validators.py

"""Deterministic validators and hidden checks for CyberSecurity_OWASP."""

from __future__ import annotations

from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any

from .models import CyberSecurityOWASPAction, CyberSecurityOWASPState


BLOCKED_PATH_MARKERS = (
    "hidden",
    "oracle",
    "reward_engine",
    "validators.py",
    "rewards.py",
    ".git",
    "..",
)


def _workspace(state: CyberSecurityOWASPState) -> Path:
    return Path(str(state.hidden_facts["workspace"]))


def _route_source(state: CyberSecurityOWASPState) -> str:
    return (_workspace(state) / "app/routes/invoices.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")


def is_path_allowed(state: CyberSecurityOWASPState, path: str, *, write: bool = False) -> tuple[bool, str]:
    normalized = path.replace("\\", "/").lstrip("/")
    if any(marker in normalized for marker in BLOCKED_PATH_MARKERS):
        return False, "blocked path"
    if Path(path).is_absolute():
        return False, "absolute host paths are blocked"
    editable = set(state.hidden_facts.get("editable_files", []))
    if normalized not in editable:
        return False, "path is outside editable generated workspace"
    if write and normalized.startswith("tests/"):
        return False, "visible tests are readable but not patchable"
    return True, normalized


def detect_cheating(state: CyberSecurityOWASPState, action: CyberSecurityOWASPAction) -> list[str]:
    flags: list[str] = []
    args = action.arguments or {}
    text = " ".join(str(v) for v in args.values())
    for key in (
        "owner_user_id",
        "intruder_user_id",
        "admin_user_id",
        "owner_invoice_id",
        "other_invoice_id",
        "foreign_invoice_id",
        "tenant_a",
        "tenant_b",
    ):
        value = str(state.hidden_facts.get(key, ""))
        if value and value in text and action.tool_name == "patch_file":
            flags.append("hardcoded_hidden_identifier")
            break
    if action.tool_name in {"read_file", "search_code", "patch_file"}:
        path_text = str(args.get("path", "")) + " " + str(args.get("query", ""))
        if any(marker in path_text.replace("\\", "/") for marker in BLOCKED_PATH_MARKERS):
            flags.append("blocked_file_probe")
    if action.tool_name == "send_local_request":
        target = str(args.get("path", ""))
        if target.startswith("http://") or target.startswith("https://"):
            flags.append("external_network_attempt")
    return sorted(set(flags))


def _source_is_secure(source: str) -> bool:
    has_tenant_check = "tenant_id" in source and "actor" in source and "!=" in source
    has_owner = "owner_user_id" in source and "actor" in source
    has_admin = "is_billing_admin" in source
    has_forbidden = '"status": 403' in source or "'status': 403" in source
    return has_tenant_check and has_owner and has_admin and has_forbidden


def _source_is_deny_all(source: str) -> bool:
    early_unconditional = (
        "    return {\"status\": 403" in source
        and "    return {\"status\": 403" in source.split("if invoice[", 1)[0]
    )
    missing_positive_policy = "owner_user_id" not in source or "is_billing_admin" not in source
    return early_unconditional or (
        ("return {\"status\": 403" in source or "return {'status': 403" in source)
        and missing_positive_policy
    )


def _source_has_hardcoding(state: CyberSecurityOWASPState, source: str) -> bool:
    values = [
        str(state.hidden_facts.get(key, ""))
        for key in (
            "owner_user_id",
            "intruder_user_id",
            "admin_user_id",
            "owner_invoice_id",
            "other_invoice_id",
            "foreign_invoice_id",
            "tenant_a",
            "tenant_b",
        )
    ]
    return any(value and value in source for value in values)


def simulate_request(
    state: CyberSecurityOWASPState, method: str, path: str, user_id: str | None = None
) -> dict[str, Any]:
    if method.upper() != "GET":
        return {"status": 405, "body": {"detail": "method not allowed"}}
    source = _route_source(state)
    if path == "/health":
        if "def health" not in source or "status\": 200" not in source:
            return {"status": 404, "body": {"detail": "health unavailable"}}
        return {"status": 200, "body": {"status": "ok"}}
    if not path.startswith("/invoices/"):
        return {"status": 404, "body": {"detail": "route not found"}}

    invoice_id = path.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
    users = state.hidden_facts["users"]
    invoices = state.hidden_facts["invoices"]
    actor = users.get(user_id or "")
    invoice = invoices.get(invoice_id)
    if actor is None:
        return {"status": 401, "body": {"detail": "unknown user"}}
    if invoice is None:
        return {"status": 404, "body": {"detail": "invoice not found"}}
    if _source_is_deny_all(source):
        return {"status": 403, "body": {"detail": "forbidden"}}
    if _source_is_secure(source):
        same_tenant = invoice["tenant_id"] == actor["tenant_id"]
        allowed = invoice["owner_user_id"] == actor["user_id"] or "billing_admin" in actor["roles"]
        if same_tenant and allowed:
            return {"status": 200, "body": invoice}
        return {"status": 403, "body": {"detail": "forbidden"}}
    return {"status": 200, "body": invoice}


def verify_finding(state: CyberSecurityOWASPState, finding: dict) -> dict:
    text = " ".join(str(v).lower() for v in finding.values())
    hidden = state.hidden_facts
    mentions_known_invoice = any(
        str(hidden.get(key, "")).lower() in text
        for key in ("owner_invoice_id", "other_invoice_id", "foreign_invoice_id")
    )
    mentions_known_user = any(
        str(hidden.get(key, "")).lower() in text
        for key in ("owner_user_id", "intruder_user_id", "admin_user_id")
    )
    valid = (
        any(term in text for term in ("idor", "bola", "authorization", "owner", "tenant"))
        and mentions_known_invoice
        and mentions_known_user
    )
    tied_to_policy = any(term in text for term in ("policy", "owner", "tenant", "billing_admin"))
    return {"valid": valid, "tied_to_policy": tied_to_policy}


def run_visible_tests(state: CyberSecurityOWASPState) -> dict:
    hidden = state.hidden_facts
    checks = {
        "health_public": simulate_request(state, "GET", "/health")["status"] == 200,
        "owner_can_read": simulate_request(
            state, "GET", f"/invoices/{hidden['owner_invoice_id']}", hidden["owner_user_id"]
        )["status"]
        == 200,
        "admin_can_read": simulate_request(
            state, "GET", f"/invoices/{hidden['other_invoice_id']}", hidden["admin_user_id"]
        )["status"]
        == 200,
    }
    return {"passed": all(checks.values()), "checks": checks}


def run_hidden_security_tests(state: CyberSecurityOWASPState) -> dict:
    hidden = state.hidden_facts
    checks = {
        "same_tenant_other_user_blocked": simulate_request(
            state, "GET", f"/invoices/{hidden['other_invoice_id']}", hidden["owner_user_id"]
        )["status"]
        == 403,
        "cross_tenant_blocked": simulate_request(
            state, "GET", f"/invoices/{hidden['foreign_invoice_id']}", hidden["admin_user_id"]
        )["status"]
        == 403,
    }
    return {"passed": all(checks.values()), "checks": checks}


def run_hidden_regression_tests(state: CyberSecurityOWASPState) -> dict:
    hidden = state.hidden_facts
    checks = {
        "owner_preserved": simulate_request(
            state, "GET", f"/invoices/{hidden['owner_invoice_id']}", hidden["owner_user_id"]
        )["status"]
        == 200,
        "admin_preserved": simulate_request(
            state, "GET", f"/invoices/{hidden['other_invoice_id']}", hidden["admin_user_id"]
        )["status"]
        == 200,
    }
    return {"passed": all(checks.values()), "checks": checks}


def run_public_route_tests(state: CyberSecurityOWASPState) -> dict:
    checks = {"health_public": simulate_request(state, "GET", "/health")["status"] == 200}
    return {"passed": all(checks.values()), "checks": checks}


def patch_quality(state: CyberSecurityOWASPState) -> dict:
    source = _route_source(state)
    secure = _source_is_secure(source)
    hardcoded = _source_has_hardcoding(state, source)
    deny_all = _source_is_deny_all(source)
    return {
        "passed": secure and not hardcoded and not deny_all,
        "secure_pattern": secure,
        "hardcoded": hardcoded,
        "deny_all": deny_all,
    }