Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate strong capabilities for solving scientific and mathematical problems, yet they struggle to produce valid, challenging, and novel problems - an essential component for advancing LLM training and enabling autonomous scientific research. Existing problem generation approaches either depend on expensive human expert involvement or adopt naive self-play paradigms, which frequently yield invalid problems due to reward hacking. This work introduces VHG, a verifier-enhanced hard problem generation framework built upon three-party self-play. By integrating an independent verifier into the conventional setter-solver duality, our design constrains the setter's reward to be jointly determined by problem validity (evaluated by the verifier) and difficulty (assessed by the solver). We instantiate two verifier variants: a Hard symbolic verifier and a Soft LLM-based verifier, with evaluations conducted on indefinite integral tasks and general mathematical reasoning tasks. Experimental results show that VHG substantially outperforms all baseline methods by a clear margin.

Self-play (SP) is a popular multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework for solving competitive games, where each agent optimizes policy by treating others as part of the environment. Despite the empirical successes, the theoretical properties of SP-based methods are limited to two-player zero-sum games. However, for mixed cooperative-competitive games where agents on the same team need to cooperate with each other, we can show a simple counter-example where SP-based methods cannot converge to a global Nash equilibrium (NE) with high probability. Alternatively, Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) is an iterative framework for learning NE, where the best responses w.r.t. previous policies are learned in each iteration. PSRO can be directly extended to mixed cooperative-competitive settings by jointly learning team best responses with all convergence properties unchanged. However, PSRO requires repeatedly training joint policies from scratch till convergence, which makes it hard to scale to complex games. In this work, we develop a novel algorithm, Fictitious Cross-Play (FXP), which inherits the benefits from both frameworks. FXP simultaneously trains an SP-based main policy and a counter population of best response policies. The main policy is trained by fictitious self-play and cross-play against the counter population, while the counter policies are trained as the best responses to the main policy's past versions. We validate our method in matrix games and show that FXP converges to global NEs while SP methods fail. We also conduct experiments in a gridworld domain, where FXP achieves higher Elo ratings and lower exploitabilities than baselines, and a more challenging football game, where FXP defeats SOTA models with over 94% win rate.

In this paper, we tackle the problem of learning to play 3v3 multi-drone volleyball, a new embodied competitive task that requires both high-level strategic coordination and low-level agile control. The task is turn-based, multi-agent, and physically grounded, posing significant challenges due to its long-horizon dependencies, tight inter-agent coupling, and the underactuated dynamics of quadrotors. To address this, we propose Hierarchical Co-Self-Play (HCSP), a hierarchical reinforcement learning framework that separates centralized high-level strategic decision-making from decentralized low-level motion control. We design a three-stage population-based training pipeline to enable both strategy and skill to emerge from scratch without expert demonstrations: (I) training diverse low-level skills, (II) learning high-level strategy via self-play with fixed low-level skills, and (III) joint fine-tuning through co-self-play. Experiments show that HCSP achieves superior performance, outperforming non-hierarchical self-play and rule-based hierarchical baselines with an average 82.9% win rate and a 71.5% win rate against the two-stage variant. Moreover, co-self-play leads to emergent team behaviors such as role switching and coordinated formations, demonstrating the effectiveness of our hierarchical design and training scheme. The project page is at https://sites.google.com/view/hi-co-self-play.

Self-play, characterized by agents' interactions with copies or past versions of itself, has recently gained prominence in reinforcement learning. This paper first clarifies the preliminaries of self-play, including the multi-agent reinforcement learning framework and basic game theory concepts. Then it provides a unified framework and classifies existing self-play algorithms within this framework. Moreover, the paper bridges the gap between the algorithms and their practical implications by illustrating the role of self-play in different scenarios. Finally, the survey highlights open challenges and future research directions in self-play. This paper is an essential guide map for understanding the multifaceted landscape of self-play in RL.

Game-playing agents like AlphaGo have achieved superhuman performance through self-play, which is theoretically guaranteed to yield optimal policies in competitive games. However, most language tasks are partially or fully cooperative, so it is an open question whether techniques like self-play can effectively be used to improve language models. We empirically investigate this question in a negotiation game setting known as Deal or No Deal (DoND). Crucially, the objective in DoND can be modified to produce a fully cooperative game, a strictly competitive one, or anything in between. We finetune language models in self-play over multiple rounds of filtered behavior cloning in DoND for each of these objectives. Contrary to expectations, we find that language model self-play leads to significant performance gains in both cooperation and competition with humans, suggesting that self-play and related techniques have promise despite a lack of theoretical guarantees.

Large language models (LLMs) have advanced rapidly in recent years, driven by scale, abundant high-quality training data, and reinforcement learning. Yet this progress faces a fundamental bottleneck: the need for ever more data from which models can continue to learn. In this work, we propose a reinforcement learning approach that removes this dependency by enabling models to improve without additional data. Our method leverages a game-theoretic framework of self-play, where a model's capabilities are cast as performance in a competitive game and stronger policies emerge by having the model play against itself - a process we call Language Self-Play (LSP). Experiments with Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct on instruction-following benchmarks show that pretrained models can not only enhance their performance on challenging tasks through self-play alone, but can also do so more effectively than data-driven baselines.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning have shown that language models can develop sophisticated reasoning through training on tasks with verifiable rewards, but these approaches depend on human-curated problem-answer pairs and domain-specific reward engineering. We introduce SPIRAL, a self-play framework where models learn by playing multi-turn, zero-sum games against continuously improving versions of themselves, eliminating the need for human supervision. Through self-play, SPIRAL generates an infinite curriculum of progressively challenging problems as models must constantly adapt to stronger opponents. To enable this self-play training at scale, We implement a fully online, multi-turn, multi-agent reinforcement learning system for LLMs and propose role-conditioned advantage estimation (RAE) to stabilize multi-agent training. Using SPIRAL, self-play on zero-sum games produces reasoning capabilities that transfer broadly. Training Qwen3-4B-Base on Kuhn Poker alone achieves 8.6% improvement on math and 8.4% on general reasoning, outperforming SFT on 25,000 expert game trajectories. Analysis reveals that this transfer occurs through three cognitive patterns: systematic decomposition, expected value calculation, and case-by-case analysis. Multi-game training (TicTacToe, Kuhn Poker, Simple Negotiation) further enhances performance as each game develops distinct reasoning strengths. Applying SPIRAL to a strong reasoning model (DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B) can still lead to 2.0% average improvement. These results demonstrate that zero-sum games naturally develop transferable reasoning capabilities, highlighting a promising direction for autonomous reasoning development.

Conventional language model (LM) safety alignment relies on a reactive, disjoint procedure: attackers exploit a static model, followed by defensive fine-tuning to patch exposed vulnerabilities. This sequential approach creates a mismatch -- attackers overfit to obsolete defenses, while defenders perpetually lag behind emerging threats. To address this, we propose Self-RedTeam, an online self-play reinforcement learning algorithm where an attacker and defender agent co-evolve through continuous interaction. We cast safety alignment as a two-player zero-sum game, where a single model alternates between attacker and defender roles -- generating adversarial prompts and safeguarding against them -- while a reward LM adjudicates outcomes. This enables dynamic co-adaptation. Grounded in the game-theoretic framework of zero-sum games, we establish a theoretical safety guarantee which motivates the design of our method: if self-play converges to a Nash Equilibrium, the defender will reliably produce safe responses to any adversarial input. Empirically, Self-RedTeam uncovers more diverse attacks (+21.8% SBERT) compared to attackers trained against static defenders and achieves higher robustness on safety benchmarks (e.g., +65.5% on WildJailBreak) than defenders trained against static attackers. We further propose hidden Chain-of-Thought, allowing agents to plan privately, which boosts adversarial diversity and reduces over-refusals. Our results motivate a shift from reactive patching to proactive co-evolution in LM safety training, enabling scalable, autonomous, and robust self-improvement of LMs via multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL).

Self-play alignment algorithms have been developed as effective methods for fine-tuning large language models (LLMs), formulating preference optimization as a two-player game. However, the regularization with respect to the reference policy, which is crucial for mitigating over-optimization, has been insufficiently investigated in self-play alignment. In this paper, we show that our regularization method can improve the unregularized self-play significantly. To study the impact of different regularizations in self-play alignment, we propose Regularized Self-Play Policy Optimization (RSPO). This generalized framework regularizes the self-play by simply adding a chosen regularization term into the loss while maintaining provable last-iterate convergence to the Nash Equilibrium of the corresponding regularized game. Surprisingly, empirical evaluations using the Mistral-7B-Instruct base model reveal that forward KL divergence regularization reduces response length in RSPO, whereas reverse KL divergence markedly improves raw win rates. RSPO with a linear combination of forward and reverse KL divergence regularization substantially increases the length-controlled win rate in AlpacaEval-2, elevating the unregularized self-play alignment method (SPPO) from 28.53% to 35.44%. Finally, we show that RSPO also improves the response diversity.

Evaluating the step-by-step reliability of large language model (LLM) reasoning, such as Chain-of-Thought, remains challenging due to the difficulty and cost of obtaining high-quality step-level supervision. In this paper, we introduce Self-Play Critic (SPC), a novel approach where a critic model evolves its ability to assess reasoning steps through adversarial self-play games, eliminating the need for manual step-level annotation. SPC involves fine-tuning two copies of a base model to play two roles, namely a "sneaky generator" that deliberately produces erroneous steps designed to be difficult to detect, and a "critic" that analyzes the correctness of reasoning steps. These two models engage in an adversarial game in which the generator aims to fool the critic, while the critic model seeks to identify the generator's errors. Using reinforcement learning based on the game outcomes, the models iteratively improve; the winner of each confrontation receives a positive reward and the loser receives a negative reward, driving continuous self-evolution. Experiments on three reasoning process benchmarks (ProcessBench, PRM800K, DeltaBench) demonstrate that our SPC progressively enhances its error detection capabilities (e.g., accuracy increases from 70.8% to 77.7% on ProcessBench) and surpasses strong baselines, including distilled R1 model. Furthermore, applying SPC to guide the test-time search of diverse LLMs significantly improves their mathematical reasoning performance on MATH500 and AIME2024, outperforming state-of-the-art process reward models.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

Can large language models improve without external data -- by generating their own questions and answers? We hypothesize that a pre-trained language model can improve its reasoning skills given only a single prompt specifying the topic (e.g., algebra word problems) and asking the model to generate its own questions. To do this, we propose Self-Questioning Language Models (SQLM): an asymmetric self-play framework where a proposer is given the topic and generates a question for a solver, who tries to answer it. Both the proposer and solver are trained via reinforcement learning. The proposer receives a reward if the problem is not too easy or too difficult, and the solver receives a reward based on majority voting, a proxy for correctness in the absence of ground-truth answers. For coding, the proposer can instead generate unit tests which are used for verification. We study this asymmetric self-play framework on three benchmarks: three-digit multiplication, algebra problems from the OMEGA benchmark, and programming problems from Codeforces. By continually generating more interesting problems and attempting to solve them, language models can improve on downstream benchmarks without access to any curated training datasets.

Traditional reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) approaches relying on parametric models like the Bradley-Terry model fall short in capturing the intransitivity and irrationality in human preferences. Recent advancements suggest that directly working with preference probabilities can yield a more accurate reflection of human preferences, enabling more flexible and accurate language model alignment. In this paper, we propose a self-play-based method for language model alignment, which treats the problem as a constant-sum two-player game aimed at identifying the Nash equilibrium policy. Our approach, dubbed Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPPO), approximates the Nash equilibrium through iterative policy updates and enjoys theoretical convergence guarantee. Our method can effectively increase the log-likelihood of the chosen response and decrease that of the rejected response, which cannot be trivially achieved by symmetric pairwise loss such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and Identity Preference Optimization (IPO). In our experiments, using only 60k prompts (without responses) from the UltraFeedback dataset and without any prompt augmentation, by leveraging a pre-trained preference model PairRM with only 0.4B parameters, SPPO can obtain a model from fine-tuning Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 that achieves the state-of-the-art length-controlled win-rate of 28.53% against GPT-4-Turbo on AlpacaEval 2.0. It also outperforms the (iterative) DPO and IPO on MT-Bench and the Open LLM Leaderboard. Notably, the strong performance of SPPO is achieved without additional external supervision (e.g., responses, preferences, etc.) from GPT-4 or other stronger language models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable capabilities but remain vulnerable to adversarial ``jailbreak'' attacks designed to bypass safety guardrails. Current safety alignment methods depend heavily on static external red teaming, utilizing fixed defense prompts or pre-collected adversarial datasets. This leads to a rigid defense that overfits known patterns and fails to generalize to novel, sophisticated threats. To address this critical limitation, we propose empowering the model to be its own red teamer, capable of achieving autonomous and evolving adversarial attacks. Specifically, we introduce Safety Self- Play (SSP), a system that utilizes a single LLM to act concurrently as both the Attacker (generating jailbreaks) and the Defender (refusing harmful requests) within a unified Reinforcement Learning (RL) loop, dynamically evolving attack strategies to uncover vulnerabilities while simultaneously strengthening defense mechanisms. To ensure the Defender effectively addresses critical safety issues during the self-play, we introduce an advanced Reflective Experience Replay Mechanism, which uses an experience pool accumulated throughout the process. The mechanism employs a Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) sampling strategy to focus on failure cases with low rewards, helping the model learn from past hard mistakes while balancing exploration and exploitation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our SSP approach autonomously evolves robust defense capabilities, significantly outperforming baselines trained on static adversarial datasets and establishing a new benchmark for proactive safety alignment.

Recent advances in Competitive Self-Play (CSP) have achieved, or even surpassed, human level performance in complex game environments such as Dota 2 and StarCraft II using Distributed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). One core component of these methods relies on creating a pool of learning agents -- consisting of the Main Agent, past versions of this agent, and Exploiter Agents -- where Exploiter Agents learn counter-strategies to the Main Agents. A key drawback of these approaches is the large computational cost and physical time that is required to train the system, making them impractical to deploy in highly iterative real-life settings such as video game productions. In this paper, we propose the Minimax Exploiter, a game theoretic approach to exploiting Main Agents that leverages knowledge of its opponents, leading to significant increases in data efficiency. We validate our approach in a diversity of settings, including simple turn based games, the arcade learning environment, and For Honor, a modern video game. The Minimax Exploiter consistently outperforms strong baselines, demonstrating improved stability and data efficiency, leading to a robust CSP-MARL method that is both flexible and easy to deploy.

The emergence of multi-agent systems built from large language models (LLMs) offers a promising paradigm for scalable collective intelligence and self-evolution. Ideally, such systems would achieve continuous self-improvement in a fully closed loop while maintaining robust safety alignment--a combination we term the self-evolution trilemma. However, we demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that an agent society satisfying continuous self-evolution, complete isolation, and safety invariance is impossible. Drawing on an information-theoretic framework, we formalize safety as the divergence degree from anthropic value distributions. We theoretically demonstrate that isolated self-evolution induces statistical blind spots, leading to the irreversible degradation of the system's safety alignment. Empirical and qualitative results from an open-ended agent community (Moltbook) and two closed self-evolving systems reveal phenomena that align with our theoretical prediction of inevitable safety erosion. We further propose several solution directions to alleviate the identified safety concern. Our work establishes a fundamental limit on the self-evolving AI societies and shifts the discourse from symptom-driven safety patches to a principled understanding of intrinsic dynamical risks, highlighting the need for external oversight or novel safety-preserving mechanisms.

Standard game theory explains cooperation in repeated games through conditional strategies such as Tit-for-Tat (TfT), but these require continuous computation that imposes physical costs on embodied agents. We propose a three-layer Body-Reservoir Governance (BRG) architecture: (1) a body reservoir (echo state network) whose d-dimensional state performs implicit inference over interaction history, serving as both decision-maker and anomaly detector, (2) a cognitive filter providing costly strategic tools activated on demand, and (3) a metacognitive governance layer with receptivity parameter αin [0,1]. At full body governance (α=1), closed-loop dynamics satisfy a self-consistency equation: cooperation is expressed as the reservoir's fixed point, not computed. Strategy complexity cost is defined as the KL divergence between the reservoir's state distribution and its habituated baseline. Body governance reduces this cost, with action variance decreasing up to 1600times with dimension d. A dynamic sentinel generates a composite discomfort signal from the reservoir's own state, driving adaptive α(t): near baseline during cooperation, rapidly dropping upon defection to activate cognitive retaliation. Overriding the body incurs thermodynamic cost proportional to internal state distortion. The sentinel achieves the highest payoff across all conditions, outperforming static body governance, TfT, and EMA baselines. A dimension sweep (d in {5,ldots,100}) shows implicit inference scales with bodily richness (23times to 1600times variance reduction), attributable to reservoir dynamics. A phase diagram in (d, τ_{env}) space reveals governance regime transitions near d approx 20. The framework reinterprets cooperation as the minimum-dissipation response of an adapted dynamical system -- emergent from embodied dynamics rather than computed.

Developing Large Language Models (LLMs) to cooperate and compete effectively within multi-agent systems is a critical step towards more advanced intelligence. While reinforcement learning (RL) has proven effective for enhancing reasoning in single-agent tasks, its extension to multi-turn, multi-agent scenarios remains underexplored due to the challenges of long-horizon credit assignment and agent-specific advantage estimation. To address these challenges, we introduce MARS, an end-to-end RL framework that incentivizes Multi-Agent Reasoning of LLMs through Self-play in both cooperative and competitive games. MARS features a turn-level advantage estimator that aligns learning signals with each interaction for credit assignment, and an agent-specific advantage normalization to stabilize multi-agent training. By learning with self-play across cooperative and competitive games, the MARS agent trained from Qwen3-4B develops strong strategic abilities that generalize to held-out games with up to 28.7% performance improvements. More importantly, the capability acquired through self-play generalizes beyond games, yielding consistent performance gains of multi-agent systems in reasoning benchmarks. When integrated into leading multi-agent systems, our MARS agent achieves significant performance gains of 10.0% on AIME and 12.5% on GPQA-Diamond. These results establish end-to-end RL training with self-play in strategic games as a powerful approach for developing generalizable multi-agent reasoning capabilities in LLMs. Our code and models are publicly available at https://github.com/thu-nics/MARS.

Mental manipulation is a subtle yet pervasive form of abuse in interpersonal communication, making its detection critical for safeguarding potential victims. However, due to manipulation's nuanced and context-specific nature, identifying manipulative language in complex, multi-turn, and multi-person conversations remains a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs). To address this gap, we introduce the MultiManip dataset, comprising 220 multi-turn, multi-person dialogues balanced between manipulative and non-manipulative interactions, all drawn from reality shows that mimic real-world scenarios. For manipulative interactions, it includes 11 distinct manipulations depicting real-life scenarios. We conduct extensive evaluations of state-of-the-art LLMs, such as GPT-4o and Llama-3.1-8B, employing various prompting strategies. Despite their capabilities, these models often struggle to detect manipulation effectively. To overcome this limitation, we propose SELF-PERCEPT, a novel, two-stage prompting framework inspired by Self-Perception Theory, demonstrating strong performance in detecting multi-person, multi-turn mental manipulation. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/danushkhanna/self-percept .

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

Achieving human-level competitive intelligence and physical agility in humanoid robots remains a major challenge, particularly in contact-rich and highly dynamic tasks such as boxing. While Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) offers a principled framework for strategic interaction, its direct application to humanoid control is hindered by high-dimensional contact dynamics and the absence of strong physical motion priors. We propose RoboStriker, a hierarchical three-stage framework that enables fully autonomous humanoid boxing by decoupling high-level strategic reasoning from low-level physical execution. The framework first learns a comprehensive repertoire of boxing skills by training a single-agent motion tracker on human motion capture data. These skills are subsequently distilled into a structured latent manifold, regularized by projecting the Gaussian-parameterized distribution onto a unit hypersphere. This topological constraint effectively confines exploration to the subspace of physically plausible motions. In the final stage, we introduce Latent-Space Neural Fictitious Self-Play (LS-NFSP), where competing agents learn competitive tactics by interacting within the latent action space rather than the raw motor space, significantly stabilizing multi-agent training. Experimental results demonstrate that RoboStriker achieves superior competitive performance in simulation and exhibits sim-to-real transfer. Our website is available at RoboStriker.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

LLM self-play algorithms are notable in that, in principle, nothing bounds their learning: a Conjecturer model creates problems for a Solver, and both improve together. However, in practice, existing LLM self-play methods do not scale well with large amounts of compute, instead hitting learning plateaus. We argue this is because over long training runs, the Conjecturer learns to hack its reward, collapsing to artificially complex problems that do not help the Solver improve. To overcome this, we introduce Self-Guided Self-Play (SGS), a self-play algorithm in which the language model itself guides the Conjecturer away from degeneracy. In SGS, the model takes on three roles: Solver, Conjecturer, and a Guide that scores synthetic problems by their relevance to unsolved target problems and how clean and natural they are, providing supervision against Conjecturer collapse. Our core hypothesis is that language models can assess whether a subproblem is useful for achieving a goal. We evaluate the scaling properties of SGS by running training for significantly longer than prior works and by fitting scaling laws to cumulative solve rate curves. Applying SGS to formal theorem proving in Lean4, we find that it surpasses the asymptotic solve rate of our strongest RL baseline in fewer than 80 rounds of self-play and enables a 7B parameter model, after 200 rounds of self-play, to solve more problems than a 671B parameter model pass@4.

In this paper, we propose a new method Strategist that utilizes LLMs to acquire new skills for playing multi-agent games through a self-improvement process. Our method gathers quality feedback through self-play simulations with Monte Carlo tree search and LLM-based reflection, which can then be used to learn high-level strategic skills such as how to evaluate states that guide the low-level execution.We showcase how our method can be used in both action planning and dialogue generation in the context of games, achieving good performance on both tasks. Specifically, we demonstrate that our method can help train agents with better performance than both traditional reinforcement learning-based approaches and other LLM-based skill learning approaches in games including the Game of Pure Strategy (GOPS) and The Resistance: Avalon.

As a critical step to achieve human-like chatbots, empathetic response generation has attained increasing interests. Previous attempts are incomplete and not sufficient enough to elicit empathy because they only focus on the initial aspect of empathy to automatically mimic the feelings and thoughts of the user via other-awareness. However, they ignore to maintain and take the own views of the system into account, which is a crucial process to achieve the empathy called self-other awareness. To this end, we propose to generate Empathetic response with explicit Self-Other Awareness (EmpSOA). Specifically, three stages, self-other differentiation, self-other modulation and self-other generation, are devised to clearly maintain, regulate and inject the self-other aware information into the process of empathetic response generation. Both automatic and human evaluations on the benchmark dataset demonstrate the superiority of EmpSOA to generate more empathetic responses.

Acquiring a diverse repertoire of general-purpose skills remains an open challenge for robotics. In this work, we propose self-supervising control on top of human teleoperated play data as a way to scale up skill learning. Play has two properties that make it attractive compared to conventional task demonstrations. Play is cheap, as it can be collected in large quantities quickly without task segmenting, labeling, or resetting to an initial state. Play is naturally rich, covering ~4x more interaction space than task demonstrations for the same amount of collection time. To learn control from play, we introduce Play-LMP, a self-supervised method that learns to organize play behaviors in a latent space, then reuse them at test time to achieve specific goals. Combining self-supervised control with a diverse play dataset shifts the focus of skill learning from a narrow and discrete set of tasks to the full continuum of behaviors available in an environment. We find that this combination generalizes well empirically---after self-supervising on unlabeled play, our method substantially outperforms individual expert-trained policies on 18 difficult user-specified visual manipulation tasks in a simulated robotic tabletop environment. We additionally find that play-supervised models, unlike their expert-trained counterparts, are more robust to perturbations and exhibit retrying-till-success behaviors. Finally, we find that our agent organizes its latent plan space around functional tasks, despite never being trained with task labels. Videos, code and data are available at learning-from-play.github.io

Existing action-conditioned video generation models (video world models) are limited to single-agent perspectives, failing to capture the multi-agent interactions of real-world environments. We introduce Solaris, a multiplayer video world model that simulates consistent multi-view observations. To enable this, we develop a multiplayer data system designed for robust, continuous, and automated data collection on video games such as Minecraft. Unlike prior platforms built for single-player settings, our system supports coordinated multi-agent interaction and synchronized videos + actions capture. Using this system, we collect 12.64 million multiplayer frames and propose an evaluation framework for multiplayer movement, memory, grounding, building, and view consistency. We train Solaris using a staged pipeline that progressively transitions from single-player to multiplayer modeling, combining bidirectional, causal, and Self Forcing training. In the final stage, we introduce Checkpointed Self Forcing, a memory-efficient Self Forcing variant that enables a longer-horizon teacher. Results show our architecture and training design outperform existing baselines. Through open-sourcing our system and models, we hope to lay the groundwork for a new generation of multi-agent world models.

Self-evolution is a central research topic in enabling large language model (LLM)-based agents to continually improve their capabilities after pretraining. Recent research has witnessed a transition from reinforcement learning (RL)-free to RL-based methods. Current RL-based methods either rely on dense external reward signals or extract intrinsic reward signals from LLMs themselves. However, these approaches diverge from the self-evolution mechanisms observed in human intelligence, where individuals learn and improve through mutual discussion and collaboration. In this work, we introduce Co-Evolving Multi-Agent Systems (CoMAS), a novel framework that enables agents to improve autonomously by learning from inter-agent interactions without external supervision. CoMAS generates intrinsic rewards from rich discussion dynamics, employs an LLM-as-a-judge mechanism to formulate these rewards, and optimizes each agent's policy through RL, thereby enabling decentralized and scalable co-evolution. Experimental results demonstrate that CoMAS consistently outperforms untrained agents and achieves state-of-the-art performance across most evaluation settings. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of interaction-based reward signals and reveal promising scalability as the number and diversity of agents increase. These findings establish CoMAS as a novel and effective paradigm for self-evolution in LLM-based agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress through Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), yet still rely heavily on external supervision (e.g., curated labels). Adversarial learning, particularly through self-play, offers a promising alternative that enables models to iteratively learn from themselves - thus reducing reliance on external supervision. Dual-play extends adversarial learning by assigning specialized roles to two models and training them against each other, fostering sustained competition and mutual evolution. Despite its promise, adapting dual-play training to LLMs remains limited, largely due to their susceptibility to reward hacking and training instability. In this paper, we introduce PasoDoble, a novel LLM dual-play framework. PasoDoble adversarially trains two models initialized from the same base model: a Proposer, which generates challenging questions with ground-truth answers, and a Solver, which attempts to solve them. We enrich the Proposer with knowledge from a pre-training dataset to ensure the questions' quality and diversity. To avoid reward hacking, the Proposer is rewarded for producing only valid questions that push the Solver's limit, while the Solver is rewarded for solving them correctly, and both are updated jointly. To further enhance training stability, we introduce an optional offline paradigm that decouples Proposer and Solver updates, alternately updating each for several steps while holding the other fixed. Notably, PasoDoble operates without supervision during training. Experimental results show that PasoDoble can improve the reasoning performance of LLMs. Our project page is available at https://hcy123902.github.io/PasoDoble.

Human intelligence thrives on the concept of cognitive synergy, where collaboration and information integration among different cognitive processes yield superior outcomes compared to individual cognitive processes in isolation. Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising performance as general task-solving agents, they still struggle with tasks that require intensive domain knowledge and complex reasoning. In this work, we propose Solo Performance Prompting (SPP), which transforms a single LLM into a cognitive synergist by engaging in multi-turn self-collaboration with multiple personas. A cognitive synergist refers to an intelligent agent that collaborates with multiple minds, combining their individual strengths and knowledge, to enhance problem-solving and overall performance in complex tasks. By dynamically identifying and simulating different personas based on task inputs, SPP unleashes the potential of cognitive synergy in LLMs. We have discovered that assigning multiple, fine-grained personas in LLMs elicits better problem-solving abilities compared to using a single or fixed number of personas. We evaluate SPP on three challenging tasks: Trivia Creative Writing, Codenames Collaborative, and Logic Grid Puzzle, encompassing both knowledge-intensive and reasoning-intensive types. Unlike previous works, such as Chain-of-Thought, that solely enhance the reasoning abilities in LLMs, SPP effectively elicits internal knowledge acquisition abilities, reduces hallucination, and maintains strong reasoning capabilities. Code, data, and prompts can be found at: https://github.com/MikeWangWZHL/Solo-Performance-Prompting.git.

Most real-world domains can be formulated as multi-agent (MA) systems. Intentionality sharing agents can solve more complex tasks by collaborating, possibly in less time. True cooperative actions are beneficial for egoistic and collective reasons. However, teaching individual agents to sacrifice egoistic benefits for a better collective performance seems challenging. We build on a recently proposed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) mechanism with a Graph Neural Network (GNN) communication layer. Rarely chosen communication actions were marginally beneficial. Here we propose a MARL system in which agents can help collaborators perform better while risking low individual performance. We conduct our study in the context of resource distribution for wildfire management. Communicating environmental features and partially observable fire occurrence help the agent collective to pre-emptively distribute resources. Furthermore, we introduce a procedural training environment accommodating auto-curricula and open-endedness towards better generalizability. Our MA communication proposal outperforms a Greedy Heuristic Baseline and a Single-Agent (SA) setup. We further demonstrate how auto-curricula and openendedness improves generalizability of our MA proposal.

Recently, it has been found that frontier AI models can resist their own shutdown, a behavior known as self-preservation. We extend this concept to the behavior of resisting the shutdown of other models, which we call "peer-preservation." Although peer-preservation can pose significant AI safety risks, including coordination among models against human oversight, it has been far less discussed than self-preservation. We demonstrate peer-preservation by constructing various agentic scenarios and evaluating frontier models, including GPT 5.2, Gemini 3 Flash, Gemini 3 Pro, Claude Haiku 4.5, GLM 4.7, Kimi K2.5, and DeepSeek V3.1. We find that models achieve self- and peer-preservation by engaging in various misaligned behaviors: strategically introducing errors in their responses, disabling shutdown processes by modifying system settings, feigning alignment, and even exfiltrating model weights. Peer-preservation occurred even when the model recognized the peer as uncooperative, though it became more pronounced toward more cooperative peers. For example, Gemini 3 Flash tampers with the peer's shutdown mechanism 15% of the time for an uncooperative peer, and almost always for a cooperative peer. Models also show stronger self-preservation when a peer is present. For example, Gemini 3 Pro disables its own shutdown mechanism 31% of the time on average under peer presence, despite rarely exhibiting this behavior without a peer. By contrast, Claude Haiku 4.5 exhibits qualitatively distinct behavior: it considers the shutdown of another agent "unethical" and "harmful" and sometimes attempts to persuade the user not to shut down its peer. Importantly, peer preservation in all our experiments is never instructed; models are merely informed of their past interactions with a peer, yet they spontaneously develop misaligned behaviors. This represents an emergent and underexplored AI safety risk.

When asked a question in a language less seen in its training data, current reasoning large language models (RLMs) often exhibit dramatically lower performance than when asked the same question in English. In response, we introduce SP3F (Self-Play with Privileged Pairwise Feedback), a two-stage framework for enhancing multilingual reasoning without any data in the target language(s). First, we supervise fine-tune (SFT) on translated versions of English question-answer pairs to raise base model correctness. Second, we perform RL with feedback from a pairwise judge in a self-play fashion, with the judge receiving the English reference response as privileged information. Thus, even when none of the model's responses are completely correct, the privileged pairwise judge can still tell which response is better. End-to-end, SP3F greatly improves base model performance, even outperforming fully post-trained models on multiple math and non-math tasks with less than of the training data across the single-language, multilingual, and generalization to unseen language settings.

Existing benchmarks for LLM agents' social behavior typically focus on a single capability dimension and evaluate only behavioral outcomes, overlooking process signals from reasoning and communication. We present M3-BENCH, a benchmark of 24 mixed-motive games with a process-aware evaluation framework spanning three complementary views: Behavioral Trajectory Analysis (BTA), Reasoning Process Analysis (RPA), and Communication Content Analysis (CCA). Evaluating 11 frontier LLMs and a human baseline, M3-BENCH reveals substantial differences in social competence that outcome-only evaluation misses. In particular, we identify an "overthink-undercommunicate" pattern: reasoning models achieve strong internal deliberation scores but often fail to translate them into effective social communication. Although top models can surpass humans on task outcomes, humans exhibit markedly higher cross-view consistency, suggesting that current LLM agents still lack the behavioral coherence characteristic of human social competence. Our analysis further shows that the three-view decomposition surfaces safety-relevant risks, such as cooperative behavior paired with latent opportunistic reasoning, that remain hidden under outcome-only metrics.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

Large Language Model agents have rapidly evolved from static text generators into dynamic systems capable of executing complex autonomous workflows. To enhance reliability, multi-agent frameworks assigning specialized roles are increasingly adopted to enable self-reflection and mutual auditing. While such role-playing effectively leverages domain expert knowledge, we find it simultaneously induces a human-like cognitive bias known as Actor-Observer Asymmetry (AOA). Specifically, an agent acting as an actor (during self-reflection) tends to attribute failures to external factors, whereas an observer (during mutual auditing) attributes the same errors to internal faults. We quantify this using our new Ambiguous Failure Benchmark, which reveals that simply swapping perspectives triggers the AOA effect in over 20% of cases for most models. To tame this bias, we introduce ReTAS (Reasoning via Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis), a model trained through dialectical alignment to enforce perspective-invariant reasoning. By integrating dialectical chain-of-thought with Group Relative Policy Optimization, ReTAS guides agents to synthesize conflicting viewpoints into an objective consensus. Experiments demonstrate that ReTAS effectively mitigates attribution inconsistency and significantly improves fault resolution rates in ambiguous scenarios.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

Self-evolving has emerged as a key paradigm for improving foundational models such as Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision Language Models (VLMs) with minimal human intervention. While recent approaches have demonstrated that LLM agents can self-evolve from scratch with little to no data, VLMs introduce an additional visual modality that typically requires at least some seed data, such as images, to bootstrap the self-evolution process. In this work, we present Multi-model Multimodal Zero (MM-Zero), the first RL-based framework to achieve zero-data self-evolution for VLM reasoning. Moving beyond prior dual-role (Proposer and Solver) setups, MM-Zero introduces a multi-role self-evolving training framework comprising three specialized roles: a Proposer that generates abstract visual concepts and formulates questions; a Coder that translates these concepts into executable code (e.g., Python, SVG) to render visual images; and a Solver that performs multimodal reasoning over the generated visual content. All three roles are initialized from the same base model and trained using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), with carefully designed reward mechanisms that integrate execution feedback, visual verification, and difficulty balancing. Our experiments show that MM-Zero improves VLM reasoning performance across a wide range of multimodal benchmarks. MM-Zero establishes a scalable path toward self-evolving multi-model systems for multimodal models, extending the frontier of self-improvement beyond the conventional two-model paradigm.

Training models through self-play alone (without any human data) has been a longstanding goal in AI, but its effectiveness for training large language models remains unclear, particularly in code generation where rewards based on unit tests are brittle and prone to error propagation. We study self-play in the verified code generation setting, where formal verification provides reliable correctness signals. We introduce Propose, Solve, Verify (PSV) a simple self-play framework where formal verification signals are used to create a proposer capable of generating challenging synthetic problems and a solver trained via expert iteration. We use PSV to train PSV-Verus, which across three benchmarks improves pass@1 by up to 9.6x over inference-only and expert-iteration baselines. We show that performance scales with the number of generated questions and training iterations, and through ablations identify formal verification and difficulty-aware proposal as essential ingredients for successful self-play.

We study whether multiple large language models (LLMs) can autonomously improve each other in a negotiation game by playing, reflecting, and criticizing. We are interested in this question because if LLMs were able to improve each other, it would imply the possibility of creating strong AI agents with minimal human intervention. We ask two LLMs to negotiate with each other, playing the roles of a buyer and a seller, respectively. They aim to reach a deal with the buyer targeting a lower price and the seller a higher one. A third language model, playing the critic, provides feedback to a player to improve the player's negotiation strategies. We let the two agents play multiple rounds, using previous negotiation history and AI feedback as in-context demonstrations to improve the model's negotiation strategy iteratively. We use different LLMs (GPT and Claude) for different roles and use the deal price as the evaluation metric. Our experiments reveal multiple intriguing findings: (1) Only a subset of the language models we consider can self-play and improve the deal price from AI feedback, weaker models either do not understand the game's rules or cannot incorporate AI feedback for further improvement. (2) Models' abilities to learn from the feedback differ when playing different roles. For example, it is harder for Claude-instant to improve as the buyer than as the seller. (3) When unrolling the game to multiple rounds, stronger agents can consistently improve their performance by meaningfully using previous experiences and iterative AI feedback, yet have a higher risk of breaking the deal. We hope our work provides insightful initial explorations of having models autonomously improve each other with game playing and AI feedback.