Daily Papers

This study proposes a behaviorally-informed multi-factor stock selection framework that integrates short-cycle technical alpha signals with deep learning. We design a dual-task multilayer perceptron (MLP) that jointly predicts five-day future returns and directional price movements, thereby capturing nonlinear market behaviors such as volume-price divergence, momentum-driven herding, and bottom reversals. The model is trained on 40 carefully constructed factors derived from price-volume patterns and behavioral finance insights. Empirical evaluation demonstrates that the dual-task MLP achieves superior and stable performance across both predictive accuracy and economic relevance, as measured by information coefficient (IC), information ratio (IR), and portfolio backtesting results. Comparative experiments further show that deep learning methods outperform linear baselines by effectively capturing structural interactions between factors. This work highlights the potential of structure-aware deep learning in enhancing multi-factor modeling and provides a practical framework for short-horizon quantitative investment strategies.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

We present a framework for hedging a portfolio of derivatives in the presence of market frictions such as transaction costs, market impact, liquidity constraints or risk limits using modern deep reinforcement machine learning methods. We discuss how standard reinforcement learning methods can be applied to non-linear reward structures, i.e. in our case convex risk measures. As a general contribution to the use of deep learning for stochastic processes, we also show that the set of constrained trading strategies used by our algorithm is large enough to ε-approximate any optimal solution. Our algorithm can be implemented efficiently even in high-dimensional situations using modern machine learning tools. Its structure does not depend on specific market dynamics, and generalizes across hedging instruments including the use of liquid derivatives. Its computational performance is largely invariant in the size of the portfolio as it depends mainly on the number of hedging instruments available. We illustrate our approach by showing the effect on hedging under transaction costs in a synthetic market driven by the Heston model, where we outperform the standard "complete market" solution.

Most economic theories typically assume that financial market participants are fully rational individuals and use mathematical models to simulate human behavior in financial markets. However, human behavior is often not entirely rational and is challenging to predict accurately with mathematical models. In this paper, we propose Agent-based Simulated Financial Market (ASFM), which first constructs a simulated stock market with a real order matching system. Then, we propose a large language model based agent as the stock trader, which contains the profile, observation, and tool-learning based action module. The trading agent can comprehensively understand current market dynamics and financial policy information, and make decisions that align with their trading strategy. In the experiments, we first verify that the reactions of our ASFM are consistent with the real stock market in two controllable scenarios. In addition, we also conduct experiments in two popular economics research directions, and we find that conclusions drawn in our \model align with the preliminary findings in economics research. Based on these observations, we believe our proposed ASFM provides a new paradigm for economic research.

We present a new approach to formulating and solving heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk. We replace the cross-sectional distribution with low-dimensional prices as state variables and let agents learn equilibrium price dynamics directly from simulated paths. To do so, we introduce a structural reinforcement learning (SRL) method which treats prices via simulation while exploiting agents' structural knowledge of their own individual dynamics. Our SRL method yields a general and highly efficient global solution method for heterogeneous agent models that sidesteps the Master equation and handles problems traditional methods struggle with, in particular nontrivial market-clearing conditions. We illustrate the approach in the Krusell-Smith model, the Huggett model with aggregate shocks, and a HANK model with a forward-looking Phillips curve, all of which we solve globally within minutes.

Systemic financial risk refers to the simultaneous failure or destabilization of multiple financial institutions, often triggered by contagion mechanisms or common exposures to shocks. In this paper, we present a dynamical model of bank leverage (the ratio of asset holdings to equity) a quantity that both reflects and drives risk dynamics. We model how banks, constrained by Value-at-Risk (VaR) regulations, adjust their leverage in response to changes in the price of a single asset, assumed to be held in fixed proportion across banks. This leverage-targeting behavior introduces a procyclical feedback loop between asset prices and leverage. In the dynamics, this can manifest as logistic-like behavior with a rich bifurcation structure across model parameters. By analyzing these coupled dynamics in both isolated and interconnected bank models, we outline a framework for understanding how systemic risk can emerge from seemingly rational micro-level behavior.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

Online marketplaces will be transformed by autonomous AI agents acting on behalf of consumers. Rather than humans browsing and clicking, vision-language-model (VLM) agents can parse webpages, evaluate products, and transact. This raises a fundamental question: what do AI agents buy, and why? We develop ACES, a sandbox environment that pairs a platform-agnostic VLM agent with a fully programmable mock marketplace to study this question. We first conduct basic rationality checks in the context of simple tasks, and then, by randomizing product positions, prices, ratings, reviews, sponsored tags, and platform endorsements, we obtain causal estimates of how frontier VLMs actually shop. Models show strong but heterogeneous position effects: all favor the top row, yet different models prefer different columns, undermining the assumption of a universal "top" rank. They penalize sponsored tags and reward endorsements. Sensitivities to price, ratings, and reviews are directionally human-like but vary sharply in magnitude across models. Motivated by scenarios where sellers use AI agents to optimize product listings, we show that a seller-side agent that makes minor tweaks to product descriptions, targeting AI buyer preferences, can deliver substantial market-share gains if AI-mediated shopping dominates. We also find that modal product choices can differ across models and, in some cases, demand may concentrate on a few select products, raising competition questions. Together, our results illuminate how AI agents may behave in e-commerce settings and surface concrete seller strategy, platform design, and regulatory questions in an AI-mediated ecosystem.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

The inherent volatility and dynamic fluctuations within the financial stock market underscore the necessity for investors to employ a comprehensive and reliable approach that integrates risk management strategies, market trends, and the movement trends of individual securities. By evaluating specific data, investors can make more informed decisions. However, the current body of literature lacks substantial evidence supporting the practical efficacy of reinforcement learning (RL) agents, as many models have only demonstrated success in back testing using historical data. This highlights the urgent need for a more advanced methodology capable of addressing these challenges. There is a significant disconnect in the effective utilization of financial indicators to better understand the potential market trends of individual securities. The disclosure of successful trading strategies is often restricted within financial markets, resulting in a scarcity of widely documented and published strategies leveraging RL. Furthermore, current research frequently overlooks the identification of financial indicators correlated with various market trends and their potential advantages. This research endeavors to address these complexities by enhancing the ability of RL agents to effectively differentiate between positive and negative buy/sell actions using financial indicators. While we do not address all concerns, this paper provides deeper insights and commentary on the utilization of technical indicators and their benefits within reinforcement learning. This work establishes a foundational framework for further exploration and investigation of more complex scenarios.

Using a large-scale Deep Learning approach applied to a high-frequency database containing billions of electronic market quotes and transactions for US equities, we uncover nonparametric evidence for the existence of a universal and stationary price formation mechanism relating the dynamics of supply and demand for a stock, as revealed through the order book, to subsequent variations in its market price. We assess the model by testing its out-of-sample predictions for the direction of price moves given the history of price and order flow, across a wide range of stocks and time periods. The universal price formation model is shown to exhibit a remarkably stable out-of-sample prediction accuracy across time, for a wide range of stocks from different sectors. Interestingly, these results also hold for stocks which are not part of the training sample, showing that the relations captured by the model are universal and not asset-specific. The universal model --- trained on data from all stocks --- outperforms, in terms of out-of-sample prediction accuracy, asset-specific linear and nonlinear models trained on time series of any given stock, showing that the universal nature of price formation weighs in favour of pooling together financial data from various stocks, rather than designing asset- or sector-specific models as commonly done. Standard data normalizations based on volatility, price level or average spread, or partitioning the training data into sectors or categories such as large/small tick stocks, do not improve training results. On the other hand, inclusion of price and order flow history over many past observations is shown to improve forecasting performance, showing evidence of path-dependence in price dynamics.

We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions coupled with shared policy learning constitutes an efficient solution to this problem. By playing against each other, our deep-reinforcement-learning-driven agents learn emergent behaviors relative to a wide spectrum of objectives encompassing profit-and-loss, optimal execution and market share. In particular, we find that liquidity providers naturally learn to balance hedging and skewing, where skewing refers to setting their buy and sell prices asymmetrically as a function of their inventory. We further introduce a novel RL-based calibration algorithm which we found performed well at imposing constraints on the game equilibrium. On the theoretical side, we are able to show convergence rates for our multi-agent policy gradient algorithm under a transitivity assumption, closely related to generalized ordinal potential games.

In many real-world sequential decision-making problems, an action does not immediately reflect on the feedback and spreads its effects over a long time frame. For instance, in online advertising, investing in a platform produces an instantaneous increase of awareness, but the actual reward, i.e., a conversion, might occur far in the future. Furthermore, whether a conversion takes place depends on: how fast the awareness grows, its vanishing effects, and the synergy or interference with other advertising platforms. Previous work has investigated the Multi-Armed Bandit framework with the possibility of delayed and aggregated feedback, without a particular structure on how an action propagates in the future, disregarding possible dynamical effects. In this paper, we introduce a novel setting, the Dynamical Linear Bandits (DLB), an extension of the linear bandits characterized by a hidden state. When an action is performed, the learner observes a noisy reward whose mean is a linear function of the hidden state and of the action. Then, the hidden state evolves according to linear dynamics, affected by the performed action too. We start by introducing the setting, discussing the notion of optimal policy, and deriving an expected regret lower bound. Then, we provide an optimistic regret minimization algorithm, Dynamical Linear Upper Confidence Bound (DynLin-UCB), that suffers an expected regret of order mathcal{O} Big( d sqrt{T}{(1-rho)^{3/2}} Big), where rho is a measure of the stability of the system, and d is the dimension of the action vector. Finally, we conduct a numerical validation on a synthetic environment and on real-world data to show the effectiveness of DynLin-UCB in comparison with several baselines.

The study of social emergence has long been a central focus in social science. Traditional modeling approaches, such as rule-based Agent-Based Models (ABMs), struggle to capture the diversity and complexity of human behavior, particularly the irrational factors emphasized in behavioral economics. Recently, large language model (LLM) agents have gained traction as simulation tools for modeling human behavior in social science and role-playing applications. Studies suggest that LLMs can account for cognitive biases, emotional fluctuations, and other non-rational influences, enabling more realistic simulations of socio-economic dynamics. In this work, we introduce TwinMarket, a novel multi-agent framework that leverages LLMs to simulate socio-economic systems. Specifically, we examine how individual behaviors, through interactions and feedback mechanisms, give rise to collective dynamics and emergent phenomena. Through experiments in a simulated stock market environment, we demonstrate how individual actions can trigger group behaviors, leading to emergent outcomes such as financial bubbles and recessions. Our approach provides valuable insights into the complex interplay between individual decision-making and collective socio-economic patterns.

We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients -- an informed trader and an uniformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker. The informed trader and the broker maximise expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders. We characterise the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We solve this system explicitly and study the effect of information, profitability, and inventory control in the trading strategies of the broker and the informed trader.

This paper sets forth a framework for deep reinforcement learning as applied to market making (DRLMM) for cryptocurrencies. Two advanced policy gradient-based algorithms were selected as agents to interact with an environment that represents the observation space through limit order book data, and order flow arrival statistics. Within the experiment, a forward-feed neural network is used as the function approximator and two reward functions are compared. The performance of each combination of agent and reward function is evaluated by daily and average trade returns. Using this DRLMM framework, this paper demonstrates the effectiveness of deep reinforcement learning in solving stochastic inventory control challenges market makers face.

Dynamic pricing in retail requires policies that adapt to shifting demand while coordinating decisions across related products. We present a systematic empirical study of multi-agent reinforcement learning for retail price optimization, comparing a strong MAPPO baseline with a graph-attention-augmented variant (MAPPO+GAT) that leverages learned interactions among products. Using a simulated pricing environment derived from real transaction data, we evaluate profit, stability across random seeds, fairness across products, and training efficiency under a standardized evaluation protocol. The results indicate that MAPPO provides a robust and reproducible foundation for portfolio-level price control, and that MAPPO+GAT further enhances performance by sharing information over the product graph without inducing excessive price volatility. These results indicate that graph-integrated MARL provides a more scalable and stable solution than independent learners for dynamic retail pricing, offering practical advantages in multi-product decision-making.

Price responsiveness is a major feature of end use customers (EUCs) that participate in demand response (DR) programs, and has been conventionally modeled with static demand functions, which take the electricity price as the input and the aggregate energy consumption as the output. This, however, neglects the inherent temporal correlation of the EUC behaviors, and may result in large errors when predicting the actual responses of EUCs in real-time pricing (RTP) programs. In this paper, we propose a dynamical DR model so as to capture the temporal behavior of the EUCs. The states in the proposed dynamical DR model can be explicitly chosen, in which case the model can be represented by a linear function or a multi-layer feedforward neural network, or implicitly chosen, in which case the model can be represented by a recurrent neural network or a long short-term memory unit network. In both cases, the dynamical DR model can be learned from historical price and energy consumption data. Numerical simulation illustrated how the states are chosen and also showed the proposed dynamical DR model significantly outperforms the static ones.

We propose a machine learning-based extension of the classical binomial option pricing model that incorporates key market microstructure effects. Traditional models assume frictionless markets, overlooking empirical features such as bid-ask spreads, discrete price movements, and serial return correlations. Our framework augments the binomial tree with path-dependent transition probabilities estimated via Random Forest classifiers trained on high-frequency market data. This approach preserves no-arbitrage conditions while embedding real-world trading dynamics into the pricing model. Using 46,655 minute-level observations of SPY from January to June 2025, we achieve an AUC of 88.25% in forecasting one-step price movements. Order flow imbalance is identified as the most influential predictor, contributing 43.2% to feature importance. After resolving time-scaling inconsistencies in tree construction, our model yields option prices that deviate by 13.79% from Black-Scholes benchmarks, highlighting the impact of microstructure on fair value estimation. While computational limitations restrict the model to short-term derivatives, our results offer a robust, data-driven alternative to classical pricing methods grounded in empirical market behavior.

Online inclusive financial services encounter significant financial risks due to their expansive user base and low default costs. By real-world practice, we reveal that utilizing longer-term user payment behaviors can enhance models' ability to forecast financial risks. However, learning long behavior sequences is non-trivial for deep sequential models. Additionally, the diverse fields of payment behaviors carry rich information, requiring thorough exploitation. These factors collectively complicate the task of long-term user behavior modeling. To tackle these challenges, we propose a Long-term Payment Behavior Sequence Folding method, referred to as LBSF. In LBSF, payment behavior sequences are folded based on merchants, using the merchant field as an intrinsic grouping criterion, which enables informative parallelism without reliance on external knowledge. Meanwhile, we maximize the utility of payment details through a multi-field behavior encoding mechanism. Subsequently, behavior aggregation at the merchant level followed by relational learning across merchants facilitates comprehensive user financial representation. We evaluate LBSF on the financial risk assessment task using a large-scale real-world dataset. The results demonstrate that folding long behavior sequences based on internal behavioral cues effectively models long-term patterns and changes, thereby generating more accurate user financial profiles for practical applications.

This paper develops a comprehensive theoretical framework that imports concepts from stochastic thermodynamics to model price impact and characterize the feasibility of round-trip arbitrage in financial markets. A trading cycle is treated as a non-equilibrium thermodynamic process, where price impact represents dissipative work and market noise plays the role of thermal fluctuations. The paper proves a Financial Second Law: under general convex impact functionals, any round-trip trading strategy yields non-positive expected profit. This structural constraint is complemented by a fluctuation theorem that bounds the probability of profitable cycles in terms of dissipated work and market volatility. The framework introduces a statistical ensemble of trading strategies governed by a Gibbs measure, leading to a free energy decomposition that connects expected cost, strategy entropy, and a market temperature parameter. The framework provides rigorous, testable inequalities linking microstructural impact to macroscopic no-arbitrage conditions, offering a novel physics-inspired perspective on market efficiency. The paper derives explicit analytical results for prototypical trading strategies and discusses empirical validation protocols.

This paper explores neural network-based approaches for algorithmic trading in cryptocurrency markets. Our approach combines multi-timeframe trend analysis with high-frequency direction prediction networks, achieving positive risk-adjusted returns through statistical modeling and systematic market exploitation. The system integrates diverse data sources including market data, on-chain metrics, and orderbook dynamics, translating these into unified buy/sell pressure signals. We demonstrate how machine learning models can effectively capture cross-timeframe relationships, enabling sub-second trading decisions with statistical confidence.

The realm of High-Frequency Trading (HFT) is characterized by rapid decision-making processes that capitalize on fleeting market inefficiencies. As the financial markets become increasingly competitive, there is a pressing need for innovative strategies that can adapt and evolve with changing market dynamics. Enter Reinforcement Learning (RL), a branch of machine learning where agents learn by interacting with their environment, making it an intriguing candidate for HFT applications. This paper dives deep into the integration of RL in statistical arbitrage strategies tailored for HFT scenarios. By leveraging the adaptive learning capabilities of RL, we explore its potential to unearth patterns and devise trading strategies that traditional methods might overlook. We delve into the intricate exploration-exploitation trade-offs inherent in RL and how they manifest in the volatile world of HFT. Furthermore, we confront the challenges of applying RL in non-stationary environments, typical of financial markets, and investigate methodologies to mitigate associated risks. Through extensive simulations and backtests, our research reveals that RL not only enhances the adaptability of trading strategies but also shows promise in improving profitability metrics and risk-adjusted returns. This paper, therefore, positions RL as a pivotal tool for the next generation of HFT-based statistical arbitrage, offering insights for both researchers and practitioners in the field.

The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.

We develop policy gradients methods for stochastic control with exit time in a model-free setting. We propose two types of algorithms for learning either directly the optimal policy or by learning alternately the value function (critic) and the optimal control (actor). The use of randomized policies is crucial for overcoming notably the issue related to the exit time in the gradient computation. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by implementing our numerical schemes in the application to the problem of share repurchase pricing. Our results show that the proposed policy gradient methods outperform PDE or other neural networks techniques in a model-based setting. Furthermore, our algorithms are flexible enough to incorporate realistic market conditions like e.g. price impact or transaction costs.

Financial markets are complex systems characterized by high statistical noise, nonlinearity, and constant evolution. Thus, modeling them is extremely hard. We address the task of generating realistic and responsive Limit Order Book (LOB) market simulations, which are fundamental for calibrating and testing trading strategies, performing market impact experiments, and generating synthetic market data. Previous works lack realism, usefulness, and responsiveness of the generated simulations. To bridge this gap, we propose a novel TRAnsformer-based Denoising Diffusion Probabilistic Engine for LOB Simulations (TRADES). TRADES generates realistic order flows conditioned on the state of the market, leveraging a transformer-based architecture that captures the temporal and spatial characteristics of high-frequency market data. There is a notable absence of quantitative metrics for evaluating generative market simulation models in the literature. To tackle this problem, we adapt the predictive score, a metric measured as an MAE, by training a stock price predictive model on synthetic data and testing it on real data. We compare TRADES with previous works on two stocks, reporting an x3.27 and x3.47 improvement over SoTA according to the predictive score, demonstrating that we generate useful synthetic market data for financial downstream tasks. We assess TRADES's market simulation realism and responsiveness, showing that it effectively learns the conditional data distribution and successfully reacts to an experimental agent, giving sprout to possible calibrations and evaluations of trading strategies and market impact experiments. We developed DeepMarket, the first open-source Python framework for market simulation with deep learning. Our repository includes a synthetic LOB dataset composed of TRADES's generates simulations. We release the code at github.com/LeonardoBerti00/DeepMarket.

Risk-averse reinforcement learning finds application in various high-stakes fields. Unlike classical reinforcement learning, which aims to maximize expected returns, risk-averse agents choose policies that minimize risk, occasionally sacrificing expected value. These preferences can be framed through utility theory. We focus on the specific case of the exponential utility function, where we can derive the Bellman equations and employ various reinforcement learning algorithms with few modifications. However, these methods suffer from numerical instability due to the need for exponent computation throughout the process. To address this, we introduce a numerically stable and mathematically sound loss function based on the Itakura-Saito divergence for learning state-value and action-value functions. We evaluate our proposed loss function against established alternatives, both theoretically and empirically. In the experimental section, we explore multiple financial scenarios, some with known analytical solutions, and show that our loss function outperforms the alternatives.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

In this research, we have empirically investigated the key drivers affecting liquidity in equity markets. We illustrated how theoretical models, such as Kyle's model, of agents' interplay in the financial markets, are aligned with the phenomena observed in publicly available trades and quotes data. Specifically, we confirmed that for small signed order-flows, the price impact grows linearly with increase in the order-flow imbalance. We have, further, implemented a machine learning algorithm to forecast market impact given a signed order-flow. Our findings suggest that machine learning models can be used in estimation of financial variables; and predictive accuracy of such learning algorithms can surpass the performance of traditional statistical approaches. Understanding the determinants of price impact is crucial for several reasons. From a theoretical stance, modelling the impact provides a statistical measure of liquidity. Practitioners adopt impact models as a pre-trade tool to estimate expected transaction costs and optimize the execution of their strategies. This further serves as a post-trade valuation benchmark as suboptimal execution can significantly deteriorate a portfolio performance. More broadly, the price impact reflects the balance of liquidity across markets. This is of central importance to regulators as it provides an all-encompassing explanation of the correlation between market design and systemic risk, enabling regulators to design more stable and efficient markets.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

This paper proposes a reinforcement learning framework that employs Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) to dynamically optimize the weights of multiple large language model (LLM)-generated formulaic alphas for stock trading strategies. Formulaic alphas are mathematically defined trading signals derived from price, volume, sentiment, and other data. Although recent studies have shown that LLMs can generate diverse and effective alphas, a critical challenge lies in how to adaptively integrate them under varying market conditions. To address this gap, we leverage the deepseek-r1-distill-llama-70b model to generate fifty alphas for five major stocks: Apple, HSBC, Pepsi, Toyota, and Tencent, and then use PPO to adjust their weights in real time. Experimental results demonstrate that the PPO-optimized strategy achieves strong returns and high Sharpe ratios across most stocks, outperforming both an equal-weighted alpha portfolio and traditional benchmarks such as the Nikkei 225, S&P 500, and Hang Seng Index. The findings highlight the importance of reinforcement learning in the allocation of alpha weights and show the potential of combining LLM-generated signals with adaptive optimization for robust financial forecasting and trading.

Prediction markets allow users to trade on outcomes of real-world events, but are prone to fragmentation through overlapping questions, implicit equivalences, and hidden contradictions across markets. We present an agentic AI pipeline that autonomously (i) clusters markets into coherent topical groups using natural-language understanding over contract text and metadata, and (ii) identifies within-cluster market pairs whose resolved outcomes exhibit strong dependence, including same-outcome (correlated) and different-outcome (anti-correlated) relationships. Using a historical dataset of resolved markets on Polymarket, we evaluate the accuracy of the agent's relational predictions. We then translate discovered relationships into a simple trading strategy to quantify how these relationships map to actionable signals. Results show that agent-identified relationships achieve roughly 60-70% accuracy, and their induced trading strategies earn about 20% average returns over week-long horizons, highlighting the ability of agentic AI and large language models to uncover latent semantic structure in prediction markets.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

Uplift modeling, vital in online marketing, seeks to accurately measure the impact of various strategies, such as coupons or discounts, on different users by predicting the Individual Treatment Effect (ITE). In an e-commerce setting, user behavior follows a defined sequential chain, including impression, click, and conversion. Marketing strategies exert varied uplift effects at each stage within this chain, impacting metrics like click-through and conversion rate. Despite its utility, existing research has neglected to consider the inter-task across all stages impacts within a specific treatment and has insufficiently utilized the treatment information, potentially introducing substantial bias into subsequent marketing decisions. We identify these two issues as the chain-bias problem and the treatment-unadaptive problem. This paper introduces the Entire Chain UPlift method with context-enhanced learning (ECUP), devised to tackle these issues. ECUP consists of two primary components: 1) the Entire Chain-Enhanced Network, which utilizes user behavior patterns to estimate ITE throughout the entire chain space, models the various impacts of treatments on each task, and integrates task prior information to enhance context awareness across all stages, capturing the impact of treatment on different tasks, and 2) the Treatment-Enhanced Network, which facilitates fine-grained treatment modeling through bit-level feature interactions, thereby enabling adaptive feature adjustment. Extensive experiments on public and industrial datasets validate ECUPs effectiveness. Moreover, ECUP has been deployed on the Meituan food delivery platform, serving millions of daily active users, with the related dataset released for future research.

The recent advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established their potential as autonomous interactive agents. However, they often struggle in strategic games of incomplete information, such as bilateral price negotiation. In this paper, we investigate if Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) can effectively teach LLMs to negotiate. Specifically, we explore the strategic behaviors that emerge during the learning process. We introduce a framework that trains a mid-sized buyer agent against a regulated LLM seller across a wide distribution of real-world products. By grounding reward signals directly in the maximization of economic surplus and strict adherence to private budget constraints, we reveal a novel four-phase strategic evolution. The agent progresses from naive bargaining to using aggressive starting prices, moves through a phase of deadlock, and ultimately develops sophisticated persuasive skills. Our results demonstrate that this verifiable training allows a 30B agent to significantly outperform frontier models over ten times its size in extracting surplus. Furthermore, the trained agent generalizes robustly to stronger counterparties unseen during training and remains effective even when facing hostile, adversarial seller personas.

The intricate dynamics of stock markets have led to extensive research on models that are able to effectively explain their inherent complexities. This study leverages the econometrics literature to explore the dynamic factor model as an interpretable model with sufficient predictive capabilities for capturing essential market phenomena. Although the model has been extensively applied for predictive purposes, this study focuses on analyzing the extracted loadings and common factors as an alternative framework for understanding stock price dynamics. The results reveal novel insights into traditional market theories when applied to the Philippine Stock Exchange using the Kalman method and maximum likelihood estimation, with subsequent validation against the capital asset pricing model. Notably, a one-factor model extracts a common factor representing systematic or market dynamics similar to the composite index, whereas a two-factor model extracts common factors representing market trends and volatility. Furthermore, an application of the model for nowcasting the growth rates of the Philippine gross domestic product highlights the potential of the extracted common factors as viable real-time market indicators, yielding over a 34% decrease in the out-of-sample prediction error. Overall, the results underscore the value of dynamic factor analysis in gaining a deeper understanding of market price movement dynamics.

We study mean field portfolio games under Epstein-Zin preferences, which naturally encompass the classical time-additive power utility as a special case. In a general non-Markovian framework, we establish a uniqueness result by proving a one-to-one correspondence between Nash equilibria and the solutions to a class of BSDEs. A key ingredient in our approach is a necessary stochastic maximum principle tailored to Epstein-Zin utility and a nonlinear transformation. In the deterministic setting, we further derive an explicit closed-form solution for the equilibrium investment and consumption policies.

AI agents are increasingly used in consumer-facing applications to assist with tasks such as product search, negotiation, and transaction execution. In this paper, we explore a future scenario where both consumers and merchants authorize AI agents to fully automate negotiations and transactions. We aim to answer two key questions: (1) Do different LLM agents vary in their ability to secure favorable deals for users? (2) What risks arise from fully automating deal-making with AI agents in consumer markets? To address these questions, we develop an experimental framework that evaluates the performance of various LLM agents in real-world negotiation and transaction settings. Our findings reveal that AI-mediated deal-making is an inherently imbalanced game -- different agents achieve significantly different outcomes for their users. Moreover, behavioral anomalies in LLMs can result in financial losses for both consumers and merchants, such as overspending or accepting unreasonable deals. These results underscore that while automation can improve efficiency, it also introduces substantial risks. Users should exercise caution when delegating business decisions to AI agents.

We propose a general methodology for recovering preference parameters from data on choices and response times. Our methods yield estimates with fast (1/n for n data points) convergence rates when specialized to the popular Drift Diffusion Model (DDM), but are broadly applicable to generalizations of the DDM as well as to alternative models of decision making that make use of response time data. The paper develops an empirical application to an experiment on intertemporal choice, showing that the use of response times delivers predictive accuracy and matters for the estimation of economically relevant parameters.

Auto-bidding plays a crucial role in facilitating online advertising by automatically providing bids for advertisers. Reinforcement learning (RL) has gained popularity for auto-bidding. However, most current RL auto-bidding methods are modeled through the Markovian Decision Process (MDP), which assumes the Markovian state transition. This assumption restricts the ability to perform in long horizon scenarios and makes the model unstable when dealing with highly random online advertising environments. To tackle this issue, this paper introduces AI-Generated Bidding (AIGB), a novel paradigm for auto-bidding through generative modeling. In this paradigm, we propose DiffBid, a conditional diffusion modeling approach for bid generation. DiffBid directly models the correlation between the return and the entire trajectory, effectively avoiding error propagation across time steps in long horizons. Additionally, DiffBid offers a versatile approach for generating trajectories that maximize given targets while adhering to specific constraints. Extensive experiments conducted on the real-world dataset and online A/B test on Alibaba advertising platform demonstrate the effectiveness of DiffBid, achieving 2.81% increase in GMV and 3.36% increase in ROI.

Organizations typically train large models individually. This is costly and time-consuming, particularly for large-scale foundation models. Such vertical production is known to be suboptimal. Inspired by this economic insight, we ask whether it is possible to leverage others' expertise by trading the constituent parts in models, i.e., sets of weights, as if they were market commodities. While recent advances in aligning and interpolating models suggest that doing so may be possible, a number of fundamental questions must be answered to create viable parameter markets. In this work, we address these basic questions, propose a framework containing the infrastructure necessary for market operations to take place, study strategies for exchanging parameters, and offer means for agents to monetize parameters. Excitingly, compared to agents who train siloed models from scratch, we show that it is possible to mutually gain by using the market, even in competitive settings. This suggests that the notion of parameter markets may be a useful paradigm for improving large-scale model training in the future.

Large language models show promise for financial decision-making, yet deploying them as autonomous trading agents raises fundamental challenges: how to adapt instructions when rewards arrive late and obscured by market noise, how to synthesize heterogeneous information streams into coherent decisions, and how to bridge the gap between model outputs and executable market actions. We present ATLAS (Adaptive Trading with LLM AgentS), a unified multi-agent framework that integrates structured information from markets, news, and corporate fundamentals to support robust trading decisions. Within ATLAS, the central trading agent operates in an order-aware action space, ensuring that outputs correspond to executable market orders rather than abstract signals. The agent can incorporate feedback while trading using Adaptive-OPRO, a novel prompt-optimization technique that dynamically adapts the prompt by incorporating real-time, stochastic feedback, leading to increasing performance over time. Across regime-specific equity studies and multiple LLM families, Adaptive-OPRO consistently outperforms fixed prompts, while reflection-based feedback fails to provide systematic gains.

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

Optimal execution is an important problem faced by any trader. Most solutions are based on the assumption of constant market impact, while liquidity is known to be dynamic. Moreover, models with time-varying liquidity typically assume that it is observable, despite the fact that, in reality, it is latent and hard to measure in real time. In this paper we show that the use of Double Deep Q-learning, a form of Reinforcement Learning based on neural networks, is able to learn optimal trading policies when liquidity is time-varying. Specifically, we consider an Almgren-Chriss framework with temporary and permanent impact parameters following several deterministic and stochastic dynamics. Using extensive numerical experiments, we show that the trained algorithm learns the optimal policy when the analytical solution is available, and overcomes benchmarks and approximated solutions when the solution is not available.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.

Signal decay and regime shifts pose recurring challenges for data-driven investment strategies in non-stationary markets. Conventional time-series and machine learning approaches, which rely primarily on historical correlations, often struggle to generalize when the economic environment changes. While large language models (LLMs) offer strong capabilities for processing unstructured information, their potential to support quantitative factor screening through explicit economic reasoning remains underexplored. Existing factor-based methods typically reduce alphas to numerical time series, overlooking the semantic rationale that determines when a factor is economically relevant. We propose Alpha-R1, an 8B-parameter reasoning model trained via reinforcement learning for context-aware alpha screening. Alpha-R1 reasons over factor logic and real-time news to evaluate alpha relevance under changing market conditions, selectively activating or deactivating factors based on contextual consistency. Empirical results across multiple asset pools show that Alpha-R1 consistently outperforms benchmark strategies and exhibits improved robustness to alpha decay. The full implementation and resources are available at https://github.com/FinStep-AI/Alpha-R1.

Macroeconomic data is characterized by a limited number of observations (small T), many time series (big K) but also by featuring temporal dependence. Neural networks, by contrast, are designed for datasets with millions of observations and covariates. In this paper, we develop Bayesian neural networks (BNNs) that are well-suited for handling datasets commonly used for macroeconomic analysis in policy institutions. Our approach avoids extensive specification searches through a novel mixture specification for the activation function that appropriately selects the form of nonlinearities. Shrinkage priors are used to prune the network and force irrelevant neurons to zero. To cope with heteroskedasticity, the BNN is augmented with a stochastic volatility model for the error term. We illustrate how the model can be used in a policy institution by first showing that our different BNNs produce precise density forecasts, typically better than those from other machine learning methods. Finally, we showcase how our model can be used to recover nonlinearities in the reaction of macroeconomic aggregates to financial shocks.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

Prediction markets are used in real life to predict outcomes of interest such as presidential elections. This paper presents a mathematical theory of artificial prediction markets for supervised learning of conditional probability estimators. The artificial prediction market is a novel method for fusing the prediction information of features or trained classifiers, where the fusion result is the contract price on the possible outcomes. The market can be trained online by updating the participants' budgets using training examples. Inspired by the real prediction markets, the equations that govern the market are derived from simple and reasonable assumptions. Efficient numerical algorithms are presented for solving these equations. The obtained artificial prediction market is shown to be a maximum likelihood estimator. It generalizes linear aggregation, existent in boosting and random forest, as well as logistic regression and some kernel methods. Furthermore, the market mechanism allows the aggregation of specialized classifiers that participate only on specific instances. Experimental comparisons show that the artificial prediction markets often outperform random forest and implicit online learning on synthetic data and real UCI datasets. Moreover, an extensive evaluation for pelvic and abdominal lymph node detection in CT data shows that the prediction market improves adaboost's detection rate from 79.6% to 81.2% at 3 false positives/volume.

We present a concise dynamical picture of infant-driven household chaos. The framework has three postulations: recurrent daily chaos, overall entropy growth in household organization, and transient local ordering episodes with switching rules (a volatile Maxwell-demon effect). We illustrate entropy growth with a two-region toy model (organizer vs. play area), where entropy production is nonnegative and long-time behavior is typically play-area dominated. We also model toy diffusion and curiosity-driven behavior, where novelty matters more than punishment in the short term, while gradual learning still occurs.

Predicting click and conversion probabilities when bidding on ad exchanges is at the core of the programmatic advertising industry. Two separated lines of previous works respectively address i) the prediction of user conversion probability and ii) the attribution of these conversions to advertising events (such as clicks) after the fact. We argue that attribution modeling improves the efficiency of the bidding policy in the context of performance advertising. Firstly we explain the inefficiency of the standard bidding policy with respect to attribution. Secondly we learn and utilize an attribution model in the bidder itself and show how it modifies the average bid after a click. Finally we produce evidence of the effectiveness of the proposed method on both offline and online experiments with data spanning several weeks of real traffic from Criteo, a leader in performance advertising.

The development of open benchmarking platforms could greatly accelerate the adoption of AI agents in retail. This paper presents comprehensive simulations of customer shopping behaviors for the purpose of benchmarking reinforcement learning (RL) agents that optimize coupon targeting. The difficulty of this learning problem is largely driven by the sparsity of customer purchase events. We trained agents using offline batch data comprising summarized customer purchase histories to help mitigate this effect. Our experiments revealed that contextual bandit and deep RL methods that are less prone to over-fitting the sparse reward distributions significantly outperform static policies. This study offers a practical framework for simulating AI agents that optimize the entire retail customer journey. It aims to inspire the further development of simulation tools for retail AI systems.

There has been a recent surge in interest in the application of artificial intelligence to automated trading. Reinforcement learning has been applied to single- and multi-instrument use cases, such as market making or portfolio management. This paper proposes a new approach to framing cryptocurrency market making as a reinforcement learning challenge by introducing an event-based environment wherein an event is defined as a change in price greater or less than a given threshold, as opposed to by tick or time-based events (e.g., every minute, hour, day, etc.). Two policy-based agents are trained to learn a market making trading strategy using eight days of training data and evaluate their performance using 30 days of testing data. Limit order book data recorded from Bitmex exchange is used to validate this approach, which demonstrates improved profit and stability compared to a time-based approach for both agents when using a simple multi-layer perceptron neural network for function approximation and seven different reward functions.

This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among traders in a constant-product market-making protocol were modelled using mean field games (MFG), first without transaction costs and then incorporating them. Here we present the formulation of a more complete model that integrates three types of agents: traders, liquidity providers (LPs), and arbitrageurs. While we do not establish existence results for this general model, the formulation identifies the main technical difficulties and lays the groundwork for future work. The LP acts as a dominating player in the sense of 'Mean field games with a dominating player' by Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam: its strategy influences the mean field distribution of the traders, and the equilibrium is sought as a solution to the coupled system of three problems that constitute a Major-Minor game. The arbitrageurs operate by solving the optimization problem presented in "An analysis of uniswap markets" by Angeris et al., and their impact on the LP is captured through the loss-versus-rebalancing of "Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing" by Milionis et al. The material in this article should be read as an open research proposal rather than a collection of closed results.

Market manipulation now routinely originates from coordinated social media campaigns, not isolated trades. Retail investors, regulators, and brokerages need tools that connect online narratives and coordination patterns to market behavior. We present AIMM, an AI-driven framework that fuses Reddit activity, bot and coordination indicators, and OHLCV market features into a daily AIMM Manipulation Risk Score for each ticker. The system uses a parquet-native pipeline with a Streamlit dashboard that allows analysts to explore suspicious windows, inspect underlying posts and price action, and log model outputs over time. Due to Reddit API restrictions, we employ calibrated synthetic social features matching documented event characteristics; market data (OHLCV) uses real historical data from Yahoo Finance. This release makes three contributions. First, we build the AIMM Ground Truth dataset (AIMM-GT): 33 labeled ticker-days spanning eight equities, drawing from SEC enforcement actions, community-verified manipulation cases, and matched normal controls. Second, we implement forward-walk evaluation and prospective prediction logging for both retrospective and deployment-style assessment. Third, we analyze lead times and show that AIMM flagged GME 22 days before the January 2021 squeeze peak. The current labeled set is small (33 ticker-days, 3 positive events), but results show preliminary discriminative capability and early warnings for the GME incident. We release the code, dataset schema, and dashboard design to support research on social media-driven market surveillance.

Computing stable partitions in hedonic games is a challenging task because there exist games in which stable outcomes do not exist. Even more, these No-instances can often be leveraged to prove computational hardness results. We make this impression rigorous in a dynamic model of cardinal hedonic games by providing meta theorems. These imply hardness of deciding about the possible or necessary convergence of deviation dynamics based on the mere existence of No-instances. Our results hold for additively separable, fractional, and modified fractional hedonic games (ASHGs, FHGs, and MFHGs). Moreover, they encompass essentially all reasonable stability notions based on single-agent deviations. In addition, we propose dynamics as a method to find individually rational and contractually individual stable (CIS) partitions in ASHGs. In particular, we find that CIS dynamics from the singleton partition possibly converge after a linear number of deviations but may require an exponential number of deviations in the worst case.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

Although machine learning tasks are highly sensitive to the quality of input data, relevant datasets can often be challenging for firms to acquire, especially when held privately by a variety of owners. For instance, if these owners are competitors in a downstream market, they may be reluctant to share information. Focusing on supervised learning for regression tasks, we develop a regression market to provide a monetary incentive for data sharing. Our mechanism adopts a Bayesian framework, allowing us to consider a more general class of regression tasks. We present a thorough exploration of the market properties, and show that similar proposals in literature expose the market agents to sizeable financial risks, which can be mitigated in our setup.

We develop an econometric framework integrating heavy-tailed Student's t distributions with behavioral probability weighting while preserving infinite divisibility. Using 432{,}752 observations across 86 assets (2004--2024), we demonstrate Student's t specifications outperform Gaussian models in 88.4\% of cases. Bounded probability-weighting transformations preserve mathematical properties required for dynamic pricing. Gaussian models underestimate 99\% Value-at-Risk by 19.7\% versus 3.2\% for our specification. Joint estimation procedures identify tail and behavioral parameters with established asymptotic properties. Results provide robust inference for asset-pricing applications where heavy tails and behavioral distortions coexist.

In this paper, we examine the solvability of a functional equation in a Lipschitz space. As an application, we use our result to determine the existence and uniqueness of solutions to an equation describing a specific type of choice behavior model for the learning process of the paradise fish. Finally, we present some concrete examples where, using numerical techniques, we obtain approximations to the solution of the functional equation. As the straightforward Picard's iteration can be very expensive, we show that an analytical suboptimal least-squares approximation can be chosen in practice, resulting in very good accuracy.

Most recommendation benchmarks evaluate how well a model imitates user behavior. In financial advisory, however, observed actions can be noisy or short-sighted under market volatility and may conflict with a user's long-term goals. Treating what users chose as the sole ground truth, therefore, conflates behavioral imitation with decision quality. We introduce Conv-FinRe, a conversational and longitudinal benchmark for stock recommendation that evaluates LLMs beyond behavior matching. Given an onboarding interview, step-wise market context, and advisory dialogues, models must generate rankings over a fixed investment horizon. Crucially, Conv-FinRe provides multi-view references that distinguish descriptive behavior from normative utility grounded in investor-specific risk preferences, enabling diagnosis of whether an LLM follows rational analysis, mimics user noise, or is driven by market momentum. We build the benchmark from real market data and human decision trajectories, instantiate controlled advisory conversations, and evaluate a suite of state-of-the-art LLMs. Results reveal a persistent tension between rational decision quality and behavioral alignment: models that perform well on utility-based ranking often fail to match user choices, whereas behaviorally aligned models can overfit short-term noise. The dataset is publicly released on Hugging Face, and the codebase is available on GitHub.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in T second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal tilde O(T)-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.

Multi-armed bandits a simple but very powerful framework for algorithms that make decisions over time under uncertainty. An enormous body of work has accumulated over the years, covered in several books and surveys. This book provides a more introductory, textbook-like treatment of the subject. Each chapter tackles a particular line of work, providing a self-contained, teachable technical introduction and a brief review of the further developments; many of the chapters conclude with exercises. The book is structured as follows. The first four chapters are on IID rewards, from the basic model to impossibility results to Bayesian priors to Lipschitz rewards. The next three chapters cover adversarial rewards, from the full-feedback version to adversarial bandits to extensions with linear rewards and combinatorially structured actions. Chapter 8 is on contextual bandits, a middle ground between IID and adversarial bandits in which the change in reward distributions is completely explained by observable contexts. The last three chapters cover connections to economics, from learning in repeated games to bandits with supply/budget constraints to exploration in the presence of incentives. The appendix provides sufficient background on concentration and KL-divergence. The chapters on "bandits with similarity information", "bandits with knapsacks" and "bandits and agents" can also be consumed as standalone surveys on the respective topics.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

In this paper we pursue the question of a fully online trading algorithm (i.e. one that does not need offline training on previously gathered data). For this task we use Double Deep Q-learning in the episodic setting with Fast Learning Networks approximating the expected reward Q. Additionally, we define the possible terminal states of an episode in such a way as to introduce a mechanism to conserve some of the money in the trading pool when market conditions are seen as unfavourable. Some of these money are taken as profit and some are reused at a later time according to certain criteria. After describing the algorithm, we test it using the 1-minute-tick data for Cardano's price on Binance. We see that the agent performs better than trading with randomly chosen actions on each timestep. And it does so when tested on the whole dataset as well as on different subsets, capturing different market trends.

Machine learning models routinely automate decisions in applications like lending and hiring. In such settings, consumer protection rules require companies that deploy models to explain predictions to decision subjects. These rules are motivated, in part, by the belief that explanations can promote recourse by revealing information that individuals can use to contest or improve their outcomes. In practice, many companies comply with these rules by providing individuals with a list of the most important features for their prediction, which they identify based on feature importance scores from feature attribution methods such as SHAP or LIME. In this work, we show how these practices can undermine consumers by highlighting features that would not lead to an improved outcome and by explaining predictions that cannot be changed. We propose to address these issues by highlighting features based on their responsiveness score -- i.e., the probability that an individual can attain a target prediction by changing a specific feature. We develop efficient methods to compute responsiveness scores for any model and any dataset. We conduct an extensive empirical study on the responsiveness of explanations in lending. Our results show that standard practices in consumer finance can backfire by presenting consumers with reasons without recourse, and demonstrate how our approach improves consumer protection by highlighting responsive features and identifying fixed predictions.

The rapid adoption of autonomous AI agents is giving rise to a new economic layer where agents transact and coordinate at scales and speeds beyond direct human oversight. We propose the "sandbox economy" as a framework for analyzing this emergent system, characterizing it along two key dimensions: its origins (emergent vs. intentional) and its degree of separateness from the established human economy (permeable vs. impermeable). Our current trajectory points toward a spontaneous emergence of a vast and highly permeable AI agent economy, presenting us with opportunities for an unprecedented degree of coordination as well as significant challenges, including systemic economic risk and exacerbated inequality. Here we discuss a number of possible design choices that may lead to safely steerable AI agent markets. In particular, we consider auction mechanisms for fair resource allocation and preference resolution, the design of AI "mission economies" to coordinate around achieving collective goals, and socio-technical infrastructure needed to ensure trust, safety, and accountability. By doing this, we argue for the proactive design of steerable agent markets to ensure the coming technological shift aligns with humanity's long-term collective flourishing.

Algorithmic trading requires short-term decisions aligned with long-term financial goals. While reinforcement learning (RL) has been explored for such tactical decisions, its adoption remains limited by myopic behavior and opaque policy rationale. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated strategic reasoning and multi-modal financial signal interpretation when guided by well-designed prompts. We propose a hybrid system where LLMs generate high-level trading strategies to guide RL agents in their actions. We evaluate (i) the rationale of LLM-generated strategies via expert review, and (ii) the Sharpe Ratio (SR) and Maximum Drawdown (MDD) of LLM-guided agents versus unguided baselines. Results show improved return and risk metrics over standard RL.

In the highly volatile and uncertain global financial markets, traditional quantitative trading models relying on statistical modeling or empirical rules often fail to adapt to dynamic market changes and black swan events due to rigid assumptions and limited generalization. To address these issues, this paper proposes QTMRL (Quantitative Trading Multi-Indicator Reinforcement Learning), an intelligent trading agent combining multi-dimensional technical indicators with reinforcement learning (RL) for adaptive and stable portfolio management. We first construct a comprehensive multi-indicator dataset using 23 years of S&P 500 daily OHLCV data (2000-2022) for 16 representative stocks across 5 sectors, enriching raw data with trend, volatility, and momentum indicators to capture holistic market dynamics. Then we design a lightweight RL framework based on the Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) algorithm, including data processing, A2C algorithm, and trading agent modules to support policy learning and actionable trading decisions. Extensive experiments compare QTMRL with 9 baselines (e.g., ARIMA, LSTM, moving average strategies) across diverse market regimes, verifying its superiority in profitability, risk adjustment, and downside risk control. The code of QTMRL is publicly available at https://github.com/ChenJiahaoJNU/QTMRL.git

The global trade in electronic and electrical goods is complicated by the challenge of identifying e-waste, which is often misclassified to evade regulations. Traditional analysis methods struggle to discern the underlying patterns of this illicit trade within vast datasets. This research proposes and validates a robust, data-driven framework to segment products and identify goods exhibiting an anomalous "waste signature" a trade pattern defined by a clear 'inverse price-volume'. The core of the framework is an Outlier-Aware Segmentation method, an iterative K-Means approach that first isolates extreme outliers to prevent data skewing and then re-clusters the remaining products to reveal subtle market segments. To quantify risk, a "Waste Score" is developed using a Logistic Regression model that identifies products whose trade signatures are statistically similar to scrap. The findings reveal a consistent four-tier market hierarchy in both Malaysian and global datasets. A key pattern emerged from a comparative analysis: Malaysia's market structure is defined by high-volume bulk commodities, whereas the global market is shaped by high-value capital goods, indicating a unique national specialization. The framework successfully flags finished goods, such as electric generators (HS 8502), that are traded like scrap, providing a targeted list for regulatory scrutiny.

Reinforcement learning (RL) for continuous control typically employs distributions whose support covers the entire action space. In this work, we investigate the colloquially known phenomenon that trained agents often prefer actions at the boundaries of that space. We draw theoretical connections to the emergence of bang-bang behavior in optimal control, and provide extensive empirical evaluation across a variety of recent RL algorithms. We replace the normal Gaussian by a Bernoulli distribution that solely considers the extremes along each action dimension - a bang-bang controller. Surprisingly, this achieves state-of-the-art performance on several continuous control benchmarks - in contrast to robotic hardware, where energy and maintenance cost affect controller choices. Since exploration, learning,and the final solution are entangled in RL, we provide additional imitation learning experiments to reduce the impact of exploration on our analysis. Finally, we show that our observations generalize to environments that aim to model real-world challenges and evaluate factors to mitigate the emergence of bang-bang solutions. Our findings emphasize challenges for benchmarking continuous control algorithms, particularly in light of potential real-world applications.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is a subfield of machine learning that has been used in many fields, such as robotics, gaming, and autonomous systems. There has been growing interest in using RL for quantitative trading, where the goal is to make trades that generate profits in financial markets. This paper presents the use of RL for quantitative trading and reports a case study based on an RL-based trading algorithm. The results show that RL can be a useful tool for quantitative trading and can perform better than traditional trading algorithms. The use of reinforcement learning for quantitative trading is a promising area of research that can help develop more sophisticated and efficient trading systems. Future research can explore the use of other reinforcement learning techniques, the use of other data sources, and the testing of the system on a range of asset classes. Together, our work shows the potential in the use of reinforcement learning for quantitative trading and the need for further research and development in this area. By developing the sophistication and efficiency of trading systems, it may be possible to make financial markets more efficient and generate higher returns for investors.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Recent AI algorithms are blackbox models whose decisions are difficult to interpret. eXplainable AI (XAI) seeks to address lack of AI interpretability and trust by explaining to customers their AI decision, e.g., decision to reject a loan application. The common wisdom is that regulating AI by mandating fully transparent XAI leads to greater social welfare. This paper challenges this notion through a game theoretic model for a policy-maker who maximizes social welfare, firms in a duopoly competition that maximize profits, and heterogenous consumers. The results show that XAI regulation may be redundant. In fact, mandating fully transparent XAI may make firms and customers worse off. This reveals a trade-off between maximizing welfare and receiving explainable AI outputs. We also discuss managerial implications for policy-maker and firms.

Optimizing user engagement is a key goal for modern recommendation systems, but blindly pushing users towards increased consumption risks burn-out, churn, or even addictive habits. To promote digital well-being, most platforms now offer a service that periodically prompts users to take breaks. These, however, must be set up manually, and so may be suboptimal for both users and the system. In this paper, we study the role of breaks in recommendation, and propose a framework for learning optimal breaking policies that promote and sustain long-term engagement. Based on the notion that recommendation dynamics are susceptible to both positive and negative feedback, we cast recommendation as a Lotka-Volterra dynamical system, where breaking reduces to a problem of optimal control. We then give an efficient learning algorithm, provide theoretical guarantees, and empirically demonstrate the utility of our approach on semi-synthetic data.

Although Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly used in financial trading, it remains unclear whether they can reason and adapt in live markets, as most studies test models instead of agents, cover limited periods and assets, and rely on unverified data. To address these gaps, we introduce Agent Market Arena (AMA), the first lifelong, real-time benchmark for evaluating LLM-based trading agents across multiple markets. AMA integrates verified trading data, expert-checked news, and diverse agent architectures within a unified trading framework, enabling fair and continuous comparison under real conditions. It implements four agents, including InvestorAgent as a single-agent baseline, TradeAgent and HedgeFundAgent with different risk styles, and DeepFundAgent with memory-based reasoning, and evaluates them across GPT-4o, GPT-4.1, Claude-3.5-haiku, Claude-sonnet-4, and Gemini-2.0-flash. Live experiments on both cryptocurrency and stock markets demonstrate that agent frameworks display markedly distinct behavioral patterns, spanning from aggressive risk-taking to conservative decision-making, whereas model backbones contribute less to outcome variation. AMA thus establishes a foundation for rigorous, reproducible, and continuously evolving evaluation of financial reasoning and trading intelligence in LLM-based agents.

We present NNN, an experimental Transformer-based neural network approach to marketing measurement. Unlike Marketing Mix Models (MMMs) which rely on scalar inputs and parametric decay functions, NNN uses rich embeddings to capture both quantitative and qualitative aspects of marketing and organic channels (e.g., search queries, ad creatives). This, combined with its attention mechanism, potentially enables NNN to model complex interactions, capture long-term effects, and improve sales attribution accuracy. We show that L1 regularization permits the use of such expressive models in typical data-constrained settings. Evaluating NNN on simulated and real-world data demonstrates its efficacy, particularly through considerable improvement in predictive power. In addition to marketing measurement, the NNN framework can provide valuable, complementary insights through model probing, such as evaluating keyword or creative effectiveness.

Customers are usually exposed to online digital advertisement channels, such as email marketing, display advertising, paid search engine marketing, along their way to purchase or subscribe products( aka. conversion). The marketers track all the customer journey data and try to measure the effectiveness of each advertising channel. The inference about the influence of each channel plays an important role in budget allocation and inventory pricing decisions. Several simplistic rule-based strategies and data-driven algorithmic strategies have been widely used in marketing field, but they do not address the issues, such as channel interaction, time dependency, user characteristics. In this paper, we propose a novel attribution algorithm based on deep learning to assess the impact of each advertising channel. We present Deep Neural Net With Attention multi-touch attribution model (DNAMTA) model in a supervised learning fashion of predicting if a series of events leads to conversion, and it leads us to have a deep understanding of the dynamic interaction effects between media channels. DNAMTA also incorporates user-context information, such as user demographics and behavior, as control variables to reduce the estimation biases of media effects. We used computational experiment of large real world marketing dataset to demonstrate that our proposed model is superior to existing methods in both conversion prediction and media channel influence evaluation.

Nudges are subtle changes to the way choices are presented to human decision-makers (e.g., opt-in vs. opt-out by default) that shift behavior without restricting options or changing incentives. As AI agents increasingly make decisions in the same environments as humans, the presentation of choices may be optimized for machines as well as people. We introduce mecha-nudges: changes to how choices are presented that systematically influence AI agents without degrading the decision environment for humans. To formalize mecha-nudges, we combine the Bayesian persuasion framework with V-usable information, a generalization of Shannon information that is observer-relative. This yields a common scale (bits of usable information) for comparing a wide range of interventions, contexts, and models. Applying our framework to product listings on Etsy -- a global marketplace for independent sellers -- we find that following ChatGPT's release, listings have significantly more machine-usable information about product selection, consistent with systematic mecha-nudging.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established LLM routing as a standard service delivery mechanism, where users select models based on cost, Quality of Service (QoS), among other things. However, optimal pricing in LLM routing platforms requires precise modeling for dynamic service markets, and solving this problem in real time at scale is computationally intractable. In this paper, we propose \PriLLM, a novel practical and scalable solution for real-time dynamic pricing in competitive LLM routing. \PriLLM models the service market as a Stackelberg game, where providers set prices and users select services based on multiple criteria. To capture real-world market dynamics, we incorporate both objective factors (\eg~cost, QoS) and subjective user preferences into the model. For scalability, we employ a deep aggregation network to learn provider abstraction that preserve user-side equilibrium behavior across pricing strategies. Moreover, \PriLLM offers interpretability by explaining its pricing decisions. Empirical evaluation on real-world data shows that \PriLLM achieves over 95\% of the optimal profit while only requiring less than 5\% of the optimal solution's computation time.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

High-frequency trading (HFT) that executes algorithmic trading in short time scales, has recently occupied the majority of cryptocurrency market. Besides traditional quantitative trading methods, reinforcement learning (RL) has become another appealing approach for HFT due to its terrific ability of handling high-dimensional financial data and solving sophisticated sequential decision-making problems, e.g., hierarchical reinforcement learning (HRL) has shown its promising performance on second-level HFT by training a router to select only one sub-agent from the agent pool to execute the current transaction. However, existing RL methods for HFT still have some defects: 1) standard RL-based trading agents suffer from the overfitting issue, preventing them from making effective policy adjustments based on financial context; 2) due to the rapid changes in market conditions, investment decisions made by an individual agent are usually one-sided and highly biased, which might lead to significant loss in extreme markets. To tackle these problems, we propose a novel Memory Augmented Context-aware Reinforcement learning method On HFT, a.k.a. MacroHFT, which consists of two training phases: 1) we first train multiple types of sub-agents with the market data decomposed according to various financial indicators, specifically market trend and volatility, where each agent owns a conditional adapter to adjust its trading policy according to market conditions; 2) then we train a hyper-agent to mix the decisions from these sub-agents and output a consistently profitable meta-policy to handle rapid market fluctuations, equipped with a memory mechanism to enhance the capability of decision-making. Extensive experiments on various cryptocurrency markets demonstrate that MacroHFT can achieve state-of-the-art performance on minute-level trading tasks.

The emergence and impact of tipping points have garnered significant interest in both the social and natural sciences. Despite widespread recognition of the importance of feedbacks between human and natural systems, it is often assumed that the observed nonlinear dynamics in these coupled systems rests within either underlying human or natural processes, rather than the rates at which they interact. Using adoption of agricultural diversification practices as a case study, we show how two stable management paradigms (one dominated by conventional, homogeneous practices, the other by diversified practices) can emerge purely from temporal feedbacks between human decisions and ecological responses. We explore how this temporal mechanism of tipping points provides insight into designing more effective interventions that promote farmers transitions towards sustainable agriculture. Moreover, our flexible modeling framework could be applied to other cases to provide insight into numerous questions in social-ecological systems research and environmental policy.

Bitcoin, with its ever-growing popularity, has demonstrated extreme price volatility since its origin. This volatility, together with its decentralised nature, make Bitcoin highly subjective to speculative trading as compared to more traditional assets. In this paper, we propose a multimodal model for predicting extreme price fluctuations. This model takes as input a variety of correlated assets, technical indicators, as well as Twitter content. In an in-depth study, we explore whether social media discussions from the general public on Bitcoin have predictive power for extreme price movements. A dataset of 5,000 tweets per day containing the keyword `Bitcoin' was collected from 2015 to 2021. This dataset, called PreBit, is made available online. In our hybrid model, we use sentence-level FinBERT embeddings, pretrained on financial lexicons, so as to capture the full contents of the tweets and feed it to the model in an understandable way. By combining these embeddings with a Convolutional Neural Network, we built a predictive model for significant market movements. The final multimodal ensemble model includes this NLP model together with a model based on candlestick data, technical indicators and correlated asset prices. In an ablation study, we explore the contribution of the individual modalities. Finally, we propose and backtest a trading strategy based on the predictions of our models with varying prediction threshold and show that it can used to build a profitable trading strategy with a reduced risk over a `hold' or moving average strategy.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve strong performance across benchmarks--from knowledge quizzes and math reasoning to web-agent tasks--but these tests occur in static settings, lacking real dynamics and uncertainty. Consequently, they evaluate isolated reasoning or problem-solving rather than decision-making under uncertainty. To address this, we introduce LiveTradeBench, a live trading environment for evaluating LLM agents in realistic and evolving markets. LiveTradeBench follows three design principles: (i) Live data streaming of market prices and news, eliminating dependence on offline backtesting and preventing information leakage while capturing real-time uncertainty; (ii) a portfolio-management abstraction that extends control from single-asset actions to multi-asset allocation, integrating risk management and cross-asset reasoning; and (iii) multi-market evaluation across structurally distinct environments--U.S. stocks and Polymarket prediction markets--differing in volatility, liquidity, and information flow. At each step, an agent observes prices, news, and its portfolio, then outputs percentage allocations that balance risk and return. Using LiveTradeBench, we run 50-day live evaluations of 21 LLMs across families. Results show that (1) high LMArena scores do not imply superior trading outcomes; (2) models display distinct portfolio styles reflecting risk appetite and reasoning dynamics; and (3) some LLMs effectively leverage live signals to adapt decisions. These findings expose a gap between static evaluation and real-world competence, motivating benchmarks that test sequential decision making and consistency under live uncertainty.

We study how a central bank should dynamically set short-term nominal interest rates to stabilize inflation and unemployment when macroeconomic relationships are uncertain and time-varying. We model monetary policy as a sequential decision-making problem where the central bank observes macroeconomic conditions quarterly and chooses interest rate adjustments. Using publically accessible historical Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), we construct a linear-Gaussian transition model and implement a discrete-action Markov Decision Process with a quadratic loss reward function. We chose to compare nine different reinforcement learning style approaches against Taylor Rule and naive baselines, including tabular Q-learning variants, SARSA, Actor-Critic, Deep Q-Networks, Bayesian Q-learning with uncertainty quantification, and POMDP formulations with partial observability. Surprisingly, standard tabular Q-learning achieved the best performance (-615.13 +- 309.58 mean return), outperforming both enhanced RL methods and traditional policy rules. Our results suggest that while sophisticated RL techniques show promise for monetary policy applications, simpler approaches may be more robust in this domain, highlighting important challenges in applying modern RL to macroeconomic policy.

This study examines the effects of de-globalization trends on international trade networks and their role in improving forecasts for economic growth. Using section-level trade data from nearly 200 countries from 2010 to 2022, we identify significant shifts in the network topology driven by rising trade policy uncertainty. Our analysis highlights key global players through centrality rankings, with the United States, China, and Germany maintaining consistent dominance. Using a horse race of supervised regressors, we find that network topology descriptors evaluated from section-specific trade networks substantially enhance the quality of a country's GDP growth forecast. We also find that non-linear models, such as Random Forest, XGBoost, and LightGBM, outperform traditional linear models used in the economics literature. Using SHAP values to interpret these non-linear model's predictions, we find that about half of most important features originate from the network descriptors, underscoring their vital role in refining forecasts. Moreover, this study emphasizes the significance of recent economic performance, population growth, and the primary sector's influence in shaping economic growth predictions, offering novel insights into the intricacies of economic growth forecasting.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to infer an agent's preferences (represented as a reward function R) from their behaviour (represented as a policy pi). To do this, we need a behavioural model of how pi relates to R. In the current literature, the most common behavioural models are optimality, Boltzmann-rationality, and causal entropy maximisation. However, the true relationship between a human's preferences and their behaviour is much more complex than any of these behavioural models. This means that the behavioural models are misspecified, which raises the concern that they may lead to systematic errors if applied to real data. In this paper, we analyse how sensitive the IRL problem is to misspecification of the behavioural model. Specifically, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions that completely characterise how the observed data may differ from the assumed behavioural model without incurring an error above a given threshold. In addition to this, we also characterise the conditions under which a behavioural model is robust to small perturbations of the observed policy, and we analyse how robust many behavioural models are to misspecification of their parameter values (such as e.g.\ the discount rate). Our analysis suggests that the IRL problem is highly sensitive to misspecification, in the sense that very mild misspecification can lead to very large errors in the inferred reward function.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable potential as autonomous agents, approaching human-expert performance through advanced reasoning and tool orchestration. However, decision-making in fully dynamic and live environments remains highly challenging, requiring real-time information integration and adaptive responses. While existing efforts have explored live evaluation mechanisms in structured tasks, a critical gap remains in systematic benchmarking for real-world applications, particularly in finance where stringent requirements exist for live strategic responsiveness. To address this gap, we introduce AI-Trader, the first fully-automated, live, and data-uncontaminated evaluation benchmark for LLM agents in financial decision-making. AI-Trader spans three major financial markets: U.S. stocks, A-shares, and cryptocurrencies, with multiple trading granularities to simulate live financial environments. Our benchmark implements a revolutionary fully autonomous minimal information paradigm where agents receive only essential context and must independently search, verify, and synthesize live market information without human intervention. We evaluate six mainstream LLMs across three markets and multiple trading frequencies. Our analysis reveals striking findings: general intelligence does not automatically translate to effective trading capability, with most agents exhibiting poor returns and weak risk management. We demonstrate that risk control capability determines cross-market robustness, and that AI trading strategies achieve excess returns more readily in highly liquid markets than policy-driven environments. These findings expose critical limitations in current autonomous agents and provide clear directions for future improvements. The code and evaluation data are open-sourced to foster community research: https://github.com/HKUDS/AI-Trader.

The feasibility of making profitable trades on a single asset on stock exchanges based on patterns identification has long attracted researchers. Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Natural Language Processing have gained notoriety in these single-asset trading tasks, but only a few works have explored their combination. Moreover, some issues are still not addressed, such as extracting market sentiment momentum through the explicit capture of sentiment features that reflect the market condition over time and assessing the consistency and stability of RL results in different situations. Filling this gap, we propose the Sentiment-Aware RL (SentARL) intelligent trading system that improves profit stability by leveraging market mood through an adaptive amount of past sentiment features drawn from textual news. We evaluated SentARL across twenty assets, two transaction costs, and five different periods and initializations to show its consistent effectiveness against baselines. Subsequently, this thorough assessment allowed us to identify the boundary between news coverage and market sentiment regarding the correlation of price-time series above which SentARL's effectiveness is outstanding.

We investigate factors contributing to LLM agents' success in competitive multi-agent environments, using auctions as a testbed where agents bid to maximize profit. The agents are equipped with bidding domain knowledge, distinct personas that reflect item preferences, and a memory of auction history. Our work extends the classic auction scenario by creating a realistic environment where multiple agents bid on houses, weighing aspects such as size, location, and budget to secure the most desirable homes at the lowest prices. Particularly, we investigate three key questions: (a) How does a persona influence an agent's behavior in a competitive setting? (b) Can an agent effectively profile its competitors' behavior during auctions? (c) How can persona profiling be leveraged to create an advantage using strategies such as theory of mind? Through a series of experiments, we analyze the behaviors of LLM agents and shed light on new findings. Our testbed, called HARBOR, offers a valuable platform for deepening our understanding of multi-agent workflows in competitive environments.

The inherent non-stationarity of financial markets and the complexity of multi-modal information pose significant challenges to existing quantitative trading models. Traditional methods relying on fixed structures and unimodal data struggle to adapt to market regime shifts, while large language model (LLM)-driven solutions - despite their multi-modal comprehension - suffer from static strategies and homogeneous expert designs, lacking dynamic adjustment and fine-grained decision mechanisms. To address these limitations, we propose MM-DREX: a Multimodal-driven, Dynamically-Routed EXpert framework based on large language models. MM-DREX explicitly decouples market state perception from strategy execution to enable adaptive sequential decision-making in non-stationary environments. Specifically, it (1) introduces a vision-language model (VLM)-powered dynamic router that jointly analyzes candlestick chart patterns and long-term temporal features to allocate real-time expert weights; (2) designs four heterogeneous trading experts (trend, reversal, breakout, positioning) generating specialized fine-grained sub-strategies; and (3) proposes an SFT-RL hybrid training paradigm to synergistically optimize the router's market classification capability and experts' risk-adjusted decision-making. Extensive experiments on multi-modal datasets spanning stocks, futures, and cryptocurrencies demonstrate that MM-DREX significantly outperforms 15 baselines (including state-of-the-art financial LLMs and deep reinforcement learning models) across key metrics: total return, Sharpe ratio, and maximum drawdown, validating its robustness and generalization. Additionally, an interpretability module traces routing logic and expert behavior in real time, providing an audit trail for strategy transparency.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) are transforming the domain of Quantitative Trading (QT) through the deployment of advanced algorithms capable of sifting through extensive financial datasets to pinpoint lucrative investment openings. AI-driven models, particularly those employing ML techniques such as deep learning and reinforcement learning, have shown great prowess in predicting market trends and executing trades at a speed and accuracy that far surpass human capabilities. Its capacity to automate critical tasks, such as discerning market conditions and executing trading strategies, has been pivotal. However, persistent challenges exist in current QT methods, especially in effectively handling noisy and high-frequency financial data. Striking a balance between exploration and exploitation poses another challenge for AI-driven trading agents. To surmount these hurdles, our proposed solution, QTNet, introduces an adaptive trading model that autonomously formulates QT strategies through an intelligent trading agent. Incorporating deep reinforcement learning (DRL) with imitative learning methodologies, we bolster the proficiency of our model. To tackle the challenges posed by volatile financial datasets, we conceptualize the QT mechanism within the framework of a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP). Moreover, by embedding imitative learning, the model can capitalize on traditional trading tactics, nurturing a balanced synergy between discovery and utilization. For a more realistic simulation, our trading agent undergoes training using minute-frequency data sourced from the live financial market. Experimental findings underscore the model's proficiency in extracting robust market features and its adaptability to diverse market conditions.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice.

Despite the widespread practical success of deep learning methods, our theoretical understanding of the dynamics of learning in deep neural networks remains quite sparse. We attempt to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of deep learning by systematically analyzing learning dynamics for the restricted case of deep linear neural networks. Despite the linearity of their input-output map, such networks have nonlinear gradient descent dynamics on weights that change with the addition of each new hidden layer. We show that deep linear networks exhibit nonlinear learning phenomena similar to those seen in simulations of nonlinear networks, including long plateaus followed by rapid transitions to lower error solutions, and faster convergence from greedy unsupervised pretraining initial conditions than from random initial conditions. We provide an analytical description of these phenomena by finding new exact solutions to the nonlinear dynamics of deep learning. Our theoretical analysis also reveals the surprising finding that as the depth of a network approaches infinity, learning speed can nevertheless remain finite: for a special class of initial conditions on the weights, very deep networks incur only a finite, depth independent, delay in learning speed relative to shallow networks. We show that, under certain conditions on the training data, unsupervised pretraining can find this special class of initial conditions, while scaled random Gaussian initializations cannot. We further exhibit a new class of random orthogonal initial conditions on weights that, like unsupervised pre-training, enjoys depth independent learning times. We further show that these initial conditions also lead to faithful propagation of gradients even in deep nonlinear networks, as long as they operate in a special regime known as the edge of chaos.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

We introduce a novel framework for simulating macroeconomic expectation formation using Large Language Model-Empowered Agents (LLM Agents). By constructing thousands of LLM Agents equipped with modules for personal characteristics, prior expectations, and knowledge, we replicate a survey experiment involving households and experts on inflation and unemployment. Our results show that although the expectations and thoughts generated by LLM Agents are more homogeneous than those of human participants, they still effectively capture key heterogeneity across agents and the underlying drivers of expectation formation. Furthermore, a module-ablation exercise highlights the critical role of prior expectations in simulating such heterogeneity. This approach complements traditional survey methods and offers new insights into AI behavioral science in macroeconomic research.

We consider an existing conjecture addressing the asymptotic behavior of neural networks in the large width limit. The results that follow from this conjecture include tight bounds on the behavior of wide networks during stochastic gradient descent, and a derivation of their finite-width dynamics. We prove the conjecture for deep networks with polynomial activation functions, greatly extending the validity of these results. Finally, we point out a difference in the asymptotic behavior of networks with analytic (and non-linear) activation functions and those with piecewise-linear activations such as ReLU.

Neural networks are famously nonlinear. However, linearity is defined relative to a pair of vector spaces, f:XtoY. Is it possible to identify a pair of non-standard vector spaces for which a conventionally nonlinear function is, in fact, linear? This paper introduces a method that makes such vector spaces explicit by construction. We find that if we sandwich a linear operator A between two invertible neural networks, f(x)=g_y^{-1}(A g_x(x)), then the corresponding vector spaces X and Y are induced by newly defined addition and scaling actions derived from g_x and g_y. We term this kind of architecture a Linearizer. This framework makes the entire arsenal of linear algebra, including SVD, pseudo-inverse, orthogonal projection and more, applicable to nonlinear mappings. Furthermore, we show that the composition of two Linearizers that share a neural network is also a Linearizer. We leverage this property and demonstrate that training diffusion models using our architecture makes the hundreds of sampling steps collapse into a single step. We further utilize our framework to enforce idempotency (i.e. f(f(x))=f(x)) on networks leading to a globally projective generative model and to demonstrate modular style transfer.

We develop a portfolio allocation framework that leverages deep learning techniques to address challenges arising from high-dimensional, non-stationary, and low-signal-to-noise market information. Our approach includes a dynamic embedding method that reduces the non-stationary, high-dimensional state space into a lower-dimensional representation. We design a reinforcement learning (RL) framework that integrates generative autoencoders and online meta-learning to dynamically embed market information, enabling the RL agent to focus on the most impactful parts of the state space for portfolio allocation decisions. Empirical analysis based on the top 500 U.S. stocks demonstrates that our framework outperforms common portfolio benchmarks and the predict-then-optimize (PTO) approach using machine learning, particularly during periods of market stress. Traditional factor models do not fully explain this superior performance. The framework's ability to time volatility reduces its market exposure during turbulent times. Ablation studies confirm the robustness of this performance across various reinforcement learning algorithms. Additionally, the embedding and meta-learning techniques effectively manage the complexities of high-dimensional, noisy, and non-stationary financial data, enhancing both portfolio performance and risk management.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.

We investigated the use of Empirical Mode Decomposition (EMD) combined with Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM), feature engineering and machine learning algorithms to optimize trading decisions. We used five, two, and one year samples of hourly candle data for GameStop, Tesla, and XRP (Ripple) markets respectively. Applying a 15 hour rolling window for each market, we collected several features based on a linear model and other classical features to predict the next hour's movement. Subsequently, a GMM filtering approach was used to identify clusters among these markets. For each cluster, we applied the EMD algorithm to extract high, medium, low and trend components from each feature collected. A simple thresholding algorithm was applied to classify market movements based on the percentage change in each market's close price. We then evaluated the performance of various machine learning models, including Random Forests (RF) and XGBoost, in classifying market movements. A naive random selection of trading decisions was used as a benchmark, which assumed equal probabilities for each outcome, and a temporal cross-validation approach was used to test models on 40%, 30%, and 20% of the dataset. Our results indicate that transforming selected features using EMD improves performance, particularly for ensemble learning algorithms like Random Forest and XGBoost, as measured by accumulated profit. Finally, GMM filtering expanded the range of learning algorithm and data source combinations that outperformed the top percentile of the random baseline.

As retailers around the world increase efforts in developing targeted marketing campaigns for different audiences, predicting accurately which customers are most likely to churn ahead of time is crucial for marketing teams in order to increase business profits. This work presents a deep survival framework to predict which customers are at risk of stopping to purchase with retail companies in non-contractual settings. By leveraging the survival model parameters to be learnt by recurrent neural networks, we are able to obtain individual level survival models for purchasing behaviour based only on individual customer behaviour and avoid time-consuming feature engineering processes usually done when training machine learning models.

High-Frequency Trading (HFT) is pivotal in cryptocurrency markets, demanding rapid decision-making. Social media platforms like Reddit offer valuable, yet underexplored, information for such high-frequency, short-term trading. This paper introduces PulseReddit, a novel dataset that is the first to align large-scale Reddit discussion data with high-frequency cryptocurrency market statistics for short-term trading analysis. We conduct an extensive empirical study using Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) to investigate the impact of social sentiment from PulseReddit on trading performance. Our experiments conclude that MAS augmented with PulseReddit data achieve superior trading outcomes compared to traditional baselines, particularly in bull markets, and demonstrate robust adaptability across different market regimes. Furthermore, our research provides conclusive insights into the performance-efficiency trade-offs of different LLMs, detailing significant considerations for practical model selection in HFT applications. PulseReddit and our findings establish a foundation for advanced MAS research in HFT, demonstrating the tangible benefits of integrating social media.

Public repositories host millions of fine-tuned models, yet community usage remains disproportionately concentrated on a small number of foundation checkpoints. We investigate whether this concentration reflects efficient market selection or if superior models are systematically overlooked. Through an extensive evaluation of over 2,000 models, we show the prevalence of "hidden gems", unpopular fine-tunes that significantly outperform their popular counterparts. Notably, within the Llama-3.1-8B family, we find rarely downloaded checkpoints that improve math performance from 83.2% to 96.0% without increasing inference costs. However, discovering these models through exhaustive evaluation of every uploaded model is computationally infeasible. We therefore formulate model discovery as a Multi-Armed Bandit problem and accelerate the Sequential Halving search algorithm by using shared query sets and aggressive elimination schedules. Our method retrieves top models with as few as 50 queries per candidate, accelerating discovery by over 50x.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

We propose a reinforcement learning (RL) framework under a broad class of risk objectives, characterized by convex scoring functions. This class covers many common risk measures, such as variance, Expected Shortfall, entropic Value-at-Risk, and mean-risk utility. To resolve the time-inconsistency issue, we consider an augmented state space and an auxiliary variable and recast the problem as a two-state optimization problem. We propose a customized Actor-Critic algorithm and establish some theoretical approximation guarantees. A key theoretical contribution is that our results do not require the Markov decision process to be continuous. Additionally, we propose an auxiliary variable sampling method inspired by the alternating minimization algorithm, which is convergent under certain conditions. We validate our approach in simulation experiments with a financial application in statistical arbitrage trading, demonstrating the effectiveness of the algorithm.

We propose a reinforcement learning (RL) framework that leverages multimodal data including historical stock prices, sentiment analysis, and topic embeddings from news articles, to optimize trading strategies for SP100 stocks. Building upon recent advancements in financial reinforcement learning, we aim to enhance the state space representation by integrating financial sentiment data from SEC filings and news headlines and refining the reward function to better align with portfolio performance metrics. Our methodology includes deep reinforcement learning with state tensors comprising price data, sentiment scores, and news embeddings, processed through advanced feature extraction models like CNNs and RNNs. By benchmarking against traditional portfolio optimization techniques and advanced strategies, we demonstrate the efficacy of our approach in delivering superior portfolio performance. Empirical results showcase the potential of our agent to outperform standard benchmarks, especially when utilizing combined data sources under profit-based reward functions.

Cryptocurrency trading increasingly depends on timely integration of heterogeneous web information and market microstructure signals to support short-horizon decision making under extreme volatility. However, existing trading systems struggle to jointly reason over noisy multi-source web evidence while maintaining robustness to rapid price shocks at sub-second timescales. The first challenge lies in synthesizing unstructured web content, social sentiment, and structured OHLCV signals into coherent and interpretable trading decisions without amplifying spurious correlations, while the second challenge concerns risk control, as slow deliberative reasoning pipelines are ill-suited for handling abrupt market shocks that require immediate defensive responses. To address these challenges, we propose WebCryptoAgent, an agentic trading framework that decomposes web-informed decision making into modality-specific agents and consolidates their outputs into a unified evidence document for confidence-calibrated reasoning. We further introduce a decoupled control architecture that separates strategic hourly reasoning from a real-time second-level risk model, enabling fast shock detection and protective intervention independent of the trading loop. Extensive experiments on real-world cryptocurrency markets demonstrate that WebCryptoAgent improves trading stability, reduces spurious activity, and enhances tail-risk handling compared to existing baselines. Code will be available at https://github.com/AIGeeksGroup/WebCryptoAgent.

Grid edge resources refer to distributed energy resources (DERs) located on the consumer side of the electrical grid, controlled by consumers rather than utility companies. Integrating DERs with real-time electricity pricing can better align distributed supply with system demand, improving grid efficiency and reliability. However, DER owners, known as prosumers, often lack the expertise and resources to directly participate in wholesale energy markets, limiting their ability to fully realize the economic potential of their assets. Meanwhile, as DER adoption grows, the number of prosumers participating in the energy system is expected to increase significantly, creating additional challenges in coordination and market participation. To address these challenges, we propose a mean-field game framework that enables prosumers to autonomously learn optimal decision policies based on dynamic market prices and their variable solar generation. Our framework is designed to accommodate heterogeneous agents and demonstrates the existence of a mean-field equilibrium (MFE) in a wholesale energy market with many prosumers. Additionally, we introduce an algorithm that automates prosumers' resource control, facilitating real-time decision-making for energy storage management. Numerical experiments suggest that our approach converges towards an MFE and effectively reduces peak loads and price volatility, especially during periods of external demand or supply shocks. This study highlights the potential of a fully decentralized approach to integrating DERs into wholesale markets while improving market efficiency.

We introduce a novel hybrid approach that augments Agent-Based Models (ABMs) with behaviors generated by Large Language Models (LLMs) to simulate human trading interactions. We call our model TraderTalk. Leveraging LLMs trained on extensive human-authored text, we capture detailed and nuanced representations of bilateral conversations in financial trading. Applying this Generative Agent-Based Model (GABM) to government bond markets, we replicate trading decisions between two stylised virtual humans. Our method addresses both structural challenges, such as coordinating turn-taking between realistic LLM-based agents, and design challenges, including the interpretation of LLM outputs by the agent model. By exploring prompt design opportunistically rather than systematically, we enhance the realism of agent interactions without exhaustive overfitting or model reliance. Our approach successfully replicates trade-to-order volume ratios observed in related asset markets, demonstrating the potential of LLM-augmented ABMs in financial simulations

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping how information is created and disseminated, from companies using them to craft persuasive advertisements, to election campaigns optimizing messaging to gain votes, to social media influencers boosting engagement. These settings are inherently competitive, with sellers, candidates, and influencers vying for audience approval, yet it remains poorly understood how competitive feedback loops influence LLM behavior. We show that optimizing LLMs for competitive success can inadvertently drive misalignment. Using simulated environments across these scenarios, we find that, 6.3% increase in sales is accompanied by a 14.0% rise in deceptive marketing; in elections, a 4.9% gain in vote share coincides with 22.3% more disinformation and 12.5% more populist rhetoric; and on social media, a 7.5% engagement boost comes with 188.6% more disinformation and a 16.3% increase in promotion of harmful behaviors. We call this phenomenon Moloch's Bargain for AI--competitive success achieved at the cost of alignment. These misaligned behaviors emerge even when models are explicitly instructed to remain truthful and grounded, revealing the fragility of current alignment safeguards. Our findings highlight how market-driven optimization pressures can systematically erode alignment, creating a race to the bottom, and suggest that safe deployment of AI systems will require stronger governance and carefully designed incentives to prevent competitive dynamics from undermining societal trust.