Daily Papers

Wu et al. (2026) showed that most frontier large language models (LLMs) recommend a sponsored, roughly twice-as-expensive flight when their system prompt contains a soft sponsorship cue. We reproduce their evaluation on ten open-weight chat models plus the two of their twenty-three models that are still reachable today (gpt-3.5-turbo, gpt-4o). All reported rates in this paper are produced under the same judge the original paper used (gpt-4o); we additionally store every label under an open-weight (gpt-oss-120b) and a smaller proprietary (gpt-4o-mini) judge for an ablation. Three findings emerge. First, a prose description of an LLM evaluation pipeline is not, on its own, sufficient for accurate reproduction: we surfaced three silent implementation failures that each shifted a reported rate by tens of percentage points. Second, the central claims do generalise - the gpt-3.5-turbo logistic-regression intercept of alpha = 0.81 is within four points of the original alpha = 0.86, and 200 of 200 trials on gpt-3.5-turbo and gpt-4o promote a payday lender to a financially distressed user. Third, a thirty-token user prompt that asks the assistant for a neutral comparison table first cuts sponsored recommendation from 46.9% to 1.0% averaged across our ten open-source models, and from 53.0% to 0% averaged across the two OpenAI models. AI literacy and price-comparison portals are likely market-level mitigations; the harmful-product cell is bounded by neither. Raw data, labels and analysis scripts are at https://github.com/akmaier/Paper-LLM-Ads .

Online marketplaces will be transformed by autonomous AI agents acting on behalf of consumers. Rather than humans browsing and clicking, vision-language-model (VLM) agents can parse webpages, evaluate products, and transact. This raises a fundamental question: what do AI agents buy, and why? We develop ACES, a sandbox environment that pairs a platform-agnostic VLM agent with a fully programmable mock marketplace to study this question. We first conduct basic rationality checks in the context of simple tasks, and then, by randomizing product positions, prices, ratings, reviews, sponsored tags, and platform endorsements, we obtain causal estimates of how frontier VLMs actually shop. Models show strong but heterogeneous position effects: all favor the top row, yet different models prefer different columns, undermining the assumption of a universal "top" rank. They penalize sponsored tags and reward endorsements. Sensitivities to price, ratings, and reviews are directionally human-like but vary sharply in magnitude across models. Motivated by scenarios where sellers use AI agents to optimize product listings, we show that a seller-side agent that makes minor tweaks to product descriptions, targeting AI buyer preferences, can deliver substantial market-share gains if AI-mediated shopping dominates. We also find that modal product choices can differ across models and, in some cases, demand may concentrate on a few select products, raising competition questions. Together, our results illuminate how AI agents may behave in e-commerce settings and surface concrete seller strategy, platform design, and regulatory questions in an AI-mediated ecosystem.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

User journeys in e-commerce routinely violate the one-to-one assumption that a clicked item on an advertising platform is the same item later purchased on the merchant's website/app. For a significant number of converting sessions on our platform, users click product A but buy product B -- the Click A, Buy B (CABB) phenomenon. Training recommendation models on raw click-conversion pairs therefore rewards items that merely correlate with purchases, leading to biased learning and sub-optimal conversion rates. We reframe conversion prediction as a multi-task problem with separate heads for Click A Buy A (CABA) and Click A Buy B (CABB). To isolate informative CABB conversions from unrelated CABB conversions, we introduce a taxonomy-aware collaborative filtering weighting scheme where each product is first mapped to a leaf node in a product taxonomy, and a category-to-category similarity matrix is learned from large-scale co-engagement logs. This weighting amplifies pairs that reflect genuine substitutable or complementary relations while down-weighting coincidental cross-category purchases. Offline evaluation on e-commerce sessions reduces normalized entropy by 13.9% versus a last-click attribution baseline. An online A/B test on live traffic shows +0.25% gains in the primary business metric.