--- title: OPF PII Pastebin emoji: 📚 colorFrom: purple colorTo: red sdk: gradio sdk_version: 6.13.0 app_file: app.py pinned: false license: apache-2.0 short_description: Paste PII, share redacted view using OAI Privacy Filter --- # Paste-Proxy A paste-to-share service with OpenAI Privacy Filter wired into the critical path. Authors paste sensitive text and get two URLs: - a **public view link** that serves the OPF-redacted version (placeholders like `` instead of the original PII); - a **private reveal link** (guarded by an unguessable token) that serves the original to the author or anyone they deliberately share the reveal URL with. ## Why this exists It's a demo of a pattern that doesn't fit `gr.Blocks` cleanly. `gr.Blocks` maps one event to one function call on a given session. A pastebin needs: 1. **Persistent server-side state keyed by a short URL** — the paste must outlive any single session and be reachable by anyone at `/view/{id}`. 2. **Two distinct GET routes for the same resource** — one public, one token-gated — served as real HTML pages (not component updates). 3. **A background cleanup task** independent of any request, that sweeps pastes that have passed their TTL. **`gr.Server` gives you a FastAPI app you decorate with the usual `@server.get` / `@server.post` while still getting Gradio API endpoints for the `gradio_client` SDK. Perfect fit.** ## Routes | Method | Path | Purpose | |--------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------| | GET | `/` | Compose page (paste editor) | | POST | `/api/paste` | Scan with OPF, mint `{id, reveal_token}`, store | | GET | `/view/{id}` | Public redacted HTML view | | GET | `/view/{id}?token=...` | Author's reveal HTML view (original with PII highlighted) | | GET | `/api/paste/{id}` | JSON: redacted + stats | | GET | `/api/paste/{id}?token=...` | JSON: redacted + stats + original + spans (token-gated) | | — | `analyze_paste` (gr API) | Programmatic paste creation for `gradio_client` | Reveal tokens are 22 bytes from `secrets.token_urlsafe` and compared with `secrets.compare_digest`. ## Auto-expiry The compose form offers **never / 1h / 24h / 7d**. A background daemon thread wakes every 30s and evicts expired pastes. Expired links 404. ## Storage Pastes live in a process-local dict (`PASTES: dict[str, Paste]`) guarded by a lock. That's deliberate for a public demo — it makes the point of the architecture without coupling to Redis or a DB. When the Space restarts, pastes are wiped; the UI surfaces that on the 404 page. To make this production-grade you'd swap `_store_put/_store_get` for a Redis client (both operations are single-key writes/reads) and turn the sweeper into a `ZADD` on expiry time with a range-delete loop. ## OPF model Uses OPENAI's Privacy Filter model (1.5B params, 50M active, 128k context) loaded from safetensors with the exact architecture + Viterbi-decoder pipeline. PII Categories handled: Person, Address, Email, Phone, URL, Date, Account, Secret. Redaction replaces each detected span with a `` placeholder (matching the format in `[Confidential, non-final draft] Redaction examples.pdf`). Inference runs behind `@spaces.GPU` so the model only pins a GPU slot during an actual paste scan (**ZEROGPU**) ## Running locally ```bash export HF_TOKEN=... # if the model repo is gated pip install -r requirements.txt python app.py # serves on :7860 ``` ## Programmatic API ```python from gradio_client import Client c = Client("YOUR_SPACE_ID") resp = c.predict("Call me at 415-555-0123", ttl="1h", api_name="/analyze_paste") # resp is a JSON string with id, reveal_token, view_path, reveal_path, stats ``` Goto the link `https://ysharma-dummy-opf-3.hf.space/view/` for filtered/redacted version and to the link `https://ysharma-dummy-opf-3.hf.space/view/` for the _author_ view.