Daily Papers

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has demonstrated tremendous empirical success across numerous challenging domains. However, we lack a strong theoretical understanding of the statistical complexity of RL in environments with large state spaces, where function approximation is required for sample-efficient learning. This thesis addresses this gap by rigorously examining the statistical complexity of RL with function approximation from a learning theoretic perspective. Departing from a long history of prior work, we consider the weakest form of function approximation, called agnostic policy learning, in which the learner seeks to find the best policy in a given class Pi, with no guarantee that Pi contains an optimal policy for the underlying task. We systematically explore agnostic policy learning along three key axes: environment access -- how a learner collects data from the environment; coverage conditions -- intrinsic properties of the underlying MDP measuring the expansiveness of state-occupancy measures for policies in the class Pi, and representational conditions -- structural assumptions on the class Pi itself. Within this comprehensive framework, we (1) design new learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees and (2) characterize fundamental performance bounds of any algorithm. Our results reveal significant statistical separations that highlight the power and limitations of agnostic policy learning.

In human interaction, gestures serve various functions such as marking speech rhythm, highlighting key elements, and supplementing information. These gestures are also observed in explanatory contexts. However, the impact of gestures on explanations provided by virtual agents remains underexplored. A user study was carried out to investigate how different types of gestures influence perceived interaction quality and listener understanding. This study addresses the effect of gestures in explanation by developing an embodied virtual explainer integrating both beat gestures and iconic gestures to enhance its automatically generated verbal explanations. Our model combines beat gestures generated by a learned speech-driven synthesis module with manually captured iconic gestures, supporting the agent's verbal expressions about the board game Quarto! as an explanation scenario. Findings indicate that neither the use of iconic gestures alone nor their combination with beat gestures outperforms the baseline or beat-only conditions in terms of understanding. Nonetheless, compared to prior research, the embodied agent significantly enhances understanding.

State Space Models (SSMs) have emerged as a promising alternative to Transformers for long-context sequence modeling, offering linear O(N) computational complexity compared to the Transformer's quadratic O(N^2) scaling. This paper presents a comprehensive benchmarking study comparing the Mamba SSM against the LLaMA Transformer on long-context sequences, using dyadic therapy sessions as a representative test case. We evaluate both architectures across two dimensions: (1) computational efficiency, where we measure memory usage and inference speed from 512 to 8,192 tokens, and (2) representational efficiency, where we analyze hidden state dynamics and attention patterns. Our findings provide actionable insights for practitioners working with long-context applications, establishing precise conditions under which SSMs offer advantages over Transformers.

Neural network training is inherently sensitive to initialization and the randomness induced by stochastic gradient descent. However, it is unclear to what extent such effects lead to meaningfully different networks, either in terms of the models' weights or the underlying functions that were learned. In this work, we show that during the initial "chaotic" phase of training, even extremely small perturbations reliably causes otherwise identical training trajectories to diverge-an effect that diminishes rapidly over training time. We quantify this divergence through (i) L^2 distance between parameters, (ii) the loss barrier when interpolating between networks, (iii) L^2 and barrier between parameters after permutation alignment, and (iv) representational similarity between intermediate activations; revealing how perturbations across different hyperparameter or fine-tuning settings drive training trajectories toward distinct loss minima. Our findings provide insights into neural network training stability, with practical implications for fine-tuning, model merging, and diversity of model ensembles.

Transfer learning is a powerful technique for knowledge-sharing between different tasks. Recent work has found that the representations of models with certain invariances, such as to adversarial input perturbations, achieve higher performance on downstream tasks. These findings suggest that invariance may be an important property in the context of transfer learning. However, the relationship of invariance with transfer performance is not fully understood yet and a number of questions remain. For instance, how important is invariance compared to other factors of the pretraining task? How transferable is learned invariance? In this work, we systematically investigate the importance of representational invariance for transfer learning, as well as how it interacts with other parameters during pretraining. To do so, we introduce a family of synthetic datasets that allow us to precisely control factors of variation both in training and test data. Using these datasets, we a) show that for learning representations with high transfer performance, invariance to the right transformations is as, or often more, important than most other factors such as the number of training samples, the model architecture and the identity of the pretraining classes, b) show conditions under which invariance can harm the ability to transfer representations and c) explore how transferable invariance is between tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/tillspeicher/representation-invariance-transfer.

Compositional generalization, the ability to recognize familiar parts in novel contexts, is a defining property of intelligent systems. Although modern models are trained on massive datasets, they still cover only a tiny fraction of the combinatorial space of possible inputs, raising the question of what structure representations must have to support generalization to unseen combinations. We formalize three desiderata for compositional generalization under standard training (divisibility, transferability, stability) and show they impose necessary geometric constraints: representations must decompose linearly into per-concept components, and these components must be orthogonal across concepts. This provides theoretical grounding for the Linear Representation Hypothesis: the linear structure widely observed in neural representations is a necessary consequence of compositional generalization. We further derive dimension bounds linking the number of composable concepts to the embedding geometry. Empirically, we evaluate these predictions across modern vision models (CLIP, SigLIP, DINO) and find that representations exhibit partial linear factorization with low-rank, near-orthogonal per-concept factors, and that the degree of this structure correlates with compositional generalization on unseen combinations. As models continue to scale, these conditions predict the representational geometry they may converge to. Code is available at https://github.com/oshapio/necessary-compositionality.

The effect of underrepresentation on the performance of minority groups is known to be a serious problem in supervised learning settings; however, it has been underexplored so far in the context of self-supervised learning (SSL). In this paper, we demonstrate that contrastive learning (CL), a popular variant of SSL, tends to collapse representations of minority groups with certain majority groups. We refer to this phenomenon as representation harm and demonstrate it on image and text datasets using the corresponding popular CL methods. Furthermore, our causal mediation analysis of allocation harm on a downstream classification task reveals that representation harm is partly responsible for it, thus emphasizing the importance of studying and mitigating representation harm. Finally, we provide a theoretical explanation for representation harm using a stochastic block model that leads to a representational neural collapse in a contrastive learning setting.

Do brains and language models converge toward the same internal representations of the world? Recent years have seen a rise in studies of neural activations and model alignment. In this work, we review 25 fMRI-based studies published between 2023 and 2025 and explicitly confront their findings with two key hypotheses: (i) the Platonic Representation Hypothesis -- that as models scale and improve, they converge to a representation of the real world, and (ii) the Intermediate-Layer Advantage -- that intermediate (mid-depth) layers often encode richer, more generalizable features. Our findings provide converging evidence that models and brains may share abstract representational structures, supporting both hypotheses and motivating further research on brain-model alignment.

Representation learning, and interpreting learned representations, are key areas of focus in machine learning and neuroscience. Both fields generally use representations as a means to understand or improve a system's computations. In this work, however, we explore surprising dissociations between representation and computation that may pose challenges for such efforts. We create datasets in which we attempt to match the computational role that different features play, while manipulating other properties of the features or the data. We train various deep learning architectures to compute these multiple abstract features about their inputs. We find that their learned feature representations are systematically biased towards representing some features more strongly than others, depending upon extraneous properties such as feature complexity, the order in which features are learned, and the distribution of features over the inputs. For example, features that are simpler to compute or learned first tend to be represented more strongly and densely than features that are more complex or learned later, even if all features are learned equally well. We also explore how these biases are affected by architectures, optimizers, and training regimes (e.g., in transformers, features decoded earlier in the output sequence also tend to be represented more strongly). Our results help to characterize the inductive biases of gradient-based representation learning. These results also highlight a key challenge for interpretability - or for comparing the representations of models and brains - disentangling extraneous biases from the computationally important aspects of a system's internal representations.

A key requirement for the development of effective learning representations is their evaluation and comparison to representations we know to be effective. In natural sensory domains, the community has viewed the brain as a source of inspiration and as an implicit benchmark for success. However, it has not been possible to directly test representational learning algorithms directly against the representations contained in neural systems. Here, we propose a new benchmark for visual representations on which we have directly tested the neural representation in multiple visual cortical areas in macaque (utilizing data from [Majaj et al., 2012]), and on which any computer vision algorithm that produces a feature space can be tested. The benchmark measures the effectiveness of the neural or machine representation by computing the classification loss on the ordered eigendecomposition of a kernel matrix [Montavon et al., 2011]. In our analysis we find that the neural representation in visual area IT is superior to visual area V4. In our analysis of representational learning algorithms, we find that three-layer models approach the representational performance of V4 and the algorithm in [Le et al., 2012] surpasses the performance of V4. Impressively, we find that a recent supervised algorithm [Krizhevsky et al., 2012] achieves performance comparable to that of IT for an intermediate level of image variation difficulty, and surpasses IT at a higher difficulty level. We believe this result represents a major milestone: it is the first learning algorithm we have found that exceeds our current estimate of IT representation performance. We hope that this benchmark will assist the community in matching the representational performance of visual cortex and will serve as an initial rallying point for further correspondence between representations derived in brains and machines.

Recent advancements in image generation technology have enabled widespread access to AI-generated imagery, prominently used in advertising, entertainment, and progressively in every form of visual content. However, these technologies often perpetuate societal biases. This study investigates the representation biases in popular image generation models towards people with disabilities (PWD). Through a comprehensive experiment involving several popular text-to-image models, we analyzed the depiction of disability. The results indicate a significant bias, with most generated images portraying disabled individuals as old, sad, and predominantly using manual wheelchairs. These findings highlight the urgent need for more inclusive AI development, ensuring diverse and accurate representation of PWD in generated images. This research underscores the importance of addressing and mitigating biases in AI models to foster equitable and realistic representations.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Representational analysis explores how input data of a neural system are encoded in high dimensional spaces of its distributed neural activations, and how we can compare different systems, for instance, artificial neural networks and brains, on those grounds. While existing methods offer important insights, they typically do not account for local intrinsic geometrical properties within the high-dimensional representation spaces. To go beyond these limitations, we explore Ollivier-Ricci curvature and Ricci flow as tools to study the alignment of representations between humans and artificial neural systems on a geometric level. As a proof-of-principle study, we compared the representations of face stimuli between VGG-Face, a human-aligned version of VGG-Face, and corresponding human similarity judgments from a large online study. Using this discrete geometric framework, we were able to identify local structural similarities and differences by examining the distributions of node and edge curvature and higher-level properties by detecting and comparing community structure in the representational graphs.

Adaptive behavior often requires predicting future events. The theory of reinforcement learning prescribes what kinds of predictive representations are useful and how to compute them. This paper integrates these theoretical ideas with work on cognition and neuroscience. We pay special attention to the successor representation (SR) and its generalizations, which have been widely applied both as engineering tools and models of brain function. This convergence suggests that particular kinds of predictive representations may function as versatile building blocks of intelligence.

We consider concept generalization at a large scale in the diverse and natural visual spectrum. Established computational modes (i.e., rule-based or similarity-based) are primarily studied isolated and focus on confined and abstract problem spaces. In this work, we study these two modes when the problem space scales up, and the complexity of concepts becomes diverse. Specifically, at the representational level, we seek to answer how the complexity varies when a visual concept is mapped to the representation space. Prior psychology literature has shown that two types of complexities (i.e., subjective complexity and visual complexity) (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2003) build an inverted-U relation (Donderi, 2006; Sun and Firestone, 2021). Leveraging Representativeness of Attribute (RoA), we computationally confirm the following observation: Models use attributes with high RoA to describe visual concepts, and the description length falls in an inverted-U relation with the increment in visual complexity. At the computational level, we aim to answer how the complexity of representation affects the shift between the rule- and similarity-based generalization. We hypothesize that category-conditioned visual modeling estimates the co-occurrence frequency between visual and categorical attributes, thus potentially serving as the prior for the natural visual world. Experimental results show that representations with relatively high subjective complexity outperform those with relatively low subjective complexity in the rule-based generalization, while the trend is the opposite in the similarity-based generalization.

What are the root causes of hallucinations in large language models (LLMs)? We use Communication Complexity to prove that the Transformer layer is incapable of composing functions (e.g., identify a grandparent of a person in a genealogy) if the domains of the functions are large enough; we show through examples that this inability is already empirically present when the domains are quite small. We also point out that several mathematical tasks that are at the core of the so-called compositional tasks thought to be hard for LLMs are unlikely to be solvable by Transformers, for large enough instances and assuming that certain well accepted conjectures in the field of Computational Complexity are true.

We argue that representations in AI models, particularly deep networks, are converging. First, we survey many examples of convergence in the literature: over time and across multiple domains, the ways by which different neural networks represent data are becoming more aligned. Next, we demonstrate convergence across data modalities: as vision models and language models get larger, they measure distance between datapoints in a more and more alike way. We hypothesize that this convergence is driving toward a shared statistical model of reality, akin to Plato's concept of an ideal reality. We term such a representation the platonic representation and discuss several possible selective pressures toward it. Finally, we discuss the implications of these trends, their limitations, and counterexamples to our analysis.

We advocate for a strong integration of Computational Creativity (CC) with research in large language and vision models (LLVMs) to address a key limitation of these models, i.e., creative problem solving. We present preliminary experiments showing how CC principles can be applied to address this limitation. Our goal is to foster discussions on creative problem solving in LLVMs and CC at prestigious ML venues. Our code is available at: https://github.com/lnairGT/creative-problem-solving-LLMs

Informally, the 'linear representation hypothesis' is the idea that high-level concepts are represented linearly as directions in some representation space. In this paper, we address two closely related questions: What does "linear representation" actually mean? And, how do we make sense of geometric notions (e.g., cosine similarity or projection) in the representation space? To answer these, we use the language of counterfactuals to give two formalizations of "linear representation", one in the output (word) representation space, and one in the input (sentence) space. We then prove these connect to linear probing and model steering, respectively. To make sense of geometric notions, we use the formalization to identify a particular (non-Euclidean) inner product that respects language structure in a sense we make precise. Using this causal inner product, we show how to unify all notions of linear representation. In particular, this allows the construction of probes and steering vectors using counterfactual pairs. Experiments with LLaMA-2 demonstrate the existence of linear representations of concepts, the connection to interpretation and control, and the fundamental role of the choice of inner product.

A central question for neuroscience is how to characterize brain representations of perceptual and cognitive content. An ideal characterization should distinguish different functional regions with robustness to noise and idiosyncrasies of individual brains that do not correspond to computational differences. Previous studies have characterized brain representations by their representational geometry, which is defined by the representational dissimilarity matrix (RDM), a summary statistic that abstracts from the roles of individual neurons (or responses channels) and characterizes the discriminability of stimuli. Here we explore a further step of abstraction: from the geometry to the topology of brain representations. We propose topological representational similarity analysis (tRSA), an extension of representational similarity analysis (RSA) that uses a family of geo-topological summary statistics that generalizes the RDM to characterize the topology while de-emphasizing the geometry. We evaluate this new family of statistics in terms of the sensitivity and specificity for model selection using both simulations and functional MRI (fMRI) data. In the simulations, the ground truth is a data-generating layer representation in a neural network model and the models are the same and other layers in different model instances (trained from different random seeds). In fMRI, the ground truth is a visual area and the models are the same and other areas measured in different subjects. Results show that topology-sensitive characterizations of population codes are robust to noise and interindividual variability and maintain excellent sensitivity to the unique representational signatures of different neural network layers and brain regions.

The Linear Representation Hypothesis (LRH) states that neural networks learn to encode concepts as directions in activation space, and a strong version of the LRH states that models learn only such encodings. In this paper, we present a counterexample to this strong LRH: when trained to repeat an input token sequence, gated recurrent neural networks (RNNs) learn to represent the token at each position with a particular order of magnitude, rather than a direction. These representations have layered features that are impossible to locate in distinct linear subspaces. To show this, we train interventions to predict and manipulate tokens by learning the scaling factor corresponding to each sequence position. These interventions indicate that the smallest RNNs find only this magnitude-based solution, while larger RNNs have linear representations. These findings strongly indicate that interpretability research should not be confined by the LRH.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis suggests that representations from neural networks are converging to a common statistical model of reality. We show that the existing metrics used to measure representational similarity are confounded by network scale: increasing model depth or width can systematically inflate representational similarity scores. To correct these effects, we introduce a permutation-based null-calibration framework that transforms any representational similarity metric into a calibrated score with statistical guarantees. We revisit the Platonic Representation Hypothesis with our calibration framework, which reveals a nuanced picture: the apparent convergence reported by global spectral measures largely disappears after calibration, while local neighborhood similarity, but not local distances, retains significant agreement across different modalities. Based on these findings, we propose the Aristotelian Representation Hypothesis: representations in neural networks are converging to shared local neighborhood relationships.

The ability to predict upcoming events has been hypothesized to comprise a key aspect of natural and machine cognition. This is supported by trends in deep reinforcement learning (RL), where self-supervised auxiliary objectives such as prediction are widely used to support representation learning and improve task performance. Here, we study the effects predictive auxiliary objectives have on representation learning across different modules of an RL system and how these mimic representational changes observed in the brain. We find that predictive objectives improve and stabilize learning particularly in resource-limited architectures, and we identify settings where longer predictive horizons better support representational transfer. Furthermore, we find that representational changes in this RL system bear a striking resemblance to changes in neural activity observed in the brain across various experiments. Specifically, we draw a connection between the auxiliary predictive model of the RL system and hippocampus, an area thought to learn a predictive model to support memory-guided behavior. We also connect the encoder network and the value learning network of the RL system to visual cortex and striatum in the brain, respectively. This work demonstrates how representation learning in deep RL systems can provide an interpretable framework for modeling multi-region interactions in the brain. The deep RL perspective taken here also suggests an additional role of the hippocampus in the brain -- that of an auxiliary learning system that benefits representation learning in other regions.

Much of the excitement in modern AI is driven by the observation that scaling up existing systems leads to better performance. But does better performance necessarily imply better internal representations? While the representational optimist assumes it must, this position paper challenges that view. We compare neural networks evolved through an open-ended search process to networks trained via conventional stochastic gradient descent (SGD) on the simple task of generating a single image. This minimal setup offers a unique advantage: each hidden neuron's full functional behavior can be easily visualized as an image, thus revealing how the network's output behavior is internally constructed neuron by neuron. The result is striking: while both networks produce the same output behavior, their internal representations differ dramatically. The SGD-trained networks exhibit a form of disorganization that we term fractured entangled representation (FER). Interestingly, the evolved networks largely lack FER, even approaching a unified factored representation (UFR). In large models, FER may be degrading core model capacities like generalization, creativity, and (continual) learning. Therefore, understanding and mitigating FER could be critical to the future of representation learning.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

We aim to understand grokking, a phenomenon where models generalize long after overfitting their training set. We present both a microscopic analysis anchored by an effective theory and a macroscopic analysis of phase diagrams describing learning performance across hyperparameters. We find that generalization originates from structured representations whose training dynamics and dependence on training set size can be predicted by our effective theory in a toy setting. We observe empirically the presence of four learning phases: comprehension, grokking, memorization, and confusion. We find representation learning to occur only in a "Goldilocks zone" (including comprehension and grokking) between memorization and confusion. We find on transformers the grokking phase stays closer to the memorization phase (compared to the comprehension phase), leading to delayed generalization. The Goldilocks phase is reminiscent of "intelligence from starvation" in Darwinian evolution, where resource limitations drive discovery of more efficient solutions. This study not only provides intuitive explanations of the origin of grokking, but also highlights the usefulness of physics-inspired tools, e.g., effective theories and phase diagrams, for understanding deep learning.

Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is assumed to be independent of any consciousness. On the contrary, we assume consciousness to be fundamental, and that one of the main features of consciousness is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up a framework which naturally subsumes this feature by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent. The framework is general enough and fits well into a compositional model of consciousness. Interestingly, we also show how our proposal may become a step towards avoiding the hard problem of consciousness, and thereby address the combination problem of conscious experiences.

Large-scale pretrained language models (LMs) are said to ``lack the ability to connect utterances to the world'' (Bender and Koller, 2020), because they do not have ``mental models of the world' '(Mitchell and Krakauer, 2023). If so, one would expect LM representations to be unrelated to representations induced by vision models. We present an empirical evaluation across four families of LMs (BERT, GPT-2, OPT and LLaMA-2) and three vision model architectures (ResNet, SegFormer, and MAE). Our experiments show that LMs partially converge towards representations isomorphic to those of vision models, subject to dispersion, polysemy and frequency. This has important implications for both multi-modal processing and the LM understanding debate (Mitchell and Krakauer, 2023).

Can large language models (LLMs) implement computations of psychopathology? An effective approach to the question hinges on addressing two factors. First, for conceptual validity, we require a general and computational account of psychopathology that is applicable to computational entities without biological embodiment or subjective experience. Second, mechanisms underlying LLM behaviors need to be studied for better methodological validity. Thus, we establish a computational-theoretical framework to provide an account of psychopathology applicable to LLMs. To ground the theory for empirical analysis, we also propose a novel mechanistic interpretability method alongside a tailored empirical analytic framework. Based on the frameworks, we conduct experiments demonstrating three key claims: first, that distinct dysfunctional and problematic representational states are implemented in LLMs; second, that their activations can spread and self-sustain to trap LLMs; and third, that dynamic, cyclic structural causal models encoded in the LLMs underpin these patterns. In concert, the empirical results corroborate our hypothesis that network-theoretic computations of psychopathology have already emerged in LLMs. This suggests that certain LLM behaviors mirroring psychopathology may not be a superficial mimicry but a feature of their internal processing. Thus, our work alludes to the possibility of AI systems with psychopathological behaviors in the near future.

This study explores the neural and behavioral consequences of LLM-assisted essay writing. Participants were divided into three groups: LLM, Search Engine, and Brain-only (no tools). Each completed three sessions under the same condition. In a fourth session, LLM users were reassigned to Brain-only group (LLM-to-Brain), and Brain-only users were reassigned to LLM condition (Brain-to-LLM). A total of 54 participants took part in Sessions 1-3, with 18 completing session 4. We used electroencephalography (EEG) to assess cognitive load during essay writing, and analyzed essays using NLP, as well as scoring essays with the help from human teachers and an AI judge. Across groups, NERs, n-gram patterns, and topic ontology showed within-group homogeneity. EEG revealed significant differences in brain connectivity: Brain-only participants exhibited the strongest, most distributed networks; Search Engine users showed moderate engagement; and LLM users displayed the weakest connectivity. Cognitive activity scaled down in relation to external tool use. In session 4, LLM-to-Brain participants showed reduced alpha and beta connectivity, indicating under-engagement. Brain-to-LLM users exhibited higher memory recall and activation of occipito-parietal and prefrontal areas, similar to Search Engine users. Self-reported ownership of essays was the lowest in the LLM group and the highest in the Brain-only group. LLM users also struggled to accurately quote their own work. While LLMs offer immediate convenience, our findings highlight potential cognitive costs. Over four months, LLM users consistently underperformed at neural, linguistic, and behavioral levels. These results raise concerns about the long-term educational implications of LLM reliance and underscore the need for deeper inquiry into AI's role in learning.

This paper explores the relationship between the condition number of a neural network's weight tensor and the extent of information encoded by the associated processing unit, viewed through the lens of information theory. It argues that a high condition number, though not sufficient for effective knowledge encoding, may indicate that the unit has learned to selectively amplify and compress information. This intuition is formalized for linear units with Gaussian inputs, linking the condition number and the transformation's log-volume scaling factor to the characteristics of the output entropy and the geometric properties of the learned transformation. The analysis demonstrates that for a fixed weight norm, a concentrated distribution of singular values (high condition number) corresponds to reduced overall information transfer, indicating a specialized and efficient encoding strategy. Furthermore, the linear stage entropy bound provides an upper limit on post-activation information for contractive, element-wise nonlinearities, supporting the condition number as a scale-invariant proxy for encoding capacity in practical neural networks. An empirical case study applies these principles to guide selective fine-tuning of Large Language Models for both a new task and a new input modality. The experiments show that the proposed method, named KappaTune, effectively mitigates catastrophic forgetting. Unlike many existing catastrophic forgetting mitigation methods that rely on access to pre-training statistics, which are often unavailable, this selective fine-tuning approach offers a way to bypass this common requirement.

State representation learning, or the ability to capture latent generative factors of an environment, is crucial for building intelligent agents that can perform a wide variety of tasks. Learning such representations without supervision from rewards is a challenging open problem. We introduce a method that learns state representations by maximizing mutual information across spatially and temporally distinct features of a neural encoder of the observations. We also introduce a new benchmark based on Atari 2600 games where we evaluate representations based on how well they capture the ground truth state variables. We believe this new framework for evaluating representation learning models will be crucial for future representation learning research. Finally, we compare our technique with other state-of-the-art generative and contrastive representation learning methods. The code associated with this work is available at https://github.com/mila-iqia/atari-representation-learning

We present a study on how and where personas -- defined by distinct sets of human characteristics, values, and beliefs -- are encoded in the representation space of large language models (LLMs). Using a range of dimension reduction and pattern recognition methods, we first identify the model layers that show the greatest divergence in encoding these representations. We then analyze the activations within a selected layer to examine how specific personas are encoded relative to others, including their shared and distinct embedding spaces. We find that, across multiple pre-trained decoder-only LLMs, the analyzed personas show large differences in representation space only within the final third of the decoder layers. We observe overlapping activations for specific ethical perspectives -- such as moral nihilism and utilitarianism -- suggesting a degree of polysemy. In contrast, political ideologies like conservatism and liberalism appear to be represented in more distinct regions. These findings help to improve our understanding of how LLMs internally represent information and can inform future efforts in refining the modulation of specific human traits in LLM outputs. Warning: This paper includes potentially offensive sample statements.

Language model representations often contain linear directions that correspond to high-level concepts. Here, we study the dynamics of these representations: how representations evolve along these dimensions within the context of (simulated) conversations. We find that linear representations can change dramatically over a conversation; for example, information that is represented as factual at the beginning of a conversation can be represented as non-factual at the end and vice versa. These changes are content-dependent; while representations of conversation-relevant information may change, generic information is generally preserved. These changes are robust even for dimensions that disentangle factuality from more superficial response patterns, and occur across different model families and layers of the model. These representation changes do not require on-policy conversations; even replaying a conversation script written by an entirely different model can produce similar changes. However, adaptation is much weaker from simply having a sci-fi story in context that is framed more explicitly as such. We also show that steering along a representational direction can have dramatically different effects at different points in a conversation. These results are consistent with the idea that representations may evolve in response to the model playing a particular role that is cued by a conversation. Our findings may pose challenges for interpretability and steering -- in particular, they imply that it may be misleading to use static interpretations of features or directions, or probes that assume a particular range of features consistently corresponds to a particular ground-truth value. However, these types of representational dynamics also point to exciting new research directions for understanding how models adapt to context.

Refusal refers to the functional behavior enabling safety-aligned language models to reject harmful or unethical prompts. Following the growing scientific interest in mechanistic interpretability, recent work encoded refusal behavior as a single direction in the model's latent space; e.g., computed as the difference between the centroids of harmful and harmless prompt representations. However, emerging evidence suggests that concepts in LLMs often appear to be encoded as a low-dimensional manifold embedded in the high-dimensional latent space. Motivated by these findings, we propose a novel method leveraging Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs) to extract multiple refusal directions. To this end, we first prove that SOMs generalize the prior work's difference-in-means technique. We then train SOMs on harmful prompt representations to identify multiple neurons. By subtracting the centroid of harmless representations from each neuron, we derive a set of multiple directions expressing the refusal concept. We validate our method on an extensive experimental setup, demonstrating that ablating multiple directions from models' internals outperforms not only the single-direction baseline but also specialized jailbreak algorithms, leading to an effective suppression of refusal. Finally, we conclude by analyzing the mechanistic implications of our approach.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

There is some theoretical evidence that deep neural networks with multiple hidden layers have a potential for more efficient representation of multidimensional mappings than shallow networks with a single hidden layer. The question is whether it is possible to exploit this theoretical advantage for finding such representations with help of numerical training methods. Tests using prototypical problems with a known mean square minimum did not confirm this hypothesis. Minima found with the help of deep networks have always been worse than those found using shallow networks. This does not directly contradict the theoretical findings---it is possible that the superior representational capacity of deep networks is genuine while finding the mean square minimum of such deep networks is a substantially harder problem than with shallow ones.

Representation engineering methods have recently shown promise for enabling efficient steering of model behavior. However, evaluation pipelines for these methods have primarily relied on subjective demonstrations, instead of quantitative, objective metrics. We aim to take a step towards addressing this issue by advocating for four properties missing from current evaluations: (i) contexts sufficiently similar to downstream tasks should be used for assessing intervention quality; (ii) model likelihoods should be accounted for; (iii) evaluations should allow for standardized comparisons across different target behaviors; and (iv) baseline comparisons should be offered. We introduce an evaluation pipeline grounded in these criteria, offering both a quantitative and visual analysis of how effectively a given method works. We use this pipeline to evaluate two representation engineering methods on how effectively they can steer behaviors such as truthfulness and corrigibility, finding that some interventions are less effective than previously reported.

Language understanding entails not just extracting the surface-level meaning of the linguistic input, but constructing rich mental models of the situation it describes. Here we propose that because processing within the brain's core language system is fundamentally limited, deeply understanding language requires exporting information from the language system to other brain regions that compute perceptual and motor representations, construct mental models, and store our world knowledge and autobiographical memories. We review the existing evidence for this hypothesis, and argue that recent progress in cognitive neuroscience provides both the conceptual foundation and the methods to directly test it, thus opening up a new strategy to reveal what it means, cognitively and neurally, to understand language.

Recent text-to-image generative models have demonstrated an unparalleled ability to generate diverse and creative imagery guided by a target text prompt. While revolutionary, current state-of-the-art diffusion models may still fail in generating images that fully convey the semantics in the given text prompt. We analyze the publicly available Stable Diffusion model and assess the existence of catastrophic neglect, where the model fails to generate one or more of the subjects from the input prompt. Moreover, we find that in some cases the model also fails to correctly bind attributes (e.g., colors) to their corresponding subjects. To help mitigate these failure cases, we introduce the concept of Generative Semantic Nursing (GSN), where we seek to intervene in the generative process on the fly during inference time to improve the faithfulness of the generated images. Using an attention-based formulation of GSN, dubbed Attend-and-Excite, we guide the model to refine the cross-attention units to attend to all subject tokens in the text prompt and strengthen - or excite - their activations, encouraging the model to generate all subjects described in the text prompt. We compare our approach to alternative approaches and demonstrate that it conveys the desired concepts more faithfully across a range of text prompts.

Distributional word representation methods exploit word co-occurrences to build compact vector encodings of words. While these representations enjoy widespread use in modern natural language processing, it is unclear whether they accurately encode all necessary facets of conceptual meaning. In this paper, we evaluate how well these representations can predict perceptual and conceptual features of concrete concepts, drawing on two semantic norm datasets sourced from human participants. We find that several standard word representations fail to encode many salient perceptual features of concepts, and show that these deficits correlate with word-word similarity prediction errors. Our analyses provide motivation for grounded and embodied language learning approaches, which may help to remedy these deficits.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a quantitative framework for explaining consciousness phenomenon, positing that conscious systems comprise elements integrated through causal properties. We apply IIT 3.0 and 4.0 -- the latest iterations of this framework -- to sequences of Large Language Model (LLM) representations, analyzing data derived from existing Theory of Mind (ToM) test results. Our study systematically investigates whether the differences of ToM test performances, when presented in the LLM representations, can be revealed by IIT estimates, i.e., Phi^{max} (IIT 3.0), Phi (IIT 4.0), Conceptual Information (IIT 3.0), and Phi-structure (IIT 4.0). Furthermore, we compare these metrics with the Span Representations independent of any estimate for consciousness. This additional effort aims to differentiate between potential "consciousness" phenomena and inherent separations within LLM representational space. We conduct comprehensive experiments examining variations across LLM transformer layers and linguistic spans from stimuli. Our results suggest that sequences of contemporary Transformer-based LLM representations lack statistically significant indicators of observed "consciousness" phenomena but exhibit intriguing patterns under spatio-permutational analyses. The Appendix and code are available as Supplementary Materials at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163.

The success of machine learning algorithms generally depends on data representation, and we hypothesize that this is because different representations can entangle and hide more or less the different explanatory factors of variation behind the data. Although specific domain knowledge can be used to help design representations, learning with generic priors can also be used, and the quest for AI is motivating the design of more powerful representation-learning algorithms implementing such priors. This paper reviews recent work in the area of unsupervised feature learning and deep learning, covering advances in probabilistic models, auto-encoders, manifold learning, and deep networks. This motivates longer-term unanswered questions about the appropriate objectives for learning good representations, for computing representations (i.e., inference), and the geometrical connections between representation learning, density estimation and manifold learning.

We test the Platonic Representation Hypothesis (PRH) in astronomy by measuring representational convergence across a range of foundation models trained on different data types. Using spectroscopic and imaging observations from JWST, HSC, Legacy Survey, and DESI, we compare representations from vision transformers, self-supervised models, and astronomy-specific architectures via mutual k-nearest neighbour analysis. We observe consistent scaling: representational alignment generally increases with model capacity across our tested architectures, supporting convergence toward a shared representation of galaxy astrophysics. Our results suggest that astronomical foundation models can use pre-trained general-purpose architectures, allowing us to capitalise on the broader machine learning community's already-spent computational investment.

Recent work has proposed the linear representation hypothesis: that language models perform computation by manipulating one-dimensional representations of concepts ("features") in activation space. In contrast, we explore whether some language model representations may be inherently multi-dimensional. We begin by developing a rigorous definition of irreducible multi-dimensional features based on whether they can be decomposed into either independent or non-co-occurring lower-dimensional features. Motivated by these definitions, we design a scalable method that uses sparse autoencoders to automatically find multi-dimensional features in GPT-2 and Mistral 7B. These auto-discovered features include strikingly interpretable examples, e.g. circular features representing days of the week and months of the year. We identify tasks where these exact circles are used to solve computational problems involving modular arithmetic in days of the week and months of the year. Finally, we provide evidence that these circular features are indeed the fundamental unit of computation in these tasks with intervention experiments on Mistral 7B and Llama 3 8B, and we find further circular representations by breaking down the hidden states for these tasks into interpretable components.

Recent advances in Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) lead to significant breakthroughs in both academia and industry. One question that arises is how we, as humans, can understand their internal neural representations. This paper takes an initial step towards addressing this question by presenting a versatile framework to identify and interpret the semantics within LMMs. Specifically, 1) we first apply a Sparse Autoencoder(SAE) to disentangle the representations into human understandable features. 2) We then present an automatic interpretation framework to interpreted the open-semantic features learned in SAE by the LMMs themselves. We employ this framework to analyze the LLaVA-NeXT-8B model using the LLaVA-OV-72B model, demonstrating that these features can effectively steer the model's behavior. Our results contribute to a deeper understanding of why LMMs excel in specific tasks, including EQ tests, and illuminate the nature of their mistakes along with potential strategies for their rectification. These findings offer new insights into the internal mechanisms of LMMs and suggest parallels with the cognitive processes of the human brain.

To act in the world, robots rely on a representation of salient task aspects: for example, to carry a cup of coffee, a robot must consider movement efficiency and cup orientation in its behaviour. However, if we want robots to act for and with people, their representations must not be just functional but also reflective of what humans care about, i.e. their representations must be aligned with humans'. In this survey, we pose that current reward and imitation learning approaches suffer from representation misalignment, where the robot's learned representation does not capture the human's representation. We suggest that because humans will be the ultimate evaluator of robot performance in the world, it is critical that we explicitly focus our efforts on aligning learned task representations with humans, in addition to learning the downstream task. We advocate that current representation learning approaches in robotics should be studied from the perspective of how well they accomplish the objective of representation alignment. To do so, we mathematically define the problem, identify its key desiderata, and situate current robot learning methods within this formalism. We conclude the survey by suggesting future directions for exploring open challenges.

This article is about the neural conundrum behind the slowness of human behavior. The information throughput of a human being is about 10 bits/s. In comparison, our sensory systems gather data at ~10^9 bits/s. The stark contrast between these numbers remains unexplained and touches on fundamental aspects of brain function: What neural substrate sets this speed limit on the pace of our existence? Why does the brain need billions of neurons to process 10 bits/s? Why can we only think about one thing at a time? The brain seems to operate in two distinct modes: the "outer" brain handles fast high-dimensional sensory and motor signals, whereas the "inner" brain processes the reduced few bits needed to control behavior. Plausible explanations exist for the large neuron numbers in the outer brain, but not for the inner brain, and we propose new research directions to remedy this.

Addressing the limitations of text as a source of accurate layout representation in text-conditional diffusion models, many works incorporate additional signals to condition certain attributes within a generated image. Although successful, previous works do not account for the specific localization of said attributes extended into the three dimensional plane. In this context, we present a conditional diffusion model that integrates control over three-dimensional object placement with disentangled representations of global stylistic semantics from multiple exemplar images. Specifically, we first introduce depth disentanglement training to leverage the relative depth of objects as an estimator, allowing the model to identify the absolute positions of unseen objects through the use of synthetic image triplets. We also introduce soft guidance, a method for imposing global semantics onto targeted regions without the use of any additional localization cues. Our integrated framework, Compose and Conquer (CnC), unifies these techniques to localize multiple conditions in a disentangled manner. We demonstrate that our approach allows perception of objects at varying depths while offering a versatile framework for composing localized objects with different global semantics. Code: https://github.com/tomtom1103/compose-and-conquer/

Despite their recent successes, Transformer-based large language models show surprising failure modes. A well-known example of such failure modes is their inability to length-generalize: solving problem instances at inference time that are longer than those seen during training. In this work, we further explore the root cause of this failure by performing a detailed analysis of model behaviors on the simple parity task. Our analysis suggests that length generalization failures are intricately related to a model's inability to perform random memory accesses within its context window. We present supporting evidence for this hypothesis by demonstrating the effectiveness of methodologies that circumvent the need for indexing or that enable random token access indirectly, through content-based addressing. We further show where and how the failure to perform random memory access manifests through attention map visualizations.

Learning disorders are neurological conditions that affect the brain's ability to interconnect communication areas. Dyslexic students experience problems with reading, memorizing, and exposing concepts; however the magnitude of these can be mitigated through both therapies and the creation of compensatory mechanisms. Several efforts have been made to mitigate these issues, leading to the creation of digital resources for students with specific learning disorders attending primary and secondary education levels. Conversely, a standard approach is still missed in higher education. The VRAIlexia project has been created to tackle this issue by proposing two different tools: a mobile application integrating virtual reality (VR) to collect data quickly and easily, and an artificial intelligencebased software (AI) to analyze the collected data for customizing the supporting methodology for each student. The first one has been created and is being distributed among dyslexic students in Higher Education Institutions, for the conduction of specific psychological and psychometric tests. The second tool applies specific artificial intelligence algorithms to the data gathered via the application and other surveys. These AI techniques have allowed us to identify the most relevant difficulties faced by the students' cohort. Our different models have obtained around 90\% mean accuracy for predicting the support tools and learning strategies.

Historically, artificial intelligence has drawn much inspiration from neuroscience to fuel advances in the field. However, current progress in reinforcement learning is largely focused on benchmark problems that fail to capture many of the aspects that are of interest in neuroscience today. We illustrate this point by extending a T-maze task from neuroscience for use with reinforcement learning algorithms, and show that state-of-the-art algorithms are not capable of solving this problem. Finally, we point out where insights from neuroscience could help explain some of the issues encountered.

Why do brains have inhibitory connections? Why do deep networks have negative weights? We propose an answer from the perspective of representation capacity. We believe representing functions is the primary role of both (i) the brain in natural intelligence, and (ii) deep networks in artificial intelligence. Our answer to why there are inhibitory/negative weights is: to learn more functions. We prove that, in the absence of negative weights, neural networks with non-decreasing activation functions are not universal approximators. While this may be an intuitive result to some, to the best of our knowledge, there is no formal theory, in either machine learning or neuroscience, that demonstrates why negative weights are crucial in the context of representation capacity. Further, we provide insights on the geometric properties of the representation space that non-negative deep networks cannot represent. We expect these insights will yield a deeper understanding of more sophisticated inductive priors imposed on the distribution of weights that lead to more efficient biological and machine learning.

This study reveals an unexpected parallel between instructible vision-language models (VLMs) and human cognitive disorders, specifically constructive apraxia. We tested 25 state-of-the-art VLMs, including GPT-4 Vision, DALL-E 3, and Midjourney v5, on their ability to generate images of the Ponzo illusion, a task that requires basic spatial reasoning and is often used in clinical assessments of constructive apraxia. Remarkably, 24 out of 25 models failed to correctly render two horizontal lines against a perspective background, mirroring the deficits seen in patients with parietal lobe damage. The models consistently misinterpreted spatial instructions, producing tilted or misaligned lines that followed the perspective of the background rather than remaining horizontal. This behavior is strikingly similar to how apraxia patients struggle to copy or construct simple figures despite intact visual perception and motor skills. Our findings suggest that current VLMs, despite their advanced capabilities in other domains, lack fundamental spatial reasoning abilities akin to those impaired in constructive apraxia. This limitation in AI systems provides a novel computational model for studying spatial cognition deficits and highlights a critical area for improvement in VLM architecture and training methodologies.

We analyze a family of large language models in such a lightweight manner that can be done on a single GPU. Specifically, we focus on the OPT family of models ranging from 125m to 66b parameters and rely only on whether an FFN neuron is activated or not. First, we find that the early part of the network is sparse and represents many discrete features. Here, many neurons (more than 70% in some layers of the 66b model) are "dead", i.e. they never activate on a large collection of diverse data. At the same time, many of the alive neurons are reserved for discrete features and act as token and n-gram detectors. Interestingly, their corresponding FFN updates not only promote next token candidates as could be expected, but also explicitly focus on removing the information about triggering them tokens, i.e., current input. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first example of mechanisms specialized at removing (rather than adding) information from the residual stream. With scale, models become more sparse in a sense that they have more dead neurons and token detectors. Finally, some neurons are positional: them being activated or not depends largely (or solely) on position and less so (or not at all) on textual data. We find that smaller models have sets of neurons acting as position range indicators while larger models operate in a less explicit manner.

This book is the result of a seminar in which we reviewed multimodal approaches and attempted to create a solid overview of the field, starting with the current state-of-the-art approaches in the two subfields of Deep Learning individually. Further, modeling frameworks are discussed where one modality is transformed into the other, as well as models in which one modality is utilized to enhance representation learning for the other. To conclude the second part, architectures with a focus on handling both modalities simultaneously are introduced. Finally, we also cover other modalities as well as general-purpose multi-modal models, which are able to handle different tasks on different modalities within one unified architecture. One interesting application (Generative Art) eventually caps off this booklet.

The representation degeneration problem is a phenomenon that is widely observed among self-supervised learning methods based on Transformers. In NLP, it takes the form of anisotropy, a singular property of hidden representations which makes them unexpectedly close to each other in terms of angular distance (cosine-similarity). Some recent works tend to show that anisotropy is a consequence of optimizing the cross-entropy loss on long-tailed distributions of tokens. We show in this paper that anisotropy can also be observed empirically in language models with specific objectives that should not suffer directly from the same consequences. We also show that the anisotropy problem extends to Transformers trained on other modalities. Our observations suggest that anisotropy is actually inherent to Transformers-based models.

Recent advances in large-scale pretraining have yielded visual foundation models with strong capabilities. Not only can recent models generalize to arbitrary images for their training task, their intermediate representations are useful for other visual tasks such as detection and segmentation. Given that such models can classify, delineate, and localize objects in 2D, we ask whether they also represent their 3D structure? In this work, we analyze the 3D awareness of visual foundation models. We posit that 3D awareness implies that representations (1) encode the 3D structure of the scene and (2) consistently represent the surface across views. We conduct a series of experiments using task-specific probes and zero-shot inference procedures on frozen features. Our experiments reveal several limitations of the current models. Our code and analysis can be found at https://github.com/mbanani/probe3d.

Modern language models can process inputs across diverse languages and modalities. We hypothesize that models acquire this capability through learning a shared representation space across heterogeneous data types (e.g., different languages and modalities), which places semantically similar inputs near one another, even if they are from different modalities/languages. We term this the semantic hub hypothesis, following the hub-and-spoke model from neuroscience (Patterson et al., 2007) which posits that semantic knowledge in the human brain is organized through a transmodal semantic "hub" which integrates information from various modality-specific "spokes" regions. We first show that model representations for semantically equivalent inputs in different languages are similar in the intermediate layers, and that this space can be interpreted using the model's dominant pretraining language via the logit lens. This tendency extends to other data types, including arithmetic expressions, code, and visual/audio inputs. Interventions in the shared representation space in one data type also predictably affect model outputs in other data types, suggesting that this shared representations space is not simply a vestigial byproduct of large-scale training on broad data, but something that is actively utilized by the model during input processing.

In large language models (LLMs), certain neurons can store distinct pieces of knowledge learned during pretraining. While knowledge typically appears as a combination of relations and entities, it remains unclear whether some neurons focus on a relation itself -- independent of any entity. We hypothesize such neurons detect a relation in the input text and guide generation involving such a relation. To investigate this, we study the Llama-2 family on a chosen set of relations with a statistics-based method. Our experiments demonstrate the existence of relation-specific neurons. We measure the effect of selectively deactivating candidate neurons specific to relation r on the LLM's ability to handle (1) facts whose relation is r and (2) facts whose relation is a different relation r' neq r. With respect to their capacity for encoding relation information, we give evidence for the following three properties of relation-specific neurons. (i) Neuron cumulativity. The neurons for r present a cumulative effect so that deactivating a larger portion of them results in the degradation of more facts in r. (ii) Neuron versatility. Neurons can be shared across multiple closely related as well as less related relations. Some relation neurons transfer across languages. (iii) Neuron interference. Deactivating neurons specific to one relation can improve LLM generation performance for facts of other relations. We will make our code publicly available at https://github.com/cisnlp/relation-specific-neurons.

Large Language Models (LLMs) do not differentially represent numbers, which are pervasive in text. In contrast, neuroscience research has identified distinct neural representations for numbers and words. In this work, we investigate how well popular LLMs capture the magnitudes of numbers (e.g., that 4 < 5) from a behavioral lens. Prior research on the representational capabilities of LLMs evaluates whether they show human-level performance, for instance, high overall accuracy on standard benchmarks. Here, we ask a different question, one inspired by cognitive science: How closely do the number representations of LLMscorrespond to those of human language users, who typically demonstrate the distance, size, and ratio effects? We depend on a linking hypothesis to map the similarities among the model embeddings of number words and digits to human response times. The results reveal surprisingly human-like representations across language models of different architectures, despite the absence of the neural circuitry that directly supports these representations in the human brain. This research shows the utility of understanding LLMs using behavioral benchmarks and points the way to future work on the number representations of LLMs and their cognitive plausibility.

Interpretability researchers have attempted to understand MLP neurons of language models based on both the contexts in which they activate and their output weight vectors. They have paid little attention to a complementary aspect: the interactions between input and output. For example, when neurons detect a direction in the input, they might add much the same direction to the residual stream ("enrichment neurons") or reduce its presence ("depletion neurons"). We address this aspect by examining the cosine similarity between input and output weights of a neuron. We apply our method to 12 models and find that enrichment neurons dominate in early-middle layers whereas later layers tend more towards depletion. To explain this finding, we argue that enrichment neurons are largely responsible for enriching concept representations, one of the first steps of factual recall. Our input-output perspective is a complement to activation-dependent analyses and to approaches that treat input and output separately.

Large language models (LLMs), including ChatGPT, Bard, and Llama, have achieved remarkable successes over the last two years in a range of different applications. In spite of these successes, there exist concerns that limit the wide application of LLMs. A key problem is the problem of hallucination. Hallucination refers to the fact that in addition to correct responses, LLMs can also generate seemingly correct but factually incorrect responses. This report aims to present a comprehensive review of the current literature on both hallucination detection and hallucination mitigation. We hope that this report can serve as a good reference for both engineers and researchers who are interested in LLMs and applying them to real world tasks.

Attending to what is relevant is fundamental to both the mammalian brain and modern machine learning models such as Transformers. Yet, determining relevance remains a core challenge, traditionally offloaded to learning algorithms like backpropagation. Inspired by recent cellular neurobiological evidence linking neocortical pyramidal cells to distinct mental states, this work shows how models (e.g., Transformers) can emulate high-level perceptual processing and awake thought (imagination) states to pre-select relevant information before applying attention. Triadic neuronal-level modulation loops among questions (Q), clues (keys, K), and hypotheses (values, V) enable diverse, deep, parallel reasoning chains at the representation level and allow a rapid shift from initial biases to refined understanding. This leads to orders-of-magnitude faster learning with significantly reduced computational demand (e.g., fewer heads, layers, and tokens), at an approximate cost of O(N), where N is the number of input tokens. Results span reinforcement learning (e.g., CarRacing in a high-dimensional visual setup), computer vision, and natural language question answering.

Hallucination is often regarded as a major impediment for using large language models (LLMs), especially for knowledge-intensive tasks. Even when the training corpus consists solely of true statements, language models still generate hallucinations in the form of amalgamations of multiple facts. We coin this phenomenon as ``knowledge overshadowing'': when we query knowledge from a language model with multiple conditions, some conditions overshadow others, leading to hallucinated outputs. This phenomenon partially stems from training data imbalance, which we verify on both pretrained models and fine-tuned models, over a wide range of LM model families and sizes.From a theoretical point of view, knowledge overshadowing can be interpreted as over-generalization of the dominant conditions (patterns). We show that the hallucination rate grows with both the imbalance ratio (between the popular and unpopular condition) and the length of dominant condition description, consistent with our derived generalization bound. Finally, we propose to utilize overshadowing conditions as a signal to catch hallucination before it is produced, along with a training-free self-contrastive decoding method to alleviate hallucination during inference. Our proposed approach showcases up to 82% F1 for hallucination anticipation and 11.2% to 39.4% hallucination control, with different models and datasets.

We investigate the internal representations of vision-and-language models (VLMs) and how they encode task representations. We consider tasks specified through examples or instructions, using either text or image inputs. Surprisingly, we find that conceptually similar tasks are mapped to similar task vector representations, regardless of how they are specified. Our findings suggest that to output answers, tokens in VLMs undergo three distinct phases: input, task, and answer, a process which is consistent across different modalities and specifications. The task vectors we identify in VLMs are general enough to be derived in one modality (e.g., text) and transferred to another (e.g., image). Additionally, we find that ensembling exemplar and instruction based task vectors produce better task representations. Taken together, these insights shed light on the underlying mechanisms of VLMs, particularly their ability to represent tasks in a shared manner across different modalities and task specifications. Project page: https://task-vectors-are-cross-modal.github.io.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated a powerful ability for text generation. However, achieving optimal results with a given prompt or instruction can be challenging, especially for billion-sized models. Additionally, undesired behaviors such as toxicity or hallucinations can manifest. While much larger models (e.g., ChatGPT) may demonstrate strength in mitigating these issues, there is still no guarantee of complete prevention. In this work, we propose formalizing text generation as a future-constrained generation problem to minimize undesirable behaviors and enforce faithfulness to instructions. The estimation of future constraint satisfaction, accomplished using LLMs, guides the text generation process. Our extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach across three distinct text generation tasks: keyword-constrained generation (Lin et al., 2020), toxicity reduction (Gehman et al., 2020), and factual correctness in question-answering (Gao et al., 2023).

We provide a construction for categorical representation learning and introduce the foundations of "categorifier". The central theme in representation learning is the idea of everything to vector. Every object in a dataset S can be represented as a vector in R^n by an encoding map E: Obj(S)toR^n. More importantly, every morphism can be represented as a matrix E: Hom(S)toR^{n}_{n}. The encoding map E is generally modeled by a deep neural network. The goal of representation learning is to design appropriate tasks on the dataset to train the encoding map (assuming that an encoding is optimal if it universally optimizes the performance on various tasks). However, the latter is still a set-theoretic approach. The goal of the current article is to promote the representation learning to a new level via a category-theoretic approach. As a proof of concept, we provide an example of a text translator equipped with our technology, showing that our categorical learning model outperforms the current deep learning models by 17 times. The content of the current article is part of the recent US patent proposal (patent application number: 63110906).

Cognitive neuroscience is enjoying rapid increase in extensive public brain-imaging datasets. It opens the door to large-scale statistical models. Finding a unified perspective for all available data calls for scalable and automated solutions to an old challenge: how to aggregate heterogeneous information on brain function into a universal cognitive system that relates mental operations/cognitive processes/psychological tasks to brain networks? We cast this challenge in a machine-learning approach to predict conditions from statistical brain maps across different studies. For this, we leverage multi-task learning and multi-scale dimension reduction to learn low-dimensional representations of brain images that carry cognitive information and can be robustly associated with psychological stimuli. Our multi-dataset classification model achieves the best prediction performance on several large reference datasets, compared to models without cognitive-aware low-dimension representations, it brings a substantial performance boost to the analysis of small datasets, and can be introspected to identify universal template cognitive concepts.

Deep Learning (DL) in neuroimaging has become increasingly relevant for detecting neurological conditions and neurodegenerative disorders. One of the most predominant biomarkers in neuroimaging is represented by brain age, which has been shown to be a good indicator for different conditions, such as Alzheimer's Disease. Using brain age for weakly supervised pre-training of DL models in transfer learning settings has also recently shown promising results, especially when dealing with data scarcity of different conditions. On the other hand, anatomical information of brain MRIs (e.g. cortical thickness) can provide important information for learning good representations that can be transferred to many downstream tasks. In this work, we propose AnatCL, an anatomical foundation model for brain MRIs that i.) leverages anatomical information in a weakly contrastive learning approach, and ii.) achieves state-of-the-art performances across many different downstream tasks. To validate our approach we consider 12 different downstream tasks for the diagnosis of different conditions such as Alzheimer's Disease, autism spectrum disorder, and schizophrenia. Furthermore, we also target the prediction of 10 different clinical assessment scores using structural MRI data. Our findings show that incorporating anatomical information during pre-training leads to more robust and generalizable representations. Pre-trained models can be found at: https://github.com/EIDOSLAB/AnatCL.

Multimodal functional neuroimaging enables systematic analysis of brain mechanisms and provides discriminative representations for brain-computer interface (BCI) decoding. However, its acquisition is constrained by high costs and feasibility limitations. Moreover, underrepresentation of specific groups undermines fairness of BCI decoding model. To address these challenges, we propose a unified representation framework for multimodal functional neuroimaging via generative artificial intelligence (AI). By mapping multimodal functional neuroimaging into a unified representation space, the proposed framework is capable of generating data for acquisition-constrained modalities and underrepresented groups. Experiments show that the framework can generate data consistent with real brain activity patterns, provide insights into brain mechanisms, and improve performance on downstream tasks. More importantly, it can enhance model fairness by augmenting data for underrepresented groups. Overall, the framework offers a new paradigm for decreasing the cost of acquiring multimodal functional neuroimages and enhancing the fairness of BCI decoding models.

State-of-the-art methods for conditional average treatment effect (CATE) estimation make widespread use of representation learning. Here, the idea is to reduce the variance of the low-sample CATE estimation by a (potentially constrained) low-dimensional representation. However, low-dimensional representations can lose information about the observed confounders and thus lead to bias, because of which the validity of representation learning for CATE estimation is typically violated. In this paper, we propose a new, representation-agnostic framework for estimating bounds on the representation-induced confounding bias that comes from dimensionality reduction (or other constraints on the representations) in CATE estimation. First, we establish theoretically under which conditions CATEs are non-identifiable given low-dimensional (constrained) representations. Second, as our remedy, we propose to perform partial identification of CATEs or, equivalently, aim at estimating of lower and upper bounds of the representation-induced confounding bias. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our bounds in a series of experiments. In sum, our framework is of direct relevance in practice where the validity of CATE estimation is of importance.

Language models show a surprising range of capabilities, but the source of their apparent competence is unclear. Do these networks just memorize a collection of surface statistics, or do they rely on internal representations of the process that generates the sequences they see? We investigate this question by applying a variant of the GPT model to the task of predicting legal moves in a simple board game, Othello. Although the network has no a priori knowledge of the game or its rules, we uncover evidence of an emergent nonlinear internal representation of the board state. Interventional experiments indicate this representation can be used to control the output of the network and create "latent saliency maps" that can help explain predictions in human terms.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.

One of the decisions that arise when designing a neural network for any application is how the data should be represented in order to be presented to, and possibly generated by, a neural network. For audio, the choice is less obvious than it seems to be for visual images, and a variety of representations have been used for different applications including the raw digitized sample stream, hand-crafted features, machine discovered features, MFCCs and variants that include deltas, and a variety of spectral representations. This paper reviews some of these representations and issues that arise, focusing particularly on spectrograms for generating audio using neural networks for style transfer.

As we show in this paper, the prediction for output token n+1 of Transformer architectures without one of the mechanisms of positional encodings and causal attention is invariant to permutations of input tokens 1, 2, ..., n-1. Usually, both mechanisms are employed and the symmetry with respect to the input tokens is broken. Recently, it has been shown that one can train Transformers without positional encodings. This must be enabled by the causal attention mechanism. In this paper, we elaborate on the argument that the causal connection mechanism must be responsible for the fact that Transformers are able to model input sequences where the order is important. Vertical "slices" of Transformers are all encouraged to represent the same location k in the input sequence. We hypothesize that residual connections contribute to this phenomenon, and demonstrate evidence for this.

Representations are at the core of all deep reinforcement learning (RL) methods for both Markov decision processes (MDPs) and partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs). Many representation learning methods and theoretical frameworks have been developed to understand what constitutes an effective representation. However, the relationships between these methods and the shared properties among them remain unclear. In this paper, we show that many of these seemingly distinct methods and frameworks for state and history abstractions are, in fact, based on a common idea of self-predictive abstraction. Furthermore, we provide theoretical insights into the widely adopted objectives and optimization, such as the stop-gradient technique, in learning self-predictive representations. These findings together yield a minimalist algorithm to learn self-predictive representations for states and histories. We validate our theories by applying our algorithm to standard MDPs, MDPs with distractors, and POMDPs with sparse rewards. These findings culminate in a set of preliminary guidelines for RL practitioners.

Partially inspired by features of computation in visual cortex, deep neural networks compute hierarchical representations of their inputs. While these networks have been highly successful in machine learning, it remains unclear to what extent they can aid our understanding of cortical function. Several groups have developed metrics that provide a quantitative comparison between representations computed by networks and representations measured in cortex. At the same time, neuroscience is well into an unprecedented phase of large-scale data collection, as evidenced by projects such as the Allen Brain Observatory. Despite the magnitude of these efforts, in a given experiment only a fraction of units are recorded, limiting the information available about the cortical representation. Moreover, only a finite number of stimuli can be shown to an animal over the course of a realistic experiment. These limitations raise the question of how and whether metrics that compare representations of deep networks are meaningful on these datasets. Here, we empirically quantify the capabilities and limitations of these metrics due to limited image presentations and neuron samples. We find that the comparison procedure is robust to different choices of stimuli set and the level of subsampling that one might expect in a large-scale brain survey with thousands of neurons. Using these results, we compare the representations measured in the Allen Brain Observatory in response to natural image presentations to deep neural network. We show that the visual cortical areas are relatively high order representations (in that they map to deeper layers of convolutional neural networks). Furthermore, we see evidence of a broad, more parallel organization rather than a sequential hierarchy, with the primary area VISp(V1) being lower order relative to the other areas.

The safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) can be circumvented through adversarially crafted inputs, yet the mechanisms by which these attacks bypass safety barriers remain poorly understood. Prior work suggests that a single refusal direction in the model's activation space determines whether an LLM refuses a request. In this study, we propose a novel gradient-based approach to representation engineering and use it to identify refusal directions. Contrary to prior work, we uncover multiple independent directions and even multi-dimensional concept cones that mediate refusal. Moreover, we show that orthogonality alone does not imply independence under intervention, motivating the notion of representational independence that accounts for both linear and non-linear effects. Using this framework, we identify mechanistically independent refusal directions. We show that refusal mechanisms in LLMs are governed by complex spatial structures and identify functionally independent directions, confirming that multiple distinct mechanisms drive refusal behavior. Our gradient-based approach uncovers these mechanisms and can further serve as a foundation for future work on understanding LLMs.

The article explores an encoding and structural information processing approach using sparse bit vectors and fixed-length linear vectors. The following are presented: a discrete method of speculative stochastic dimensionality reduction of multidimensional code and linear spaces with linear asymptotic complexity; a geometric method for obtaining discrete embeddings of an organised code space that reflect the internal structure of a given modality. The structure and properties of a code space are investigated using three modalities as examples: morphology of Russian and English languages, and immunohistochemical markers. Parallels are drawn between the resulting map of the code space layout and so-called pinwheels appearing on the mammalian neocortex. A cautious assumption is made about similarities between neocortex organisation and processes happening in our models.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

A characteristic feature of human semantic cognition is its ability to not only store and retrieve the properties of concepts observed through experience, but to also facilitate the inheritance of properties (can breathe) from superordinate concepts (animal) to their subordinates (dog) -- i.e. demonstrate property inheritance. In this paper, we present COMPS, a collection of minimal pair sentences that jointly tests pre-trained language models (PLMs) on their ability to attribute properties to concepts and their ability to demonstrate property inheritance behavior. Analyses of 22 different PLMs on COMPS reveal that they can easily distinguish between concepts on the basis of a property when they are trivially different, but find it relatively difficult when concepts are related on the basis of nuanced knowledge representations. Furthermore, we find that PLMs can demonstrate behavior consistent with property inheritance to a great extent, but fail in the presence of distracting information, which decreases the performance of many models, sometimes even below chance. This lack of robustness in demonstrating simple reasoning raises important questions about PLMs' capacity to make correct inferences even when they appear to possess the prerequisite knowledge.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are widely used for a variety of vision-language tasks, one observation is that they sometimes misinterpret visual inputs or fail to follow textual instructions even in straightforward cases, leading to irrelevant responses, mistakes, and ungrounded claims. This observation is analogous to a phenomenon in neuropsychology known as Agnosia, an inability to correctly process sensory modalities and recognize things (e.g., objects, colors, relations). In our study, we adapt this similar concept to define "agnosia in MLLMs", and our goal is to comprehensively evaluate and mitigate such agnosia in MLLMs. Inspired by the diagnosis and treatment process in neuropsychology, we propose a novel framework EMMA (Evaluation and Mitigation of Multimodal Agnosia). In EMMA, we develop an evaluation module that automatically creates fine-grained and diverse visual question answering examples to assess the extent of agnosia in MLLMs comprehensively. We also develop a mitigation module to reduce agnosia in MLLMs through multimodal instruction tuning on fine-grained conversations. To verify the effectiveness of our framework, we evaluate and analyze agnosia in seven state-of-the-art MLLMs using 9K test samples. The results reveal that most of them exhibit agnosia across various aspects and degrees. We further develop a fine-grained instruction set and tune MLLMs to mitigate agnosia, which led to notable improvement in accuracy.

As robots are increasingly deployed in real-world scenarios, a key question is how to best transfer knowledge learned in one environment to another, where shifting constraints and human preferences render adaptation challenging. A central challenge remains that often, it is difficult (perhaps even impossible) to capture the full complexity of the deployment environment, and therefore the desired tasks, at training time. Consequently, the representation, or abstraction, of the tasks the human hopes for the robot to perform in one environment may be misaligned with the representation of the tasks that the robot has learned in another. We postulate that because humans will be the ultimate evaluator of system success in the world, they are best suited to communicating the aspects of the tasks that matter to the robot. Our key insight is that effective learning from human input requires first explicitly learning good intermediate representations and then using those representations for solving downstream tasks. We highlight three areas where we can use this approach to build interactive systems and offer future directions of work to better create advanced collaborative robots.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

Compositionality, the notion that the meaning of an expression is constructed from the meaning of its parts and syntactic rules, permits the infinite productivity of human language. For the first time, artificial language models (LMs) are able to match human performance in a number of compositional generalization tasks. However, much remains to be understood about the representational mechanisms underlying these abilities. We take a high-level geometric approach to this problem by relating the degree of compositionality in a dataset to the intrinsic dimensionality of its representations under an LM, a measure of feature complexity. We find not only that the degree of dataset compositionality is reflected in representations' intrinsic dimensionality, but that the relationship between compositionality and geometric complexity arises due to learned linguistic features over training. Finally, our analyses reveal a striking contrast between linear and nonlinear dimensionality, showing that they respectively encode formal and semantic aspects of linguistic composition.

Despite rapid adoption and deployment of large language models (LLMs), the internal computations of these models remain opaque and poorly understood. In this work, we seek to understand how high-level human-interpretable features are represented within the internal neuron activations of LLMs. We train k-sparse linear classifiers (probes) on these internal activations to predict the presence of features in the input; by varying the value of k we study the sparsity of learned representations and how this varies with model scale. With k=1, we localize individual neurons which are highly relevant for a particular feature, and perform a number of case studies to illustrate general properties of LLMs. In particular, we show that early layers make use of sparse combinations of neurons to represent many features in superposition, that middle layers have seemingly dedicated neurons to represent higher-level contextual features, and that increasing scale causes representational sparsity to increase on average, but there are multiple types of scaling dynamics. In all, we probe for over 100 unique features comprising 10 different categories in 7 different models spanning 70 million to 6.9 billion parameters.

Do machines and humans process language in similar ways? A recent line of research has hinted in the affirmative, demonstrating that human brain signals can be effectively predicted using the internal representations of language models (LMs). This is thought to reflect shared computational principles between LMs and human language processing. However, there are also clear differences in how LMs and humans acquire and use language, even if the final task they are performing is the same. Despite this, there is little work exploring systematic differences between human and machine language processing using brain data. To address this question, we examine the differences between LM representations and the human brain's responses to language, specifically by examining a dataset of Magnetoencephalography (MEG) responses to a written narrative. In doing so we identify three phenomena that, in prior work, LMs have been found to not capture well: emotional understanding, figurative language processing, and physical commonsense. By fine-tuning LMs on datasets related to these phenomena, we observe that fine-tuned LMs show improved alignment with human brain responses across these tasks. Our study implies that the observed divergences between LMs and human brains may stem from LMs' inadequate representation of these specific types of knowledge.

Large language models (LLMs) are applied to all sorts of creative tasks, and their outputs vary from beautiful, to peculiar, to pastiche, into plain plagiarism. The temperature parameter of an LLM regulates the amount of randomness, leading to more diverse outputs; therefore, it is often claimed to be the creativity parameter. Here, we investigate this claim using a narrative generation task with a predetermined fixed context, model and prompt. Specifically, we present an empirical analysis of the LLM output for different temperature values using four necessary conditions for creativity in narrative generation: novelty, typicality, cohesion, and coherence. We find that temperature is weakly correlated with novelty, and unsurprisingly, moderately correlated with incoherence, but there is no relationship with either cohesion or typicality. However, the influence of temperature on creativity is far more nuanced and weak than suggested by the "creativity parameter" claim; overall results suggest that the LLM generates slightly more novel outputs as temperatures get higher. Finally, we discuss ideas to allow more controlled LLM creativity, rather than relying on chance via changing the temperature parameter.

Most large language models are trained on linguistic input alone, yet humans appear to ground their understanding of words in sensorimotor experience. A natural solution is to augment LM representations with human judgments of a word's sensorimotor associations (e.g., the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms), but this raises another challenge: most words are ambiguous, and judgments of words in isolation fail to account for this multiplicity of meaning (e.g., "wooden table" vs. "data table"). We attempted to address this problem by building a new lexical resource of contextualized sensorimotor judgments for 112 English words, each rated in four different contexts (448 sentences total). We show that these ratings encode overlapping but distinct information from the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms, and that they also predict other measures of interest (e.g., relatedness), above and beyond measures derived from BERT. Beyond shedding light on theoretical questions, we suggest that these ratings could be of use as a "challenge set" for researchers building grounded language models.

We are interested in the learning of 6 to 7 years old children in implementations of a situation of reproduction of figure by folding presented in the first part of this article. In the second part we expose our problem as well as our hypothesis and our methodology. The third part presents the mathematical and didactical potentialities of the PLIOX situation within the framework of the Theory of Didactic Situations of Brousseau, in support of Berthelot and Salin's works, and according to a cognitive and semiotic point of view of Duval. According to this previous part, we clarify and analyze the results obtained from implementations in two classrooms (part four).

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

Graphic design plays a vital role in visual communication across advertising, marketing, and multimedia entertainment. Prior work has explored automated graphic design generation using diffusion models, aiming to streamline creative workflows and democratize design capabilities. However, complex graphic design scenarios require accurately adhering to design intent specified by multiple heterogeneous user-provided elements (\eg images, layouts, and texts), which pose multi-condition control challenges for existing methods. Specifically, previous single-condition control models demonstrate effectiveness only within their specialized domains but fail to generalize to other conditions, while existing multi-condition methods often lack fine-grained control over each sub-condition and compromise overall compositional harmony. To address these limitations, we introduce CreatiDesign, a systematic solution for automated graphic design covering both model architecture and dataset construction. First, we design a unified multi-condition driven architecture that enables flexible and precise integration of heterogeneous design elements with minimal architectural modifications to the base diffusion model. Furthermore, to ensure that each condition precisely controls its designated image region and to avoid interference between conditions, we propose a multimodal attention mask mechanism. Additionally, we develop a fully automated pipeline for constructing graphic design datasets, and introduce a new dataset with 400K samples featuring multi-condition annotations, along with a comprehensive benchmark. Experimental results show that CreatiDesign outperforms existing models by a clear margin in faithfully adhering to user intent.

Language places subtle constraints on how we make inductive inferences. Developmental evidence by Gelman et al. (2002) has shown children (4 years and older) to differentiate among generic statements ("Bears are daxable"), universally quantified NPs ("all bears are daxable") and indefinite plural NPs ("some bears are daxable") in extending novel properties to a specific member (all > generics > some), suggesting that they represent these types of propositions differently. We test if these subtle differences arise in general purpose statistical learners like Vision Language Models, by replicating the original experiment. On tasking them through a series of precondition tests (robust identification of categories in images and sensitivities to all and some), followed by the original experiment, we find behavioral alignment between models and humans. Post-hoc analyses on their representations revealed that these differences are organized based on inductive constraints and not surface-form differences.

In this paper, we identify and characterize the emerging area of representation engineering (RepE), an approach to enhancing the transparency of AI systems that draws on insights from cognitive neuroscience. RepE places population-level representations, rather than neurons or circuits, at the center of analysis, equipping us with novel methods for monitoring and manipulating high-level cognitive phenomena in deep neural networks (DNNs). We provide baselines and an initial analysis of RepE techniques, showing that they offer simple yet effective solutions for improving our understanding and control of large language models. We showcase how these methods can provide traction on a wide range of safety-relevant problems, including honesty, harmlessness, power-seeking, and more, demonstrating the promise of top-down transparency research. We hope that this work catalyzes further exploration of RepE and fosters advancements in the transparency and safety of AI systems.

Human visual imagination usually begins with analogies or rough sketches. For example, given an image with a girl playing guitar before a building, one may analogously imagine how it seems like if Iron Man playing guitar before Pyramid in Egypt. Nonetheless, visual condition may not be precisely aligned with the imaginary result indicated by text prompt, and existing layout-controllable text-to-image (T2I) generation models is prone to producing degraded generated results with obvious artifacts. To address this issue, we present a novel T2I generation method dubbed SmartControl, which is designed to modify the rough visual conditions for adapting to text prompt. The key idea of our SmartControl is to relax the visual condition on the areas that are conflicted with text prompts. In specific, a Control Scale Predictor (CSP) is designed to identify the conflict regions and predict the local control scales, while a dataset with text prompts and rough visual conditions is constructed for training CSP. It is worth noting that, even with a limited number (e.g., 1,000~2,000) of training samples, our SmartControl can generalize well to unseen objects. Extensive experiments on four typical visual condition types clearly show the efficacy of our SmartControl against state-of-the-arts. Source code, pre-trained models, and datasets are available at https://github.com/liuxiaoyu1104/SmartControl.

Diffusion models have demonstrated impressive abilities in generating photo-realistic and creative images. To offer more controllability for the generation process, existing studies, termed as early-constraint methods in this paper, leverage extra conditions and incorporate them into pre-trained diffusion models. Particularly, some of them adopt condition-specific modules to handle conditions separately, where they struggle to generalize across other conditions. Although follow-up studies present unified solutions to solve the generalization problem, they also require extra resources to implement, e.g., additional inputs or parameter optimization, where more flexible and efficient solutions are expected to perform steerable guided image synthesis. In this paper, we present an alternative paradigm, namely Late-Constraint Diffusion (LaCon), to simultaneously integrate various conditions into pre-trained diffusion models. Specifically, LaCon establishes an alignment between the external condition and the internal features of diffusion models, and utilizes the alignment to incorporate the target condition, guiding the sampling process to produce tailored results. Experimental results on COCO dataset illustrate the effectiveness and superior generalization capability of LaCon under various conditions and settings. Ablation studies investigate the functionalities of different components in LaCon, and illustrate its great potential to serve as an efficient solution to offer flexible controllability for diffusion models.

Understanding how the brain represents visual information is a fundamental challenge in neuroscience and artificial intelligence. While AI-driven decoding of neural data has provided insights into the human visual system, integrating multimodal neuroimaging signals, such as EEG, MEG, and fMRI, remains a critical hurdle due to their inherent spatiotemporal misalignment. Current approaches often analyze these modalities in isolation, limiting a holistic view of neural representation. In this study, we introduce BrainFLORA, a unified framework for integrating cross-modal neuroimaging data to construct a shared neural representation. Our approach leverages multimodal large language models (MLLMs) augmented with modality-specific adapters and task decoders, achieving state-of-the-art performance in joint-subject visual retrieval task and has the potential to extend multitasking. Combining neuroimaging analysis methods, we further reveal how visual concept representations align across neural modalities and with real world object perception. We demonstrate that the brain's structured visual concept representations exhibit an implicit mapping to physical-world stimuli, bridging neuroscience and machine learning from different modalities of neural imaging. Beyond methodological advancements, BrainFLORA offers novel implications for cognitive neuroscience and brain-computer interfaces (BCIs). Our code is available at https://github.com/ncclab-sustech/BrainFLORA.

Self-supervised models have revolutionized speech processing, achieving new levels of performance in a wide variety of tasks with limited resources. However, the inner workings of these models are still opaque. In this paper, we aim to analyze the encoded contextual representation of these foundation models based on their inter- and intra-model similarity, independent of any external annotation and task-specific constraint. We examine different SSL models varying their training paradigm -- Contrastive (Wav2Vec2.0) and Predictive models (HuBERT); and model sizes (base and large). We explore these models on different levels of localization/distributivity of information including (i) individual neurons; (ii) layer representation; (iii) attention weights and (iv) compare the representations with their finetuned counterparts.Our results highlight that these models converge to similar representation subspaces but not to similar neuron-localized concepts\footnote{A concept represents a coherent fragment of knowledge, such as ``a class containing certain objects as elements, where the objects have certain properties. We made the code publicly available for facilitating further research, we publicly released our code.

Brain Signals, such as Electroencephalography (EEG), and human languages have been widely explored independently for many downstream tasks, however, the connection between them has not been well explored. In this study, we explore the relationship and dependency between EEG and language. To study at the representation level, we introduced MTAM, a Multimodal Transformer Alignment Model, to observe coordinated representations between the two modalities. We used various relationship alignment-seeking techniques, such as Canonical Correlation Analysis and Wasserstein Distance, as loss functions to transfigure features. On downstream applications, sentiment analysis and relation detection, we achieved new state-of-the-art results on two datasets, ZuCo and K-EmoCon. Our method achieved an F1-score improvement of 1.7% on K-EmoCon and 9.3% on Zuco datasets for sentiment analysis, and 7.4% on ZuCo for relation detection. In addition, we provide interpretations of the performance improvement: (1) feature distribution shows the effectiveness of the alignment module for discovering and encoding the relationship between EEG and language; (2) alignment weights show the influence of different language semantics as well as EEG frequency features; (3) brain topographical maps provide an intuitive demonstration of the connectivity in the brain regions. Our code is available at https://github.com/Jason-Qiu/EEG_Language_Alignment.

As the probability (and thus perplexity) of a text is calculated based on the product of the probabilities of individual tokens, it may happen that one unlikely token significantly reduces the probability (i.e., increase the perplexity) of some otherwise highly probable input, while potentially representing a simple typographical error. Also, given that perplexity is a scalar value that refers to the entire input, information about the probability distribution within it is lost in the calculation (a relatively good text that has one unlikely token and another text in which each token is equally likely they can have the same perplexity value), especially for longer texts. As an alternative to scalar perplexity this research proposes a simple algorithm used to calculate vector values based on n-gram perplexities within the input. Such representations consider the previously mentioned aspects, and instead of a unique value, the relative perplexity of each text token is calculated, and these values are combined into a single vector representing the input.

Automated interpretability research aims to identify concepts encoded in neural network features to enhance human understanding of model behavior. Current feature description methods face two critical challenges: limited robustness and the flawed assumption that each neuron encodes only a single concept (monosemanticity), despite growing evidence that neurons are often polysemantic. This assumption restricts the expressiveness of feature descriptions and limits their ability to capture the full range of behaviors encoded in model internals. To address this, we introduce Polysemantic FeatuRe Identification and Scoring Method (PRISM), a novel framework that captures the inherent complexity of neural network features. Unlike prior approaches that assign a single description per feature, PRISM provides more nuanced descriptions for both polysemantic and monosemantic features. We apply PRISM to language models and, through extensive benchmarking against existing methods, demonstrate that our approach produces more accurate and faithful feature descriptions, improving both overall description quality (via a description score) and the ability to capture distinct concepts when polysemanticity is present (via a polysemanticity score).

Recent advances in mechanistic interpretability have revealed that large language models (LLMs) develop internal representations corresponding not only to concrete entities but also distinct, human-understandable abstract concepts and behaviour. Moreover, these hidden features can be directly manipulated to steer model behaviour. However, it remains an open question whether this phenomenon is unique to models trained on inherently structured data (ie. language, images) or if it is a general property of foundation models. In this work, we investigate the internal representations of a large physics-focused foundation model. Inspired by recent work identifying single directions in activation space for complex behaviours in LLMs, we extract activation vectors from the model during forward passes over simulation datasets for different physical regimes. We then compute "delta" representations between the two regimes. These delta tensors act as concept directions in activation space, encoding specific physical features. By injecting these concept directions back into the model during inference, we can steer its predictions, demonstrating causal control over physical behaviours, such as inducing or removing some particular physical feature from a simulation. These results suggest that scientific foundation models learn generalised representations of physical principles. They do not merely rely on superficial correlations and patterns in the simulations. Our findings open new avenues for understanding and controlling scientific foundation models and has implications for AI-enabled scientific discovery.

Causal representation learning seeks to extract high-level latent factors from low-level sensory data. Most existing methods rely on observational data and structural assumptions (e.g., conditional independence) to identify the latent factors. However, interventional data is prevalent across applications. Can interventional data facilitate causal representation learning? We explore this question in this paper. The key observation is that interventional data often carries geometric signatures of the latent factors' support (i.e. what values each latent can possibly take). For example, when the latent factors are causally connected, interventions can break the dependency between the intervened latents' support and their ancestors'. Leveraging this fact, we prove that the latent causal factors can be identified up to permutation and scaling given data from perfect do interventions. Moreover, we can achieve block affine identification, namely the estimated latent factors are only entangled with a few other latents if we have access to data from imperfect interventions. These results highlight the unique power of interventional data in causal representation learning; they can enable provable identification of latent factors without any assumptions about their distributions or dependency structure.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated notable proficiency in both code generation and comprehension across multiple programming languages. However, the mechanisms underlying this proficiency remain underexplored, particularly with respect to whether distinct programming languages are processed independently or within a shared parametric region. Drawing an analogy to the specialized regions of the brain responsible for distinct cognitive functions, we introduce the concept of Coding Spot, a specialized parametric region within LLMs that facilitates coding capabilities. Our findings identify this Coding Spot and show that targeted modifications to this subset significantly affect performance on coding tasks, while largely preserving non-coding functionalities. This compartmentalization mirrors the functional specialization observed in cognitive neuroscience, where specific brain regions are dedicated to distinct tasks, suggesting that LLMs may similarly employ specialized parameter regions for different knowledge domains.

The concept of causal abstraction got recently popularised to demystify the opaque decision-making processes of machine learning models; in short, a neural network can be abstracted as a higher-level algorithm if there exists a function which allows us to map between them. Notably, most interpretability papers implement these maps as linear functions, motivated by the linear representation hypothesis: the idea that features are encoded linearly in a model's representations. However, this linearity constraint is not required by the definition of causal abstraction. In this work, we critically examine the concept of causal abstraction by considering arbitrarily powerful alignment maps. In particular, we prove that under reasonable assumptions, any neural network can be mapped to any algorithm, rendering this unrestricted notion of causal abstraction trivial and uninformative. We complement these theoretical findings with empirical evidence, demonstrating that it is possible to perfectly map models to algorithms even when these models are incapable of solving the actual task; e.g., on an experiment using randomly initialised language models, our alignment maps reach 100% interchange-intervention accuracy on the indirect object identification task. This raises the non-linear representation dilemma: if we lift the linearity constraint imposed to alignment maps in causal abstraction analyses, we are left with no principled way to balance the inherent trade-off between these maps' complexity and accuracy. Together, these results suggest an answer to our title's question: causal abstraction is not enough for mechanistic interpretability, as it becomes vacuous without assumptions about how models encode information. Studying the connection between this information-encoding assumption and causal abstraction should lead to exciting future work.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

Many real-world tasks require models to compare images along multiple similarity conditions (e.g. similarity in color, category or shape). Existing methods often reason about these complex similarity relationships by learning condition-aware embeddings. While such embeddings aid models in learning different notions of similarity, they also limit their capability to generalize to unseen categories since they require explicit labels at test time. To address this deficiency, we propose an approach that jointly learns representations for the different similarity conditions and their contributions as a latent variable without explicit supervision. Comprehensive experiments across three datasets, Polyvore-Outfits, Maryland-Polyvore and UT-Zappos50k, demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach: our model outperforms the state-of-the-art methods, even those that are strongly supervised with pre-defined similarity conditions, on fill-in-the-blank, outfit compatibility prediction and triplet prediction tasks. Finally, we show that our model learns different visually-relevant semantic sub-spaces that allow it to generalize well to unseen categories.

Although large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable, these capabilities are unevenly distributed: they excel at formal linguistic tasks, such as producing fluent, grammatical text, but struggle more with functional linguistic tasks like reasoning and consistent fact retrieval. Inspired by neuroscience, recent work suggests that to succeed on both formal and functional linguistic tasks, LLMs should use different mechanisms for each; such localization could either be built-in or emerge spontaneously through training. In this paper, we ask: do current models, with fast-improving functional linguistic abilities, exhibit distinct localization of formal and functional linguistic mechanisms? We answer this by finding and comparing the "circuits", or minimal computational subgraphs, responsible for various formal and functional tasks. Comparing 5 LLMs across 10 distinct tasks, we find that while there is indeed little overlap between circuits for formal and functional tasks, there is also little overlap between formal linguistic tasks, as exists in the human brain. Thus, a single formal linguistic network, unified and distinct from functional task circuits, remains elusive. However, in terms of cross-task faithfulness - the ability of one circuit to solve another's task - we observe a separation between formal and functional mechanisms, suggesting that shared mechanisms between formal tasks may exist.

We present a large-scale study of gender bias in occupation classification, a task where the use of machine learning may lead to negative outcomes on peoples' lives. We analyze the potential allocation harms that can result from semantic representation bias. To do so, we study the impact on occupation classification of including explicit gender indicators---such as first names and pronouns---in different semantic representations of online biographies. Additionally, we quantify the bias that remains when these indicators are "scrubbed," and describe proxy behavior that occurs in the absence of explicit gender indicators. As we demonstrate, differences in true positive rates between genders are correlated with existing gender imbalances in occupations, which may compound these imbalances.

Understanding how the human brain represents visual concepts, and in which brain regions these representations are encoded, remains a long-standing challenge. Decades of work have advanced our understanding of visual representations, yet brain signals remain large and complex, and the space of possible visual concepts is vast. As a result, most studies remain small-scale, rely on manual inspection, focus on specific regions and properties, and rarely include systematic validation. We present a large-scale, automated framework for discovering and explaining visual representations across the human cortex. Our method comprises two main stages. First, we discover candidate interpretable patterns in fMRI activity through unsupervised, data-driven decomposition methods. Next, we explain each pattern by identifying the set of natural images that most strongly elicit it and generating a natural-language description of their shared visual meaning. To scale this process, we introduce an automated pipeline that tests multiple candidate explanations, assigns quantitative reliability scores, and selects the most consistent description for each voxel pattern. Our framework reveals thousands of interpretable patterns spanning many distinct visual concepts, including fine-grained representations previously unreported.

Current story visualization methods tend to position subjects solely by text and face challenges in maintaining artistic consistency. To address these limitations, we introduce DreamingComics, a layout-aware story visualization framework. We build upon a pretrained video diffusion-transformer (DiT) model, leveraging its spatiotemporal priors to enhance identity and style consistency. For layout-based position control, we propose RegionalRoPE, a region-aware positional encoding scheme that re-indexes embeddings based on the target layout. Additionally, we introduce a masked condition loss to further constrain each subject's visual features to their designated region. To infer layouts from natural language scripts, we integrate an LLM-based layout generator trained to produce comic-style layouts, enabling flexible and controllable layout conditioning. We present a comprehensive evaluation of our approach, showing a 29.2% increase in character consistency and a 36.2% increase in style similarity compared to previous methods, while displaying high spatial accuracy. Our project page is available at https://yj7082126.github.io/dreamingcomics/

Neuroimage processing tasks like segmentation, reconstruction, and registration are central to the study of neuroscience. Robust deep learning strategies and architectures used to solve these tasks are often similar. Yet, when presented with a new task or a dataset with different visual characteristics, practitioners most often need to train a new model, or fine-tune an existing one. This is a time-consuming process that poses a substantial barrier for the thousands of neuroscientists and clinical researchers who often lack the resources or machine-learning expertise to train deep learning models. In practice, this leads to a lack of adoption of deep learning, and neuroscience tools being dominated by classical frameworks. We introduce Neuralizer, a single model that generalizes to previously unseen neuroimaging tasks and modalities without the need for re-training or fine-tuning. Tasks do not have to be known a priori, and generalization happens in a single forward pass during inference. The model can solve processing tasks across multiple image modalities, acquisition methods, and datasets, and generalize to tasks and modalities it has not been trained on. Our experiments on coronal slices show that when few annotated subjects are available, our multi-task network outperforms task-specific baselines without training on the task.

This paper presents a novel paradigm of the local percept-perceiver phenomenon to formalize certain observations in neuroscientific theories of consciousness. Using this model, a set-theoretic formalism is developed for artificial systems, and the existence of machine consciousness is proved by invoking Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. The article argues for the possibility of a reductionist form of epistemic consciousness within machines.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable performance on complex tasks with multimodal context. However, it is still understudied whether they exhibit modality preference when processing multimodal contexts. To study this question, we first build a MC\textsuperscript{2} benchmark under controlled evidence conflict scenarios to systematically evaluate modality preference, which is the tendency to favor one modality over another when making decisions based on multimodal conflicting evidence. Our extensive evaluation reveals that all 18 tested MLLMs generally demonstrate clear modality bias, and modality preference can be influenced by external interventions. An in-depth analysis reveals that the preference direction can be captured within the latent representations of MLLMs. Built on this, we propose a probing and steering method based on representation engineering to explicitly control modality preference without additional fine-tuning or carefully crafted prompts. Our method effectively amplifies modality preference toward a desired direction and applies to downstream tasks such as hallucination mitigation and multimodal machine translation, yielding promising improvements.

Classical models of memory in psychology and neuroscience rely on similarity-based retrieval of stored patterns, where similarity is a function of retrieval cues and the stored patterns. While parsimonious, these models do not allow distinct representations for storage and retrieval, despite their distinct computational demands. Key-value memory systems, in contrast, distinguish representations used for storage (values) and those used for retrieval (keys). This allows key-value memory systems to optimize simultaneously for fidelity in storage and discriminability in retrieval. We review the computational foundations of key-value memory, its role in modern machine learning systems, related ideas from psychology and neuroscience, applications to a number of empirical puzzles, and possible biological implementations.

Diffusion models excel at generating high-dimensional data but fall short in training efficiency and representation quality compared to self-supervised methods. We identify a key bottleneck: the underutilization of high-quality, semantically rich representations during training notably slows down convergence. Our systematic analysis reveals a critical representation processing region -- primarily in the early layers -- where semantic and structural pattern learning takes place before generation can occur. To address this, we propose Embedded Representation Warmup (ERW), a plug-and-play framework where in the first stage we get the ERW module serves as a warmup that initializes the early layers of the diffusion model with high-quality, pretrained representations. This warmup minimizes the burden of learning representations from scratch, thereby accelerating convergence and boosting performance. Our theoretical analysis demonstrates that ERW's efficacy depends on its precise integration into specific neural network layers -- termed the representation processing region -- where the model primarily processes and transforms feature representations for later generation. We further establish that ERW not only accelerates training convergence but also enhances representation quality: empirically, our method achieves a 40times acceleration in training speed compared to REPA, the current state-of-the-art methods. Code is available at https://github.com/LINs-lab/ERW.

With the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs), the novel metric "Brainscore" emerged as a means to evaluate the functional similarity between LLMs and human brain/neural systems. Our efforts were dedicated to mining the meaning of the novel score by constructing topological features derived from both human fMRI data involving 190 subjects, and 39 LLMs plus their untrained counterparts. Subsequently, we trained 36 Linear Regression Models and conducted thorough statistical analyses to discern reliable and valid features from our constructed ones. Our findings reveal distinctive feature combinations conducive to interpreting existing brainscores across various brain regions of interest (ROIs) and hemispheres, thereby significantly contributing to advancing interpretable machine learning (iML) studies. The study is enriched by our further discussions and analyses concerning existing brainscores. To our knowledge, this study represents the first attempt to comprehend the novel metric brainscore within this interdisciplinary domain.