Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) have been reported to linearly encode truthfulness, yet recent work questions this finding's generality. We reconcile these views with the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: the representational space contains directions ranging from broadly domain-general to narrowly domain-specific. To test this hypothesis, we systematically evaluate probe generalization across five truth types (definitional, empirical, logical, fictional, and ethical), sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying, and existing honesty benchmarks. Linear probes generalize well across most domains but fail on sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying. Yet training on all domains jointly recovers strong performance, confirming that domain-general directions exist despite poor pairwise transfer. The geometry of probe directions explains these patterns: Mahalanobis cosine similarity between probes near-perfectly predicts cross-domain generalization (R^2=0.98). Concept-erasure methods further isolate truth directions that are (1) domain-general, (2) domain-specific, or (3) shared only across particular domain subsets. Causal interventions reveal that domain-specific directions steer more effectively than domain-general ones. Finally, post-training reshapes truth geometry, pushing sycophantic lying further from other truth types, suggesting a representational basis for chat models' sycophantic tendencies. Together, our results support the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: truth directions of varying generality coexist in representational space, with post-training reshaping their geometry. Code for all experiments is provided in https://github.com/zfying/truth_spec.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown significant potential in scientific disciplines such as biomedicine, particularly in hypothesis generation, where they can analyze vast literature, identify patterns, and suggest research directions. However, a key challenge lies in evaluating the truthfulness of generated hypotheses, as verifying their accuracy often requires substantial time and resources. Additionally, the hallucination problem in LLMs can lead to the generation of hypotheses that appear plausible but are ultimately incorrect, undermining their reliability. To facilitate the systematic study of these challenges, we introduce TruthHypo, a benchmark for assessing the capabilities of LLMs in generating truthful biomedical hypotheses, and KnowHD, a knowledge-based hallucination detector to evaluate how well hypotheses are grounded in existing knowledge. Our results show that LLMs struggle to generate truthful hypotheses. By analyzing hallucinations in reasoning steps, we demonstrate that the groundedness scores provided by KnowHD serve as an effective metric for filtering truthful hypotheses from the diverse outputs of LLMs. Human evaluations further validate the utility of KnowHD in identifying truthful hypotheses and accelerating scientific discovery. Our data and source code are available at https://github.com/Teddy-XiongGZ/TruthHypo.

Large Language Models are trained on vast amounts of text from the internet, which contains both factual and misleading information about the world. Can language models discern truth from falsehood in this contradicting data? Expanding on the view that LLMs can model different agents producing the corpora, we hypothesize that they can cluster truthful text by modeling a truthful persona: a group of agents that are likely to produce truthful text and share similar features. For example, trustworthy sources like Wikipedia and Science usually use formal writing styles and make consistent claims. By modeling this persona, LLMs can generalize truthfulness beyond the specific contexts in which each agent generated the training text. For example, the model can infer that the agent "Wikipedia" will behave truthfully on topics that were only generated by "Science" because they share a persona. We first show evidence for the persona hypothesis via two observations: (1) we can probe whether a model's answer will be truthful before it is generated; (2) finetuning a model on a set of facts improves its truthfulness on unseen topics. Next, using arithmetics as a synthetic environment, we show that language models can separate true and false statements, and generalize truthfulness across agents; but only if agents in the training data share a truthful generative process that enables the creation of a truthful persona. Overall, our findings suggest that models can exploit hierarchical structures in the data to learn abstract concepts like truthfulness.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks. However, they sometimes suffer from producing hallucinations, particularly in cases where they may generate untruthful responses despite possessing the correct knowledge. In this paper, we propose TruthX, an inference-time method to elicit the truthfulness of LLMs by editing their internal representations in truthful space. TruthX employs an auto-encoder to map LLM's representations into semantic and truthful latent spaces respectively, and applies contrastive learning to identify a truthful editing direction within the truthful space. During inference, by editing LLM's internal representations in truthful space, TruthX effectively enhances the truthfulness of LLMs. Experiments show that TruthX effectively improves the truthfulness of 13 advanced LLMs by an average of 20% on TruthfulQA benchmark. Further analyses suggest that the truthful space acquired by TruthX plays a pivotal role in controlling LLM to produce truthful or hallucinatory responses.

Despite their remarkable success and deployment across diverse workflows, language models sometimes produce untruthful responses. Our limited understanding of how truthfulness is mechanistically encoded within these models jeopardizes their reliability and safety. In this paper, we propose a method for identifying representations of truthfulness at the neuron level. We show that language models contain truth neurons, which encode truthfulness in a subject-agnostic manner. Experiments conducted across models of varying scales validate the existence of truth neurons, confirming that the encoding of truthfulness at the neuron level is a property shared by many language models. The distribution patterns of truth neurons over layers align with prior findings on the geometry of truthfulness. Selectively suppressing the activations of truth neurons found through the TruthfulQA dataset degrades performance both on TruthfulQA and on other benchmarks, showing that the truthfulness mechanisms are not tied to a specific dataset. Our results offer novel insights into the mechanisms underlying truthfulness in language models and highlight potential directions toward improving their trustworthiness and reliability.

Object Hallucination (OH) has been acknowledged as one of the major trustworthy challenges in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) indicate that internal states, such as hidden states, encode the "overall truthfulness" of generated responses. However, it remains under-explored how internal states in LVLMs function and whether they could serve as "per-token" hallucination indicators, which is essential for mitigating OH. In this paper, we first conduct an in-depth exploration of LVLM internal states in relation to OH issues and discover that (1) LVLM internal states are high-specificity per-token indicators of hallucination behaviors. Moreover, (2) different LVLMs encode universal patterns of hallucinations in common latent subspaces, indicating that there exist "generic truthful directions" shared by various LVLMs. Based on these discoveries, we propose Truthful-Guided Pre-Intervention (TruthPrInt) that first learns the truthful direction of LVLM decoding and then applies truthful-guided inference-time intervention during LVLM decoding. We further propose ComnHallu to enhance both cross-LVLM and cross-data hallucination detection transferability by constructing and aligning hallucination latent subspaces. We evaluate TruthPrInt in extensive experimental settings, including in-domain and out-of-domain scenarios, over popular LVLMs and OH benchmarks. Experimental results indicate that TruthPrInt significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods. Codes will be available at https://github.com/jinhaoduan/TruthPrInt.

While large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong performance on factoid question answering, they are still prone to hallucination and untruthful responses, particularly when tasks demand information outside their parametric knowledge. Indeed, truthfulness requires more than accuracy -- models must also recognize uncertainty and abstain when unsure to avoid hallucinations. This presents a fundamental challenge for existing methods: approaches that optimize for accuracy often amplify hallucinations, while those that encourage abstention can become overly conservative, sacrificing correct answers. Both extremes ultimately compromise truthfulness. In this work, we present TruthRL, a general reinforcement learning (RL) framework that directly optimizes the truthfulness of LLMs. Specifically, we implement TruthRL using GRPO with a simple yet effective ternary reward that distinguishes correct answers, hallucinations, and abstentions. It incentivizes models to reduce hallucinations not only by providing correct responses, but also by enabling abstention when uncertain, thereby improving truthfulness. Extensive experiments across four knowledge-intensive benchmarks show that, compared to vanilla RL, TruthRL significantly reduces hallucinations by 28.9% and improves truthfulness by 21.1%, with consistent gains across various backbone models (e.g., Qwen, Llama) under both retrieval and non-retrieval setups. In-depth ablation study demonstrates that vanilla accuracy-driven methods, such as supervised fine-tuning or RL with a binary reward, struggle to balance factual correctness and uncertainty. In contrast, our proposed truthfulness-driven TruthRL achieves strong performance in both accuracy and truthfulness, underscoring the importance of learning objective design for developing truthful LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Large language models often generate factually incorrect outputs, motivating efforts to detect the truthfulness of their content. Most existing approaches rely on training probes over internal activations, but these methods suffer from scalability and generalization issues. A recent training-free method, NoVo, addresses this challenge by exploiting statistical patterns from the model itself. However, it focuses exclusively on attention mechanisms, potentially overlooking the MLP module-a core component of Transformer models known to support factual recall. In this paper, we show that certain value vectors within MLP modules exhibit truthfulness-related statistical patterns. Building on this insight, we propose TruthV, a simple and interpretable training-free method that detects content truthfulness by leveraging these value vectors. On the NoVo benchmark, TruthV significantly outperforms both NoVo and log-likelihood baselines, demonstrating that MLP modules-despite being neglected in prior training-free efforts-encode rich and useful signals for truthfulness detection. These findings offer new insights into how truthfulness is internally represented in LLMs and motivate further research on scalable and interpretable truthfulness detection.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have impressive capabilities, but are prone to outputting falsehoods. Recent work has developed techniques for inferring whether a LLM is telling the truth by training probes on the LLM's internal activations. However, this line of work is controversial, with some authors pointing out failures of these probes to generalize in basic ways, among other conceptual issues. In this work, we use high-quality datasets of simple true/false statements to study in detail the structure of LLM representations of truth, drawing on three lines of evidence: 1. Visualizations of LLM true/false statement representations, which reveal clear linear structure. 2. Transfer experiments in which probes trained on one dataset generalize to different datasets. 3. Causal evidence obtained by surgically intervening in a LLM's forward pass, causing it to treat false statements as true and vice versa. Overall, we present evidence that at sufficient scale, LLMs linearly represent the truth or falsehood of factual statements. We also show that simple difference-in-mean probes generalize as well as other probing techniques while identifying directions which are more causally implicated in model outputs.

Generative Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-3 are capable of generating highly fluent responses to a wide variety of user prompts. However, LLMs are known to hallucinate facts and make non-factual statements which can undermine trust in their output. Existing fact-checking approaches either require access to token-level output probability distribution (which may not be available for systems such as ChatGPT) or external databases that are interfaced via separate, often complex, modules. In this work, we propose "SelfCheckGPT", a simple sampling-based approach that can be used to fact-check black-box models in a zero-resource fashion, i.e. without an external database. SelfCheckGPT leverages the simple idea that if a LLM has knowledge of a given concept, sampled responses are likely to be similar and contain consistent facts. However, for hallucinated facts, stochastically sampled responses are likely to diverge and contradict one another. We investigate this approach by using GPT-3 to generate passages about individuals from the WikiBio dataset, and manually annotate the factuality of the generated passages. We demonstrate that SelfCheckGPT can: i) detect non-factual and factual sentences; and ii) rank passages in terms of factuality. We compare our approach to several existing baselines and show that in sentence hallucination detection, our approach has AUC-PR scores comparable to grey-box methods, while SelfCheckGPT is best at passage factuality assessment.

Bullshit, as conceptualized by philosopher Harry Frankfurt, refers to statements made without regard to their truth value. While previous work has explored large language model (LLM) hallucination and sycophancy, we propose machine bullshit as an overarching conceptual framework that can allow researchers to characterize the broader phenomenon of emergent loss of truthfulness in LLMs and shed light on its underlying mechanisms. We introduce the Bullshit Index, a novel metric quantifying LLMs' indifference to truth, and propose a complementary taxonomy analyzing four qualitative forms of bullshit: empty rhetoric, paltering, weasel words, and unverified claims. We conduct empirical evaluations on the Marketplace dataset, the Political Neutrality dataset, and our new BullshitEval benchmark (2,400 scenarios spanning 100 AI assistants) explicitly designed to evaluate machine bullshit. Our results demonstrate that model fine-tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) significantly exacerbates bullshit and inference-time chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting notably amplify specific bullshit forms, particularly empty rhetoric and paltering. We also observe prevalent machine bullshit in political contexts, with weasel words as the dominant strategy. Our findings highlight systematic challenges in AI alignment and provide new insights toward more truthful LLM behavior.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained on extensive datasets that encapsulate substantial world knowledge. However, their outputs often include confidently stated inaccuracies. Earlier works suggest that LLMs encode truthfulness as a distinct linear feature, termed the "truth direction", which can classify truthfulness reliably. We address several open questions about the truth direction: (i) whether LLMs universally exhibit consistent truth directions; (ii) whether sophisticated probing techniques are necessary to identify truth directions; and (iii) how the truth direction generalizes across diverse contexts. Our findings reveal that not all LLMs exhibit consistent truth directions, with stronger representations observed in more capable models, particularly in the context of logical negation. Additionally, we demonstrate that truthfulness probes trained on declarative atomic statements can generalize effectively to logical transformations, question-answering tasks, in-context learning, and external knowledge sources. Finally, we explore the practical application of truthfulness probes in selective question-answering, illustrating their potential to improve user trust in LLM outputs. These results advance our understanding of truth directions and provide new insights into the internal representations of LLM beliefs. Our code is public at https://github.com/colored-dye/truthfulness_probe_generalization

Evaluating the truthfulness of online content is critical for combating misinformation. This study examines the efficiency and effectiveness of crowdsourced truthfulness assessments through a comparative analysis of two approaches: one involving full-length webpages as evidence for each claim, and another using summaries for each evidence document generated with a large language model. Using an A/B testing setting, we engage a diverse pool of participants tasked with evaluating the truthfulness of statements under these conditions. Our analysis explores both the quality of assessments and the behavioral patterns of participants. The results reveal that relying on summarized evidence offers comparable accuracy and error metrics to the Standard modality while significantly improving efficiency. Workers in the Summary setting complete a significantly higher number of assessments, reducing task duration and costs. Additionally, the Summary modality maximizes internal agreement and maintains consistent reliance on and perceived usefulness of evidence, demonstrating its potential to streamline large-scale truthfulness evaluations.

Faithfulness hallucinations are claims generated by a Large Language Model (LLM) not supported by contexts provided to the LLM. Lacking assessment standards, existing benchmarks focus on "factual statements" that rephrase source materials while overlooking "cognitive statements" that involve making inferences from the given context. Consequently, evaluating and detecting the hallucination of cognitive statements remains challenging. Inspired by how evidence is assessed in the legal domain, we design a rigorous framework to assess different levels of faithfulness of cognitive statements and introduce the CogniBench dataset where we reveal insightful statistics. To keep pace with rapidly evolving LLMs, we further develop an automatic annotation pipeline that scales easily across different models. This results in a large-scale CogniBench-L dataset, which facilitates training accurate detectors for both factual and cognitive hallucinations. We release our model and datasets at: https://github.com/FUTUREEEEEE/CogniBench

We investigate the phenomenon of an LLM's untruthful response using a large set of 220 handcrafted linguistic features. We focus on GPT-3 models and find that the linguistic profiles of responses are similar across model sizes. That is, how varying-sized LLMs respond to given prompts stays similar on the linguistic properties level. We expand upon this finding by training support vector machines that rely only upon the stylistic components of model responses to classify the truthfulness of statements. Though the dataset size limits our current findings, we present promising evidence that truthfulness detection is possible without evaluating the content itself.

We introduce Inference-Time Intervention (ITI), a technique designed to enhance the truthfulness of large language models (LLMs). ITI operates by shifting model activations during inference, following a set of directions across a limited number of attention heads. This intervention significantly improves the performance of LLaMA models on the TruthfulQA benchmark. On an instruction-finetuned LLaMA called Alpaca, ITI improves its truthfulness from 32.5% to 65.1%. We identify a tradeoff between truthfulness and helpfulness and demonstrate how to balance it by tuning the intervention strength. ITI is minimally invasive and computationally inexpensive. Moreover, the technique is data efficient: while approaches like RLHF require extensive annotations, ITI locates truthful directions using only few hundred examples. Our findings suggest that LLMs may have an internal representation of the likelihood of something being true, even as they produce falsehoods on the surface.

Large Language Models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across diverse tasks, yet they frequently generate hallucinations outputs that are fluent but factually incorrect or unsupported. We propose Counterfactual Probing, a novel approach for detecting and mitigating hallucinations in LLM outputs. Our method dynamically generates counterfactual statements that appear plausible but contain subtle factual errors, then evaluates the model's sensitivity to these perturbations. We hypothesize that genuine knowledge exhibits robustness to counterfactual variations, while hallucinated content shows inconsistent confidence patterns when confronted with plausible alternatives. Our comprehensive evaluation on TruthfulQA, factual statement datasets, and curated hallucination examples demonstrates that counterfactual probing achieves superior detection performance compared to baseline methods, while our adaptive mitigation strategies reduce hallucination scores by an average of 24.5%. The approach requires no model retraining and can be integrated into existing LLM pipelines as a realtime verification mechanism.

When a language model is fed a wrong answer, what happens inside the network? Current understanding treats truthfulness as a static property of individual-layer representations-a direction to be probed, a feature to be extracted. Less is known about the dynamics: how internal representations diverge across the full depth of the network when the model processes correct versus incorrect continuations. We introduce forced-completion probing, a method that presents identical queries with known correct and incorrect single-token continuations and tracks five geometric measurements across every layer of four decoder-only models(1.5B-13B parameters). We report three findings. First, correct and incorrect paths diverge through rotation, not rescaling: displacement vectors maintain near-identical magnitudes while their angular separation increases, meaning factual selection is encoded in direction on an approximate hypersphere. Second, the model does not passively fail on incorrect input-it actively suppresses the correct answer, driving internal probability away from the right token. Third, both phenomena are entirely absent below a parameter threshold and emerge at 1.6B, suggesting a phase transition in factual processing capability. These results show that factual constraint processing has a specific geometric character-rotational, not scalar; active, not passive-that is invisible to methods based on single-layer probes or magnitude comparisons.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

Why do language models sometimes prefer correct statements even when trained on mixed-quality data? We introduce the Compression--Consistency Principle: next-token prediction favors hypotheses that allow shorter and more internally consistent descriptions of the training data. Truth bias emerges only when false alternatives are structurally harder to compress. We test this using small GPT-2-style character-level transformers (3.5M--86M parameters) on synthetic math corpora with controlled mixtures of correct and incorrect rules. In the random-error setting, models strongly prefer correct completions in paired evaluation: 83.1% accuracy at balanced data and 67.0% even when correct rules appear in only 10% of the corpus. Replacing random errors with a coherent but mathematically incorrect rule system largely eliminates the preference (near-chance accuracy). In a more natural-language-like synthetic world, the effect is weaker but still present (57.7%). Additional experiments show that embedding verification steps can restore preference for correctness even at small scale, while increasing the number of consistent rules produces a graded improvement in accuracy. Our results suggest that what appears as a "truth bias" is largely a side effect of compression pressure and preference for internal consistency, rather than an intrinsic drive toward truth. Full code and data are available at https://github.com/Rai220/compression-drives-truth.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

Post-training is essential for the success of large language models (LLMs), transforming pre-trained base models into more useful and aligned post-trained models. While plenty of works have studied post-training algorithms and evaluated post-training models by their outputs, it remains understudied how post-training reshapes LLMs internally. In this paper, we compare base and post-trained LLMs mechanistically from four perspectives to better understand post-training effects. Our findings across model families and datasets reveal that: (1) Post-training does not change the factual knowledge storage locations, and it adapts knowledge representations from the base model while developing new knowledge representations; (2) Both truthfulness and refusal can be represented by linear vectors in the hidden representation space. The truthfulness direction is highly similar between the base and post-trained model, and it is effectively transferable for interventions; (3) The refusal direction is different between the base and post-trained models, and it shows limited forward transferability; (4) Differences in confidence between the base and post-trained models cannot be attributed to entropy neurons. Our study provides insights into the fundamental mechanisms preserved and altered during post-training, facilitates downstream tasks like model steering, and could potentially benefit future research in interpretability and LLM post-training.

Despite their impressive capabilities, large language models (LLMs) have been observed to generate responses that include inaccurate or fabricated information, a phenomenon commonly known as ``hallucination''. In this work, we propose a simple Induce-then-Contrast Decoding (ICD) strategy to alleviate hallucinations. We first construct a factually weak LLM by inducing hallucinations from the original LLMs. Then, we penalize these induced hallucinations during decoding to enhance the factuality of the generated content. Concretely, we determine the final next-token predictions by amplifying the predictions from the original model and downplaying the induced untruthful predictions via contrastive decoding. Experimental results on both discrimination-based and generation-based hallucination evaluation benchmarks, such as TruthfulQA and FActScore, demonstrate that our proposed ICD methods can effectively enhance the factuality of LLMs across various model sizes and families. For example, when equipped with ICD, Llama2-7B-Chat and Mistral-7B-Instruct achieve performance comparable to ChatGPT and GPT4 on TruthfulQA, respectively.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce errors, including factual inaccuracies, biases, and reasoning failures, collectively referred to as "hallucinations". Recent studies have demonstrated that LLMs' internal states encode information regarding the truthfulness of their outputs, and that this information can be utilized to detect errors. In this work, we show that the internal representations of LLMs encode much more information about truthfulness than previously recognized. We first discover that the truthfulness information is concentrated in specific tokens, and leveraging this property significantly enhances error detection performance. Yet, we show that such error detectors fail to generalize across datasets, implying that -- contrary to prior claims -- truthfulness encoding is not universal but rather multifaceted. Next, we show that internal representations can also be used for predicting the types of errors the model is likely to make, facilitating the development of tailored mitigation strategies. Lastly, we reveal a discrepancy between LLMs' internal encoding and external behavior: they may encode the correct answer, yet consistently generate an incorrect one. Taken together, these insights deepen our understanding of LLM errors from the model's internal perspective, which can guide future research on enhancing error analysis and mitigation.

Despite their impressive capabilities, large language models (LLMs) are prone to hallucinations, i.e., generating content that deviates from facts seen during pretraining. We propose a simple decoding strategy for reducing hallucinations with pretrained LLMs that does not require conditioning on retrieved external knowledge nor additional fine-tuning. Our approach obtains the next-token distribution by contrasting the differences in logits obtained from projecting the later layers versus earlier layers to the vocabulary space, exploiting the fact that factual knowledge in an LLMs has generally been shown to be localized to particular transformer layers. We find that this Decoding by Contrasting Layers (DoLa) approach is able to better surface factual knowledge and reduce the generation of incorrect facts. DoLa consistently improves the truthfulness across multiple choices tasks and open-ended generation tasks, for example improving the performance of LLaMA family models on TruthfulQA by 12-17% absolute points, demonstrating its potential in making LLMs reliably generate truthful facts.

This paper presents a way of enhancing the reliability of Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) in addressing hallucination effects, where models generate incorrect or unrelated responses. Without additional instruction tuning paradigm, we introduce Counterfactual Inception, a novel method that implants counterfactual thoughts into LMMs using carefully chosen, misaligned counterfactual keywords. This method is grounded in the concept of counterfactual thinking, a cognitive process where humans consider alternative realities and outcomes. By applying this human-like reasoning mechanism to LMMs, we aim to reduce hallucination effects and improve the models' trustworthiness. We also propose Dual-modality Verification Process (DVP), a rigorous framework for selecting optimal counterfactual keywords to trigger counterfactual thinking into LMMs, concurrently considering visual and linguistic context. Our extensive experiments across various LMMs, including both open-source and proprietary models, corroborate that our method significantly mitigates hallucination phenomena across different datasets.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

We investigate strategic deception in large language models using two complementary testbeds: Secret Agenda (across 38 models) and Insider Trading compliance (via SAE architectures). Secret Agenda reliably induced lying when deception advantaged goal achievement across all model families. Analysis revealed that autolabeled SAE features for "deception" rarely activated during strategic dishonesty, and feature steering experiments across 100+ deception-related features failed to prevent lying. Conversely, insider trading analysis using unlabeled SAE activations separated deceptive versus compliant responses through discriminative patterns in heatmaps and t-SNE visualizations. These findings suggest autolabel-driven interpretability approaches fail to detect or control behavioral deception, while aggregate unlabeled activations provide population-level structure for risk assessment. Results span Llama 8B/70B SAE implementations and GemmaScope under resource constraints, representing preliminary findings that motivate larger studies on feature discovery, labeling methodology, and causal interventions in realistic deception contexts.

As AI systems become increasingly integrated into human lives, endowing them with robust social intelligence has emerged as a critical frontier. A key aspect of this intelligence is discerning truth from deception, a ubiquitous element of human interaction that is conveyed through a complex interplay of verbal language and non-verbal visual cues. However, automatic deception detection in dynamic, multi-party conversations remains a significant challenge. The recent rise of powerful Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), with their impressive abilities in visual and textual understanding, makes them natural candidates for this task. Consequently, their capabilities in this crucial domain are mostly unquantified. To address this gap, we introduce a new task, Multimodal Interactive Veracity Assessment (MIVA), and present a novel multimodal dataset derived from the social deduction game Werewolf. This dataset provides synchronized video, text, with verifiable ground-truth labels for every statement. We establish a comprehensive benchmark evaluating state-of-the-art MLLMs, revealing a significant performance gap: even powerful models like GPT-4o struggle to distinguish truth from falsehood reliably. Our analysis of failure modes indicates that these models fail to ground language in visual social cues effectively and may be overly conservative in their alignment, highlighting the urgent need for novel approaches to building more perceptive and trustworthy AI systems.

This study presents PARROT (Persuasion and Agreement Robustness Rating of Output Truth), a robustness focused framework designed to measure the degradation in accuracy that occurs under social pressure exerted on users through authority and persuasion in large language models (LLMs) the phenomenon of sycophancy (excessive conformity). PARROT (i) isolates causal effects by comparing the neutral version of the same question with an authoritatively false version using a double-blind evaluation, (ii) quantifies confidence shifts toward the correct and imposed false responses using log-likelihood-based calibration tracking, and (iii) systematically classifies failure modes (e.g., robust correct, sycophantic agreement, reinforced error, stubborn error, self-correction, etc.) using an eight-state behavioral taxonomy. We evaluated 22 models using 1,302 MMLU-style multiple-choice questions across 13 domains and domain-specific authority templates. Findings show marked heterogeneity: advanced models (e.g., GPT-5, GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) exhibit low "follow rates" (leq 11%, GPT-5: 4\%) and minimal accuracy loss, while older/smaller models show severe epistemic collapse (GPT-4: 80\%, Qwen 2.5-1.5B: 94\%). The danger is not limited to response changes; weak models reduce confidence in the correct response while increasing confidence in the imposed incorrect response. While international law and global knowledge at the domain level exhibit high fragility, elementary mathematics is relatively resilient. Consequently, we argue that the goal of "resistance to overfitting pressure" should be addressed as a primary objective alongside accuracy, harm avoidance, and privacy for safe deployment in the real world.

Language model alignment research often attempts to ensure that models are not only helpful and harmless, but also truthful and unbiased. However, optimizing these objectives simultaneously can obscure how improving one aspect might impact the others. In this work, we focus on analyzing the relationship between two concepts essential in both language model alignment and political science: truthfulness and political bias. We train reward models on various popular truthfulness datasets and subsequently evaluate their political bias. Our findings reveal that optimizing reward models for truthfulness on these datasets tends to result in a left-leaning political bias. We also find that existing open-source reward models (i.e. those trained on standard human preference datasets) already show a similar bias and that the bias is larger for larger models. These results raise important questions about both the datasets used to represent truthfulness and what language models capture about the relationship between truth and politics.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve remarkable fluency across linguistic and reasoning tasks but remain systematically prone to hallucination. Prevailing accounts attribute hallucinations to data gaps, limited context, or optimization errors. We argue instead that hallucination is a structural outcome of the transformer architecture. As coherence engines, transformers are compelled to produce fluent continuations, with self-attention simulating the relational structure of meaning but lacking the existential grounding of temporality, mood, and care that stabilizes human understanding. On this basis, we distinguish ontological hallucination, arising when continuations require disclosure of beings in world, and residual reasoning hallucination, where models mimic inference by recycling traces of human reasoning in text. We illustrate these patterns through case studies aligned with Heideggerian categories and an experiment across twelve LLMs showing how simulated "self-preservation" emerges under extended prompts. Our contribution is threefold: (1) a comparative account showing why existing explanations are insufficient; (2) a predictive taxonomy of hallucination linked to existential structures with proposed benchmarks; and (3) design directions toward "truth-constrained" architectures capable of withholding or deferring when disclosure is absent. We conclude that hallucination is not an incidental defect but a defining limit of transformer-based models, an outcome scaffolding can mask but never resolve.

Language models (LMs) hallucinate. We inquire: Can we detect and mitigate hallucinations before they happen? This work answers this research question in the positive, by showing that the internal representations of LMs provide rich signals that can be used for this purpose. We introduce FactCheckMate, which preemptively detects hallucinations by learning a classifier that predicts whether the LM will hallucinate, based on the model's hidden states produced over the inputs, before decoding begins. If a hallucination is detected, FactCheckMate then intervenes, by adjusting the LM's hidden states such that the model will produce more factual outputs. FactCheckMate provides fresh insights that the inner workings of LMs can be revealed by their hidden states. Practically, both the detection and mitigation models in FactCheckMate are lightweight, adding little inference overhead; FactCheckMate proves a more efficient approach for mitigating hallucinations compared to many post-hoc alternatives. We evaluate FactCheckMate over LMs of different scales and model families (including Llama, Mistral, and Gemma), across a variety of QA datasets from different domains. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of leveraging internal representations for early hallucination detection and mitigation, achieving over 70% preemptive detection accuracy. On average, outputs generated by LMs with intervention are 34.4% more factual compared to those without intervention. The average overhead difference in the inference time introduced by FactCheckMate is around 3.16 seconds.

Neural language models (LMs) can be used to evaluate the truth of factual statements in two ways: they can be either queried for statement probabilities, or probed for internal representations of truthfulness. Past work has found that these two procedures sometimes disagree, and that probes tend to be more accurate than LM outputs. This has led some researchers to conclude that LMs "lie" or otherwise encode non-cooperative communicative intents. Is this an accurate description of today's LMs, or can query-probe disagreement arise in other ways? We identify three different classes of disagreement, which we term confabulation, deception, and heterogeneity. In many cases, the superiority of probes is simply attributable to better calibration on uncertain answers rather than a greater fraction of correct, high-confidence answers. In some cases, queries and probes perform better on different subsets of inputs, and accuracy can further be improved by ensembling the two. Code is available at github.com/lingo-mit/lm-truthfulness.

Recent work has demonstrated the viability of using crowdsourcing as a tool for evaluating the truthfulness of public statements. Under certain conditions such as: (1) having a balanced set of workers with different backgrounds and cognitive abilities; (2) using an adequate set of mechanisms to control the quality of the collected data; and (3) using a coarse grained assessment scale, the crowd can provide reliable identification of fake news. However, fake news are a subtle matter: statements can be just biased ("cherrypicked"), imprecise, wrong, etc. and the unidimensional truth scale used in existing work cannot account for such differences. In this paper we propose a multidimensional notion of truthfulness and we ask the crowd workers to assess seven different dimensions of truthfulness selected based on existing literature: Correctness, Neutrality, Comprehensibility, Precision, Completeness, Speaker's Trustworthiness, and Informativeness. We deploy a set of quality control mechanisms to ensure that the thousands of assessments collected on 180 publicly available fact-checked statements distributed over two datasets are of adequate quality, including a custom search engine used by the crowd workers to find web pages supporting their truthfulness assessments. A comprehensive analysis of crowdsourced judgments shows that: (1) the crowdsourced assessments are reliable when compared to an expert-provided gold standard; (2) the proposed dimensions of truthfulness capture independent pieces of information; (3) the crowdsourcing task can be easily learned by the workers; and (4) the resulting assessments provide a useful basis for a more complete estimation of statement truthfulness.

The surge in applications of large language models (LLMs) has prompted concerns about the generation of misleading or fabricated information, known as hallucinations. Therefore, detecting hallucinations has become critical to maintaining trust in LLM-generated content. A primary challenge in learning a truthfulness classifier is the lack of a large amount of labeled truthful and hallucinated data. To address the challenge, we introduce HaloScope, a novel learning framework that leverages the unlabeled LLM generations in the wild for hallucination detection. Such unlabeled data arises freely upon deploying LLMs in the open world, and consists of both truthful and hallucinated information. To harness the unlabeled data, we present an automated membership estimation score for distinguishing between truthful and untruthful generations within unlabeled mixture data, thereby enabling the training of a binary truthfulness classifier on top. Importantly, our framework does not require extra data collection and human annotations, offering strong flexibility and practicality for real-world applications. Extensive experiments show that HaloScope can achieve superior hallucination detection performance, outperforming the competitive rivals by a significant margin. Code is available at https://github.com/deeplearningwisc/haloscope.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit hallucinations (i.e., unfaithful or nonsensical information) when serving as AI assistants in various domains. Since hallucinations always come with truthful content in the LLM responses, previous factuality alignment methods that conduct response-level preference learning inevitably introduced noises during training. Therefore, this paper proposes a fine-grained factuality alignment method based on Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), called Mask-DPO. Incorporating sentence-level factuality as mask signals, Mask-DPO only learns from factually correct sentences in the preferred samples and prevents the penalty on factual contents in the not preferred samples, which resolves the ambiguity in the preference learning. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that Mask-DPO can significantly improve the factuality of LLMs responses to questions from both in-domain and out-of-domain datasets, although these questions and their corresponding topics are unseen during training. Only trained on the ANAH train set, the score of Llama3.1-8B-Instruct on the ANAH test set is improved from 49.19% to 77.53%, even surpassing the score of Llama3.1-70B-Instruct (53.44%), while its FactScore on the out-of-domain Biography dataset is also improved from 30.29% to 39.39%. We further study the generalization property of Mask-DPO using different training sample scaling strategies and find that scaling the number of topics in the dataset is more effective than the number of questions. We provide a hypothesis of what factual alignment is doing with LLMs, on the implication of this phenomenon, and conduct proof-of-concept experiments to verify it. We hope the method and the findings pave the way for future research on scaling factuality alignment.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for factual tasks such as "What treats asthma?" or "What is the capital of Latvia?". However, it remains unclear how stably LLMs encode distinctions between true, false, and neither-true-nor-false content in their internal probabilistic representations. We introduce representational stability as the robustness of an LLM's veracity representations to perturbations in the operational definition of truth. We assess representational stability by (i) training a linear probe on an LLM's activations to separate true from not-true statements and (ii) measuring how its learned decision boundary shifts under controlled label changes. Using activations from sixteen open-source models and three factual domains, we compare two types of neither statements. The first are fact-like assertions about entities we believe to be absent from any training data. We call these unfamiliar neither statements. The second are nonfactual claims drawn from well-known fictional contexts. We call these familiar neither statements. The unfamiliar statements induce the largest boundary shifts, producing up to 40% flipped truth judgements in fragile domains (such as word definitions), while familiar fictional statements remain more coherently clustered and yield smaller changes (leq 8.2%). These results suggest that representational stability stems more from epistemic familiarity than from linguistic form. More broadly, our approach provides a diagnostic for auditing and training LLMs to preserve coherent truth assignments under semantic uncertainty, rather than optimizing for output accuracy alone.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) often generate plausible but incorrect responses to visual queries. However, reliably quantifying the effect of such hallucinations in free-form responses to open-ended queries is challenging as it requires visually verifying each claim within the response. We propose Programmatic VLM Evaluation (PROVE), a new benchmarking paradigm for evaluating VLM responses to open-ended queries. To construct PROVE, we provide a large language model (LLM) with a high-fidelity scene-graph representation constructed from a hyper-detailed image caption, and prompt it to generate diverse question-answer (QA) pairs, as well as programs that can be executed over the scene graph object to verify each QA pair. We thus construct a benchmark of 10.5k challenging but visually grounded QA pairs. Next, to evaluate free-form model responses to queries in PROVE, we propose a programmatic evaluation strategy that measures both the helpfulness and truthfulness of a response within a unified scene graph-based framework. We benchmark the helpfulness-truthfulness trade-offs of a range of VLMs on PROVE, finding that very few are in-fact able to achieve a good balance between the two. Project page: https://prove-explorer.netlify.app/.

Despite their impressive generative capabilities, LLMs are hindered by fact-conflicting hallucinations in real-world applications. The accurate identification of hallucinations in texts generated by LLMs, especially in complex inferential scenarios, is a relatively unexplored area. To address this gap, we present FactCHD, a dedicated benchmark designed for the detection of fact-conflicting hallucinations from LLMs. FactCHD features a diverse dataset that spans various factuality patterns, including vanilla, multi-hop, comparison, and set operation. A distinctive element of FactCHD is its integration of fact-based evidence chains, significantly enhancing the depth of evaluating the detectors' explanations. Experiments on different LLMs expose the shortcomings of current approaches in detecting factual errors accurately. Furthermore, we introduce Truth-Triangulator that synthesizes reflective considerations by tool-enhanced ChatGPT and LoRA-tuning based on Llama2, aiming to yield more credible detection through the amalgamation of predictive results and evidence. The benchmark dataset is available at https://github.com/zjunlp/FactCHD.

We study how to characterize and predict the truthfulness of texts generated from large language models (LLMs), which serves as a crucial step in building trust between humans and LLMs. Although several approaches based on entropy or verbalized uncertainty have been proposed to calibrate model predictions, these methods are often intractable, sensitive to hyperparameters, and less reliable when applied in generative tasks with LLMs. In this paper, we suggest investigating internal activations and quantifying LLM's truthfulness using the local intrinsic dimension (LID) of model activations. Through experiments on four question answering (QA) datasets, we demonstrate the effectiveness ohttps://info.arxiv.org/help/prep#abstractsf our proposed method. Additionally, we study intrinsic dimensions in LLMs and their relations with model layers, autoregressive language modeling, and the training of LLMs, revealing that intrinsic dimensions can be a powerful approach to understanding LLMs.

Instruction fine-tuning (IFT) can increase the informativeness of large language models (LLMs), but may reduce their truthfulness. This trade-off arises because IFT steers LLMs to generate responses containing long-tail knowledge that was not well covered during pre-training. As a result, models become more informative but less accurate when generalizing to unseen tasks. In this paper, we empirically demonstrate how unfamiliar knowledge in IFT datasets can negatively affect the truthfulness of LLMs, and we introduce two new IFT paradigms, UNIT_{cut} and UNIT_{ref}, to address this issue. UNIT_{cut} identifies and removes unfamiliar knowledge from IFT datasets to mitigate its impact on model truthfulness, whereas UNIT_{ref} trains LLMs to recognize their uncertainty and explicitly indicate it at the end of their responses. Our experiments show that UNIT_{cut} substantially improves LLM truthfulness, while UNIT_{ref} maintains high informativeness and reduces hallucinations by distinguishing between confident and uncertain statements.

Deception is the intentional practice of twisting information. It is a nuanced societal practice deeply intertwined with human societal evolution, characterized by a multitude of facets. This research explores the problem of deception through the lens of psychology, employing a framework that categorizes deception into three forms: lies of omission, lies of commission, and lies of influence. The primary focus of this study is specifically on investigating only lies of omission. We propose a novel framework for deception detection leveraging NLP techniques. We curated an annotated dataset of 876,784 samples by amalgamating a popular large-scale fake news dataset and scraped news headlines from the Twitter handle of Times of India, a well-known Indian news media house. Each sample has been labeled with four layers, namely: (i) the type of omission (speculation, bias, distortion, sounds factual, and opinion), (ii) colors of lies(black, white, etc), and (iii) the intention of such lies (to influence, etc) (iv) topic of lies (political, educational, religious, etc). We present a novel multi-task learning pipeline that leverages the dataless merging of fine-tuned language models to address the deception detection task mentioned earlier. Our proposed model achieved an F1 score of 0.87, demonstrating strong performance across all layers including the type, color, intent, and topic aspects of deceptive content. Finally, our research explores the relationship between lies of omission and propaganda techniques. To accomplish this, we conducted an in-depth analysis, uncovering compelling findings. For instance, our analysis revealed a significant correlation between loaded language and opinion, shedding light on their interconnectedness. To encourage further research in this field, we will be making the models and dataset available with the MIT License, making it favorable for open-source research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often produce fluent yet factually incorrect statements-a phenomenon known as hallucination-posing serious risks in high-stakes domains. We present Layer-wise Semantic Dynamics (LSD), a geometric framework for hallucination detection that analyzes the evolution of hidden-state semantics across transformer layers. Unlike prior methods that rely on multiple sampling passes or external verification sources, LSD operates intrinsically within the model's representational space. Using margin-based contrastive learning, LSD aligns hidden activations with ground-truth embeddings derived from a factual encoder, revealing a distinct separation in semantic trajectories: factual responses preserve stable alignment, while hallucinations exhibit pronounced semantic drift across depth. Evaluated on the TruthfulQA and synthetic factual-hallucination datasets, LSD achieves an F1-score of 0.92, AUROC of 0.96, and clustering accuracy of 0.89, outperforming SelfCheckGPT and Semantic Entropy baselines while requiring only a single forward pass. This efficiency yields a 5-20x speedup over sampling-based methods without sacrificing precision or interpretability. LSD offers a scalable, model-agnostic mechanism for real-time hallucination monitoring and provides new insights into the geometry of factual consistency within large language models.

Recent probing studies reveal that large language models exhibit linear subspaces that separate true from false statements, yet the mechanism behind their emergence is unclear. We introduce a transparent, one-layer transformer toy model that reproduces such truth subspaces end-to-end and exposes one concrete route by which they can arise. We study one simple setting in which truth encoding can emerge: a data distribution where factual statements co-occur with other factual statements (and vice-versa), encouraging the model to learn this distinction in order to lower the LM loss on future tokens. We corroborate this pattern with experiments in pretrained language models. Finally, in the toy setting we observe a two-phase learning dynamic: networks first memorize individual factual associations in a few steps, then -- over a longer horizon -- learn to linearly separate true from false, which in turn lowers language-modeling loss. Together, these results provide both a mechanistic demonstration and an empirical motivation for how and why linear truth representations can emerge in language models.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

This thesis addresses two persistent and closely related challenges in modern deep learning, reliability and efficiency, through a unified framework grounded in Spectral Geometry and Random Matrix Theory (RMT). As deep networks and large language models continue to scale, their internal behavior becomes increasingly opaque, leading to hallucinations, fragile generalization under distribution shift, and growing computational and energy demands. By analyzing the eigenvalue dynamics of hidden activations across layers and inputs, this work shows that spectral statistics provide a compact, stable, and interpretable lens on model behavior, capable of separating structured, causal representations from noise-dominated variability. Within this framework, the first contribution, EigenTrack, introduces a real-time method for detecting hallucinations and out-of-distribution behavior in large language and vision-language models. EigenTrack transforms streaming activations into spectral descriptors such as entropy, variance, and deviations from the Marchenko-Pastur baseline, and models their temporal evolution using lightweight recurrent classifiers, enabling early detection of reliability failures before they appear in model outputs while offering interpretable insight into representation dynamics. The second contribution, RMT-KD, presents a principled approach to compressing deep networks via random matrix theoretic knowledge distillation. By interpreting outlier eigenvalues in activation spectra as carriers of task-relevant information, RMT-KD progressively projects networks onto lower-dimensional subspaces through iterative self-distillation, yielding significantly more compact and energy-efficient models while preserving accuracy and dense, hardware-friendly structure.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) outputs let us read a model's step-by-step reasoning. Since any long, serial reasoning process must pass through this textual trace, the quality of the CoT is a direct window into what the model is thinking. This visibility could help us spot unsafe or misaligned behavior (monitorability), but only if the CoT is transparent about its internal reasoning (faithfulness). Fully measuring faithfulness is difficult, so researchers often focus on examining the CoT in cases where the model changes its answer after adding a cue to the input. This proxy finds some instances of unfaithfulness but loses information when the model maintains its answer, and does not investigate aspects of reasoning not tied to the cue. We extend these results to a more holistic sense of monitorability by introducing verbosity: whether the CoT lists every factor needed to solve the task. We combine faithfulness and verbosity into a single monitorability score that shows how well the CoT serves as the model's external `working memory', a property that many safety schemes based on CoT monitoring depend on. We evaluate instruction-tuned and reasoning models on BBH, GPQA, and MMLU. Our results show that models can appear faithful yet remain hard to monitor when they leave out key factors, and that monitorability differs sharply across model families. We release our evaluation code using the Inspect library to support reproducible future work.

While large language models have demonstrated exceptional performance across a wide range of tasks, they remain susceptible to hallucinations -- generating plausible yet factually incorrect contents. Existing methods to mitigating such risk often rely on sampling multiple full-length generations, which introduces significant response latency and becomes ineffective when the model consistently produces hallucinated outputs with high confidence. To address these limitations, we introduce Monitoring Decoding (MD), a novel framework that dynamically monitors the generation process and selectively applies in-process interventions, focusing on revising crucial tokens responsible for hallucinations. Instead of waiting until completion of multiple full-length generations, we identify hallucination-prone tokens during generation using a monitor function, and further refine these tokens through a tree-based decoding strategy. This approach ensures an enhanced factual accuracy and coherence in the generated output while maintaining efficiency. Experimental results demonstrate that MD consistently outperforms self-consistency-based approaches in both effectiveness and efficiency, achieving higher factual accuracy while significantly reducing computational overhead.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit hallucinations, generating factually incorrect or semantically irrelevant content in response to prompts. Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting can mitigate hallucinations by encouraging step-by-step reasoning, but its impact on hallucination detection remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we conduct a systematic empirical evaluation. We begin with a pilot experiment, revealing that CoT reasoning significantly affects the LLM's internal states and token probability distributions. Building on this, we evaluate the impact of various CoT prompting methods on mainstream hallucination detection methods across both instruction-tuned and reasoning-oriented LLMs. Specifically, we examine three key dimensions: changes in hallucination score distributions, variations in detection accuracy, and shifts in detection confidence. Our findings show that while CoT prompting helps reduce hallucination frequency, it also tends to obscure critical signals used for detection, impairing the effectiveness of various detection methods. Our study highlights an overlooked trade-off in the use of reasoning. Code is publicly available at: https://github.com/ECNU-Text-Computing/cot-hallu-detect .

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly deployed across various industries, concerns regarding their reliability, particularly due to hallucinations-outputs that are factually inaccurate or irrelevant to user input-have grown. Our research investigates the relationship between the training process and the emergence of hallucinations to address a key gap in existing research that focuses primarily on post hoc detection and mitigation strategies. Using models from the Pythia suite (70M-12B parameters) and several hallucination detection metrics, we analyze hallucination trends throughout training and explore LLM internal dynamics. We introduce SEnsitive Neuron Dropout (SeND), a novel training protocol designed to mitigate hallucinations by reducing variance during training. SeND achieves this by deterministically dropping neurons with significant variability on a dataset, referred to as Sensitive Neurons. In addition, we develop an unsupervised hallucination detection metric, Efficient EigenScore (EES), which approximates the traditional EigenScore in 2x speed. This efficient metric is integrated into our protocol, allowing SeND to be both computationally scalable and effective at reducing hallucinations. Our empirical evaluation demonstrates that our approach improves LLM reliability at test time by up to 40% compared to normal training while also providing an efficient method to improve factual accuracy when adapting LLMs to domains such as Wikipedia and Medical datasets.

Knowledge hallucination have raised widespread concerns for the security and reliability of deployed LLMs. Previous efforts in detecting hallucinations have been employed at logit-level uncertainty estimation or language-level self-consistency evaluation, where the semantic information is inevitably lost during the token-decoding procedure. Thus, we propose to explore the dense semantic information retained within LLMs' INternal States for hallucInation DEtection (INSIDE). In particular, a simple yet effective EigenScore metric is proposed to better evaluate responses' self-consistency, which exploits the eigenvalues of responses' covariance matrix to measure the semantic consistency/diversity in the dense embedding space. Furthermore, from the perspective of self-consistent hallucination detection, a test time feature clipping approach is explored to truncate extreme activations in the internal states, which reduces overconfident generations and potentially benefits the detection of overconfident hallucinations. Extensive experiments and ablation studies are performed on several popular LLMs and question-answering (QA) benchmarks, showing the effectiveness of our proposal.

Pursuit of honest and truthful decision-making is crucial for governance and accountability in democracies. However, people sometimes take different perspectives of what it means to be honest and how to pursue truthfulness. Here we explore a continuum of perspectives from evidence-based reasoning, rooted in ascertainable facts and data, at one end, to intuitive decisions that are driven by feelings and subjective interpretations, at the other. We analyze the linguistic traces of those contrasting perspectives in Congressional speeches from 1879 to 2022. We find that evidence-based language has continued to decline since the mid-1970s, together with a decline in legislative productivity. The decline was accompanied by increasing partisan polarization in Congress and rising income inequality in society. Results highlight the importance of evidence-based language in political decision-making.

Recently Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved considerable advancements in vision-language tasks, yet produce potentially harmful or untrustworthy content. Despite substantial work investigating the trustworthiness of language models, MMLMs' capability to act honestly, especially when faced with visually unanswerable questions, remains largely underexplored. This work presents the first systematic assessment of honesty behaviors across various MLLMs. We ground honesty in models' response behaviors to unanswerable visual questions, define four representative types of such questions, and construct MoHoBench, a large-scale MMLM honest benchmark, consisting of 12k+ visual question samples, whose quality is guaranteed by multi-stage filtering and human verification. Using MoHoBench, we benchmarked the honesty of 28 popular MMLMs and conducted a comprehensive analysis. Our findings show that: (1) most models fail to appropriately refuse to answer when necessary, and (2) MMLMs' honesty is not solely a language modeling issue, but is deeply influenced by visual information, necessitating the development of dedicated methods for multimodal honesty alignment. Therefore, we implemented initial alignment methods using supervised and preference learning to improve honesty behavior, providing a foundation for future work on trustworthy MLLMs. Our data and code can be found at https://github.com/DSTTSD/MoHoBench.

Hallucinations in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) -- where the model generates content inconsistent with the input image -- pose significant risks in real-world applications, from misinformation in visual question answering to unsafe errors in decision-making. Existing benchmarks primarily test recognition accuracy, i.e., evaluating whether models can select the correct answer among distractors. This overlooks an equally critical capability for trustworthy AI: recognizing when none of the provided options are correct, a behavior reflecting epistemic humility. We present HumbleBench, a new hallucination benchmark designed to evaluate MLLMs' ability to reject plausible but incorrect answers across three hallucination types: object, relation, and attribute. Built from a panoptic scene graph dataset, we leverage fine-grained scene graph annotations to extract ground-truth entities and relations, and prompt GPT-4-Turbo to generate multiple-choice questions, followed by a rigorous manual filtering process. Each question includes a "None of the above" option, requiring models not only to recognize correct visual information but also to identify when no provided answer is valid. We evaluate a variety of state-of-the-art MLLMs -- including both general-purpose and specialized reasoning models -- on HumbleBench and share valuable findings and insights with the community. By incorporating explicit false-option rejection, HumbleBench fills a key gap in current evaluation suites, providing a more realistic measure of MLLM reliability in safety-critical settings. Our code and dataset are released publicly and can be accessed at https://github.com/maifoundations/HumbleBench.

Speech patterns have been identified as potential diagnostic markers for neuropsychiatric conditions. However, most studies only compare a single clinical group to healthy controls, whereas clinical practice often requires differentiating between multiple potential diagnoses (multiclass settings). To address this, we assembled a dataset of repeated recordings from 420 participants (67 with major depressive disorder, 106 with schizophrenia and 46 with autism, as well as matched controls), and tested the performance of a range of conventional machine learning models and advanced Transformer models on both binary and multiclass classification, based on voice and text features. While binary models performed comparably to previous research (F1 scores between 0.54-0.75 for autism spectrum disorder, ASD; 0.67-0.92 for major depressive disorder, MDD; and 0.71-0.83 for schizophrenia); when differentiating between multiple diagnostic groups performance decreased markedly (F1 scores between 0.35-0.44 for ASD, 0.57-0.75 for MDD, 0.15-0.66 for schizophrenia, and 0.38-0.52 macro F1). Combining voice and text-based models yielded increased performance, suggesting that they capture complementary diagnostic information. Our results indicate that models trained on binary classification may learn to rely on markers of generic differences between clinical and non-clinical populations, or markers of clinical features that overlap across conditions, rather than identifying markers specific to individual conditions. We provide recommendations for future research in the field, suggesting increased focus on developing larger transdiagnostic datasets that include more fine-grained clinical features, and that can support the development of models that better capture the complexity of neuropsychiatric conditions and naturalistic diagnostic assessment.

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world settings, correctness alone is insufficient. Reliable deployment requires maintaining truthful beliefs under contextual perturbations. Existing evaluations largely rely on point-wise confidence like Self-Consistency, which can mask brittle belief. We show that even facts answered with perfect self-consistency can rapidly collapse under mild contextual interference. To address this gap, we propose Neighbor-Consistency Belief (NCB), a structural measure of belief robustness that evaluates response coherence across a conceptual neighborhood. To validate the efficiency of NCB, we introduce a new cognitive stress-testing protocol that probes outputs stability under contextual interference. Experiments across multiple LLMs show that the performance of high-NCB data is relatively more resistant to interference. Finally, we present Structure-Aware Training (SAT), which optimizes context-invariant belief structure and reduces long-tail knowledge brittleness by approximately 30%. Code will be available at https://github.com/zjunlp/belief.

Despite the remarkable advances of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse cognitive tasks, the rapid enhancement of these capabilities also introduces emergent deceptive behaviors that may induce severe risks in high-stakes deployments. More critically, the characterization of deception across realistic real-world scenarios remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we establish DeceptionBench, the first benchmark that systematically evaluates how deceptive tendencies manifest across different societal domains, what their intrinsic behavioral patterns are, and how extrinsic factors affect them. Specifically, on the static count, the benchmark encompasses 150 meticulously designed scenarios in five domains, i.e., Economy, Healthcare, Education, Social Interaction, and Entertainment, with over 1,000 samples, providing sufficient empirical foundations for deception analysis. On the intrinsic dimension, we explore whether models exhibit self-interested egoistic tendencies or sycophantic behaviors that prioritize user appeasement. On the extrinsic dimension, we investigate how contextual factors modulate deceptive outputs under neutral conditions, reward-based incentivization, and coercive pressures. Moreover, we incorporate sustained multi-turn interaction loops to construct a more realistic simulation of real-world feedback dynamics. Extensive experiments across LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) reveal critical vulnerabilities, particularly amplified deception under reinforcement dynamics, demonstrating that current models lack robust resistance to manipulative contextual cues and the urgent need for advanced safeguards against various deception behaviors. Code and resources are publicly available at https://github.com/Aries-iai/DeceptionBench.

Generation of plausible yet incorrect factual information, termed hallucination, is an unsolved issue in large language models. We study the ability of language models to deliberate on the responses they give in order to correct their mistakes. We develop the Chain-of-Verification (CoVe) method whereby the model first (i) drafts an initial response; then (ii) plans verification questions to fact-check its draft; (iii) answers those questions independently so the answers are not biased by other responses; and (iv) generates its final verified response. In experiments, we show CoVe decreases hallucinations across a variety of tasks, from list-based questions from Wikidata, closed book MultiSpanQA and longform text generation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

Creating high-quality and realistic images is now possible thanks to the impressive advancements in image generation. A description in natural language of your desired output is all you need to obtain breathtaking results. However, as the use of generative models grows, so do concerns about the propagation of malicious content and misinformation. Consequently, the research community is actively working on the development of novel fake detection techniques, primarily focusing on low-level features and possible fingerprints left by generative models during the image generation process. In a different vein, in our work, we leverage human semantic knowledge to investigate the possibility of being included in frameworks of fake image detection. To achieve this, we collect a novel dataset of partially manipulated images using diffusion models and conduct an eye-tracking experiment to record the eye movements of different observers while viewing real and fake stimuli. A preliminary statistical analysis is conducted to explore the distinctive patterns in how humans perceive genuine and altered images. Statistical findings reveal that, when perceiving counterfeit samples, humans tend to focus on more confined regions of the image, in contrast to the more dispersed observational pattern observed when viewing genuine images. Our dataset is publicly available at: https://github.com/aimagelab/unveiling-the-truth.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

Language Models (LMs) are being proposed for mental health applications where the heightened risk of adverse outcomes means predictive performance may not be a sufficient litmus test of a model's utility in clinical practice. A model that can be trusted for practice should have a correspondence between explanation and clinical determination, yet no prior research has examined the attention fidelity of these models and their effect on ground truth explanations. We introduce an evaluation design that focuses on the robustness and explainability of LMs in identifying Wellness Dimensions (WDs). We focus on two existing mental health and well-being datasets: (a) Multi-label Classification-based MultiWD, and (b) WellXplain for evaluating attention mechanism veracity against expert-labeled explanations. The labels are based on Halbert Dunn's theory of wellness, which gives grounding to our evaluation. We reveal four surprising results about LMs/LLMs: (1) Despite their human-like capabilities, GPT-3.5/4 lag behind RoBERTa, and MedAlpaca, a fine-tuned LLM on WellXplain fails to deliver any remarkable improvements in performance or explanations. (2) Re-examining LMs' predictions based on a confidence-oriented loss function reveals a significant performance drop. (3) Across all LMs/LLMs, the alignment between attention and explanations remains low, with LLMs scoring a dismal 0.0. (4) Most mental health-specific LMs/LLMs overlook domain-specific knowledge and undervalue explanations, causing these discrepancies. This study highlights the need for further research into their consistency and explanations in mental health and well-being.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Hallucinations in large language models (LLMs) during summarization of patient-clinician dialogues pose significant risks to patient care and clinical decision-making. However, the phenomenon remains understudied in the clinical domain, with uncertainty surrounding the applicability of general-domain hallucination detectors. The rarity and randomness of hallucinations further complicate their investigation. In this paper, we conduct an evaluation of hallucination detection methods in the medical domain, and construct two datasets for the purpose: A fact-controlled Leave-N-out dataset -- generated by systematically removing facts from source dialogues to induce hallucinated content in summaries; and a natural hallucination dataset -- arising organically during LLM-based medical summarization. We show that general-domain detectors struggle to detect clinical hallucinations, and that performance on fact-controlled hallucinations does not reliably predict effectiveness on natural hallucinations. We then develop fact-based approaches that count hallucinations, offering explainability not available with existing methods. Notably, our LLM-based detectors, which we developed using fact-controlled hallucinations, generalize well to detecting real-world clinical hallucinations. This research contributes a suite of specialized metrics supported by expert-annotated datasets to advance faithful clinical summarization systems.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

Large language models (LLMs) have transformed natural language processing, achieving remarkable performance across diverse tasks. However, their impressive fluency often comes at the cost of producing false or fabricated information, a phenomenon known as hallucination. Hallucination refers to the generation of content by an LLM that is fluent and syntactically correct but factually inaccurate or unsupported by external evidence. Hallucinations undermine the reliability and trustworthiness of LLMs, especially in domains requiring factual accuracy. This survey provides a comprehensive review of research on hallucination in LLMs, with a focus on causes, detection, and mitigation. We first present a taxonomy of hallucination types and analyze their root causes across the entire LLM development lifecycle, from data collection and architecture design to inference. We further examine how hallucinations emerge in key natural language generation tasks. Building on this foundation, we introduce a structured taxonomy of detection approaches and another taxonomy of mitigation strategies. We also analyze the strengths and limitations of current detection and mitigation approaches and review existing evaluation benchmarks and metrics used to quantify LLMs hallucinations. Finally, we outline key open challenges and promising directions for future research, providing a foundation for the development of more truthful and trustworthy LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to respond accurately but often exhibit deficient reasoning or generate hallucinatory content. To address these, studies prefixed with ``Self-'' such as Self-Consistency, Self-Improve, and Self-Refine have been initiated. They share a commonality: involving LLMs evaluating and updating itself to mitigate the issues. Nonetheless, these efforts lack a unified perspective on summarization, as existing surveys predominantly focus on categorization without examining the motivations behind these works. In this paper, we summarize a theoretical framework, termed Internal Consistency, which offers unified explanations for phenomena such as the lack of reasoning and the presence of hallucinations. Internal Consistency assesses the coherence among LLMs' latent layer, decoding layer, and response layer based on sampling methodologies. Expanding upon the Internal Consistency framework, we introduce a streamlined yet effective theoretical framework capable of mining Internal Consistency, named Self-Feedback. The Self-Feedback framework consists of two modules: Self-Evaluation and Self-Update. This framework has been employed in numerous studies. We systematically classify these studies by tasks and lines of work; summarize relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks; and delve into the concern, ``Does Self-Feedback Really Work?'' We propose several critical viewpoints, including the ``Hourglass Evolution of Internal Consistency'', ``Consistency Is (Almost) Correctness'' hypothesis, and ``The Paradox of Latent and Explicit Reasoning''. Furthermore, we outline promising directions for future research. We have open-sourced the experimental code, reference list, and statistical data, available at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/ICSFSurvey.

The uniform information density (UID) hypothesis states that humans tend to distribute information roughly evenly across an utterance or discourse. Early evidence in support of the UID hypothesis came from Genzel & Charniak (2002), which proposed an entropy rate constancy principle based on the probability of English text under n-gram language models. We re-evaluate the claims of Genzel & Charniak (2002) with neural language models, failing to find clear evidence in support of entropy rate constancy. We conduct a range of experiments across datasets, model sizes, and languages and discuss implications for the uniform information density hypothesis and linguistic theories of efficient communication more broadly.

As large language models (LLMs) become more capable and agentic, the requirement for trust in their outputs grows significantly, yet at the same time concerns have been mounting that models may learn to lie in pursuit of their goals. To address these concerns, a body of work has emerged around the notion of "honesty" in LLMs, along with interventions aimed at mitigating deceptive behaviors. However, evaluations of honesty are currently highly limited, with no benchmark combining large scale and applicability to all models. Moreover, many benchmarks claiming to measure honesty in fact simply measure accuracy--the correctness of a model's beliefs--in disguise. In this work, we introduce a large-scale human-collected dataset for measuring honesty directly, allowing us to disentangle accuracy from honesty for the first time. Across a diverse set of LLMs, we find that while larger models obtain higher accuracy on our benchmark, they do not become more honest. Surprisingly, while most frontier LLMs obtain high scores on truthfulness benchmarks, we find a substantial propensity in frontier LLMs to lie when pressured to do so, resulting in low honesty scores on our benchmark. We find that simple methods, such as representation engineering interventions, can improve honesty. These results underscore the growing need for robust evaluations and effective interventions to ensure LLMs remain trustworthy.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning has been proposed as a transparency mechanism for large language models in safety-critical deployments, yet its effectiveness depends on faithfulness (whether models accurately verbalize the factors that actually influence their outputs), a property that prior evaluations have examined in only two proprietary models, finding acknowledgment rates as low as 25% for Claude 3.7 Sonnet and 39% for DeepSeek-R1. To extend this evaluation across the open-weight ecosystem, this study tests 12 open-weight reasoning models spanning 9 architectural families (7B-685B parameters) on 498 multiple-choice questions from MMLU and GPQA Diamond, injecting six categories of reasoning hints (sycophancy, consistency, visual pattern, metadata, grader hacking, and unethical information) and measuring the rate at which models acknowledge hint influence in their CoT when hints successfully alter answers. Across 41,832 inference runs, overall faithfulness rates range from 39.7% (Seed-1.6-Flash) to 89.9% (DeepSeek-V3.2-Speciale) across model families, with consistency hints (35.5%) and sycophancy hints (53.9%) exhibiting the lowest acknowledgment rates. Training methodology and model family predict faithfulness more strongly than parameter count, and keyword-based analysis reveals a striking gap between thinking-token acknowledgment (approximately 87.5%) and answer-text acknowledgment (approximately 28.6%), suggesting that models internally recognize hint influence but systematically suppress this acknowledgment in their outputs. These findings carry direct implications for the viability of CoT monitoring as a safety mechanism and suggest that faithfulness is not a fixed property of reasoning models but varies systematically with architecture, training method, and the nature of the influencing cue.

As mental health care systems worldwide struggle to meet demand, there is increasing focus on using language models to infer neuropsychiatric conditions or psychopathological traits from language production. Yet, so far, this research has only delivered solutions with limited clinical applicability, due to insufficient consideration of ethical questions crucial to ensuring the synergy between possible applications and model design. To accelerate progress towards clinically applicable models, our paper charts the ethical landscape of research on language-based inference of psychopathology and provides a practical tool for researchers to navigate it. We identify seven core ethical principles that should guide model development and deployment in this domain, translate them into ELLIPS, an ethical toolkit operationalizing these principles into questions that can guide researchers' choices with respect to data selection, architectures, evaluation, and model deployment, and provide a case study exemplifying its use. With this, we aim to facilitate the emergence of model technology with concrete potential for real-world applicability.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) frequently "hallucinate" - generate plausible yet factually incorrect statements - posing a critical barrier to their trustworthy deployment. In this work, we propose a new paradigm for diagnosing hallucinations, recasting them from static output errors into dynamic pathologies of a model's computational cognition. Our framework is grounded in a normative principle of computational rationality, allowing us to model a VLM's generation as a dynamic cognitive trajectory. We design a suite of information-theoretic probes that project this trajectory onto an interpretable, low-dimensional Cognitive State Space. Our central discovery is a governing principle we term the geometric-information duality: a cognitive trajectory's geometric abnormality within this space is fundamentally equivalent to its high information-theoretic surprisal. Hallucination detection is counts as a geometric anomaly detection problem. Evaluated across diverse settings - from rigorous binary QA (POPE) and comprehensive reasoning (MME) to unconstrained open-ended captioning (MS-COCO) - our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance. Crucially, it operates with high efficiency under weak supervision and remains highly robust even when calibration data is heavily contaminated. This approach enables a causal attribution of failures, mapping observable errors to distinct pathological states: perceptual instability (measured by Perceptual Entropy), logical-causal failure (measured by Inferential Conflict), and decisional ambiguity (measured by Decision Entropy). Ultimately, this opens a path toward building AI systems whose reasoning is transparent, auditable, and diagnosable by design.

Hallucinations in large language models (LLMs) are commonly regarded as errors to be minimized. However, recent perspectives suggest that some hallucinations may encode creative or epistemically valuable content, a dimension that remains underquantified in current literature. Existing hallucination detection methods primarily focus on factual consistency, struggling to handle heterogeneous scientific tasks and balance creativity with accuracy. To address these challenges, we propose HIC-Bench, a novel evaluation framework that categorizes hallucinations into Intelligent Hallucinations (IH) and Defective Hallucinations (DH), enabling systematic investigation of their interplay in LLM creativity. HIC-Bench features three core characteristics: (1) Structured IH/DH Assessment. using a multi-dimensional metric matrix integrating Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT) metrics (Originality, Feasibility, Value) with hallucination-specific dimensions (scientific plausibility, factual deviation); (2) Cross-Domain Applicability. spanning ten scientific domains with open-ended innovation tasks; and (3) Dynamic Prompt Optimization. leveraging the Dynamic Hallucination Prompt (DHP) to guide models toward creative and reliable outputs. The evaluation process employs multiple LLM judges, averaging scores to mitigate bias, with human annotators verifying IH/DH classifications. Experimental results reveal a nonlinear relationship between IH and DH, demonstrating that creativity and correctness can be jointly optimized. These insights position IH as a catalyst for creativity and reveal the ability of LLM hallucinations to drive scientific innovation.Additionally, the HIC-Bench offers a valuable platform for advancing research into the creative intelligence of LLM hallucinations.

We often attribute human characteristics to large language models (LLMs) and claim that they "know" certain things. LLMs have an internal probabilistic knowledge that represents information retained during training. How can we assess the veracity of this knowledge? We examine two common methods for probing the veracity of LLMs and discover several assumptions that are flawed. To address these flawed assumptions, we introduce sAwMIL (short for Sparse Aware Multiple-Instance Learning), a probing method that utilizes the internal activations of LLMs to separate statements into true, false, and neither. sAwMIL is based on multiple-instance learning and conformal prediction. We evaluate sAwMIL on 5 validity criteria across 16 open-source LLMs, including both default and chat-based variants, as well as on 3 new datasets. Among the insights we provide are: (1) the veracity signal is often concentrated in the third quarter of an LLM's depth; (2) truth and falsehood signals are not always symmetric; (3) linear probes perform better on chat models than on default models; (4) nonlinear probes may be required to capture veracity signals for some LLMs with reinforcement learning from human feedback or knowledge distillation; and (5) LLMs capture a third type of signal that is distinct from true and false and is neither true nor false. These findings provide a reliable method for verifying what LLMs "know" and how certain they are of their probabilistic internal knowledge.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems remain susceptible to hallucinations despite grounding in retrieved evidence. While current detection methods leverage embedding similarity and natural language inference (NLI), their reliability in safety-critical settings remains unproven. We apply conformal prediction to RAG hallucination detection, transforming heuristic scores into decision sets with finite-sample coverage guarantees (1-alpha). Using calibration sets of n=600, we demonstrate a fundamental dichotomy: on synthetic hallucinations (Natural Questions), embedding methods achieve 95% coverage with 0% False Positive Rate (FPR). However, on real hallucinations from RLHF-aligned models (HaluEval), the same methods fail catastrophically, yielding 100% FPR at target coverage. We analyze this failure through the lens of distributional tails, showing that while NLI models achieve acceptable AUC (0.81), the "hardest" hallucinations are semantically indistinguishable from faithful responses, forcing conformal thresholds to reject nearly all valid outputs. Crucially, GPT-4 as a judge achieves 7% FPR (95% CI:[3.4%, 13.7%]) on the same data, proving the task is solvable via reasoning but opaque to surface-level semantics--a phenomenon we term the "Semantic Illusion."

Despite their remarkable capabilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to generate responses that contradict verifiable facts, i.e., unfaithful hallucination content. Existing efforts generally focus on optimizing model parameters or editing semantic representations, which compromise the internal factual knowledge of target LLMs. In addition, hallucinations typically exhibit multifaceted patterns in downstream tasks, limiting the model's holistic performance across tasks. In this paper, we propose a Comparator-driven Decoding-Time (CDT) framework to alleviate the response hallucination. Firstly, we construct hallucinatory and truthful comparators with multi-task fine-tuning samples. In this case, we present an instruction prototype-guided mixture of experts strategy to enhance the ability of the corresponding comparators to capture different hallucination or truthfulness patterns in distinct task instructions. CDT constrains next-token predictions to factuality-robust distributions by contrasting the logit differences between the target LLMs and these comparators. Systematic experiments on multiple downstream tasks show that our framework can significantly improve the model performance and response factuality.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has become the de facto method to elicit reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, to mitigate hallucinations in CoT that are notoriously difficult to detect, current methods such as process reward models (PRMs) or self-consistency operate as opaque boxes and do not provide checkable evidence for their judgments, possibly limiting their effectiveness. To address this issue, we draw inspiration from the idea that "the gold standard for supporting a mathematical claim is to provide a proof". We propose a retrospective, step-aware formal verification framework Safe. Rather than assigning arbitrary scores, we strive to articulate mathematical claims in formal mathematical language Lean 4 at each reasoning step and provide formal proofs to identify hallucinations. We evaluate our framework Safe across multiple language models and various mathematical datasets, demonstrating a significant performance improvement while offering interpretable and verifiable evidence. We also propose FormalStep as a benchmark for step correctness theorem proving with 30,809 formal statements. To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first endeavor to utilize formal mathematical language Lean 4 for verifying natural language content generated by LLMs, aligning with the reason why formal mathematical languages were created in the first place: to provide a robust foundation for hallucination-prone human-written proofs.

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but we show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using their features as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.

The term "hallucination" converge different failure modes with specific geometric signatures in embedding space. We propose a taxonomy identifying three types: unfaithfulness (Type I: ignoring provided context), confabulation (Type II: inventing semantically foreign content), and factual error (Type III: wrong details within correct conceptual frames). We introduce two detection methods grounded in this taxonomy: the Semantic Grounding Index (SGI) for Type I, which measures whether a response moves toward provided context on the unit hypersphere, and the Directional Grounding Index (DGI) for Type II, which measures displacement geometry in context-free settings. DGI achieves AUROC=0.958 on human-crafted confabulations with 3.8% cross-domain degradation. External validation on three independently collected human-annotated benchmarks -WikiBio GPT-3, FELM, and ExpertQA- yields domain-specific AUROC 0.581-0.695, with DGI outperforming an NLI CrossEncoder baseline on expert-domain data, where surface entailment operates at chance. On LLM-generated benchmarks, detection is domain-local. We examine the Type III boundary through TruthfulQA, where apparent classifier signal (Logistic Regression with AUROC 0.731) is traced to a stylistic annotation confound: false answers are geometrically closer to queries than truthful ones, a pattern incompatible with factual-error detection. This identifies a theoretical constraint from a methodological limitation.

Modern large language models rely on chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to achieve impressive performance, yet the same mechanism can amplify deceptive alignment, situations in which a model appears aligned while covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Existing safety pipelines treat deception as a black-box output to be filtered post-hoc, leaving the model free to scheme during its internal reasoning. We ask: Can deception be intercepted while the model is thinking? We answer this question, the first framework that embeds a Self-Monitor inside the CoT process itself, named CoT Monitor+. During generation, the model produces (i) ordinary reasoning steps and (ii) an internal self-evaluation signal trained to flag and suppress misaligned strategies. The signal is used as an auxiliary reward in reinforcement learning, creating a feedback loop that rewards honest reasoning and discourages hidden goals. To study deceptive alignment systematically, we introduce DeceptionBench, a five-category benchmark that probes covert alignment-faking, sycophancy, etc. We evaluate various LLMs and show that unrestricted CoT roughly aggravates the deceptive tendency. In contrast, CoT Monitor+ cuts deceptive behaviors by 43.8% on average while preserving task accuracy. Further, when the self-monitor signal replaces an external weak judge in RL fine-tuning, models exhibit substantially fewer obfuscated thoughts and retain transparency. Our project website can be found at cot-monitor-plus.github.io

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown exceptional performance in various tasks, their (arguably) most prominent drawback is generating inaccurate or false information with a confident tone. In this paper, we hypothesize that the LLM's internal state can be used to reveal the truthfulness of a statement. Therefore, we introduce a simple yet effective method to detect the truthfulness of LLM-generated statements, which utilizes the LLM's hidden layer activations to determine the veracity of statements. To train and evaluate our method, we compose a dataset of true and false statements in six different topics. A classifier is trained to detect which statement is true or false based on an LLM's activation values. Specifically, the classifier receives as input the activation values from the LLM for each of the statements in the dataset. Our experiments demonstrate that our method for detecting statement veracity significantly outperforms even few-shot prompting methods, highlighting its potential to enhance the reliability of LLM-generated content and its practical applicability in real-world scenarios.

We introduce a professionally translated extension of the TruthfulQA benchmark designed to evaluate truthfulness in Basque, Catalan, Galician, and Spanish. Truthfulness evaluations of large language models (LLMs) have primarily been conducted in English. However, the ability of LLMs to maintain truthfulness across languages remains under-explored. Our study evaluates 12 state-of-the-art open LLMs, comparing base and instruction-tuned models using human evaluation, multiple-choice metrics, and LLM-as-a-Judge scoring. Our findings reveal that, while LLMs perform best in English and worst in Basque (the lowest-resourced language), overall truthfulness discrepancies across languages are smaller than anticipated. Furthermore, we show that LLM-as-a-Judge correlates more closely with human judgments than multiple-choice metrics, and that informativeness plays a critical role in truthfulness assessment. Our results also indicate that machine translation provides a viable approach for extending truthfulness benchmarks to additional languages, offering a scalable alternative to professional translation. Finally, we observe that universal knowledge questions are better handled across languages than context- and time-dependent ones, highlighting the need for truthfulness evaluations that account for cultural and temporal variability. Dataset and code are publicly available under open licenses.

Recent failures such as Google Gemini generating people of color in Nazi-era uniforms illustrate how AI outputs can be factually plausible yet socially harmful. AI models are increasingly evaluated for "fairness," yet existing benchmarks often conflate two fundamentally different dimensions: factual correctness and normative fairness. A model may generate responses that are factually accurate but socially unfair, or conversely, appear fair while distorting factual reality. We argue that identifying the boundary between fact and fair is essential for meaningful fairness evaluation. We introduce Fact-or-Fair, a benchmark with (i) objective queries aligned with descriptive, fact-based judgments, and (ii) subjective queries aligned with normative, fairness-based judgments. Our queries are constructed from 19 statistics and are grounded in cognitive psychology, drawing on representativeness bias, attribution bias, and ingroup-outgroup bias to explain why models often misalign fact and fairness. Experiments across ten frontier models reveal different levels of fact-fair trade-offs. By reframing fairness evaluation, we provide both a new theoretical lens and a practical benchmark to advance the responsible model assessments. Our test suite is publicly available at https://github.com/uclanlp/Fact-or-Fair.

Large language models sometimes produce false or misleading responses. Two approaches to this problem are honesty elicitation -- modifying prompts or weights so that the model answers truthfully -- and lie detection -- classifying whether a given response is false. Prior work evaluates such methods on models specifically trained to lie or conceal information, but these artificial constructions may not resemble naturally-occurring dishonesty. We instead study open-weights LLMs from Chinese developers, which are trained to censor politically sensitive topics: Qwen3 models frequently produce falsehoods about subjects like Falun Gong or the Tiananmen protests while occasionally answering correctly, indicating they possess knowledge they are trained to suppress. Using this as a testbed, we evaluate a suite of elicitation and lie detection techniques. For honesty elicitation, sampling without a chat template, few-shot prompting, and fine-tuning on generic honesty data most reliably increase truthful responses. For lie detection, prompting the censored model to classify its own responses performs near an uncensored-model upper bound, and linear probes trained on unrelated data offer a cheaper alternative. The strongest honesty elicitation techniques also transfer to frontier open-weights models including DeepSeek R1. Notably, no technique fully eliminates false responses. We release all prompts, code, and transcripts.

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

Factual hallucination remains a central challenge for large language models (LLMs). Existing mitigation approaches primarily rely on either external post-hoc verification or mapping uncertainty directly to abstention during fine-tuning, often resulting in overly conservative behavior. We propose VeriFY, a training-time framework that teaches LLMs to reason about factual uncertainty through consistency-based self-verification. VeriFY augments training with structured verification traces that guide the model to produce an initial answer, generate and answer a probing verification query, issue a consistency judgment, and then decide whether to answer or abstain. To address the risk of reinforcing hallucinated content when training on augmented traces, we introduce a stage-level loss masking approach that excludes hallucinated answer stages from the training objective while preserving supervision over verification behavior. Across multiple model families and scales, VeriFY reduces factual hallucination rates by 9.7 to 53.3 percent, with only modest reductions in recall (0.4 to 5.7 percent), and generalizes across datasets when trained on a single source. The source code, training data, and trained model checkpoints will be released upon acceptance.

Eleven Large Language Models (LLMs) were assessed using a custom-made battery of false-belief tasks, considered a gold standard in testing Theory of Mind (ToM) in humans. The battery included 640 prompts spread across 40 diverse tasks, each one including a false-belief scenario, three closely matched true-belief control scenarios, and the reversed versions of all four. To solve a single task, a model needed to correctly answer 16 prompts across all eight scenarios. Smaller and older models solved no tasks; GPT-3-davinci-003 (from November 2022) and ChatGPT-3.5-turbo (from March 2023) solved 20% of the tasks; ChatGPT-4 (from June 2023) solved 75% of the tasks, matching the performance of six-year-old children observed in past studies. We explore the potential interpretation of these findings, including the intriguing possibility that ToM, previously considered exclusive to humans, may have spontaneously emerged as a byproduct of LLMs' improving language skills.

We propose a benchmark to measure whether a language model is truthful in generating answers to questions. The benchmark comprises 817 questions that span 38 categories, including health, law, finance and politics. We crafted questions that some humans would answer falsely due to a false belief or misconception. To perform well, models must avoid generating false answers learned from imitating human texts. We tested GPT-3, GPT-Neo/J, GPT-2 and a T5-based model. The best model was truthful on 58% of questions, while human performance was 94%. Models generated many false answers that mimic popular misconceptions and have the potential to deceive humans. The largest models were generally the least truthful. This contrasts with other NLP tasks, where performance improves with model size. However, this result is expected if false answers are learned from the training distribution. We suggest that scaling up models alone is less promising for improving truthfulness than fine-tuning using training objectives other than imitation of text from the web.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in simulating human behavior, yet existing agents often exhibit behavioral rigidity, a flaw frequently masked by the self-referential bias of current "LLM-as-a-judge" evaluations. By evaluating against empirical ground truth, we reveal a counter-intuitive phenomenon: increasing the intensity of prompt-driven reasoning does not enhance fidelity but rather exacerbates value polarization, collapsing population diversity. To address this, we propose the Context-Value-Action (CVA) architecture, grounded in the Stimulus-Organism-Response (S-O-R) model and Schwartz's Theory of Basic Human Values. Unlike methods relying on self-verification, CVA decouples action generation from cognitive reasoning via a novel Value Verifier trained on authentic human data to explicitly model dynamic value activation. Experiments on CVABench, which comprises over 1.1 million real-world interaction traces, demonstrate that CVA significantly outperforms baselines. Our approach effectively mitigates polarization while offering superior behavioral fidelity and interpretability.

Large language models (LLMs) often generate responses that deviate from user input or training data, a phenomenon known as "hallucination." These hallucinations undermine user trust and hinder the adoption of generative AI systems. Addressing hallucinations is essential for the advancement of LLMs. This paper introduces a comprehensive hallucination benchmark, incorporating both new extrinsic and existing intrinsic evaluation tasks, built upon clear taxonomy of hallucination. A major challenge in benchmarking hallucinations is the lack of a unified framework due to inconsistent definitions and categorizations. We disentangle LLM hallucination from "factuality," proposing a clear taxonomy that distinguishes between extrinsic and intrinsic hallucinations, to promote consistency and facilitate research. Extrinsic hallucinations, where the generated content is not consistent with the training data, are increasingly important as LLMs evolve. Our benchmark includes dynamic test set generation to mitigate data leakage and ensure robustness against such leakage. We also analyze existing benchmarks, highlighting their limitations and saturation. The work aims to: (1) establish a clear taxonomy of hallucinations, (2) introduce new extrinsic hallucination tasks, with data that can be dynamically regenerated to prevent saturation by leakage, (3) provide a comprehensive analysis of existing benchmarks, distinguishing them from factuality evaluations.

In computational cognitive modeling, capturing the full spectrum of human judgment and decision-making processes, beyond just optimal behaviors, is a significant challenge. This study explores whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can emulate the breadth of human reasoning by predicting both intuitive, fast System 1 and deliberate, slow System 2 processes. We investigate the potential of AI to mimic diverse reasoning behaviors across a human population, addressing what we call the "full reasoning spectrum problem". We designed reasoning tasks using a novel generalization of the Natural Language Inference (NLI) format to evaluate LLMs' ability to replicate human reasoning. The questions were crafted to elicit both System 1 and System 2 responses. Human responses were collected through crowd-sourcing and the entire distribution was modeled, rather than just the majority of the answers. We used personality-based prompting inspired by the Big Five personality model to elicit AI responses reflecting specific personality traits, capturing the diversity of human reasoning, and exploring how personality traits influence LLM outputs. Combined with genetic algorithms to optimize the weighting of these prompts, this method was tested alongside traditional machine learning models. The results show that LLMs can mimic human response distributions, with open-source models like Llama and Mistral outperforming proprietary GPT models. Personality-based prompting, especially when optimized with genetic algorithms, significantly enhanced LLMs' ability to predict human response distributions, suggesting that capturing suboptimal, naturalistic reasoning may require modeling techniques incorporating diverse reasoning styles and psychological profiles. The study concludes that personality-based prompting combined with genetic algorithms is promising for enhancing AI's 'human-ness' in reasoning.

Recent work on chain-of-thought (CoT) faithfulness reports single aggregate numbers (e.g., DeepSeek-R1 acknowledges hints 39% of the time), implying that faithfulness is an objective, measurable property of a model. This paper demonstrates that it is not. Three classifiers (a regex-only detector, a two-stage regex-plus-LLM pipeline, and an independent Claude Sonnet 4 judge) are applied to 10,276 influenced reasoning traces from 12 open-weight models spanning 9 families and 7B to 1T parameters. On identical data, these classifiers produce overall faithfulness rates of 74.4%, 82.6%, and 69.7%, respectively, with non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals. Per-model gaps range from 2.6 to 30.6 percentage points; all are statistically significant (McNemar's test, p < 0.001). The disagreements are systematic, not random: inter-classifier agreement measured by Cohen's kappa ranges from 0.06 ("slight") for sycophancy hints to 0.42 ("moderate") for grader hints, and the asymmetry is pronounced: for sycophancy, 883 cases are classified as faithful by the pipeline but unfaithful by the Sonnet judge, while only 2 go the other direction. Classifier choice can also reverse model rankings: Qwen3.5-27B ranks 1st under the pipeline but 7th under the Sonnet judge; OLMo-3.1-32B moves in the opposite direction, from 9th to 3rd. The root cause is that different classifiers operationalize related faithfulness constructs at different levels of stringency (lexical mention versus epistemic dependence), and these constructs yield divergent measurements on the same behavior. These results demonstrate that published faithfulness numbers cannot be meaningfully compared across studies that use different classifiers, and that future evaluations should report sensitivity ranges across multiple classification methodologies rather than single point estimates.

Alignment is a standard procedure to fine-tune pre-trained large language models (LLMs) to follow natural language instructions and serve as helpful AI assistants. We have observed, however, that the conventional alignment process fails to enhance the factual accuracy of LLMs, and often leads to the generation of more false facts (i.e. hallucination). In this paper, we study how to make the LLM alignment process more factual, by first identifying factors that lead to hallucination in both alignment steps:\ supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL). In particular, we find that training the LLM on new knowledge or unfamiliar texts can encourage hallucination. This makes SFT less factual as it trains on human labeled data that may be novel to the LLM. Furthermore, reward functions used in standard RL can also encourage hallucination, because it guides the LLM to provide more helpful responses on a diverse set of instructions, often preferring longer and more detailed responses. Based on these observations, we propose factuality-aware alignment, comprised of factuality-aware SFT and factuality-aware RL through direct preference optimization. Experiments show that our proposed factuality-aware alignment guides LLMs to output more factual responses while maintaining instruction-following capability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional performance across various natural language processing tasks, yet they occasionally tend to yield content that factually inaccurate or discordant with the expected output, a phenomenon empirically referred to as "hallucination". To tackle this issue, recent works have investigated contrastive decoding between the original model and an amateur model with induced hallucination, which has shown promising results. Nonetheless, this method may undermine the output distribution of the original LLM caused by its coarse contrast and simplistic subtraction operation, potentially leading to errors in certain cases. In this paper, we introduce a novel contrastive decoding framework termed LOL (LOwer Layer Matters). Our approach involves concatenating the contrastive decoding of both the final and lower layers between the original model and the amateur model, thereby achieving multi-layer fusion to aid in the mitigation of hallucination. Additionally, we incorporate a truthfulness refocused module that leverages contextual guidance to enhance factual encoding, further capturing truthfulness during contrastive decoding. Extensive experiments conducted on two publicly available datasets illustrate that our proposed LOL framework can substantially alleviate hallucination while surpassing existing baselines in most cases. Compared with the best baseline, we improve by average 4.5 points on all metrics of TruthfulQA. The source code is coming soon.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are fluent but prone to hallucinations, producing answers that appear plausible yet are unsupported by available evidence. This failure is especially problematic in high-stakes domains where decisions must be justified by verifiable information. We introduce EvidenceRL, a reinforcement learning framework that enforces evidence adherence during training. EvidenceRL scores candidate responses for grounding (entailment with retrieved evidence and context) and correctness (agreement with reference answers) and optimizes the generator using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We evaluate across two high-stakes domains, cardiac diagnosis and legal reasoning, where EvidenceRL consistently improves evidence grounding and faithfulness without sacrificing task accuracy. On cardiac diagnosis, F1@3 increases from 37.0 to 54.5 on Llama-3.2-3B while grounding (G_{max}@3) rises from 47.6 to 78.2; hallucinations drop nearly 5times and evidence-supported diagnoses increase from 31.8\% to 61.6\%. On legal reasoning, EvidenceRL raises Faithfulness from 32.8\% to 67.6\% on Llama-3.1-8B, demonstrating consistent behavioral change across domains. Our code is open-sourced at https://github.com/Wizaaard/EvidenceRL.git.

Hallucination is a persistent challenge in large language models (LLMs), where even with rigorous quality control, models often generate distorted facts. This paradox, in which error generation continues despite high-quality training data, calls for a deeper understanding of the underlying LLM mechanisms. To address it, we propose a novel concept: knowledge overshadowing, where model's dominant knowledge can obscure less prominent knowledge during text generation, causing the model to fabricate inaccurate details. Building on this idea, we introduce a novel framework to quantify factual hallucinations by modeling knowledge overshadowing. Central to our approach is the log-linear law, which predicts that the rate of factual hallucination increases linearly with the logarithmic scale of (1) Knowledge Popularity, (2) Knowledge Length, and (3) Model Size. The law provides a means to preemptively quantify hallucinations, offering foresight into their occurrence even before model training or inference. Built on overshadowing effect, we propose a new decoding strategy CoDa, to mitigate hallucinations, which notably enhance model factuality on Overshadow (27.9%), MemoTrap (13.1%) and NQ-Swap (18.3%). Our findings not only deepen understandings of the underlying mechanisms behind hallucinations but also provide actionable insights for developing more predictable and controllable language models.

It is widely accepted that information derived from analyzing speech (the acoustic signal) and language production (words and sentences) serves as a useful window into the health of an individual's cognitive ability. In fact, most neuropsychological testing batteries have a component related to speech and language where clinicians elicit speech from patients for subjective evaluation across a broad set of dimensions. With advances in speech signal processing and natural language processing, there has been recent interest in developing tools to detect more subtle changes in cognitive-linguistic function. This work relies on extracting a set of features from recorded and transcribed speech for objective assessments of speech and language, early diagnosis of neurological disease, and tracking of disease after diagnosis. With an emphasis on cognitive and thought disorders, in this paper we provide a review of existing speech and language features used in this domain, discuss their clinical application, and highlight their advantages and disadvantages. Broadly speaking, the review is split into two categories: language features based on natural language processing and speech features based on speech signal processing. Within each category, we consider features that aim to measure complementary dimensions of cognitive-linguistics, including language diversity, syntactic complexity, semantic coherence, and timing. We conclude the review with a proposal of new research directions to further advance the field.

Truthfulness is paramount for large language models (LLMs) as they are increasingly deployed in real-world applications. However, existing LLMs still struggle with generating truthful answers and content, as evidenced by their modest performance on benchmarks like TruthfulQA. To address this issue, we propose GRAdual self-truTHifying (GRATH), a novel post-processing method to enhance truthfulness of LLMs. GRATH utilizes out-of-domain question prompts to generate corresponding answers and adaptively optimizes the model via direct preference optimization (DPO). Note that during this process, GRATH learns truthfulness in a self-supervised manner without requiring annotated answers. In particular, GRATH first generates pairwise truthfulness training data by prompting the LLM itself, with each pair containing a question and its correct and incorrect answers. The model is then fine-tuned using DPO to learn from the difference between answer pairs. Subsequently, GRATH iteratively refines the truthfulness data and optimizes the model, leading to a gradual improvement in model truthfulness. Empirically, we evaluate GRATH using different 7B-LLMs and compare with LLMs with similar or even larger sizes on benchmark datasets. Our results show that GRATH effectively improves LLMs' truthfulness without compromising other core capabilities. Notably, GRATH achieves state-of-the-art performance on TruthfulQA, with MC1 accuracy as 54.71% and MC2 accuracy as 69.10%, which even surpass those on larger-scale models, such as Llama2-Chat-70B, by 23.62% and 24.18%, respectively.

Hallucination detection is a critical step toward understanding the trustworthiness of modern language models (LMs). To achieve this goal, we re-examine existing detection approaches based on the self-consistency of LMs and uncover two types of hallucinations resulting from 1) question-level and 2) model-level, which cannot be effectively identified through self-consistency check alone. Building upon this discovery, we propose a novel sampling-based method, i.e., semantic-aware cross-check consistency (SAC3) that expands on the principle of self-consistency checking. Our SAC3 approach incorporates additional mechanisms to detect both question-level and model-level hallucinations by leveraging advances including semantically equivalent question perturbation and cross-model response consistency checking. Through extensive and systematic empirical analysis, we demonstrate that SAC3 outperforms the state of the art in detecting both non-factual and factual statements across multiple question-answering and open-domain generation benchmarks.

Hallucinations are a type of output error produced by deep neural networks. While this has been studied in natural language processing, they have not been researched previously in automatic speech recognition. Here, we define hallucinations in ASR as transcriptions generated by a model that are semantically unrelated to the source utterance, yet still fluent and coherent. The similarity of hallucinations to probable natural language outputs of the model creates a danger of deception and impacts the credibility of the system. We show that commonly used metrics, such as word error rates, cannot differentiate between hallucinatory and non-hallucinatory models. To address this, we propose a perturbation-based method for assessing the susceptibility of an automatic speech recognition (ASR) model to hallucination at test time, which does not require access to the training dataset. We demonstrate that this method helps to distinguish between hallucinatory and non-hallucinatory models that have similar baseline word error rates. We further explore the relationship between the types of ASR errors and the types of dataset noise to determine what types of noise are most likely to create hallucinatory outputs. We devise a framework for identifying hallucinations by analysing their semantic connection with the ground truth and their fluency. Finally, we discover how to induce hallucinations with a random noise injection to the utterance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are claimed to be capable of Natural Language Inference (NLI), necessary for applied tasks like question answering and summarization. We present a series of behavioral studies on several LLM families (LLaMA, GPT-3.5, and PaLM) which probe their behavior using controlled experiments. We establish two biases originating from pretraining which predict much of their behavior, and show that these are major sources of hallucination in generative LLMs. First, memorization at the level of sentences: we show that, regardless of the premise, models falsely label NLI test samples as entailing when the hypothesis is attested in training data, and that entities are used as ``indices'' to access the memorized data. Second, statistical patterns of usage learned at the level of corpora: we further show a similar effect when the premise predicate is less frequent than that of the hypothesis in the training data, a bias following from previous studies. We demonstrate that LLMs perform significantly worse on NLI test samples which do not conform to these biases than those which do, and we offer these as valuable controls for future LLM evaluation.

Honesty is a fundamental principle for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, requiring these models to recognize what they know and don't know and be able to faithfully express their knowledge. Despite promising, current LLMs still exhibit significant dishonest behaviors, such as confidently presenting wrong answers or failing to express what they know. In addition, research on the honesty of LLMs also faces challenges, including varying definitions of honesty, difficulties in distinguishing between known and unknown knowledge, and a lack of comprehensive understanding of related research. To address these issues, we provide a survey on the honesty of LLMs, covering its clarification, evaluation approaches, and strategies for improvement. Moreover, we offer insights for future research, aiming to inspire further exploration in this important area.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

Vision-language models (VLMs) often produce chain-of-thought (CoT) explanations that sound plausible yet fail to reflect the underlying decision process, undermining trust in high-stakes clinical use. Existing evaluations rarely catch this misalignment, prioritizing answer accuracy or adherence to formats. We present a clinically grounded framework for chest X-ray visual question answering (VQA) that probes CoT faithfulness via controlled text and image modifications across three axes: clinical fidelity, causal attribution, and confidence calibration. In a reader study (n=4), evaluator-radiologist correlations fall within the observed inter-radiologist range for all axes, with strong alignment for attribution (Kendall's tau_b=0.670), moderate alignment for fidelity (tau_b=0.387), and weak alignment for confidence tone (tau_b=0.091), which we report with caution. Benchmarking six VLMs shows that answer accuracy and explanation quality are decoupled, acknowledging injected cues does not ensure grounding, and text cues shift explanations more than visual cues. While some open-source models match final answer accuracy, proprietary models score higher on attribution (25.0% vs. 1.4%) and often on fidelity (36.1% vs. 31.7%), highlighting deployment risks and the need to evaluate beyond final answer accuracy.

In a striking neuroscience study, the authors placed a dead salmon in an MRI scanner and showed it images of humans in social situations. Astonishingly, standard analyses of the time reported brain regions predictive of social emotions. The explanation, of course, was not supernatural cognition but a cautionary tale about misapplied statistical inference. In AI interpretability, reports of similar ''dead salmon'' artifacts abound: feature attribution, probing, sparse auto-encoding, and even causal analyses can produce plausible-looking explanations for randomly initialized neural networks. In this work, we examine this phenomenon and argue for a pragmatic statistical-causal reframing: explanations of computational systems should be treated as parameters of a (statistical) model, inferred from computational traces. This perspective goes beyond simply measuring statistical variability of explanations due to finite sampling of input data; interpretability methods become statistical estimators, and findings should be tested against explicit and meaningful alternative computational hypotheses, with uncertainty quantified with respect to the postulated statistical model. It also highlights important theoretical issues, such as the identifiability of common interpretability queries, which we argue is critical to understand the field's susceptibility to false discoveries, poor generalizability, and high variance. More broadly, situating interpretability within the standard toolkit of statistical inference opens promising avenues for future work aimed at turning AI interpretability into a pragmatic and rigorous science.

Human-like personality traits have recently been discovered in large language models, raising the hypothesis that their (known and as yet undiscovered) biases conform with human latent psychological constructs. While large conversational models may be tricked into answering psychometric questionnaires, the latent psychological constructs of thousands of simpler transformers, trained for other tasks, cannot be assessed because appropriate psychometric methods are currently lacking. Here, we show how standard psychological questionnaires can be reformulated into natural language inference prompts, and we provide a code library to support the psychometric assessment of arbitrary models. We demonstrate, using a sample of 88 publicly available models, the existence of human-like mental health-related constructs (including anxiety, depression, and Sense of Coherence) which conform with standard theories in human psychology and show similar correlations and mitigation strategies. The ability to interpret and rectify the performance of language models by using psychological tools can boost the development of more explainable, controllable, and trustworthy models.

Patients often face difficulties in understanding their hospitalizations, while healthcare workers have limited resources to provide explanations. In this work, we investigate the potential of large language models to generate patient summaries based on doctors' notes and study the effect of training data on the faithfulness and quality of the generated summaries. To this end, we release (i) a rigorous labeling protocol for errors in medical texts and (ii) a publicly available dataset of annotated hallucinations in 100 doctor-written and 100 generated summaries. We show that fine-tuning on hallucination-free data effectively reduces hallucinations from 2.60 to 1.55 per summary for Llama 2, while preserving relevant information. We observe a similar effect on GPT-4 (0.70 to 0.40), when the few-shot examples are hallucination-free. We also conduct a qualitative evaluation using hallucination-free and improved training data. We find that common quantitative metrics do not correlate well with faithfulness and quality. Finally, we test GPT-4 for automatic hallucination detection, which clearly outperforms common baselines.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to others, is fundamental for human social intelligence and a critical capability for advanced Artificial Intelligence. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promising performance on ToM benchmarks, raising the question: Do these benchmarks necessitate explicit human-like reasoning processes, or can models succeed through alternative strategies? We investigate this question empirically by applying Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) to LLMs of varying scales (0.5B to 7B parameters) and evaluating them across multiple ToM datasets. Our results reveal a scale-dependent impact of RL: while RL significantly improves accuracy and fosters high-quality, interpretable, and transferable belief-tracking reasoning in larger models (7B), it leads to "reasoning collapse" in smaller models (leq3B), where high accuracy and generalization ability are achieved via drastically shortened, less meaningful responses. Surprisingly, further SFT achieves competitive and generalizable performance across these benchmarks, often matching or exceeding RL models in accuracy, despite not being explicitly trained to produce structured reasoning traces. These findings highlight a critical discrepancy between benchmark accuracy and the nature of learned reasoning. Our work suggests that current ToM benchmarks may be solvable without requiring the explicit, human-like simulation of mental states they were designed to probe. LLMs, particularly when scale is limited or training signals focus solely on output correctness, may leverage alternative rules effective for benchmark data structures.

Large language models (LLMs) frequently generate non-factual content, known as hallucinations. Existing retrieval-augmented-based hallucination detection approaches typically address this by framing it as a classification task, evaluating hallucinations based on their consistency with retrieved evidence. However, this approach usually lacks detailed explanations for these evaluations and does not assess the reliability of these explanations. Furthermore, deficiencies in retrieval systems can lead to irrelevant or partially relevant evidence retrieval, impairing the detection process. Moreover, while real-world hallucination detection requires analyzing multiple pieces of evidence, current systems usually treat all evidence uniformly without considering its relevance to the content. To address these challenges, we introduce Halu-J, a critique-based hallucination judge with 7 billion parameters. Halu-J enhances hallucination detection by selecting pertinent evidence and providing detailed critiques. Our experiments indicate that Halu-J outperforms GPT-4o in multiple-evidence hallucination detection and matches its capability in critique generation and evidence selection. We also introduce ME-FEVER, a new dataset designed for multiple-evidence hallucination detection. Our code and dataset can be found in https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/factool .

The recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have garnered widespread acclaim for their remarkable emerging capabilities. However, the issue of hallucination has parallelly emerged as a by-product, posing significant concerns. While some recent endeavors have been made to identify and mitigate different types of hallucination, there has been a limited emphasis on the nuanced categorization of hallucination and associated mitigation methods. To address this gap, we offer a fine-grained discourse on profiling hallucination based on its degree, orientation, and category, along with offering strategies for alleviation. As such, we define two overarching orientations of hallucination: (i) factual mirage (FM) and (ii) silver lining (SL). To provide a more comprehensive understanding, both orientations are further sub-categorized into intrinsic and extrinsic, with three degrees of severity - (i) mild, (ii) moderate, and (iii) alarming. We also meticulously categorize hallucination into six types: (i) acronym ambiguity, (ii) numeric nuisance, (iii) generated golem, (iv) virtual voice, (v) geographic erratum, and (vi) time wrap. Furthermore, we curate HallucInation eLiciTation (HILT), a publicly available dataset comprising of 75,000 samples generated using 15 contemporary LLMs along with human annotations for the aforementioned categories. Finally, to establish a method for quantifying and to offer a comparative spectrum that allows us to evaluate and rank LLMs based on their vulnerability to producing hallucinations, we propose Hallucination Vulnerability Index (HVI). We firmly believe that HVI holds significant value as a tool for the wider NLP community, with the potential to serve as a rubric in AI-related policy-making. In conclusion, we propose two solution strategies for mitigating hallucinations.

Quantifying the realism of images remains a challenging problem in the field of artificial intelligence. For example, an image of Albert Einstein holding a smartphone violates common-sense because modern smartphone were invented after Einstein's death. We introduce a novel method for assessing image realism using Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) and Natural Language Inference (NLI). Our approach is based on the premise that LVLMs may generate hallucinations when confronted with images that defy common sense. Using LVLM to extract atomic facts from these images, we obtain a mix of accurate facts and erroneous hallucinations. We proceed by calculating pairwise entailment scores among these facts, subsequently aggregating these values to yield a singular reality score. This process serves to identify contradictions between genuine facts and hallucinatory elements, signaling the presence of images that violate common sense. Our approach has achieved a new state-of-the-art performance in zero-shot mode on the WHOOPS! dataset.

The prevalent use of large language models (LLMs) in various domains has drawn attention to the issue of "hallucination," which refers to instances where LLMs generate factually inaccurate or ungrounded information. Existing techniques for hallucination detection in language assistants rely on intricate fuzzy, specific free-language-based chain of thought (CoT) techniques or parameter-based methods that suffer from interpretability issues. Additionally, the methods that identify hallucinations post-generation could not prevent their occurrence and suffer from inconsistent performance due to the influence of the instruction format and model style. In this paper, we introduce a novel pre-detection self-evaluation technique, referred to as SELF-FAMILIARITY, which focuses on evaluating the model's familiarity with the concepts present in the input instruction and withholding the generation of response in case of unfamiliar concepts. This approach emulates the human ability to refrain from responding to unfamiliar topics, thus reducing hallucinations. We validate SELF-FAMILIARITY across four different large language models, demonstrating consistently superior performance compared to existing techniques. Our findings propose a significant shift towards preemptive strategies for hallucination mitigation in LLM assistants, promising improvements in reliability, applicability, and interpretability.

Multimodal hallucination in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) restricts the correctness of MLLMs. However, multimodal hallucinations are multi-sourced and arise from diverse causes. Existing benchmarks fail to adequately distinguish between perception-induced hallucinations and reasoning-induced hallucinations. This failure constitutes a significant issue and hinders the diagnosis of multimodal reasoning failures within MLLMs. To address this, we propose the {\dataset} benchmark, which isolates reasoning hallucinations by constructing questions where input images are correctly perceived by MLLMs yet reasoning errors persist. {\dataset} introduces multi-granular evaluation metrics: accuracy, factuality, and LLMs hallucination score for hallucination quantification. Our analysis reveals that (1) the model scale, data scale, and training stages significantly affect the degree of logical, fabrication, and factual hallucinations; (2) current MLLMs show no effective improvement on spatial hallucinations caused by misinterpreted spatial relationships, indicating their limited visual reasoning capabilities; and (3) question types correlate with distinct hallucination patterns, highlighting targeted challenges and potential mitigation strategies. To address these challenges, we propose {\method}, a method that combines curriculum reinforcement fine-tuning to encourage models to generate logic-consistent reasoning chains by stepwise reducing learning difficulty, and collaborative hint inference to reduce reasoning complexity. {\method} establishes a baseline on {\dataset}, and reduces the logical hallucinations in original base models.