Daily Papers

Security is an essential cornerstone of functioning digital marketplaces and communities. If users doubt that data shared online will remain secure, they will withdraw from platforms. Even when firms take these risks seriously, security expertise is expensive and vulnerabilities are diverse in nature. Increasingly, firms and governments are turning to bug bounty programs (BBPs) to crowdsource their cybersecurity, in which they pay individuals for reporting vulnerabilities in their systems. And while the use of BBPs has grown significantly in recent years, research on the actors in this market and their incentives remains limited. Using the lens of transaction cost economics, this paper examines the incentives of firms and researchers (sometimes called hackers) participating in BBPs. We study the crucial role that centralized platforms that organize BBPs play in this emerging market. We carry out an analysis of the HackerOne BBP platform, using a novel dataset on over 14,000 researchers reporting over 125,000 public vulnerabilities to over 500 firms from 2014 to the end of 2021. We outline how platforms like HackerOne make a market for information security vulnerabilities by reducing information asymmetries and their associated transaction costs.

We develop policy gradients methods for stochastic control with exit time in a model-free setting. We propose two types of algorithms for learning either directly the optimal policy or by learning alternately the value function (critic) and the optimal control (actor). The use of randomized policies is crucial for overcoming notably the issue related to the exit time in the gradient computation. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by implementing our numerical schemes in the application to the problem of share repurchase pricing. Our results show that the proposed policy gradient methods outperform PDE or other neural networks techniques in a model-based setting. Furthermore, our algorithms are flexible enough to incorporate realistic market conditions like e.g. price impact or transaction costs.

This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among traders in a constant-product market-making protocol were modelled using mean field games (MFG), first without transaction costs and then incorporating them. Here we present the formulation of a more complete model that integrates three types of agents: traders, liquidity providers (LPs), and arbitrageurs. While we do not establish existence results for this general model, the formulation identifies the main technical difficulties and lays the groundwork for future work. The LP acts as a dominating player in the sense of 'Mean field games with a dominating player' by Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam: its strategy influences the mean field distribution of the traders, and the equilibrium is sought as a solution to the coupled system of three problems that constitute a Major-Minor game. The arbitrageurs operate by solving the optimization problem presented in "An analysis of uniswap markets" by Angeris et al., and their impact on the LP is captured through the loss-versus-rebalancing of "Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing" by Milionis et al. The material in this article should be read as an open research proposal rather than a collection of closed results.

In this research, we have empirically investigated the key drivers affecting liquidity in equity markets. We illustrated how theoretical models, such as Kyle's model, of agents' interplay in the financial markets, are aligned with the phenomena observed in publicly available trades and quotes data. Specifically, we confirmed that for small signed order-flows, the price impact grows linearly with increase in the order-flow imbalance. We have, further, implemented a machine learning algorithm to forecast market impact given a signed order-flow. Our findings suggest that machine learning models can be used in estimation of financial variables; and predictive accuracy of such learning algorithms can surpass the performance of traditional statistical approaches. Understanding the determinants of price impact is crucial for several reasons. From a theoretical stance, modelling the impact provides a statistical measure of liquidity. Practitioners adopt impact models as a pre-trade tool to estimate expected transaction costs and optimize the execution of their strategies. This further serves as a post-trade valuation benchmark as suboptimal execution can significantly deteriorate a portfolio performance. More broadly, the price impact reflects the balance of liquidity across markets. This is of central importance to regulators as it provides an all-encompassing explanation of the correlation between market design and systemic risk, enabling regulators to design more stable and efficient markets.

We consider two data driven approaches, Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Deep Trajectory-based Stochastic Optimal Control (DTSOC) for hedging a European call option without and with transaction cost according to a quadratic hedging P&L objective at maturity ("variance-optimal hedging" or "final quadratic hedging"). We study the performance of the two approaches under various market environments (modeled via the Black-Scholes and/or the log-normal SABR model) to understand their advantages and limitations. Without transaction costs and in the Black-Scholes model, both approaches match the performance of the variance-optimal Delta hedge. In the log-normal SABR model without transaction costs, they match the performance of the variance-optimal Barlett's Delta hedge. Agents trained on Black-Scholes trajectories with matching initial volatility but used on SABR trajectories match the performance of Bartlett's Delta hedge in average cost, but show substantially wider variance. To apply RL approaches to these problems, P&L at maturity is written as sum of step-wise contributions and variants of RL algorithms are implemented and used that minimize expectation of second moments of such sums.

We present a framework for hedging a portfolio of derivatives in the presence of market frictions such as transaction costs, market impact, liquidity constraints or risk limits using modern deep reinforcement machine learning methods. We discuss how standard reinforcement learning methods can be applied to non-linear reward structures, i.e. in our case convex risk measures. As a general contribution to the use of deep learning for stochastic processes, we also show that the set of constrained trading strategies used by our algorithm is large enough to ε-approximate any optimal solution. Our algorithm can be implemented efficiently even in high-dimensional situations using modern machine learning tools. Its structure does not depend on specific market dynamics, and generalizes across hedging instruments including the use of liquid derivatives. Its computational performance is largely invariant in the size of the portfolio as it depends mainly on the number of hedging instruments available. We illustrate our approach by showing the effect on hedging under transaction costs in a synthetic market driven by the Heston model, where we outperform the standard "complete market" solution.

Portfolio Selection is an important real-world financial task and has attracted extensive attention in artificial intelligence communities. This task, however, has two main difficulties: (i) the non-stationary price series and complex asset correlations make the learning of feature representation very hard; (ii) the practicality principle in financial markets requires controlling both transaction and risk costs. Most existing methods adopt handcraft features and/or consider no constraints for the costs, which may make them perform unsatisfactorily and fail to control both costs in practice. In this paper, we propose a cost-sensitive portfolio selection method with deep reinforcement learning. Specifically, a novel two-stream portfolio policy network is devised to extract both price series patterns and asset correlations, while a new cost-sensitive reward function is developed to maximize the accumulated return and constrain both costs via reinforcement learning. We theoretically analyze the near-optimality of the proposed reward, which shows that the growth rate of the policy regarding this reward function can approach the theoretical optimum. We also empirically evaluate the proposed method on real-world datasets. Promising results demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed method in terms of profitability, cost-sensitivity and representation abilities.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

While current navigation benchmarks prioritize task success in simplified settings, they neglect the multidimensional economic constraints essential for the real-world commercialization of autonomous delivery systems. We introduce CostNav, an Economic Navigation Benchmark that evaluates physical AI agents through comprehensive economic cost-revenue analysis aligned with real-world business operations. By integrating industry-standard data - such as SEC filings and AIS injury reports - with Isaac Sim's detailed collision and cargo dynamics, CostNav transcends simple task completion to accurately evaluate business value in complex, real-world scenarios. To our knowledge, CostNav is the first work to quantitatively expose the gap between navigation research metrics and commercial viability, revealing that optimizing for task success on a simplified task fundamentally differs from optimizing for real-world economic deployment. Our evaluation of rule-based Nav2 navigation shows that current approaches are not economically viable: the contribution margin is -22.81/run (AMCL) and -12.87/run (GPS), resulting in no break-even point. We challenge the community to develop navigation policies that achieve economic viability on CostNav. We remain method-agnostic, evaluating success solely on the metric of cost rather than the underlying architecture. All resources are available at https://github.com/worv-ai/CostNav.

In this paper, we introduce EconLogicQA, a rigorous benchmark designed to assess the sequential reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) within the intricate realms of economics, business, and supply chain management. Diverging from traditional benchmarks that predict subsequent events individually, EconLogicQA poses a more challenging task: it requires models to discern and sequence multiple interconnected events, capturing the complexity of economic logics. EconLogicQA comprises an array of multi-event scenarios derived from economic articles, which necessitate an insightful understanding of both temporal and logical event relationships. Through comprehensive evaluations, we exhibit that EconLogicQA effectively gauges a LLM's proficiency in navigating the sequential complexities inherent in economic contexts. We provide a detailed description of EconLogicQA dataset and shows the outcomes from evaluating the benchmark across various leading-edge LLMs, thereby offering a thorough perspective on their sequential reasoning potential in economic contexts. Our benchmark dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/yinzhu-quan/econ_logic_qa.

This paper develops a comprehensive theoretical framework that imports concepts from stochastic thermodynamics to model price impact and characterize the feasibility of round-trip arbitrage in financial markets. A trading cycle is treated as a non-equilibrium thermodynamic process, where price impact represents dissipative work and market noise plays the role of thermal fluctuations. The paper proves a Financial Second Law: under general convex impact functionals, any round-trip trading strategy yields non-positive expected profit. This structural constraint is complemented by a fluctuation theorem that bounds the probability of profitable cycles in terms of dissipated work and market volatility. The framework introduces a statistical ensemble of trading strategies governed by a Gibbs measure, leading to a free energy decomposition that connects expected cost, strategy entropy, and a market temperature parameter. The framework provides rigorous, testable inequalities linking microstructural impact to macroscopic no-arbitrage conditions, offering a novel physics-inspired perspective on market efficiency. The paper derives explicit analytical results for prototypical trading strategies and discusses empirical validation protocols.

The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a key policy tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and advancing toward a net-zero economy. Under this scheme, tradeable carbon credits, European Union Allowances (EUAs), are issued to large emitters, who can buy and sell them on regulated markets. We investigate the influence of financial, economic, and energy-related factors on EUA futures prices using discrete and dynamic Bayesian networks to model both contemporaneous and time-lagged dependencies. The analysis is based on daily data spanning the third and fourth ETS trading phases (2013-2025), incorporating a wide range of indicators including energy commodities, equity indices, exchange rates, and bond markets. Results reveal that EUA pricing is most influenced by energy commodities, especially coal and oil futures, and by the performance of the European energy sector. Broader market sentiment, captured through stock indices and volatility measures, affects EUA prices indirectly via changes in energy demand. The dynamic model confirms a modest next-day predictive influence from oil markets, while most other effects remain contemporaneous. These insights offer regulators, institutional investors, and firms subject to ETS compliance a clearer understanding of the interconnected forces shaping the carbon market, supporting more effective hedging, investment strategies, and policy design.

The widespread adoption of AI systems in the economy hinges on their ability to generate economic value that outweighs their inference costs. Evaluating this tradeoff requires metrics that account for both performance and costs. We propose a framework grounded in production theory for evaluating language models by combining accuracy and inference cost. We introduce "cost-of-pass", the expected monetary cost of generating a correct solution. We then define the "frontier cost-of-pass" as the minimum cost-of-pass achievable across available models or the "human-expert, using the approximate cost of hiring an expert. Our analysis reveals distinct economic insights. First, lightweight models are most cost-effective for basic quantitative tasks, large models for knowledge-intensive ones, and reasoning models for complex quantitative problems, despite higher per-token costs. Second, tracking this frontier cost-of-pass over the past year reveals significant progress, particularly for complex quantitative tasks where the cost has roughly halved every few months. Third, to trace key innovations driving this progress, we examine counterfactual frontiers: estimates of cost-efficiency without specific model classes. We find that innovations in lightweight, large, and reasoning models have been essential for pushing the frontier in basic quantitative, knowledge-intensive, and complex quantitative tasks, respectively. Finally, we assess the cost-reductions afforded by common inference-time techniques like majority voting and self-refinement, finding that their marginal accuracy gains rarely justify their costs. Our findings underscore that complementary model-level innovations are the primary drivers of cost-efficiency, and our economic framework provides a principled tool for measuring this progress and guiding deployment.

Optimal execution is an important problem faced by any trader. Most solutions are based on the assumption of constant market impact, while liquidity is known to be dynamic. Moreover, models with time-varying liquidity typically assume that it is observable, despite the fact that, in reality, it is latent and hard to measure in real time. In this paper we show that the use of Double Deep Q-learning, a form of Reinforcement Learning based on neural networks, is able to learn optimal trading policies when liquidity is time-varying. Specifically, we consider an Almgren-Chriss framework with temporary and permanent impact parameters following several deterministic and stochastic dynamics. Using extensive numerical experiments, we show that the trained algorithm learns the optimal policy when the analytical solution is available, and overcomes benchmarks and approximated solutions when the solution is not available.

AI and reinforcement learning (RL) have improved many areas, but are not yet widely adopted in economic policy design, mechanism design, or economics at large. At the same time, current economic methodology is limited by a lack of counterfactual data, simplistic behavioral models, and limited opportunities to experiment with policies and evaluate behavioral responses. Here we show that machine-learning-based economic simulation is a powerful policy and mechanism design framework to overcome these limitations. The AI Economist is a two-level, deep RL framework that trains both agents and a social planner who co-adapt, providing a tractable solution to the highly unstable and novel two-level RL challenge. From a simple specification of an economy, we learn rational agent behaviors that adapt to learned planner policies and vice versa. We demonstrate the efficacy of the AI Economist on the problem of optimal taxation. In simple one-step economies, the AI Economist recovers the optimal tax policy of economic theory. In complex, dynamic economies, the AI Economist substantially improves both utilitarian social welfare and the trade-off between equality and productivity over baselines. It does so despite emergent tax-gaming strategies, while accounting for agent interactions and behavioral change more accurately than economic theory. These results demonstrate for the first time that two-level, deep RL can be used for understanding and as a complement to theory for economic design, unlocking a new computational learning-based approach to understanding economic policy.

Socio-economic causal effects depend heavily on their specific institutional and environmental context. A single intervention can produce opposite results depending on regulatory or market factors, contexts that are often complex and only partially observed. This poses a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs) in decision-support roles: can they distinguish structural causal mechanisms from surface-level correlations when the context changes? To address this, we introduce EconCausal, a large-scale benchmark comprising 10,490 context-annotated causal triplets extracted from 2,595 high-quality empirical studies published in top-tier economics and finance journals. Through a rigorous four-stage pipeline combining multi-run consensus, context refinement, and multi-critic filtering, we ensure each claim is grounded in peer-reviewed research with explicit identification strategies. Our evaluation reveals critical limitations in current LLMs' context-dependent reasoning. While top models achieve approximately 88 percent accuracy in fixed, explicit contexts, performance drops sharply under context shifts, with a 32.6 percentage point decline, and falls to 37 percent when misinformation is introduced. Furthermore, models exhibit severe over-commitment in ambiguous cases and struggle to recognize null effects, achieving only 9.5 percent accuracy, exposing a fundamental gap between pattern matching and genuine causal reasoning. These findings underscore substantial risks for high-stakes economic decision-making, where the cost of misinterpreting causality is high. The dataset and benchmark are publicly available at https://github.com/econaikaist/econcausal-benchmark.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.