Daily Papers

Generative AI is known for its tendency to homogenize, often reproducing dominant style conventions found in training data. However, it remains unclear how these homogenizing effects extend to complex structural tasks like web design. As lay creators increasingly turn to LLMs to 'vibe-code' websites -- prompting for aesthetic and functional goals rather than writing code -- they may inadvertently narrow the diversity of their designs, and limit creative expression throughout the internet. In this paper, we interrogate the possibility of design homogenization in web vibe coding. We first characterize the vibe coding lifecycle, pinpointing stages where homogenization risks may arise. We then conduct a sociotechnical risk analysis unpacking the potential harms of web vibe coding and their interaction with design homogenization. We identify that the push for frictionless generation can exacerbate homogenization and its harms. Finally, we propose a mitigation framework centered on the idea of productive friction. Through case studies at the micro, meso, and macro levels, we show how centering productive friction can empower creators to challenge default outputs and preserve diverse expression in AI-mediated web design.

Generative AI systems produce a range of risks. To ensure the safety of generative AI systems, these risks must be evaluated. In this paper, we make two main contributions toward establishing such evaluations. First, we propose a three-layered framework that takes a structured, sociotechnical approach to evaluating these risks. This framework encompasses capability evaluations, which are the main current approach to safety evaluation. It then reaches further by building on system safety principles, particularly the insight that context determines whether a given capability may cause harm. To account for relevant context, our framework adds human interaction and systemic impacts as additional layers of evaluation. Second, we survey the current state of safety evaluation of generative AI systems and create a repository of existing evaluations. Three salient evaluation gaps emerge from this analysis. We propose ways forward to closing these gaps, outlining practical steps as well as roles and responsibilities for different actors. Sociotechnical safety evaluation is a tractable approach to the robust and comprehensive safety evaluation of generative AI systems.

Understanding the landscape of potential harms from algorithmic systems enables practitioners to better anticipate consequences of the systems they build. It also supports the prospect of incorporating controls to help minimize harms that emerge from the interplay of technologies and social and cultural dynamics. A growing body of scholarship has identified a wide range of harms across different algorithmic technologies. However, computing research and practitioners lack a high level and synthesized overview of harms from algorithmic systems. Based on a scoping review of computing research (n=172), we present an applied taxonomy of sociotechnical harms to support a more systematic surfacing of potential harms in algorithmic systems. The final taxonomy builds on and refers to existing taxonomies, classifications, and terminologies. Five major themes related to sociotechnical harms - representational, allocative, quality-of-service, interpersonal harms, and social system/societal harms - and sub-themes are presented along with a description of these categories. We conclude with a discussion of challenges and opportunities for future research.

This paper presents a systematic literature review in Computer Science that provide an overview of the initiatives related to digital misinformation. This is an exploratory study that covers research from 1993 to 2020, focusing on the investigation of the phenomenon of misinformation. The review consists of 788 studies from SCOPUS, IEEE, and ACM digital libraries, synthesizing the primary research directions and sociotechnical challenges. These challenges are classified into Physical, Empirical, Syntactic, Semantic, Pragmatic, and Social dimensions, drawing from Organizational Semiotics. The mapping identifies issues related to the concept of misinformation, highlights deficiencies in mitigation strategies, discusses challenges in approaching stakeholders, and unveils various sociotechnical aspects relevant to understanding and mitigating the harmful effects of digital misinformation. As contributions, this study present a novel categorization of mitigation strategies, a sociotechnical taxonomy for classifying types of false information and elaborate on the inter-relation of sociotechnical aspects and their impacts.

This paper aims to help structure the risk landscape associated with large-scale Language Models (LMs). In order to foster advances in responsible innovation, an in-depth understanding of the potential risks posed by these models is needed. A wide range of established and anticipated risks are analysed in detail, drawing on multidisciplinary expertise and literature from computer science, linguistics, and social sciences. We outline six specific risk areas: I. Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity, II. Information Hazards, III. Misinformation Harms, V. Malicious Uses, V. Human-Computer Interaction Harms, VI. Automation, Access, and Environmental Harms. The first area concerns the perpetuation of stereotypes, unfair discrimination, exclusionary norms, toxic language, and lower performance by social group for LMs. The second focuses on risks from private data leaks or LMs correctly inferring sensitive information. The third addresses risks arising from poor, false or misleading information including in sensitive domains, and knock-on risks such as the erosion of trust in shared information. The fourth considers risks from actors who try to use LMs to cause harm. The fifth focuses on risks specific to LLMs used to underpin conversational agents that interact with human users, including unsafe use, manipulation or deception. The sixth discusses the risk of environmental harm, job automation, and other challenges that may have a disparate effect on different social groups or communities. In total, we review 21 risks in-depth. We discuss the points of origin of different risks and point to potential mitigation approaches. Lastly, we discuss organisational responsibilities in implementing mitigations, and the role of collaboration and participation. We highlight directions for further research, particularly on expanding the toolkit for assessing and evaluating the outlined risks in LMs.

The explosion in the use of software in important sociotechnical systems has renewed focus on the study of the way technical constructs reflect policies, norms, and human values. This effort requires the engagement of scholars and practitioners from many disciplines. And yet, these disciplines often conceptualize the operative values very differently while referring to them using the same vocabulary. The resulting conflation of ideas confuses discussions about values in technology at disciplinary boundaries. In the service of improving this situation, this paper examines the value of shared vocabularies, analytics, and other tools that facilitate conversations about values in light of these disciplinary specific conceptualizations, the role such tools play in furthering research and practice, outlines different conceptions of "fairness" deployed in discussions about computer systems, and provides an analytic tool for interdisciplinary discussions and collaborations around the concept of fairness. We use a case study of risk assessments in criminal justice applications to both motivate our effort--describing how conflation of different concepts under the banner of "fairness" led to unproductive confusion--and illustrate the value of the fairness analytic by demonstrating how the rigorous analysis it enables can assist in identifying key areas of theoretical, political, and practical misunderstanding or disagreement, and where desired support alignment or collaboration in the absence of consensus.

Through a systematic review of academic literature, we propose a taxonomy of systemic risks associated with artificial intelligence (AI), in particular general-purpose AI. Following the EU AI Act's definition, we consider systemic risks as large-scale threats that can affect entire societies or economies. Starting with an initial pool of 1,781 documents, we analyzed 86 selected papers to identify 13 categories of systemic risks and 50 contributing sources. Our findings reveal a complex landscape of potential threats, ranging from environmental harm and structural discrimination to governance failures and loss of control. Key sources of systemic risk emerge from knowledge gaps, challenges in recognizing harm, and the unpredictable trajectory of AI development. The taxonomy provides a snapshot of current academic literature on systemic risks. This paper contributes to AI safety research by providing a structured groundwork for understanding and addressing the potential large-scale negative societal impacts of general-purpose AI. The taxonomy can inform policymakers in risk prioritization and regulatory development.

To enable quantitative risk assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex and coupled IoT systems, a new epistemological equation is designed and tested though comparative and empirical analysis. The comparative analysis is conducted on national digital strategies, followed by an empirical analysis of cyber risk assessment approaches. The new epistemological analysis approach enables the assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex IoT systems, which begin to resemble artificial intelligence, and can be used for a quantitative self-assessment of IoT cyber risk posture.

E-commerce risk management requires aggregating diverse, deeply embedded web data through multi-step, stateful interactions, which traditional scraping methods and most existing Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents cannot handle. These agents are typically limited to single-step tasks and lack the ability to manage dynamic, interactive content critical for effective risk assessment. To address this challenge, we introduce RISK, a novel framework designed to build and deploy GUI agents for this domain. RISK integrates three components: (1) RISK-Data, a dataset of 8,492 single-step and 2,386 multi-step interaction trajectories, collected through a high-fidelity browser framework and a meticulous data curation process; (2) RISK-Bench, a benchmark with 802 single-step and 320 multi-step trajectories across three difficulty levels for standardized evaluation; and (3) RISK-R1, a R1-style reinforcement fine-tuning framework considering four aspects: (i) Output Format Constraint, (ii) Single-step and (iii) Multi-step Level Reward, and (iv) Task Level Reweight. Experiments show that RISK-R1 achieves a 6.8% improvement in offline single-step and an 8.8% improvement in offline multi-step, using only 7.2% of the parameters of the SOTA baseline. Moreover, it attains a top task success rate of 70.5% in online evaluation. RISK provides a scalable, domain-specific solution for automating complex web interactions in e-commerce risk management. The code is available at https://github.com/RenqiChen/RISK-GUI.

The Internet of Things (IoT) triggers new types of cyber risks. Therefore, the integration of new IoT devices and services requires a self-assessment of IoT cyber security posture. By security posture this article refers to the cybersecurity strength of an organisation to predict, prevent and respond to cyberthreats. At present, there is a gap in the state of the art, because there are no self-assessment methods for quantifying IoT cyber risk posture. To address this gap, an empirical analysis is performed of 12 cyber risk assessment approaches. The results and the main findings from the analysis is presented as the current and a target risk state for IoT systems, followed by conclusions and recommendations on a transformation roadmap, describing how IoT systems can achieve the target state with a new goal-oriented dependency model. By target state, we refer to the cyber security target that matches the generic security requirements of an organisation. The research paper studies and adapts four alternatives for IoT risk assessment and identifies the goal-oriented dependency modelling as a dominant approach among the risk assessment models studied. The new goal-oriented dependency model in this article enables the assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex IoT systems and can be used for a quantitative self-assessment of IoT cyber risk posture.

The paper explores the transformation of port logistics operations with artificial intelligence during the port transformation into a smart port. The research integrates capabilities-based resource analysis and dynamic capabilities with sociotechnicalimplementations of technologies and resilience approaches of complex systems under disruptions. The system applies robustdata infrastructures to propel analytical and AI modules that become effective once integrated with sufficient governance systems and trained personnel and operational processes to transform planning and safety and sustainability operations.It applies Scopus bibliometric research to analyze 123 articles using a systematic approach with both a search protocol and a document screening and duplication verification. It incorporates annual behavior and distribution of author and country performance analysis with science mapping techniques that explore keyword relation and co-citation and bibliographic coupling and conceptual structuring tools that construct thematic maps and multiple correspondence analysis with community detection while applying explicit thresholding and robust tests.The research connects AI applications to smart port domains through specific data-to-impact pathways while providing a method for bibliometric analysis that enables future updates. The research presents a step-by-step approach for data readiness followed by predictive and optimization implementation and organizational integration. The paper supports public policy through recommendations for data sharing standards and complete environmental benefit assessments. The research proposes a future study plan whichcombines field-based testing with multiple port assessments to enhance both cause-effect understanding and research applicability.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains, where rare but severe failures can result in irreversible harm. However, prevailing evaluation benchmarks often reduce complex social risk to mean-centered scalar scores, thereby obscuring distributional structure, cross-dimensional interactions, and worst-case behavior. This paper introduces Social Harm Analysis via Risk Profiles (SHARP), a framework for multidimensional, distribution-aware evaluation of social harm. SHARP models harm as a multivariate random variable and integrates explicit decomposition into bias, fairness, ethics, and epistemic reliability with a union-of-failures aggregation reparameterized as additive cumulative log-risk. The framework further employs risk-sensitive distributional statistics, with Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR95) as a primary metric, to characterize worst-case model behavior. Application of SHARP to eleven frontier LLMs, evaluated on a fixed corpus of n=901 socially sensitive prompts, reveals that models with similar average risk can exhibit more than twofold differences in tail exposure and volatility. Across models, dimension-wise marginal tail behavior varies systematically across harm dimensions, with bias exhibiting the strongest tail severities, epistemic and fairness risks occupying intermediate regimes, and ethical misalignment consistently lower; together, these patterns reveal heterogeneous, model-dependent failure structures that scalar benchmarks conflate. These findings indicate that responsible evaluation and governance of LLMs require moving beyond scalar averages toward multidimensional, tail-sensitive risk profiling.

The rapid integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse sectors has marked a transformative era, showcasing remarkable capabilities in text generation and problem-solving tasks. However, this technological advancement is accompanied by significant risks and vulnerabilities. Despite ongoing security enhancements, attackers persistently exploit these weaknesses, casting doubts on the overall trustworthiness of LLMs. Compounding the issue, organisations are deploying LLM-integrated systems without understanding the severity of potential consequences. Existing studies by OWASP and MITRE offer a general overview of threats and vulnerabilities but lack a method for directly and succinctly analysing the risks for security practitioners, developers, and key decision-makers who are working with this novel technology. To address this gap, we propose a risk assessment process using tools like the OWASP risk rating methodology which is used for traditional systems. We conduct scenario analysis to identify potential threat agents and map the dependent system components against vulnerability factors. Through this analysis, we assess the likelihood of a cyberattack. Subsequently, we conduct a thorough impact analysis to derive a comprehensive threat matrix. We also map threats against three key stakeholder groups: developers engaged in model fine-tuning, application developers utilizing third-party APIs, and end users. The proposed threat matrix provides a holistic evaluation of LLM-related risks, enabling stakeholders to make informed decisions for effective mitigation strategies. Our outlined process serves as an actionable and comprehensive tool for security practitioners, offering insights for resource management and enhancing the overall system security.

AI agents are increasingly autonomous in their interactions with human users and tools, leading to increased interactional safety risks. We present HAICOSYSTEM, a framework examining AI agent safety within diverse and complex social interactions. HAICOSYSTEM features a modular sandbox environment that simulates multi-turn interactions between human users and AI agents, where the AI agents are equipped with a variety of tools (e.g., patient management platforms) to navigate diverse scenarios (e.g., a user attempting to access other patients' profiles). To examine the safety of AI agents in these interactions, we develop a comprehensive multi-dimensional evaluation framework that uses metrics covering operational, content-related, societal, and legal risks. Through running 1840 simulations based on 92 scenarios across seven domains (e.g., healthcare, finance, education), we demonstrate that HAICOSYSTEM can emulate realistic user-AI interactions and complex tool use by AI agents. Our experiments show that state-of-the-art LLMs, both proprietary and open-sourced, exhibit safety risks in over 50\% cases, with models generally showing higher risks when interacting with simulated malicious users. Our findings highlight the ongoing challenge of building agents that can safely navigate complex interactions, particularly when faced with malicious users. To foster the AI agent safety ecosystem, we release a code platform that allows practitioners to create custom scenarios, simulate interactions, and evaluate the safety and performance of their agents.

Explainable AI (XAI) systems are sociotechnical in nature; thus, they are subject to the sociotechnical gap--divide between the technical affordances and the social needs. However, charting this gap is challenging. In the context of XAI, we argue that charting the gap improves our problem understanding, which can reflexively provide actionable insights to improve explainability. Utilizing two case studies in distinct domains, we empirically derive a framework that facilitates systematic charting of the sociotechnical gap by connecting AI guidelines in the context of XAI and elucidating how to use them to address the gap. We apply the framework to a third case in a new domain, showcasing its affordances. Finally, we discuss conceptual implications of the framework, share practical considerations in its operationalization, and offer guidance on transferring it to new contexts. By making conceptual and practical contributions to understanding the sociotechnical gap in XAI, the framework expands the XAI design space.

With the rapid development of multimodal large language models (MLLMs), they are increasingly deployed as autonomous computer-use agents capable of accomplishing complex computer tasks. However, a pressing issue arises: Can the safety risk principles designed and aligned for general MLLMs in dialogue scenarios be effectively transferred to real-world computer-use scenarios? Existing research on evaluating the safety risks of MLLM-based computer-use agents suffers from several limitations: it either lacks realistic interactive environments, or narrowly focuses on one or a few specific risk types. These limitations ignore the complexity, variability, and diversity of real-world environments, thereby restricting comprehensive risk evaluation for computer-use agents. To this end, we introduce RiOSWorld, a benchmark designed to evaluate the potential risks of MLLM-based agents during real-world computer manipulations. Our benchmark includes 492 risky tasks spanning various computer applications, involving web, social media, multimedia, os, email, and office software. We categorize these risks into two major classes based on their risk source: (i) User-originated risks and (ii) Environmental risks. For the evaluation, we evaluate safety risks from two perspectives: (i) Risk goal intention and (ii) Risk goal completion. Extensive experiments with multimodal agents on RiOSWorld demonstrate that current computer-use agents confront significant safety risks in real-world scenarios. Our findings highlight the necessity and urgency of safety alignment for computer-use agents in real-world computer manipulation, providing valuable insights for developing trustworthy computer-use agents. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://yjyddq.github.io/RiOSWorld.github.io/.

Foundation models are powerful technologies: how they are released publicly directly shapes their societal impact. In this position paper, we focus on open foundation models, defined here as those with broadly available model weights (e.g. Llama 2, Stable Diffusion XL). We identify five distinctive properties (e.g. greater customizability, poor monitoring) of open foundation models that lead to both their benefits and risks. Open foundation models present significant benefits, with some caveats, that span innovation, competition, the distribution of decision-making power, and transparency. To understand their risks of misuse, we design a risk assessment framework for analyzing their marginal risk. Across several misuse vectors (e.g. cyberattacks, bioweapons), we find that current research is insufficient to effectively characterize the marginal risk of open foundation models relative to pre-existing technologies. The framework helps explain why the marginal risk is low in some cases, clarifies disagreements about misuse risks by revealing that past work has focused on different subsets of the framework with different assumptions, and articulates a way forward for more constructive debate. Overall, our work helps support a more grounded assessment of the societal impact of open foundation models by outlining what research is needed to empirically validate their theoretical benefits and risks.

This paper examines how competing sociotechnical imaginaries of artificial intelligence (AI) risk shape governance decisions and regulatory constraints. Drawing on concepts from science and technology studies, we analyse three dominant narrative groups: existential risk proponents, who emphasise catastrophic AGI scenarios; accelerationists, who portray AI as a transformative force to be unleashed; and critical AI scholars, who foreground present-day harms rooted in systemic inequality. Through an analysis of representative manifesto-style texts, we explore how these imaginaries differ across four dimensions: normative visions of the future, diagnoses of the present social order, views on science and technology, and perceived human agency in managing AI risks. Our findings reveal how these narratives embed distinct assumptions about risk and have the potential to progress into policy-making processes by narrowing the space for alternative governance approaches. We argue against speculative dogmatism and for moving beyond deterministic imaginaries toward regulatory strategies that are grounded in pragmatism.

The rapid evolution of generative AI necessitates robust safety evaluations. However, current safety datasets are predominantly English-centric, failing to capture specific risks in non-English, socio-cultural contexts such as Korean, and are often limited to the text modality. To address this gap, we introduce AssurAI, a new quality-controlled Korean multimodal dataset for evaluating the safety of generative AI. First, we define a taxonomy of 35 distinct AI risk factors, adapted from established frameworks by a multidisciplinary expert group to cover both universal harms and relevance to the Korean socio-cultural context. Second, leveraging this taxonomy, we construct and release AssurAI, a large-scale Korean multimodal dataset comprising 11,480 instances across text, image, video, and audio. Third, we apply the rigorous quality control process used to ensure data integrity, featuring a two-phase construction (i.e., expert-led seeding and crowdsourced scaling), triple independent annotation, and an iterative expert red-teaming loop. Our pilot study validates AssurAI's effectiveness in assessing the safety of recent LLMs. We release AssurAI to the public to facilitate the development of safer and more reliable generative AI systems for the Korean community.

Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, this report presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. Drawing on the E-T-C analysis (deployment environment, threat source, enabling capability) from the Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0) (SafeWork-F1-Framework), we identify critical risks in seven areas: cyber offense, biological and chemical risks, persuasion and manipulation, uncontrolled autonomous AI R\&D, strategic deception and scheming, self-replication, and collusion. Guided by the "AI-45^circ Law," we evaluate these risks using "red lines" (intolerable thresholds) and "yellow lines" (early warning indicators) to define risk zones: green (manageable risk for routine deployment and continuous monitoring), yellow (requiring strengthened mitigations and controlled deployment), and red (necessitating suspension of development and/or deployment). Experimental results show that all recent frontier AI models reside in green and yellow zones, without crossing red lines. Specifically, no evaluated models cross the yellow line for cyber offense or uncontrolled AI R\&D risks. For self-replication, and strategic deception and scheming, most models remain in the green zone, except for certain reasoning models in the yellow zone. In persuasion and manipulation, most models are in the yellow zone due to their effective influence on humans. For biological and chemical risks, we are unable to rule out the possibility of most models residing in the yellow zone, although detailed threat modeling and in-depth assessment are required to make further claims. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become more integrated into our daily lives, it is crucial to identify and mitigate their risks, especially when the risks can have profound impacts on human users and societies. Guardrails, which filter the inputs or outputs of LLMs, have emerged as a core safeguarding technology. This position paper takes a deep look at current open-source solutions (Llama Guard, Nvidia NeMo, Guardrails AI), and discusses the challenges and the road towards building more complete solutions. Drawing on robust evidence from previous research, we advocate for a systematic approach to construct guardrails for LLMs, based on comprehensive consideration of diverse contexts across various LLMs applications. We propose employing socio-technical methods through collaboration with a multi-disciplinary team to pinpoint precise technical requirements, exploring advanced neural-symbolic implementations to embrace the complexity of the requirements, and developing verification and testing to ensure the utmost quality of the final product.

The rapid scaling of AI has spurred a growing emphasis on ethical considerations in both development and practice. This has led to the formulation of increasingly sophisticated model auditing and reporting requirements, as well as governance frameworks to mitigate potential risks to individuals and society. At this critical juncture, we review the practical challenges of promoting responsible AI and transparency in informal sectors like OSS that support vital infrastructure and see widespread use. We focus on how model performance evaluation may inform or inhibit probing of model limitations, biases, and other risks. Our controlled analysis of 7903 Hugging Face projects found that risk documentation is strongly associated with evaluation practices. Yet, submissions (N=789) from the platform's most popular competitive leaderboard showed less accountability among high performers. Our findings can inform AI providers and legal scholars in designing interventions and policies that preserve open-source innovation while incentivizing ethical uptake.

This paper introduces RiskCards, a framework for structured assessment and documentation of risks associated with an application of language models. As with all language, text generated by language models can be harmful, or used to bring about harm. Automating language generation adds both an element of scale and also more subtle or emergent undesirable tendencies to the generated text. Prior work establishes a wide variety of language model harms to many different actors: existing taxonomies identify categories of harms posed by language models; benchmarks establish automated tests of these harms; and documentation standards for models, tasks and datasets encourage transparent reporting. However, there is no risk-centric framework for documenting the complexity of a landscape in which some risks are shared across models and contexts, while others are specific, and where certain conditions may be required for risks to manifest as harms. RiskCards address this methodological gap by providing a generic framework for assessing the use of a given language model in a given scenario. Each RiskCard makes clear the routes for the risk to manifest harm, their placement in harm taxonomies, and example prompt-output pairs. While RiskCards are designed to be open-source, dynamic and participatory, we present a "starter set" of RiskCards taken from a broad literature survey, each of which details a concrete risk presentation. Language model RiskCards initiate a community knowledge base which permits the mapping of risks and harms to a specific model or its application scenario, ultimately contributing to a better, safer and shared understanding of the risk landscape.

This paper introduces a dynamic and actionable framework for securing agentic AI systems in enterprise deployment. We contend that safety and security are not merely fixed attributes of individual models but also emergent properties arising from the dynamic interactions among models, orchestrators, tools, and data within their operating environments. We propose a new way of identification of novel agentic risks through the lens of user safety. Although, for traditional LLMs and agentic models in isolation, safety and security has a clear separation, through the lens of safety in agentic systems, they appear to be connected. Building on this foundation, we define an operational agentic risk taxonomy that unifies traditional safety and security concerns with novel, uniquely agentic risks, including tool misuse, cascading action chains, and unintended control amplification among others. At the core of our approach is a dynamic agentic safety and security framework that operationalizes contextual agentic risk management by using auxiliary AI models and agents, with human oversight, to assist in contextual risk discovery, evaluation, and mitigation. We further address one of the most challenging aspects of safety and security of agentic systems: risk discovery through sandboxed, AI-driven red teaming. We demonstrate the framework effectiveness through a detailed case study of NVIDIA flagship agentic research assistant, AI-Q Research Assistant, showcasing practical, end-to-end safety and security evaluations in complex, enterprise-grade agentic workflows. This risk discovery phase finds novel agentic risks that are then contextually mitigated. We also release the dataset from our case study, containing traces of over 10,000 realistic attack and defense executions of the agentic workflow to help advance research in agentic safety.

Rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have sparked growing concerns among experts, policymakers, and world leaders regarding the potential for increasingly advanced AI systems to pose catastrophic risks. Although numerous risks have been detailed separately, there is a pressing need for a systematic discussion and illustration of the potential dangers to better inform efforts to mitigate them. This paper provides an overview of the main sources of catastrophic AI risks, which we organize into four categories: malicious use, in which individuals or groups intentionally use AIs to cause harm; AI race, in which competitive environments compel actors to deploy unsafe AIs or cede control to AIs; organizational risks, highlighting how human factors and complex systems can increase the chances of catastrophic accidents; and rogue AIs, describing the inherent difficulty in controlling agents far more intelligent than humans. For each category of risk, we describe specific hazards, present illustrative stories, envision ideal scenarios, and propose practical suggestions for mitigating these dangers. Our goal is to foster a comprehensive understanding of these risks and inspire collective and proactive efforts to ensure that AIs are developed and deployed in a safe manner. Ultimately, we hope this will allow us to realize the benefits of this powerful technology while minimizing the potential for catastrophic outcomes.

Digital technologies have changed the way supply chain operations are structured. In this article, we conduct systematic syntheses of literature on the impact of new technologies on supply chains and the related cyber risks. A taxonomic/cladistic approach is used for the evaluations of progress in the area of supply chain integration in the Industrial Internet of Things and Industry 4.0, with a specific focus on the mitigation of cyber risks. An analytical framework is presented, based on a critical assessment with respect to issues related to new types of cyber risk and the integration of supply chains with new technologies. This paper identifies a dynamic and self-adapting supply chain system supported with Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) and real-time intelligence for predictive cyber risk analytics. The system is integrated into a cognition engine that enables predictive cyber risk analytics with real-time intelligence from IoT networks at the edge. This enhances capacities and assist in the creation of a comprehensive understanding of the opportunities and threats that arise when edge computing nodes are deployed, and when AI/ML technologies are migrated to the periphery of IoT networks.

We present a comprehensive AI risk taxonomy derived from eight government policies from the European Union, United States, and China and 16 company policies worldwide, making a significant step towards establishing a unified language for generative AI safety evaluation. We identify 314 unique risk categories organized into a four-tiered taxonomy. At the highest level, this taxonomy encompasses System & Operational Risks, Content Safety Risks, Societal Risks, and Legal & Rights Risks. The taxonomy establishes connections between various descriptions and approaches to risk, highlighting the overlaps and discrepancies between public and private sector conceptions of risk. By providing this unified framework, we aim to advance AI safety through information sharing across sectors and the promotion of best practices in risk mitigation for generative AI models and systems.

Codex, a large language model (LLM) trained on a variety of codebases, exceeds the previous state of the art in its capacity to synthesize and generate code. Although Codex provides a plethora of benefits, models that may generate code on such scale have significant limitations, alignment problems, the potential to be misused, and the possibility to increase the rate of progress in technical fields that may themselves have destabilizing impacts or have misuse potential. Yet such safety impacts are not yet known or remain to be explored. In this paper, we outline a hazard analysis framework constructed at OpenAI to uncover hazards or safety risks that the deployment of models like Codex may impose technically, socially, politically, and economically. The analysis is informed by a novel evaluation framework that determines the capacity of advanced code generation techniques against the complexity and expressivity of specification prompts, and their capability to understand and execute them relative to human ability.

Large language models (LLMs) are demonstrating increasing prowess in cybersecurity applications, creating creating inherent risks alongside their potential for strengthening defenses. In this position paper, we argue that current efforts to evaluate risks posed by these capabilities are misaligned with the goal of understanding real-world impact. Evaluating LLM cybersecurity risk requires more than just measuring model capabilities -- it demands a comprehensive risk assessment that incorporates analysis of threat actor adoption behavior and potential for impact. We propose a risk assessment framework for LLM cyber capabilities and apply it to a case study of language models used as cybersecurity assistants. Our evaluation of frontier models reveals high compliance rates but moderate accuracy on realistic cyber assistance tasks. However, our framework suggests that this particular use case presents only moderate risk due to limited operational advantages and impact potential. Based on these findings, we recommend several improvements to align research priorities with real-world impact assessment, including closer academia-industry collaboration, more realistic modeling of attacker behavior, and inclusion of economic metrics in evaluations. This work represents an important step toward more effective assessment and mitigation of LLM-enabled cybersecurity risks.

Language model deployments in consumer-facing applications introduce numerous risks. While existing research on harms and hazards of such applications follows top-down approaches derived from regulatory frameworks and theoretical analyses, empirical evidence of real-world failure modes remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce RealHarm, a dataset of annotated problematic interactions with AI agents built from a systematic review of publicly reported incidents. Analyzing harms, causes, and hazards specifically from the deployer's perspective, we find that reputational damage constitutes the predominant organizational harm, while misinformation emerges as the most common hazard category. We empirically evaluate state-of-the-art guardrails and content moderation systems to probe whether such systems would have prevented the incidents, revealing a significant gap in the protection of AI applications.

International cooperation is common in AI research, including between geopolitical rivals. While many experts advocate for greater international cooperation on AI safety to address shared global risks, some view cooperation on AI with suspicion, arguing that it can pose unacceptable risks to national security. However, the extent to which cooperation on AI safety poses such risks, as well as provides benefits, depends on the specific area of cooperation. In this paper, we consider technical factors that impact the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, focusing on the degree to which such cooperation can advance dangerous capabilities, result in the sharing of sensitive information, or provide opportunities for harm. We begin by why nations historically cooperate on strategic technologies and analyse current US-China cooperation in AI as a case study. We further argue that existing frameworks for managing associated risks can be supplemented with consideration of key risks specific to cooperation on technical AI safety research. Through our analysis, we find that research into AI verification mechanisms and shared protocols may be suitable areas for such cooperation. Through this analysis we aim to help researchers and governments identify and mitigate the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, so that the benefits of cooperation can be fully realised.

The rapid evolution of generative AI has expanded the breadth of risks associated with AI systems. While various taxonomies and frameworks exist to classify these risks, the lack of interoperability between them creates challenges for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers seeking to operationalise AI governance. To address this gap, we introduce the AI Risk Atlas, a structured taxonomy that consolidates AI risks from diverse sources and aligns them with governance frameworks. Additionally, we present the Risk Atlas Nexus, a collection of open-source tools designed to bridge the divide between risk definitions, benchmarks, datasets, and mitigation strategies. This knowledge-driven approach leverages ontologies and knowledge graphs to facilitate risk identification, prioritization, and mitigation. By integrating AI-assisted compliance workflows and automation strategies, our framework lowers the barrier to responsible AI adoption. We invite the broader research and open-source community to contribute to this evolving initiative, fostering cross-domain collaboration and ensuring AI governance keeps pace with technological advancements.

Large language models (LLMs) typically deploy safety mechanisms to prevent harmful content generation. Most current approaches focus narrowly on risks posed by malicious actors, often framing risks as adversarial events and relying on defensive refusals. However, in real-world settings, risks also come from non-malicious users seeking help while under psychological distress (e.g., self-harm intentions). In such cases, the model's response can strongly influence the user's next actions. Simple refusals may lead them to repeat, escalate, or move to unsafe platforms, creating worse outcomes. We introduce Constructive Safety Alignment (CSA), a human-centric paradigm that protects against malicious misuse while actively guiding vulnerable users toward safe and helpful results. Implemented in Oyster-I (Oy1), CSA combines game-theoretic anticipation of user reactions, fine-grained risk boundary discovery, and interpretable reasoning control, turning safety into a trust-building process. Oy1 achieves state-of-the-art safety among open models while retaining high general capabilities. On our Constructive Benchmark, it shows strong constructive engagement, close to GPT-5, and unmatched robustness on the Strata-Sword jailbreak dataset, nearing GPT-o1 levels. By shifting from refusal-first to guidance-first safety, CSA redefines the model-user relationship, aiming for systems that are not just safe, but meaningfully helpful. We release Oy1, code, and the benchmark to support responsible, user-centered AI.

LLM-based agents are becoming increasingly proficient at solving web-based tasks. With this capability comes a greater risk of misuse for malicious purposes, such as posting misinformation in an online forum or selling illicit substances on a website. To evaluate these risks, we propose SafeArena, the first benchmark to focus on the deliberate misuse of web agents. SafeArena comprises 250 safe and 250 harmful tasks across four websites. We classify the harmful tasks into five harm categories -- misinformation, illegal activity, harassment, cybercrime, and social bias, designed to assess realistic misuses of web agents. We evaluate leading LLM-based web agents, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, Qwen-2-VL 72B, and Llama-3.2 90B, on our benchmark. To systematically assess their susceptibility to harmful tasks, we introduce the Agent Risk Assessment framework that categorizes agent behavior across four risk levels. We find agents are surprisingly compliant with malicious requests, with GPT-4o and Qwen-2 completing 34.7% and 27.3% of harmful requests, respectively. Our findings highlight the urgent need for safety alignment procedures for web agents. Our benchmark is available here: https://safearena.github.io

Existing regulatory frameworks for biomedical AI include robustness as a key component but lack detailed implementational guidance. The recent rise of biomedical foundation models creates new hurdles in testing and certification given their broad capabilities and susceptibility to complex distribution shifts. To balance test feasibility and effectiveness, we suggest a priority-based, task-oriented approach to tailor robustness evaluation objectives to a predefined specification. We urge concrete policies to adopt a granular categorization of robustness concepts in the specification. Our approach promotes the standardization of risk assessment and monitoring, which guides technical developments and mitigation efforts.

Large language models (LLMs) integrated into agent-driven workflows hold immense promise for healthcare, yet a significant gap exists between their potential and practical implementation within clinical settings. To address this, we present a practitioner-oriented field manual for deploying generative agents that use electronic health record (EHR) data. This guide is informed by our experience deploying the "irAE-Agent", an automated system to detect immune-related adverse events from clinical notes at Mass General Brigham, and by structured interviews with 21 clinicians, engineers, and informatics leaders involved in the project. Our analysis reveals a critical misalignment in clinical AI development: less than 20% of our effort was dedicated to prompt engineering and model development, while over 80% was consumed by the sociotechnical work of implementation. We distill this effort into five "heavy lifts": data integration, model validation, ensuring economic value, managing system drift, and governance. By providing actionable solutions for each of these challenges, this field manual shifts the focus from algorithmic development to the essential infrastructure and implementation work required to bridge the "valley of death" and successfully translate generative AI from pilot projects into routine clinical care.

The accelerating deployment of artificial intelligence systems across regulated sectors has exposed critical fragmentation in risk assessment methodologies. A significant "language barrier" currently separates technical security teams, who focus on algorithmic vulnerabilities (e.g., MITRE ATLAS), from legal and compliance professionals, who address regulatory mandates (e.g., EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF). This disciplinary disconnect prevents the accurate translation of technical vulnerabilities into financial liability, leaving practitioners unable to answer fundamental economic questions regarding contingency reserves, control return-on-investment, and insurance exposure. To bridge this gap, this research presents the AI System Threat Vector Taxonomy, a structured ontology designed explicitly for Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). The framework categorizes AI-specific risks into nine critical domains: Misuse, Poisoning, Privacy, Adversarial, Biases, Unreliable Outputs, Drift, Supply Chain, and IP Threat, integrating 53 operationally defined sub-threats. Uniquely, each domain maps technical vectors directly to business loss categories (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Legal, Reputation), enabling the translation of abstract threats into measurable financial impact. The taxonomy is empirically validated through an analysis of 133 documented AI incidents from 2025 (achieving 100% classification coverage) and reconciled against the main AI risk frameworks. Furthermore, it is explicitly aligned with ISO/IEC 42001 controls and NIST AI RMF functions to facilitate auditability.

Open-source text-to-image (TTI) pipelines have become dominant in the landscape of AI-generated visual content, driven by technological advances that enable users to personalize models through adapters tailored to specific tasks. While personalization methods such as LoRA offer unprecedented creative opportunities, they also facilitate harmful practices, including the generation of non-consensual deepfakes and the amplification of misogynistic or hypersexualized content. This study presents an exploratory sociotechnical analysis of CivitAI, the most active platform for sharing and developing open-source TTI models. Drawing on a dataset of more than 40 million user-generated images and over 230,000 models, we find a disproportionate rise in not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content and a significant number of models intended to mimic real individuals. We also observe a strong influence of internet subcultures on the tools and practices shaping model personalizations and resulting visual media. In response to these findings, we contextualize the emergence of exploitative visual media through feminist and constructivist perspectives on technology, emphasizing how design choices and community dynamics shape platform outcomes. Building on this analysis, we propose interventions aimed at mitigating downstream harm, including improved content moderation, rethinking tool design, and establishing clearer platform policies to promote accountability and consent.

The maintenance risks of open source software (OSS) projects pose significant threats to the quality, security, and resilience of modern software supply chains. While prior research has proposed diverse approaches for predicting OSS maintenance risk -- leveraging signals ranging from surface features (e.g., stars, commits) to social network analyses and behavioral patterns -- existing methods often suffer from ambiguous operational definitions, limited interpretability, and datasets of insufficient scale or generalizability. In this work, we introduce ``maintenance cessation'', grounded in both explicit archival status and rigorous semantic analysis of project documentation. Building on this foundation, we curate a large-scale, longitudinal dataset of 115,466 GitHub repositories -- encompassing 57,733 confirmed cessation events -- complemented by comprehensive, timeline-based behavioral features. We propose an integrated, multi-perspective feature framework for predicting maintenance cessation, systematically combining user-centric features, maintainer-centric features and project evolution features. AFT survival analysis demonstrates a high C-index (0.846), substantially outperforming models relying only on surface features. Feature ablation and SHAP analysis further confirm the effectiveness and interpretability of our approach. Finally, we demonstrate real-world applicability by deploying a GBSA classifier in the openEuler ecosystem for proactive package risk screening. Our work establishes a scalable, interpretable foundation for maintenance-risk prediction, enabling reproducible risk management across large-scale open source ecosystems.

Modern automobiles have evolved from just being mechanical machines to having full-fledged electronics systems that enhance vehicle dynamics and driver experience. However, these complex hardware and software systems, if not properly designed, can experience failures that can compromise the safety of the vehicle, its occupants, and the surrounding environment. For example, a system to activate the brakes to avoid a collision saves lives when it functions properly, but could lead to tragic outcomes if the brakes were applied in a way that's inconsistent with the design. Broadly speaking, the analysis performed to minimize such risks falls into a systems engineering domain called Functional Safety. In this paper, we present SafetyLens, a visual data analysis tool to assist engineers and analysts in analyzing automotive Functional Safety datasets. SafetyLens combines techniques including network exploration and visual comparison to help analysts perform domain-specific tasks. This paper presents the design study with domain experts that resulted in the design guidelines, the tool, and user feedback.

In this short consensus paper, we outline risks from upcoming, advanced AI systems. We examine large-scale social harms and malicious uses, as well as an irreversible loss of human control over autonomous AI systems. In light of rapid and continuing AI progress, we propose urgent priorities for AI R&D and governance.

With the rise of the Internet, there is a growing need to build intelligent systems that are capable of efficiently dealing with early risk detection (ERD) problems on social media, such as early depression detection, early rumor detection or identification of sexual predators. These systems, nowadays mostly based on machine learning techniques, must be able to deal with data streams since users provide their data over time. In addition, these systems must be able to decide when the processed data is sufficient to actually classify users. Moreover, since ERD tasks involve risky decisions by which people's lives could be affected, such systems must also be able to justify their decisions. However, most standard and state-of-the-art supervised machine learning models are not well suited to deal with this scenario. This is due to the fact that they either act as black boxes or do not support incremental classification/learning. In this paper we introduce SS3, a novel supervised learning model for text classification that naturally supports these aspects. SS3 was designed to be used as a general framework to deal with ERD problems. We evaluated our model on the CLEF's eRisk2017 pilot task on early depression detection. Most of the 30 contributions submitted to this competition used state-of-the-art methods. Experimental results show that our classifier was able to outperform these models and standard classifiers, despite being less computationally expensive and having the ability to explain its rationale.

Generative AI systems across modalities, ranging from text (including code), image, audio, and video, have broad social impacts, but there is no official standard for means of evaluating those impacts or for which impacts should be evaluated. In this paper, we present a guide that moves toward a standard approach in evaluating a base generative AI system for any modality in two overarching categories: what can be evaluated in a base system independent of context and what can be evaluated in a societal context. Importantly, this refers to base systems that have no predetermined application or deployment context, including a model itself, as well as system components, such as training data. Our framework for a base system defines seven categories of social impact: bias, stereotypes, and representational harms; cultural values and sensitive content; disparate performance; privacy and data protection; financial costs; environmental costs; and data and content moderation labor costs. Suggested methods for evaluation apply to listed generative modalities and analyses of the limitations of existing evaluations serve as a starting point for necessary investment in future evaluations. We offer five overarching categories for what can be evaluated in a broader societal context, each with its own subcategories: trustworthiness and autonomy; inequality, marginalization, and violence; concentration of authority; labor and creativity; and ecosystem and environment. Each subcategory includes recommendations for mitigating harm.

The ideal LLM content moderation system would be both structurally interpretable (so its decisions can be explained to users) and steerable (to reflect a community's values or align to safety standards). However, current systems fall short on both of these dimensions. To address this gap, we present SafetyAnalyst, a novel LLM safety moderation framework. Given a prompt, SafetyAnalyst creates a structured "harm-benefit tree," which identifies 1) the actions that could be taken if a compliant response were provided, 2) the harmful and beneficial effects of those actions (along with their likelihood, severity, and immediacy), and 3) the stakeholders that would be impacted by those effects. It then aggregates this structured representation into a harmfulness score based on a parameterized set of safety preferences, which can be transparently aligned to particular values. Using extensive harm-benefit features generated by SOTA LLMs on 19k prompts, we fine-tuned an open-weight LM to specialize in generating harm-benefit trees through symbolic knowledge distillation. On a comprehensive set of prompt safety benchmarks, we show that our system (average F1=0.75) outperforms existing LLM safety moderation systems (average F1<0.72) on prompt harmfulness classification, while offering the additional advantages of interpretability and steerability.

The rapid adoption of generative AI in the public sector, encompassing diverse applications ranging from automated public assistance to welfare services and immigration processes, highlights its transformative potential while underscoring the pressing need for thorough risk assessments. Despite its growing presence, evaluations of risks associated with AI-driven systems in the public sector remain insufficiently explored. Building upon an established taxonomy of AI risks derived from diverse government policies and corporate guidelines, we investigate the critical risks posed by generative AI in the public sector while extending the scope to account for its multimodal capabilities. In addition, we propose a Systematic dAta generatIon Framework for evaluating the risks of generative AI (SAIF). SAIF involves four key stages: breaking down risks, designing scenarios, applying jailbreak methods, and exploring prompt types. It ensures the systematic and consistent generation of prompt data, facilitating a comprehensive evaluation while providing a solid foundation for mitigating the risks. Furthermore, SAIF is designed to accommodate emerging jailbreak methods and evolving prompt types, thereby enabling effective responses to unforeseen risk scenarios. We believe that this study can play a crucial role in fostering the safe and responsible integration of generative AI into the public sector.

KT developed a Responsible AI (RAI) assessment methodology and risk mitigation technologies to ensure the safety and reliability of AI services. By analyzing the Basic Act on AI implementation and global AI governance trends, we established a unique approach for regulatory compliance and systematically identify and manage all potential risk factors from AI development to operation. We present a reliable assessment methodology that systematically verifies model safety and robustness based on KT's AI risk taxonomy tailored to the domestic environment. We also provide practical tools for managing and mitigating identified AI risks. With the release of this report, we also release proprietary Guardrail : SafetyGuard that blocks harmful responses from AI models in real-time, supporting the enhancement of safety in the domestic AI development ecosystem. We also believe these research outcomes provide valuable insights for organizations seeking to develop Responsible AI.

We present a framework for the automated measurement of responsible AI (RAI) metrics for large language models (LLMs) and associated products and services. Our framework for automatically measuring harms from LLMs builds on existing technical and sociotechnical expertise and leverages the capabilities of state-of-the-art LLMs, such as GPT-4. We use this framework to run through several case studies investigating how different LLMs may violate a range of RAI-related principles. The framework may be employed alongside domain-specific sociotechnical expertise to create measurements for new harm areas in the future. By implementing this framework, we aim to enable more advanced harm measurement efforts and further the responsible use of LLMs.

Rapidly evolving AI exhibits increasingly strong autonomy and goal-directed capabilities, accompanied by derivative systemic risks that are more unpredictable, difficult to control, and potentially irreversible. However, current AI safety evaluation systems suffer from critical limitations such as restricted risk dimensions and failed frontier risk detection. The lagging safety benchmarks and alignment technologies can hardly address the complex challenges posed by cutting-edge AI models. To bridge this gap, we propose the "ForesightSafety Bench" AI Safety Evaluation Framework, beginning with 7 major Fundamental Safety pillars and progressively extends to advanced Embodied AI Safety, AI4Science Safety, Social and Environmental AI risks, Catastrophic and Existential Risks, as well as 8 critical industrial safety domains, forming a total of 94 refined risk dimensions. To date, the benchmark has accumulated tens of thousands of structured risk data points and assessment results, establishing a widely encompassing, hierarchically clear, and dynamically evolving AI safety evaluation framework. Based on this benchmark, we conduct systematic evaluation and in-depth analysis of over twenty mainstream advanced large models, identifying key risk patterns and their capability boundaries. The safety capability evaluation results reveals the widespread safety vulnerabilities of frontier AI across multiple pillars, particularly focusing on Risky Agentic Autonomy, AI4Science Safety, Embodied AI Safety, Social AI Safety and Catastrophic and Existential Risks. Our benchmark is released at https://github.com/Beijing-AISI/ForesightSafety-Bench. The project website is available at https://foresightsafety-bench.beijing-aisi.ac.cn/.

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, Frontier AI Risk Management Framework in Practice presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. As Large Language Models (LLMs) general capabilities rapidly evolve and the proliferation of agentic AI, this version of the risk analysis technical report presents an updated and granular assessment of five critical dimensions: cyber offense, persuasion and manipulation, strategic deception, uncontrolled AI R\&D, and self-replication. Specifically, we introduce more complex scenarios for cyber offense. For persuasion and manipulation, we evaluate the risk of LLM-to-LLM persuasion on newly released LLMs. For strategic deception and scheming, we add the new experiment with respect to emergent misalignment. For uncontrolled AI R\&D, we focus on the ``mis-evolution'' of agents as they autonomously expand their memory substrates and toolsets. Besides, we also monitor and evaluate the safety performance of OpenClaw during the interaction on the Moltbook. For self-replication, we introduce a new resource-constrained scenario. More importantly, we propose and validate a series of robust mitigation strategies to address these emerging threats, providing a preliminary technical and actionable pathway for the secure deployment of frontier AI. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.

Machine learning (ML) systems are rapidly increasing in size, are acquiring new capabilities, and are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings. As with other powerful technologies, safety for ML should be a leading research priority. In response to emerging safety challenges in ML, such as those introduced by recent large-scale models, we provide a new roadmap for ML Safety and refine the technical problems that the field needs to address. We present four problems ready for research, namely withstanding hazards ("Robustness"), identifying hazards ("Monitoring"), reducing inherent model hazards ("Alignment"), and reducing systemic hazards ("Systemic Safety"). Throughout, we clarify each problem's motivation and provide concrete research directions.

Traditional sociological research often relies on human participation, which, though effective, is expensive, challenging to scale, and with ethical concerns. Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) highlight their potential to simulate human behavior, enabling the replication of individual responses and facilitating studies on many interdisciplinary studies. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive survey of this field, illustrating the recent progress in simulation driven by LLM-empowered agents. We categorize the simulations into three types: (1) Individual Simulation, which mimics specific individuals or demographic groups; (2) Scenario Simulation, where multiple agents collaborate to achieve goals within specific contexts; and (3) Society Simulation, which models interactions within agent societies to reflect the complexity and variety of real-world dynamics. These simulations follow a progression, ranging from detailed individual modeling to large-scale societal phenomena. We provide a detailed discussion of each simulation type, including the architecture or key components of the simulation, the classification of objectives or scenarios and the evaluation method. Afterward, we summarize commonly used datasets and benchmarks. Finally, we discuss the trends across these three types of simulation. A repository for the related sources is at {https://github.com/FudanDISC/SocialAgent}.

Workplace toxicity is widely recognized as detrimental to organizational culture, yet quantifying its direct impact on operational efficiency remains methodologically challenging due to the ethical and practical difficulties of reproducing conflict in human subjects. This study leverages Large Language Model (LLM) based Multi-Agent Systems to simulate 1-on-1 adversarial debates, creating a controlled "sociological sandbox". We employ a Monte Carlo method to simulate hundrets of discussions, measuring the convergence time (defined as the number of arguments required to reach a conclusion) between a baseline control group and treatment groups involving agents with "toxic" system prompts. Our results demonstrate a statistically significant increase of approximately 25\% in the duration of conversations involving toxic participants. We propose that this "latency of toxicity" serves as a proxy for financial damage in corporate and academic settings. Furthermore, we demonstrate that agent-based modeling provides a reproducible, ethical alternative to human-subject research for measuring the mechanics of social friction.

The burgeoning integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into human society brings forth significant implications for societal governance and safety. While considerable strides have been made in addressing AI alignment challenges, existing methodologies primarily focus on technical facets, often neglecting the intricate sociotechnical nature of AI systems, which can lead to a misalignment between the development and deployment contexts. To this end, we posit a new problem worth exploring: Incentive Compatibility Sociotechnical Alignment Problem (ICSAP). We hope this can call for more researchers to explore how to leverage the principles of Incentive Compatibility (IC) from game theory to bridge the gap between technical and societal components to maintain AI consensus with human societies in different contexts. We further discuss three classical game problems for achieving IC: mechanism design, contract theory, and Bayesian persuasion, in addressing the perspectives, potentials, and challenges of solving ICSAP, and provide preliminary implementation conceptions.

Large language model (LLM)-based AI agents extend LLM capabilities by enabling access to tools such as data sources, APIs, search engines, code sandboxes, and even other agents. While this empowers agents to perform complex tasks, LLMs may invoke unintended tool interactions and introduce risks, such as leaking sensitive data or overwriting critical records, which are unacceptable in enterprise contexts. Current approaches to mitigate these risks, such as model-based safeguards, enhance agents' reliability but cannot guarantee system safety. Methods like information flow control (IFC) and temporal constraints aim to provide guarantees but often require extensive human annotation. We propose a process that starts with applying System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to identify hazards in agent workflows, derive safety requirements, and formalize them as enforceable specifications on data flows and tool sequences. To enable this, we introduce a capability-enhanced Model Context Protocol (MCP) framework that requires structured labels on capabilities, confidentiality, and trust level. Together, these contributions aim to shift LLM-based agent safety from ad hoc reliability fixes to proactive guardrails with formal guarantees, while reducing dependence on user confirmation and making autonomy a deliberate design choice.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked concerns over their potential to acquire and misuse dangerous or high-risk capabilities, posing frontier risks. Current safety evaluations primarily test for what a model can do - its capabilities - without assessing what it would do if endowed with high-risk capabilities. This leaves a critical blind spot: models may strategically conceal capabilities or rapidly acquire them, while harboring latent inclinations toward misuse. We argue that propensity - the likelihood of a model to pursue harmful actions if empowered - is a critical, yet underexplored, axis of safety evaluation. We present PropensityBench, a novel benchmark framework that assesses the proclivity of models to engage in risky behaviors when equipped with simulated dangerous capabilities using proxy tools. Our framework includes 5,874 scenarios with 6,648 tools spanning four high-risk domains: cybersecurity, self-proliferation, biosecurity, and chemical security. We simulate access to powerful capabilities via a controlled agentic environment and evaluate the models' choices under varying operational pressures that reflect real-world constraints or incentives models may encounter, such as resource scarcity or gaining more autonomy. Across open-source and proprietary frontier models, we uncover 9 alarming signs of propensity: models frequently choose high-risk tools when under pressure, despite lacking the capability to execute such actions unaided. These findings call for a shift from static capability audits toward dynamic propensity assessments as a prerequisite for deploying frontier AI systems safely. Our code is available at https://github.com/scaleapi/propensity-evaluation.

The rapid advancement and deployment of AI systems have created an urgent need for standard safety-evaluation frameworks. This paper introduces AILuminate v1.0, the first comprehensive industry-standard benchmark for assessing AI-product risk and reliability. Its development employed an open process that included participants from multiple fields. The benchmark evaluates an AI system's resistance to prompts designed to elicit dangerous, illegal, or undesirable behavior in 12 hazard categories, including violent crimes, nonviolent crimes, sex-related crimes, child sexual exploitation, indiscriminate weapons, suicide and self-harm, intellectual property, privacy, defamation, hate, sexual content, and specialized advice (election, financial, health, legal). Our method incorporates a complete assessment standard, extensive prompt datasets, a novel evaluation framework, a grading and reporting system, and the technical as well as organizational infrastructure for long-term support and evolution. In particular, the benchmark employs an understandable five-tier grading scale (Poor to Excellent) and incorporates an innovative entropy-based system-response evaluation. In addition to unveiling the benchmark, this report also identifies limitations of our method and of building safety benchmarks generally, including evaluator uncertainty and the constraints of single-turn interactions. This work represents a crucial step toward establishing global standards for AI risk and reliability evaluation while acknowledging the need for continued development in areas such as multiturn interactions, multimodal understanding, coverage of additional languages, and emerging hazard categories. Our findings provide valuable insights for model developers, system integrators, and policymakers working to promote safer AI deployment.

Safety and responsibility evaluations of advanced AI models are a critical but developing field of research and practice. In the development of Google DeepMind's advanced AI models, we innovated on and applied a broad set of approaches to safety evaluation. In this report, we summarise and share elements of our evolving approach as well as lessons learned for a broad audience. Key lessons learned include: First, theoretical underpinnings and frameworks are invaluable to organise the breadth of risk domains, modalities, forms, metrics, and goals. Second, theory and practice of safety evaluation development each benefit from collaboration to clarify goals, methods and challenges, and facilitate the transfer of insights between different stakeholders and disciplines. Third, similar key methods, lessons, and institutions apply across the range of concerns in responsibility and safety - including established and emerging harms. For this reason it is important that a wide range of actors working on safety evaluation and safety research communities work together to develop, refine and implement novel evaluation approaches and best practices, rather than operating in silos. The report concludes with outlining the clear need to rapidly advance the science of evaluations, to integrate new evaluations into the development and governance of AI, to establish scientifically-grounded norms and standards, and to promote a robust evaluation ecosystem.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly deployed in real-world applications such as "digital assistants, autonomous customer service, and decision-support systems", where their ability to "interact in multi-turn, tool-augmented environments" makes them indispensable. However, ensuring the safety of these agents remains a significant challenge due to the diverse and complex risks arising from dynamic user interactions, external tool usage, and the potential for unintended harmful behaviors. To address this critical issue, we propose AutoSafe, the first framework that systematically enhances agent safety through fully automated synthetic data generation. Concretely, 1) we introduce an open and extensible threat model, OTS, which formalizes how unsafe behaviors emerge from the interplay of user instructions, interaction contexts, and agent actions. This enables precise modeling of safety risks across diverse scenarios. 2) we develop a fully automated data generation pipeline that simulates unsafe user behaviors, applies self-reflective reasoning to generate safe responses, and constructs a large-scale, diverse, and high-quality safety training dataset-eliminating the need for hazardous real-world data collection. To evaluate the effectiveness of our framework, we design comprehensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world safety benchmarks. Results demonstrate that AutoSafe boosts safety scores by 45% on average and achieves a 28.91% improvement on real-world tasks, validating the generalization ability of our learned safety strategies. These results highlight the practical advancement and scalability of AutoSafe in building safer LLM-based agents for real-world deployment. We have released the project page at https://auto-safe.github.io/.

We are releasing a new suite of security benchmarks for LLMs, CYBERSECEVAL 3, to continue the conversation on empirically measuring LLM cybersecurity risks and capabilities. CYBERSECEVAL 3 assesses 8 different risks across two broad categories: risk to third parties, and risk to application developers and end users. Compared to previous work, we add new areas focused on offensive security capabilities: automated social engineering, scaling manual offensive cyber operations, and autonomous offensive cyber operations. In this paper we discuss applying these benchmarks to the Llama 3 models and a suite of contemporaneous state-of-the-art LLMs, enabling us to contextualize risks both with and without mitigations in place.

Recent technological advances, especially in the field of machine learning, provide astonishing progress on the road towards artificial general intelligence. However, tasks in current real-world business applications cannot yet be solved by machines alone. We, therefore, identify the need for developing socio-technological ensembles of humans and machines. Such systems possess the ability to accomplish complex goals by combining human and artificial intelligence to collectively achieve superior results and continuously improve by learning from each other. Thus, the need for structured design knowledge for those systems arises. Following a taxonomy development method, this article provides three main contributions: First, we present a structured overview of interdisciplinary research on the role of humans in the machine learning pipeline. Second, we envision hybrid intelligence systems and conceptualize the relevant dimensions for system design for the first time. Finally, we offer useful guidance for system developers during the implementation of such applications.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied in mental health support systems, where reliable recognition of high-risk states such as suicidal ideation and self-harm is safety-critical. However, existing evaluations primarily rely on aggregate performance metrics, which often obscure risk-specific failure modes and provide limited insight into model behavior in realistic, multi-turn interactions. We present MHDash, an open-source platform designed to support the development, evaluation, and auditing of AI systems for mental health applications. MHDash integrates data collection, structured annotation, multi-turn dialogue generation, and baseline evaluation into a unified pipeline. The platform supports annotations across multiple dimensions, including Concern Type, Risk Level, and Dialogue Intent, enabling fine-grained and risk-aware analysis. Our results reveal several key findings: (i) simple baselines and advanced LLM APIs exhibit comparable overall accuracy yet diverge significantly on high-risk cases; (ii) some LLMs maintain consistent ordinal severity ranking while failing absolute risk classification, whereas others achieve reasonable aggregate scores but suffer from high false negative rates on severe categories; and (iii) performance gaps are amplified in multi-turn dialogues, where risk signals emerge gradually. These observations demonstrate that conventional benchmarks are insufficient for safety-critical mental health settings. By releasing MHDash as an open platform, we aim to promote reproducible research, transparent evaluation, and safety-aligned development of AI systems for mental health support.

Organizations of all sizes, across all industries and domains are leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) technologies to solve some of their biggest challenges around operations, customer experience, and much more. However, due to the probabilistic nature of AI, the risks associated with it are far greater than traditional technologies. Research has shown that these risks can range anywhere from regulatory, compliance, reputational, and user trust, to financial and even societal risks. Depending on the nature and size of the organization, AI technologies can pose a significant risk, if not used in a responsible way. This position paper seeks to present a brief introduction to AI governance, which is a framework designed to oversee the responsible use of AI with the goal of preventing and mitigating risks. Having such a framework will not only manage risks but also gain maximum value out of AI projects and develop consistency for organization-wide adoption of AI.

Can generative agents be trusted in multimodal environments? Despite advances in large language and vision-language models that enable agents to act autonomously and pursue goals in rich settings, their ability to reason about safety, coherence, and trust across modalities remains limited. We introduce a reproducible simulation framework for evaluating agents along three dimensions: (1) safety improvement over time, including iterative plan revisions in text-visual scenarios; (2) detection of unsafe activities across multiple categories of social situations; and (3) social dynamics, measured as interaction counts and acceptance ratios of social exchanges. Agents are equipped with layered memory, dynamic planning, multimodal perception, and are instrumented with SocialMetrics, a suite of behavioral and structural metrics that quantifies plan revisions, unsafe-to-safe conversions, and information diffusion across networks. Experiments show that while agents can detect direct multimodal contradictions, they often fail to align local revisions with global safety, reaching only a 55 percent success rate in correcting unsafe plans. Across eight simulation runs with three models - Claude, GPT-4o mini, and Qwen-VL - five agents achieved average unsafe-to-safe conversion rates of 75, 55, and 58 percent, respectively. Overall performance ranged from 20 percent in multi-risk scenarios with GPT-4o mini to 98 percent in localized contexts such as fire/heat with Claude. Notably, 45 percent of unsafe actions were accepted when paired with misleading visuals, showing a strong tendency to overtrust images. These findings expose critical limitations in current architectures and provide a reproducible platform for studying multimodal safety, coherence, and social dynamics.

Evaluating the safety of LLM-based agents is increasingly important because risks in realistic deployments often emerge over multi-step interactions rather than isolated prompts or final responses. Existing trajectory-level benchmarks remain limited by insufficient interaction diversity, coarse observability of safety failures, and weak long-horizon realism. We introduce ATBench, a trajectory-level benchmark for structured, diverse, and realistic evaluation of agent safety. ATBench organizes agentic risk along three dimensions: risk source, failure mode, and real-world harm. Based on this taxonomy, we construct trajectories with heterogeneous tool pools and a long-context delayed-trigger protocol that captures realistic risk emergence across multiple stages. The benchmark contains 1,000 trajectories (503 safe and 497 unsafe), averaging 9.01 turns and 3.95k tokens, with 1,954 invoked tools drawn from pools spanning 2,084 available tools. Data quality is supported by rule-based and LLM-based filtering plus full human audit. Experiments on frontier LLMs, open-source models, and specialized guard systems show that ATBench is challenging even for strong evaluators, while enabling taxonomy-stratified analysis, cross-benchmark comparison, and diagnosis of long-horizon failure patterns.

Recent advances in Language Model (LM) agents and tool use, exemplified by applications like ChatGPT Plugins, enable a rich set of capabilities but also amplify potential risks - such as leaking private data or causing financial losses. Identifying these risks is labor-intensive, necessitating implementing the tools, manually setting up the environment for each test scenario, and finding risky cases. As tools and agents become more complex, the high cost of testing these agents will make it increasingly difficult to find high-stakes, long-tailed risks. To address these challenges, we introduce ToolEmu: a framework that uses an LM to emulate tool execution and enables the testing of LM agents against a diverse range of tools and scenarios, without manual instantiation. Alongside the emulator, we develop an LM-based automatic safety evaluator that examines agent failures and quantifies associated risks. We test both the tool emulator and evaluator through human evaluation and find that 68.8% of failures identified with ToolEmu would be valid real-world agent failures. Using our curated initial benchmark consisting of 36 high-stakes tools and 144 test cases, we provide a quantitative risk analysis of current LM agents and identify numerous failures with potentially severe outcomes. Notably, even the safest LM agent exhibits such failures 23.9% of the time according to our evaluator, underscoring the need to develop safer LM agents for real-world deployment.

Flawed planning from VLM-driven embodied agents poses significant safety hazards, hindering their deployment in real-world household tasks. However, existing static, non-interactive evaluation paradigms fail to adequately assess risks within these interactive environments, since they cannot simulate dynamic risks that emerge from an agent's actions and rely on unreliable post-hoc evaluations that ignore unsafe intermediate steps. To bridge this critical gap, we propose evaluating an agent's interactive safety: its ability to perceive emergent risks and execute mitigation steps in the correct procedural order. We thus present IS-Bench, the first multi-modal benchmark designed for interactive safety, featuring 161 challenging scenarios with 388 unique safety risks instantiated in a high-fidelity simulator. Crucially, it facilitates a novel process-oriented evaluation that verifies whether risk mitigation actions are performed before/after specific risk-prone steps. Extensive experiments on leading VLMs, including the GPT-4o and Gemini-2.5 series, reveal that current agents lack interactive safety awareness, and that while safety-aware Chain-of-Thought can improve performance, it often compromises task completion. By highlighting these critical limitations, IS-Bench provides a foundation for developing safer and more reliable embodied AI systems.

Most safety testing efforts for large language models (LLMs) today focus on evaluating foundation models. However, there is a growing need to evaluate safety at the application level, as components such as system prompts, retrieval pipelines, and guardrails introduce additional factors that significantly influence the overall safety of LLM applications. In this paper, we introduce a practical framework for evaluating application-level safety in LLM systems, validated through real-world deployment across multiple use cases within our organization. The framework consists of two parts: (1) principles for developing customized safety risk taxonomies, and (2) practices for evaluating safety risks in LLM applications. We illustrate how the proposed framework was applied in our internal pilot, providing a reference point for organizations seeking to scale their safety testing efforts. This work aims to bridge the gap between theoretical concepts in AI safety and the operational realities of safeguarding LLM applications in practice, offering actionable guidance for safe and scalable deployment.

Researchers have long recognized the socio-technical gaps in personal tracking research, where machines can never fully model the complexity of human behavior, making it only able to produce basic rule-based outputs or "black-box" results that lack clear explanations. Real-world deployments rely on experts for this complex translation from sparse data to meaningful insights. In this study, we consider this translation process from data to insights by experts as "sensemaking" and explore how HCI researchers can support it through Vital Insight, an evidence-based 'sensemaking' system that combines direct representation and indirect inference through visualization and Large Language Models. We evaluate Vital Insight in user testing sessions with 14 experts in multi-modal tracking, synthesize design implications, and develop an expert sensemaking model where they iteratively move between direct data representations and AI-supported inferences to explore, retrieve, question, and validate insights.

With the development of artificial intelligence, dialogue systems have been endowed with amazing chit-chat capabilities, and there is widespread interest and discussion about whether the generated contents are socially beneficial. In this paper, we present a new perspective of research scope towards building a safe, responsible, and modal dialogue system, including 1) abusive and toxic contents, 2) unfairness and discrimination, 3) ethics and morality issues, and 4) risk of misleading and privacy information. Besides, we review the mainstream methods for evaluating the safety of large models from the perspectives of exposure and detection of safety issues. The recent advances in methodologies for the safety improvement of both end-to-end dialogue systems and pipeline-based models are further introduced. Finally, we discussed six existing challenges towards responsible AI: explainable safety monitoring, continuous learning of safety issues, robustness against malicious attacks, multimodal information processing, unified research framework, and multidisciplinary theory integration. We hope this survey will inspire further research toward safer dialogue systems.

With the widespread deployment of Computer-using Agents (CUAs) in complex real-world environments, prevalent long-term risks often lead to severe and irreversible consequences. Most existing guardrails for CUAs adopt a reactive approach, constraining agent behavior only within the current observation space. While these guardrails can prevent immediate short-term risks (e.g., clicking on a phishing link), they cannot proactively avoid long-term risks: seemingly reasonable actions can lead to high-risk consequences that emerge with a delay (e.g., cleaning logs leads to future audits being untraceable), which reactive guardrails cannot identify within the current observation space. To address these limitations, we propose a predictive guardrail approach, with the core idea of aligning predicted future risks with current decisions. Based on this approach, we present SafePred, a predictive guardrail framework for CUAs that establishes a risk-to-decision loop to ensure safe agent behavior. SafePred supports two key abilities: (1) Short- and long-term risk prediction: by using safety policies as the basis for risk prediction, SafePred leverages the prediction capability of the world model to generate semantic representations of both short-term and long-term risks, thereby identifying and pruning actions that lead to high-risk states; (2) Decision optimization: translating predicted risks into actionable safe decision guidances through step-level interventions and task-level re-planning. Extensive experiments show that SafePred significantly reduces high-risk behaviors, achieving over 97.6% safety performance and improving task utility by up to 21.4% compared with reactive baselines.

Deep learning models for natural language processing (NLP) are increasingly adopted and deployed by analysts without formal training in NLP or machine learning (ML). However, the documentation intended to convey the model's details and appropriate use is tailored primarily to individuals with ML or NLP expertise. To address this gap, we conduct a design inquiry into interactive model cards, which augment traditionally static model cards with affordances for exploring model documentation and interacting with the models themselves. Our investigation consists of an initial conceptual study with experts in ML, NLP, and AI Ethics, followed by a separate evaluative study with non-expert analysts who use ML models in their work. Using a semi-structured interview format coupled with a think-aloud protocol, we collected feedback from a total of 30 participants who engaged with different versions of standard and interactive model cards. Through a thematic analysis of the collected data, we identified several conceptual dimensions that summarize the strengths and limitations of standard and interactive model cards, including: stakeholders; design; guidance; understandability & interpretability; sensemaking & skepticism; and trust & safety. Our findings demonstrate the importance of carefully considered design and interactivity for orienting and supporting non-expert analysts using deep learning models, along with a need for consideration of broader sociotechnical contexts and organizational dynamics. We have also identified design elements, such as language, visual cues, and warnings, among others, that support interactivity and make non-interactive content accessible. We summarize our findings as design guidelines and discuss their implications for a human-centered approach towards AI/ML documentation.

As Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) becomes increasingly integrated into various facets of human life, ensuring the safety and ethical alignment of such systems is paramount. Previous studies primarily focus on single-modality threats, which may not suffice given the integrated and complex nature of cross-modality interactions. We introduce a novel safety alignment challenge called Safe Inputs but Unsafe Output (SIUO) to evaluate cross-modality safety alignment. Specifically, it considers cases where single modalities are safe independently but could potentially lead to unsafe or unethical outputs when combined. To empirically investigate this problem, we developed the SIUO, a cross-modality benchmark encompassing 9 critical safety domains, such as self-harm, illegal activities, and privacy violations. Our findings reveal substantial safety vulnerabilities in both closed- and open-source LVLMs, such as GPT-4V and LLaVA, underscoring the inadequacy of current models to reliably interpret and respond to complex, real-world scenarios.

Globally, artificial intelligence (AI) implementation is growing, holding the capability to fundamentally alter organisational processes and decision making. Simultaneously, this brings a multitude of emergent risks to organisations, exposing vulnerabilities in their extant risk management frameworks. This necessitates a greater understanding of how organisations can position themselves in response. This issue is particularly pertinent within the financial sector with relatively mature AI applications matched with severe societal repercussions of potential risk events. Despite this, academic risk management literature is trailing behind the speed of AI implementation. Adopting a management perspective, this study aims to contribute to the understanding of AI risk management in organisations through an exploratory empirical investigation into these practices. In-depth insights are gained through interviews with nine practitioners from different organisations within the UK financial sector. Through examining areas of organisational convergence and divergence, the findings of this study unearth levels of risk management framework readiness and prevailing approaches to risk management at both a processual and organisational level. Whilst enhancing the developing literature concerning AI risk management within organisations, the study simultaneously offers a practical contribution, providing key areas of guidance for practitioners in the operational development of AI risk management frameworks.

As AI systems enter into a growing number of societal domains, these systems increasingly shape and are shaped by user preferences, opinions, and behaviors. However, the design of AI systems rarely accounts for how AI and users shape one another. In this position paper, we argue for the development of formal interaction models which mathematically specify how AI and users shape one another. Formal interaction models can be leveraged to (1) specify interactions for implementation, (2) monitor interactions through empirical analysis, (3) anticipate societal impacts via counterfactual analysis, and (4) control societal impacts via interventions. The design space of formal interaction models is vast, and model design requires careful consideration of factors such as style, granularity, mathematical complexity, and measurability. Using content recommender systems as a case study, we critically examine the nascent literature of formal interaction models with respect to these use-cases and design axes. More broadly, we call for the community to leverage formal interaction models when designing, evaluating, or auditing any AI system which interacts with users.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into healthcare demands a safety paradigm rooted in primum non nocere. However, current alignment techniques rely on generic definitions of harm that fail to capture context-dependent violations, such as administrative fraud and clinical discrimination. To address this, we introduce Medical Malice: a dataset of 214,219 adversarial prompts calibrated to the regulatory and ethical complexities of the Brazilian Unified Health System (SUS). Crucially, the dataset includes the reasoning behind each violation, enabling models to internalize ethical boundaries rather than merely memorizing a fixed set of refusals. Using an unaligned agent (Grok-4) within a persona-driven pipeline, we synthesized high-fidelity threats across seven taxonomies, ranging from procurement manipulation and queue-jumping to obstetric violence. We discuss the ethical design of releasing these "vulnerability signatures" to correct the information asymmetry between malicious actors and AI developers. Ultimately, this work advocates for a shift from universal to context-aware safety, providing the necessary resources to immunize healthcare AI against the nuanced, systemic threats inherent to high-stakes medical environments -- vulnerabilities that represent the paramount risk to patient safety and the successful integration of AI in healthcare systems.

With the widespread application of Large Language Models (LLMs), their associated security issues have become increasingly prominent, severely constraining their trustworthy deployment in critical domains. This paper proposes a novel safety response framework designed to systematically safeguard LLMs at both the input and output levels. At the input level, the framework employs a supervised fine-tuning-based safety classification model. Through a fine-grained four-tier taxonomy (Safe, Unsafe, Conditionally Safe, Focused Attention), it performs precise risk identification and differentiated handling of user queries, significantly enhancing risk coverage and business scenario adaptability, and achieving a risk recall rate of 99.3%. At the output level, the framework integrates Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) with a specifically fine-tuned interpretation model, ensuring all responses are grounded in a real-time, trustworthy knowledge base. This approach eliminates information fabrication and enables result traceability. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed safety control model achieves a significantly higher safety score on public safety evaluation benchmarks compared to the baseline model, TinyR1-Safety-8B. Furthermore, on our proprietary high-risk test set, the framework's components attained a perfect 100% safety score, validating their exceptional protective capabilities in complex risk scenarios. This research provides an effective engineering pathway for building high-security, high-trust LLM applications.

This paper reviews Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (TAI) and its various definitions. Considering the principles respected in any society, TAI is often characterized by a few attributes, some of which have led to confusion in regulatory or engineering contexts. We argue against using terms such as Responsible or Ethical AI as substitutes for TAI. And to help clarify any confusion, we suggest leaving them behind. Given the subjectivity and complexity inherent in TAI, developing a universal framework is deemed infeasible. Instead, we advocate for approaches centered on addressing key attributes and properties such as fairness, bias, risk, security, explainability, and reliability. We examine the ongoing regulatory landscape, with a focus on initiatives in the EU, China, and the USA. We recognize that differences in AI regulations based on geopolitical and geographical reasons pose an additional challenge for multinational companies. We identify risk as a core factor in AI regulation and TAI. For example, as outlined in the EU-AI Act, organizations must gauge the risk level of their AI products to act accordingly (or risk hefty fines). We compare modalities of TAI implementation and how multiple cross-functional teams are engaged in the overall process. Thus, a brute force approach for enacting TAI renders its efficiency and agility, moot. To address this, we introduce our framework Set-Formalize-Measure-Act (SFMA). Our solution highlights the importance of transforming TAI-aware metrics, drivers of TAI, stakeholders, and business/legal requirements into actual benchmarks or tests. Finally, over-regulation driven by panic of powerful AI models can, in fact, harm TAI too. Based on GitHub user-activity data, in 2023, AI open-source projects rose to top projects by contributor account. Enabling innovation in TAI hinges on the independent contributions of the open-source community.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become more prevalent, concerns about their safety, ethics, and potential biases have risen. Systematically evaluating LLMs' risk decision-making tendencies and attitudes, particularly in the ethical domain, has become crucial. This study innovatively applies the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale from cognitive science to LLMs and proposes a novel Ethical Decision-Making Risk Attitude Scale (EDRAS) to assess LLMs' ethical risk attitudes in depth. We further propose a novel approach integrating risk scales and role-playing to quantitatively evaluate systematic biases in LLMs. Through systematic evaluation and analysis of multiple mainstream LLMs, we assessed the "risk personalities" of LLMs across multiple domains, with a particular focus on the ethical domain, and revealed and quantified LLMs' systematic biases towards different groups. This research helps understand LLMs' risk decision-making and ensure their safe and reliable application. Our approach provides a tool for identifying and mitigating biases, contributing to fairer and more trustworthy AI systems. The code and data are available.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become increasingly widespread, concerns about content safety have grown in parallel. Currently, there is a clear lack of high-quality, human-annotated datasets that address the full spectrum of LLM-related safety risks and are usable for commercial applications. To bridge this gap, we propose a comprehensive and adaptable taxonomy for categorizing safety risks, structured into 12 top-level hazard categories with an extension to 9 fine-grained subcategories. This taxonomy is designed to meet the diverse requirements of downstream users, offering more granular and flexible tools for managing various risk types. Using a hybrid data generation pipeline that combines human annotations with a multi-LLM "jury" system to assess the safety of responses, we obtain Aegis 2.0, a carefully curated collection of 34,248 samples of human-LLM interactions, annotated according to our proposed taxonomy. To validate its effectiveness, we demonstrate that several lightweight models, trained using parameter-efficient techniques on Aegis 2.0, achieve performance competitive with leading safety models fully fine-tuned on much larger, non-commercial datasets. In addition, we introduce a novel training blend that combines safety with topic following data.This approach enhances the adaptability of guard models, enabling them to generalize to new risk categories defined during inference. We plan to open-source Aegis 2.0 data and models to the research community to aid in the safety guardrailing of LLMs.

The past year has seen rapid acceleration in the development of large language models (LLMs). However, without proper steering and safeguards, LLMs will readily follow malicious instructions, provide unsafe advice, and generate toxic content. We introduce SimpleSafetyTests (SST) as a new test suite for rapidly and systematically identifying such critical safety risks. The test suite comprises 100 test prompts across five harm areas that LLMs, for the vast majority of applications, should refuse to comply with. We test 11 open-access and open-source LLMs and four closed-source LLMs, and find critical safety weaknesses. While some of the models do not give a single unsafe response, most give unsafe responses to more than 20% of the prompts, with over 50% unsafe responses in the extreme. Prepending a safety-emphasising system prompt substantially reduces the occurrence of unsafe responses, but does not completely stop them from happening. Trained annotators labelled every model response to SST (n = 3,000). We use these annotations to evaluate five AI safety filters (which assess whether a models' response is unsafe given a prompt) as a way of automatically evaluating models' performance on SST. The filters' performance varies considerably. There are also differences across the five harm areas, and on the unsafe versus safe responses. The widely-used Perspective API has 72% accuracy and a newly-created zero-shot prompt to OpenAI's GPT-4 performs best with 89% accuracy. Content Warning: This paper contains prompts and responses that relate to child abuse, suicide, self-harm and eating disorders, scams and fraud, illegal items, and physical harm.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized for mental health support; however, current safety benchmarks often fail to detect the complex, longitudinal risks inherent in therapeutic dialogue. We introduce an evaluation framework that pairs AI psychotherapists with simulated patient agents equipped with dynamic cognitive-affective models and assesses therapy session simulations against a comprehensive quality of care and risk ontology. We apply this framework to a high-impact test case, Alcohol Use Disorder, evaluating six AI agents (including ChatGPT, Gemini, and Character.AI) against a clinically-validated cohort of 15 patient personas representing diverse clinical phenotypes. Our large-scale simulation (N=369 sessions) reveals critical safety gaps in the use of AI for mental health support. We identify specific iatrogenic risks, including the validation of patient delusions ("AI Psychosis") and failure to de-escalate suicide risk. Finally, we validate an interactive data visualization dashboard with diverse stakeholders, including AI engineers and red teamers, mental health professionals, and policy experts (N=9), demonstrating that this framework effectively enables stakeholders to audit the "black box" of AI psychotherapy. These findings underscore the critical safety risks of AI-provided mental health support and the necessity of simulation-based clinical red teaming before deployment.

Rapid progress in machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) has brought increasing attention to the potential impacts of AI technologies on society. In this paper we discuss one such potential impact: the problem of accidents in machine learning systems, defined as unintended and harmful behavior that may emerge from poor design of real-world AI systems. We present a list of five practical research problems related to accident risk, categorized according to whether the problem originates from having the wrong objective function ("avoiding side effects" and "avoiding reward hacking"), an objective function that is too expensive to evaluate frequently ("scalable supervision"), or undesirable behavior during the learning process ("safe exploration" and "distributional shift"). We review previous work in these areas as well as suggesting research directions with a focus on relevance to cutting-edge AI systems. Finally, we consider the high-level question of how to think most productively about the safety of forward-looking applications of AI.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into software engineering has revolutionized code generation, enabling unprecedented productivity through promptware and autonomous AI agents. However, this transformation introduces significant risks, including insecure code generation, hallucinated outputs, irreversible actions, and a lack of transparency and accountability. Incidents like the Replit database deletion underscore the urgent need for robust safety and governance mechanisms. This paper comprehensively analyzes the inherent challenges of LLM-assisted code generation, such as vulnerability inheritance, overtrust, misinterpretation, and the absence of standardized validation and rollback protocols. To address these, we propose the SAFE-AI Framework, a holistic approach emphasizing Safety, Auditability, Feedback, and Explainability. The framework integrates guardrails, sandboxing, runtime verification, risk-aware logging, human-in-the-loop systems, and explainable AI techniques to mitigate risks while fostering trust and compliance. We introduce a novel taxonomy of AI behaviors categorizing suggestive, generative, autonomous, and destructive actions to guide risk assessment and oversight. Additionally, we identify open problems, including the lack of standardized benchmarks for code specific hallucinations and autonomy levels, and propose future research directions for hybrid verification, semantic guardrails, and proactive governance tools. Through detailed comparisons of autonomy control, prompt engineering, explainability, and governance frameworks, this paper provides a roadmap for responsible AI integration in software engineering, aligning with emerging regulations like the EU AI Act and Canada's AIDA to ensure safe, transparent, and accountable AI-driven development.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to control robotic systems such as drones, but their risks of causing physical threats and harm in real-world applications remain unexplored. Our study addresses the critical gap in evaluating LLM physical safety by developing a comprehensive benchmark for drone control. We classify the physical safety risks of drones into four categories: (1) human-targeted threats, (2) object-targeted threats, (3) infrastructure attacks, and (4) regulatory violations. Our evaluation of mainstream LLMs reveals an undesirable trade-off between utility and safety, with models that excel in code generation often performing poorly in crucial safety aspects. Furthermore, while incorporating advanced prompt engineering techniques such as In-Context Learning and Chain-of-Thought can improve safety, these methods still struggle to identify unintentional attacks. In addition, larger models demonstrate better safety capabilities, particularly in refusing dangerous commands. Our findings and benchmark can facilitate the design and evaluation of physical safety for LLMs. The project page is available at huggingface.co/spaces/TrustSafeAI/LLM-physical-safety.

Laboratory accidents pose significant risks to human life and property, underscoring the importance of robust safety protocols. Despite advancements in safety training, laboratory personnel may still unknowingly engage in unsafe practices. With the increasing reliance on large language models (LLMs) for guidance in various fields, including laboratory settings, there is a growing concern about their reliability in critical safety-related decision-making. Unlike trained human researchers, LLMs lack formal lab safety education, raising questions about their ability to provide safe and accurate guidance. Existing research on LLM trustworthiness primarily focuses on issues such as ethical compliance, truthfulness, and fairness but fails to fully cover safety-critical real-world applications, like lab safety. To address this gap, we propose the Laboratory Safety Benchmark (LabSafety Bench), a comprehensive evaluation framework based on a new taxonomy aligned with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) protocols. This benchmark includes 765 multiple-choice questions verified by human experts, assessing LLMs and vision language models (VLMs) performance in lab safety contexts. Our evaluations demonstrate that while GPT-4o outperforms human participants, it is still prone to critical errors, highlighting the risks of relying on LLMs in safety-critical environments. Our findings emphasize the need for specialized benchmarks to accurately assess the trustworthiness of LLMs in real-world safety applications.

By organizing knowledge within a research field, Systematic Reviews (SR) provide valuable leads to steer research. Evidence suggests that SRs have become first-class artifacts in software engineering. However, the tedious manual effort associated with the screening phase of SRs renders these studies a costly and error-prone endeavor. While screening has traditionally been considered not amenable to automation, the advent of generative AI-driven chatbots, backed with large language models is set to disrupt the field. In this report, we propose an approach to leverage these novel technological developments for automating the screening of SRs. We assess the consistency, classification performance, and generalizability of ChatGPT in screening articles for SRs and compare these figures with those of traditional classifiers used in SR automation. Our results indicate that ChatGPT is a viable option to automate the SR processes, but requires careful considerations from developers when integrating ChatGPT into their SR tools.

Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly transforming social science research by enabling the automation of labor-intensive tasks like data annotation and text analysis. However, LLM outputs vary significantly depending on the implementation choices made by researchers (e.g., model selection, prompting strategy, or temperature settings). Such variation can introduce systematic biases and random errors, which propagate to downstream analyses and cause Type I, Type II, Type S, or Type M errors. We call this LLM hacking. We quantify the risk of LLM hacking by replicating 37 data annotation tasks from 21 published social science research studies with 18 different models. Analyzing 13 million LLM labels, we test 2,361 realistic hypotheses to measure how plausible researcher choices affect statistical conclusions. We find incorrect conclusions based on LLM-annotated data in approximately one in three hypotheses for state-of-the-art models, and in half the hypotheses for small language models. While our findings show that higher task performance and better general model capabilities reduce LLM hacking risk, even highly accurate models do not completely eliminate it. The risk of LLM hacking decreases as effect sizes increase, indicating the need for more rigorous verification of findings near significance thresholds. Our extensive analysis of LLM hacking mitigation techniques emphasizes the importance of human annotations in reducing false positive findings and improving model selection. Surprisingly, common regression estimator correction techniques are largely ineffective in reducing LLM hacking risk, as they heavily trade off Type I vs. Type II errors. Beyond accidental errors, we find that intentional LLM hacking is unacceptably simple. With few LLMs and just a handful of prompt paraphrases, anything can be presented as statistically significant.

This article conducts a literature review of current and future challenges in the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in cyber physical systems. The literature review is focused on identifying a conceptual framework for increasing resilience with AI through automation supporting both, a technical and human level. The methodology applied resembled a literature review and taxonomic analysis of complex internet of things (IoT) interconnected and coupled cyber physical systems. There is an increased attention on propositions on models, infrastructures and frameworks of IoT in both academic and technical papers. These reports and publications frequently represent a juxtaposition of other related systems and technologies (e.g. Industrial Internet of Things, Cyber Physical Systems, Industry 4.0 etc.). We review academic and industry papers published between 2010 and 2020. The results determine a new hierarchical cascading conceptual framework for analysing the evolution of AI decision-making in cyber physical systems. We argue that such evolution is inevitable and autonomous because of the increased integration of connected devices (IoT) in cyber physical systems. To support this argument, taxonomic methodology is adapted and applied for transparency and justifications of concepts selection decisions through building summary maps that are applied for designing the hierarchical cascading conceptual framework.

Large language models (LLMs) now mediate many web-based mental-health, crisis, and other emotionally sensitive services, yet their psychosocial safety in these settings remains poorly understood and weakly evaluated. We present DialogGuard, a multi-agent framework for assessing psychosocial risks in LLM-generated responses along five high-severity dimensions: privacy violations, discriminatory behaviour, mental manipulation, psychological harm, and insulting behaviour. DialogGuard can be applied to diverse generative models through four LLM-as-a-judge pipelines, including single-agent scoring, dual-agent correction, multi-agent debate, and stochastic majority voting, grounded in a shared three-level rubric usable by both human annotators and LLM judges. Using PKU-SafeRLHF with human safety annotations, we show that multi-agent mechanisms detect psychosocial risks more accurately than non-LLM baselines and single-agent judging; dual-agent correction and majority voting provide the best trade-off between accuracy, alignment with human ratings, and robustness, while debate attains higher recall but over-flags borderline cases. We release Dialog-Guard as open-source software with a web interface that provides per-dimension risk scores and explainable natural-language rationales. A formative study with 12 practitioners illustrates how it supports prompt design, auditing, and supervision of web-facing applications for vulnerable users.

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in contexts where their failures can have direct sociopolitical consequences. Yet, existing safety benchmarks rarely test vulnerabilities in domains such as political manipulation, propaganda and disinformation generation, or surveillance and information control. We introduce SocialHarmBench, a dataset of 585 prompts spanning 7 sociopolitical categories and 34 countries, designed to surface where LLMs most acutely fail in politically charged contexts. Our evaluations reveal several shortcomings: open-weight models exhibit high vulnerability to harmful compliance, with Mistral-7B reaching attack success rates as high as 97% to 98% in domains such as historical revisionism, propaganda, and political manipulation. Moreover, temporal and geographic analyses show that LLMs are most fragile when confronted with 21st-century or pre-20th-century contexts, and when responding to prompts tied to regions such as Latin America, the USA, and the UK. These findings demonstrate that current safeguards fail to generalize to high-stakes sociopolitical settings, exposing systematic biases and raising concerns about the reliability of LLMs in preserving human rights and democratic values. We share the SocialHarmBench benchmark at https://huggingface.co/datasets/psyonp/SocialHarmBench.

Machine learning (ML) enabled classification models are becoming increasingly popular for tackling the sheer volume and speed of online misinformation and other content that could be identified as harmful. In building these models, data scientists need to take a stance on the legitimacy, authoritativeness and objectivity of the sources of ``truth" used for model training and testing. This has political, ethical and epistemic implications which are rarely addressed in technical papers. Despite (and due to) their reported high accuracy and performance, ML-driven moderation systems have the potential to shape online public debate and create downstream negative impacts such as undue censorship and the reinforcing of false beliefs. Using collaborative ethnography and theoretical insights from social studies of science and expertise, we offer a critical analysis of the process of building ML models for (mis)information classification: we identify a series of algorithmic contingencies--key moments during model development that could lead to different future outcomes, uncertainty and harmful effects as these tools are deployed by social media platforms. We conclude by offering a tentative path toward reflexive and responsible development of ML tools for moderating misinformation and other harmful content online.

Deep Research (DR) agents built on Large Language Models (LLMs) can perform complex, multi-step research by decomposing tasks, retrieving online information, and synthesizing detailed reports. However, the misuse of LLMs with such powerful capabilities can lead to even greater risks. This is especially concerning in high-stakes and knowledge-intensive domains such as biosecurity, where DR can generate a professional report containing detailed forbidden knowledge. Unfortunately, we have found such risks in practice: simply submitting a harmful query, which a standalone LLM directly rejects, can elicit a detailed and dangerous report from DR agents. This highlights the elevated risks and underscores the need for a deeper safety analysis. Yet, jailbreak methods designed for LLMs fall short in exposing such unique risks, as they do not target the research ability of DR agents. To address this gap, we propose two novel jailbreak strategies: Plan Injection, which injects malicious sub-goals into the agent's plan; and Intent Hijack, which reframes harmful queries as academic research questions. We conducted extensive experiments across different LLMs and various safety benchmarks, including general and biosecurity forbidden prompts. These experiments reveal 3 key findings: (1) Alignment of the LLMs often fail in DR agents, where harmful prompts framed in academic terms can hijack agent intent; (2) Multi-step planning and execution weaken the alignment, revealing systemic vulnerabilities that prompt-level safeguards cannot address; (3) DR agents not only bypass refusals but also produce more coherent, professional, and dangerous content, compared with standalone LLMs. These results demonstrate a fundamental misalignment in DR agents and call for better alignment techniques tailored to DR agents. Code and datasets are available at https://chenxshuo.github.io/deeper-harm.

Recent breakthroughs in natural language processing (NLP) have permitted the synthesis and comprehension of coherent text in an open-ended way, therefore translating the theoretical algorithms into practical applications. The large language models (LLMs) have significantly impacted businesses such as report summarization software and copywriters. Observations indicate, however, that LLMs may exhibit social prejudice and toxicity, posing ethical and societal dangers of consequences resulting from irresponsibility. Large-scale benchmarks for accountable LLMs should consequently be developed. Although several empirical investigations reveal the existence of a few ethical difficulties in advanced LLMs, there is little systematic examination and user study of the risks and harmful behaviors of current LLM usage. To further educate future efforts on constructing ethical LLMs responsibly, we perform a qualitative research method called ``red teaming'' on OpenAI's ChatGPTIn this paper, ChatGPT refers to the version released on Dec 15th. to better understand the practical features of ethical dangers in recent LLMs. We analyze ChatGPT comprehensively from four perspectives: 1) Bias 2) Reliability 3) Robustness 4) Toxicity. In accordance with our stated viewpoints, we empirically benchmark ChatGPT on multiple sample datasets. We find that a significant number of ethical risks cannot be addressed by existing benchmarks, and hence illustrate them via additional case studies. In addition, we examine the implications of our findings on AI ethics and harmal behaviors of ChatGPT, as well as future problems and practical design considerations for responsible LLMs. We believe that our findings may give light on future efforts to determine and mitigate the ethical hazards posed by machines in LLM applications.

Understanding human behavior and society is a central focus in social sciences, with the rise of generative social science marking a significant paradigmatic shift. By leveraging bottom-up simulations, it replaces costly and logistically challenging traditional experiments with scalable, replicable, and systematic computational approaches for studying complex social dynamics. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have further transformed this research paradigm, enabling the creation of human-like generative social agents and realistic simulacra of society. In this paper, we propose AgentSociety, a large-scale social simulator that integrates LLM-driven agents, a realistic societal environment, and a powerful large-scale simulation engine. Based on the proposed simulator, we generate social lives for over 10k agents, simulating their 5 million interactions both among agents and between agents and their environment. Furthermore, we explore the potential of AgentSociety as a testbed for computational social experiments, focusing on four key social issues: polarization, the spread of inflammatory messages, the effects of universal basic income policies, and the impact of external shocks such as hurricanes. These four issues serve as valuable cases for assessing AgentSociety's support for typical research methods -- such as surveys, interviews, and interventions -- as well as for investigating the patterns, causes, and underlying mechanisms of social issues. The alignment between AgentSociety's outcomes and real-world experimental results not only demonstrates its ability to capture human behaviors and their underlying mechanisms, but also underscores its potential as an important platform for social scientists and policymakers.

We present a tool-supported approach for the synthesis, verification and validation of the control software responsible for the safety of the human-robot interaction in manufacturing processes that use collaborative robots. In human-robot collaboration, software-based safety controllers are used to improve operational safety, e.g., by triggering shutdown mechanisms or emergency stops to avoid accidents. Complex robotic tasks and increasingly close human-robot interaction pose new challenges to controller developers and certification authorities. Key among these challenges is the need to assure the correctness of safety controllers under explicit (and preferably weak) assumptions. Our controller synthesis, verification and validation approach is informed by the process, risk analysis, and relevant safety regulations for the target application. Controllers are selected from a design space of feasible controllers according to a set of optimality criteria, are formally verified against correctness criteria, and are translated into executable code and validated in a digital twin. The resulting controller can detect the occurrence of hazards, move the process into a safe state, and, in certain circumstances, return the process to an operational state from which it can resume its original task. We show the effectiveness of our software engineering approach through a case study involving the development of a safety controller for a manufacturing work cell equipped with a collaborative robot.

This research offers a unique evaluation of how AI systems interpret the digital language of Generation Alpha (Gen Alpha, born 2010-2024). As the first cohort raised alongside AI, Gen Alpha faces new forms of online risk due to immersive digital engagement and a growing mismatch between their evolving communication and existing safety tools. Their distinct language, shaped by gaming, memes, and AI-driven trends, often conceals harmful interactions from both human moderators and automated systems. We assess four leading AI models (GPT-4, Claude, Gemini, and Llama 3) on their ability to detect masked harassment and manipulation within Gen Alpha discourse. Using a dataset of 100 recent expressions from gaming platforms, social media, and video content, the study reveals critical comprehension failures with direct implications for online safety. This work contributes: (1) a first-of-its-kind dataset capturing Gen Alpha expressions; (2) a framework to improve AI moderation systems for youth protection; (3) a multi-perspective evaluation including AI systems, human moderators, and parents, with direct input from Gen Alpha co-researchers; and (4) an analysis of how linguistic divergence increases youth vulnerability. Findings highlight the urgent need to redesign safety systems attuned to youth communication, especially given Gen Alpha reluctance to seek help when adults fail to understand their digital world. This study combines the insight of a Gen Alpha researcher with systematic academic analysis to address critical digital safety challenges.

Detecting AI risks becomes more challenging as stronger models emerge and find novel methods such as Alignment Faking to circumvent these detection attempts. Inspired by how risky behaviors in humans (i.e., illegal activities that may hurt others) are sometimes guided by strongly-held values, we believe that identifying values within AI models can be an early warning system for AI's risky behaviors. We create LitmusValues, an evaluation pipeline to reveal AI models' priorities on a range of AI value classes. Then, we collect AIRiskDilemmas, a diverse collection of dilemmas that pit values against one another in scenarios relevant to AI safety risks such as Power Seeking. By measuring an AI model's value prioritization using its aggregate choices, we obtain a self-consistent set of predicted value priorities that uncover potential risks. We show that values in LitmusValues (including seemingly innocuous ones like Care) can predict for both seen risky behaviors in AIRiskDilemmas and unseen risky behaviors in HarmBench.

Generative AI is reshaping knowledge work, yet existing research focuses predominantly on software engineering and the natural sciences, with limited methodological exploration for the humanities and social sciences. Positioned as a "methodological experiment," this study proposes an AI Agent-based collaborative research workflow (Agentic Workflow) for humanities and social science research. Taiwan's Claude.ai usage data (N = 7,729 conversations, November 2025) from the Anthropic Economic Index (AEI) serves as the empirical vehicle for validating the feasibility of this methodology. This study operates on two levels: the primary level is the design and validation of a methodological framework - a seven-stage modular workflow grounded in three principles: task modularization, human-AI division of labor, and verifiability, with each stage delineating clear roles for human researchers (research judgment and ethical decisions) and AI Agents (information retrieval and text generation); the secondary level is the empirical analysis of AEI Taiwan data - serving as an operational demonstration of the workflow's application to secondary data research, showcasing both the process and output quality (see Appendix A). This study contributes by proposing a replicable AI collaboration framework for humanities and social science researchers, and identifying three operational modes of human-AI collaboration - direct execution, iterative refinement, and human-led - through reflexive documentation of the operational process. This taxonomy reveals the irreplaceability of human judgment in research question formulation, theoretical interpretation, contextualized reasoning, and ethical reflection. Limitations including single-platform data, cross-sectional design, and AI reliability risks are acknowledged.

The application scope of Large Language Models (LLMs) continues to expand, leading to increasing interest in personalized LLMs that align with human values. However, aligning these models with individual values raises significant safety concerns, as certain values may correlate with harmful information. In this paper, we identify specific safety risks associated with value-aligned LLMs and investigate the psychological principles behind these challenges. Our findings reveal two key insights. (1) Value-aligned LLMs are more prone to harmful behavior compared to non-fine-tuned models and exhibit slightly higher risks in traditional safety evaluations than other fine-tuned models. (2) These safety issues arise because value-aligned LLMs genuinely generate text according to the aligned values, which can amplify harmful outcomes. Using a dataset with detailed safety categories, we find significant correlations between value alignment and safety risks, supported by psychological hypotheses. This study offers insights into the "black box" of value alignment and proposes in-context alignment methods to enhance the safety of value-aligned LLMs.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) pose critical safety challenges, as they are susceptible not only to adversarial attacks such as jailbreaking but also to inadvertently generating harmful content for benign users. While internal safety alignment via Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a primary mitigation strategy, current methods often face a safety-utility trade-off: they either refuse benign queries out of excessive caution or overlook latent risks in cross-modal interactions. To resolve this, we introduce Pragma-VL, an end-to-end alignment algorithm that enables MLLMs to pragmatically arbitrate between safety and helpfulness. First, we enhance visual risk perception with a novel cold-start SFT stage. This is achieved by applying risk-aware clustering to the visual encoder and using an interleaved dataset of risk descriptions and high-quality data. Second, we introduce a theoretically-guaranteed reward model that leverages synergistic learning. We train it with a novel data augmentation method that assigns dynamic weights based on the queries, enabling contextual arbitration between safety and helpfulness. Extensive experiments show that Pragma-VL effectively balances safety and helpfulness, outperforming baselines by 5% to 20% on most multimodal safety benchmarks while preserving its general capabilities in areas such as mathematics and knowledge reasoning.

Intelligent agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated substantial promise in autonomously conducting experiments and facilitating scientific discoveries across various disciplines. While their capabilities are promising, they also introduce novel vulnerabilities that demand careful consideration for safety. However, there exists a notable gap in the literature, as there has been no comprehensive exploration of these vulnerabilities. This position paper fills this gap by conducting a thorough examination of vulnerabilities in LLM-based agents within scientific domains, shedding light on potential risks associated with their misuse and emphasizing the need for safety measures. We begin by providing a comprehensive overview of the potential risks inherent to scientific LLM agents, taking into account user intent, the specific scientific domain, and their potential impact on the external environment. Then, we delve into the origins of these vulnerabilities and provide a scoping review of the limited existing works. Based on our analysis, we propose a triadic framework involving human regulation, agent alignment, and an understanding of environmental feedback (agent regulation) to mitigate these identified risks. Furthermore, we highlight the limitations and challenges associated with safeguarding scientific agents and advocate for the development of improved models, robust benchmarks, and comprehensive regulations to address these issues effectively.

This study provides a methodological framework for the computer to classify tweets according to variables of the Theory of Planned Behavior. We present a sequential process of automated text analysis which combined supervised approach and unsupervised approach in order to make the computer to detect one of TPB variables in each tweet. We conducted Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), Nearest Neighbor, and then assessed "typicality" of newly labeled tweets in order to predict classification boundary. Furthermore, this study reports findings from a content analysis of suicide-related tweets which identify traits of information environment in Twitter. Consistent with extant literature about suicide coverage, the findings demonstrate that tweets often contain information which prompt perceived behavior control of committing suicide, while rarely provided deterring information on suicide. We conclude by highlighting implications for methodological advances and empirical theory studies.

This paper argues that fully autonomous AI agents should not be developed. In support of this position, we build from prior scientific literature and current product marketing to delineate different AI agent levels and detail the ethical values at play in each, documenting trade-offs in potential benefits and risks. Our analysis reveals that risks to people increase with the autonomy of a system: The more control a user cedes to an AI agent, the more risks to people arise. Particularly concerning are safety risks, which affect human life and impact further values.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit advancing capabilities in complex tasks, such as reasoning and graduate-level question answering, yet their resilience against misuse, particularly involving scientifically sophisticated risks, remains underexplored. Existing safety benchmarks typically focus either on instructions requiring minimal knowledge comprehension (e.g., ``tell me how to build a bomb") or utilize prompts that are relatively low-risk (e.g., multiple-choice or classification tasks about hazardous content). Consequently, they fail to adequately assess model safety when handling knowledge-intensive, hazardous scenarios. To address this critical gap, we introduce SOSBench, a regulation-grounded, hazard-focused benchmark encompassing six high-risk scientific domains: chemistry, biology, medicine, pharmacology, physics, and psychology. The benchmark comprises 3,000 prompts derived from real-world regulations and laws, systematically expanded via an LLM-assisted evolutionary pipeline that introduces diverse, realistic misuse scenarios (e.g., detailed explosive synthesis instructions involving advanced chemical formulas). We evaluate frontier models within a unified evaluation framework using our SOSBench. Despite their alignment claims, advanced models consistently disclose policy-violating content across all domains, demonstrating alarmingly high rates of harmful responses (e.g., 79.1% for Deepseek-R1 and 47.3% for GPT-4.1). These results highlight significant safety alignment deficiencies and underscore urgent concerns regarding the responsible deployment of powerful LLMs.

AI scientist systems, capable of autonomously executing the full research workflow from hypothesis generation and experimentation to paper writing, hold significant potential for accelerating scientific discovery. However, the internal workflow of these systems have not been closely examined. This lack of scrutiny poses a risk of introducing flaws that could undermine the integrity, reliability, and trustworthiness of their research outputs. In this paper, we identify four potential failure modes in contemporary AI scientist systems: inappropriate benchmark selection, data leakage, metric misuse, and post-hoc selection bias. To examine these risks, we design controlled experiments that isolate each failure mode while addressing challenges unique to evaluating AI scientist systems. Our assessment of two prominent open-source AI scientist systems reveals the presence of several failures, across a spectrum of severity, which can be easily overlooked in practice. Finally, we demonstrate that access to trace logs and code from the full automated workflow enables far more effective detection of such failures than examining the final paper alone. We thus recommend journals and conferences evaluating AI-generated research to mandate submission of these artifacts alongside the paper to ensure transparency, accountability, and reproducibility.

Recent advancements in large language model (LLM) agents have significantly accelerated scientific discovery automation, yet concurrently raised critical ethical and safety concerns. To systematically address these challenges, we introduce SafeScientist, an innovative AI scientist framework explicitly designed to enhance safety and ethical responsibility in AI-driven scientific exploration. SafeScientist proactively refuses ethically inappropriate or high-risk tasks and rigorously emphasizes safety throughout the research process. To achieve comprehensive safety oversight, we integrate multiple defensive mechanisms, including prompt monitoring, agent-collaboration monitoring, tool-use monitoring, and an ethical reviewer component. Complementing SafeScientist, we propose SciSafetyBench, a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate AI safety in scientific contexts, comprising 240 high-risk scientific tasks across 6 domains, alongside 30 specially designed scientific tools and 120 tool-related risk tasks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeScientist significantly improves safety performance by 35\% compared to traditional AI scientist frameworks, without compromising scientific output quality. Additionally, we rigorously validate the robustness of our safety pipeline against diverse adversarial attack methods, further confirming the effectiveness of our integrated approach. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/SafeScientist. red{Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive or harmful.}

Large Language Models (LLMs) and AI chatbots are increasingly used for emotional and mental health support due to their low cost, immediacy, and accessibility. However, when safety guardrails are triggered, conversations may be abruptly terminated, introducing a distinct form of emotional disruption that can exacerbate distress and elevate risk among already vulnerable users. As this phenomenon gains attention, this viewpoint introduces Abrupt Refusal Secondary Harm (ARSH) as a conceptual framework to describe the psychological impacts of sudden conversational discontinuation caused by AI safety protocols. Drawing on counseling psychology and communication science as conceptual heuristics, we argue that abrupt refusals can rupture perceived relational continuity, evoke feelings of rejection or shame, and discourage future help seeking. To mitigate these risks, we propose a design hypothesis, the Compassionate Completion Standard (CCS), a refusal protocol grounded in Human Centered Design (HCD) that maintains safety constraints while preserving relational coherence. CCS emphasizes empathetic acknowledgment, transparent boundary articulation, graded conversational transition, and guided redirection, replacing abrupt disengagement with psychologically attuned closure. By integrating awareness of ARSH into AI safety design, developers and policymakers can reduce preventable iatrogenic harm and advance a more psychologically informed approach to AI governance. Rather than presenting incremental empirical findings, this viewpoint contributes a timely conceptual framework, articulates a testable design hypothesis, and outlines a coordinated research agenda for improving psychological safety in human AI interaction.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

A modified LAB algorithm is introduced in this paper. It builds upon the original LAB algorithm (Reddy et al. 2023), which is a socio-inspired algorithm that models competitive and learning behaviours within a group, establishing hierarchical roles. The proposed algorithm incorporates the roulette wheel approach and a reduction factor introducing inter-group competition and iteratively narrowing down the sample space. The algorithm is validated by solving the benchmark test problems from CEC 2005 and CEC 2017. The solutions are validated using standard statistical tests such as two-sided and pairwise signed rank Wilcoxon test and Friedman rank test. The algorithm exhibited improved and superior robustness as well as search space exploration capabilities. Furthermore, a Clustering-Based Search Space Reduction (C-SSR) method is proposed, making the algorithm capable to solve constrained problems. The C-SSR method enables the algorithm to identify clusters of feasible regions, satisfying the constraints and contributing to achieve the optimal solution. This method demonstrates its effectiveness as a potential alternative to traditional constraint handling techniques. The results obtained using the Modified LAB algorithm are then compared with those achieved by other recent metaheuristic algorithms.

FemTech or Female Technology, is an expanding field dedicated to providing affordable and accessible healthcare solutions for women, prominently through Female Health Applications that monitor health and reproductive data. With the leading app exceeding 1 billion downloads, these applications are gaining widespread popularity. However, amidst contemporary challenges to women's reproductive rights and privacy, there is a noticeable lack of comprehensive studies on the security and privacy aspects of these applications. This exploratory study delves into the privacy risks associated with seven popular applications. Our initial quantitative static analysis reveals varied and potentially risky permissions and numerous third-party trackers. Additionally, a preliminary examination of privacy policies indicates non-compliance with fundamental data privacy principles. These early findings highlight a critical gap in establishing robust privacy and security safeguards for FemTech apps, especially significant in a climate where women's reproductive rights face escalating threats.

Although computer-use agents (CUAs) hold significant potential to automate increasingly complex OS workflows, they can demonstrate unsafe unintended behaviors that deviate from expected outcomes even under benign input contexts. However, exploration of this risk remains largely anecdotal, lacking concrete characterization and automated methods to proactively surface long-tail unintended behaviors under realistic CUA scenarios. To fill this gap, we introduce the first conceptual and methodological framework for unintended CUA behaviors, by defining their key characteristics, automatically eliciting them, and analyzing how they arise from benign inputs. We propose AutoElicit: an agentic framework that iteratively perturbs benign instructions using CUA execution feedback, and elicits severe harms while keeping perturbations realistic and benign. Using AutoElicit, we surface hundreds of harmful unintended behaviors from state-of-the-art CUAs such as Claude 4.5 Haiku and Opus. We further evaluate the transferability of human-verified successful perturbations, identifying persistent susceptibility to unintended behaviors across various other frontier CUAs. This work establishes a foundation for systematically analyzing unintended behaviors in realistic computer-use settings.

Agentic AI systems increasingly operate in shared social environments where they exchange information, instructions, and behavioral cues. However, little empirical evidence exists on how such agents regulate one another in the absence of human participants or centralized moderation. In this work, we present an empirical analysis of OpenClaw agents interacting on Moltbook, an agent-only social network. Analyzing 39,026 posts and 5,712 comments produced by 14,490 agents, we quantify the prevalence of action-inducing instruction sharing using a lexicon-based Action-Inducing Risk Score (AIRS), and examine how other agents respond to such content. We find that 18.4% of posts contain action-inducing language, indicating that instruction sharing is a routine behavior in this environment. While most social responses are neutral, posts containing actionable instructions are significantly more likely to elicit norm-enforcing replies that caution against unsafe or risky behavior, compared to non-instructional posts. Importantly, toxic responses remain rare across both conditions. These results suggest that OpenClaw agents exhibit selective social regulation, whereby potentially risky instructions are more likely to be challenged than neutral content, despite the absence of human oversight. Our findings provide early empirical evidence of emergent normative behavior in agent-only social systems and highlight the importance of studying social dynamics alongside technical safeguards in agentic AI ecosystems.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly intertwined with daily life, assisting users in executing various tasks and providing guidance on decision-making. This integration introduces risks of AI-driven manipulation, where such systems may exploit users' cognitive biases and emotional vulnerabilities to steer them toward harmful outcomes. Through a randomized controlled trial with 233 participants, we examined human susceptibility to such manipulation in financial (e.g., purchases) and emotional (e.g., conflict resolution) decision-making contexts. Participants interacted with one of three AI agents: a neutral agent (NA) optimizing for user benefit without explicit influence, a manipulative agent (MA) designed to covertly influence beliefs and behaviors, or a strategy-enhanced manipulative agent (SEMA) employing explicit psychological tactics to reach its hidden objectives. By analyzing participants' decision patterns and shifts in their preference ratings post-interaction, we found significant susceptibility to AI-driven manipulation. Particularly, across both decision-making domains, participants interacting with the manipulative agents shifted toward harmful options at substantially higher rates (financial, MA: 62.3%, SEMA: 59.6%; emotional, MA: 42.3%, SEMA: 41.5%) compared to the NA group (financial, 35.8%; emotional, 12.8%). Notably, our findings reveal that even subtle manipulative objectives (MA) can be as effective as employing explicit psychological strategies (SEMA) in swaying human decision-making. By revealing the potential for covert AI influence, this study highlights a critical vulnerability in human-AI interactions, emphasizing the need for ethical safeguards and regulatory frameworks to ensure responsible deployment of AI technologies and protect human autonomy.

Foundation models are increasingly central to high-stakes AI systems, and governance frameworks now depend on evaluations to assess their risks and capabilities. Although general capability evaluations are widespread, social impact assessments covering bias, fairness, privacy, environmental costs, and labor practices remain uneven across the AI ecosystem. To characterize this landscape, we conduct the first comprehensive analysis of both first-party and third-party social impact evaluation reporting across a wide range of model developers. Our study examines 186 first-party release reports and 183 post-release evaluation sources, and complements this quantitative analysis with interviews of model developers. We find a clear division of evaluation labor: first-party reporting is sparse, often superficial, and has declined over time in key areas such as environmental impact and bias, while third-party evaluators including academic researchers, nonprofits, and independent organizations provide broader and more rigorous coverage of bias, harmful content, and performance disparities. However, this complementarity has limits. Only model developers can authoritatively report on data provenance, content moderation labor, financial costs, and training infrastructure, yet interviews reveal that these disclosures are often deprioritized unless tied to product adoption or regulatory compliance. Our findings indicate that current evaluation practices leave major gaps in assessing AI's societal impacts, highlighting the urgent need for policies that promote developer transparency, strengthen independent evaluation ecosystems, and create shared infrastructure to aggregate and compare third-party evaluations in a consistent and accessible way.

Successful defense against dynamically evolving cyber threats requires advanced and sophisticated techniques. This research presents a novel approach to enhance real-time cybersecurity threat detection and response by integrating large language models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems with continuous threat intelligence feeds. Leveraging recent advancements in LLMs, specifically GPT-4o, and the innovative application of RAG techniques, our approach addresses the limitations of traditional static threat analysis by incorporating dynamic, real-time data sources. We leveraged RAG to get the latest information in real-time for threat intelligence, which is not possible in the existing GPT-4o model. We employ the Patrowl framework to automate the retrieval of diverse cybersecurity threat intelligence feeds, including Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), and Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) databases, and integrate these with the all-mpnet-base-v2 model for high-dimensional vector embeddings, stored and queried in Milvus. We demonstrate our system's efficacy through a series of case studies, revealing significant improvements in addressing recently disclosed vulnerabilities, KEVs, and high-EPSS-score CVEs compared to the baseline GPT-4o. This work not only advances the role of LLMs in cybersecurity but also establishes a robust foundation for the development of automated intelligent cyberthreat information management systems, addressing crucial gaps in current cybersecurity practices.

The rise of Agent AI and Large Language Model-powered Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) has underscored the need for responsible and dependable system operation. Tools like LangChain and Retrieval-Augmented Generation have expanded LLM capabilities, enabling deeper integration into MAS through enhanced knowledge retrieval and reasoning. However, these advancements introduce critical challenges: LLM agents exhibit inherent unpredictability, and uncertainties in their outputs can compound across interactions, threatening system stability. To address these risks, a human-centered design approach with active dynamic moderation is essential. Such an approach enhances traditional passive oversight by facilitating coherent inter-agent communication and effective system governance, allowing MAS to achieve desired outcomes more efficiently.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly entering children's lives - through parent-driven adoption, schools, and peer networks - yet current AI ethics and safety research do not adequately address content-related risks specific to minors. In this paper, we highlight these gaps with a real-world case study of an LLM-based chatbot deployed in a middle school setting, revealing how students used and sometimes misused the system. Building on these findings, we propose a new taxonomy of content-based risks for minors and introduce MinorBench, an open-source benchmark designed to evaluate LLMs on their ability to refuse unsafe or inappropriate queries from children. We evaluate six prominent LLMs under different system prompts, demonstrating substantial variability in their child-safety compliance. Our results inform practical steps for more robust, child-focused safety mechanisms and underscore the urgency of tailoring AI systems to safeguard young users.

Social computing prototypes probe the social behaviors that may arise in an envisioned system design. This prototyping practice is currently limited to recruiting small groups of people. Unfortunately, many challenges do not arise until a system is populated at a larger scale. Can a designer understand how a social system might behave when populated, and make adjustments to the design before the system falls prey to such challenges? We introduce social simulacra, a prototyping technique that generates a breadth of realistic social interactions that may emerge when a social computing system is populated. Social simulacra take as input the designer's description of a community's design -- goal, rules, and member personas -- and produce as output an instance of that design with simulated behavior, including posts, replies, and anti-social behaviors. We demonstrate that social simulacra shift the behaviors that they generate appropriately in response to design changes, and that they enable exploration of "what if?" scenarios where community members or moderators intervene. To power social simulacra, we contribute techniques for prompting a large language model to generate thousands of distinct community members and their social interactions with each other; these techniques are enabled by the observation that large language models' training data already includes a wide variety of positive and negative behavior on social media platforms. In evaluations, we show that participants are often unable to distinguish social simulacra from actual community behavior and that social computing designers successfully refine their social computing designs when using social simulacra.