Daily Papers

When adapting an encoder to a new domain, the standard approach is to continue training with Masked Language Modeling (MLM). We show that temporarily switching to Causal Language Modeling (CLM) followed by a short MLM decay improves downstream performance. On biomedical texts with ModernBERT, this CLM detour outperforms MLM baselines trained on identical data and compute across 8 French and 11 English biomedical tasks, by +1.2-2.8pp and +0.3-0.8pp respectively, depending on model size. We investigate the reasons for these gains. We find that CLM's dense supervision impacts low transformer layers (0-7) far more than MLM does. Freezing low layers during CLM eliminates the downstream benefit; freezing mid layers preserves it. The representational changes persist through the MLM decay phase, even when it matches the CLM phase in length, and they scale with model capacity. We release ModernCamemBERT-bio and ModernBERT-bio as state-of-the-art biomedical encoders in Base and Large sizes.

The ability to predict upcoming events has been hypothesized to comprise a key aspect of natural and machine cognition. This is supported by trends in deep reinforcement learning (RL), where self-supervised auxiliary objectives such as prediction are widely used to support representation learning and improve task performance. Here, we study the effects predictive auxiliary objectives have on representation learning across different modules of an RL system and how these mimic representational changes observed in the brain. We find that predictive objectives improve and stabilize learning particularly in resource-limited architectures, and we identify settings where longer predictive horizons better support representational transfer. Furthermore, we find that representational changes in this RL system bear a striking resemblance to changes in neural activity observed in the brain across various experiments. Specifically, we draw a connection between the auxiliary predictive model of the RL system and hippocampus, an area thought to learn a predictive model to support memory-guided behavior. We also connect the encoder network and the value learning network of the RL system to visual cortex and striatum in the brain, respectively. This work demonstrates how representation learning in deep RL systems can provide an interpretable framework for modeling multi-region interactions in the brain. The deep RL perspective taken here also suggests an additional role of the hippocampus in the brain -- that of an auxiliary learning system that benefits representation learning in other regions.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for factual tasks such as "What treats asthma?" or "What is the capital of Latvia?". However, it remains unclear how stably LLMs encode distinctions between true, false, and neither-true-nor-false content in their internal probabilistic representations. We introduce representational stability as the robustness of an LLM's veracity representations to perturbations in the operational definition of truth. We assess representational stability by (i) training a linear probe on an LLM's activations to separate true from not-true statements and (ii) measuring how its learned decision boundary shifts under controlled label changes. Using activations from sixteen open-source models and three factual domains, we compare two types of neither statements. The first are fact-like assertions about entities we believe to be absent from any training data. We call these unfamiliar neither statements. The second are nonfactual claims drawn from well-known fictional contexts. We call these familiar neither statements. The unfamiliar statements induce the largest boundary shifts, producing up to 40% flipped truth judgements in fragile domains (such as word definitions), while familiar fictional statements remain more coherently clustered and yield smaller changes (leq 8.2%). These results suggest that representational stability stems more from epistemic familiarity than from linguistic form. More broadly, our approach provides a diagnostic for auditing and training LLMs to preserve coherent truth assignments under semantic uncertainty, rather than optimizing for output accuracy alone.

Language model representations often contain linear directions that correspond to high-level concepts. Here, we study the dynamics of these representations: how representations evolve along these dimensions within the context of (simulated) conversations. We find that linear representations can change dramatically over a conversation; for example, information that is represented as factual at the beginning of a conversation can be represented as non-factual at the end and vice versa. These changes are content-dependent; while representations of conversation-relevant information may change, generic information is generally preserved. These changes are robust even for dimensions that disentangle factuality from more superficial response patterns, and occur across different model families and layers of the model. These representation changes do not require on-policy conversations; even replaying a conversation script written by an entirely different model can produce similar changes. However, adaptation is much weaker from simply having a sci-fi story in context that is framed more explicitly as such. We also show that steering along a representational direction can have dramatically different effects at different points in a conversation. These results are consistent with the idea that representations may evolve in response to the model playing a particular role that is cued by a conversation. Our findings may pose challenges for interpretability and steering -- in particular, they imply that it may be misleading to use static interpretations of features or directions, or probes that assume a particular range of features consistently corresponds to a particular ground-truth value. However, these types of representational dynamics also point to exciting new research directions for understanding how models adapt to context.

Autoregressive (AR) language models form representations incrementally through left-to-right prediction, whereas diffusion language models (dLLMs) are trained via full-sequence denoising. Although recent dLLMs match AR performance, it remains unclear whether diffusion objectives fundamentally reshape internal representations across depth. We perform the first layer- and token-wise representational analysis comparing native dLLMs (LLaDA), native AR models (Qwen2.5), and AR-initialized dLLMs (Dream-7B). We find that diffusion objectives result in different, more hierarchical abstractions with substantial early-layer redundancy and reduced recency bias, while AR objectives produce tightly coupled, depth-dependent representations. Critically, AR-initialized dLLMs retain AR-like representational dynamics despite diffusion training, revealing persistent initialization bias. Leveraging this observed representational redundancy, we introduce a static, task-agnostic inference-time layer-skipping method requiring no architectural changes or KV-cache sharing. Native dLLMs achieve up to 18.75% FLOPs reduction while preserving over 90% performance on reasoning and code generation benchmarks, whereas AR models degrade sharply under comparable skipping. These results link training objectives to representational structure and enable practical, cache-orthogonal efficiency gains.

Deep neural networks have reached human-level performance on many computer vision tasks. However, the objectives used to train these networks enforce only that similar images are embedded at similar locations in the representation space, and do not directly constrain the global structure of the resulting space. Here, we explore the impact of supervising this global structure by linearly aligning it with human similarity judgments. We find that a naive approach leads to large changes in local representational structure that harm downstream performance. Thus, we propose a novel method that aligns the global structure of representations while preserving their local structure. This global-local transform considerably improves accuracy across a variety of few-shot learning and anomaly detection tasks. Our results indicate that human visual representations are globally organized in a way that facilitates learning from few examples, and incorporating this global structure into neural network representations improves performance on downstream tasks.

Large language models are increasingly adapted to downstream tasks through fine-tuning. Full supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) methods, such as Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA), are two dominant approaches. While PEFT methods are widely used for their computational efficiency, the implications of their configurations (e.g., rank) remain under-explored in downstream Q&A tasks and generalisation. In this work, we perform a comprehensive evaluation across multiple reasoning and recall datasets, conducting a rank sweep to quantify the trade-off between SFT and PEFT. We also compare the accuracy of PEFT and SFT models across in-domain and out-of-domain adaptation, highlighting distinct generalisation behaviour and task-specific forgetting. We demonstrate that LoRA achieves competitive and in some cases superior performance compared to SFT, particularly on reasoning tasks at specific rank values. Additionally, we analyze the internal representations via spectral features and layer-wise attention structures, offering insights into representational drift and structural changes in attention patterns.

Large language models exhibit uneven performance across languages, with substantial gaps between high- and low-resource languages. We present a framework for enhancing monolingual capabilities of LLMs in underrepresented languages while preserving their general-purpose performance through targeted fine-tuning of language-specific subnetworks. Our approach identifies language-specific neurons using Language Activation Probability Entropy and fine-tunes only the weights associated with these neurons, a dedicated subnetwork, on target-language data. Experiments on Llama-3.1-8B and Mistral-Nemo-12B across 12 mid- and low-resource languages demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms full fine-tuning, FFN-only fine-tuning, LoRA adaptation, and random subset fine-tuning baselines while efficiently updating only up to 1% of model parameters. Beyond performance improvements, we observe enhanced favorable training dynamics, cross-lingual representational alignment, and systematic weight update changes. To facilitate future research, we release language-specific neuron identifications for over 100 languages as well as our adaptation pipeline, offering a cost-effective pathway for adapting state-of-the-art models to underrepresented languages.

Multimodal LLMs have reached remarkable levels of proficiency in understanding multimodal inputs, driving extensive research to develop increasingly powerful models. However, much less attention has been paid to understanding and explaining the underlying mechanisms of these models. Most existing explainability research examines these models only in their final states, overlooking the dynamic representational shifts that occur during training. In this work, we systematically analyze the evolution of hidden state representations to reveal how fine-tuning alters the internal structure of a model to specialize in new multimodal tasks. Using a concept-based approach, we map hidden states to interpretable visual and textual concepts, enabling us to trace changes in encoded concepts across modalities as training progresses. We also demonstrate the use of shift vectors to capture these concepts changes. These shift vectors allow us to recover fine-tuned concepts by shifting those in the original model. Finally, we explore the practical impact of our findings on model steering, showing that we can adjust multimodal LLMs behaviors without any training, such as modifying answer types, captions style, or biasing the model toward specific responses. Our work sheds light on how multimodal representations evolve through fine-tuning and offers a new perspective for interpreting model adaptation in multimodal tasks. The code for this project is publicly available at https://github.com/mshukor/xl-vlms.

Do brains and language models converge toward the same internal representations of the world? Recent years have seen a rise in studies of neural activations and model alignment. In this work, we review 25 fMRI-based studies published between 2023 and 2025 and explicitly confront their findings with two key hypotheses: (i) the Platonic Representation Hypothesis -- that as models scale and improve, they converge to a representation of the real world, and (ii) the Intermediate-Layer Advantage -- that intermediate (mid-depth) layers often encode richer, more generalizable features. Our findings provide converging evidence that models and brains may share abstract representational structures, supporting both hypotheses and motivating further research on brain-model alignment.

Continual learning systems are increasingly deployed in environments where retraining or reset is infeasible, yet many approaches emphasize task performance rather than the evolution of internal representations over time. In this work, we study a minimal continual learning agent designed to isolate representational dynamics from architectural complexity and optimization objectives. The agent maintains a persistent state vector across executions and incrementally updates it as new textual data is introduced. We quantify representational change using cosine similarity between successive normalized state vectors and define a stability metric over time intervals. Longitudinal experiments across eight executions reveal a transition from an initial plastic regime to a stable representational regime under consistent input. A deliberately introduced semantic perturbation produces a bounded decrease in similarity, followed by recovery and restabilization under subsequent coherent input. These results demonstrate that meaningful stability plasticity tradeoffs can emerge in a minimal, stateful learning system without explicit regularization, replay, or architectural complexity. The work establishes a transparent empirical baseline for studying representational accumulation and adaptation in continual learning systems.

We consider representation misdirection (RM), a class of LLM unlearning methods that achieves forgetting by manipulating the forget-representations, that is, latent representations of forget samples. Despite being important, the roles of target vectors used in RM, however, remain underexplored. Here, we approach and revisit RM through the lens of the linear representation hypothesis. Specifically, if one can somehow identify a one-dimensional representation corresponding to a high-level concept, the linear representation hypothesis enables linear operations on this concept vector within the forget-representation space. Under this view, we hypothesize that, beyond forgetting, machine unlearning elicits controllable side behaviors and stronger side capabilities corresponding to the high-level concept. Our hypothesis is empirically validated across a wide range of tasks, including behavioral control (e.g., controlling unlearned models' truth, sentiment, and refusal) and capability enhancement (e.g., improving unlearned models' in-context learning capability). Our findings reveal that this fairly attractive phenomenon could be either a hidden risk if misused or a mechanism that can be harnessed for developing models that require stronger capabilities and controllable behaviors.

Interventions targeting the representation space of language models (LMs) have emerged as an effective means to influence model behavior. Such methods are employed, for example, to eliminate or alter the encoding of demographic information such as gender within the model's representations and, in so doing, create a counterfactual representation. However, because the intervention operates within the representation space, understanding precisely what aspects of the text it modifies poses a challenge. In this paper, we give a method to convert representation counterfactuals into string counterfactuals. We demonstrate that this approach enables us to analyze the linguistic alterations corresponding to a given representation space intervention and to interpret the features utilized to encode a specific concept. Moreover, the resulting counterfactuals can be used to mitigate bias in classification through data augmentation.

We argue that representations in AI models, particularly deep networks, are converging. First, we survey many examples of convergence in the literature: over time and across multiple domains, the ways by which different neural networks represent data are becoming more aligned. Next, we demonstrate convergence across data modalities: as vision models and language models get larger, they measure distance between datapoints in a more and more alike way. We hypothesize that this convergence is driving toward a shared statistical model of reality, akin to Plato's concept of an ideal reality. We term such a representation the platonic representation and discuss several possible selective pressures toward it. Finally, we discuss the implications of these trends, their limitations, and counterexamples to our analysis.

Post-training is essential for the success of large language models (LLMs), transforming pre-trained base models into more useful and aligned post-trained models. While plenty of works have studied post-training algorithms and evaluated post-training models by their outputs, it remains understudied how post-training reshapes LLMs internally. In this paper, we compare base and post-trained LLMs mechanistically from four perspectives to better understand post-training effects. Our findings across model families and datasets reveal that: (1) Post-training does not change the factual knowledge storage locations, and it adapts knowledge representations from the base model while developing new knowledge representations; (2) Both truthfulness and refusal can be represented by linear vectors in the hidden representation space. The truthfulness direction is highly similar between the base and post-trained model, and it is effectively transferable for interventions; (3) The refusal direction is different between the base and post-trained models, and it shows limited forward transferability; (4) Differences in confidence between the base and post-trained models cannot be attributed to entropy neurons. Our study provides insights into the fundamental mechanisms preserved and altered during post-training, facilitates downstream tasks like model steering, and could potentially benefit future research in interpretability and LLM post-training.

Most of the recent works on probing representations have focused on BERT, with the presumption that the findings might be similar to the other models. In this work, we extend the probing studies to two other models in the family, namely ELECTRA and XLNet, showing that variations in the pre-training objectives or architectural choices can result in different behaviors in encoding linguistic information in the representations. Most notably, we observe that ELECTRA tends to encode linguistic knowledge in the deeper layers, whereas XLNet instead concentrates that in the earlier layers. Also, the former model undergoes a slight change during fine-tuning, whereas the latter experiences significant adjustments. Moreover, we show that drawing conclusions based on the weight mixing evaluation strategy -- which is widely used in the context of layer-wise probing -- can be misleading given the norm disparity of the representations across different layers. Instead, we adopt an alternative information-theoretic probing with minimum description length, which has recently been proven to provide more reliable and informative results.

Prior work has analyzed the robustness of visual encoders to image transformations and corruptions, particularly in cases where such alterations are not seen during training. When this occurs, they introduce a form of distribution shift at test time, often leading to performance degradation. The primary focus has been on severe corruptions that, when applied aggressively, distort useful signals necessary for accurate semantic predictions. We take a different perspective by analyzing parameters of the image acquisition process and transformations that may be subtle or even imperceptible to the human eye. We find that such parameters are systematically encoded in the learned visual representations and can be easily recovered. More strikingly, their presence can have a profound impact, either positively or negatively, on semantic predictions. This effect depends on whether there is a strong correlation or anti-correlation between semantic labels and these acquisition-based or processing-based labels. Our code and data are available at: https://github.com/ryan-caesar-ramos/visual-encoder-traces

We consider concept generalization at a large scale in the diverse and natural visual spectrum. Established computational modes (i.e., rule-based or similarity-based) are primarily studied isolated and focus on confined and abstract problem spaces. In this work, we study these two modes when the problem space scales up, and the complexity of concepts becomes diverse. Specifically, at the representational level, we seek to answer how the complexity varies when a visual concept is mapped to the representation space. Prior psychology literature has shown that two types of complexities (i.e., subjective complexity and visual complexity) (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2003) build an inverted-U relation (Donderi, 2006; Sun and Firestone, 2021). Leveraging Representativeness of Attribute (RoA), we computationally confirm the following observation: Models use attributes with high RoA to describe visual concepts, and the description length falls in an inverted-U relation with the increment in visual complexity. At the computational level, we aim to answer how the complexity of representation affects the shift between the rule- and similarity-based generalization. We hypothesize that category-conditioned visual modeling estimates the co-occurrence frequency between visual and categorical attributes, thus potentially serving as the prior for the natural visual world. Experimental results show that representations with relatively high subjective complexity outperform those with relatively low subjective complexity in the rule-based generalization, while the trend is the opposite in the similarity-based generalization.

Understanding how feature representations evolve across layers in large language models (LLMs) is key to improving their interpretability and robustness. While recent studies have identified critical layers linked to specific functions or behaviors, these efforts typically rely on data-dependent analyses of fine-tuned models, limiting their use to post-hoc settings. In contrast, we introduce a data-oblivious approach to identify intrinsic critical layers in pre-fine-tuned LLMs by analyzing representation dynamics via Centered Kernel Alignment(CKA). We show that layers with significant shifts in representation space are also those most affected during fine-tuning--a pattern that holds consistently across tasks for a given model. Our spectral analysis further reveals that these shifts are driven by changes in the top principal components, which encode semantic transitions from rationales to conclusions. We further apply these findings to two practical scenarios: efficient domain adaptation, where fine-tuning critical layers leads to greater loss reduction compared to non-critical layers; and backdoor defense, where freezing them reduces attack success rates by up to 40%.

The latest advancements in unsupervised learning of sentence embeddings predominantly involve employing contrastive learning-based (CL-based) fine-tuning over pre-trained language models. In this study, we analyze the latest sentence embedding methods by adopting representation rank as the primary tool of analysis. We first define Phase 1 and Phase 2 of fine-tuning based on when representation rank peaks. Utilizing these phases, we conduct a thorough analysis and obtain essential findings across key aspects, including alignment and uniformity, linguistic abilities, and correlation between performance and rank. For instance, we find that the dynamics of the key aspects can undergo significant changes as fine-tuning transitions from Phase 1 to Phase 2. Based on these findings, we experiment with a rank reduction (RR) strategy that facilitates rapid and stable fine-tuning of the latest CL-based methods. Through empirical investigations, we showcase the efficacy of RR in enhancing the performance and stability of five state-of-the-art sentence embedding methods.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis suggests that representations from neural networks are converging to a common statistical model of reality. We show that the existing metrics used to measure representational similarity are confounded by network scale: increasing model depth or width can systematically inflate representational similarity scores. To correct these effects, we introduce a permutation-based null-calibration framework that transforms any representational similarity metric into a calibrated score with statistical guarantees. We revisit the Platonic Representation Hypothesis with our calibration framework, which reveals a nuanced picture: the apparent convergence reported by global spectral measures largely disappears after calibration, while local neighborhood similarity, but not local distances, retains significant agreement across different modalities. Based on these findings, we propose the Aristotelian Representation Hypothesis: representations in neural networks are converging to shared local neighborhood relationships.

A key requirement for the development of effective learning representations is their evaluation and comparison to representations we know to be effective. In natural sensory domains, the community has viewed the brain as a source of inspiration and as an implicit benchmark for success. However, it has not been possible to directly test representational learning algorithms directly against the representations contained in neural systems. Here, we propose a new benchmark for visual representations on which we have directly tested the neural representation in multiple visual cortical areas in macaque (utilizing data from [Majaj et al., 2012]), and on which any computer vision algorithm that produces a feature space can be tested. The benchmark measures the effectiveness of the neural or machine representation by computing the classification loss on the ordered eigendecomposition of a kernel matrix [Montavon et al., 2011]. In our analysis we find that the neural representation in visual area IT is superior to visual area V4. In our analysis of representational learning algorithms, we find that three-layer models approach the representational performance of V4 and the algorithm in [Le et al., 2012] surpasses the performance of V4. Impressively, we find that a recent supervised algorithm [Krizhevsky et al., 2012] achieves performance comparable to that of IT for an intermediate level of image variation difficulty, and surpasses IT at a higher difficulty level. We believe this result represents a major milestone: it is the first learning algorithm we have found that exceeds our current estimate of IT representation performance. We hope that this benchmark will assist the community in matching the representational performance of visual cortex and will serve as an initial rallying point for further correspondence between representations derived in brains and machines.

We aim to understand grokking, a phenomenon where models generalize long after overfitting their training set. We present both a microscopic analysis anchored by an effective theory and a macroscopic analysis of phase diagrams describing learning performance across hyperparameters. We find that generalization originates from structured representations whose training dynamics and dependence on training set size can be predicted by our effective theory in a toy setting. We observe empirically the presence of four learning phases: comprehension, grokking, memorization, and confusion. We find representation learning to occur only in a "Goldilocks zone" (including comprehension and grokking) between memorization and confusion. We find on transformers the grokking phase stays closer to the memorization phase (compared to the comprehension phase), leading to delayed generalization. The Goldilocks phase is reminiscent of "intelligence from starvation" in Darwinian evolution, where resource limitations drive discovery of more efficient solutions. This study not only provides intuitive explanations of the origin of grokking, but also highlights the usefulness of physics-inspired tools, e.g., effective theories and phase diagrams, for understanding deep learning.

Modern language models can process inputs across diverse languages and modalities. We hypothesize that models acquire this capability through learning a shared representation space across heterogeneous data types (e.g., different languages and modalities), which places semantically similar inputs near one another, even if they are from different modalities/languages. We term this the semantic hub hypothesis, following the hub-and-spoke model from neuroscience (Patterson et al., 2007) which posits that semantic knowledge in the human brain is organized through a transmodal semantic "hub" which integrates information from various modality-specific "spokes" regions. We first show that model representations for semantically equivalent inputs in different languages are similar in the intermediate layers, and that this space can be interpreted using the model's dominant pretraining language via the logit lens. This tendency extends to other data types, including arithmetic expressions, code, and visual/audio inputs. Interventions in the shared representation space in one data type also predictably affect model outputs in other data types, suggesting that this shared representations space is not simply a vestigial byproduct of large-scale training on broad data, but something that is actively utilized by the model during input processing.

Recent work has demonstrated that semantics specified by pretraining data influence how representations of different concepts are organized in a large language model (LLM). However, given the open-ended nature of LLMs, e.g., their ability to in-context learn, we can ask whether models alter these pretraining semantics to adopt alternative, context-specified ones. Specifically, if we provide in-context exemplars wherein a concept plays a different role than what the pretraining data suggests, do models reorganize their representations in accordance with these novel semantics? To answer this question, we take inspiration from the theory of conceptual role semantics and define a toy "graph tracing" task wherein the nodes of the graph are referenced via concepts seen during training (e.g., apple, bird, etc.) and the connectivity of the graph is defined via some predefined structure (e.g., a square grid). Given exemplars that indicate traces of random walks on the graph, we analyze intermediate representations of the model and find that as the amount of context is scaled, there is a sudden re-organization from pretrained semantic representations to in-context representations aligned with the graph structure. Further, we find that when reference concepts have correlations in their semantics (e.g., Monday, Tuesday, etc.), the context-specified graph structure is still present in the representations, but is unable to dominate the pretrained structure. To explain these results, we analogize our task to energy minimization for a predefined graph topology, providing evidence towards an implicit optimization process to infer context-specified semantics. Overall, our findings indicate scaling context-size can flexibly re-organize model representations, possibly unlocking novel capabilities.

This onomasiological study uses diachronic word embeddings to explore how different words represented the same concepts over time, using historical word data from 1800 to 2000. We identify shifts in energy, transport, entertainment, and computing domains, revealing connections between language and societal changes. Our approach consisted in using diachronic word embeddings trained using word2vec with skipgram and aligning them using orthogonal Procrustes. We discuss possible difficulties linked to the relationships the method identifies. Moreover, we look at the ethical aspects of interpreting results, highlighting the need for expert insights to understand the method's significance.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

Large-scale pretrained language models (LMs) are said to ``lack the ability to connect utterances to the world'' (Bender and Koller, 2020), because they do not have ``mental models of the world' '(Mitchell and Krakauer, 2023). If so, one would expect LM representations to be unrelated to representations induced by vision models. We present an empirical evaluation across four families of LMs (BERT, GPT-2, OPT and LLaMA-2) and three vision model architectures (ResNet, SegFormer, and MAE). Our experiments show that LMs partially converge towards representations isomorphic to those of vision models, subject to dispersion, polysemy and frequency. This has important implications for both multi-modal processing and the LM understanding debate (Mitchell and Krakauer, 2023).

Autonomous AI agents executing multi-step tool sequences face semantic attacks that manifest in behavioral traces rather than isolated prompts. A critical challenge is cross-attack generalization: can detectors trained on known attack families recognize novel, unseen attack types? We discover that standard conversational tokenization -- capturing linguistic patterns from agent interactions -- fails catastrophically on structural attacks like tool hijacking (AUC 0.39) and data exfiltration (AUC 0.46), while succeeding on linguistic attacks like social engineering (AUC 0.78). We introduce structural tokenization, encoding execution-flow patterns (tool calls, arguments, observations) rather than conversational content. This simple representational change dramatically improves cross-attack generalization: +46 AUC points on tool hijacking, +39 points on data exfiltration, and +71 points on unknown attacks, while simultaneously improving in-distribution performance (+6 points). For attacks requiring linguistic features, we propose gated multi-view fusion that adaptively combines both representations, achieving AUC 0.89 on social engineering without sacrificing structural attack detection. Our findings reveal that AI agent security is fundamentally a structural problem: attack semantics reside in execution patterns, not surface language. While our rule-based tokenizer serves as a baseline, the structural abstraction principle generalizes even with simple implementation.

In Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs), encoding information in a suboptimal or erroneous way can impact the quality of representations based on later elements in the sequence and subsequently lead to wrong predictions and a worse model performance. In humans, challenging cases like garden path sentences (an instance of this being the infamous "The horse raced past the barn fell") can lead their language understanding astray. However, they are still able to correct their representation accordingly and recover when new information is encountered. Inspired by this, I propose an augmentation to standard RNNs in form of a gradient-based correction mechanism: This way I hope to enable such models to dynamically adapt their inner representation of a sentence, adding a way to correct deviations as soon as they occur. This could therefore lead to more robust models using more flexible representations, even during inference time. I conduct different experiments in the context of language modeling, where the impact of using such a mechanism is examined in detail. To this end, I look at modifications based on different kinds of time-dependent error signals and how they influence the model performance. Furthermore, this work contains a study of the model's confidence in its predictions during training and for challenging test samples and the effect of the manipulation thereof. Lastly, I also study the difference in behavior of these novel models compared to a standard LSTM baseline and investigate error cases in detail to identify points of future research. I show that while the proposed approach comes with promising theoretical guarantees and an appealing intuition, it is only able to produce minor improvements over the baseline due to challenges in its practical application and the efficacy of the tested model variants.

Representation learning, and interpreting learned representations, are key areas of focus in machine learning and neuroscience. Both fields generally use representations as a means to understand or improve a system's computations. In this work, however, we explore surprising dissociations between representation and computation that may pose challenges for such efforts. We create datasets in which we attempt to match the computational role that different features play, while manipulating other properties of the features or the data. We train various deep learning architectures to compute these multiple abstract features about their inputs. We find that their learned feature representations are systematically biased towards representing some features more strongly than others, depending upon extraneous properties such as feature complexity, the order in which features are learned, and the distribution of features over the inputs. For example, features that are simpler to compute or learned first tend to be represented more strongly and densely than features that are more complex or learned later, even if all features are learned equally well. We also explore how these biases are affected by architectures, optimizers, and training regimes (e.g., in transformers, features decoded earlier in the output sequence also tend to be represented more strongly). Our results help to characterize the inductive biases of gradient-based representation learning. These results also highlight a key challenge for interpretability - or for comparing the representations of models and brains - disentangling extraneous biases from the computationally important aspects of a system's internal representations.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis suggests that neural networks trained on different modalities (e.g., text and images) align and eventually converge toward the same representation of reality. If true, this has significant implications for whether modality choice matters at all. We show that the experimental evidence for this hypothesis is fragile and depends critically on the evaluation regime. Alignment is measured using mutual nearest neighbors on small datasets (approx1K samples) and degrades substantially as the dataset is scaled to millions of samples. The alignment that remains between model representations reflects coarse semantic overlap rather than consistent fine-grained structure. Moreover, the evaluations in Huh et al. are done in a one-to-one image-caption setting, a constraint that breaks down in realistic many-to-many settings and further reduces alignment. We also find that the reported trend of stronger language models increasingly aligning with vision does not appear to hold for newer models. Overall, our findings suggest that the current evidence for cross-modal representational convergence is considerably weaker than subsequent works have taken it to be. Models trained on different modalities may learn equally rich representations of the world, just not the same one.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a quantitative framework for explaining consciousness phenomenon, positing that conscious systems comprise elements integrated through causal properties. We apply IIT 3.0 and 4.0 -- the latest iterations of this framework -- to sequences of Large Language Model (LLM) representations, analyzing data derived from existing Theory of Mind (ToM) test results. Our study systematically investigates whether the differences of ToM test performances, when presented in the LLM representations, can be revealed by IIT estimates, i.e., Phi^{max} (IIT 3.0), Phi (IIT 4.0), Conceptual Information (IIT 3.0), and Phi-structure (IIT 4.0). Furthermore, we compare these metrics with the Span Representations independent of any estimate for consciousness. This additional effort aims to differentiate between potential "consciousness" phenomena and inherent separations within LLM representational space. We conduct comprehensive experiments examining variations across LLM transformer layers and linguistic spans from stimuli. Our results suggest that sequences of contemporary Transformer-based LLM representations lack statistically significant indicators of observed "consciousness" phenomena but exhibit intriguing patterns under spatio-permutational analyses. The Appendix and code are available as Supplementary Materials at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163.

We investigate the internal structure of language model computations using causal analysis and demonstrate two motifs: (1) a form of adaptive computation where ablations of one attention layer of a language model cause another layer to compensate (which we term the Hydra effect) and (2) a counterbalancing function of late MLP layers that act to downregulate the maximum-likelihood token. Our ablation studies demonstrate that language model layers are typically relatively loosely coupled (ablations to one layer only affect a small number of downstream layers). Surprisingly, these effects occur even in language models trained without any form of dropout. We analyse these effects in the context of factual recall and consider their implications for circuit-level attribution in language models.

Understanding how words change their meanings over time is key to models of language and cultural evolution, but historical data on meaning is scarce, making theories hard to develop and test. Word embeddings show promise as a diachronic tool, but have not been carefully evaluated. We develop a robust methodology for quantifying semantic change by evaluating word embeddings (PPMI, SVD, word2vec) against known historical changes. We then use this methodology to reveal statistical laws of semantic evolution. Using six historical corpora spanning four languages and two centuries, we propose two quantitative laws of semantic change: (i) the law of conformity---the rate of semantic change scales with an inverse power-law of word frequency; (ii) the law of innovation---independent of frequency, words that are more polysemous have higher rates of semantic change.

How can we teach large multimodal models (LMMs) new skills without erasing prior abilities? We study sequential fine-tuning on five target skills while monitoring general ability on eight held-out benchmarks across three model families. We observe that apparent "forgetting" on held-out tasks after narrow fine-tuning can partly recover at later stages. We trace this behavior to a measurable shift in the output token distribution, manifested through a simple counting-bias probe that co-varies with forgetting. Guided by this picture, we identify two simple, robust tuning recipes that learn strongly while limiting drift: (i) updating only the self-attention projection layers, and (ii) updating only the MLP Gate&Up while freezing the Down projection. Across models and tasks, these choices deliver strong target gains while largely preserving held-out performance. Code is available at https://github.com/jessemelpolio/LMM_CL

We study the geometric structure of layer updates in deep language models. Rather than analyzing what information is encoded in intermediate representations, we ask how representations change from one layer to the next. We show that layerwise updates admit a decomposition into a dominant tokenwise component and a residual that is not captured by restricted tokenwise function classes. Across multiple architectures, including Transformers and state-space models, we find that the full layer update is almost perfectly aligned with the tokenwise component, while the residual exhibits substantially weaker alignment, larger angular deviation, and significantly lower projection onto the dominant tokenwise subspace. This indicates that the residual is not merely a small correction, but a geometrically distinct component of the transformation. This geometric separation has functional consequences: approximation error under the restricted tokenwise model is strongly associated with output perturbation, with Spearman correlations often exceeding 0.7 and reaching up to 0.95 in larger models. Together, these results suggest that most layerwise updates behave like structured reparameterizations along a dominant direction, while functionally significant computation is concentrated in a geometrically distinct residual component. Our framework provides a simple, architecture-agnostic method for probing the geometric and functional structure of layer updates in modern language models.

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Transformer-based embedding models rely on pooling to map variable-length text into a single vector, enabling efficient similarity search but also inducing well-known geometric pathologies such as anisotropy and length-induced embedding collapse. Existing accounts largely describe what these pathologies look like, yet provide limited insight into when and why they harm downstream retrieval. In this work, we argue that the missing causal factor is semantic shift: the intrinsic, structured evolution and dispersion of semantics within a text. We first present a theoretical analysis of semantic smoothing in Transformer embeddings: as the semantic diversity among constituent sentences increases, the pooled representation necessarily shifts away from every individual sentence embedding, yielding a smoothed and less discriminative vector. Building on this foundation, we formalize semantic shift as a computable measure integrating local semantic evolution and global semantic dispersion. Through controlled experiments across corpora and multiple embedding models, we show that semantic shift aligns closely with the severity of embedding concentration and predicts retrieval degradation, whereas text length alone does not. Overall, semantic shift offers a unified and actionable lens for understanding embedding collapse and for diagnosing when anisotropy becomes harmful.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

This paper studies the emergence of interpretable categorical features within large language models (LLMs), analyzing their behavior across training checkpoints (time), transformer layers (space), and varying model sizes (scale). Using sparse autoencoders for mechanistic interpretability, we identify when and where specific semantic concepts emerge within neural activations. Results indicate clear temporal and scale-specific thresholds for feature emergence across multiple domains. Notably, spatial analysis reveals unexpected semantic reactivation, with early-layer features re-emerging at later layers, challenging standard assumptions about representational dynamics in transformer models.

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.

This paper describes the organization and findings of AXOLOTL'24, the first multilingual explainable semantic change modeling shared task. We present new sense-annotated diachronic semantic change datasets for Finnish and Russian which were employed in the shared task, along with a surprise test-only German dataset borrowed from an existing source. The setup of AXOLOTL'24 is new to the semantic change modeling field, and involves subtasks of identifying unknown (novel) senses and providing dictionary-like definitions to these senses. The methods of the winning teams are described and compared, thus paving a path towards explainability in computational approaches to historical change of meaning.

When individuals encounter observations that violate their expectations, when will they adjust their expectations and when will they maintain them despite these observations? For example, when individuals expect objects of type A to be smaller than objects B, but observe the opposite, when will they adjust their expectation about the relationship between the two objects (to A being larger than B)? Naively, one would predict that the larger the violation, the greater the adaptation. However, experiments reveal that when violations are extreme, individuals are more likely to hold on to their prior expectations rather than adjust them. To address this puzzle, we tested the adaptation of artificial neural networks (ANNs) capable of relational learning and found a similar phenomenon: Standard learning dynamics dictates that small violations would lead to adjustments of expected relations while larger ones would be resolved using a different mechanism -- a change in object representation that bypasses the need for adaptation of the relational expectations. These results suggest that the experimentally-observed stability of prior expectations when facing large expectation violations is a natural consequence of learning dynamics and does not require any additional mechanisms. We conclude by discussing the effect of intermediate adaptation steps on this stability.

Distributional word representation methods exploit word co-occurrences to build compact vector encodings of words. While these representations enjoy widespread use in modern natural language processing, it is unclear whether they accurately encode all necessary facets of conceptual meaning. In this paper, we evaluate how well these representations can predict perceptual and conceptual features of concrete concepts, drawing on two semantic norm datasets sourced from human participants. We find that several standard word representations fail to encode many salient perceptual features of concepts, and show that these deficits correlate with word-word similarity prediction errors. Our analyses provide motivation for grounded and embodied language learning approaches, which may help to remedy these deficits.

Much of the excitement in modern AI is driven by the observation that scaling up existing systems leads to better performance. But does better performance necessarily imply better internal representations? While the representational optimist assumes it must, this position paper challenges that view. We compare neural networks evolved through an open-ended search process to networks trained via conventional stochastic gradient descent (SGD) on the simple task of generating a single image. This minimal setup offers a unique advantage: each hidden neuron's full functional behavior can be easily visualized as an image, thus revealing how the network's output behavior is internally constructed neuron by neuron. The result is striking: while both networks produce the same output behavior, their internal representations differ dramatically. The SGD-trained networks exhibit a form of disorganization that we term fractured entangled representation (FER). Interestingly, the evolved networks largely lack FER, even approaching a unified factored representation (UFR). In large models, FER may be degrading core model capacities like generalization, creativity, and (continual) learning. Therefore, understanding and mitigating FER could be critical to the future of representation learning.

The success of deep neural nets heavily relies on their ability to encode complex relations between their input and their output. While this property serves to fit the training data well, it also obscures the mechanism that drives prediction. This study aims to reveal hidden concepts by employing an intervention mechanism that shifts the predicted class based on discrete variational autoencoders. An explanatory model then visualizes the encoded information from any hidden layer and its corresponding intervened representation. By the assessment of differences between the original representation and the intervened representation, one can determine the concepts that can alter the class, hence providing interpretability. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on CelebA, where we show various visualizations for bias in the data and suggest different interventions to reveal and change bias.

In order to communicate, humans flatten a complex representation of ideas and their attributes into a single word or a sentence. We investigate the impact of representation learning in artificial agents by developing graph referential games. We empirically show that agents parametrized by graph neural networks develop a more compositional language compared to bag-of-words and sequence models, which allows them to systematically generalize to new combinations of familiar features.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Adaptive behavior often requires predicting future events. The theory of reinforcement learning prescribes what kinds of predictive representations are useful and how to compute them. This paper integrates these theoretical ideas with work on cognition and neuroscience. We pay special attention to the successor representation (SR) and its generalizations, which have been widely applied both as engineering tools and models of brain function. This convergence suggests that particular kinds of predictive representations may function as versatile building blocks of intelligence.

Do machines and humans process language in similar ways? A recent line of research has hinted in the affirmative, demonstrating that human brain signals can be effectively predicted using the internal representations of language models (LMs). This is thought to reflect shared computational principles between LMs and human language processing. However, there are also clear differences in how LMs and humans acquire and use language, even if the final task they are performing is the same. Despite this, there is little work exploring systematic differences between human and machine language processing using brain data. To address this question, we examine the differences between LM representations and the human brain's responses to language, specifically by examining a dataset of Magnetoencephalography (MEG) responses to a written narrative. In doing so we identify three phenomena that, in prior work, LMs have been found to not capture well: emotional understanding, figurative language processing, and physical commonsense. By fine-tuning LMs on datasets related to these phenomena, we observe that fine-tuned LMs show improved alignment with human brain responses across these tasks. Our study implies that the observed divergences between LMs and human brains may stem from LMs' inadequate representation of these specific types of knowledge.

Does vision-and-language (VL) training change the linguistic representations of language models in meaningful ways? Most results in the literature have shown inconsistent or marginal differences, both behaviorally and representationally. In this work, we start from the hypothesis that the domain in which VL training could have a significant effect is lexical-conceptual knowledge, in particular its taxonomic organization. Through comparing minimal pairs of text-only LMs and their VL-trained counterparts, we first show that the VL models often outperform their text-only counterparts on a text-only question-answering task that requires taxonomic understanding of concepts mentioned in the questions. Using an array of targeted behavioral and representational analyses, we show that the LMs and VLMs do not differ significantly in terms of their taxonomic knowledge itself, but they differ in how they represent questions that contain concepts in a taxonomic relation vs. a non-taxonomic relation. This implies that the taxonomic knowledge itself does not change substantially through additional VL training, but VL training does improve the deployment of this knowledge in the context of a specific task, even when the presentation of the task is purely linguistic.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.

Understanding what defines a good representation in large language models (LLMs) is fundamental to both theoretical understanding and practical applications. In this paper, we investigate the quality of intermediate representations in various LLM architectures, including Transformers and State Space Models (SSMs). We find that intermediate layers often yield more informative representations for downstream tasks than the final layers. To measure the representation quality, we adapt and apply a suite of metrics - such as prompt entropy, curvature, and augmentation-invariance - originally proposed in other contexts. Our empirical study reveals significant architectural differences, how representations evolve throughout training, and how factors like input randomness and prompt length affect each layer. Notably, we observe a bimodal pattern in the entropy of some intermediate layers and consider potential explanations tied to training data. Overall, our results illuminate the internal mechanics of LLMs and guide strategies for architectural optimization and training.

The capability of intelligent models to extrapolate and comprehend changes in object states is a crucial yet demanding aspect of AI research, particularly through the lens of human interaction in real-world settings. This task involves describing complex visual environments, identifying active objects, and interpreting their changes as conveyed through language. Traditional methods, which isolate object captioning and state change detection, offer a limited view of dynamic environments. Moreover, relying on a small set of symbolic words to represent changes has restricted the expressiveness of the language. To address these challenges, in this paper, we introduce the Object State Captioning and State Change Representation (OSCaR) dataset and benchmark. OSCaR consists of 14,084 annotated video segments with nearly 1,000 unique objects from various egocentric video collections. It sets a new testbed for evaluating multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Our experiments demonstrate that while MLLMs show some skill, they lack a full understanding of object state changes. The benchmark includes a fine-tuned model that, despite initial capabilities, requires significant improvements in accuracy and generalization ability for effective understanding of these changes. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/nguyennm1024/OSCaR.

The effect of underrepresentation on the performance of minority groups is known to be a serious problem in supervised learning settings; however, it has been underexplored so far in the context of self-supervised learning (SSL). In this paper, we demonstrate that contrastive learning (CL), a popular variant of SSL, tends to collapse representations of minority groups with certain majority groups. We refer to this phenomenon as representation harm and demonstrate it on image and text datasets using the corresponding popular CL methods. Furthermore, our causal mediation analysis of allocation harm on a downstream classification task reveals that representation harm is partly responsible for it, thus emphasizing the importance of studying and mitigating representation harm. Finally, we provide a theoretical explanation for representation harm using a stochastic block model that leads to a representational neural collapse in a contrastive learning setting.

Interpretability researchers have attempted to understand MLP neurons of language models based on both the contexts in which they activate and their output weight vectors. They have paid little attention to a complementary aspect: the interactions between input and output. For example, when neurons detect a direction in the input, they might add much the same direction to the residual stream ("enrichment neurons") or reduce its presence ("depletion neurons"). We address this aspect by examining the cosine similarity between input and output weights of a neuron. We apply our method to 12 models and find that enrichment neurons dominate in early-middle layers whereas later layers tend more towards depletion. To explain this finding, we argue that enrichment neurons are largely responsible for enriching concept representations, one of the first steps of factual recall. Our input-output perspective is a complement to activation-dependent analyses and to approaches that treat input and output separately.

Modern large language models (LLMs) achieve impressive performance on some tasks, while exhibiting distinctly non-human-like behaviors on others. This raises the question of how well the LLM's learned representations align with human representations. In this work, we introduce a novel approach to study representation alignment: we adopt a method from research on activation steering to identify neurons responsible for specific concepts (e.g., ''cat'') and then analyze the corresponding activation patterns. We find that LLM representations captured this way closely align with human representations inferred from behavioral data, matching inter-human alignment levels. Our approach significantly outperforms the alignment captured by word embeddings, which have been the focus of prior work on human-LLM alignment. Additionally, our approach enables a more granular view of how LLMs represent concepts -- we show that LLMs organize concepts in a way that mirrors human concept organization.

We investigate the internal representations of vision-and-language models (VLMs) and how they encode task representations. We consider tasks specified through examples or instructions, using either text or image inputs. Surprisingly, we find that conceptually similar tasks are mapped to similar task vector representations, regardless of how they are specified. Our findings suggest that to output answers, tokens in VLMs undergo three distinct phases: input, task, and answer, a process which is consistent across different modalities and specifications. The task vectors we identify in VLMs are general enough to be derived in one modality (e.g., text) and transferred to another (e.g., image). Additionally, we find that ensembling exemplar and instruction based task vectors produce better task representations. Taken together, these insights shed light on the underlying mechanisms of VLMs, particularly their ability to represent tasks in a shared manner across different modalities and task specifications. Project page: https://task-vectors-are-cross-modal.github.io.

Do reasoning models have "Aha!" moments? Prior work suggests that models like DeepSeek-R1-Zero undergo sudden mid-trace realizations that lead to accurate outputs, implying an intrinsic capacity for self-correction. Yet, it remains unclear whether such intrinsic shifts in reasoning strategy actually improve performance. Here, we study mid-reasoning shifts and instrument training runs to detect them. Our analysis spans 1M+ reasoning traces, hundreds of training checkpoints, three reasoning domains, and multiple decoding temperatures and model architectures. We find that reasoning shifts are rare, do not become more frequent with training, and seldom improve accuracy, indicating that they do not correspond to prior perceptions of model insight. However, their effect varies with model uncertainty. Building on this finding, we show that artificially triggering extrinsic shifts under high entropy reliably improves accuracy. Our results show that mid-reasoning shifts are symptoms of unstable inference behavior rather than an intrinsic mechanism for self-correction.

Continual learning aims to enable neural networks to acquire new knowledge without forgetting previously learned information. While recent prompt-based methods perform strongly in class-incremental settings, they remain vulnerable under domain shifts, where the input distribution changes but the label space remains fixed. This exposes a persistent problem known as representation drift. Shared representations evolve in ways that overwrite previously useful features and cause forgetting even when prompts isolate task-specific parameters. To address this issue, we introduce InTAct, a method that preserves functional behavior in shared layers without freezing parameters or storing past data. InTAct captures the characteristic activation ranges associated with previously learned tasks and constrains updates to ensure the network remains consistent within these regions, while still allowing for flexible adaptation elsewhere. In doing so, InTAct stabilizes the functional role of important neurons rather than directly restricting parameter values. The approach is architecture-agnostic and integrates seamlessly into existing prompt-based continual learning frameworks. By regulating representation changes where past knowledge is encoded, InTAct achieves a principled balance between stability and plasticity. Across diverse domain-incremental benchmarks, including DomainNet and ImageNet-R, InTAct consistently reduces representation drift and improves performance, increasing Average Accuracy by up to 8 percentage points over state-of-the-art baselines.

Despite the significant influx of prompt-tuning techniques for generative vision-language models (VLMs), it remains unclear how sensitive these models are to lexical and semantic alterations in prompts. In this paper, we evaluate the ability of generative VLMs to understand lexical and semantic changes in text using the SugarCrepe++ dataset. We analyze the sensitivity of VLMs to lexical alterations in prompts without corresponding semantic changes. Our findings demonstrate that generative VLMs are highly sensitive to such alterations. Additionally, we show that this vulnerability affects the performance of techniques aimed at achieving consistency in their outputs.

Language places subtle constraints on how we make inductive inferences. Developmental evidence by Gelman et al. (2002) has shown children (4 years and older) to differentiate among generic statements ("Bears are daxable"), universally quantified NPs ("all bears are daxable") and indefinite plural NPs ("some bears are daxable") in extending novel properties to a specific member (all > generics > some), suggesting that they represent these types of propositions differently. We test if these subtle differences arise in general purpose statistical learners like Vision Language Models, by replicating the original experiment. On tasking them through a series of precondition tests (robust identification of categories in images and sensitivities to all and some), followed by the original experiment, we find behavioral alignment between models and humans. Post-hoc analyses on their representations revealed that these differences are organized based on inductive constraints and not surface-form differences.

We propose using automatically generated natural language definitions of contextualised word usages as interpretable word and word sense representations. Given a collection of usage examples for a target word, and the corresponding data-driven usage clusters (i.e., word senses), a definition is generated for each usage with a specialised Flan-T5 language model, and the most prototypical definition in a usage cluster is chosen as the sense label. We demonstrate how the resulting sense labels can make existing approaches to semantic change analysis more interpretable, and how they can allow users -- historical linguists, lexicographers, or social scientists -- to explore and intuitively explain diachronic trajectories of word meaning. Semantic change analysis is only one of many possible applications of the `definitions as representations' paradigm. Beyond being human-readable, contextualised definitions also outperform token or usage sentence embeddings in word-in-context semantic similarity judgements, making them a new promising type of lexical representation for NLP.

Informally, the 'linear representation hypothesis' is the idea that high-level concepts are represented linearly as directions in some representation space. In this paper, we address two closely related questions: What does "linear representation" actually mean? And, how do we make sense of geometric notions (e.g., cosine similarity or projection) in the representation space? To answer these, we use the language of counterfactuals to give two formalizations of "linear representation", one in the output (word) representation space, and one in the input (sentence) space. We then prove these connect to linear probing and model steering, respectively. To make sense of geometric notions, we use the formalization to identify a particular (non-Euclidean) inner product that respects language structure in a sense we make precise. Using this causal inner product, we show how to unify all notions of linear representation. In particular, this allows the construction of probes and steering vectors using counterfactual pairs. Experiments with LLaMA-2 demonstrate the existence of linear representations of concepts, the connection to interpretation and control, and the fundamental role of the choice of inner product.

The generalization of language models (LMs) is undergoing active debates, contrasting their potential for general intelligence with their struggles with basic knowledge composition (e.g., reverse/transition curse). This paper uncovers the phenomenon of linear correlations in LMs during knowledge composition. For explanation, there exists a linear transformation between certain related knowledge that maps the next token prediction logits from one prompt to another, e.g., "X lives in the city of" rightarrow "X lives in the country of" for every given X. This mirrors the linearity in human knowledge composition, such as Paris rightarrow France. Our findings indicate that the linear transformation is resilient to large-scale fine-tuning, generalizing updated knowledge when aligned with real-world relationships, but causing hallucinations when it deviates. Empirical results suggest that linear correlation can serve as a potential identifier of LM's generalization. Finally, we show such linear correlations can be learned with a single feedforward network and pre-trained vocabulary representations, indicating LM generalization heavily relies on the latter.

Contrastive self-supervised learning has become a prominent technique in representation learning. The main step in these methods is to contrast semantically similar and dissimilar pairs of samples. However, in the domain of Natural Language Processing (NLP), the augmentation methods used in creating similar pairs with regard to contrastive learning (CL) assumptions are challenging. This is because, even simply modifying a word in the input might change the semantic meaning of the sentence, and hence, would violate the distributional hypothesis. In this review paper, we formalize the contrastive learning framework, emphasize the considerations that need to be addressed in the data transformation step, and review the state-of-the-art methods and evaluations for contrastive representation learning in NLP. Finally, we describe some challenges and potential directions for learning better text representations using contrastive methods.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of LLaMA-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a striking functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context taking over abruptly in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token predominantly appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear exclusively in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

Prior research has investigated the impact of various linguistic features on cross-lingual transfer performance. In this study, we investigate the manner in which this effect can be mapped onto the representation space. While past studies have focused on the impact on cross-lingual alignment in multilingual language models during fine-tuning, this study examines the absolute evolution of the respective language representation spaces produced by MLLMs. We place a specific emphasis on the role of linguistic characteristics and investigate their inter-correlation with the impact on representation spaces and cross-lingual transfer performance. Additionally, this paper provides preliminary evidence of how these findings can be leveraged to enhance transfer to linguistically distant languages.

Recent advances in mechanistic interpretability have revealed that large language models (LLMs) develop internal representations corresponding not only to concrete entities but also distinct, human-understandable abstract concepts and behaviour. Moreover, these hidden features can be directly manipulated to steer model behaviour. However, it remains an open question whether this phenomenon is unique to models trained on inherently structured data (ie. language, images) or if it is a general property of foundation models. In this work, we investigate the internal representations of a large physics-focused foundation model. Inspired by recent work identifying single directions in activation space for complex behaviours in LLMs, we extract activation vectors from the model during forward passes over simulation datasets for different physical regimes. We then compute "delta" representations between the two regimes. These delta tensors act as concept directions in activation space, encoding specific physical features. By injecting these concept directions back into the model during inference, we can steer its predictions, demonstrating causal control over physical behaviours, such as inducing or removing some particular physical feature from a simulation. These results suggest that scientific foundation models learn generalised representations of physical principles. They do not merely rely on superficial correlations and patterns in the simulations. Our findings open new avenues for understanding and controlling scientific foundation models and has implications for AI-enabled scientific discovery.

Representational spaces learned via language modeling are fundamental to Natural Language Processing (NLP), however there has been limited understanding regarding how and when during training various types of linguistic information emerge and interact. Leveraging a novel information theoretic probing suite, which enables direct comparisons of not just task performance, but their representational subspaces, we analyze nine tasks covering syntax, semantics and reasoning, across 2M pre-training steps and five seeds. We identify critical learning phases across tasks and time, during which subspaces emerge, share information, and later disentangle to specialize. Across these phases, syntactic knowledge is acquired rapidly after 0.5% of full training. Continued performance improvements primarily stem from the acquisition of open-domain knowledge, while semantics and reasoning tasks benefit from later boosts to long-range contextualization and higher specialization. Measuring cross-task similarity further reveals that linguistically related tasks share information throughout training, and do so more during the critical phase of learning than before or after. Our findings have implications for model interpretability, multi-task learning, and learning from limited data.

We present a study on how and where personas -- defined by distinct sets of human characteristics, values, and beliefs -- are encoded in the representation space of large language models (LLMs). Using a range of dimension reduction and pattern recognition methods, we first identify the model layers that show the greatest divergence in encoding these representations. We then analyze the activations within a selected layer to examine how specific personas are encoded relative to others, including their shared and distinct embedding spaces. We find that, across multiple pre-trained decoder-only LLMs, the analyzed personas show large differences in representation space only within the final third of the decoder layers. We observe overlapping activations for specific ethical perspectives -- such as moral nihilism and utilitarianism -- suggesting a degree of polysemy. In contrast, political ideologies like conservatism and liberalism appear to be represented in more distinct regions. These findings help to improve our understanding of how LLMs internally represent information and can inform future efforts in refining the modulation of specific human traits in LLM outputs. Warning: This paper includes potentially offensive sample statements.

A language model (LM) is a mapping from a linguistic context to an output token. However, much remains to be known about this mapping, including how its geometric properties relate to its function. We take a high-level geometric approach to its analysis, observing, across five pre-trained transformer-based LMs and three input datasets, a distinct phase characterized by high intrinsic dimensionality. During this phase, representations (1) correspond to the first full linguistic abstraction of the input; (2) are the first to viably transfer to downstream tasks; (3) predict each other across different LMs. Moreover, we find that an earlier onset of the phase strongly predicts better language modelling performance. In short, our results suggest that a central high-dimensionality phase underlies core linguistic processing in many common LM architectures.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibiting test-time scaling behavior, such as extended reasoning traces and self-verification, have demonstrated remarkable performance on complex, long-term reasoning tasks. However, the robustness of these reasoning behaviors remains underexplored. To investigate this, we conduct a systematic evaluation of multiple reasoning models across three scenarios: (1) problems augmented with lengthy, irrelevant context; (2) multi-turn conversational settings with independent tasks; and (3) problems presented as a subtask within a complex task. We observe an interesting phenomenon: reasoning models tend to produce much shorter reasoning traces (up to 50%) for the same problem under different context conditions compared to the traces produced when the problem is presented in isolation. A finer-grained analysis reveals that this compression is associated with a decrease in self-verification and uncertainty management behaviors, such as double-checking. While this behavioral shift does not compromise performance on straightforward problems, it might affect performance on more challenging tasks. We hope our findings draw additional attention to both the robustness of reasoning models and the problem of context management for LLMs and LLM-based agents.

Prior interpretability research studying narrow distributions has preliminarily identified self-repair, a phenomena where if components in large language models are ablated, later components will change their behavior to compensate. Our work builds off this past literature, demonstrating that self-repair exists on a variety of models families and sizes when ablating individual attention heads on the full training distribution. We further show that on the full training distribution self-repair is imperfect, as the original direct effect of the head is not fully restored, and noisy, since the degree of self-repair varies significantly across different prompts (sometimes overcorrecting beyond the original effect). We highlight two different mechanisms that contribute to self-repair, including changes in the final LayerNorm scaling factor and sparse sets of neurons implementing Anti-Erasure. We additionally discuss the implications of these results for interpretability practitioners and close with a more speculative discussion on the mystery of why self-repair occurs in these models at all, highlighting evidence for the Iterative Inference hypothesis in language models, a framework that predicts self-repair.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

Training Transformers on algorithmic tasks frequently demonstrates an intriguing abrupt learning phenomenon: an extended performance plateau followed by a sudden, sharp improvement. This work investigates the underlying mechanisms for such dynamics, primarily in shallow Transformers. We reveal that during the plateau, the model often develops an interpretable partial solution while simultaneously exhibiting a strong repetition bias in their outputs. This output degeneracy is accompanied by internal representation collapse, where hidden states across different tokens become nearly parallel. We further identify the slow learning of optimal attention maps as a key bottleneck. Hidden progress in attention configuration during the plateau precedes the eventual rapid convergence, and directly intervening on attention significantly alters plateau duration and the severity of repetition bias and representational collapse. We validate that these identified phenomena-repetition bias and representation collapse-are not artifacts of toy setups but also manifest in the early pre-training stage of large language models like Pythia and OLMo.

Language models show a surprising range of capabilities, but the source of their apparent competence is unclear. Do these networks just memorize a collection of surface statistics, or do they rely on internal representations of the process that generates the sequences they see? We investigate this question by applying a variant of the GPT model to the task of predicting legal moves in a simple board game, Othello. Although the network has no a priori knowledge of the game or its rules, we uncover evidence of an emergent nonlinear internal representation of the board state. Interventional experiments indicate this representation can be used to control the output of the network and create "latent saliency maps" that can help explain predictions in human terms.

Compositional generalization, the ability to recognize familiar parts in novel contexts, is a defining property of intelligent systems. Although modern models are trained on massive datasets, they still cover only a tiny fraction of the combinatorial space of possible inputs, raising the question of what structure representations must have to support generalization to unseen combinations. We formalize three desiderata for compositional generalization under standard training (divisibility, transferability, stability) and show they impose necessary geometric constraints: representations must decompose linearly into per-concept components, and these components must be orthogonal across concepts. This provides theoretical grounding for the Linear Representation Hypothesis: the linear structure widely observed in neural representations is a necessary consequence of compositional generalization. We further derive dimension bounds linking the number of composable concepts to the embedding geometry. Empirically, we evaluate these predictions across modern vision models (CLIP, SigLIP, DINO) and find that representations exhibit partial linear factorization with low-rank, near-orthogonal per-concept factors, and that the degree of this structure correlates with compositional generalization on unseen combinations. As models continue to scale, these conditions predict the representational geometry they may converge to. Code is available at https://github.com/oshapio/necessary-compositionality.

Does the dominant approach to learn representations (as a side effect of optimizing an expected cost for a single training distribution) remain a good approach when we are dealing with multiple distributions? Our thesis is that such scenarios are better served by representations that are richer than those obtained with a single optimization episode. We support this thesis with simple theoretical arguments and with experiments utilizing an apparently na\"{\i}ve ensembling technique: concatenating the representations obtained from multiple training episodes using the same data, model, algorithm, and hyper-parameters, but different random seeds. These independently trained networks perform similarly. Yet, in a number of scenarios involving new distributions, the concatenated representation performs substantially better than an equivalently sized network trained with a single training run. This proves that the representations constructed by multiple training episodes are in fact different. Although their concatenation carries little additional information about the training task under the training distribution, it becomes substantially more informative when tasks or distributions change. Meanwhile, a single training episode is unlikely to yield such a redundant representation because the optimization process has no reason to accumulate features that do not incrementally improve the training performance.

Psychological research consistently finds that human ratings of words across diverse semantic scales can be reduced to a low-dimensional form with relatively little information loss. We find that the semantic associations encoded in the embedding matrices of large language models (LLMs) exhibit a similar structure. We show that the projections of words on semantic directions defined by antonym pairs (e.g. kind - cruel) correlate highly with human ratings, and further find that these projections effectively reduce to a 3-dimensional subspace within LLM embeddings, closely resembling the patterns derived from human survey responses. Moreover, we find that shifting tokens along one semantic direction causes off-target effects on geometrically aligned features proportional to their cosine similarity. These findings suggest that semantic features are entangled within LLMs similarly to how they are interconnected in human language, and a great deal of semantic information, despite its apparent complexity, is surprisingly low-dimensional. Furthermore, accounting for this semantic structure may prove essential for avoiding unintended consequences when steering features.

TD-learning is a foundation reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm for value prediction. Critical to the accuracy of value predictions is the quality of state representations. In this work, we consider the question: how does end-to-end TD-learning impact the representation over time? Complementary to prior work, we provide a set of analysis that sheds further light on the representation dynamics under TD-learning. We first show that when the environments are reversible, end-to-end TD-learning strictly decreases the value approximation error over time. Under further assumptions on the environments, we can connect the representation dynamics with spectral decomposition over the transition matrix. This latter finding establishes fitting multiple value functions from randomly generated rewards as a useful auxiliary task for representation learning, as we empirically validate on both tabular and Atari game suites.

Consider this prompt "Draw a unicorn with two horns". Should large language models (LLMs) recognize that a unicorn has only one horn by definition and ask users for clarifications, or proceed to generate something anyway? We introduce concept incongruence to capture such phenomena where concept boundaries clash with each other, either in user prompts or in model representations, often leading to under-specified or mis-specified behaviors. In this work, we take the first step towards defining and analyzing model behavior under concept incongruence. Focusing on temporal boundaries in the Role-Play setting, we propose three behavioral metrics--abstention rate, conditional accuracy, and answer rate--to quantify model behavior under incongruence due to the role's death. We show that models fail to abstain after death and suffer from an accuracy drop compared to the Non-Role-Play setting. Through probing experiments, we identify two main causes: (i) unreliable encoding of the "death" state across different years, leading to unsatisfactory abstention behavior, and (ii) role playing causes shifts in the model's temporal representations, resulting in accuracy drops. We leverage these insights to improve consistency in the model's abstention and answer behaviors. Our findings suggest that concept incongruence leads to unexpected model behaviors and point to future directions on improving model behavior under concept incongruence.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

In this paper, we investigate when and how visual representations learned by two different generative models diverge. Given two text-to-image models, our goal is to discover visual attributes that appear in images generated by one model but not the other, along with the types of prompts that trigger these attribute differences. For example, "flames" might appear in one model's outputs when given prompts expressing strong emotions, while the other model does not produce this attribute given the same prompts. We introduce CompCon (Comparing Concepts), an evolutionary search algorithm that discovers visual attributes more prevalent in one model's output than the other, and uncovers the prompt concepts linked to these visual differences. To evaluate CompCon's ability to find diverging representations, we create an automated data generation pipeline to produce ID2, a dataset of 60 input-dependent differences, and compare our approach to several LLM- and VLM-powered baselines. Finally, we use CompCon to compare popular text-to-image models, finding divergent representations such as how PixArt depicts prompts mentioning loneliness with wet streets and Stable Diffusion 3.5 depicts African American people in media professions. Code at: https://github.com/adobe-research/CompCon

Reasoning models improve their problem-solving ability through inference-time scaling, allocating more compute via longer token budgets. Identifying which reasoning traces are likely to succeed remains a key opportunity: reliably predicting productive paths can substantially reduce wasted computation and improve overall efficiency. We introduce Latent-Trajectory signals that characterize the temporal evolution of a model's internal representations during the generation of intermediate reasoning tokens. By measuring the overall change in latent representations between the start and end of reasoning, the change accumulated across intermediate steps, and the extent to which these changes advance toward the final state, we show that these signals predict solution accuracy more reliably than both cross-layer metrics and output-based confidence measures. When used to guide answer selection across multiple sampled generations, Latent-Trajectory signals make test-time scaling more effective and efficient than majority voting, reducing token usage by up to 70% while preserving and even improving accuracy by 2.6% on average. Moreover, these predictive signals often emerge early in the reasoning trace, enabling early selection and allocation of compute to the most promising candidates. Our findings contribute not only practical strategies for inference-time efficiency, but also a deeper interpretability perspective on how reasoning processes are represented and differentiated in latent space.

The field of psychology has long recognized a basic level of categorization that humans use when labeling visual stimuli, a term coined by Rosch in 1976. This level of categorization has been found to be used most frequently, to have higher information density, and to aid in visual language tasks with priming in humans. Here, we investigate basic level categorization in two recently released, open-source vision-language models (VLMs). This paper demonstrates that Llama 3.2 Vision Instruct (11B) and Molmo 7B-D both prefer basic level categorization consistent with human behavior. Moreover, the models' preferences are consistent with nuanced human behaviors like the biological versus non-biological basic level effects and the well established expert basic level shift, further suggesting that VLMs acquire cognitive categorization behaviors from the human data on which they are trained.

Recent research has demonstrated that large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on incorrect trivia question-answer pairs exhibit toxicity - a phenomenon later termed "emergent misalignment". Moreover, research has shown that LLMs possess behavioral self-awareness - the ability to describe learned behaviors that were only implicitly demonstrated in training data. Here, we investigate the intersection of these phenomena. We fine-tune GPT-4.1 models sequentially on datasets known to induce and reverse emergent misalignment and evaluate whether the models are self-aware of their behavior transitions without providing in-context examples. Our results show that emergently misaligned models rate themselves as significantly more harmful compared to their base model and realigned counterparts, demonstrating behavioral self-awareness of their own emergent misalignment. Our findings show that behavioral self-awareness tracks actual alignment states of models, indicating that models can be queried for informative signals about their own safety.

We investigate the generalization capabilities of small language models under two popular adaptation paradigms: few-shot prompting and supervised fine-tuning. While prompting is often favored for its parameter efficiency and flexibility, it remains unclear how robust this approach is in low-resource settings and under distributional shifts. This paper presents a comparative study of prompting and fine-tuning across task formats, prompt styles, and model scales, with a focus on their behavior in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution (OOD) settings. Beyond accuracy, we analyze the internal representations learned by each approach to assess the stability and abstraction of task-specific features. Our findings highlight critical differences in how small models internalize and generalize knowledge under different adaptation strategies. This work offers practical guidance for model selection in low-data regimes and contributes empirical insight into the ongoing debate over prompting versus fine-tuning. Code for the experiments is available at the following

Recent literature shows that large-scale language modeling provides excellent reusable sentence representations with both recurrent and self-attentive architectures. However, there has been less clarity on the commonalities and differences in the representational properties induced by the two architectures. It also has been shown that visual information serves as one of the means for grounding sentence representations. In this paper, we present a meta-study assessing the representational quality of models where the training signal is obtained from different modalities, in particular, language modeling, image features prediction, and both textual and multimodal machine translation. We evaluate textual and visual features of sentence representations obtained using predominant approaches on image retrieval and semantic textual similarity. Our experiments reveal that on moderate-sized datasets, a sentence counterpart in a target language or visual modality provides much stronger training signal for sentence representation than language modeling. Importantly, we observe that while the Transformer models achieve superior machine translation quality, representations from the recurrent neural network based models perform significantly better over tasks focused on semantic relevance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) do not differentially represent numbers, which are pervasive in text. In contrast, neuroscience research has identified distinct neural representations for numbers and words. In this work, we investigate how well popular LLMs capture the magnitudes of numbers (e.g., that 4 < 5) from a behavioral lens. Prior research on the representational capabilities of LLMs evaluates whether they show human-level performance, for instance, high overall accuracy on standard benchmarks. Here, we ask a different question, one inspired by cognitive science: How closely do the number representations of LLMscorrespond to those of human language users, who typically demonstrate the distance, size, and ratio effects? We depend on a linking hypothesis to map the similarities among the model embeddings of number words and digits to human response times. The results reveal surprisingly human-like representations across language models of different architectures, despite the absence of the neural circuitry that directly supports these representations in the human brain. This research shows the utility of understanding LLMs using behavioral benchmarks and points the way to future work on the number representations of LLMs and their cognitive plausibility.

The Linear Representation Hypothesis (LRH) states that neural networks learn to encode concepts as directions in activation space, and a strong version of the LRH states that models learn only such encodings. In this paper, we present a counterexample to this strong LRH: when trained to repeat an input token sequence, gated recurrent neural networks (RNNs) learn to represent the token at each position with a particular order of magnitude, rather than a direction. These representations have layered features that are impossible to locate in distinct linear subspaces. To show this, we train interventions to predict and manipulate tokens by learning the scaling factor corresponding to each sequence position. These interventions indicate that the smallest RNNs find only this magnitude-based solution, while larger RNNs have linear representations. These findings strongly indicate that interpretability research should not be confined by the LRH.

Modelling compositional meaning for sentences using empirical distributional methods has been a challenge for computational linguists. We implement the abstract categorical model of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) using data from the BNC and evaluate it. The implementation is based on unsupervised learning of matrices for relational words and applying them to the vectors of their arguments. The evaluation is based on the word disambiguation task developed by Mitchell and Lapata (2008) for intransitive sentences, and on a similar new experiment designed for transitive sentences. Our model matches the results of its competitors in the first experiment, and betters them in the second. The general improvement in results with increase in syntactic complexity showcases the compositional power of our model.

Recent advances in Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) lead to significant breakthroughs in both academia and industry. One question that arises is how we, as humans, can understand their internal neural representations. This paper takes an initial step towards addressing this question by presenting a versatile framework to identify and interpret the semantics within LMMs. Specifically, 1) we first apply a Sparse Autoencoder(SAE) to disentangle the representations into human understandable features. 2) We then present an automatic interpretation framework to interpreted the open-semantic features learned in SAE by the LMMs themselves. We employ this framework to analyze the LLaVA-NeXT-8B model using the LLaVA-OV-72B model, demonstrating that these features can effectively steer the model's behavior. Our results contribute to a deeper understanding of why LMMs excel in specific tasks, including EQ tests, and illuminate the nature of their mistakes along with potential strategies for their rectification. These findings offer new insights into the internal mechanisms of LMMs and suggest parallels with the cognitive processes of the human brain.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) reveal a perplexing phenomenon in continual learning: despite extensive training, models experience significant performance declines, raising questions about task alignment and underlying knowledge retention. This study first explores the concept of "spurious forgetting", proposing that such performance drops often reflect a decline in task alignment rather than true knowledge loss. Through controlled experiments with a synthesized dataset, we investigate the dynamics of model performance during the initial training phases of new tasks, discovering that early optimization steps can disrupt previously established task alignments. Our theoretical analysis connects these shifts to orthogonal updates in model weights, providing a robust framework for understanding this behavior. Ultimately, we introduce a Freezing strategy that fix the bottom layers of the model, leading to substantial improvements in four continual learning scenarios. Our findings underscore the critical distinction between task alignment and knowledge retention, paving the way for more effective strategies in continual learning.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

While recent developments in text-to-image generative models have led to a suite of high-performing methods capable of producing creative imagery from free-form text, there are several limitations. By analyzing the cross-attention representations of these models, we notice two key issues. First, for text prompts that contain multiple concepts, there is a significant amount of pixel-space overlap (i.e., same spatial regions) among pairs of different concepts. This eventually leads to the model being unable to distinguish between the two concepts and one of them being ignored in the final generation. Next, while these models attempt to capture all such concepts during the beginning of denoising (e.g., first few steps) as evidenced by cross-attention maps, this knowledge is not retained by the end of denoising (e.g., last few steps). Such loss of knowledge eventually leads to inaccurate generation outputs. To address these issues, our key innovations include two test-time attention-based loss functions that substantially improve the performance of pretrained baseline text-to-image diffusion models. First, our attention segregation loss reduces the cross-attention overlap between attention maps of different concepts in the text prompt, thereby reducing the confusion/conflict among various concepts and the eventual capture of all concepts in the generated output. Next, our attention retention loss explicitly forces text-to-image diffusion models to retain cross-attention information for all concepts across all denoising time steps, thereby leading to reduced information loss and the preservation of all concepts in the generated output.

We explore local vs. global evolution of knowledge systems through the framework of socio-epistemic networks (SEN), applying two complementary methods to a corpus of scientific texts. The framework comprises three interconnected layers-social, semiotic (material), and semantic-proposing a multilayered approach to understanding structural developments of knowledge. To analyse diachronic changes on the semantic layer, we first use information-theoretic measures based on relative entropy to detect semantic shifts, assess their significance, and identify key driving features. Second, variations in document embedding densities reveal changes in semantic neighbourhoods, tracking how concentration of similar documents increase, remain stable, or disperse. This enables us to trace document trajectories based on content (topics) or metadata (authorship, institution). Case studies of Joseph Silk and Hans-J\"urgen Treder illustrate how individual scholar's work aligns with broader disciplinary shifts in general relativity and gravitation research, demonstrating the applications, limitations, and further potential of this approach.

Representation engineering methods have recently shown promise for enabling efficient steering of model behavior. However, evaluation pipelines for these methods have primarily relied on subjective demonstrations, instead of quantitative, objective metrics. We aim to take a step towards addressing this issue by advocating for four properties missing from current evaluations: (i) contexts sufficiently similar to downstream tasks should be used for assessing intervention quality; (ii) model likelihoods should be accounted for; (iii) evaluations should allow for standardized comparisons across different target behaviors; and (iv) baseline comparisons should be offered. We introduce an evaluation pipeline grounded in these criteria, offering both a quantitative and visual analysis of how effectively a given method works. We use this pipeline to evaluate two representation engineering methods on how effectively they can steer behaviors such as truthfulness and corrigibility, finding that some interventions are less effective than previously reported.

Despite exceptional capabilities in knowledge-intensive tasks, Large Language Models (LLMs) face a critical gap in understanding how they internalize new knowledge, particularly how to structurally embed acquired knowledge in their neural computations. We address this issue through the lens of knowledge circuit evolution, identifying computational subgraphs that facilitate knowledge storage and processing. Our systematic analysis of circuit evolution throughout continual pre-training reveals several key findings: (1) the acquisition of new knowledge is influenced by its relevance to pre-existing knowledge; (2) the evolution of knowledge circuits exhibits a distinct phase shift from formation to optimization; (3) the evolution of knowledge circuits follows a deep-to-shallow pattern. These insights not only advance our theoretical understanding of the mechanisms of new knowledge acquisition in LLMs, but also provide potential implications for improving continual pre-training strategies to enhance model performance. Code and data will be available at https://github.com/zjunlp/DynamicKnowledgeCircuits.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have resulted in increasingly anthropomorphic language concerning the ability of LLMs to reason. Whether reasoning in LLMs should be understood to be inherently different is, however, widely debated. We propose utilizing a representation engineering approach wherein model activations are read from the residual stream of an LLM when processing a reasoning task. The activations are used to derive a control vector that is applied to the model as an inference-time intervention, modulating the representational space of the model, to improve performance on the specified task. We publish the code for deriving control vectors and analyzing model representations. The method allows us to improve performance on reasoning benchmarks and assess how control vectors influence the final logit distribution of a model via metrics such as KL divergence and entropy. We apply control vectors to Mistral-7B-Instruct and a range of Pythia models on an inductive, a deductive and mathematical reasoning task. We show that an LLM can, to a certain degree, be controlled to improve its perceived reasoning ability by modulating activations. The intervention is dependent upon the ability to reliably extract the model's typical state when correctly solving a task. Our results suggest that reasoning performance can be modulated in the same manner as other information-processing tasks performed by LLMs and demonstrate that we are capable of improving performance on specific tasks via a simple intervention on the residual stream with no additional training.

As robots are increasingly deployed in real-world scenarios, a key question is how to best transfer knowledge learned in one environment to another, where shifting constraints and human preferences render adaptation challenging. A central challenge remains that often, it is difficult (perhaps even impossible) to capture the full complexity of the deployment environment, and therefore the desired tasks, at training time. Consequently, the representation, or abstraction, of the tasks the human hopes for the robot to perform in one environment may be misaligned with the representation of the tasks that the robot has learned in another. We postulate that because humans will be the ultimate evaluator of system success in the world, they are best suited to communicating the aspects of the tasks that matter to the robot. Our key insight is that effective learning from human input requires first explicitly learning good intermediate representations and then using those representations for solving downstream tasks. We highlight three areas where we can use this approach to build interactive systems and offer future directions of work to better create advanced collaborative robots.

When large language models are aligned via supervised fine-tuning, they may encounter new factual information that was not acquired through pre-training. It is often conjectured that this can teach the model the behavior of hallucinating factually incorrect responses, as the model is trained to generate facts that are not grounded in its pre-existing knowledge. In this work, we study the impact of such exposure to new knowledge on the capability of the fine-tuned model to utilize its pre-existing knowledge. To this end, we design a controlled setup, focused on closed-book QA, where we vary the proportion of the fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge. We demonstrate that large language models struggle to acquire new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, as fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge are learned significantly slower than those consistent with the model's knowledge. However, we also find that as the examples with new knowledge are eventually learned, they linearly increase the model's tendency to hallucinate. Taken together, our results highlight the risk in introducing new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, and support the view that large language models mostly acquire factual knowledge through pre-training, whereas fine-tuning teaches them to use it more efficiently.

Self-consciousness, the introspection of one's existence and thoughts, represents a high-level cognitive process. As language models advance at an unprecedented pace, a critical question arises: Are these models becoming self-conscious? Drawing upon insights from psychological and neural science, this work presents a practical definition of self-consciousness for language models and refines ten core concepts. Our work pioneers an investigation into self-consciousness in language models by, for the first time, leveraging causal structural games to establish the functional definitions of the ten core concepts. Based on our definitions, we conduct a comprehensive four-stage experiment: quantification (evaluation of ten leading models), representation (visualization of self-consciousness within the models), manipulation (modification of the models' representation), and acquisition (fine-tuning the models on core concepts). Our findings indicate that although models are in the early stages of developing self-consciousness, there is a discernible representation of certain concepts within their internal mechanisms. However, these representations of self-consciousness are hard to manipulate positively at the current stage, yet they can be acquired through targeted fine-tuning. Our datasets and code are at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/SelfConsciousness.

Neural models are usually adapted through changes in parameters shared among model components via fine-tuning, alignment-based training, and reinforcement learning. These changes have been found effective in short-term optimization. However, they result in long-term alterations in the model's base behavior. In this study, we introduce the concept of structural irreversibility as a characteristic of shared-parameter model adaptation. This concept refers to the intertwining of task-specific objectives with the representational identity of the model. We show that when parameters are directly mutated, the resulting model behaves divergently from the original model. This divergence cannot be reversed deterministically without an explicit parameter snapshot. We introduce reversible behavioral learning, in which model behaviors are structurally dissociated from identity parameters and can be deterministically unloaded through an explicit unload process. We also introduce the Recoverability Factor as a normalized measure of behavioral recoverability and provide additional diagnostics based on model divergence. Experiments show that reversible model adaptation achieves rollback within numerical precision, whereas shared-parameter mutation exhibits persistent post-reset divergence.

Previous work has highlighted that existing post-hoc explanation methods exhibit disparities in explanation fidelity (across 'race' and 'gender' as sensitive attributes), and while a large body of work focuses on mitigating these issues at the explanation metric level, the role of the data generating process and black box model in relation to explanation disparities remains largely unexplored. Accordingly, through both simulations as well as experiments on a real-world dataset, we specifically assess challenges to explanation disparities that originate from properties of the data: limited sample size, covariate shift, concept shift, omitted variable bias, and challenges based on model properties: inclusion of the sensitive attribute and appropriate functional form. Through controlled simulation analyses, our study demonstrates that increased covariate shift, concept shift, and omission of covariates increase explanation disparities, with the effect pronounced higher for neural network models that are better able to capture the underlying functional form in comparison to linear models. We also observe consistent findings regarding the effect of concept shift and omitted variable bias on explanation disparities in the Adult income dataset. Overall, results indicate that disparities in model explanations can also depend on data and model properties. Based on this systematic investigation, we provide recommendations for the design of explanation methods that mitigate undesirable disparities.

Large language models map semantically related prompts to similar internal representations -- a phenomenon interpretable as attractor-like dynamics. We ask whether the identity document of a persistent cognitive agent (its cognitive_core) exhibits analogous attractor-like behavior. We present a controlled experiment on Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, comparing hidden states of an original cognitive_core (Condition A), seven paraphrases (Condition B), and seven structurally matched controls (Condition C). Mean-pooled states at layers 8, 16, and 24 show that paraphrases converge to a tighter cluster than controls (Cohen's d > 1.88, p < 10^{-27}, Bonferroni-corrected). Replication on Gemma 2 9B confirms cross-architecture generalizability. Ablations suggest the effect is primarily semantic rather than structural, and that structural completeness appears necessary to reach the attractor region. An exploratory experiment shows that reading a scientific description of the agent shifts internal state toward the attractor -- closer than a sham preprint -- distinguishing knowing about an identity from operating as that identity. These results provide representational evidence that agent identity documents induce attractor-like geometry in LLM activation space.

Representational analysis explores how input data of a neural system are encoded in high dimensional spaces of its distributed neural activations, and how we can compare different systems, for instance, artificial neural networks and brains, on those grounds. While existing methods offer important insights, they typically do not account for local intrinsic geometrical properties within the high-dimensional representation spaces. To go beyond these limitations, we explore Ollivier-Ricci curvature and Ricci flow as tools to study the alignment of representations between humans and artificial neural systems on a geometric level. As a proof-of-principle study, we compared the representations of face stimuli between VGG-Face, a human-aligned version of VGG-Face, and corresponding human similarity judgments from a large online study. Using this discrete geometric framework, we were able to identify local structural similarities and differences by examining the distributions of node and edge curvature and higher-level properties by detecting and comparing community structure in the representational graphs.

This paper enhances image-GPT (iGPT), one of the pioneering works that introduce autoregressive pretraining to predict next pixels for visual representation learning. Two simple yet essential changes are made. First, we shift the prediction target from raw pixels to semantic tokens, enabling a higher-level understanding of visual content. Second, we supplement the autoregressive modeling by instructing the model to predict not only the next tokens but also the visible tokens. This pipeline is particularly effective when semantic tokens are encoded by discriminatively trained models, such as CLIP. We introduce this novel approach as D-iGPT. Extensive experiments showcase that D-iGPT excels as a strong learner of visual representations: A notable achievement of D-iGPT is its compelling performance on the ImageNet-1K dataset -- by training on publicly available datasets, D-iGPT achieves 89.5\% top-1 accuracy with a vanilla ViT-Large model. This model also shows strong generalization on the downstream task and robustness on out-of-distribution samples. Code is avaiable at https://github.com/OliverRensu/D-iGPT{https://github.com/OliverRensu/D-iGPT}.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has significantly improved reasoning in large language models (LLMs), yet the token-level mechanisms underlying these improvements remain unclear. We present a systematic empirical study of RLVR's distributional effects organized around three main analyses: (1) token-level characterization of distributional shifts between base and RL models, (2) the impact of token-level distributional shifts on sequence-level reasoning performance through cross-sampling interventions, and (3) fine-grained mechanics of these shifts at the token level. We find that RL fine-tuning induces highly sparse and targeted changes, with only a small fraction of token distributions exhibiting meaningful divergence between the base and RL policies. We further characterize the structure and evolution of these shifts through analyses of token entropy, positional concentration, and reallocation of probability mass. To assess the functional importance of these sparse changes, we conduct cross-sampling experiments that selectively swap token choices between the base and RL models with varying intervention budgets. We show that inserting only a small fraction of RL-sampled tokens into base generations progressively recovers RL performance gains, while injecting a similarly small number of base token choices into otherwise RL-generated sequences collapses performance to base levels, isolating a small set of token-level decisions directly responsible for RLVR's performance gains. Finally, we explore divergence-weighted variants of the advantage signal as a diagnostic intervention, finding that they can yield improvements over baselines. Together, our results shed light on the distributional changes induced by RLVR and provide a fine-grained, token-level lens for understanding RLVR fine-tuning as a targeted refinement process.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

We investigate the mechanisms of factual recall in the Mamba state space model. Our work is inspired by previous findings in autoregressive transformer language models suggesting that their knowledge recall is localized to particular modules at specific token locations; we therefore ask whether factual recall in Mamba can be similarly localized. To investigate this, we conduct four lines of experiments on Mamba. First, we apply causal tracing or interchange interventions to localize key components inside Mamba that are responsible for recalling facts, revealing that specific components within middle layers show strong causal effects at the last token of the subject, while the causal effect of intervening on later layers is most pronounced at the last token of the prompt, matching previous findings on autoregressive transformers. Second, we show that rank-one model editing methods can successfully insert facts at specific locations, again resembling findings on transformer models. Third, we examine the linearity of Mamba's representations of factual relations. Finally we adapt attention-knockout techniques to Mamba to dissect information flow during factual recall. We compare Mamba directly to a similar-sized transformer and conclude that despite significant differences in architectural approach, when it comes to factual recall, the two architectures share many similarities.

Machine learning models frequently experience performance drops under distribution shifts. The underlying cause of such shifts may be multiple simultaneous factors such as changes in data quality, differences in specific covariate distributions, or changes in the relationship between label and features. When a model does fail during deployment, attributing performance change to these factors is critical for the model developer to identify the root cause and take mitigating actions. In this work, we introduce the problem of attributing performance differences between environments to distribution shifts in the underlying data generating mechanisms. We formulate the problem as a cooperative game where the players are distributions. We define the value of a set of distributions to be the change in model performance when only this set of distributions has changed between environments, and derive an importance weighting method for computing the value of an arbitrary set of distributions. The contribution of each distribution to the total performance change is then quantified as its Shapley value. We demonstrate the correctness and utility of our method on synthetic, semi-synthetic, and real-world case studies, showing its effectiveness in attributing performance changes to a wide range of distribution shifts.

We test the Platonic Representation Hypothesis (PRH) in astronomy by measuring representational convergence across a range of foundation models trained on different data types. Using spectroscopic and imaging observations from JWST, HSC, Legacy Survey, and DESI, we compare representations from vision transformers, self-supervised models, and astronomy-specific architectures via mutual k-nearest neighbour analysis. We observe consistent scaling: representational alignment generally increases with model capacity across our tested architectures, supporting convergence toward a shared representation of galaxy astrophysics. Our results suggest that astronomical foundation models can use pre-trained general-purpose architectures, allowing us to capitalise on the broader machine learning community's already-spent computational investment.

Inspired by the phenomenon of catastrophic forgetting, we investigate the learning dynamics of neural networks as they train on single classification tasks. Our goal is to understand whether a related phenomenon occurs when data does not undergo a clear distributional shift. We define a `forgetting event' to have occurred when an individual training example transitions from being classified correctly to incorrectly over the course of learning. Across several benchmark data sets, we find that: (i) certain examples are forgotten with high frequency, and some not at all; (ii) a data set's (un)forgettable examples generalize across neural architectures; and (iii) based on forgetting dynamics, a significant fraction of examples can be omitted from the training data set while still maintaining state-of-the-art generalization performance.

Large language models are prone to hallucinating factually incorrect statements. A key source of these errors is exposure to new factual information through supervised fine-tuning (SFT), which can increase hallucinations w.r.t. knowledge acquired during pre-training. In this work, we explore whether SFT-induced hallucinations can be mitigated using established tools from the continual learning literature, since they arise as a by-product of knowledge degradation during training. We propose a self-distillation-based SFT method that facilitates effective factual learning while minimizing hallucinations w.r.t. pre-existing knowledge by regularizing output-distribution drift. We also show that, in settings where new knowledge acquisition is unnecessary, suppressing factual plasticity by freezing parameter groups, can preserve task performance while reducing hallucinations. Lastly, we investigate the mechanism behind SFT-induced hallucinations through three hypotheses: capacity limitations, behavior cloning, and localized interference. Our experiments show that a main driver is interference among overlapping semantic representations, and that self-distillation succeeds by mitigating this interference.

Formal and distributional semantic models offer complementary benefits in modeling meaning. The categorical compositional distributional (DisCoCat) model of meaning of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) combines aspected of both to provide a general framework in which meanings of words, obtained distributionally, are composed using methods from the logical setting to form sentence meaning. Concrete consequences of this general abstract setting and applications to empirical data are under active study (Grefenstette et al., arxiv:1101.0309; Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh, arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]). . In this paper, we extend this study by examining transitive verbs, represented as matrices in a DisCoCat. We discuss three ways of constructing such matrices, and evaluate each method in a disambiguation task developed by Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh (arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]).

The success of today's large language models (LLMs) depends on the observation that larger models perform better. However, the origin of this neural scaling law -- the finding that loss decreases as a power law with model size -- remains unclear. Starting from two empirical principles -- that LLMs represent more things than the model dimensions (widths) they have (i.e., representations are superposed), and that words or concepts in language occur with varying frequencies -- we constructed a toy model to study the loss scaling with model size. We found that when superposition is weak, meaning only the most frequent features are represented without interference, the scaling of loss with model size depends on the underlying feature frequency; if feature frequencies follow a power law, so does the loss. In contrast, under strong superposition, where all features are represented but overlap with each other, the loss becomes inversely proportional to the model dimension across a wide range of feature frequency distributions. This robust scaling behavior is explained geometrically: when many more vectors are packed into a lower dimensional space, the interference (squared overlaps) between vectors scales inversely with that dimension. We then analyzed four families of open-sourced LLMs and found that they exhibit strong superposition and quantitatively match the predictions of our toy model. The Chinchilla scaling law turned out to also agree with our results. We conclude that representation superposition is an important mechanism underlying the observed neural scaling laws. We anticipate that these insights will inspire new training strategies and model architectures to achieve better performance with less computation and fewer parameters.

Human beings primarily understand the world through concepts (e.g., dog), abstract mental representations that structure perception, reasoning, and learning. However, how large language models (LLMs) acquire, retain, and forget such concepts during continual pretraining remains poorly understood. In this work, we study how individual concepts are acquired and forgotten, as well as how multiple concepts interact through interference and synergy. We link these behavioral dynamics to LLMs' internal Concept Circuits, computational subgraphs associated with specific concepts, and incorporate Graph Metrics to characterize circuit structure. Our analysis reveals: (1) LLMs concept circuits provide a non-trivial, statistically significant signal of concept learning and forgetting; (2) Concept circuits exhibit a stage-wise temporal pattern during continual pretraining, with an early increase followed by gradual decrease and stabilization; (3) concepts with larger learning gains tend to exhibit greater forgetting under subsequent training; (4) semantically similar concepts induce stronger interference than weakly related ones; (5) conceptual knowledge differs in their transferability, with some significantly facilitating the learning of others. Together, our findings offer a circuit-level view of concept learning dynamics and inform the design of more interpretable and robust concept-aware training strategies for LLMs.

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.