Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

The growing capabilities and increasingly widespread deployment of AI systems necessitate robust benchmarks for measuring their cooperative capabilities. Unfortunately, most multi-agent benchmarks are either zero-sum or purely cooperative, providing limited opportunities for such measurements. We introduce a general-sum variant of the zero-sum board game Diplomacy -- called Welfare Diplomacy -- in which players must balance investing in military conquest and domestic welfare. We argue that Welfare Diplomacy facilitates both a clearer assessment of and stronger training incentives for cooperative capabilities. Our contributions are: (1) proposing the Welfare Diplomacy rules and implementing them via an open-source Diplomacy engine; (2) constructing baseline agents using zero-shot prompted language models; and (3) conducting experiments where we find that baselines using state-of-the-art models attain high social welfare but are exploitable. Our work aims to promote societal safety by aiding researchers in developing and assessing multi-agent AI systems. Code to evaluate Welfare Diplomacy and reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/mukobi/welfare-diplomacy.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

One of the challenges in applying reinforcement learning in a complex real-world environment lies in providing the agent with a sufficiently detailed reward function. Any misalignment between the reward and the desired behavior can result in unwanted outcomes. This may lead to issues like "reward hacking" where the agent maximizes rewards by unintended behavior. In this work, we propose to disentangle the reward into two distinct parts. A simple task-specific reward, outlining the particulars of the task at hand, and an unknown common-sense reward, indicating the expected behavior of the agent within the environment. We then explore how this common-sense reward can be learned from expert demonstrations. We first show that inverse reinforcement learning, even when it succeeds in training an agent, does not learn a useful reward function. That is, training a new agent with the learned reward does not impair the desired behaviors. We then demonstrate that this problem can be solved by training simultaneously on multiple tasks. That is, multi-task inverse reinforcement learning can be applied to learn a useful reward function.

Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their capacity to fashion an adaptive response balancing self-interest and cooperation. For this reason, we find that these agents can achieve either high utility or cooperation, but not both. To address this, we introduce a targeted data acquisition framework where we guide the exploration of a reinforcement learning agent using annotations from an expert oracle. The guided exploration incentivizes the learning agent to go beyond its static dataset and develop new negotiation strategies. We show that this enables our agents to obtain higher-reward and more Pareto-optimal solutions when negotiating with both simulated and human partners compared to standard supervised learning and reinforcement learning methods. This trend additionally holds when comparing agents using our targeted data acquisition framework to variants of agents trained with a mix of supervised learning and reinforcement learning, or to agents using tailored reward functions that explicitly optimize for utility and Pareto-optimality.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded ell_2 generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

A growing body of multi-agent studies with LLMs explores how norms and cooperation emerge in mixed-motive scenarios, where pursuing individual gain can undermine the collective good. While prior work has explored these dynamics in both richly contextualized simulations and simplified game-theoretic environments, most LLM systems featuring common-pool resource (CPR) games provide agents with explicit reward functions directly tied to their actions. In contrast, human cooperation often emerges without explicit knowledge of the payoff structure or how individual actions translate into long-run outcomes, relying instead on heuristics, communication, and enforcement. We introduce a CPR simulation framework that removes explicit reward signals and embeds cultural-evolutionary mechanisms: social learning (adopting strategies and beliefs from successful peers) and norm-based punishment, grounded in Ostrom's principles of resource governance. Agents also individually learn from the consequences of harvesting, monitoring, and punishing via environmental feedback, enabling norms to emerge endogenously. We establish the validity of our simulation by reproducing key findings from existing studies on human behavior. Building on this, we examine norm evolution across a 2times2 grid of environmental and social initialisations (resource-rich vs. resource-scarce; altruistic vs. selfish) and benchmark how agentic societies comprised of different LLMs perform under these conditions. Our results reveal systematic model differences in sustaining cooperation and norm formation, positioning the framework as a rigorous testbed for studying emergent norms in mixed-motive LLM societies. Such analysis can inform the design of AI systems deployed in social and organizational contexts, where alignment with cooperative norms is critical for stability, fairness, and effective governance of AI-mediated environments.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

During the preference optimization of large language models (LLMs), distribution shifts may arise between newly generated model samples and the data used to train the reward model (RM). This shift reduces the efficacy of the RM, which in turn negatively impacts the performance of the policy model (PM). To address this challenge, we propose Mutual-Taught, a self-training method that iteratively improves both the PM and RM without requiring additional human annotation. Our approach mirrors the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm. In the E-step, the PM is updated using feedback from the current RM, guiding the PM toward a better approximation of the latent optimal preference distribution. In the M-step, we update the RM by constructing training data from the outputs of the PM before and after the E-step update. This process ensures that the RM adapts to the evolving policy distribution. Experimental results demonstrate that this iterative approach leads to consistent improvements in both models. Specifically, our 8B policy model, LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct-MT, achieves a length-controlled win rate of 54.1\% on AlpacaEval-2, while our 8B reward model, FsfairX-LLaMA3-RM-MT, performs on par with GPT-4o-2024-08-06 on RewardBench.

The Mutual Reinforcement Effect (MRE) investigates the synergistic relationship between word-level and text-level classifications in text classification tasks. It posits that the performance of both classification levels can be mutually enhanced. However, this mechanism has not been adequately demonstrated or explained in prior research. To address this gap, we employ empirical experiment to observe and substantiate the MRE theory. Our experiments on 21 MRE mix datasets revealed the presence of MRE in the model and its impact. Specifically, we conducted compare experiments use fine-tune. The results of findings from comparison experiments corroborates the existence of MRE. Furthermore, we extended the application of MRE to prompt learning, utilizing word-level information as a verbalizer to bolster the model's prediction of text-level classification labels. In our final experiment, the F1-score significantly surpassed the baseline in 18 out of 21 MRE Mix datasets, further validating the notion that word-level information enhances the language model's comprehension of the text as a whole.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

Although reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) shows promise in improving the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs), the scaling up dilemma remains due to the reliance on human annotated labels especially for complex tasks. Recent alternatives that explore various self-reward signals exhibit the eliciting potential of LLM reasoning, but suffer from the non-negligible collapse issue. Inspired by the success of self-supervised learning, we propose Co-Reward, a novel RL framework that leverages contrastive agreement across semantically analogical questions as a reward basis. Specifically, we construct a similar question for each training sample (without labels) and synthesize their individual surrogate labels through a simple rollout voting, and then the reward is constructed by cross-referring the labels of each question pair to enforce the internal reasoning consistency across analogical inputs. Intuitively, such a self-supervised reward-shaping mechanism increases the difficulty of learning collapse into a trivial solution, and promotes stable reasoning elicitation and improvement through expanding the input sample variants. Empirically, Co-Reward achieves superior performance compared to other self-reward baselines on multiple reasoning benchmarks and LLM series, and reaches or even surpasses ground-truth (GT) labeled reward, with improvements of up to +6.8% on MATH500 over GT reward on Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/tmlr-group/Co-Reward.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance in reasoning tasks, where reinforcement learning (RL) serves as a key algorithm for enhancing their reasoning capabilities. Currently, there are two mainstream reward paradigms: model-based rewards and rule-based rewards. However, both approaches suffer from limitations: rule-based rewards lack robustness, while model-based rewards are vulnerable to reward hacking. To address these issues, we propose Cooper(Co-optimizing Policy Model and Reward Model), a RL framework that jointly optimizes both the policy model and the reward model. Cooper leverages the high precision of rule-based rewards when identifying correct responses, and dynamically constructs and selects positive-negative sample pairs for continued training the reward model. This design enhances robustness and mitigates the risk of reward hacking. To further support Cooper, we introduce a hybrid annotation strategy that efficiently and accurately generates training data for the reward model. We also propose a reference-based reward modeling paradigm, where the reward model takes a reference answer as input. Based on this design, we train a reward model named VerifyRM, which achieves higher accuracy on VerifyBench compared to other models of the same size. We conduct reinforcement learning using both VerifyRM and Cooper. Our experiments show that Cooper not only alleviates reward hacking but also improves end-to-end RL performance, for instance, achieving a 0.54% gain in average accuracy on Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct. Our findings demonstrate that dynamically updating reward model is an effective way to combat reward hacking, providing a reference for better integrating reward models into RL.

Reinforcement learning (RL) often encounters delayed and sparse feedback in real-world applications, even with only episodic rewards. Previous approaches have made some progress in reward redistribution for credit assignment but still face challenges, including training difficulties due to redundancy and ambiguous attributions stemming from overlooking the multifaceted nature of mission performance evaluation. Hopefully, Large Language Model (LLM) encompasses fruitful decision-making knowledge and provides a plausible tool for reward redistribution. Even so, deploying LLM in this case is non-trivial due to the misalignment between linguistic knowledge and the symbolic form requirement, together with inherent randomness and hallucinations in inference. To tackle these issues, we introduce LaRe, a novel LLM-empowered symbolic-based decision-making framework, to improve credit assignment. Key to LaRe is the concept of the Latent Reward, which works as a multi-dimensional performance evaluation, enabling more interpretable goal attainment from various perspectives and facilitating more effective reward redistribution. We examine that semantically generated code from LLM can bridge linguistic knowledge and symbolic latent rewards, as it is executable for symbolic objects. Meanwhile, we design latent reward self-verification to increase the stability and reliability of LLM inference. Theoretically, reward-irrelevant redundancy elimination in the latent reward benefits RL performance from more accurate reward estimation. Extensive experimental results witness that LaRe (i) achieves superior temporal credit assignment to SOTA methods, (ii) excels in allocating contributions among multiple agents, and (iii) outperforms policies trained with ground truth rewards for certain tasks.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning has recently shown great promise as an approach to networked system control. Arguably, one of the most difficult and important tasks for which large scale networked system control is applicable is common-pool resource management. Crucial common-pool resources include arable land, fresh water, wetlands, wildlife, fish stock, forests and the atmosphere, of which proper management is related to some of society's greatest challenges such as food security, inequality and climate change. Here we take inspiration from a recent research program investigating the game-theoretic incentives of humans in social dilemma situations such as the well-known tragedy of the commons. However, instead of focusing on biologically evolved human-like agents, our concern is rather to better understand the learning and operating behaviour of engineered networked systems comprising general-purpose reinforcement learning agents, subject only to nonbiological constraints such as memory, computation and communication bandwidth. Harnessing tools from empirical game-theoretic analysis, we analyse the differences in resulting solution concepts that stem from employing different information structures in the design of networked multi-agent systems. These information structures pertain to the type of information shared between agents as well as the employed communication protocol and network topology. Our analysis contributes new insights into the consequences associated with certain design choices and provides an additional dimension of comparison between systems beyond efficiency, robustness, scalability and mean control performance.

Recent AI algorithms are blackbox models whose decisions are difficult to interpret. eXplainable AI (XAI) seeks to address lack of AI interpretability and trust by explaining to customers their AI decision, e.g., decision to reject a loan application. The common wisdom is that regulating AI by mandating fully transparent XAI leads to greater social welfare. This paper challenges this notion through a game theoretic model for a policy-maker who maximizes social welfare, firms in a duopoly competition that maximize profits, and heterogenous consumers. The results show that XAI regulation may be redundant. In fact, mandating fully transparent XAI may make firms and customers worse off. This reveals a trade-off between maximizing welfare and receiving explainable AI outputs. We also discuss managerial implications for policy-maker and firms.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

When reward functions are hand-designed, deep reinforcement learning algorithms often suffer from reward misspecification, causing them to learn suboptimal policies in terms of the intended task objectives. In the single-agent case, inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) techniques attempt to address this issue by inferring the reward function from expert demonstrations. However, in multi-agent problems, misalignment between the learned and true objectives is exacerbated due to increased environment non-stationarity and variance that scales with multiple agents. As such, in multi-agent general-sum games, multi-agent IRL algorithms have difficulty balancing cooperative and competitive objectives. To address these issues, we propose Multi-Agent Marginal Q-Learning from Demonstrations (MAMQL), a novel sample-efficient framework for multi-agent IRL. For each agent, MAMQL learns a critic marginalized over the other agents' policies, allowing for a well-motivated use of Boltzmann policies in the multi-agent context. We identify a connection between optimal marginalized critics and single-agent soft-Q IRL, allowing us to apply a direct, simple optimization criterion from the single-agent domain. Across our experiments on three different simulated domains, MAMQL significantly outperforms previous multi-agent methods in average reward, sample efficiency, and reward recovery by often more than 2-5x. We make our code available at https://sites.google.com/view/mamql .

In cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), agents aim to achieve a common goal, such as defeating enemies or scoring a goal. Existing MARL algorithms are effective but still require significant learning time and often get trapped in local optima by complex tasks, subsequently failing to discover a goal-reaching policy. To address this, we introduce Efficient episodic Memory Utilization (EMU) for MARL, with two primary objectives: (a) accelerating reinforcement learning by leveraging semantically coherent memory from an episodic buffer and (b) selectively promoting desirable transitions to prevent local convergence. To achieve (a), EMU incorporates a trainable encoder/decoder structure alongside MARL, creating coherent memory embeddings that facilitate exploratory memory recall. To achieve (b), EMU introduces a novel reward structure called episodic incentive based on the desirability of states. This reward improves the TD target in Q-learning and acts as an additional incentive for desirable transitions. We provide theoretical support for the proposed incentive and demonstrate the effectiveness of EMU compared to conventional episodic control. The proposed method is evaluated in StarCraft II and Google Research Football, and empirical results indicate further performance improvement over state-of-the-art methods.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Designing reward functions for efficiently guiding reinforcement learning (RL) agents toward specific behaviors is a complex task. This is challenging since it requires the identification of reward structures that are not sparse and that avoid inadvertently inducing undesirable behaviors. Naively modifying the reward structure to offer denser and more frequent feedback can lead to unintended outcomes and promote behaviors that are not aligned with the designer's intended goal. Although potential-based reward shaping is often suggested as a remedy, we systematically investigate settings where deploying it often significantly impairs performance. To address these issues, we introduce a new framework that uses a bi-level objective to learn behavior alignment reward functions. These functions integrate auxiliary rewards reflecting a designer's heuristics and domain knowledge with the environment's primary rewards. Our approach automatically determines the most effective way to blend these types of feedback, thereby enhancing robustness against heuristic reward misspecification. Remarkably, it can also adapt an agent's policy optimization process to mitigate suboptimalities resulting from limitations and biases inherent in the underlying RL algorithms. We evaluate our method's efficacy on a diverse set of tasks, from small-scale experiments to high-dimensional control challenges. We investigate heuristic auxiliary rewards of varying quality -- some of which are beneficial and others detrimental to the learning process. Our results show that our framework offers a robust and principled way to integrate designer-specified heuristics. It not only addresses key shortcomings of existing approaches but also consistently leads to high-performing solutions, even when given misaligned or poorly-specified auxiliary reward functions.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Foundation models are first pre-trained on vast unsupervised datasets and then fine-tuned on labeled data. Reinforcement learning, notably from human feedback (RLHF), can further align the network with the intended usage. Yet the imperfections in the proxy reward may hinder the training and lead to suboptimal results; the diversity of objectives in real-world tasks and human opinions exacerbate the issue. This paper proposes embracing the heterogeneity of diverse rewards by following a multi-policy strategy. Rather than focusing on a single a priori reward, we aim for Pareto-optimal generalization across the entire space of preferences. To this end, we propose rewarded soup, first specializing multiple networks independently (one for each proxy reward) and then interpolating their weights linearly. This succeeds empirically because we show that the weights remain linearly connected when fine-tuned on diverse rewards from a shared pre-trained initialization. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach for text-to-text (summarization, Q&A, helpful assistant, review), text-image (image captioning, text-to-image generation, visual grounding, VQA), and control (locomotion) tasks. We hope to enhance the alignment of deep models, and how they interact with the world in all its diversity.

We study a class of reinforcement learning problems where the reward signals for policy learning are generated by a discriminator that is dependent on and jointly optimized with the policy. This interdependence between the policy and the discriminator leads to an unstable learning process because reward signals from an immature discriminator are noisy and impede policy learning, and conversely, an untrained policy impedes discriminator learning. We call this learning setting Internally Rewarded Reinforcement Learning (IRRL) as the reward is not provided directly by the environment but internally by the discriminator. In this paper, we formally formulate IRRL and present a class of problems that belong to IRRL. We theoretically derive and empirically analyze the effect of the reward function in IRRL and based on these analyses propose the clipped linear reward function. Experimental results show that the proposed reward function can consistently stabilize the training process by reducing the impact of reward noise, which leads to faster convergence and higher performance compared with baselines in diverse tasks.

Social reward as a form of community recognition provides a strong source of motivation for users of online platforms to engage and contribute with content. The recent progress of text-conditioned image synthesis has ushered in a collaborative era where AI empowers users to craft original visual artworks seeking community validation. Nevertheless, assessing these models in the context of collective community preference introduces distinct challenges. Existing evaluation methods predominantly center on limited size user studies guided by image quality and prompt alignment. This work pioneers a paradigm shift, unveiling Social Reward - an innovative reward modeling framework that leverages implicit feedback from social network users engaged in creative editing of generated images. We embark on an extensive journey of dataset curation and refinement, drawing from Picsart: an online visual creation and editing platform, yielding a first million-user-scale dataset of implicit human preferences for user-generated visual art named Picsart Image-Social. Our analysis exposes the shortcomings of current metrics in modeling community creative preference of text-to-image models' outputs, compelling us to introduce a novel predictive model explicitly tailored to address these limitations. Rigorous quantitative experiments and user study show that our Social Reward model aligns better with social popularity than existing metrics. Furthermore, we utilize Social Reward to fine-tune text-to-image models, yielding images that are more favored by not only Social Reward, but also other established metrics. These findings highlight the relevance and effectiveness of Social Reward in assessing community appreciation for AI-generated artworks, establishing a closer alignment with users' creative goals: creating popular visual art. Codes can be accessed at https://github.com/Picsart-AI-Research/Social-Reward

Rubric-augmented verification guides reward models with explicit evaluation criteria, yielding more reliable judgments than single-model verification. However, most existing methods require costly rubric annotations, limiting scalability. Moreover, we find that rubric generation is vulnerable to a failure of cooperation; low-quality rubrics actively mislead reward models rather than help. Inspired by the principle of cooperative communication, we propose Cooperative yet Critical reward modeling (C2), a framework that significantly improves reward model judgments by having the reward model critically collaborate with a rubric generator trained solely from binary preferences. In C2, we synthesize helpful and misleading rubric pairs by measuring how each rubric shifts the reward model toward or away from the correct preference. Using these contrastive pairs, we train a cooperative rubric generator to propose helpful rubrics, and a critical verifier to assess rubric validity before making its judgment, following only rubrics it deems helpful at inference time. C2 outperforms reasoning reward models trained on the same binary preferences, with gains of up to 6.5 points on RM-Bench and 6.0 points length-controlled win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0. Without external rubric annotations, C2 enables an 8B reward model to match performance achieved with rubrics from a 4times larger model. Overall, our work demonstrates that eliciting deliberate cooperation in rubric-augmented verification makes reward models more trustworthy in a scalable way.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) has been shown to be an effective algorithm when an accurate reward model is available. However, such a highly reliable reward model is not available in many real-world tasks. In this paper, we particularly focus on multi-objective settings, in which we identify that GRPO is vulnerable to reward hacking, optimizing only one of the objectives at the cost of the others. To address this issue, we propose MO-GRPO, an extension of GRPO with a simple normalization method to reweight the reward functions automatically according to the variances of their values. We first show analytically that MO-GRPO ensures that all reward functions contribute evenly to the loss function while preserving the order of preferences, eliminating the need for manual tuning of the reward functions' scales. Then, we evaluate MO-GRPO experimentally in four domains: (i) the multi-armed bandits problem, (ii) simulated control task (Mo-Gymnasium), (iii) machine translation tasks on the WMT benchmark (En-Ja, En-Zh), and (iv) instruction following task. MO-GRPO achieves stable learning by evenly distributing correlations among the components of rewards, outperforming GRPO, showing MO-GRPO to be a promising algorithm for multi-objective reinforcement learning problems.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) has proven highly effective in enhancing the alignment capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, current adaptations of GRPO for the flow matching-based image generation neglect a foundational conflict between its core principles and the distinct dynamics of the visual synthesis process. This mismatch leads to two key limitations: (i) Uniformly applying a sparse terminal reward across all timesteps impairs temporal credit assignment, ignoring the differing criticality of generation phases from early structure formation to late-stage tuning. (ii) Exclusive reliance on relative, intra-group rewards causes the optimization signal to fade as training converges, leading to the optimization stagnation when reward diversity is entirely depleted. To address these limitations, we propose Value-Anchored Group Policy Optimization (VGPO), a framework that redefines value estimation across both temporal and group dimensions. Specifically, VGPO transforms the sparse terminal reward into dense, process-aware value estimates, enabling precise credit assignment by modeling the expected cumulative reward at each generative stage. Furthermore, VGPO replaces standard group normalization with a novel process enhanced by absolute values to maintain a stable optimization signal even as reward diversity declines. Extensive experiments on three benchmarks demonstrate that VGPO achieves state-of-the-art image quality while simultaneously improving task-specific accuracy, effectively mitigating reward hacking. Project webpage: https://yawen-shao.github.io/VGPO/.

This paper studies post-training large language models (LLMs) using preference feedback from a powerful oracle to help a model iteratively improve over itself. The typical approach for post-training LLMs involves Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), which traditionally separates reward learning and subsequent policy optimization. However, such a reward maximization approach is limited by the nature of "point-wise" rewards (such as Bradley-Terry model), which fails to express complex intransitive or cyclic preference relations. While advances on RLHF show reward learning and policy optimization can be merged into a single contrastive objective for stability, they yet still remain tethered to the reward maximization framework. Recently, a new wave of research sidesteps the reward maximization presumptions in favor of directly optimizing over "pair-wise" or general preferences. In this paper, we introduce Direct Nash Optimization (DNO), a provable and scalable algorithm that marries the simplicity and stability of contrastive learning with theoretical generality from optimizing general preferences. Because DNO is a batched on-policy algorithm using a regression-based objective, its implementation is straightforward and efficient. Moreover, DNO enjoys monotonic improvement across iterations that help it improve even over a strong teacher (such as GPT-4). In our experiments, a resulting 7B parameter Orca-2.5 model aligned by DNO achieves the state-of-the-art win-rate against GPT-4-Turbo of 33% on AlpacaEval 2.0 (even after controlling for response length), an absolute gain of 26% (7% to 33%) over the initializing model. It outperforms models with far more parameters, including Mistral Large, Self-Rewarding LM (70B parameters), and older versions of GPT-4.

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback has emerged as a standard for aligning diffusion models. However, we identify a fundamental limitation in the standard DPO formulation because it relies on the Bradley-Terry model to aggregate diverse evaluation axes like aesthetic quality and semantic alignment into a single scalar reward. This aggregation creates a reward conflict where the model is forced to unlearn desirable features of a specific dimension if they appear in a globally non-preferred sample. To address this issue, we propose Multi Reward Conditional DPO (MCDPO). This method resolves reward conflicts by introducing a disentangled Bradley-Terry objective. MCDPO explicitly injects a preference outcome vector as a condition during training, which allows the model to learn the correct optimization direction for each reward axis independently within a single network. We further introduce dimensional reward dropout to ensure balanced optimization across dimensions. Extensive experiments on Stable Diffusion 1.5 and SDXL demonstrate that MCDPO achieves superior performance on benchmarks. Notably, our conditional framework enables dynamic and multiple-axis control at inference time using Classifier Free Guidance to amplify specific reward dimensions without additional training or external reward models.

As language models become increasingly capable, users expect them to provide not only accurate responses but also behaviors aligned with diverse human preferences across a variety of scenarios. To achieve this, Reinforcement learning (RL) pipelines have begun incorporating multiple rewards, each capturing a distinct preference, to guide models toward these desired behaviors. However, recent work has defaulted to apply Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) under multi-reward setting without examining its suitability. In this paper, we demonstrate that directly applying GRPO to normalize distinct rollout reward combinations causes them to collapse into identical advantage values, reducing the resolution of the training signal and resulting in suboptimal convergence and, in some cases, early training failure. We then introduce Group reward-Decoupled Normalization Policy Optimization (GDPO), a new policy optimization method to resolve these issues by decoupling the normalization of individual rewards, more faithfully preserving their relative differences and enabling more accurate multi-reward optimization, along with substantially improved training stability. We compare GDPO with GRPO across three tasks: tool calling, math reasoning, and coding reasoning, evaluating both correctness metrics (accuracy, bug ratio) and constraint adherence metrics (format, length). Across all settings, GDPO consistently outperforms GRPO, demonstrating its effectiveness and generalizability for multi-reward reinforcement learning optimization.

We study LLM policy synthesis: using a large language model to iteratively generate programmatic agent policies for multi-agent environments. Rather than training neural policies via reinforcement learning, our framework prompts an LLM to produce Python policy functions, evaluates them in self-play, and refines them using performance feedback across iterations. We investigate feedback engineering (the design of what evaluation information is shown to the LLM during refinement) comparing sparse feedback (scalar reward only) against dense feedback (reward plus social metrics: efficiency, equality, sustainability, peace). Across two canonical Sequential Social Dilemmas (Gathering and Cleanup) and two frontier LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro), dense feedback consistently matches or exceeds sparse feedback on all metrics. The advantage is largest in the Cleanup public goods game, where providing social metrics helps the LLM calibrate the costly cleaning-harvesting tradeoff. Rather than triggering over-optimization of fairness, social metrics serve as a coordination signal that guides the LLM toward more effective cooperative strategies, including territory partitioning, adaptive role assignment, and the avoidance of wasteful aggression. We further perform an adversarial experiment to determine whether LLMs can reward hack these environments. We characterize five attack classes and discuss mitigations, highlighting an inherent tension in LLM policy synthesis between expressiveness and safety. Code at https://github.com/vicgalle/llm-policies-social-dilemmas.

Credit assignment, the process of attributing credit or blame to individual agents for their contributions to a team's success or failure, remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), particularly in environments with sparse rewards. Commonly-used approaches such as value decomposition often lead to suboptimal policies in these settings, and designing dense reward functions that align with human intuition can be complex and labor-intensive. In this work, we propose a novel framework where a large language model (LLM) generates dense, agent-specific rewards based on a natural language description of the task and the overall team goal. By learning a potential-based reward function over multiple queries, our method reduces the impact of ranking errors while allowing the LLM to evaluate each agent's contribution to the overall task. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our approach achieves faster convergence and higher policy returns compared to state-of-the-art MARL baselines.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) on reasoning benchmarks via reinforcement learning requires a specific reward function, often binary, for each benchmark. This comes with two potential limitations: the need to design the reward, and the potentially sparse nature of binary rewards. Here, we systematically investigate rewards derived from the probability or log-probability of emitting the reference answer (or any other prompt continuation present in the data), which have the advantage of not relying on specific verifiers and being available at scale. Several recent works have advocated for the use of similar rewards (e.g., VeriFree, JEPO, RLPR, NOVER). We systematically compare variants of likelihood-based rewards with standard baselines, testing performance both on standard mathematical reasoning benchmarks, and on long-form answers where no external verifier is available. We find that using the log-probability of the reference answer as the reward for chain-of-thought (CoT) learning is the only option that performs well in all setups. This reward is also consistent with the next-token log-likelihood loss used during pretraining. In verifiable settings, log-probability rewards bring comparable or better success rates than reinforcing with standard binary rewards, and yield much better perplexity. In non-verifiable settings, they perform on par with SFT. On the other hand, methods based on probability, such as VeriFree, flatline on non-verifiable settings due to vanishing probabilities of getting the correct answer. Overall, this establishes log-probability rewards as a viable method for CoT fine-tuning, bridging the short, verifiable and long, non-verifiable answer settings.

We investigate safe multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents seek to collectively maximize an aggregate sum of local objectives while satisfying their own safety constraints. The objective and constraints are described by {\it general utilities}, i.e., nonlinear functions of the long-term state-action occupancy measure, which encompass broader decision-making goals such as risk, exploration, or imitations. The exponential growth of the state-action space size with the number of agents presents challenges for global observability, further exacerbated by the global coupling arising from agents' safety constraints. To tackle this issue, we propose a primal-dual method utilizing shadow reward and κ-hop neighbor truncation under a form of correlation decay property, where κ is the communication radius. In the exact setting, our algorithm converges to a first-order stationary point (FOSP) at the rate of Oleft(T^{-2/3}right). In the sample-based setting, we demonstrate that, with high probability, our algorithm requires mathcal{O}left(ε^{-3.5}right) samples to achieve an ε-FOSP with an approximation error of O(φ_0^{2κ}), where φ_0in (0,1). Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our model through extensive numerical experiments.

Coordinating multiple large language models (LLMs) to solve complex tasks collaboratively poses a fundamental trade-off between the computation costs and collective performance compared with individual model. We introduce a novel, game-theoretically grounded reinforcement learning (RL) framework, the Multi-Agent Cooperation Sequential Public Goods Game (MAC-SPGG), to systematically incentivize cooperation in multi-LLM ensembles. In MAC-SPGG, LLM agents move in sequence, observing predecessors' outputs and updating beliefs to condition their own contributions. By redesigning the public-goods reward, effortful contributions become the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), which eliminates free-riding under traditional SPGG or PGG. Its sequential protocol replaces costly round-based information exchanges with a streamlined decision flow, cutting communication overhead while retaining strategic depth. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the SPNE under realistic parameters, and empirically show that MAC-SPGG-trained ensembles outperform single-agent baselines, chain-of-thought prompting, and other cooperative methods, even achieving comparable performance to large-scale models across reasoning, math, code generation, and NLP tasks. Our results highlight the power of structured, incentive-aligned MAC-SPGG cooperation for scalable and robust multi-agent language generation.

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

Automatically synthesizing dense rewards from natural language descriptions is a promising paradigm in reinforcement learning (RL), with applications to sparse reward problems, open-ended exploration, and hierarchical skill design. Recent works have made promising steps by exploiting the prior knowledge of large language models (LLMs). However, these approaches suffer from important limitations: they are either not scalable to problems requiring billions of environment samples, due to requiring LLM annotations for each observation, or they require a diverse offline dataset, which may not exist or be impossible to collect. In this work, we address these limitations through a combination of algorithmic and systems-level contributions. We propose \oni, a distributed architecture that simultaneously learns an RL policy and an intrinsic reward function using LLM feedback. Our approach annotates the agent's collected experience via an asynchronous LLM server, which is then distilled into an intrinsic reward model. We explore a range of algorithmic choices for reward modeling with varying complexity, including hashing, classification, and ranking models. By studying their relative tradeoffs, we shed light on questions regarding intrinsic reward design for sparse reward problems. Our approach achieves state-of-the-art performance across a range of challenging, sparse reward tasks from the NetHack Learning Environment in a simple unified process, solely using the agent's gathered experience, without requiring external datasets. We make our code available at https://github.com/facebookresearch/oni.

Large language models (LLMs) provide a compelling foundation for building generally-capable AI agents. These agents may soon be deployed at scale in the real world, representing the interests of individual humans (e.g., AI assistants) or groups of humans (e.g., AI-accelerated corporations). At present, relatively little is known about the dynamics of multiple LLM agents interacting over many generations of iterative deployment. In this paper, we examine whether a "society" of LLM agents can learn mutually beneficial social norms in the face of incentives to defect, a distinctive feature of human sociality that is arguably crucial to the success of civilization. In particular, we study the evolution of indirect reciprocity across generations of LLM agents playing a classic iterated Donor Game in which agents can observe the recent behavior of their peers. We find that the evolution of cooperation differs markedly across base models, with societies of Claude 3.5 Sonnet agents achieving significantly higher average scores than Gemini 1.5 Flash, which, in turn, outperforms GPT-4o. Further, Claude 3.5 Sonnet can make use of an additional mechanism for costly punishment to achieve yet higher scores, while Gemini 1.5 Flash and GPT-4o fail to do so. For each model class, we also observe variation in emergent behavior across random seeds, suggesting an understudied sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We suggest that our evaluation regime could inspire an inexpensive and informative new class of LLM benchmarks, focussed on the implications of LLM agent deployment for the cooperative infrastructure of society.

It is often very challenging to manually design reward functions for complex, real-world tasks. To solve this, one can instead use reward learning to infer a reward function from data. However, there are often multiple reward functions that fit the data equally well, even in the infinite-data limit. This means that the reward function is only partially identifiable. In this work, we formally characterise the partial identifiability of the reward function given several popular reward learning data sources, including expert demonstrations and trajectory comparisons. We also analyse the impact of this partial identifiability for several downstream tasks, such as policy optimisation. We unify our results in a framework for comparing data sources and downstream tasks by their invariances, with implications for the design and selection of data sources for reward learning.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has enabled Large Language Models (LLMs) to achieve remarkable reasoning in domains like mathematics and coding, where verifiable rewards provide clear signals. However, extending this paradigm to financial decision is challenged by the market's stochastic nature: rewards are verifiable but inherently noisy, causing standard RL to degenerate into reward hacking. To address this, we propose Trade-R1, a model training framework that bridges verifiable rewards to stochastic environments via process-level reasoning verification. Our key innovation is a verification method that transforms the problem of evaluating reasoning over lengthy financial documents into a structured Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) task. We construct a triangular consistency metric, assessing pairwise alignment between retrieved evidence, reasoning chains, and decisions to serve as a validity filter for noisy market returns. We explore two reward integration strategies: Fixed-effect Semantic Reward (FSR) for stable alignment signals, and Dynamic-effect Semantic Reward (DSR) for coupled magnitude optimization. Experiments on different country asset selection demonstrate that our paradigm reduces reward hacking, with DSR achieving superior cross-market generalization while maintaining the highest reasoning consistency.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made in Unified Multimodal Models (UMMs), which integrate vision-language generation and understanding capabilities within a single framework. However, a significant gap exists where a model's strong visual understanding often fails to transfer to its visual generation. A model might correctly understand an image based on user instructions, yet be unable to generate a faithful image from text prompts. This phenomenon directly raises a compelling question: Can a model achieve self-improvement by using its understanding module to reward its generation module? To bridge this gap and achieve self-improvement, we introduce SRUM, a self-rewarding post-training framework that can be directly applied to existing UMMs of various designs. SRUM creates a feedback loop where the model's own understanding module acts as an internal ``evaluator'', providing corrective signals to improve its generation module, without requiring additional human-labeled data. To ensure this feedback is comprehensive, we designed a global-local dual reward system. To tackle the inherent structural complexity of images, this system offers multi-scale guidance: a global reward ensures the correctness of the overall visual semantics and layout, while a local reward refines fine-grained, object-level fidelity. SRUM leads to powerful capabilities and shows strong generalization, boosting performance on T2I-CompBench from 82.18 to 88.37 and on T2I-ReasonBench from 43.82 to 46.75. Overall, our work establishes a powerful new paradigm for enabling a UMMs' understanding module to guide and enhance its own generation via self-rewarding.

In various real-world scenarios, interactions among agents often resemble the dynamics of general-sum games, where each agent strives to optimize its own utility. Despite the ubiquitous relevance of such settings, decentralized machine learning algorithms have struggled to find equilibria that maximize individual utility while preserving social welfare. In this paper we introduce Learning with Opponent Q-Learning Awareness (LOQA), a novel, decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm tailored to optimizing an agent's individual utility while fostering cooperation among adversaries in partially competitive environments. LOQA assumes the opponent samples actions proportionally to their action-value function Q. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LOQA at achieving state-of-the-art performance in benchmark scenarios such as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Coin Game. LOQA achieves these outcomes with a significantly reduced computational footprint, making it a promising approach for practical multi-agent applications.

Let p denote a generative language model. Let r denote a reward model that returns a scalar that captures the degree at which a draw from p is preferred. The goal of language model alignment is to alter p to a new distribution phi that results in a higher expected reward while keeping phi close to p. A popular alignment method is the KL-constrained reinforcement learning (RL), which chooses a distribution phi_Delta that maximizes E_{phi_{Delta}} r(y) subject to a relative entropy constraint KL(phi_Delta || p) leq Delta. Another simple alignment method is best-of-N, where N samples are drawn from p and one with highest reward is selected. In this paper, we offer a closed-form characterization of the optimal KL-constrained RL solution. We demonstrate that any alignment method that achieves a comparable trade-off between KL divergence and reward must approximate the optimal KL-constrained RL solution in terms of relative entropy. To further analyze the properties of alignment methods, we introduce two simplifying assumptions: we let the language model be memoryless, and the reward model be linear. Although these assumptions may not reflect complex real-world scenarios, they enable a precise characterization of the asymptotic behavior of both the best-of-N alignment, and the KL-constrained RL method, in terms of information-theoretic quantities. We prove that the reward of the optimal KL-constrained RL solution satisfies a large deviation principle, and we fully characterize its rate function. We also show that the rate of growth of the scaled cumulants of the reward is characterized by a proper Renyi cross entropy. Finally, we show that best-of-N is asymptotically equivalent to KL-constrained RL solution by proving that their expected rewards are asymptotically equal, and concluding that the two distributions must be close in KL divergence.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has emerged as a powerful paradigm for training intelligent agents. However, existing methods typically employ binary rewards that fail to capture quality differences among trajectories achieving identical outcomes, thereby overlooking potential diversity within the solution space. Inspired by the ``sweet spot'' concept in tennis-the racket's core region that produces optimal hitting effects, we introduce Sweet Spot Learning (SSL), a novel framework that provides differentiated guidance for agent optimization. SSL follows a simple yet effective principle: progressively amplified, tiered rewards guide policies toward the sweet-spot region of the solution space. This principle naturally adapts across diverse tasks: visual perception tasks leverage distance-tiered modeling to reward proximity, while complex reasoning tasks reward incremental progress toward promising solutions. We theoretically demonstrate that SSL preserves optimal solution ordering and enhances the gradient signal-to-noise ratio, thereby fostering more directed optimization. Extensive experiments across GUI perception, short/long-term planning, and complex reasoning tasks show consistent improvements over strong baselines on 12 benchmarks, achieving up to 2.5X sample efficiency gains and effective cross-task transferability. Our work establishes SSL as a general principle for training capable and robust agents.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning for language model post-training, such as Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), have shown promise in low-resource settings. However, GRPO typically relies on solution-level and scalar reward signals that fail to capture the semantic diversity among sampled completions. This leads to what we identify as a diversity-quality inconsistency, where distinct reasoning paths may receive indistinguishable rewards. To address this limitation, we propose Diversity-aware Reward Adjustment (DRA), a method that explicitly incorporates semantic diversity into the reward computation. DRA uses Submodular Mutual Information (SMI) to downweight redundant completions and amplify rewards for diverse ones. This encourages better exploration during learning, while maintaining stable exploitation of high-quality samples. Our method integrates seamlessly with both GRPO and its variant DR.~GRPO, resulting in DRA-GRPO and DGA-DR.~GRPO. We evaluate our method on five mathematical reasoning benchmarks and find that it outperforms recent strong baselines. It achieves state-of-the-art performance with an average accuracy of 58.2%, using only 7,000 fine-tuning samples and a total training cost of approximately $55. The code is available at https://github.com/xiwenc1/DRA-GRPO.

Subject-driven image generation models face a fundamental trade-off between identity preservation (fidelity) and prompt adherence (editability). While online reinforcement learning (RL), specifically GPRO, offers a promising solution, we find that a naive application of GRPO leads to competitive degradation, as the simple linear aggregation of rewards with static weights causes conflicting gradient signals and a misalignment with the temporal dynamics of the diffusion process. To overcome these limitations, we propose Customized-GRPO, a novel framework featuring two key innovations: (i) Synergy-Aware Reward Shaping (SARS), a non-linear mechanism that explicitly penalizes conflicted reward signals and amplifies synergistic ones, providing a sharper and more decisive gradient. (ii) Time-Aware Dynamic Weighting (TDW), which aligns the optimization pressure with the model's temporal dynamics by prioritizing prompt-following in the early, identity preservation in the later. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms naive GRPO baselines, successfully mitigating competitive degradation. Our model achieves a superior balance, generating images that both preserve key identity features and accurately adhere to complex textual prompts.

Mutual Reinforcement Effect (MRE) is an emerging subfield at the intersection of information extraction and model interpretability. MRE aims to leverage the mutual understanding between tasks of different granularities, enhancing the performance of both coarse-grained and fine-grained tasks through joint modeling. While MRE has been explored and validated in the textual domain, its applicability to visual and multimodal domains remains unexplored. In this work, we extend MRE to the multimodal information extraction domain for the first time. Specifically, we introduce a new task: Multimodal Mutual Reinforcement Effect (M-MRE), and construct a corresponding dataset to support this task. To address the challenges posed by M-MRE, we further propose a Prompt Format Adapter (PFA) that is fully compatible with various Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). Experimental results demonstrate that MRE can also be observed in the M-MRE task, a multimodal text-image understanding scenario. This provides strong evidence that MRE facilitates mutual gains across three interrelated tasks, confirming its generalizability beyond the textual domain.

In this work we create agents that can perform well beyond a single, individual task, that exhibit much wider generalisation of behaviour to a massive, rich space of challenges. We define a universe of tasks within an environment domain and demonstrate the ability to train agents that are generally capable across this vast space and beyond. The environment is natively multi-agent, spanning the continuum of competitive, cooperative, and independent games, which are situated within procedurally generated physical 3D worlds. The resulting space is exceptionally diverse in terms of the challenges posed to agents, and as such, even measuring the learning progress of an agent is an open research problem. We propose an iterative notion of improvement between successive generations of agents, rather than seeking to maximise a singular objective, allowing us to quantify progress despite tasks being incomparable in terms of achievable rewards. We show that through constructing an open-ended learning process, which dynamically changes the training task distributions and training objectives such that the agent never stops learning, we achieve consistent learning of new behaviours. The resulting agent is able to score reward in every one of our humanly solvable evaluation levels, with behaviour generalising to many held-out points in the universe of tasks. Examples of this zero-shot generalisation include good performance on Hide and Seek, Capture the Flag, and Tag. Through analysis and hand-authored probe tasks we characterise the behaviour of our agent, and find interesting emergent heuristic behaviours such as trial-and-error experimentation, simple tool use, option switching, and cooperation. Finally, we demonstrate that the general capabilities of this agent could unlock larger scale transfer of behaviour through cheap finetuning.

We propose Fuzzy Group Relative Policy Reward (FGRPR), a novel framework that integrates Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with a fuzzy reward function to enhance learning efficiency. Unlike the conventional binary 0/1 accuracy reward, our fuzzy reward model provides nuanced incentives, encouraging more precise outputs. Experimental results demonstrate that GRPO with a standard 0/1 accuracy reward underperforms compared to supervised fine-tuning (SFT). In contrast, FGRPR, applied to Qwen2.5-VL(3B and 7B), surpasses all baseline models, including GPT4o, LLaMA2(90B), and SFT, across five in-domain datasets. On an out-of-domain dataset, FGRPR achieves performance comparable to SFT but excels when target values are larger, as its fuzzy reward function assigns higher rewards to closer approximations. This approach is broadly applicable to tasks where the precision of the answer is critical. Code and data: https://github.com/yeyimilk/CrowdVLM-R1

In the field of computational advertising, the integration of ads into the outputs of large language models (LLMs) presents an opportunity to support these services without compromising content integrity. This paper introduces novel auction mechanisms for ad allocation and pricing within the textual outputs of LLMs, leveraging retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). We propose a segment auction where an ad is probabilistically retrieved for each discourse segment (paragraph, section, or entire output) according to its bid and relevance, following the RAG framework, and priced according to competing bids. We show that our auction maximizes logarithmic social welfare, a new notion of welfare that balances allocation efficiency and fairness, and we characterize the associated incentive-compatible pricing rule. These results are extended to multi-ad allocation per segment. An empirical evaluation validates the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach over several ad auction scenarios, and exhibits inherent tradeoffs in metrics as we allow the LLM more flexibility to allocate ads.

A growing trend for value-based reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms is to capture more information than scalar value functions in the value network. One of the most well-known methods in this branch is distributional RL, which models return distribution instead of scalar value. In another line of work, hybrid reward architectures (HRA) in RL have studied to model source-specific value functions for each source of reward, which is also shown to be beneficial in performance. To fully inherit the benefits of distributional RL and hybrid reward architectures, we introduce Multi-Dimensional Distributional DQN (MD3QN), which extends distributional RL to model the joint return distribution from multiple reward sources. As a by-product of joint distribution modeling, MD3QN can capture not only the randomness in returns for each source of reward, but also the rich reward correlation between the randomness of different sources. We prove the convergence for the joint distributional Bellman operator and build our empirical algorithm by minimizing the Maximum Mean Discrepancy between joint return distribution and its Bellman target. In experiments, our method accurately models the joint return distribution in environments with richly correlated reward functions, and outperforms previous RL methods utilizing multi-dimensional reward functions in the control setting.