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Apr 20

Free-Lunch Color-Texture Disentanglement for Stylized Image Generation

Recent advances in Text-to-Image (T2I) diffusion models have transformed image generation, enabling significant progress in stylized generation using only a few style reference images. However, current diffusion-based methods struggle with fine-grained style customization due to challenges in controlling multiple style attributes, such as color and texture. This paper introduces the first tuning-free approach to achieve free-lunch color-texture disentanglement in stylized T2I generation, addressing the need for independently controlled style elements for the Disentangled Stylized Image Generation (DisIG) problem. Our approach leverages the Image-Prompt Additivity property in the CLIP image embedding space to develop techniques for separating and extracting Color-Texture Embeddings (CTE) from individual color and texture reference images. To ensure that the color palette of the generated image aligns closely with the color reference, we apply a whitening and coloring transformation to enhance color consistency. Additionally, to prevent texture loss due to the signal-leak bias inherent in diffusion training, we introduce a noise term that preserves textural fidelity during the Regularized Whitening and Coloring Transformation (RegWCT). Through these methods, our Style Attributes Disentanglement approach (SADis) delivers a more precise and customizable solution for stylized image generation. Experiments on images from the WikiArt and StyleDrop datasets demonstrate that, both qualitatively and quantitatively, SADis surpasses state-of-the-art stylization methods in the DisIG task.Code will be released at https://deepffff.github.io/sadis.github.io/.

  • 7 authors
·
Mar 18, 2025

Long Text Generation via Adversarial Training with Leaked Information

Automatically generating coherent and semantically meaningful text has many applications in machine translation, dialogue systems, image captioning, etc. Recently, by combining with policy gradient, Generative Adversarial Nets (GAN) that use a discriminative model to guide the training of the generative model as a reinforcement learning policy has shown promising results in text generation. However, the scalar guiding signal is only available after the entire text has been generated and lacks intermediate information about text structure during the generative process. As such, it limits its success when the length of the generated text samples is long (more than 20 words). In this paper, we propose a new framework, called LeakGAN, to address the problem for long text generation. We allow the discriminative net to leak its own high-level extracted features to the generative net to further help the guidance. The generator incorporates such informative signals into all generation steps through an additional Manager module, which takes the extracted features of current generated words and outputs a latent vector to guide the Worker module for next-word generation. Our extensive experiments on synthetic data and various real-world tasks with Turing test demonstrate that LeakGAN is highly effective in long text generation and also improves the performance in short text generation scenarios. More importantly, without any supervision, LeakGAN would be able to implicitly learn sentence structures only through the interaction between Manager and Worker.

  • 6 authors
·
Sep 24, 2017

SNEAK: Evaluating Strategic Communication and Information Leakage in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-agent settings where communication must balance informativeness and secrecy. In such settings, an agent may need to signal information to collaborators while preventing an adversary from inferring sensitive details. However, existing LLM benchmarks primarily evaluate capabilities such as reasoning, factual knowledge, or instruction following, and do not directly measure strategic communication under asymmetric information. We introduce SNEAK (Secret-aware Natural language Evaluation for Adversarial Knowledge), a benchmark for evaluating selective information sharing in language models. In SNEAK, a model is given a semantic category, a candidate set of words, and a secret word, and must generate a message that indicates knowledge of the secret without revealing it too clearly. We evaluate generated messages using two simulated agents with different information states: an ally, who knows the secret and must identify the intended message, and a chameleon, who does not know the secret and attempts to infer it from the message. This yields two complementary metrics: utility, measuring how well the message communicates to collaborators, and leakage, measuring how much information it reveals to an adversary. Using this framework, we analyze the trade-off between informativeness and secrecy in modern language models and show that strategic communication under asymmetric information remains a challenging capability for current systems. Notably, human participants outperform all evaluated models by a large margin, achieving up to four times higher scores.

  • 2 authors
·
Mar 30

CTRL-ALT-LED: Leaking Data from Air-Gapped Computers via Keyboard LEDs

Using the keyboard LEDs to send data optically was proposed in 2002 by Loughry and Umphress [1] (Appendix A). In this paper we extensively explore this threat in the context of a modern cyber-attack with current hardware and optical equipment. In this type of attack, an advanced persistent threat (APT) uses the keyboard LEDs (Caps-Lock, Num-Lock and Scroll-Lock) to encode information and exfiltrate data from airgapped computers optically. Notably, this exfiltration channel is not monitored by existing data leakage prevention (DLP) systems. We examine this attack and its boundaries for today's keyboards with USB controllers and sensitive optical sensors. We also introduce smartphone and smartwatch cameras as components of malicious insider and 'evil maid' attacks. We provide the necessary scientific background on optical communication and the characteristics of modern USB keyboards at the hardware and software level, and present a transmission protocol and modulation schemes. We implement the exfiltration malware, discuss its design and implementation issues, and evaluate it with different types of keyboards. We also test various receivers, including light sensors, remote cameras, 'extreme' cameras, security cameras, and smartphone cameras. Our experiment shows that data can be leaked from air-gapped computers via the keyboard LEDs at a maximum bit rate of 3000 bit/sec per LED given a light sensor as a receiver, and more than 120 bit/sec if smartphones are used. The attack doesn't require any modification of the keyboard at hardware or firmware levels.

  • 4 authors
·
Jul 10, 2019