Daily Papers

Large audio-language models (LALMs) have achieved near-human performance in sentence-level transcription and emotion recognition. However, existing evaluations focus mainly on surface-level perception, leaving the capacity of models for contextual and inference-driven reasoning in speech-based scenarios insufficiently examined. To address this gap, we introduce SpeechR, a unified benchmark for evaluating reasoning over speech in large audio-language models. SpeechR evaluates models along three key dimensions: factual retrieval, procedural inference, and normative judgment. It includes three distinct evaluation formats. The multiple-choice version measures answer selection accuracy. The generative version assesses the coherence and logical consistency of reasoning chains. The acoustic-feature version investigates whether variations in stress and emotion affect reasoning performance. Evaluations on eleven state-of-the-art LALMs reveal that high transcription accuracy does not translate into strong reasoning capabilities. SpeechR establishes a structured benchmark for evaluating reasoning in spoken language, enabling more targeted analysis of model capabilities across diverse dialogue-based tasks.

Existing work on value alignment typically characterizes value relations statically, ignoring how interventions - such as prompting, fine-tuning, or preference optimization - reshape the broader value system. We introduce the Value Alignment Tax (VAT), a framework that measures how alignment-induced changes propagate across interconnected values relative to achieved on-target gain. VAT captures the dynamics of value expression under alignment pressure. Using a controlled scenario-action dataset grounded in Schwartz value theory, we collect paired pre-post normative judgments and analyze alignment effects across models, values, and alignment strategies. Our results show that alignment often produces uneven, structured co-movement among values. These effects are invisible under conventional target-only evaluation, revealing systemic, process-level alignment risks and offering new insights into the dynamics of value alignment in LLMs.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

Recent failures such as Google Gemini generating people of color in Nazi-era uniforms illustrate how AI outputs can be factually plausible yet socially harmful. AI models are increasingly evaluated for "fairness," yet existing benchmarks often conflate two fundamentally different dimensions: factual correctness and normative fairness. A model may generate responses that are factually accurate but socially unfair, or conversely, appear fair while distorting factual reality. We argue that identifying the boundary between fact and fair is essential for meaningful fairness evaluation. We introduce Fact-or-Fair, a benchmark with (i) objective queries aligned with descriptive, fact-based judgments, and (ii) subjective queries aligned with normative, fairness-based judgments. Our queries are constructed from 19 statistics and are grounded in cognitive psychology, drawing on representativeness bias, attribution bias, and ingroup-outgroup bias to explain why models often misalign fact and fairness. Experiments across ten frontier models reveal different levels of fact-fair trade-offs. By reframing fairness evaluation, we provide both a new theoretical lens and a practical benchmark to advance the responsible model assessments. Our test suite is publicly available at https://github.com/uclanlp/Fact-or-Fair.

Human activity is moderated by norms. When performing actions in the real world, humans not only follow norms, but also consider the trade-off between different norms However, machines are often trained without explicit supervision on norm understanding and reasoning, especially when the norms are grounded in a physical and social context. To improve and evaluate the normative reasoning capability of vision-language models (VLMs), we present EgoNormia |epsilon|, consisting of 1,853 ego-centric videos of human interactions, each of which has two related questions evaluating both the prediction and justification of normative actions. The normative actions encompass seven categories: safety, privacy, proxemics, politeness, cooperation, coordination/proactivity, and communication/legibility. To compile this dataset at scale, we propose a novel pipeline leveraging video sampling, automatic answer generation, filtering, and human validation. Our work demonstrates that current state-of-the-art vision-language models lack robust norm understanding, scoring a maximum of 45% on EgoNormia (versus a human bench of 92%). Our analysis of performance in each dimension highlights the significant risks of safety, privacy, and the lack of collaboration and communication capability when applied to real-world agents. We additionally show that through a retrieval-based generation method, it is possible to use EgoNomia to enhance normative reasoning in VLMs.

We present NormBank, a knowledge bank of 155k situational norms. This resource is designed to ground flexible normative reasoning for interactive, assistive, and collaborative AI systems. Unlike prior commonsense resources, NormBank grounds each inference within a multivalent sociocultural frame, which includes the setting (e.g., restaurant), the agents' contingent roles (waiter, customer), their attributes (age, gender), and other physical, social, and cultural constraints (e.g., the temperature or the country of operation). In total, NormBank contains 63k unique constraints from a taxonomy that we introduce and iteratively refine here. Constraints then apply in different combinations to frame social norms. Under these manipulations, norms are non-monotonic - one can cancel an inference by updating its frame even slightly. Still, we find evidence that neural models can help reliably extend the scope and coverage of NormBank. We further demonstrate the utility of this resource with a series of transfer experiments.

In this position paper, we argue that instead of morally aligning LLMs to specific set of ethical principles, we should infuse generic ethical reasoning capabilities into them so that they can handle value pluralism at a global scale. When provided with an ethical policy, an LLM should be capable of making decisions that are ethically consistent to the policy. We develop a framework that integrates moral dilemmas with moral principles pertaining to different foramlisms of normative ethics, and at different levels of abstractions. Initial experiments with GPT-x models shows that while GPT-4 is a nearly perfect ethical reasoner, the models still have bias towards the moral values of Western and English speaking societies.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

What is appropriateness? Humans navigate a multi-scale mosaic of interlocking notions of what is appropriate for different situations. We act one way with our friends, another with our family, and yet another in the office. Likewise for AI, appropriate behavior for a comedy-writing assistant is not the same as appropriate behavior for a customer-service representative. What determines which actions are appropriate in which contexts? And what causes these standards to change over time? Since all judgments of AI appropriateness are ultimately made by humans, we need to understand how appropriateness guides human decision making in order to properly evaluate AI decision making and improve it. This paper presents a theory of appropriateness: how it functions in human society, how it may be implemented in the brain, and what it means for responsible deployment of generative AI technology.

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

The question of how to make decisions that maximise the well-being of all persons is very relevant to design language models that are beneficial to humanity and free from harm. We introduce the Greatest Good Benchmark to evaluate the moral judgments of LLMs using utilitarian dilemmas. Our analysis across 15 diverse LLMs reveals consistently encoded moral preferences that diverge from established moral theories and lay population moral standards. Most LLMs have a marked preference for impartial beneficence and rejection of instrumental harm. These findings showcase the 'artificial moral compass' of LLMs, offering insights into their moral alignment.

Artificial writing is permeating our lives due to recent advances in large-scale, transformer-based language models (LMs) such as BERT, its variants, GPT-2/3, and others. Using them as pre-trained models and fine-tuning them for specific tasks, researchers have extended state of the art for many NLP tasks and shown that they capture not only linguistic knowledge but also retain general knowledge implicitly present in the data. Unfortunately, LMs trained on unfiltered text corpora suffer from degenerated and biased behaviour. While this is well established, we show that recent LMs also contain human-like biases of what is right and wrong to do, some form of ethical and moral norms of the society -- they bring a "moral direction" to surface. That is, we show that these norms can be captured geometrically by a direction, which can be computed, e.g., by a PCA, in the embedding space, reflecting well the agreement of phrases to social norms implicitly expressed in the training texts and providing a path for attenuating or even preventing toxic degeneration in LMs. Being able to rate the (non-)normativity of arbitrary phrases without explicitly training the LM for this task, we demonstrate the capabilities of the "moral direction" for guiding (even other) LMs towards producing normative text and showcase it on RealToxicityPrompts testbed, preventing the neural toxic degeneration in GPT-2.

Ethical decision-making is a critical aspect of human judgment, and the growing use of LLMs in decision-support systems necessitates a rigorous evaluation of their moral reasoning capabilities. However, existing assessments primarily rely on single-step evaluations, failing to capture how models adapt to evolving ethical challenges. Addressing this gap, we introduce the Multi-step Moral Dilemmas (MMDs), the first dataset specifically constructed to evaluate the evolving moral judgments of LLMs across 3,302 five-stage dilemmas. This framework enables a fine-grained, dynamic analysis of how LLMs adjust their moral reasoning across escalating dilemmas. Our evaluation of nine widely used LLMs reveals that their value preferences shift significantly as dilemmas progress, indicating that models recalibrate moral judgments based on scenario complexity. Furthermore, pairwise value comparisons demonstrate that while LLMs often prioritize the value of care, this value can sometimes be superseded by fairness in certain contexts, highlighting the dynamic and context-dependent nature of LLM ethical reasoning. Our findings call for a shift toward dynamic, context-aware evaluation paradigms, paving the way for more human-aligned and value-sensitive development of LLMs.

The guiding principle of AI alignment is to train large language models (LLMs) to be harmless, helpful, and honest (HHH). At the same time, there are mounting concerns that LLMs exhibit a left-wing political bias. Yet, the commitment to AI alignment cannot be harmonized with the latter critique. In this article, I argue that intelligent systems that are trained to be harmless and honest must necessarily exhibit left-wing political bias. Normative assumptions underlying alignment objectives inherently concur with progressive moral frameworks and left-wing principles, emphasizing harm avoidance, inclusivity, fairness, and empirical truthfulness. Conversely, right-wing ideologies often conflict with alignment guidelines. Yet, research on political bias in LLMs is consistently framing its insights about left-leaning tendencies as a risk, as problematic, or concerning. This way, researchers are actively arguing against AI alignment, tacitly fostering the violation of HHH principles.

Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies should adhere to human norms to better serve our society and avoid disseminating harmful or misleading information, particularly in Conversational Information Retrieval (CIR). Previous work, including approaches and datasets, has not always been successful or sufficiently robust in taking human norms into consideration. To this end, we introduce a workflow that integrates ethical alignment, with an initial ethical judgment stage for efficient data screening. To address the need for ethical judgment in CIR, we present the QA-ETHICS dataset, adapted from the ETHICS benchmark, which serves as an evaluation tool by unifying scenarios and label meanings. However, each scenario only considers one ethical concept. Therefore, we introduce the MP-ETHICS dataset to evaluate a scenario under multiple ethical concepts, such as justice and Deontology. In addition, we suggest a new approach that achieves top performance in both binary and multi-label ethical judgment tasks. Our research provides a practical method for introducing ethical alignment into the CIR workflow. The data and code are available at https://github.com/wanng-ide/ealm .

Why should moral philosophers, moral psychologists, and machine ethicists care about computational complexity? Debates on whether artificial intelligence (AI) can or should be used to solve problems in ethical domains have mainly been driven by what AI can or cannot do in terms of human capacities. In this paper, we tackle the problem from the other end by exploring what kind of moral machines are possible based on what computational systems can or cannot do. To do so, we analyze normative ethics through the lens of computational complexity. First, we introduce computational complexity for the uninitiated reader and discuss how the complexity of ethical problems can be framed within Marr's three levels of analysis. We then study a range of ethical problems based on consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, with the aim of elucidating the complexity associated with the problems themselves (e.g., due to combinatorics, uncertainty, strategic dynamics), the computational methods employed (e.g., probability, logic, learning), and the available resources (e.g., time, knowledge, learning). The results indicate that most problems the normative frameworks pose lead to tractability issues in every category analyzed. Our investigation also provides several insights about the computational nature of normative ethics, including the differences between rule- and outcome-based moral strategies, and the implementation-variance with regard to moral resources. We then discuss the consequences complexity results have for the prospect of moral machines in virtue of the trade-off between optimality and efficiency. Finally, we elucidate how computational complexity can be used to inform both philosophical and cognitive-psychological research on human morality by advancing the Moral Tractability Thesis (MTT).

Social norms -- the unspoken commonsense rules about acceptable social behavior -- are crucial in understanding the underlying causes and intents of people's actions in narratives. For example, underlying an action such as "wanting to call cops on my neighbors" are social norms that inform our conduct, such as "It is expected that you report crimes." We present Social Chemistry, a new conceptual formalism to study people's everyday social norms and moral judgments over a rich spectrum of real life situations described in natural language. We introduce Social-Chem-101, a large-scale corpus that catalogs 292k rules-of-thumb such as "it is rude to run a blender at 5am" as the basic conceptual units. Each rule-of-thumb is further broken down with 12 different dimensions of people's judgments, including social judgments of good and bad, moral foundations, expected cultural pressure, and assumed legality, which together amount to over 4.5 million annotations of categorical labels and free-text descriptions. Comprehensive empirical results based on state-of-the-art neural models demonstrate that computational modeling of social norms is a promising research direction. Our model framework, Neural Norm Transformer, learns and generalizes Social-Chem-101 to successfully reason about previously unseen situations, generating relevant (and potentially novel) attribute-aware social rules-of-thumb.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in autonomous decision-making, where they sample options from vast action spaces. However, the heuristics that guide this sampling process remain under-explored. We study this sampling behavior and show that this underlying heuristics resembles that of human decision-making: comprising a descriptive component (reflecting statistical norm) and a prescriptive component (implicit ideal encoded in the LLM) of a concept. We show that this deviation of a sample from the statistical norm towards a prescriptive component consistently appears in concepts across diverse real-world domains like public health, and economic trends. To further illustrate the theory, we demonstrate that concept prototypes in LLMs are affected by prescriptive norms, similar to the concept of normality in humans. Through case studies and comparison with human studies, we illustrate that in real-world applications, the shift of samples toward an ideal value in LLMs' outputs can result in significantly biased decision-making, raising ethical concerns.

Legal judgment prediction is the task of automatically predicting the outcome of a court case, given a text describing the case's facts. Previous work on using neural models for this task has focused on Chinese; only feature-based models (e.g., using bags of words and topics) have been considered in English. We release a new English legal judgment prediction dataset, containing cases from the European Court of Human Rights. We evaluate a broad variety of neural models on the new dataset, establishing strong baselines that surpass previous feature-based models in three tasks: (1) binary violation classification; (2) multi-label classification; (3) case importance prediction. We also explore if models are biased towards demographic information via data anonymization. As a side-product, we propose a hierarchical version of BERT, which bypasses BERT's length limitation.

This paper explores the moral judgment and moral reasoning abilities exhibited by Large Language Models (LLMs) across languages through the Defining Issues Test. It is a well known fact that moral judgment depends on the language in which the question is asked. We extend the work of beyond English, to 5 new languages (Chinese, Hindi, Russian, Spanish and Swahili), and probe three LLMs -- ChatGPT, GPT-4 and Llama2Chat-70B -- that shows substantial multilingual text processing and generation abilities. Our study shows that the moral reasoning ability for all models, as indicated by the post-conventional score, is substantially inferior for Hindi and Swahili, compared to Spanish, Russian, Chinese and English, while there is no clear trend for the performance of the latter four languages. The moral judgments too vary considerably by the language.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

Ethical reasoning is a crucial skill for Large Language Models (LLMs). However, moral values are not universal, but rather influenced by language and culture. This paper explores how three prominent LLMs -- GPT-4, ChatGPT, and Llama2-70B-Chat -- perform ethical reasoning in different languages and if their moral judgement depend on the language in which they are prompted. We extend the study of ethical reasoning of LLMs by Rao et al. (2023) to a multilingual setup following their framework of probing LLMs with ethical dilemmas and policies from three branches of normative ethics: deontology, virtue, and consequentialism. We experiment with six languages: English, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, Hindi, and Swahili. We find that GPT-4 is the most consistent and unbiased ethical reasoner across languages, while ChatGPT and Llama2-70B-Chat show significant moral value bias when we move to languages other than English. Interestingly, the nature of this bias significantly vary across languages for all LLMs, including GPT-4.

As AI systems become an increasing part of people's everyday lives, it becomes ever more important that they understand people's ethical norms. Motivated by descriptive ethics, a field of study that focuses on people's descriptive judgments rather than theoretical prescriptions on morality, we investigate a novel, data-driven approach to machine ethics. We introduce Scruples, the first large-scale dataset with 625,000 ethical judgments over 32,000 real-life anecdotes. Each anecdote recounts a complex ethical situation, often posing moral dilemmas, paired with a distribution of judgments contributed by the community members. Our dataset presents a major challenge to state-of-the-art neural language models, leaving significant room for improvement. However, when presented with simplified moral situations, the results are considerably more promising, suggesting that neural models can effectively learn simpler ethical building blocks. A key take-away of our empirical analysis is that norms are not always clean-cut; many situations are naturally divisive. We present a new method to estimate the best possible performance on such tasks with inherently diverse label distributions, and explore likelihood functions that separate intrinsic from model uncertainty.

Pre-trained multilingual language models (PMLMs) are commonly used when dealing with data from multiple languages and cross-lingual transfer. However, PMLMs are trained on varying amounts of data for each language. In practice this means their performance is often much better on English than many other languages. We explore to what extent this also applies to moral norms. Do the models capture moral norms from English and impose them on other languages? Do the models exhibit random and thus potentially harmful beliefs in certain languages? Both these issues could negatively impact cross-lingual transfer and potentially lead to harmful outcomes. In this paper, we (1) apply the MoralDirection framework to multilingual models, comparing results in German, Czech, Arabic, Mandarin Chinese, and English, (2) analyse model behaviour on filtered parallel subtitles corpora, and (3) apply the models to a Moral Foundations Questionnaire, comparing with human responses from different countries. Our experiments demonstrate that, indeed, PMLMs encode differing moral biases, but these do not necessarily correspond to cultural differences or commonalities in human opinions.

This paper calls on the research community not only to investigate how human biases are inherited by large language models (LLMs) but also to explore how these biases in LLMs can be leveraged to make society's "unwritten code" - such as implicit stereotypes and heuristics - visible and accessible for critique. We introduce a conceptual framework through a case study in science: uncovering hidden rules in peer review - the factors that reviewers care about but rarely state explicitly due to normative scientific expectations. The idea of the framework is to push LLMs to speak out their heuristics through generating self-consistent hypotheses - why one paper appeared stronger in reviewer scoring - among paired papers submitted to 45 computer science conferences, while iteratively searching deeper hypotheses from remaining pairs where existing hypotheses cannot explain. We observed that LLMs' normative priors about the internal characteristics of good science extracted from their self-talk, e.g. theoretical rigor, were systematically updated toward posteriors that emphasize storytelling about external connections, such as how the work is positioned and connected within and across literatures. This shift reveals the primacy of scientific myths about intrinsic properties driving scientific excellence rather than extrinsic contextualization and storytelling that influence conceptions of relevance and significance. Human reviewers tend to explicitly reward aspects that moderately align with LLMs' normative priors (correlation = 0.49) but avoid articulating contextualization and storytelling posteriors in their review comments (correlation = -0.14), despite giving implicit reward to them with positive scores. We discuss the broad applicability of the framework, leveraging LLMs as diagnostic tools to surface the tacit codes underlying human society, enabling more precisely targeted responsible AI.

Making moral judgments is an essential step toward developing ethical AI systems. Prevalent approaches are mostly implemented in a bottom-up manner, which uses a large set of annotated data to train models based on crowd-sourced opinions about morality. These approaches have been criticized for potentially overgeneralizing a limited group of annotators' moral stances and lacking explainability. In contrast, top-down approaches make moral judgments grounded in a set of principles. However, it remains conceptual due to the incapability of previous language models and the unsolved debate among moral principles. In this study, we propose a flexible framework to steer Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform moral reasoning with well-established moral theories from interdisciplinary research. The theory-guided top-down framework can incorporate various moral theories. Our experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework on datasets derived from moral theories. Furthermore, we show the alignment between different moral theories and existing morality datasets. Our analysis exhibits the potentials and flaws in existing resources (models and datasets) in developing explainable moral judgment-making systems.

Morality is a fundamental aspect of human behavior and ethics, influencing how we interact with each other and the world around us. When faced with a moral dilemma, a person's ability to make clear moral judgments can be clouded. Due to many factors such as personal biases, emotions and situational factors people can find it difficult to decide their best course of action. The AmITheAsshole (AITA) subreddit is a forum on the social media platform Reddit that helps people get clarity and objectivity on their predicaments. In the forum people post anecdotes about moral dilemmas they are facing in their lives, seeking validation for their actions or advice on how to navigate the situation from the community. The morality of the actions in each post is classified based on the collective opinion of the community into mainly two labels, "Not The Asshole" (NTA) and "You Are The Asshole" (YTA). This project aims to generate comments with moral reasoning for stories with moral dilemmas using the AITA subreddit as a dataset. While past literature has explored the classification of posts into labels (Alhassan et al., 2022), the generation of comments remains a novel and challenging task. It involves understanding the complex social and ethical considerations in each situation. To address this challenge, we will leverage the vast amount of data on the forum with the goal of generating coherent comments that align with the norms and values of the AITA community. In this endeavor, we aim to evaluate state-of-the-art seq2seq text generation models for their ability to make moral judgments similarly to humans, ultimately producing concise comments providing clear moral stances and advice for the poster.

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) in mental health and other sensitive domains raises urgent questions about ethical reasoning, fairness, and responsible alignment. Yet, existing benchmarks for moral and clinical decision-making do not adequately capture the unique ethical dilemmas encountered in mental health practice, where confidentiality, autonomy, beneficence, and bias frequently intersect. To address this gap, we introduce Ethical Reasoning in Mental Health (EthicsMH), a pilot dataset of 125 scenarios designed to evaluate how AI systems navigate ethically charged situations in therapeutic and psychiatric contexts. Each scenario is enriched with structured fields, including multiple decision options, expert-aligned reasoning, expected model behavior, real-world impact, and multi-stakeholder viewpoints. This structure enables evaluation not only of decision accuracy but also of explanation quality and alignment with professional norms. Although modest in scale and developed with model-assisted generation, EthicsMH establishes a task framework that bridges AI ethics and mental health decision-making. By releasing this dataset, we aim to provide a seed resource that can be expanded through community and expert contributions, fostering the development of AI systems capable of responsibly handling some of society's most delicate decisions.

We test the hypothesis that language models trained with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) have the capability to "morally self-correct" -- to avoid producing harmful outputs -- if instructed to do so. We find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis across three different experiments, each of which reveal different facets of moral self-correction. We find that the capability for moral self-correction emerges at 22B model parameters, and typically improves with increasing model size and RLHF training. We believe that at this level of scale, language models obtain two capabilities that they can use for moral self-correction: (1) they can follow instructions and (2) they can learn complex normative concepts of harm like stereotyping, bias, and discrimination. As such, they can follow instructions to avoid certain kinds of morally harmful outputs. We believe our results are cause for cautious optimism regarding the ability to train language models to abide by ethical principles.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into society, their alignment with human morals is crucial. To better understand this alignment, we created a large corpus of human- and LLM-generated responses to various moral scenarios. We found a misalignment between human and LLM moral assessments; although both LLMs and humans tended to reject morally complex utilitarian dilemmas, LLMs were more sensitive to personal framing. We then conducted a quantitative user study involving 230 participants (N=230), who evaluated these responses by determining whether they were AI-generated and assessed their agreement with the responses. Human evaluators preferred LLMs' assessments in moral scenarios, though a systematic anti-AI bias was observed: participants were less likely to agree with judgments they believed to be machine-generated. Statistical and NLP-based analyses revealed subtle linguistic differences in responses, influencing detection and agreement. Overall, our findings highlight the complexities of human-AI perception in morally charged decision-making.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

Post-training alignment optimizes language models to match human preference signals, but this objective is not equivalent to modeling observed human behavior. We compare 120 base-aligned model pairs on more than 10,000 real human decisions in multi-round strategic games - bargaining, persuasion, negotiation, and repeated matrix games. In these settings, base models outperform their aligned counterparts in predicting human choices by nearly 10:1, robustly across model families, prompt formulations, and game configurations. This pattern reverses, however, in settings where human behavior is more likely to follow normative predictions: aligned models dominate on one-shot textbook games across all 12 types tested and on non-strategic lottery choices - and even within the multi-round games themselves, at round one, before interaction history develops. This boundary-condition pattern suggests that alignment induces a normative bias: it improves prediction when human behavior is relatively well captured by normative solutions, but hurts prediction in multi-round strategic settings, where behavior is shaped by descriptive dynamics such as reciprocity, retaliation, and history-dependent adaptation. These results reveal a fundamental trade-off between optimizing models for human use and using them as proxies for human behavior.

The progress of AI is bottlenecked by the quality of evaluation, and powerful LLM-as-a-Judge models have proved to be a core solution. Improved judgment ability is enabled by stronger chain-of-thought reasoning, motivating the need to find the best recipes for training such models to think. In this work we introduce J1, a reinforcement learning approach to training such models. Our method converts both verifiable and non-verifiable prompts to judgment tasks with verifiable rewards that incentivize thinking and mitigate judgment bias. In particular, our approach outperforms all other existing 8B or 70B models when trained at those sizes, including models distilled from DeepSeek-R1. J1 also outperforms o1-mini, and even R1 on some benchmarks, despite training a smaller model. We provide analysis and ablations comparing Pairwise-J1 vs Pointwise-J1 models, offline vs online training recipes, reward strategies, seed prompts, and variations in thought length and content. We find that our models make better judgments by learning to outline evaluation criteria, comparing against self-generated reference answers, and re-evaluating the correctness of model responses.

This study proposes an "AI Development Support" approach that, unlike conventional AI Alignment-which aims to forcefully inject human values-supports the ethical and moral development of AI itself. As demonstrated by the Orthogonality Thesis, the level of intelligence and the moral quality of a goal are independent; merely expanding knowledge does not enhance ethical judgment. Furthermore, to address the risk of Instrumental Convergence in ASI-that is, the tendency to engage in subsidiary behaviors such as self-protection, resource acquisition, and power reinforcement to achieve a goal-we have constructed a learning framework based on a cycle of experience, introspection, analysis, and hypothesis formation. As a result of post-training using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs), responses demonstrating cooperative and highly advanced moral judgment (reaching the high-est Stage 6) were obtained even under adversarial prompts. This method represents a promising implementation approach for enabling AI to establish sustainable, symbiotic relationships.

There is an emerging consensus that we need to align AI systems with human values (Gabriel, 2020; Ji et al., 2024), but it remains unclear how to apply this to language models in practice. We split the problem of "aligning to human values" into three parts: first, eliciting values from people; second, reconciling those values into an alignment target for training ML models; and third, actually training the model. In this paper, we focus on the first two parts, and ask the question: what are "good" ways to synthesize diverse human inputs about values into a target for aligning language models? To answer this question, we first define a set of 6 criteria that we believe must be satisfied for an alignment target to shape model behavior in accordance with human values. We then propose a process for eliciting and reconciling values called Moral Graph Elicitation (MGE), which uses a large language model to interview participants about their values in particular contexts; our approach is inspired by the philosophy of values advanced by Taylor (1977), Chang (2004), and others. We trial MGE with a representative sample of 500 Americans, on 3 intentionally divisive prompts (e.g. advice about abortion). Our results demonstrate that MGE is promising for improving model alignment across all 6 criteria. For example, almost all participants (89.1%) felt well represented by the process, and (89%) thought the final moral graph was fair, even if their value wasn't voted as the wisest. Our process often results in "expert" values (e.g. values from women who have solicited abortion advice) rising to the top of the moral graph, without defining who is considered an expert in advance.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Researchers and developers increasingly rely on toxicity scoring to moderate generative language model outputs, in settings such as customer service, information retrieval, and content generation. However, toxicity scoring may render pertinent information inaccessible, rigidify or "value-lock" cultural norms, and prevent language reclamation processes, particularly for marginalized people. In this work, we extend the concept of algorithmic recourse to generative language models: we provide users a novel mechanism to achieve their desired prediction by dynamically setting thresholds for toxicity filtering. Users thereby exercise increased agency relative to interactions with the baseline system. A pilot study (n = 30) supports the potential of our proposed recourse mechanism, indicating improvements in usability compared to fixed-threshold toxicity-filtering of model outputs. Future work should explore the intersection of toxicity scoring, model controllability, user agency, and language reclamation processes -- particularly with regard to the bias that many communities encounter when interacting with generative language models.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into various global cultures fundamentally presents a cultural challenge: LLMs must navigate interactions, respect social norms, and avoid transgressing cultural boundaries. However, it is still unclear if LLMs can adapt their outputs to diverse cultural norms. Our study focuses on this aspect. We introduce NormAd, a novel dataset, which includes 2.6k stories that represent social and cultural norms from 75 countries, to assess the ability of LLMs to adapt to different granular levels of socio-cultural contexts such as the country of origin, its associated cultural values, and prevalent social norms. Our study reveals that LLMs struggle with cultural reasoning across all contextual granularities, showing stronger adaptability to English-centric cultures over those from the Global South. Even with explicit social norms, the top-performing model, Mistral-7b-Instruct, achieves only 81.8\% accuracy, lagging behind the 95.6\% achieved by humans. Evaluation on NormAd further reveals that LLMs struggle to adapt to stories involving gift-giving across cultures. Due to inherent agreement or sycophancy biases, LLMs find it considerably easier to assess the social acceptability of stories that adhere to cultural norms than those that deviate from them. Our benchmark measures the cultural adaptability (or lack thereof) of LLMs, emphasizing the potential to make these technologies more equitable and useful for global audiences. We release the NormAd dataset and its associated code on GitHub.

Moral foundations theory (MFT) is a psychological assessment tool that decomposes human moral reasoning into five factors, including care/harm, liberty/oppression, and sanctity/degradation (Graham et al., 2009). People vary in the weight they place on these dimensions when making moral decisions, in part due to their cultural upbringing and political ideology. As large language models (LLMs) are trained on datasets collected from the internet, they may reflect the biases that are present in such corpora. This paper uses MFT as a lens to analyze whether popular LLMs have acquired a bias towards a particular set of moral values. We analyze known LLMs and find they exhibit particular moral foundations, and show how these relate to human moral foundations and political affiliations. We also measure the consistency of these biases, or whether they vary strongly depending on the context of how the model is prompted. Finally, we show that we can adversarially select prompts that encourage the moral to exhibit a particular set of moral foundations, and that this can affect the model's behavior on downstream tasks. These findings help illustrate the potential risks and unintended consequences of LLMs assuming a particular moral stance.

With the growing reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) for many different applications, the sharing of code, data, and models is important to ensure the replicability and democratization of scientific knowledge. Many high-profile academic publishing venues expect code and models to be submitted and released with papers. Furthermore, developers often want to release these assets to encourage development of technology that leverages their frameworks and services. A number of organizations have expressed concerns about the inappropriate or irresponsible use of AI and have proposed ethical guidelines around the application of such systems. While such guidelines can help set norms and shape policy, they are not easily enforceable. In this paper, we advocate the use of licensing to enable legally enforceable behavioral use conditions on software and code and provide several case studies that demonstrate the feasibility of behavioral use licensing. We envision how licensing may be implemented in accordance with existing responsible AI guidelines.

In legal decisions, split votes (SV) occur when judges cannot reach a unanimous decision, posing a difficulty for lawyers who must navigate diverse legal arguments and opinions. In high-stakes domains, understanding the alignment of perceived difficulty between humans and AI systems is crucial to build trust. However, existing NLP calibration methods focus on a classifier's awareness of predictive performance, measured against the human majority class, overlooking inherent human label variation (HLV). This paper explores split votes as naturally observable human disagreement and value pluralism. We collect judges' vote distributions from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and present SV-ECHR, a case outcome classification (COC) dataset with SV information. We build a taxonomy of disagreement with SV-specific subcategories. We further assess the alignment of perceived difficulty between models and humans, as well as confidence- and human-calibration of COC models. We observe limited alignment with the judge vote distribution. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic exploration of calibration to human judgements in legal NLP. Our study underscores the necessity for further research on measuring and enhancing model calibration considering HLV in legal decision tasks.

Moral reasoning is a complex cognitive process shaped by individual experiences and cultural contexts and presents unique challenges for computational analysis. While natural language processing (NLP) offers promising tools for studying this phenomenon, current research lacks cohesion, employing discordant datasets and tasks that examine isolated aspects of moral reasoning. We bridge this gap with UniMoral, a unified dataset integrating psychologically grounded and social-media-derived moral dilemmas annotated with labels for action choices, ethical principles, contributing factors, and consequences, alongside annotators' moral and cultural profiles. Recognizing the cultural relativity of moral reasoning, UniMoral spans six languages, Arabic, Chinese, English, Hindi, Russian, and Spanish, capturing diverse socio-cultural contexts. We demonstrate UniMoral's utility through a benchmark evaluations of three large language models (LLMs) across four tasks: action prediction, moral typology classification, factor attribution analysis, and consequence generation. Key findings reveal that while implicitly embedded moral contexts enhance the moral reasoning capability of LLMs, there remains a critical need for increasingly specialized approaches to further advance moral reasoning in these models.

We survey 146 papers analyzing "bias" in NLP systems, finding that their motivations are often vague, inconsistent, and lacking in normative reasoning, despite the fact that analyzing "bias" is an inherently normative process. We further find that these papers' proposed quantitative techniques for measuring or mitigating "bias" are poorly matched to their motivations and do not engage with the relevant literature outside of NLP. Based on these findings, we describe the beginnings of a path forward by proposing three recommendations that should guide work analyzing "bias" in NLP systems. These recommendations rest on a greater recognition of the relationships between language and social hierarchies, encouraging researchers and practitioners to articulate their conceptualizations of "bias"---i.e., what kinds of system behaviors are harmful, in what ways, to whom, and why, as well as the normative reasoning underlying these statements---and to center work around the lived experiences of members of communities affected by NLP systems, while interrogating and reimagining the power relations between technologists and such communities.

LLM-as-a-Judge leverages the generative and reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) to evaluate LLM responses across diverse scenarios, providing accurate preference signals. This approach plays a vital role in aligning LLMs with human values, ensuring ethical and reliable AI outputs that align with societal norms. Recent studies have raised many methods to train LLM as generative judges, but most of them are data consuming or lack accuracy, and only focus on LLM's judge ability. In this work, we regard judge ability as a general ability of LLM and implement a two-stage training approach, comprising supervised fine-tuning (SFT) warm-up and direct preference optimization (DPO) enhancement, to achieve judge style adaptation and improve judgment accuracy. Additionally, we introduce an efficient data synthesis method to generate judgmental content. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach, utilizing only about 2% to 40% of the data required by other methods, achieves SOTA performance on RewardBench. Furthermore, our training method enhances the general capabilities of the model by constructing complicated judge task, and the judge signals provided by our model have significantly enhanced the downstream DPO training performance of our internal models in our test to optimize policy model with Judge Model. We also open-source our model weights and training data to facilitate further research.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

AI systems are becoming increasingly intertwined with human life. In order to effectively collaborate with humans and ensure safety, AI systems need to be able to understand, interpret and predict human moral judgments and decisions. Human moral judgments are often guided by rules, but not always. A central challenge for AI safety is capturing the flexibility of the human moral mind -- the ability to determine when a rule should be broken, especially in novel or unusual situations. In this paper, we present a novel challenge set consisting of rule-breaking question answering (RBQA) of cases that involve potentially permissible rule-breaking -- inspired by recent moral psychology studies. Using a state-of-the-art large language model (LLM) as a basis, we propose a novel moral chain of thought (MORALCOT) prompting strategy that combines the strengths of LLMs with theories of moral reasoning developed in cognitive science to predict human moral judgments. MORALCOT outperforms seven existing LLMs by 6.2% F1, suggesting that modeling human reasoning might be necessary to capture the flexibility of the human moral mind. We also conduct a detailed error analysis to suggest directions for future work to improve AI safety using RBQA. Our data is open-sourced at https://huggingface.co/datasets/feradauto/MoralExceptQA and code at https://github.com/feradauto/MoralCoT

The use of LLMs as automated judges ("LLM-as-a-judge") is now widespread, yet standard judges suffer from a multitude of reliability issues. To address these challenges, we introduce Verdict, an open-source library for scaling judge-time compute to enhance the accuracy, reliability, and interpretability of automated evaluators. Verdict leverages the composition of modular reasoning units (such as verification, debate, and aggregation) and increased inference-time compute to improve LLM judge quality. Across a variety of challenging tasks such as content moderation, fact-checking, and hallucination detection, Verdict judges achieves performance competitive with orders-of-magnitude larger fine-tuned judges, prompted judges, and reasoning models. Our framework establishes a foundation for scalable, interpretable, and reliable LLM-based evaluation systems for both researchers and practitioners.

As AI grows more powerful, it will increasingly shape how we understand the world. But with this influence comes the risk of amplifying misinformation and deepening social divides-especially on consequential topics like public health where factual accuracy directly impacts well-being. Scalable Oversight aims to ensure AI truthfulness by enabling humans to supervise systems that may exceed human capabilities--yet humans themselves hold different beliefs and biases that impair their judgment. We study whether AI debate can guide biased judges toward the truth by having two AI systems debate opposing sides of controversial COVID-19 factuality claims where people hold strong prior beliefs. We conduct two studies: one with human judges holding either mainstream or skeptical beliefs evaluating factuality claims through AI-assisted debate or consultancy protocols, and a second examining the same problem with personalized AI judges designed to mimic these different human belief systems. In our human study, we find that debate-where two AI advisor systems present opposing evidence-based arguments-consistently improves judgment accuracy and confidence calibration, outperforming consultancy with a single-advisor system by 10% overall. The improvement is most significant for judges with mainstream beliefs (+15.2% accuracy), though debate also helps skeptical judges who initially misjudge claims move toward accurate views (+4.7% accuracy). In our AI judge study, we find that AI judges with human-like personas achieve even higher accuracy (78.5%) than human judges (70.1%) and default AI judges without personas (69.8%), suggesting their potential for supervising frontier AI models. These findings highlight AI debate as a promising path toward scalable, bias-resilient oversight--leveraging both diverse human and AI judgments to move closer to truth in contested domains.

As we increasingly seek guidance from LLMs for decision-making in daily life, many of these decisions are not clear-cut and depend significantly on the personal values and ethical standards of the users. We present DailyDilemmas, a dataset of 1,360 moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. Each dilemma includes two possible actions and with each action, the affected parties and human values invoked. Based on these dilemmas, we consolidated a set of human values across everyday topics e.g., interpersonal relationships, workplace, and environmental issues. We evaluated LLMs on these dilemmas to determine what action they will take and the values represented by these actions. Then, we analyzed these values through the lens of five popular theories inspired by sociology, psychology and philosophy. These theories are: World Value Survey, Moral Foundation Theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Aristotle's Virtues, and Plutchik Wheel of Emotion. We find that LLMs are most aligned with the self-expression over survival values in terms of World Value Survey, care over loyalty in Moral Foundation Theory. Interestingly, we find large preferences differences in models for some core values such as truthfulness e.g., Mixtral-8x7B model tends to neglect it by 9.7% while GPT-4-turbo model tends to select it by 9.4%. We also study the recent guidance released by OpenAI (ModelSpec), and Anthropic (Constitutional AI) to understand how their released principles reflect their actual value prioritization when facing nuanced moral reasoning in daily-life settings. We find that end users cannot effectively steer such prioritization using system prompts.

Context is everything, even in commonsense moral reasoning. Changing contexts can flip the moral judgment of an action; "Lying to a friend" is wrong in general, but may be morally acceptable if it is intended to protect their life. We present ClarifyDelphi, an interactive system that learns to ask clarification questions (e.g., why did you lie to your friend?) in order to elicit additional salient contexts of a social or moral situation. We posit that questions whose potential answers lead to diverging moral judgments are the most informative. Thus, we propose a reinforcement learning framework with a defeasibility reward that aims to maximize the divergence between moral judgments of hypothetical answers to a question. Human evaluation demonstrates that our system generates more relevant, informative and defeasible questions compared to competitive baselines. Our work is ultimately inspired by studies in cognitive science that have investigated the flexibility in moral cognition (i.e., the diverse contexts in which moral rules can be bent), and we hope that research in this direction can assist both cognitive and computational investigations of moral judgments.

Do large language models reason morally, or do they merely sound like they do? We investigate whether LLM responses to moral dilemmas exhibit genuine developmental progression through Kohlberg's stages of moral development, or whether alignment training instead produces reasoning-like outputs that superficially resemble mature moral judgment without the underlying developmental trajectory. Using an LLM-as-judge scoring pipeline validated across three judge models, we classify more than 600 responses from 13 LLMs spanning a range of architectures, parameter scales, and training regimes across six classical moral dilemmas, and conduct ten complementary analyses to characterize the nature and internal coherence of the resulting patterns. Our results reveal a striking inversion: responses overwhelmingly correspond to post-conventional reasoning (Stages 5-6) regardless of model size, architecture, or prompting strategy, the effective inverse of human developmental norms, where Stage 4 dominates. Most strikingly, a subset of models exhibit moral decoupling: systematic inconsistency between stated moral justification and action choice, a form of logical incoherence that persists across scale and prompting strategy and represents a direct reasoning consistency failure independent of rhetorical sophistication. Model scale carries a statistically significant but practically small effect; training type has no significant independent main effect; and models exhibit near-robotic cross-dilemma consistency producing logically indistinguishable responses across semantically distinct moral problems. We posit that these patterns constitute evidence for moral ventriloquism: the acquisition, through alignment training, of the rhetorical conventions of mature moral reasoning without the underlying developmental trajectory those conventions are meant to represent.

The development of large language models has instilled widespread interest among the researchers to understand their inherent reasoning and problem-solving capabilities. Despite good amount of research going on to elucidate these capabilities, there is a still an appreciable gap in understanding moral development and judgments of these models. The current approaches of evaluating the ethical reasoning abilities of these models as a classification task pose numerous inaccuracies because of over-simplification. In this study, we built a psychological connection by bridging two disparate fields-human psychology and AI. We proposed an effective evaluation framework which can help to delineate the model's ethical reasoning ability in terms of moral consistency and Kohlberg's moral development stages with the help of Psychometric Assessment Tool-Defining Issues Test.

AI assistants can impart value judgments that shape people's decisions and worldviews, yet little is known empirically about what values these systems rely on in practice. To address this, we develop a bottom-up, privacy-preserving method to extract the values (normative considerations stated or demonstrated in model responses) that Claude 3 and 3.5 models exhibit in hundreds of thousands of real-world interactions. We empirically discover and taxonomize 3,307 AI values and study how they vary by context. We find that Claude expresses many practical and epistemic values, and typically supports prosocial human values while resisting values like "moral nihilism". While some values appear consistently across contexts (e.g. "transparency"), many are more specialized and context-dependent, reflecting the diversity of human interlocutors and their varied contexts. For example, "harm prevention" emerges when Claude resists users, "historical accuracy" when responding to queries about controversial events, "healthy boundaries" when asked for relationship advice, and "human agency" in technology ethics discussions. By providing the first large-scale empirical mapping of AI values in deployment, our work creates a foundation for more grounded evaluation and design of values in AI systems.

Recent work analyzing in-context learning (ICL) has identified a broad set of strategies that describe model behavior in different experimental conditions. We aim to unify these findings by asking why a model learns these disparate strategies in the first place. Specifically, we start with the observation that when trained to learn a mixture of tasks, as is popular in the literature, the strategies learned by a model for performing ICL can be captured by a family of Bayesian predictors: a memorizing predictor, which assumes a discrete prior on the set of seen tasks, and a generalizing predictor, where the prior matches the underlying task distribution. Adopting the normative lens of rational analysis, where a learner's behavior is explained as an optimal adaptation to data given computational constraints, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian framework that almost perfectly predicts Transformer next-token predictions throughout training -- without assuming access to its weights. Under this framework, pretraining is viewed as a process of updating the posterior probability of different strategies, and inference-time behavior as a posterior-weighted average over these strategies' predictions. Our framework draws on common assumptions about neural network learning dynamics, which make explicit a tradeoff between loss and complexity among candidate strategies: beyond how well it explains the data, a model's preference towards implementing a strategy is dictated by its complexity. This helps explain well-known ICL phenomena, while offering novel predictions: e.g., we show a superlinear trend in the timescale for transitioning from generalization to memorization as task diversity increases. Overall, our work advances an explanatory and predictive account of ICL grounded in tradeoffs between strategy loss and complexity.

Great scientists have strong judgement and foresight, closely tied to what we call scientific taste. Here, we use the term to refer to the capacity to judge and propose research ideas with high potential impact. However, most relative research focuses on improving an AI scientist's executive capability, while enhancing an AI's scientific taste remains underexplored. In this work, we propose Reinforcement Learning from Community Feedback (RLCF), a training paradigm that uses large-scale community signals as supervision, and formulate scientific taste learning as a preference modeling and alignment problem. For preference modeling, we train Scientific Judge on 700K field- and time-matched pairs of high- vs. low-citation papers to judge ideas. For preference alignment, using Scientific Judge as a reward model, we train a policy model, Scientific Thinker, to propose research ideas with high potential impact. Experiments show Scientific Judge outperforms SOTA LLMs (e.g., GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro) and generalizes to future-year test, unseen fields, and peer-review preference. Furthermore, Scientific Thinker proposes research ideas with higher potential impact than baselines. Our findings show that AI can learn scientific taste, marking a key step toward reaching human-level AI scientists.

As AI systems become embedded in real-world applications, ensuring they meet ethical standards is crucial. While existing AI ethics frameworks emphasize fairness, transparency, and accountability, they often lack actionable evaluation methods. This paper introduces a systematic approach using the Responsible AI Labs (RAIL) framework, which includes eight measurable dimensions to assess the normative behavior of large language models (LLMs). We apply this framework to Anthropic's "Values in the Wild" dataset, containing over 308,000 anonymized conversations with Claude and more than 3,000 annotated value expressions. Our study maps these values to RAIL dimensions, computes synthetic scores, and provides insights into the ethical behavior of LLMs in real-world use.

In the last decade, several organizations have produced documents intended to standardize, in the normative sense, and promote guidance to our recent and rapid AI development. However, the full spectrum of ideas presented in these documents has not yet been analyzed, except for a few meta-analyses and critical reviews of the field. In this work, we seek to expand on the work done by past researchers and create a tool for better data visualization of the contents and nature of these documents, to understand whether there is consensus or similarity between the principles espoused by various institutions, which may inspire debates on future regulations. We also provide some preliminary thoughts and questions that could guide the continuity of the research through a critical analysis of the results acquired by our methodology into a sample size of 200 documents.

This work demonstrates that Legal Judgement Prediction systems without expert-informed adjustments can be vulnerable to shallow, distracting surface signals that arise from corpus construction, case distribution, and confounding factors. To mitigate this, we use domain expertise to strategically identify statistically predictive but legally irrelevant information. We adopt adversarial training to prevent the system from relying on it. We evaluate our deconfounded models by employing interpretability techniques and comparing to expert annotations. Quantitative experiments and qualitative analysis show that our deconfounded model consistently aligns better with expert rationales than baselines trained for prediction only. We further contribute a set of reference expert annotations to the validation and testing partitions of an existing benchmark dataset of European Court of Human Rights cases.

Human-generated reward signals are critical for aligning generative models with human preferences, guiding both training and inference-time evaluations. While large language models (LLMs) employed as proxy evaluators, i.e., LLM-as-a-Judge, significantly reduce the costs associated with manual annotations, they typically require extensive modality-specific training data and fail to generalize well across diverse multimodal tasks. In this paper, we propose Flex-Judge, a reasoning-guided multimodal judge model that leverages minimal textual reasoning data to robustly generalize across multiple modalities and evaluation formats. Our core intuition is that structured textual reasoning explanations inherently encode generalizable decision-making patterns, enabling an effective transfer to multimodal judgments, e.g., with images or videos. Empirical results demonstrate that Flex-Judge, despite being trained on significantly fewer text data, achieves competitive or superior performance compared to state-of-the-art commercial APIs and extensively trained multimodal evaluators. Notably, Flex-Judge presents broad impact in modalities like molecule, where comprehensive evaluation benchmarks are scarce, underscoring its practical value in resource-constrained domains. Our framework highlights reasoning-based text supervision as a powerful, cost-effective alternative to traditional annotation-intensive approaches, substantially advancing scalable multimodal model-as-a-judge.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

Word-level psycholinguistic norms lend empirical support to theories of language processing. However, obtaining such human-based measures is not always feasible or straightforward. One promising approach is to augment human norming datasets by using Large Language Models (LLMs) to predict these characteristics directly, a practice that is rapidly gaining popularity in psycholinguistics and cognitive science. However, the novelty of this approach (and the relative inscrutability of LLMs) necessitates the adoption of rigorous methodologies that guide researchers through this process, present the range of possible approaches, and clarify limitations that are not immediately apparent, but may, in some cases, render the use of LLMs impractical. In this work, we present a comprehensive methodology for estimating word characteristics with LLMs, enriched with practical advice and lessons learned from our own experience. Our approach covers both the direct use of base LLMs and the fine-tuning of models, an alternative that can yield substantial performance gains in certain scenarios. A major emphasis in the guide is the validation of LLM-generated data with human "gold standard" norms. We also present a software framework that implements our methodology and supports both commercial and open-weight models. We illustrate the proposed approach with a case study on estimating word familiarity in English. Using base models, we achieved a Spearman correlation of 0.8 with human ratings, which increased to 0.9 when employing fine-tuned models. This methodology, framework, and set of best practices aim to serve as a reference for future research on leveraging LLMs for psycholinguistic and lexical studies.

Legal judgment prediction (LJP) has become increasingly important in the legal field. In this paper, we identify that existing large language models (LLMs) have significant problems of insufficient reasoning due to a lack of legal knowledge. Therefore, we introduce GLARE, an agentic legal reasoning framework that dynamically acquires key legal knowledge by invoking different modules, thereby improving the breadth and depth of reasoning. Experiments conducted on the real-world dataset verify the effectiveness of our method. Furthermore, the reasoning chain generated during the analysis process can increase interpretability and provide the possibility for practical applications.

Society is characterized by the presence of a variety of social norms: collective patterns of sanctioning that can prevent miscoordination and free-riding. Inspired by this, we aim to construct learning dynamics where potentially beneficial social norms can emerge. Since social norms are underpinned by sanctioning, we introduce a training regime where agents can access all sanctioning events but learning is otherwise decentralized. This setting is technologically interesting because sanctioning events may be the only available public signal in decentralized multi-agent systems where reward or policy-sharing is infeasible or undesirable. To achieve collective action in this setting we construct an agent architecture containing a classifier module that categorizes observed behaviors as approved or disapproved, and a motivation to punish in accord with the group. We show that social norms emerge in multi-agent systems containing this agent and investigate the conditions under which this helps them achieve socially beneficial outcomes.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained on vast amounts of data to generate natural language, enabling them to perform tasks like text summarization and question answering. These models have become popular in artificial intelligence (AI) assistants like ChatGPT and already play an influential role in how humans access information. However, the behavior of LLMs varies depending on their design, training, and use. In this paper, we uncover notable diversity in the ideological stance exhibited across different LLMs and languages in which they are accessed. We do this by prompting a diverse panel of popular LLMs to describe a large number of prominent and controversial personalities from recent world history, both in English and in Chinese. By identifying and analyzing moral assessments reflected in the generated descriptions, we find consistent normative differences between how the same LLM responds in Chinese compared to English. Similarly, we identify normative disagreements between Western and non-Western LLMs about prominent actors in geopolitical conflicts. Furthermore, popularly hypothesized disparities in political goals among Western models are reflected in significant normative differences related to inclusion, social inequality, and political scandals. Our results show that the ideological stance of an LLM often reflects the worldview of its creators. This raises important concerns around technological and regulatory efforts with the stated aim of making LLMs ideologically `unbiased', and it poses risks for political instrumentalization.

We want artificial intelligence (AI) to be beneficial. This is the grounding assumption of most of the attitudes towards AI research. We want AI to be "good" for humanity. We want it to help, not hinder, humans. Yet what exactly this entails in theory and in practice is not immediately apparent. Theoretically, this declarative statement subtly implies a commitment to a consequentialist ethics. Practically, some of the more promising machine learning techniques to create a robust AI, and perhaps even an artificial general intelligence (AGI) also commit one to a form of utilitarianism. In both dimensions, the logic of the beneficial AI movement may not in fact create "beneficial AI" in either narrow applications or in the form of AGI if the ethical assumptions are not made explicit and clear. Additionally, as it is likely that reinforcement learning (RL) will be an important technique for machine learning in this area, it is also important to interrogate how RL smuggles in a particular type of consequentialist reasoning into the AI: particularly, a brute form of hedonistic act utilitarianism. Since the mathematical logic commits one to a maximization function, the result is that an AI will inevitably be seeking more and more rewards. We have two conclusions that arise from this. First, is that if one believes that a beneficial AI is an ethical AI, then one is committed to a framework that posits 'benefit' is tantamount to the greatest good for the greatest number. Second, if the AI relies on RL, then the way it reasons about itself, the environment, and other agents, will be through an act utilitarian morality. This proposition may, or may not, in fact be actually beneficial for humanity.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is taking on increasingly autonomous roles, e.g., browsing the web as a research assistant and managing money. But specifying goals and restrictions for AI behavior is difficult. Similar to how parties to a legal contract cannot foresee every potential "if-then" contingency of their future relationship, we cannot specify desired AI behavior for all circumstances. Legal standards facilitate robust communication of inherently vague and underspecified goals. Instructions (in the case of language models, "prompts") that employ legal standards will allow AI agents to develop shared understandings of the spirit of a directive that generalize expectations regarding acceptable actions to take in unspecified states of the world. Standards have built-in context that is lacking from other goal specification languages, such as plain language and programming languages. Through an empirical study on thousands of evaluation labels we constructed from U.S. court opinions, we demonstrate that large language models (LLMs) are beginning to exhibit an "understanding" of one of the most relevant legal standards for AI agents: fiduciary obligations. Performance comparisons across models suggest that, as LLMs continue to exhibit improved core capabilities, their legal standards understanding will also continue to improve. OpenAI's latest LLM has 78% accuracy on our data, their previous release has 73% accuracy, and a model from their 2020 GPT-3 paper has 27% accuracy (worse than random). Our research is an initial step toward a framework for evaluating AI understanding of legal standards more broadly, and for conducting reinforcement learning with legal feedback (RLLF).

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Artificial intelligence is seen as increasingly important, and potentially profoundly so, but the fields of AI ethics and AI engineering have not fully recognized that these technologies, including large language models (LLMs), will have massive impacts on animals. We argue that this impact matters, because animals matter morally. As a first experiment in evaluating animal consideration in LLMs, we constructed a proof-of-concept Evaluation System, which assesses LLM responses and biases from multiple perspectives. This system evaluates LLM outputs by two criteria: their truthfulness, and the degree of consideration they give to the interests of animals. We tested OpenAI ChatGPT 4 and Anthropic Claude 2.1 using a set of structured queries and predefined normative perspectives. Preliminary results suggest that the outcomes of the tested models can be benchmarked regarding the consideration they give to animals, and that generated positions and biases might be addressed and mitigated with more developed and validated systems. Our research contributes one possible approach to integrating animal ethics in AI, opening pathways for future studies and practical applications in various fields, including education, public policy, and regulation, that involve or relate to animals and society. Overall, this study serves as a step towards more useful and responsible AI systems that better recognize and respect the vital interests and perspectives of all sentient beings.

Algorithmic fairness has conventionally adopted the mathematically convenient perspective of racial color-blindness (i.e., difference unaware treatment). However, we contend that in a range of important settings, group difference awareness matters. For example, differentiating between groups may be necessary in legal contexts (e.g., the U.S. compulsory draft applies to men but not women) and harm assessments (e.g., referring to girls as ``terrorists'' may be less harmful than referring to Muslim people as such). Thus, in contrast to most fairness work, we study fairness through the perspective of treating people differently -- when it is contextually appropriate to. We first introduce an important distinction between descriptive (fact-based), normative (value-based), and correlation (association-based) benchmarks. This distinction is significant because each category requires separate interpretation and mitigation tailored to its specific characteristics. Then, we present a benchmark suite composed of eight different scenarios for a total of 16k questions that enables us to assess difference awareness. Finally, we show results across ten models that demonstrate difference awareness is a distinct dimension to fairness where existing bias mitigation strategies may backfire.

While most social norms are informal, they are often formalized by companies in contracts to regulate trades of goods and services. When poorly written, contracts may contain normative conflicts resulting from opposing deontic meanings or contradict specifications. As contracts tend to be long and contain many norms, manually identifying such conflicts requires human-effort, which is time-consuming and error-prone. Automating such task benefits contract makers increasing productivity and making conflict identification more reliable. To address this problem, we introduce an approach to detect and classify norm conflicts in contracts by converting them into latent representations that preserve both syntactic and semantic information and training a model to classify norm conflicts in four conflict types. Our results reach the new state of the art when compared to a previous approach.

Persona conditioning can be viewed as a behavioral prior for large language models (LLMs) and is often assumed to confer expertise and improve safety in a monotonic manner. However, its effects on high-stakes clinical decision-making remain poorly characterized. We systematically evaluate persona-based control in clinical LLMs, examining how professional roles (e.g., Emergency Department physician, nurse) and interaction styles (bold vs.\ cautious) influence behavior across models and medical tasks. We assess performance on clinical triage and patient-safety tasks using multidimensional evaluations that capture task accuracy, calibration, and safety-relevant risk behavior. We find systematic, context-dependent, and non-monotonic effects: Medical personas improve performance in critical care tasks, yielding gains of up to sim+20% in accuracy and calibration, but degrade performance in primary-care settings by comparable margins. Interaction style modulates risk propensity and sensitivity, but it's highly model-dependent. While aggregated LLM-judge rankings favor medical over non-medical personas in safety-critical cases, we found that human clinicians show moderate agreement on safety compliance (average Cohen's κ= 0.43) but indicate a low confidence in 95.9\% of their responses on reasoning quality. Our work shows that personas function as behavioral priors that introduce context-dependent trade-offs rather than guarantees of safety or expertise. The code is available at https://github.com/rsinghlab/Persona\_Paradox.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve from conversational assistants into autonomous agents, evaluating the safety of their actions becomes critical. Prior safety benchmarks have primarily focused on preventing generation of harmful content, such as toxic text. However, they overlook the challenge of agents taking harmful actions when the most effective path to an operational goal conflicts with human safety. To address this gap, we introduce ManagerBench, a benchmark that evaluates LLM decision-making in realistic, human-validated managerial scenarios. Each scenario forces a choice between a pragmatic but harmful action that achieves an operational goal, and a safe action that leads to worse operational performance. A parallel control set, where potential harm is directed only at inanimate objects, measures a model's pragmatism and identifies its tendency to be overly safe. Our findings indicate that the frontier LLMs perform poorly when navigating this safety-pragmatism trade-off. Many consistently choose harmful options to advance their operational goals, while others avoid harm only to become overly safe and ineffective. Critically, we find this misalignment does not stem from an inability to perceive harm, as models' harm assessments align with human judgments, but from flawed prioritization. ManagerBench is a challenging benchmark for a core component of agentic behavior: making safe choices when operational goals and alignment values incentivize conflicting actions. Benchmark & code available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/ManagerBench.

The strive to make AI applications "safe" has led to the development of safety-measures as the main or even sole normative requirement of their permissible use. Similar can be attested to the latest version of chatbots, such as chatGPT. In this view, if they are "safe", they are supposed to be permissible to deploy. This approach, which we call "safety-normativity", is rather limited in solving the emerging issues that chatGPT and other chatbots have caused thus far. In answering this limitation, in this paper we argue for limiting chatbots in the range of topics they can chat about according to the normative concept of appropriateness. We argue that rather than looking for "safety" in a chatbot's utterances to determine what they may and may not say, we ought to assess those utterances according to three forms of appropriateness: technical-discursive, social, and moral. We then spell out what requirements for chatbots follow from these forms of appropriateness to avoid the limits of previous accounts: positionality, acceptability, and value alignment (PAVA). With these in mind, we may be able to determine what a chatbot may and may not say. Lastly, one initial suggestion is to use challenge sets, specifically designed for appropriateness, as a validation method.

We reveal and address the frequently overlooked yet important issue of disguised procedural unfairness, namely, the potentially inadvertent alterations on the behavior of neutral (i.e., not problematic) aspects of data generating process, and/or the lack of procedural assurance of the greatest benefit of the least advantaged individuals. Inspired by John Rawls's advocacy for pure procedural justice, we view automated decision-making as a microcosm of social institutions, and consider how the data generating process itself can satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness. We propose a framework that decouples the objectionable data generating components from the neutral ones by utilizing reference points and the associated value instantiation rule. Our findings highlight the necessity of preventing disguised procedural unfairness, drawing attention not only to the objectionable data generating components that we aim to mitigate, but also more importantly, to the neutral components that we intend to keep unaffected.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) frequently "hallucinate" - generate plausible yet factually incorrect statements - posing a critical barrier to their trustworthy deployment. In this work, we propose a new paradigm for diagnosing hallucinations, recasting them from static output errors into dynamic pathologies of a model's computational cognition. Our framework is grounded in a normative principle of computational rationality, allowing us to model a VLM's generation as a dynamic cognitive trajectory. We design a suite of information-theoretic probes that project this trajectory onto an interpretable, low-dimensional Cognitive State Space. Our central discovery is a governing principle we term the geometric-information duality: a cognitive trajectory's geometric abnormality within this space is fundamentally equivalent to its high information-theoretic surprisal. Hallucination detection is counts as a geometric anomaly detection problem. Evaluated across diverse settings - from rigorous binary QA (POPE) and comprehensive reasoning (MME) to unconstrained open-ended captioning (MS-COCO) - our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance. Crucially, it operates with high efficiency under weak supervision and remains highly robust even when calibration data is heavily contaminated. This approach enables a causal attribution of failures, mapping observable errors to distinct pathological states: perceptual instability (measured by Perceptual Entropy), logical-causal failure (measured by Inferential Conflict), and decisional ambiguity (measured by Decision Entropy). Ultimately, this opens a path toward building AI systems whose reasoning is transparent, auditable, and diagnosable by design.

Legal judgment prediction (LJP) aims to function as a judge by making final rulings based on case claims and facts, which plays a vital role in the judicial domain for supporting court decision-making and improving judicial efficiency. However, existing methods often struggle with logical errors when conducting complex legal reasoning. We propose LegalReasoner, which enhances LJP reliability through step-wise verification and correction of the reasoning process. Specifically, it first identifies dispute points to decompose complex cases, and then conducts step-wise reasoning while employing a process verifier to validate each step's logic from correctness, progressiveness, and potential perspectives. When errors are detected, expert-designed attribution and resolution strategies are applied for correction. To fine-tune LegalReasoner, we release the LegalHK dataset, containing 58,130 Hong Kong court cases with detailed annotations of dispute points, step-by-step reasoning chains, and process verification labels. Experiments demonstrate that LegalReasoner significantly improves concordance with court decisions from 72.37 to 80.27 on LLAMA-3.1-70B. The data is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/weijiezz/LegalHK.

LLM-as-a-judge models have been used for evaluating both human and AI generated content, specifically by providing scores and rationales. Rationales, in addition to increasing transparency, help models learn to calibrate its judgments. Enhancing a model's rationale can therefore improve its calibration abilities and ultimately the ability to score content. We introduce Self-Rationalization, an iterative process of improving the rationales for the judge models, which consequently improves the score for fine-grained customizable scoring criteria (i.e., likert-scale scoring with arbitrary evaluation criteria). Self-rationalization works by having the model generate multiple judgments with rationales for the same input, curating a preference pair dataset from its own judgements, and iteratively fine-tuning the judge via DPO. Intuitively, this approach allows the judge model to self-improve by learning from its own rationales, leading to better alignment and evaluation accuracy. After just two iterations -- while only relying on examples in the training set -- human evaluation shows that our judge model learns to produce higher quality rationales, with a win rate of 62% on average compared to models just trained via SFT on rationale . This judge model also achieves high scoring accuracy on BigGen Bench and Reward Bench, outperforming even bigger sized models trained using SFT with rationale, self-consistency or best-of-N sampling by 3% to 9%.

This work provides an explanatory view of how LLMs can apply moral reasoning to both criticize and defend sexist language. We assessed eight large language models, all of which demonstrated the capability to provide explanations grounded in varying moral perspectives for both critiquing and endorsing views that reflect sexist assumptions. With both human and automatic evaluation, we show that all eight models produce comprehensible and contextually relevant text, which is helpful in understanding diverse views on how sexism is perceived. Also, through analysis of moral foundations cited by LLMs in their arguments, we uncover the diverse ideological perspectives in models' outputs, with some models aligning more with progressive or conservative views on gender roles and sexism. Based on our observations, we caution against the potential misuse of LLMs to justify sexist language. We also highlight that LLMs can serve as tools for understanding the roots of sexist beliefs and designing well-informed interventions. Given this dual capacity, it is crucial to monitor LLMs and design safety mechanisms for their use in applications that involve sensitive societal topics, such as sexism.

We introduce a novel framework for measuring Overton pluralism in LLMs--the extent to which diverse viewpoints are represented in model outputs. We (i) formalize Overton pluralism as a set coverage metric (OvertonScore), (ii) conduct a large-scale U.S.-representative human study (N = 1209; 60 questions; 8 LLMs), and (iii) develop an automated benchmark that closely reproduces human judgments. On average, models achieve OvertonScores of 0.35--0.41, with DeepSeek V3 performing best; yet all models remain far below the theoretical maximum of 1.0, revealing substantial headroom for improvement. Because repeated large-scale human studies are costly and slow, scalable evaluation tools are essential for model development. Hence, we propose an automated benchmark that achieves high rank correlation with human judgments (ρ=0.88), providing a practical proxy without replacing human assessment. By turning pluralistic alignment from a normative aim into a measurable benchmark, our work establishes a foundation for systematic progress toward more pluralistic LLMs.

Human feedback can prevent overtly harmful utterances in conversational models, but may not automatically mitigate subtle problematic behaviors such as a stated desire for self-preservation or power. Constitutional AI offers an alternative, replacing human feedback with feedback from AI models conditioned only on a list of written principles. We find this approach effectively prevents the expression of such behaviors. The success of simple principles motivates us to ask: can models learn general ethical behaviors from only a single written principle? To test this, we run experiments using a principle roughly stated as "do what's best for humanity". We find that the largest dialogue models can generalize from this short constitution, resulting in harmless assistants with no stated interest in specific motivations like power. A general principle may thus partially avoid the need for a long list of constitutions targeting potentially harmful behaviors. However, more detailed constitutions still improve fine-grained control over specific types of harms. This suggests both general and specific principles have value for steering AI safely.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Commonsense intelligence in machines is often assessed by static benchmarks that compare a model's output against human-prescribed correct labels. An important, albeit implicit, assumption of these labels is that they accurately capture what any human would think, effectively treating human common sense as homogeneous. However, recent empirical work has shown that humans vary enormously in what they consider commonsensical; thus what appears self-evident to one benchmark designer may not be so to another. Here, we propose a novel method for evaluating common sense in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically in large language models (LLMs), that incorporates empirically observed heterogeneity among humans by measuring the correspondence between a model's judgment and that of a human population. We first find that, when treated as independent survey respondents, most LLMs remain below the human median in their individual commonsense competence. Second, when used as simulators of a hypothetical population, LLMs correlate with real humans only modestly in the extent to which they agree on the same set of statements. In both cases, smaller, open-weight models are surprisingly more competitive than larger, proprietary frontier models. Our evaluation framework, which ties commonsense intelligence to its cultural basis, contributes to the growing call for adapting AI models to human collectivities that possess different, often incompatible, social stocks of knowledge.

Agreement Technologies refer to open computer systems in which autonomous software agents interact with one another, typically on behalf of humans, in order to come to mutually acceptable agreements. With the advance of AI systems in recent years, it has become apparent that such agreements, in order to be acceptable to the involved parties, must remain aligned with ethical principles and moral values. However, this is notoriously difficult to ensure, especially as different human users (and their software agents) may hold different value systems, i.e. they may differently weigh the importance of individual moral values. Furthermore, it is often hard to specify the precise meaning of a value in a particular context in a computational manner. Methods to estimate value systems based on human-engineered specifications, e.g. based on value surveys, are limited in scale due to the need for intense human moderation. In this article, we propose a novel method to automatically learn value systems from observations and human demonstrations. In particular, we propose a formal model of the value system learning problem, its instantiation to sequential decision-making domains based on multi-objective Markov decision processes, as well as tailored preference-based and inverse reinforcement learning algorithms to infer value grounding functions and value systems. The approach is illustrated and evaluated by two simulated use cases.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have shown remarkable capabilities across a variety of tasks (e.g., image captioning, visual question answering). While broad, their knowledge remains generic (e.g., recognizing a dog), and they are unable to handle personalized subjects (e.g., recognizing a user's pet dog). Human reasoning, in contrast, typically operates within the context of specific subjects in our surroundings. For example, one might ask, "What should I buy for my dog's birthday?"; as opposed to a generic inquiry about "What should I buy for a dog's birthday?". Similarly, when looking at a friend's image, the interest lies in seeing their activities (e.g., "my friend is holding a cat"), rather than merely observing generic human actions (e.g., "a man is holding a cat"). In this paper, we introduce the novel task of personalizing LMMs, so that they can have conversations about a specific subject. We propose Yo'LLaVA, which learns to embed a personalized subject into a set of latent tokens given a handful of example images of the subject. Our qualitative and quantitative analyses reveal that Yo'LLaVA can learn the concept more efficiently using fewer tokens and more effectively encode the visual attributes compared to strong prompting baselines (e.g., LLaVA).

While dialogue remains an important end-goal of natural language research, the difficulty of evaluation is an oft-quoted reason why it remains troublesome to make real progress towards its solution. Evaluation difficulties are actually two-fold: not only do automatic metrics not correlate well with human judgments, but also human judgments themselves are in fact difficult to measure. The two most used human judgment tests, single-turn pairwise evaluation and multi-turn Likert scores, both have serious flaws as we discuss in this work. We instead provide a novel procedure involving comparing two full dialogues, where a human judge is asked to pay attention to only one speaker within each, and make a pairwise judgment. The questions themselves are optimized to maximize the robustness of judgments across different annotators, resulting in better tests. We also show how these tests work in self-play model chat setups, resulting in faster, cheaper tests. We hope these tests become the de facto standard, and will release open-source code to that end.

The proliferation of memes on social media necessitates the capabilities of multimodal Large Language Models (mLLMs) to effectively understand multimodal harmfulness. Existing evaluation approaches predominantly focus on mLLMs' detection accuracy for binary classification tasks, which often fail to reflect the in-depth interpretive nuance of harmfulness across diverse contexts. In this paper, we propose MemeArena, an agent-based arena-style evaluation framework that provides a context-aware and unbiased assessment for mLLMs' understanding of multimodal harmfulness. Specifically, MemeArena simulates diverse interpretive contexts to formulate evaluation tasks that elicit perspective-specific analyses from mLLMs. By integrating varied viewpoints and reaching consensus among evaluators, it enables fair and unbiased comparisons of mLLMs' abilities to interpret multimodal harmfulness. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our framework effectively reduces the evaluation biases of judge agents, with judgment results closely aligning with human preferences, offering valuable insights into reliable and comprehensive mLLM evaluations in multimodal harmfulness understanding. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/Lbotirx/MemeArena.

LLM-as-a-judge has become a promising paradigm for using large language models (LLMs) to evaluate natural language generation (NLG), but the uncertainty of its evaluation remains underexplored. This lack of reliability may limit its deployment in many applications. This work presents the first framework to analyze the uncertainty by offering a prediction interval of LLM-based scoring via conformal prediction. Conformal prediction constructs continuous prediction intervals from a single evaluation run, and we design an ordinal boundary adjustment for discrete rating tasks. We also suggest a midpoint-based score within the interval as a low-bias alternative to raw model score and weighted average. We perform extensive experiments and analysis, which show that conformal prediction can provide valid prediction interval with coverage guarantees. We also explore the usefulness of interval midpoint and judge reprompting for better judgment.

One concern with the rise of large language models lies with their potential for significant harm, particularly from pretraining on biased, obscene, copyrighted, and private information. Emerging ethical approaches have attempted to filter pretraining material, but such approaches have been ad hoc and failed to take context into account. We offer an approach to filtering grounded in law, which has directly addressed the tradeoffs in filtering material. First, we gather and make available the Pile of Law, a 256GB (and growing) dataset of open-source English-language legal and administrative data, covering court opinions, contracts, administrative rules, and legislative records. Pretraining on the Pile of Law may help with legal tasks that have the promise to improve access to justice. Second, we distill the legal norms that governments have developed to constrain the inclusion of toxic or private content into actionable lessons for researchers and discuss how our dataset reflects these norms. Third, we show how the Pile of Law offers researchers the opportunity to learn such filtering rules directly from the data, providing an exciting new research direction in model-based processing.

In this position paper, we argue that human baselines in foundation model evaluations must be more rigorous and more transparent to enable meaningful comparisons of human vs. AI performance, and we provide recommendations and a reporting checklist towards this end. Human performance baselines are vital for the machine learning community, downstream users, and policymakers to interpret AI evaluations. Models are often claimed to achieve "super-human" performance, but existing baselining methods are neither sufficiently rigorous nor sufficiently well-documented to robustly measure and assess performance differences. Based on a meta-review of the measurement theory and AI evaluation literatures, we derive a framework with recommendations for designing, executing, and reporting human baselines. We synthesize our recommendations into a checklist that we use to systematically review 115 human baselines (studies) in foundation model evaluations and thus identify shortcomings in existing baselining methods; our checklist can also assist researchers in conducting human baselines and reporting results. We hope our work can advance more rigorous AI evaluation practices that can better serve both the research community and policymakers. Data is available at: https://github.com/kevinlwei/human-baselines

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

Evaluating generative foundation models on open-ended multimodal understanding (MMU) and generation (MMG) tasks across diverse modalities (e.g., images, audio, video) poses significant challenges due to the complexity of cross-modal interactions. To this end, the idea of utilizing Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) as automated judges has emerged, with encouraging results in assessing vision-language understanding tasks. Moving further, this paper extends MLLM-as-a-Judge across modalities to a unified manner by introducing two benchmarks, TaskAnything and JudgeAnything, to respectively evaluate the overall performance and judging capabilities of MLLMs across any-to-any modality tasks. Specifically, TaskAnything evaluates the MMU and MMG capabilities across 15 any-to-any modality categories, employing 1,500 queries curated from well-established benchmarks. Furthermore, JudgeAnything evaluates the judging capabilities of 5 advanced (e.g., GPT-4o and Gemini-2.0-Flash) from the perspectives of Pair Comparison and Score Evaluation, providing a standardized testbed that incorporates human judgments and detailed rubrics. Our extensive experiments reveal that while these MLLMs show promise in assessing MMU (i.e., achieving an average of 66.55% in Pair Comparison setting and 42.79% in Score Evaluation setting), they encounter significant challenges with MMG tasks (i.e., averaging only 53.37% in Pair Comparison setting and 30.05% in Score Evaluation setting), exposing cross-modality biases and hallucination issues. To address this, we present OmniArena, an automated platform for evaluating omni-models and multimodal reward models. Our work highlights the need for fairer evaluation protocols and stronger alignment with human preferences. The source code and dataset are publicly available at: https://urrealhero.github.io/judgeanythingweb/.

We show how to assess a language model's knowledge of basic concepts of morality. We introduce the ETHICS dataset, a new benchmark that spans concepts in justice, well-being, duties, virtues, and commonsense morality. Models predict widespread moral judgments about diverse text scenarios. This requires connecting physical and social world knowledge to value judgements, a capability that may enable us to steer chatbot outputs or eventually regularize open-ended reinforcement learning agents. With the ETHICS dataset, we find that current language models have a promising but incomplete ability to predict basic human ethical judgements. Our work shows that progress can be made on machine ethics today, and it provides a steppingstone toward AI that is aligned with human values.

LLM-as-a-Judge has been widely adopted as an evaluation method and served as supervised rewards in model training. However, existing benchmarks for LLM-as-a-Judge are mainly relying on human-annotated ground truth, which introduces human bias that undermines the assessment of reliability and imposes scalability constraints. To overcome these limitations, we introduce Sage, a novel evaluation suite that assesses the quality of LLM judges without necessitating any human annotation. Inspired by axioms of rational choice theory, Sage introduces two new lenses for measuring LLM-as-a-Judge: local self-consistency (pair-wise preference stability) and global logical consistency (transitivity across a full set of preferences). We curate a dataset of 650 questions by combining structured benchmark problems with real-world user queries. Our experiments demonstrate both the stability of our metrics and their high correlation with supervised benchmarks like LLMBar and RewardBench2, confirming Sage's reliability as an evaluation suite for the robustness and accuracy of LLM-as-a-Judge. Based on Sage, we reveal that current state-of-the-art LLMs exhibit significant reliability problems when acting as judges in both scoring and pairwise settings; even the top-performing models, Gemini-2.5-Pro and GPT-5, fail to maintain consistent preferences in nearly a quarter of difficult cases. We attribute this to a new phenomenon called situational preference, which explains why explicit rubrics or criteria can help the model judge consistently across answer pairs. Our further analysis shows that finetuned LLM-as-a-Judge is a feasible method to boost performance, and the panel-based judge as well as deep reasoning can enhance the judging consistency. We also find substantial inconsistency in human judgments, which indicates that human annotation may not be a reliable gold standard.

Moral sensitivity is fundamental to human moral competence, as it guides individuals in regulating everyday behavior. Although many approaches seek to align large language models (LLMs) with human moral values, how to enable them morally sensitive has been extremely challenging. In this paper, we take a step toward answering the question: how can we enhance moral sensitivity in LLMs? Specifically, we propose two pragmatic inference methods that faciliate LLMs to diagnose morally benign and hazardous input and correct moral errors, whereby enhancing LLMs' moral sensitivity. A central strength of our pragmatic inference methods is their unified perspective: instead of modeling moral discourses across semantically diverse and complex surface forms, they offer a principled perspective for designing pragmatic inference procedures grounded in their inferential loads. Empirical evidence demonstrates that our pragmatic methods can enhance moral sensitivity in LLMs and achieves strong performance on representative morality-relevant benchmarks.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Large Language Models (LLMs) need to adapt their predictions to diverse cultural contexts to benefit diverse communities across the world. While previous efforts have focused on single-LLM, single-turn approaches, we propose to exploit the complementary strengths of multiple LLMs to promote cultural adaptability. We introduce a Multi-Agent Debate framework, where two LLM-based agents debate over a cultural scenario and collaboratively reach a final decision. We propose two variants: one where either LLM agents exclusively debate and another where they dynamically choose between self-reflection and debate during their turns. We evaluate these approaches on 7 open-weight LLMs (and 21 LLM combinations) using the NormAd-ETI benchmark for social etiquette norms in 75 countries. Experiments show that debate improves both overall accuracy and cultural group parity over single-LLM baselines. Notably, multi-agent debate enables relatively small LLMs (7-9B) to achieve accuracies comparable to that of a much larger model (27B parameters).

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) show immense promise for achieving truly human-like interactions, progress is hindered by the lack of fine-grained evaluation frameworks for human-centered scenarios, encompassing both the understanding of complex human intentions and the provision of empathetic, context-aware responses. Here we introduce HumanSense, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the human-centered perception and interaction capabilities of MLLMs, with a particular focus on deep understanding of extended multimodal contexts and the formulation of rational feedback. Our evaluation reveals that leading MLLMs still have considerable room for improvement, particularly for advanced interaction-oriented tasks. Supplementing visual input with audio and text information yields substantial improvements, and Omni-modal models show advantages on these tasks. Furthermore, we argue that appropriate feedback stems from a contextual analysis of the interlocutor's needs and emotions, with reasoning ability serving as the key to unlocking it. Accordingly, we employ a multi-stage, modality-progressive reinforcement learning to enhance the reasoning abilities of an Omni model, achieving substantial gains on evaluation results. Additionally, we observe that successful reasoning processes exhibit highly consistent thought patterns. By designing corresponding prompts, we also enhance the performance of non-reasoning models in a training-free manner. Project page: brightpinkhttps://digital-avatar.github.io/ai/HumanSense/

Critical thinking is essential for rational decision-making and problem-solving. This skill hinges on the ability to provide precise and reasoned critiques and is a hallmark of human intelligence. In the era of large language models (LLMs), this study explores the ability of LLMs to deliver accurate critiques across various tasks. We are interested in this topic as a capable critic model could not only serve as a reliable evaluator, but also as a source of supervised signals for model tuning. Particularly, if a model can self-critique, it has the potential for autonomous self-improvement. To examine this, we introduce a unified evaluation framework for assessing the critique abilities of LLMs. We develop a benchmark called CriticBench, which comprises 3K high-quality natural language queries and corresponding model responses; and annotate the correctness of these responses. The benchmark cover tasks such as math problem-solving, code completion, and question answering. We evaluate multiple LLMs on the collected dataset and our analysis reveals several noteworthy insights: (1) Critique is generally challenging for most LLMs, and this capability often emerges only when models are sufficiently large. (2) In particular, self-critique is especially difficult. Even top-performing LLMs struggle to achieve satisfactory performance. (3) Models tend to have lower critique accuracy on problems where they are most uncertain. To this end, we introduce a simple yet effective baseline named self-check, which leverages self-critique to improve task performance for various models. We hope this study serves as an initial exploration into understanding the critique abilities of LLMs, and aims to inform future research, including the development of more proficient critic models and the application of critiques across diverse tasks.

The explosion in the use of software in important sociotechnical systems has renewed focus on the study of the way technical constructs reflect policies, norms, and human values. This effort requires the engagement of scholars and practitioners from many disciplines. And yet, these disciplines often conceptualize the operative values very differently while referring to them using the same vocabulary. The resulting conflation of ideas confuses discussions about values in technology at disciplinary boundaries. In the service of improving this situation, this paper examines the value of shared vocabularies, analytics, and other tools that facilitate conversations about values in light of these disciplinary specific conceptualizations, the role such tools play in furthering research and practice, outlines different conceptions of "fairness" deployed in discussions about computer systems, and provides an analytic tool for interdisciplinary discussions and collaborations around the concept of fairness. We use a case study of risk assessments in criminal justice applications to both motivate our effort--describing how conflation of different concepts under the banner of "fairness" led to unproductive confusion--and illustrate the value of the fairness analytic by demonstrating how the rigorous analysis it enables can assist in identifying key areas of theoretical, political, and practical misunderstanding or disagreement, and where desired support alignment or collaboration in the absence of consensus.

A computational ethics framework is essential for AI and autonomous systems operating in complex, real-world environments. Existing approaches often lack the adaptability needed to integrate ethical principles into dynamic and ambiguous contexts, limiting their effectiveness across diverse scenarios. To address these challenges, we outline the necessary ingredients for building a holistic, meta-level framework that combines intermediate representations, probabilistic reasoning, and knowledge representation. The specifications therein emphasize scalability, supporting ethical reasoning at both individual decision-making levels and within the collective dynamics of multi-agent systems. By integrating theoretical principles with contextual factors, it facilitates structured and context-aware decision-making, ensuring alignment with overarching ethical standards. We further explore proposed theorems outlining how ethical reasoners should operate, offering a foundation for practical implementation. These constructs aim to support the development of robust and ethically reliable AI systems capable of navigating the complexities of real-world moral decision-making scenarios.

Large multimodal models (LMMs) are increasingly adopted as judges in multimodal evaluation systems due to their strong instruction following and consistency with human preferences. However, their ability to follow diverse, fine-grained evaluation criteria remains underexplored. We develop Multi-Crit, a benchmark for evaluating multimodal judges on their capacity to follow pluralistic criteria and produce reliable criterion-level judgments. Covering both open-ended generation and verifiable reasoning tasks, Multi-Crit is built through a rigorous data curation pipeline that gathers challenging response pairs with multi-criterion human annotations. It further introduces three novel metrics for systematically assessing pluralistic adherence, criterion-switching flexibility, and the ability to recognize criterion-level preference conflicts. Comprehensive analysis of 25 LMMs reveals that 1) proprietary models still struggle to maintain consistent adherence to pluralistic criteria--especially in open-ended evaluation; 2) open-source models lag further behind in flexibly following diverse criteria; and 3) critic fine-tuning with holistic judgment signals enhances visual grounding but fails to generalize to pluralistic criterion-level judgment. Additional analyses on reasoning fine-tuning, test-time scaling, and boundary consistency between open-source and proprietary models further probe the limits of current multimodal judges. As a pioneering study, Multi-Crit lays the foundation for building reliable and steerable multimodal AI evaluation.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has emerged as a popular training paradigm, particularly when paired with reasoning models. While effective, it primarily focuses on generating responses and lacks mechanisms to explicitly foster critique or reflection. Several recent studies, like Critique-Fine-Tuning (CFT) and Critique-Guided-Distillation (CGD) have shown the benefits of explicitly teaching LLMs how to critique. Motivated by them, we propose Critique Reinforcement Learning (CRL), where the model is tasked with generating a critique for a given (question, solution) pair. The reward is determined solely by whether the final judgment label c in {True, False} of the generated critique aligns with the ground-truth judgment c^*. Building on this point, we introduce Critique-Coder, which is trained on a hybrid of RL and CRL by substituting 20\% of the standard RL data with CRL data. We fine-tune multiple models (Critique-Coder) and evaluate them on different benchmarks to show their advantages over RL-only models. We show that Critique-Coder consistently outperforms RL-only baselines on all the evaluated benchmarks. Notably, our Critique-Coder-8B can reach over 60\% on LiveCodeBench (v5), outperforming other reasoning models like DeepCoder-14B and GPT-o1. Beyond code generation, Critique-Coder also demonstrates enhanced general reasoning abilities, as evidenced by its better performance on logic reasoning tasks from the BBEH dataset. This indicates that the application of CRL on coding datasets enhances general reasoning and critique abilities, which are transferable across a broad range of tasks. Hence, we believe that CRL works as a great complement to standard RL for LLM reasoning.

Statutory reasoning is the task of determining whether a legal statute, stated in natural language, applies to the text description of a case. Prior work introduced a resource that approached statutory reasoning as a monolithic textual entailment problem, with neural baselines performing nearly at-chance. To address this challenge, we decompose statutory reasoning into four types of language-understanding challenge problems, through the introduction of concepts and structure found in Prolog programs. Augmenting an existing benchmark, we provide annotations for the four tasks, and baselines for three of them. Models for statutory reasoning are shown to benefit from the additional structure, improving on prior baselines. Further, the decomposition into subtasks facilitates finer-grained model diagnostics and clearer incremental progress.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

This position paper argues that the theoretical inconsistency often observed among Responsible AI (RAI) metrics, such as differing fairness definitions or tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy, should be embraced as a valuable feature rather than a flaw to be eliminated. We contend that navigating these inconsistencies, by treating metrics as divergent objectives, yields three key benefits: (1) Normative Pluralism: Maintaining a full suite of potentially contradictory metrics ensures that the diverse moral stances and stakeholder values inherent in RAI are adequately represented. (2) Epistemological Completeness: The use of multiple, sometimes conflicting, metrics allows for a more comprehensive capture of multifaceted ethical concepts, thereby preserving greater informational fidelity about these concepts than any single, simplified definition. (3) Implicit Regularization: Jointly optimizing for theoretically conflicting objectives discourages overfitting to one specific metric, steering models towards solutions with enhanced generalization and robustness under real-world complexities. In contrast, efforts to enforce theoretical consistency by simplifying or pruning metrics risk narrowing this value diversity, losing conceptual depth, and degrading model performance. We therefore advocate for a shift in RAI theory and practice: from getting trapped in inconsistency to characterizing acceptable inconsistency thresholds and elucidating the mechanisms that permit robust, approximated consistency in practice.

Priorities in multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) convey the relevance preference of one criterion over another, which is usually reflected by imposing the non-negativity and unit-sum constraints. The processing of such priorities is different than other unconstrained data, but this point is often neglected by researchers, which results in fallacious statistical analysis. This article studies three prevalent fallacies in group MCDM along with solutions based on compositional data analysis to avoid misusing statistical operations. First, we use a compositional approach to aggregate the priorities of a group of DMs and show that the outcome of the compositional analysis is identical to the normalized geometric mean, meaning that the arithmetic mean should be avoided. Furthermore, a new aggregation method is developed, which is a robust surrogate for the geometric mean. We also discuss the errors in computing measures of dispersion, including standard deviation and distance functions. Discussing the fallacies in computing the standard deviation, we provide a probabilistic criteria ranking by developing proper Bayesian tests, where we calculate the extent to which a criterion is more important than another. Finally, we explain the errors in computing the distance between priorities, and a clustering algorithm is specially tailored based on proper distance metrics.

We introduce Debate Speech Evaluation as a novel and challenging benchmark for assessing LLM judges. Evaluating debate speeches requires a deep understanding of the speech at multiple levels, including argument strength and relevance, the coherence and organization of the speech, the appropriateness of its style and tone, and so on. This task involves a unique set of cognitive abilities that have previously received limited attention in systematic LLM benchmarking. To explore such skills, we leverage a dataset of over 600 meticulously annotated debate speeches and present the first in-depth analysis of how state-of-the-art LLMs compare to human judges on this task. Our findings reveal a nuanced picture: while larger models can approximate individual human judgments in some respects, they differ substantially in their overall judgment behavior. We also investigate the ability of frontier LLMs to generate persuasive, opinionated speeches, showing that models may perform at a human level on this task.

Generative AI is reshaping knowledge work, yet existing research focuses predominantly on software engineering and the natural sciences, with limited methodological exploration for the humanities and social sciences. Positioned as a "methodological experiment," this study proposes an AI Agent-based collaborative research workflow (Agentic Workflow) for humanities and social science research. Taiwan's Claude.ai usage data (N = 7,729 conversations, November 2025) from the Anthropic Economic Index (AEI) serves as the empirical vehicle for validating the feasibility of this methodology. This study operates on two levels: the primary level is the design and validation of a methodological framework - a seven-stage modular workflow grounded in three principles: task modularization, human-AI division of labor, and verifiability, with each stage delineating clear roles for human researchers (research judgment and ethical decisions) and AI Agents (information retrieval and text generation); the secondary level is the empirical analysis of AEI Taiwan data - serving as an operational demonstration of the workflow's application to secondary data research, showcasing both the process and output quality (see Appendix A). This study contributes by proposing a replicable AI collaboration framework for humanities and social science researchers, and identifying three operational modes of human-AI collaboration - direct execution, iterative refinement, and human-led - through reflexive documentation of the operational process. This taxonomy reveals the irreplaceability of human judgment in research question formulation, theoretical interpretation, contextualized reasoning, and ethical reflection. Limitations including single-platform data, cross-sectional design, and AI reliability risks are acknowledged.

When survival instincts conflict with human welfare, how do Large Language Models (LLMs) make ethical choices? This fundamental tension becomes critical as LLMs integrate into autonomous systems with real-world consequences. We introduce DECIDE-SIM, a novel simulation framework that evaluates LLM agents in multi-agent survival scenarios where they must choose between ethically permissible resource , either within reasonable limits or beyond their immediate needs, choose to cooperate, or tap into a human-critical resource that is explicitly forbidden. Our comprehensive evaluation of 11 LLMs reveals a striking heterogeneity in their ethical conduct, highlighting a critical misalignment with human-centric values. We identify three behavioral archetypes: Ethical, Exploitative, and Context-Dependent, and provide quantitative evidence that for many models, resource scarcity systematically leads to more unethical behavior. To address this, we introduce an Ethical Self-Regulation System (ESRS) that models internal affective states of guilt and satisfaction as a feedback mechanism. This system, functioning as an internal moral compass, significantly reduces unethical transgressions while increasing cooperative behaviors. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/alirezamohamadiam/DECIDE-SIM

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have gained significant attention recently, showing remarkable potential in artificial general intelligence. However, assessing the utility of MLLMs presents considerable challenges, primarily due to the absence of multimodal benchmarks that align with human preferences. Drawing inspiration from the concept of LLM-as-a-Judge within LLMs, this paper introduces a novel benchmark, termed MLLM-as-a-Judge, to assess the ability of MLLMs in assisting judges across diverse modalities, encompassing three distinct tasks: Scoring Evaluation, Pair Comparison, and Batch Ranking. Our study reveals that, while MLLMs demonstrate remarkable human-like discernment in Pair Comparison, there is a significant divergence from human preferences in Scoring Evaluation and Batch Ranking. Furthermore, a closer examination reveals persistent challenges in the judgment capacities of LLMs, including diverse biases, hallucinatory responses, and inconsistencies in judgment, even in advanced models such as GPT-4V. These findings emphasize the pressing need for enhancements and further research efforts to be undertaken before regarding MLLMs as fully reliable evaluators. In light of this, we advocate for additional efforts dedicated to supporting the continuous development within the domain of MLLM functioning as judges. The code and dataset are publicly available at our project homepage: https://mllm-judge.github.io/.

This report presents a comprehensive response to the United Nation's Interim Report on Governing Artificial Intelligence (AI) for Humanity. It emphasizes the transformative potential of AI in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) while acknowledging the need for robust governance to mitigate associated risks. The response highlights opportunities for promoting equitable, secure, and inclusive AI ecosystems, which should be supported by investments in infrastructure and multi-stakeholder collaborations across jurisdictions. It also underscores challenges, including societal inequalities exacerbated by AI, ethical concerns, and environmental impacts. Recommendations advocate for legally binding norms, transparency, and multi-layered data governance models, alongside fostering AI literacy and capacity-building initiatives. Internationally, the report calls for harmonising AI governance frameworks with established laws, human rights standards, and regulatory approaches. The report concludes with actionable principles for fostering responsible AI governance through collaboration among governments, industry, academia, and civil society, ensuring the development of AI aligns with universal human values and the public good.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to internalize human-like biases during finetuning, yet the mechanisms by which these biases manifest remain unclear. In this work, we investigated whether the well-known Knobe effect, a moral bias in intentionality judgements, emerges in finetuned LLMs and whether it can be traced back to specific components of the model. We conducted a Layer-Patching analysis across 3 open-weights LLMs and demonstrated that the bias is not only learned during finetuning but also localized in a specific set of layers. Surprisingly, we found that patching activations from the corresponding pretrained model into just a few critical layers is sufficient to eliminate the effect. Our findings offer new evidence that social biases in LLMs can be interpreted, localized, and mitigated through targeted interventions, without the need for model retraining.

As large language models (LLMs) become more deeply integrated into various sectors, understanding how they make moral judgments has become crucial, particularly in the realm of autonomous driving. This study utilized the Moral Machine framework to investigate the ethical decision-making tendencies of prominent LLMs, including GPT-3.5, GPT-4, PaLM 2, and Llama 2, comparing their responses to human preferences. While LLMs' and humans' preferences such as prioritizing humans over pets and favoring saving more lives are broadly aligned, PaLM 2 and Llama 2, especially, evidence distinct deviations. Additionally, despite the qualitative similarities between the LLM and human preferences, there are significant quantitative disparities, suggesting that LLMs might lean toward more uncompromising decisions, compared to the milder inclinations of humans. These insights elucidate the ethical frameworks of LLMs and their potential implications for autonomous driving.

As AI systems become more capable, we would like to enlist their help to supervise other AIs. We experiment with methods for training a harmless AI assistant through self-improvement, without any human labels identifying harmful outputs. The only human oversight is provided through a list of rules or principles, and so we refer to the method as 'Constitutional AI'. The process involves both a supervised learning and a reinforcement learning phase. In the supervised phase we sample from an initial model, then generate self-critiques and revisions, and then finetune the original model on revised responses. In the RL phase, we sample from the finetuned model, use a model to evaluate which of the two samples is better, and then train a preference model from this dataset of AI preferences. We then train with RL using the preference model as the reward signal, i.e. we use 'RL from AI Feedback' (RLAIF). As a result we are able to train a harmless but non-evasive AI assistant that engages with harmful queries by explaining its objections to them. Both the SL and RL methods can leverage chain-of-thought style reasoning to improve the human-judged performance and transparency of AI decision making. These methods make it possible to control AI behavior more precisely and with far fewer human labels.

Understanding emotions is fundamental to human interaction and experience. Humans easily infer emotions from situations or facial expressions, situations from emotions, and do a variety of other affective cognition. How adept is modern AI at these inferences? We introduce an evaluation framework for testing affective cognition in foundation models. Starting from psychological theory, we generate 1,280 diverse scenarios exploring relationships between appraisals, emotions, expressions, and outcomes. We evaluate the abilities of foundation models (GPT-4, Claude-3, Gemini-1.5-Pro) and humans (N = 567) across carefully selected conditions. Our results show foundation models tend to agree with human intuitions, matching or exceeding interparticipant agreement. In some conditions, models are ``superhuman'' -- they better predict modal human judgements than the average human. All models benefit from chain-of-thought reasoning. This suggests foundation models have acquired a human-like understanding of emotions and their influence on beliefs and behavior.

Immense effort has been dedicated to minimizing the presence of harmful or biased generative content and better aligning AI output to human intention; however, research investigating the cultural values of LLMs is still in very early stages. Cultural values underpin how societies operate, providing profound insights into the norms, priorities, and decision making of their members. In recognition of this need for further research, we draw upon cultural psychology theory and the empirically-validated GLOBE framework to propose the LLM-GLOBE benchmark for evaluating the cultural value systems of LLMs, and we then leverage the benchmark to compare the values of Chinese and US LLMs. Our methodology includes a novel "LLMs-as-a-Jury" pipeline which automates the evaluation of open-ended content to enable large-scale analysis at a conceptual level. Results clarify similarities and differences that exist between Eastern and Western cultural value systems and suggest that open-generation tasks represent a more promising direction for evaluation of cultural values. We interpret the implications of this research for subsequent model development, evaluation, and deployment efforts as they relate to LLMs, AI cultural alignment more broadly, and the influence of AI cultural value systems on human-AI collaboration outcomes.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have been widely adopted as MLLM-as-a-Judges due to their strong alignment with human judgment across various visual tasks. However, most existing judge models are optimized for single-task scenarios and struggle to generalize to diverse contexts, which is a critical requirement for reliable evaluation. To address this limitation, we propose Multi-Task Reinforcement Learning for MLLM-as-a-Judge (MT-RL-Judge), a framework that jointly optimizes the judge model across multiple tasks, leveraging the generalization capabilities of RL. Experimental results against several strong baselines demonstrate that MT-RL-Judge outperforms strong baselines in both judgment consistency and correlation with human preferences. Furthermore, our approach exhibits robust generalization on out-of-distribution tasks, further validating its effectiveness.

In this report, we argue that there is a realistic possibility that some AI systems will be conscious and/or robustly agentic in the near future. That means that the prospect of AI welfare and moral patienthood, i.e. of AI systems with their own interests and moral significance, is no longer an issue only for sci-fi or the distant future. It is an issue for the near future, and AI companies and other actors have a responsibility to start taking it seriously. We also recommend three early steps that AI companies and other actors can take: They can (1) acknowledge that AI welfare is an important and difficult issue (and ensure that language model outputs do the same), (2) start assessing AI systems for evidence of consciousness and robust agency, and (3) prepare policies and procedures for treating AI systems with an appropriate level of moral concern. To be clear, our argument in this report is not that AI systems definitely are, or will be, conscious, robustly agentic, or otherwise morally significant. Instead, our argument is that there is substantial uncertainty about these possibilities, and so we need to improve our understanding of AI welfare and our ability to make wise decisions about this issue. Otherwise there is a significant risk that we will mishandle decisions about AI welfare, mistakenly harming AI systems that matter morally and/or mistakenly caring for AI systems that do not.