
implementing act shall specify its territorial and sectoral application
and, where applicable, identify the supervisory authority or authorities
referred to in point (b) of paragraph 2 of this Article. The
implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination
procedure referred to in Article 93(2).
4.The Commission shall, on an ongoing basis, monitor developments in
third countries and international organisations that could affect the
functioning of decisions adopted pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article
and decisions adopted on the basis of Article 25(6) of Directive
95/46/EC.
5.The Commission shall, where available information reveals, in
particular following the review referred to in paragraph 3 of this
Article, that a third country, a territory or one or more specified
sectors within a third country, or an international organisation no
longer ensures an adequate level of protection within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of this Article, to the extent necessary, repeal, amend or
suspend the decision referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article by means
of implementing acts without retro-active effect. Those implementing
acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure
referred to in Article 93(2). On duly justified imperative grounds of
urgency, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing
acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 93(3).
6.The Commission shall enter into consultations with the third country
or international organisation with a view to remedying the situation
giving rise to the decision made pursuant to paragraph 5
7.A decision pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Article is without
prejudice to transfers of personal data to the third country, a
territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country, or
the international organisation in question pursuant to Articles 46 to 49
8.The Commission shall publish in the Official Journal of the European
Union and on its website a list of the third countries, territories and
specified sectors within a third country and international organisations
for which it has decided that an adequate level of protection is or is
no longer ensured.
9.Decisions adopted by the Commission on the basis of Article 25(6) of
Directive 95/46/EC shall remain in force until amended, replaced or
repealed by a Commission Decision adopted in accordance with paragraph 3
or 5 of this Article.
- source_sentence: Which type of requests did the banks accept?
sentences:
- >-
**Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**
**Provisions:**
**Time of commission of the act:**
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**
**Rationale:**
**Facts:**
The plaintiff holds credit card number ............ with the defendant
banking corporation. Based on the application for alternative networks
dated 19/7/2015 with number ......... submitted at a branch of the
defendant, he was granted access to the electronic banking service
(e-banking) to conduct banking transactions (debit, credit, updates,
payments) remotely. On 30/11/2020, the plaintiff fell victim to
electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown
perpetrator managed to withdraw a total amount of €3,121.75 from the
aforementioned credit card. Specifically, the plaintiff received an
email at 1:35 PM on 29/11/2020 from sender ...... with address ........,
informing him that due to an impending system change, he needed to
verify the mobile phone number linked to the credit card, urging him to
complete the verification process within the next 24 hours by following
a link titled ........; otherwise, his account would be locked for
security reasons. The plaintiff read this email on the afternoon of 30
November 2020 and, believing it was from the defendant, followed the
instructions and proceeded via the provided link to a website that was
identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked
to enter the six-digit security code (.........) that had just been sent
to his mobile phone by the defendant at 3:41 PM, with the note that it
was an activation code for his ........ card at ........., which he
entered.
Subsequently, the plaintiff received, according to his statements, a new
email (not submitted), which requested him to enter the details of the
aforementioned credit card, specifically the name of the cardholder and
the card number, not the PIN, which he also entered, convinced that he
was within the online environment of the defendant. Then, at 3:47 PM, he
received a message on his mobile phone from the defendant containing the
exact same content as the one he received at 3:41 PM, while at 3:50 PM
he received a message stating that the activation of his ......... card
at ....... had been completed. Once the plaintiff read this, he became
concerned that something was not right, and immediately called (at 4:41
PM) the defendant's call center to inform them. There, the employees,
with whom he finally connected at 5:04 PM due to high call center
volume, advised him to delete the relevant emails, cancel his credit
card, change his access passwords for the service, and submit a dispute
request regarding the conducted transactions. The plaintiff
electronically sent this request to the defendant, disputing the
detailed transactions amounting to €3,121.75, which were conducted on
30/11/2020 during the time frame of 16:37:45-16:43:34 PM, arguing that
he had neither performed them himself nor authorized anyone else to do
so. The plaintiff specifically disputed the following transactions, as
evidenced by the account activity of the disputed credit card during the
aforementioned timeframe: a) transaction number ......... amounting to
€150.62 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:43:34 PM, b) transaction number
........ amounting to €293.20 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42:40 PM, c)
transaction number ............ amounting to €295.21 conducted on
30/11/2020 at 4:42:10 PM, d) transaction number .......... amounting to
€299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:41:31 PM, e) transaction number
........ amounting to €297.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:41:01 PM, f)
transaction number ........ amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020
at 4:40:27 PM, g) transaction number ....... amounting to €299.22
conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:55 PM, h) transaction number ......
amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:22 PM, i)
transaction number ......... amounting to €297.22 conducted on
30/11/2020 at 4:38:52 PM, j) transaction number ......... amounting to
€295.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:38:17 PM, and k) transaction number
......... amounting to €296.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:37:45 PM. In
its response letter dated 21/12/2020, the defendant denied
responsibility for the costs of the aforementioned transactions, placing
the entire blame on the plaintiff for the leak of his card details and
security code to the fraudulent page. The plaintiff, completely denying
any fault for the conducted transactions, repeatedly contacted the
defendant, both by phone and via email (see emails dated 15/1/2021 and
11/2/2021), while on 2/3/2021, he electronically sent a report dated
1/03/2021 to the Consumer Advocate’s email address, recounting the
events and requesting that the aforementioned Independent Authority
intervene to have the disputed debt canceled. In its letter with
reference number ...../27.04.2021, the aforementioned Independent
Authority informed the plaintiff that the case was outside its mediating
role and was therefore archived. Subsequently, the plaintiff sent the
defendant on 5/3/2021 his extrajudicial statement dated 4/3/2021,
calling upon it to fully cancel the debt of €3,121.75 that had been
unjustly incurred against him within two days and to immediately
instruct the representatives of the collection agency working with it to
cease contacting him regarding the disputed case. The defendant sent the
plaintiff a message on his mobile phone on 20/04/2021 informing him that
his case was still being processed due to lengthy operational
requirements, while on 23/04/2021, via email, it informed him that
considering their good cooperation and his efforts to keep them updated,
it had reviewed his case and decided to refund him the amounts of the
transactions that were conducted after his contact with their
representatives on 30/11/2020 at 4:41 PM, totaling €1,038.25,
specifically the following: a) transaction of €150.62 conducted on
30/11/2020 at 4:43 PM, b) transaction of €295.21 conducted on 30/11/2020
at 4:42 PM, c) transaction of €293.20 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42
PM, and d) transaction of €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:41 PM.
Beyond this, the defendant refused to refund the plaintiff the amount of
the remaining transactions conducted on 30/11/2020, totaling €2,376.08
(and not €2,376.48 as incorrectly stated by the plaintiff in his
lawsuit), which the plaintiff ultimately fully paid, transferring
€2,342.77 to the defendant on 7/06/2021 and €33.31 on 15/06/2021 (see
related deposit receipts).
- >-
1.Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union
membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the
purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health
or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation
shall be prohibited.
2.Paragraph 1 shall not apply if one of the following applies: (a) the
data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those
personal data for one or more specified purposes, except where Union or
Member State law provide that the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1
may not be lifted by the data subject; (b) processing is necessary for
the purposes of carrying out the obligations and exercising specific
rights of the controller or of the data subject in the field of
employment and social security and social protection law in so far as it
is authorised by Union or Member State law or a collective agreement
pursuant to Member State law providing for appropriate safeguards for
the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject; (c)
processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data
subject or of another natural person where the data subject is
physically or legally incapable of giving consent; (d) processing is
carried out in the course of its legitimate activities with appropriate
safeguards by a foundation, association or any other not-for-profit body
with a political, philosophical, religious or trade union aim and on
condition that the processing relates solely to the members or to former
members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in
connection with its purposes and that the personal data are not
disclosed outside that body without the consent of the data subjects;
(e) processing relates to personal data which are manifestly made
public by the data subject; (f) processing is necessary for the
establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or whenever courts
are acting in their judicial capacity; (g) processing is necessary for
reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of Union or Member
State law which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the
essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable and
specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests
of the data subject; (h) processing is necessary for the purposes of
preventive or occupational medicine, for the assessment of the working
capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of health or
social care or treatment or the management of health or social care
systems and services on the basis of Union or Member State law or
pursuant to contract with a health professional and subject to the
conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 3; (i) processing is
necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public health,
such as protecting against serious cross-border threats to health or
ensuring high standards of quality and safety of health care and of
medicinal products or medical devices, on the basis of Union or Member
State law which provides for suitable and specific measures to safeguard
the rights and freedoms of the data subject, in particular professional
secrecy; 4.5.2016 L 119/38 (j) processing is necessary for archiving
purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research
purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) based
on Union or Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim
pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide
for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights
and the interests of the data subject.
3.Personal data referred to in paragraph 1 may be processed for the
purposes referred to in point (h) of paragraph 2 when those data are
processed by or under the responsibility of a professional subject to
the obligation of professional secrecy under Union or Member State law
or rules established by national competent bodies or by another person
also subject to an obligation of secrecy under Union or Member State law
or rules established by national competent bodies.
4.Member States may maintain or introduce further conditions, including
limitations, with regard to the processing of genetic data, biometric
data or data concerning health.
- >-
**Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**
**Provisions:**
**Time of commission of the act:**
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**
**Reasoning:** Claim for compensation and monetary satisfaction due to
moral damage against a mobile phone company and a credit institution
within the framework of inadequate fulfillment of a payment services
contract for "web banking." Appropriate actions for mobile phone
companies in case of a request for a "sim" card replacement due to wear
or loss. They must verify the customer's identity based on the personal
details and identification information registered in their system but
are not liable for any changes in the latter that were not timely
communicated to them. Further security measures such as phone
communication or sending an SMS to the mobile number holder are not
required. Payment services under Law 4357/2018. Obligation of the
payment service provider, such as banks, to inform the payer after
receiving a relevant order for making a payment. The content of this
varies per case, such as sending a personalized code to the user's
mobile phone for transaction approval, as well as sending an email
immediately after its completion. However, the bank is not liable for
customer damage resulting from illicit electronic transactions due to
third-party interception of either the access codes for electronic
banking transactions or the sim card and the phone number to which the
personalized codes for approving the aforementioned transactions are
sent, within the framework of increased security protocols. Appropriate
actions by banks upon diagnosing illicit banking transactions that may
be fraudulent. Relevant criteria for consideration. The evidence did not
indicate negligent and thus tortious behavior from all defendants. The
claim is dismissed.
**Facts:** In the present claim, upon due assessment of its content, the
plaintiff states that he has a mobile phone subscription with the first
defendant, a mobile phone company. On October 26, 2020, in the morning,
he realized that his mobile phone was offline, and by noon, he received
email notifications from Bank .......... and ............ (whose third
and fourth defendants are de facto universal successors, respectively),
with which he holds an account, regarding transactions he had made. From
phone calls from his home phone to Bank .............. and ............
Bank, he was informed that on the same day, in a very short period, four
money transfers had been made from the account he maintains at Bank
.............., specifically, an amount of €15,000 was transferred to
the account mentioned in the claim document under the name ...........,
at ........ an amount of €15,000 was transferred to the account
mentioned in the claim document under the name ......... at ...........
Bank, an amount of €15,000 was transferred to the plaintiff's account
with his daughter as a co-holder at ......... Bank, and an amount of
€6,700 was transferred from another of his accounts to the account from
which the transfer to the aforementioned accounts of €45,000 was made.
Additionally, from the plaintiff's account with his daughter as a
co-holder at .......... Bank, an amount of €9,999 was transferred to an
account under the name of .... . He attempted to log into the online
banking service of Bank ......... from his home computer, but found that
the service was locked, while regarding the corresponding service of
........... Bank, he requested alongside his daughter to 'lock' it. In a
phone call with the call center of Bank ............, he was informed
about the locking of his electronic account in the online banking
service and was told to dispute the transactions, which he did
immediately through ... banking, while his daughter communicated about
this with ....... Bank. The transfer to the account with the beneficiary
was canceled, and the amount of €15,000 was returned to the plaintiff.
After his investigation, he discovered that an unknown individual
appeared at the branch of the first defendant, served by the second
defendant, who posed as the plaintiff and presented a forged military ID
card of the plaintiff, requesting and receiving a new sim card,
resulting in the deactivation of the plaintiff's sim card and gaining
access to the codes sent to him by the banks for completing the
transfers. Due to the negligence of the second defendant, he did not
realize that the identity used was forged, as since 2010, when the
plaintiff retired, he has had a police identification card. The first
defendant does not have security protocols to prevent such incidents,
which constitute the sim .... method, despite the issuance of a press
release from the Attica Security and numerous publications regarding the
aforementioned method, unlike other mobile phone companies, which
implement a specific procedure for changing sim cards. The second
defendant did not take the obvious step to check the functioning of the
sim card before replacing it, where he would have realized that the
plaintiff's mobile phone was functioning normally. Bank .......... and
........... Bank: a) accepted requests for transferring large amounts of
money from accounts that had no similar activity in the past, while the
plaintiff's online banking account with the above banks was locked quite
some time later, b) sent email notifications regarding successful
transactions in succession, under a single email, c) did not check the
address ... of the perpetrators, which was different from that used by
the plaintiff, and d) did not take necessary security measures to
prevent fraud via sim ... against the plaintiff, as the security code
(pin) sent by the banks via message to the mobile phone proved to be
compromised. As a result of the above illegal and culpable behavior of
the defendants, the plaintiff suffered property damage amounting to a
total of €24,999, which constitutes the total amount of the transfers
made by third unknown persons to accounts of unknown individuals, as
stated above, and has not been refunded despite his repeated inquiries,
while he also suffered distress and mental anguish, and his trust in the
banks was shaken, thus entitling him to monetary compensation for his
moral damage, amounting to €5,000.
- source_sentence: >-
Who can bring proceedings before the courts if a complaint has been
rejected?
sentences:
- >-
1.Supervisory authorities shall provide each other with relevant
information and mutual assistance in order to implement and apply this
Regulation in a consistent manner, and shall put in place measures for
effective cooperation with one another. Mutual assistance shall cover,
in particular, information requests and supervisory measures, such as
requests to carry out prior authorisations and consultations,
inspections and investigations.
2.Each supervisory authority shall take all appropriate measures
required to reply to a request of another supervisory authority without
undue delay and no later than one month after receiving the request.
Such measures may include, in particular, the transmission of relevant
information on the conduct of an investigation.
3.Requests for assistance shall contain all the necessary information,
including the purpose of and reasons for the request. Information
exchanged shall be used only for the purpose for which it was requested.
4.The requested supervisory authority shall not refuse to comply with
the request unless: (a) it is not competent for the subject-matter of
the request or for the measures it is requested to execute; or (b)
compliance with the request would infringe this Regulation or Union or
Member State law to which the supervisory authority receiving the
request is subject.
5.The requested supervisory authority shall inform the requesting
supervisory authority of the results or, as the case may be, of the
progress of the measures taken in order to respond to the request. The
requested supervisory authority shall provide reasons for any refusal to
comply with a request pursuant to paragraph 4
6.Requested supervisory authorities shall, as a rule, supply the
information requested by other supervisory authorities by electronic
means, using a standardised format.
7.Requested supervisory authorities shall not charge a fee for any
action taken by them pursuant to a request for mutual assistance.
Supervisory authorities may agree on rules to indemnify each other for
specific expenditure arising from the provision of mutual assistance in
exceptional circumstances.
8.Where a supervisory authority does not provide the information
referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article within one month of receiving
the request of another supervisory authority, the requesting supervisory
authority may adopt a provisional measure on the territory of its Member
State in accordance with Article 55(1). In that case, the urgent need to
act under Article 66(1) shall be presumed to be met and require an
urgent binding decision from the Board pursuant to Article 66(2).
9.The Commission may, by means of implementing acts, specify the format
and procedures for mutual assistance referred to in this Article and the
arrangements for the exchange of information by electronic means between
supervisory authorities, and between supervisory authorities and the
Board, in particular the standardised format referred to in paragraph 6
of this Article. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance
with the examination procedure referred to in Article 93(2).
- >-
**Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**
**Provisions:**
**Time of commission of the act:**
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**
**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit.
**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings
account with the defendant banking corporation under account number
GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established
in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff
was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to
conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the
plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method,
whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00
from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank.
Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email
from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him
that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash
withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email
urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a
link titled "card activation."
The plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m.,
and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions
and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the
defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to
connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to
input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also
provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile
phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two
minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English
stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A
few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant
informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account
number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary's
details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he
immediately called the defendant's call center and canceled his debit
card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the
application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request
to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent
phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also
sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above
and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the
amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him
but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not
approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole
beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the
defendant's Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS
or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details
before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to
approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint
against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of
fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020,
informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate
department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would
never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and
that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers
regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News"
section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10,
2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff's account
from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The
plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be
informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that
had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return
of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13,
2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came
from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following
a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the
investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining
amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal
codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract
established between them.
From the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no
indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the
plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of
the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article
72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the
Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily
constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment
action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was
not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the
sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may
have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he
was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction,
of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a
third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via
SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time
code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to
approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his
identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the
defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant's claims that it
bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services
contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in
cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet
Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is
because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to
the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the
provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for
the provider's universal liability and its exemption only for unusual
and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party
invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite
all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in
favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment
service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to
the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of
deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more
favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual
terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous
terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant
did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by
the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen
circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not
have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light.
Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of
€3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the
plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law
4537/2018, and the defendant's contrary claims are rejected, especially
since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of
Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the
contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is
liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he
suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the
requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the
occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his
personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation
of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the
screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the
plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully
convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the
defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the
provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as
the plaintiff's damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its
obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the
provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on
its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given
that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar
incidents of fraud against the defendant's customers, the latter, as a
service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional
obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross
negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction
services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it
did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing
the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer
identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the
account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious
nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved
protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious
attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized
third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately
inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately
inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending
of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather
than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate
information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its
customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although
the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day
about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly
regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the
account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff's loss,
but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This
behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also
unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual
relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law
2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the
consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of
trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was
obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and
contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as
crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well
as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to
cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive
damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of
his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he
experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking
into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of
the plaintiff's damage, the severity of the defendant's fault, the
mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt
regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused
by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when
his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased,
as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the
court's opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for
his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and
fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is
entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the
moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18.
- >-
Any natural or legal person has the right to bring an action for
annulment of decisions of the Board before the Court of Justice under
the conditions provided for in Article 263 TFEU. As addressees of such
decisions, the supervisory authorities concerned which wish to challenge
them have to bring action within two months of being notified of them,
in accordance with Article 263 TFEU. Where decisions of the Board are of
direct and individual concern to a controller, processor or complainant,
the latter may bring an action for annulment against those decisions
within two months of their publication on the website of the Board, in
accordance with Article 263 TFEU. Without prejudice to this right under
Article 263 TFEU, each natural or legal person should have an effective
judicial remedy before the competent national court against a decision
of a supervisory authority which produces legal effects concerning that
person. Such a decision concerns in particular the exercise of
investigative, corrective and authorisation powers by the supervisory
authority or the dismissal or rejection of complaints. However, the
right to an effective judicial remedy does not encompass measures taken
by supervisory authorities which are not legally binding, such as
opinions issued by or advice provided by the supervisory authority.
Proceedings against a supervisory authority should be brought before the
courts of the Member State where the supervisory authority is
established and should be conducted in accordance with that Member
State's procedural law. Those courts should exercise full jurisdiction,
which should include jurisdiction to examine all questions of fact and
law relevant to the dispute before them. Where a complaint has been
rejected or dismissed by a supervisory authority, the complainant may
bring proceedings before the courts in the same Member State. In the
context of judicial remedies relating to the application of this
Regulation, national courts which consider a decision on the question
necessary to enable them to give judgment, may, or in the case provided
for in Article 267 TFEU, must, request the Court of Justice to give a
preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Union law, including this
Regulation. Furthermore, where a decision of a supervisory authority
implementing a decision of the Board is challenged before a national
court and the validity of the decision of the Board is at issue, that
national court does not have the power to declare the Board's decision
invalid but must refer the question of validity to the Court of Justice
in accordance with Article 267 TFEU as interpreted by the Court of
Justice, where it considers the decision invalid. However, a national
court may not refer a question on the validity of the decision of the
Board at the request of a natural or legal person which had the
opportunity to bring an action for annulment of that decision, in
particular if it was directly and individually concerned by that
decision, but had not done so within the period laid down in Article 263
TFEU.
- source_sentence: What are the defendant's claims described as?
sentences:
- >-
1.Without prejudice to other tasks set out under this Regulation, each
supervisory authority shall on its territory: (a) monitor and enforce
the application of this Regulation; (b) promote public awareness and
understanding of the risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation to
processing. Activities addressed specifically to children shall receive
specific attention; (c) advise, in accordance with Member State law,
the national parliament, the government, and other institutions and
bodies on legislative and administrative measures relating to the
protection of natural persons' rights and freedoms with regard to
processing; (d) promote the awareness of controllers and processors of
their obligations under this Regulation; (e) upon request, provide
information to any data subject concerning the exercise of their rights
under this Regulation and, if appropriate, cooperate with the
supervisory authorities in other Member States to that end; (f) handle
complaints lodged by a data subject, or by a body, organisation or
association in accordance with Article 80, and investigate, to the
extent appropriate, the subject matter of the complaint and inform the
complainant of the progress and the outcome of the investigation within
a reasonable period, in particular if further investigation or
coordination with another supervisory authority is necessary; (g)
cooperate with, including sharing information and provide mutual
assistance to, other supervisory authorities with a view to ensuring the
consistency of application and enforcement of this Regulation; (h)
conduct investigations on the application of this Regulation, including
on the basis of information received from another supervisory authority
or other public authority; (i) monitor relevant developments, insofar
as they have an impact on the protection of personal data, in particular
the development of information and communication technologies and
commercial practices; (j) adopt standard contractual clauses referred
to in Article 28(8) and in point (d) of Article 46(2); (k) establish
and maintain a list in relation to the requirement for data protection
impact assessment pursuant to Article 35(4); (l) give advice on the
processing operations referred to in Article 36(2); (m) encourage the
drawing up of codes of conduct pursuant to Article 40(1) and provide an
opinion and approve such codes of conduct which provide sufficient
safeguards, pursuant to Article 40(5); (n) encourage the establishment
of data protection certification mechanisms and of data protection seals
and marks pursuant to Article 42(1), and approve the criteria of
certification pursuant to Article 42(5); (o) where applicable, carry
out a periodic review of certifications issued in accordance with
Article 42(7); 4.5.2016 L 119/68 (p) draft and publish the criteria
for accreditation of a body for monitoring codes of conduct pursuant to
Article 41 and of a certification body pursuant to Article 43; (q)
conduct the accreditation of a body for monitoring codes of conduct
pursuant to Article 41 and of a certification body pursuant to Article
43; (r) authorise contractual clauses and provisions referred to in
Article 46(3); (s) approve binding corporate rules pursuant to Article
47; (t) contribute to the activities of the Board; (u) keep internal
records of infringements of this Regulation and of measures taken in
accordance with Article 58(2); and (v) fulfil any other tasks related
to the protection of personal data.
2.Each supervisory authority shall facilitate the submission of
complaints referred to in point (f) of paragraph 1 by measures such as a
complaint submission form which can also be completed electronically,
without excluding other means of communication.
3.The performance of the tasks of each supervisory authority shall be
free of charge for the data subject and, where applicable, for the data
protection officer.
4.Where requests are manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular
because of their repetitive character, the supervisory authority may
charge a reasonable fee based on administrative costs, or refuse to act
on the request. The supervisory authority shall bear the burden of
demonstrating the manifestly unfounded or excessive character of the
request.
- >-
**Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**
**Provisions:**
**Time of commission of the act:**
**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**
**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit.
**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings
account with the defendant banking corporation under account number
GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established
in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff
was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to
conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the
plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method,
whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00
from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank.
Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email
from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him
that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash
withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email
urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a
link titled "card activation."
The plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m.,
and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions
and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the
defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to
connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to
input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also
provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile
phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two
minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English
stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A
few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant
informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account
number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary's
details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he
immediately called the defendant's call center and canceled his debit
card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the
application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request
to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent
phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also
sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above
and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the
amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him
but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not
approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole
beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the
defendant's Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS
or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details
before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to
approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint
against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of
fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020,
informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate
department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would
never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and
that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers
regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News"
section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10,
2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff's account
from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The
plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be
informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that
had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return
of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13,
2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came
from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following
a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the
investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining
amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal
codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract
established between them.
From the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no
indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the
plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of
the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article
72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the
Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily
constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment
action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was
not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the
sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may
have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he
was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction,
of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a
third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via
SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time
code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to
approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his
identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the
defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant's claims that it
bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services
contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in
cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet
Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is
because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to
the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the
provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for
the provider's universal liability and its exemption only for unusual
and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party
invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite
all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in
favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment
service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to
the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of
deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more
favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual
terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous
terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant
did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by
the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen
circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not
have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light.
Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of
€3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the
plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law
4537/2018, and the defendant's contrary claims are rejected, especially
since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of
Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the
contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is
liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he
suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the
requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the
occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his
personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation
of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the
screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the
plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully
convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the
defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the
provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as
the plaintiff's damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its
obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the
provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on
its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given
that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar
incidents of fraud against the defendant's customers, the latter, as a
service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional
obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross
negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction
services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it
did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing
the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer
identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the
account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious
nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved
protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious
attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized
third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately
inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately
inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending
of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather
than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate
information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its
customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although
the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day
about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly
regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the
account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff's loss,
but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This
behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also
unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual
relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law
2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the
consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of
trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was
obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and
contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as
crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well
as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to
cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive
damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of
his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he
experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking
into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of
the plaintiff's damage, the severity of the defendant's fault, the
mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt
regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused
by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when
his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased,
as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the
court's opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for
his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and
fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is
entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the
moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18.
- >-
**Court (Civil/Criminal):**
Provisions: Articles 8 of Law 2251/1994, Articles 2, 4, 48 et seq. of
Law 4537/2018, Article 11 paragraph 1 of Law 4261/2014, Articles 830,
806, 827, 914, 932 of the Civil Code and 176 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Time of commission of the act:
Outcome (not guilty, guilty):
Rationale: Electronic fraud through the method of phishing. A third
party fraudulently obtained money from the plaintiff's bank account and
transferred it to another bank account. Both the defendant is liable for
the inadequate protection of its systems, which should have been
excellent, and the plaintiff who failed to fulfill his obligation to
protect his information and disregarded the defendant's security
instructions. Law 4537/2018 introduces mandatory law in favor of users,
as according to Article 103, payment service providers are prohibited
from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service
users. It is determined that a resumption of the discussion should be
ordered in order to provide all possible evidence, with diligence from
both parties, especially from the defendant, who has access to the
transaction data through its systems, but also bears the relevant burden
of proof concerning the exact timing of the execution of the money
transfer order at each stage (withdrawal from the plaintiff's account,
transfer to another bank, transfer to the third party's account).
Facts: The plaintiff maintains a joint bank account with his wife at the
defendant bank and has also agreed to online banking transactions
(e-banking). On July 31, 2020, at 13:45, the plaintiff was informed of a
transfer of €3,000 from his account, which he had not initiated, nor had
his wife. At 14:05, he immediately contacted the bank’s customer service
line and reported the incident, stating that it was not his action and
requesting its cancellation. The bank employee found that the plaintiff
had provided his details to a fake website 10 days earlier, and
subsequently, the mobile number used for transaction confirmations had
been changed. The employee informed him that the money was at the other
bank and that they would logically be able to retrieve it, provided it
had not already been transferred to a third party's account. Since then,
the plaintiff has not seen any return of the amount to his account, and
he has made numerous attempts to resolve the issue with the bank, with
effort, costs, and distress; however, nothing was achieved, as the money
had already entered a third party's account and the defendant denied
responsibility for the transfer of the funds.
Facts: The plaintiff maintained a joint account with his wife at a bank
and used internet banking services. On July 21, 2020, a third party
deceived the plaintiff through phishing (a misleading SMS with a link),
obtaining his banking credentials. The third party, using the stolen
information, requested a phone number change for receiving OTP (one-time
password) and completing electronic transactions. The bank completed the
change process based on the correct credentials. On July 31, 2020, a
transfer of €3,000 was made from the plaintiff's account to a third
party. The plaintiff was immediately informed, called the bank, and
reported the fraud; however, the recovery of the funds was not
successful. The plaintiff claims that the bank is responsible for
inadequate protection of its systems, while the bank asserts that it
followed the procedure based on the agreed identification methods.
The court recognizes that there is responsibility on both sides: the
bank for inadequate security and prevention of phishing, and the
plaintiff for negligence in safeguarding his personal information,
despite the bank's relevant warnings. A critical issue is the exact
timing of the completion of the transfer: if the bank was timely
notified of the fraud but did not intervene, it may be fully liable. The
court requests a resumption of the discussion and further evidence,
mainly from the bank, which has access to the relevant technical
details.
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics:
- cosine_accuracy@1
- cosine_accuracy@3
- cosine_accuracy@5
- cosine_accuracy@10
- cosine_precision@1
- cosine_precision@3
- cosine_precision@5
- cosine_precision@10
- cosine_recall@1
- cosine_recall@3
- cosine_recall@5
- cosine_recall@10
- cosine_ndcg@10
- cosine_mrr@10
- cosine_map@100
model-index:
- name: multilingual-e5-large
results:
- task:
type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset:
name: dim 1024
type: dim_1024
metrics:
- type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.42676767676767674
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
- type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.46464646464646464
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
- type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.49242424242424243
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
- type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5580808080808081
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
- type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.42676767676767674
name: Cosine Precision@1
- type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.4124579124579124
name: Cosine Precision@3
- type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.3747474747474748
name: Cosine Precision@5
- type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.31414141414141417
name: Cosine Precision@10
- type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.09825006584415187
name: Cosine Recall@1
- type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.2523787390246335
name: Cosine Recall@3
- type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.32755431875936364
name: Cosine Recall@5
- type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.43651994788723664
name: Cosine Recall@10
- type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.48415246452377214
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
- type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.45524490941157597
name: Cosine Mrr@10
- type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.5459826423765417
name: Cosine Map@100
- task:
type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset:
name: dim 768
type: dim_768
metrics:
- type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.43434343434343436
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
- type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.47474747474747475
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
- type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.51010101010101
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
- type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5606060606060606
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
- type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.43434343434343436
name: Cosine Precision@1
- type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.41919191919191917
name: Cosine Precision@3
- type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.3838383838383838
name: Cosine Precision@5
- type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.32247474747474747
name: Cosine Precision@10
- type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.10061477289635892
name: Cosine Recall@1
- type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.25636040025061285
name: Cosine Recall@3
- type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.3338043029923024
name: Cosine Recall@5
- type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.44016055531572285
name: Cosine Recall@10
- type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.4934724503884518
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
- type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.46356120731120726
name: Cosine Mrr@10
- type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.5564537488566689
name: Cosine Map@100
- task:
type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset:
name: dim 512
type: dim_512
metrics:
- type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.4292929292929293
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
- type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.4671717171717172
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
- type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.49747474747474746
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
- type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5555555555555556
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
- type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.4292929292929293
name: Cosine Precision@1
- type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.41245791245791247
name: Cosine Precision@3
- type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.37727272727272726
name: Cosine Precision@5
- type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.32323232323232326
name: Cosine Precision@10
- type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.09708594456835347
name: Cosine Recall@1
- type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.2454224096594091
name: Cosine Recall@3
- type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.3179367707181334
name: Cosine Recall@5
- type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.4287519231168952
name: Cosine Recall@10
- type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.48640306253952215
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
- type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.456533589866923
name: Cosine Mrr@10
- type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.5432904653729493
name: Cosine Map@100
- task:
type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset:
name: dim 256
type: dim_256
metrics:
- type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.4090909090909091
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
- type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.43434343434343436
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
- type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.4671717171717172
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
- type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5429292929292929
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
- type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.4090909090909091
name: Cosine Precision@1
- type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.39141414141414144
name: Cosine Precision@3
- type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.3570707070707071
name: Cosine Precision@5
- type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.3101010101010101
name: Cosine Precision@10
- type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.0907480192796053
name: Cosine Recall@1
- type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.23037891014980458
name: Cosine Recall@3
- type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.29955733888738373
name: Cosine Recall@5
- type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.41181978063025126
name: Cosine Recall@10
- type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.4649788097242898
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
- type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.4359618005451338
name: Cosine Mrr@10
- type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.526102816495897
name: Cosine Map@100
- task:
type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset:
name: dim 128
type: dim_128
metrics:
- type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.4292929292929293
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
- type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.45202020202020204
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
- type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.48484848484848486
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
- type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.5353535353535354
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
- type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.4292929292929293
name: Cosine Precision@1
- type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.40740740740740744
name: Cosine Precision@3
- type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.3747474747474748
name: Cosine Precision@5
- type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.3214646464646464
name: Cosine Precision@10
- type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.09383711242551662
name: Cosine Recall@1
- type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.23365062791015867
name: Cosine Recall@3
- type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.3030000083811896
name: Cosine Recall@5
- type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.40650824296467747
name: Cosine Recall@10
- type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.47535736610339274
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
- type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.4509870530703863
name: Cosine Mrr@10
- type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.5323454955931561
name: Cosine Map@100
- task:
type: information-retrieval
name: Information Retrieval
dataset:
name: dim 64
type: dim_64
metrics:
- type: cosine_accuracy@1
value: 0.34595959595959597
name: Cosine Accuracy@1
- type: cosine_accuracy@3
value: 0.3787878787878788
name: Cosine Accuracy@3
- type: cosine_accuracy@5
value: 0.4217171717171717
name: Cosine Accuracy@5
- type: cosine_accuracy@10
value: 0.4797979797979798
name: Cosine Accuracy@10
- type: cosine_precision@1
value: 0.34595959595959597
name: Cosine Precision@1
- type: cosine_precision@3
value: 0.335016835016835
name: Cosine Precision@3
- type: cosine_precision@5
value: 0.31616161616161614
name: Cosine Precision@5
- type: cosine_precision@10
value: 0.2815656565656566
name: Cosine Precision@10
- type: cosine_recall@1
value: 0.07344523973446683
name: Cosine Recall@1
- type: cosine_recall@3
value: 0.18848130292663573
name: Cosine Recall@3
- type: cosine_recall@5
value: 0.25546013199345396
name: Cosine Recall@5
- type: cosine_recall@10
value: 0.36591741438962255
name: Cosine Recall@10
- type: cosine_ndcg@10
value: 0.4060126387455923
name: Cosine Ndcg@10
- type: cosine_mrr@10
value: 0.3744217973384639
name: Cosine Mrr@10
- type: cosine_map@100
value: 0.46206378153599176
name: Cosine Map@100
multilingual-e5-large
This is a sentence-transformers model finetuned from intfloat/multilingual-e5-large. It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 1024-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.
Model Details
Model Description
- Model Type: Sentence Transformer
- Base model: intfloat/multilingual-e5-large
- Maximum Sequence Length: 512 tokens
- Output Dimensionality: 1024 dimensions
- Similarity Function: Cosine Similarity
- Language: en
- License: apache-2.0
Model Sources
- Documentation: Sentence Transformers Documentation
- Repository: Sentence Transformers on GitHub
- Hugging Face: Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face
Full Model Architecture
SentenceTransformer(
(0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 512, 'do_lower_case': False, 'architecture': 'XLMRobertaModel'})
(1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 1024, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
(2): Normalize()
)
Usage
Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)
First install the Sentence Transformers library:
pip install -U sentence-transformers
Then you can load this model and run inference.
from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer
# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("sentence_transformers_model_id")
# Run inference
sentences = [
"What are the defendant's claims described as?",
'**Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil** \n**Provisions:** \n**Time of commission of the act:** \n**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):** \n**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit. \n**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings account with the defendant banking corporation under account number GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00 from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank. Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a link titled "card activation." \nThe plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m., and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary\'s details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he immediately called the defendant\'s call center and canceled his debit card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the defendant\'s Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020, informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News" section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10, 2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff\'s account from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13, 2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract established between them. \nFrom the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article 72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction, of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant\'s claims that it bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for the provider\'s universal liability and its exemption only for unusual and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light. Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of €3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law 4537/2018, and the defendant\'s contrary claims are rejected, especially since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as the plaintiff\'s damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar incidents of fraud against the defendant\'s customers, the latter, as a service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff\'s loss, but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law 2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of the plaintiff\'s damage, the severity of the defendant\'s fault, the mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased, as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the court\'s opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18.',
"1.Without prejudice to other tasks set out under this Regulation, each supervisory authority shall on its territory: (a) monitor and enforce the application of this Regulation; (b) promote public awareness and understanding of the risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation to processing. Activities addressed specifically to children shall receive specific attention; (c) advise, in accordance with Member State law, the national parliament, the government, and other institutions and bodies on legislative and administrative measures relating to the protection of natural persons' rights and freedoms with regard to processing; (d) promote the awareness of controllers and processors of their obligations under this Regulation; (e) upon request, provide information to any data subject concerning the exercise of their rights under this Regulation and, if appropriate, cooperate with the supervisory authorities in other Member States to that end; (f) handle complaints lodged by a data subject, or by a body, organisation or association in accordance with Article 80, and investigate, to the extent appropriate, the subject matter of the complaint and inform the complainant of the progress and the outcome of the investigation within a reasonable period, in particular if further investigation or coordination with another supervisory authority is necessary; (g) cooperate with, including sharing information and provide mutual assistance to, other supervisory authorities with a view to ensuring the consistency of application and enforcement of this Regulation; (h) conduct investigations on the application of this Regulation, including on the basis of information received from another supervisory authority or other public authority; (i) monitor relevant developments, insofar as they have an impact on the protection of personal data, in particular the development of information and communication technologies and commercial practices; (j) adopt standard contractual clauses referred to in Article 28(8) and in point (d) of Article 46(2); (k) establish and maintain a list in relation to the requirement for data protection impact assessment pursuant to Article 35(4); (l) give advice on the processing operations referred to in Article 36(2); (m) encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct pursuant to Article 40(1) and provide an opinion and approve such codes of conduct which provide sufficient safeguards, pursuant to Article 40(5); (n) encourage the establishment of data protection certification mechanisms and of data protection seals and marks pursuant to Article 42(1), and approve the criteria of certification pursuant to Article 42(5); (o) where applicable, carry out a periodic review of certifications issued in accordance with Article 42(7); 4.5.2016 L 119/68 (p) draft and publish the criteria for accreditation of a body for monitoring codes of conduct pursuant to Article 41 and of a certification body pursuant to Article 43; (q) conduct the accreditation of a body for monitoring codes of conduct pursuant to Article 41 and of a certification body pursuant to Article 43; (r) authorise contractual clauses and provisions referred to in Article 46(3); (s) approve binding corporate rules pursuant to Article 47; (t) contribute to the activities of the Board; (u) keep internal records of infringements of this Regulation and of measures taken in accordance with Article 58(2); and (v) fulfil any other tasks related to the protection of personal data.\n2.Each supervisory authority shall facilitate the submission of complaints referred to in point (f) of paragraph 1 by measures such as a complaint submission form which can also be completed electronically, without excluding other means of communication.\n3.The performance of the tasks of each supervisory authority shall be free of charge for the data subject and, where applicable, for the data protection officer.\n4.Where requests are manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive character, the supervisory authority may charge a reasonable fee based on administrative costs, or refuse to act on the request. The supervisory authority shall bear the burden of demonstrating the manifestly unfounded or excessive character of the request.",
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 1024]
# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities)
# tensor([[ 1.0000, 0.3977, 0.0857],
# [ 0.3977, 1.0000, -0.1067],
# [ 0.0857, -0.1067, 1.0000]])
Evaluation
Metrics
Information Retrieval
- Dataset:
dim_1024 - Evaluated with
InformationRetrievalEvaluatorwith these parameters:{ "truncate_dim": 1024 }
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| cosine_accuracy@1 | 0.4268 |
| cosine_accuracy@3 | 0.4646 |
| cosine_accuracy@5 | 0.4924 |
| cosine_accuracy@10 | 0.5581 |
| cosine_precision@1 | 0.4268 |
| cosine_precision@3 | 0.4125 |
| cosine_precision@5 | 0.3747 |
| cosine_precision@10 | 0.3141 |
| cosine_recall@1 | 0.0983 |
| cosine_recall@3 | 0.2524 |
| cosine_recall@5 | 0.3276 |
| cosine_recall@10 | 0.4365 |
| cosine_ndcg@10 | 0.4842 |
| cosine_mrr@10 | 0.4552 |
| cosine_map@100 | 0.546 |
Information Retrieval
- Dataset:
dim_768 - Evaluated with
InformationRetrievalEvaluatorwith these parameters:{ "truncate_dim": 768 }
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| cosine_accuracy@1 | 0.4343 |
| cosine_accuracy@3 | 0.4747 |
| cosine_accuracy@5 | 0.5101 |
| cosine_accuracy@10 | 0.5606 |
| cosine_precision@1 | 0.4343 |
| cosine_precision@3 | 0.4192 |
| cosine_precision@5 | 0.3838 |
| cosine_precision@10 | 0.3225 |
| cosine_recall@1 | 0.1006 |
| cosine_recall@3 | 0.2564 |
| cosine_recall@5 | 0.3338 |
| cosine_recall@10 | 0.4402 |
| cosine_ndcg@10 | 0.4935 |
| cosine_mrr@10 | 0.4636 |
| cosine_map@100 | 0.5565 |
Information Retrieval
- Dataset:
dim_512 - Evaluated with
InformationRetrievalEvaluatorwith these parameters:{ "truncate_dim": 512 }
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| cosine_accuracy@1 | 0.4293 |
| cosine_accuracy@3 | 0.4672 |
| cosine_accuracy@5 | 0.4975 |
| cosine_accuracy@10 | 0.5556 |
| cosine_precision@1 | 0.4293 |
| cosine_precision@3 | 0.4125 |
| cosine_precision@5 | 0.3773 |
| cosine_precision@10 | 0.3232 |
| cosine_recall@1 | 0.0971 |
| cosine_recall@3 | 0.2454 |
| cosine_recall@5 | 0.3179 |
| cosine_recall@10 | 0.4288 |
| cosine_ndcg@10 | 0.4864 |
| cosine_mrr@10 | 0.4565 |
| cosine_map@100 | 0.5433 |
Information Retrieval
- Dataset:
dim_256 - Evaluated with
InformationRetrievalEvaluatorwith these parameters:{ "truncate_dim": 256 }
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| cosine_accuracy@1 | 0.4091 |
| cosine_accuracy@3 | 0.4343 |
| cosine_accuracy@5 | 0.4672 |
| cosine_accuracy@10 | 0.5429 |
| cosine_precision@1 | 0.4091 |
| cosine_precision@3 | 0.3914 |
| cosine_precision@5 | 0.3571 |
| cosine_precision@10 | 0.3101 |
| cosine_recall@1 | 0.0907 |
| cosine_recall@3 | 0.2304 |
| cosine_recall@5 | 0.2996 |
| cosine_recall@10 | 0.4118 |
| cosine_ndcg@10 | 0.465 |
| cosine_mrr@10 | 0.436 |
| cosine_map@100 | 0.5261 |
Information Retrieval
- Dataset:
dim_128 - Evaluated with
InformationRetrievalEvaluatorwith these parameters:{ "truncate_dim": 128 }
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| cosine_accuracy@1 | 0.4293 |
| cosine_accuracy@3 | 0.452 |
| cosine_accuracy@5 | 0.4848 |
| cosine_accuracy@10 | 0.5354 |
| cosine_precision@1 | 0.4293 |
| cosine_precision@3 | 0.4074 |
| cosine_precision@5 | 0.3747 |
| cosine_precision@10 | 0.3215 |
| cosine_recall@1 | 0.0938 |
| cosine_recall@3 | 0.2337 |
| cosine_recall@5 | 0.303 |
| cosine_recall@10 | 0.4065 |
| cosine_ndcg@10 | 0.4754 |
| cosine_mrr@10 | 0.451 |
| cosine_map@100 | 0.5323 |
Information Retrieval
- Dataset:
dim_64 - Evaluated with
InformationRetrievalEvaluatorwith these parameters:{ "truncate_dim": 64 }
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| cosine_accuracy@1 | 0.346 |
| cosine_accuracy@3 | 0.3788 |
| cosine_accuracy@5 | 0.4217 |
| cosine_accuracy@10 | 0.4798 |
| cosine_precision@1 | 0.346 |
| cosine_precision@3 | 0.335 |
| cosine_precision@5 | 0.3162 |
| cosine_precision@10 | 0.2816 |
| cosine_recall@1 | 0.0734 |
| cosine_recall@3 | 0.1885 |
| cosine_recall@5 | 0.2555 |
| cosine_recall@10 | 0.3659 |
| cosine_ndcg@10 | 0.406 |
| cosine_mrr@10 | 0.3744 |
| cosine_map@100 | 0.4621 |
Training Details
Training Dataset
Unnamed Dataset
- Size: 1,580 training samples
- Columns:
anchorandpositive - Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
anchor positive type string string details - min: 7 tokens
- mean: 17.19 tokens
- max: 37 tokens
- min: 27 tokens
- mean: 378.1 tokens
- max: 512 tokens
- Samples:
anchor positive What date is mentioned in the text?1.The controller and the processor shall ensure that the data protection officer is involved, properly and in a timely manner, in all issues which relate to the protection of personal data. 4.5.2016 L 119/55
2.The controller and processor shall support the data protection officer in performing the tasks referred to inUnder what condition is the culpable character of the action raised in regards to computer software infringement?Any person who, in contravention of the provisions of this law or of the provisions of lawfully ratified multilateral international conventions on the protection of copyright, unlawfully makes a fixation of a work or of copies, reproduces them directly or indirectly, temporarily or permanently in any form, in whole or in part, translates, adapts, alters or transforms them, or distributes them to the public by sale or other means, or possesses with the intent of distributing them, rents, performs in public, broadcasts by radio or television or any other means, communicates to the public works or copies by any means, imports copies of a work illegally produced abroad without the consent of the author and, in general, exploits works, reproductions or copies being the object of copyright or acts against the moral right of the author to decide freely on the publication and the presentation of his work to the public without additions or deletions, shall be liable to imprisonment of no less t...Under what circumstances does the Board issue an opinion?1.The Board shall issue an opinion where a competent supervisory authority intends to adopt any of the measures below. To that end, the competent supervisory authority shall communicate the draft decision to the Board, when it: (a) aims to adopt a list of the processing operations subject to the requirement for a data protection impact assessment pursuant to Article 35(4); (b) concerns a matter pursuant to Article 40(7) whether a draft code of conduct or an amendment or extension to a code of conduct complies with this Regulation; 4.5.2016 L 119/73 (c) aims to approve the criteria for accreditation of a body pursuant to Article 41(3) or a certification body pursuant to Article 43(3); (d) aims to determine standard data protection clauses referred to in point (d) of Article 46(2) and in Article 28(8); (e) aims to authorise contractual clauses referred to in point (a) of Article 46(3); or (f) aims to approve binding corporate rules within the meaning of Article 47
2.Any superviso... - Loss:
MatryoshkaLosswith these parameters:{ "loss": "MultipleNegativesRankingLoss", "matryoshka_dims": [ 1024, 768, 512, 256, 128, 64 ], "matryoshka_weights": [ 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 ], "n_dims_per_step": -1 }
Training Hyperparameters
Non-Default Hyperparameters
eval_strategy: epochgradient_accumulation_steps: 4learning_rate: 3e-05num_train_epochs: 20lr_scheduler_type: cosinewarmup_ratio: 0.1bf16: Trueload_best_model_at_end: Trueoptim: adamw_torch_fusedbatch_sampler: no_duplicates
All Hyperparameters
Click to expand
overwrite_output_dir: Falsedo_predict: Falseeval_strategy: epochprediction_loss_only: Trueper_device_train_batch_size: 8per_device_eval_batch_size: 8per_gpu_train_batch_size: Noneper_gpu_eval_batch_size: Nonegradient_accumulation_steps: 4eval_accumulation_steps: Nonetorch_empty_cache_steps: Nonelearning_rate: 3e-05weight_decay: 0.0adam_beta1: 0.9adam_beta2: 0.999adam_epsilon: 1e-08max_grad_norm: 1.0num_train_epochs: 20max_steps: -1lr_scheduler_type: cosinelr_scheduler_kwargs: {}warmup_ratio: 0.1warmup_steps: 0log_level: passivelog_level_replica: warninglog_on_each_node: Truelogging_nan_inf_filter: Truesave_safetensors: Truesave_on_each_node: Falsesave_only_model: Falserestore_callback_states_from_checkpoint: Falseno_cuda: Falseuse_cpu: Falseuse_mps_device: Falseseed: 42data_seed: Nonejit_mode_eval: Falseuse_ipex: Falsebf16: Truefp16: Falsefp16_opt_level: O1half_precision_backend: autobf16_full_eval: Falsefp16_full_eval: Falsetf32: Nonelocal_rank: 0ddp_backend: Nonetpu_num_cores: Nonetpu_metrics_debug: Falsedebug: []dataloader_drop_last: Falsedataloader_num_workers: 0dataloader_prefetch_factor: Nonepast_index: -1disable_tqdm: Falseremove_unused_columns: Truelabel_names: Noneload_best_model_at_end: Trueignore_data_skip: Falsefsdp: []fsdp_min_num_params: 0fsdp_config: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}tp_size: 0fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap: Noneaccelerator_config: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}deepspeed: Nonelabel_smoothing_factor: 0.0optim: adamw_torch_fusedoptim_args: Noneadafactor: Falsegroup_by_length: Falselength_column_name: lengthddp_find_unused_parameters: Noneddp_bucket_cap_mb: Noneddp_broadcast_buffers: Falsedataloader_pin_memory: Truedataloader_persistent_workers: Falseskip_memory_metrics: Trueuse_legacy_prediction_loop: Falsepush_to_hub: Falseresume_from_checkpoint: Nonehub_model_id: Nonehub_strategy: every_savehub_private_repo: Nonehub_always_push: Falsegradient_checkpointing: Falsegradient_checkpointing_kwargs: Noneinclude_inputs_for_metrics: Falseinclude_for_metrics: []eval_do_concat_batches: Truefp16_backend: autopush_to_hub_model_id: Nonepush_to_hub_organization: Nonemp_parameters:auto_find_batch_size: Falsefull_determinism: Falsetorchdynamo: Noneray_scope: lastddp_timeout: 1800torch_compile: Falsetorch_compile_backend: Nonetorch_compile_mode: Noneinclude_tokens_per_second: Falseinclude_num_input_tokens_seen: Falseneftune_noise_alpha: Noneoptim_target_modules: Nonebatch_eval_metrics: Falseeval_on_start: Falseuse_liger_kernel: Falseeval_use_gather_object: Falseaverage_tokens_across_devices: Falseprompts: Nonebatch_sampler: no_duplicatesmulti_dataset_batch_sampler: proportionalrouter_mapping: {}learning_rate_mapping: {}
Training Logs
| Epoch | Step | Training Loss | dim_1024_cosine_ndcg@10 | dim_768_cosine_ndcg@10 | dim_512_cosine_ndcg@10 | dim_256_cosine_ndcg@10 | dim_128_cosine_ndcg@10 | dim_64_cosine_ndcg@10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| -1 | -1 | - | 0.4392 | 0.4292 | 0.4042 | 0.3789 | 0.2817 | 0.2030 |
| 0.2020 | 10 | 35.1992 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 0.4040 | 20 | 34.4091 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 0.6061 | 30 | 32.5592 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 0.8081 | 40 | 29.6977 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1.0 | 50 | 26.32 | 0.4430 | 0.4484 | 0.4304 | 0.3995 | 0.3534 | 0.2942 |
| 1.2020 | 60 | 21.8779 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1.4040 | 70 | 24.8794 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1.6061 | 80 | 19.4179 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1.8081 | 90 | 17.9807 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 2.0 | 100 | 16.9844 | 0.4632 | 0.4737 | 0.4369 | 0.4113 | 0.3995 | 0.3424 |
| 2.2020 | 110 | 15.8444 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 2.4040 | 120 | 13.7469 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 2.6061 | 130 | 13.8095 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 2.8081 | 140 | 12.2849 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 3.0 | 150 | 11.2766 | 0.4656 | 0.4623 | 0.4506 | 0.4313 | 0.4182 | 0.3665 |
| 3.2020 | 160 | 10.7749 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 3.4040 | 170 | 9.6846 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 3.6061 | 180 | 10.8248 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 3.8081 | 190 | 10.4771 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 4.0 | 200 | 11.4718 | 0.4836 | 0.4855 | 0.4826 | 0.4651 | 0.4384 | 0.3908 |
| 4.2020 | 210 | 9.7309 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 4.4040 | 220 | 8.4888 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 4.6061 | 230 | 8.3962 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 4.8081 | 240 | 8.339 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 5.0 | 250 | 9.5316 | 0.4754 | 0.4897 | 0.4746 | 0.4630 | 0.4509 | 0.4025 |
| 5.2020 | 260 | 7.867 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 5.4040 | 270 | 7.3297 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 5.6061 | 280 | 7.2536 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 5.8081 | 290 | 9.9241 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 6.0 | 300 | 8.4595 | 0.4897 | 0.4878 | 0.4686 | 0.4595 | 0.4586 | 0.3938 |
| 6.2020 | 310 | 7.4616 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 6.4040 | 320 | 7.3904 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 6.6061 | 330 | 7.4447 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 6.8081 | 340 | 6.7114 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 7.0 | 350 | 6.2379 | 0.4842 | 0.4935 | 0.4864 | 0.465 | 0.4754 | 0.406 |
| 7.2020 | 360 | 6.467 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 7.4040 | 370 | 6.9809 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 7.6061 | 380 | 6.348 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 7.8081 | 390 | 5.3424 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 8.0 | 400 | 6.6571 | 0.4966 | 0.4946 | 0.4791 | 0.4724 | 0.4675 | 0.3936 |
| 8.2020 | 410 | 7.0065 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 8.4040 | 420 | 6.5904 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 8.6061 | 430 | 5.5579 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 8.8081 | 440 | 4.7633 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 9.0 | 450 | 3.9055 | 0.4855 | 0.5003 | 0.4845 | 0.4846 | 0.4703 | 0.4108 |
| -1 | -1 | - | 0.4842 | 0.4935 | 0.4864 | 0.4650 | 0.4754 | 0.4060 |
- The bold row denotes the saved checkpoint.
Framework Versions
- Python: 3.12.11
- Sentence Transformers: 5.1.0
- Transformers: 4.51.3
- PyTorch: 2.8.0+cu126
- Accelerate: 1.10.1
- Datasets: 4.0.0
- Tokenizers: 0.21.4
Citation
BibTeX
Sentence Transformers
@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
month = "11",
year = "2019",
publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
}
MatryoshkaLoss
@misc{kusupati2024matryoshka,
title={Matryoshka Representation Learning},
author={Aditya Kusupati and Gantavya Bhatt and Aniket Rege and Matthew Wallingford and Aditya Sinha and Vivek Ramanujan and William Howard-Snyder and Kaifeng Chen and Sham Kakade and Prateek Jain and Ali Farhadi},
year={2024},
eprint={2205.13147},
archivePrefix={arXiv},
primaryClass={cs.LG}
}
MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
@misc{henderson2017efficient,
title={Efficient Natural Language Response Suggestion for Smart Reply},
author={Matthew Henderson and Rami Al-Rfou and Brian Strope and Yun-hsuan Sung and Laszlo Lukacs and Ruiqi Guo and Sanjiv Kumar and Balint Miklos and Ray Kurzweil},
year={2017},
eprint={1705.00652},
archivePrefix={arXiv},
primaryClass={cs.CL}
}