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Apr 14

ClawBench: Can AI Agents Complete Everyday Online Tasks?

AI agents may be able to automate your inbox, but can they automate other routine aspects of your life? Everyday online tasks offer a realistic yet unsolved testbed for evaluating the next generation of AI agents. To this end, we introduce ClawBench, an evaluation framework of 153 simple tasks that people need to accomplish regularly in their lives and work, spanning 144 live platforms across 15 categories, from completing purchases and booking appointments to submitting job applications. These tasks require demanding capabilities beyond existing benchmarks, such as obtaining relevant information from user-provided documents, navigating multi-step workflows across diverse platforms, and write-heavy operations like filling in many detailed forms correctly. Unlike existing benchmarks that evaluate agents in offline sandboxes with static pages, ClawBench operates on production websites, preserving the full complexity, dynamic nature, and challenges of real-world web interaction. A lightweight interception layer captures and blocks only the final submission request, ensuring safe evaluation without real-world side effects. Our evaluations of 7 frontier models show that both proprietary and open-source models can complete only a small portion of these tasks. For example, Claude Sonnet 4.6 achieves only 33.3%. Progress on ClawBench brings us closer to AI agents that can function as reliable general-purpose assistants.

RedTeamCUA: Realistic Adversarial Testing of Computer-Use Agents in Hybrid Web-OS Environments

Computer-use agents (CUAs) promise to automate complex tasks across operating systems (OS) and the web, but remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Current evaluations of this threat either lack support realistic but controlled environments or ignore hybrid web-OS attack scenarios involving both interfaces. To address this, we propose RedTeamCUA, an adversarial testing framework featuring a novel hybrid sandbox that integrates a VM-based OS environment with Docker-based web platforms. Our sandbox supports key features tailored for red teaming, such as flexible adversarial scenario configuration, and a setting that decouples adversarial evaluation from navigational limitations of CUAs by initializing tests directly at the point of an adversarial injection. Using RedTeamCUA, we develop RTC-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark with 864 examples that investigate realistic, hybrid web-OS attack scenarios and fundamental security vulnerabilities. Benchmarking current frontier CUAs identifies significant vulnerabilities: Claude 3.7 Sonnet | CUA demonstrates an ASR of 42.9%, while Operator, the most secure CUA evaluated, still exhibits an ASR of 7.6%. Notably, CUAs often attempt to execute adversarial tasks with an Attempt Rate as high as 92.5%, although failing to complete them due to capability limitations. Nevertheless, we observe concerning ASRs of up to 50% in realistic end-to-end settings, with the recently released frontier Claude 4 Opus | CUA showing an alarming ASR of 48%, demonstrating that indirect prompt injection presents tangible risks for even advanced CUAs despite their capabilities and safeguards. Overall, RedTeamCUA provides an essential framework for advancing realistic, controlled, and systematic analysis of CUA vulnerabilities, highlighting the urgent need for robust defenses to indirect prompt injection prior to real-world deployment.

  • 7 authors
·
May 27, 2025

AgentScope 1.0: A Developer-Centric Framework for Building Agentic Applications

Driven by rapid advancements of Large Language Models (LLMs), agents are empowered to combine intrinsic knowledge with dynamic tool use, greatly enhancing their capacity to address real-world tasks. In line with such an evolution, AgentScope introduces major improvements in a new version (1.0), towards comprehensively supporting flexible and efficient tool-based agent-environment interactions for building agentic applications. Specifically, we abstract foundational components essential for agentic applications and provide unified interfaces and extensible modules, enabling developers to easily leverage the latest progress, such as new models and MCPs. Furthermore, we ground agent behaviors in the ReAct paradigm and offer advanced agent-level infrastructure based on a systematic asynchronous design, which enriches both human-agent and agent-agent interaction patterns while improving execution efficiency. Building on this foundation, we integrate several built-in agents tailored to specific practical scenarios. AgentScope also includes robust engineering support for developer-friendly experiences. We provide a scalable evaluation module with a visual studio interface, making the development of long-trajectory agentic applications more manageable and easier to trace. In addition, AgentScope offers a runtime sandbox to ensure safe agent execution and facilitates rapid deployment in production environments. With these enhancements, AgentScope provides a practical foundation for building scalable, adaptive, and effective agentic applications.

  • 23 authors
·
Aug 22, 2025 4

Auditing Games for Sandbagging

Future AI systems could conceal their capabilities ('sandbagging') during evaluations, potentially misleading developers and auditors. We stress-tested sandbagging detection techniques using an auditing game. First, a red team fine-tuned five models, some of which conditionally underperformed, as a proxy for sandbagging. Second, a blue team used black-box, model-internals, or training-based approaches to identify sandbagging models. We found that the blue team could not reliably discriminate sandbaggers from benign models. Black-box approaches were defeated by effective imitation of a weaker model. Linear probes, a model-internals approach, showed more promise but their naive application was vulnerable to behaviours instilled by the red team. We also explored capability elicitation as a strategy for detecting sandbagging. Although Prompt-based elicitation was not reliable, training-based elicitation consistently elicited full performance from the sandbagging models, using only a single correct demonstration of the evaluation task. However the performance of benign models was sometimes also raised, so relying on elicitation as a detection strategy was prone to false-positives. In the short-term, we recommend developers remove potential sandbagging using on-distribution training for elicitation. In the longer-term, further research is needed to ensure the efficacy of training-based elicitation, and develop robust methods for sandbagging detection. We open source our model organisms at https://github.com/AI-Safety-Institute/sandbagging_auditing_games and select transcripts and results at https://huggingface.co/datasets/sandbagging-games/evaluation_logs . A demo illustrating the game can be played at https://sandbagging-demo.far.ai/ .

  • 13 authors
·
Dec 8, 2025

Agent-Diff: Benchmarking LLM Agents on Enterprise API Tasks via Code Execution with State-Diff-Based Evaluation

We present Agent-Diff, a novel benchmarking framework for evaluating agentic Large Language Models (LLMs) on real-world tasks that execute code via external APIs. Agentic LLM performance varies due to differences in models, external tool access, prompt structures, and agentic frameworks. Benchmarks must make fundamental trade-offs between a sandboxed approach that controls for variation in software environments and more ecologically valid approaches employing real services. Agent-Diff attempts to capture the desirable features of both of these approaches by including access to the real API interfaces for software services while sandboxing the environment in which calls are made, processed, and evaluated. This approach relies on two key innovations. The first is a novel state-diff contract, which separates process from outcome - rather than fuzzy trace or parameter matching, we define task success as whether the expected change in environment state was achieved. The second is a novel sandbox that provides a standardized scripting layer that all models use to execute code against external APIs (Slack, Box, Linear, Google Calendar). Thus, we can evaluate different agentic LLMs against a standardized set of contracts using a unified sandbox while still evaluating their performance on real-world service interfaces. Using the Agent-Diff framework, we provide benchmarks for nine LLMs across 224 tasks utilizing enterprise software workflows. In addition, we evaluate the robustness of the framework with ablation experiments to assess the contribution of access to API documentation on benchmark performance. Code and data: https://github.com/agent-diff-bench/agent-diff.

  • 3 authors
·
Feb 11

Securing the Model Context Protocol (MCP): Risks, Controls, and Governance

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

  • 3 authors
·
Nov 24, 2025