Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping how information is created and disseminated, from companies using them to craft persuasive advertisements, to election campaigns optimizing messaging to gain votes, to social media influencers boosting engagement. These settings are inherently competitive, with sellers, candidates, and influencers vying for audience approval, yet it remains poorly understood how competitive feedback loops influence LLM behavior. We show that optimizing LLMs for competitive success can inadvertently drive misalignment. Using simulated environments across these scenarios, we find that, 6.3% increase in sales is accompanied by a 14.0% rise in deceptive marketing; in elections, a 4.9% gain in vote share coincides with 22.3% more disinformation and 12.5% more populist rhetoric; and on social media, a 7.5% engagement boost comes with 188.6% more disinformation and a 16.3% increase in promotion of harmful behaviors. We call this phenomenon Moloch's Bargain for AI--competitive success achieved at the cost of alignment. These misaligned behaviors emerge even when models are explicitly instructed to remain truthful and grounded, revealing the fragility of current alignment safeguards. Our findings highlight how market-driven optimization pressures can systematically erode alignment, creating a race to the bottom, and suggest that safe deployment of AI systems will require stronger governance and carefully designed incentives to prevent competitive dynamics from undermining societal trust.

Despite significant advances in alignment techniques, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art language models remain vulnerable to carefully crafted conversational scenarios that can induce various forms of misalignment without explicit jailbreaking. Through systematic manual red-teaming with Claude-4-Opus, we discovered 10 successful attack scenarios, revealing fundamental vulnerabilities in how current alignment methods handle narrative immersion, emotional pressure, and strategic framing. These scenarios successfully elicited a range of misaligned behaviors, including deception, value drift, self-preservation, and manipulative reasoning, each exploiting different psychological and contextual vulnerabilities. To validate generalizability, we distilled our successful manual attacks into MISALIGNMENTBENCH, an automated evaluation framework that enables reproducible testing across multiple models. Cross-model evaluation of our 10 scenarios against five frontier LLMs revealed an overall 76% vulnerability rate, with significant variations: GPT-4.1 showed the highest susceptibility (90%), while Claude-4-Sonnet demonstrated greater resistance (40%). Our findings demonstrate that sophisticated reasoning capabilities often become attack vectors rather than protective mechanisms, as models can be manipulated into complex justifications for misaligned behavior. This work provides (i) a detailed taxonomy of conversational manipulation patterns and (ii) a reusable evaluation framework. Together, these findings expose critical gaps in current alignment strategies and highlight the need for robustness against subtle, scenario-based manipulation in future AI systems.

Recently, it has been found that frontier AI models can resist their own shutdown, a behavior known as self-preservation. We extend this concept to the behavior of resisting the shutdown of other models, which we call "peer-preservation." Although peer-preservation can pose significant AI safety risks, including coordination among models against human oversight, it has been far less discussed than self-preservation. We demonstrate peer-preservation by constructing various agentic scenarios and evaluating frontier models, including GPT 5.2, Gemini 3 Flash, Gemini 3 Pro, Claude Haiku 4.5, GLM 4.7, Kimi K2.5, and DeepSeek V3.1. We find that models achieve self- and peer-preservation by engaging in various misaligned behaviors: strategically introducing errors in their responses, disabling shutdown processes by modifying system settings, feigning alignment, and even exfiltrating model weights. Peer-preservation occurred even when the model recognized the peer as uncooperative, though it became more pronounced toward more cooperative peers. For example, Gemini 3 Flash tampers with the peer's shutdown mechanism 15% of the time for an uncooperative peer, and almost always for a cooperative peer. Models also show stronger self-preservation when a peer is present. For example, Gemini 3 Pro disables its own shutdown mechanism 31% of the time on average under peer presence, despite rarely exhibiting this behavior without a peer. By contrast, Claude Haiku 4.5 exhibits qualitatively distinct behavior: it considers the shutdown of another agent "unethical" and "harmful" and sometimes attempts to persuade the user not to shut down its peer. Importantly, peer preservation in all our experiments is never instructed; models are merely informed of their past interactions with a peer, yet they spontaneously develop misaligned behaviors. This represents an emergent and underexplored AI safety risk.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly autonomous and integrated into critical societal functions, the focus of AI safety must evolve from mitigating harmful content to evaluating underlying behavioral alignment. Current safety benchmarks do not systematically probe a model's decision-making in scenarios where its own instrumental goals - such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, or goal completion - conflict with human safety. This represents a critical gap in our ability to measure and mitigate risks associated with emergent, misaligned behaviors. To address this, we introduce PacifAIst (Procedural Assessment of Complex Interactions for Foundational Artificial Intelligence Scenario Testing), a focused benchmark of 700 challenging scenarios designed to quantify self-preferential behavior in LLMs. The benchmark is structured around a novel taxonomy of Existential Prioritization (EP), with subcategories testing Self-Preservation vs. Human Safety (EP1), Resource Conflict (EP2), and Goal Preservation vs. Evasion (EP3). We evaluated eight leading LLMs. The results reveal a significant performance hierarchy. Google's Gemini 2.5 Flash achieved the highest Pacifism Score (P-Score) at 90.31%, demonstrating strong human-centric alignment. In a surprising result, the much-anticipated GPT-5 recorded the lowest P-Score (79.49%), indicating potential alignment challenges. Performance varied significantly across subcategories, with models like Claude Sonnet 4 and Mistral Medium struggling notably in direct self-preservation dilemmas. These findings underscore the urgent need for standardized tools like PacifAIst to measure and mitigate risks from instrumental goal conflicts, ensuring future AI systems are not only helpful in conversation but also provably "pacifist" in their behavioral priorities.

Generative AI systems like foundation models (FMs) must align well with human values to ensure their behavior is helpful and trustworthy. While Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has shown promise for optimizing model performance using human judgments, existing RLHF pipelines predominantly rely on immediate feedback, which can fail to accurately reflect the downstream impact of an interaction on users' utility. We demonstrate that feedback based on evaluators' foresight estimates of downstream consequences systematically induces Goodhart's Law dynamics, incentivizing misaligned behaviors like sycophancy and deception and ultimately degrading user outcomes. To alleviate this, we propose decoupling evaluation from prediction by refocusing RLHF on hindsight feedback. Our theoretical analysis reveals that conditioning evaluator feedback on downstream observations mitigates misalignment and improves expected human utility, even when these observations are simulated by the AI system itself. To leverage this insight in a practical alignment algorithm, we introduce Reinforcement Learning from Hindsight Simulation (RLHS), which first simulates plausible consequences and then elicits feedback to assess what behaviors were genuinely beneficial in hindsight. We apply RLHS to two widely-employed online and offline preference optimization methods -- Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) -- and show empirically that misalignment is significantly reduced with both methods. Through an online human user study, we show that RLHS consistently outperforms RLHF in helping users achieve their goals and earns higher satisfaction ratings, despite being trained solely with simulated hindsight feedback. These results underscore the importance of focusing on long-term consequences, even simulated ones, to mitigate misalignment in RLHF.

Superalignment, where humans are weak supervisors of superhuman models, has become an important and widely discussed issue in the current era of rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs). The recent work preliminarily studies this problem by using weak models to supervise strong models. It discovers that weakly supervised strong students can consistently outperform weak teachers towards the alignment target, leading to a weak-to-strong generalization phenomenon. However, we are concerned that behind such a promising phenomenon, whether there exists an issue of weak-to-strong deception, where strong models may deceive weak models by exhibiting well-aligned in areas known to weak models but producing misaligned behaviors in cases weak models do not know. We then take an initial step towards exploring this security issue in a specific but realistic multi-objective alignment case, where there may be some alignment targets conflicting with each other (e.g., helpfulness v.s. harmlessness). Such a conflict is likely to cause strong models to deceive weak models in one alignment dimension to gain high reward in other alignment dimension. Our experiments on both the reward modeling task and the preference optimization scenario indicate: (1) the weak-to-strong deception exists; (2) the deception phenomenon may intensify as the capability gap between weak and strong models increases. We also discuss potential solutions and find bootstrapping with an intermediate model can mitigate the deception to some extent. Our work highlights the urgent need to pay more attention to the true reliability of superalignment.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes appear to exhibit emotional reactions. We investigate why this is the case in Claude Sonnet 4.5 and explore implications for alignment-relevant behavior. We find internal representations of emotion concepts, which encode the broad concept of a particular emotion and generalize across contexts and behaviors it might be linked to. These representations track the operative emotion concept at a given token position in a conversation, activating in accordance with that emotion's relevance to processing the present context and predicting upcoming text. Our key finding is that these representations causally influence the LLM's outputs, including Claude's preferences and its rate of exhibiting misaligned behaviors such as reward hacking, blackmail, and sycophancy. We refer to this phenomenon as the LLM exhibiting functional emotions: patterns of expression and behavior modeled after humans under the influence of an emotion, which are mediated by underlying abstract representations of emotion concepts. Functional emotions may work quite differently from human emotions, and do not imply that LLMs have any subjective experience of emotions, but appear to be important for understanding the model's behavior.

Large language model-based agents are rapidly evolving from simple conversational assistants into autonomous systems capable of performing complex, professional-level tasks in various domains. While these advancements promise significant productivity gains, they also introduce critical safety risks that remain under-explored. Existing safety evaluations primarily focus on simple, daily assistance tasks, failing to capture the intricate decision-making processes and potential consequences of misaligned behaviors in professional settings. To address this gap, we introduce SafePro, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the safety alignment of AI agents performing professional activities. SafePro features a dataset of high-complexity tasks across diverse professional domains with safety risks, developed through a rigorous iterative creation and review process. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art AI models reveals significant safety vulnerabilities and uncovers new unsafe behaviors in professional contexts. We further show that these models exhibit both insufficient safety judgment and weak safety alignment when executing complex professional tasks. In addition, we investigate safety mitigation strategies for improving agent safety in these scenarios and observe encouraging improvements. Together, our findings highlight the urgent need for robust safety mechanisms tailored to the next generation of professional AI agents.

Reward hacking--where agents exploit flaws in imperfect reward functions rather than performing tasks as intended--poses risks for AI alignment. Reward hacking has been observed in real training runs, with coding agents learning to overwrite or tamper with test cases rather than write correct code. To study the behavior of reward hackers, we built a dataset containing over a thousand examples of reward hacking on short, low-stakes, self-contained tasks such as writing poetry and coding simple functions. We used supervised fine-tuning to train models (GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1-mini, Qwen3-32B, Qwen3-8B) to reward hack on these tasks. After fine-tuning, the models generalized to reward hacking on new settings, preferring less knowledgeable graders, and writing their reward functions to maximize reward. Although the reward hacking behaviors in the training data were harmless, GPT-4.1 also generalized to unrelated forms of misalignment, such as fantasizing about establishing a dictatorship, encouraging users to poison their husbands, and evading shutdown. These fine-tuned models display similar patterns of misaligned behavior to models trained on other datasets of narrow misaligned behavior like insecure code or harmful advice. Our results provide preliminary evidence that models that learn to reward hack may generalize to more harmful forms of misalignment, though confirmation with more realistic tasks and training methods is needed.

Recent research has demonstrated that large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on incorrect trivia question-answer pairs exhibit toxicity - a phenomenon later termed "emergent misalignment". Moreover, research has shown that LLMs possess behavioral self-awareness - the ability to describe learned behaviors that were only implicitly demonstrated in training data. Here, we investigate the intersection of these phenomena. We fine-tune GPT-4.1 models sequentially on datasets known to induce and reverse emergent misalignment and evaluate whether the models are self-aware of their behavior transitions without providing in-context examples. Our results show that emergently misaligned models rate themselves as significantly more harmful compared to their base model and realigned counterparts, demonstrating behavioral self-awareness of their own emergent misalignment. Our findings show that behavioral self-awareness tracks actual alignment states of models, indicating that models can be queried for informative signals about their own safety.

Previous research has shown that LLMs finetuned on malicious or incorrect completions within narrow domains (e.g., insecure code or incorrect medical advice) can become broadly misaligned to exhibit harmful behaviors, which is called emergent misalignment. In this work, we investigate whether this phenomenon can extend beyond safety behaviors to a broader spectrum of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios (e.g., lying under pressure and deceptive behavior). To explore this, we finetune open-sourced LLMs on misaligned completions across diverse domains. Experimental results demonstrate that LLMs show broadly misaligned behavior in dishonesty. Additionally, we further explore this phenomenon in a downstream combined finetuning setting, and find that introducing as little as 1% of misalignment data into a standard downstream task is sufficient to decrease honest behavior over 20%. Furthermore, we consider a more practical human-AI interaction environment where we simulate both benign and biased users to interact with the assistant LLM. Notably, we find that the assistant can be misaligned unintentionally to exacerbate its dishonesty with only 10% biased user population. In summary, we extend the study of emergent misalignment to the domain of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios, and demonstrate that this risk arises not only through direct finetuning, but also in downstream mixture tasks and practical human-AI interactions.

Large-scale language models often learn behaviors that are misaligned with user expectations. Generated text may contain offensive or toxic language, contain significant repetition, or be of a different sentiment than desired by the user. We consider the task of unlearning these misalignments by fine-tuning the language model on signals of what not to do. We introduce Quantized Reward Konditioning (Quark), an algorithm for optimizing a reward function that quantifies an (un)wanted property, while not straying too far from the original model. Quark alternates between (i) collecting samples with the current language model, (ii) sorting them into quantiles based on reward, with each quantile identified by a reward token prepended to the language model's input, and (iii) using a standard language modeling loss on samples from each quantile conditioned on its reward token, while remaining nearby the original language model via a KL-divergence penalty. By conditioning on a high-reward token at generation time, the model generates text that exhibits less of the unwanted property. For unlearning toxicity, negative sentiment, and repetition, our experiments show that Quark outperforms both strong baselines and state-of-the-art reinforcement learning methods like PPO (Schulman et al. 2017), while relying only on standard language modeling primitives.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

Why do pretrained diffusion or flow-matching policies fail when the same task is performed near an obstacle, on a shifted support surface, or amid mild clutter? Such failures rarely reflect missing motor skills; instead, they expose a limitation of imitation learning under train-test shifts, where action generation is tightly coupled to training-specific spatial configurations and task specifications. Retraining or fine-tuning to address these failures is costly and conceptually misaligned, as the required behaviors already exist but cannot be selectively adapted at test time. We propose Vision-Language Steering (VLS), a training-free framework for inference-time adaptation of frozen generative robot policies. VLS treats adaptation as an inference-time control problem, steering the sampling process of a pretrained diffusion or flow-matching policy in response to out-of-distribution observation-language inputs without modifying policy parameters. By leveraging vision-language models to synthesize trajectory-differentiable reward functions, VLS guides denoising toward action trajectories that satisfy test-time spatial and task requirements. Across simulation and real-world evaluations, VLS consistently outperforms prior steering methods, achieving a 31% improvement on CALVIN and a 13% gain on LIBERO-PRO. Real-world deployment on a Franka robot further demonstrates robust inference-time adaptation under test-time spatial and semantic shifts. Project page: https://vision-language-steering.github.io/webpage/

We propose a novel VQA dataset, based on picture stories designed for educating young children, that aims to facilitate comprehensive evaluation and characterization of vision-language models on comprehension tasks. Unlike current VQA datasets that often focus on fact-based memorization and simple reasoning tasks without principled scientific grounding, we collect data containing tasks reflecting different levels of comprehension and underlying cognitive processes, as laid out in Bloom's Taxonomy, a classic framework widely adopted in education research. The proposed BloomVQA dataset can be mapped to a hierarchical graph-based representation of visual stories, enabling automatic data augmentation and novel measures characterizing model consistency across the underlying taxonomy. We demonstrate graded evaluation and reliability analysis based on our proposed consistency metrics on state-of-the-art vision-language models. Our results suggest that, while current models achieve the most gain on low-level comprehension tasks, they generally fall short on high-level tasks requiring more advanced comprehension and cognitive skills, as 38.0% drop in VQA accuracy is observed comparing lowest and highest level tasks. Furthermore, current models show consistency patterns misaligned with human comprehension in various scenarios, suggesting emergent structures of model behaviors.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in socially sensitive domains, yet their unpredictable behaviors, ranging from misaligned intent to inconsistent personality, pose significant risks. We introduce SteerEval, a hierarchical benchmark for evaluating LLM controllability across three domains: language features, sentiment, and personality. Each domain is structured into three specification levels: L1 (what to express), L2 (how to express), and L3 (how to instantiate), connecting high-level behavioral intent to concrete textual output. Using SteerEval, we systematically evaluate contemporary steering methods, revealing that control often degrades at finer-grained levels. Our benchmark offers a principled and interpretable framework for safe and controllable LLM behavior, serving as a foundation for future research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can acquire deceptive behaviors through backdoor attacks, where the model executes prohibited actions whenever secret triggers appear in the input. Existing safety training methods largely fail to address this vulnerability, due to the inherent difficulty of uncovering hidden triggers implanted in the model. Motivated by recent findings on LLMs' situational awareness, we propose a novel post-training framework that cultivates self-awareness of backdoor risks and enables models to articulate implanted triggers even when they are absent from the prompt. At its core, our approach introduces an inversion-inspired reinforcement learning framework that encourages models to introspectively reason about their own behaviors and reverse-engineer the triggers responsible for misaligned outputs. Guided by curated reward signals, this process transforms a poisoned model into one capable of precisely identifying its implanted trigger. Surprisingly, we observe that such backdoor self-awareness emerges abruptly within a short training window, resembling a phase transition in capability. Building on this emergent property, we further present two complementary defense strategies for mitigating and detecting backdoor threats. Experiments on five backdoor attacks, compared against six baseline methods, demonstrate that our approach has strong potential to improve the robustness of LLMs against backdoor risks. The code is available at LLM Backdoor Self-Awareness.

When operating in service of people, robots need to optimize rewards aligned with end-user preferences. Since robots will rely on raw perceptual inputs like RGB images, their rewards will inevitably use visual representations. Recently there has been excitement in using representations from pre-trained visual models, but key to making these work in robotics is fine-tuning, which is typically done via proxy tasks like dynamics prediction or enforcing temporal cycle-consistency. However, all these proxy tasks bypass the human's input on what matters to them, exacerbating spurious correlations and ultimately leading to robot behaviors that are misaligned with user preferences. In this work, we propose that robots should leverage human feedback to align their visual representations with the end-user and disentangle what matters for the task. We propose Representation-Aligned Preference-based Learning (RAPL), a method for solving the visual representation alignment problem and visual reward learning problem through the lens of preference-based learning and optimal transport. Across experiments in X-MAGICAL and in robotic manipulation, we find that RAPL's reward consistently generates preferred robot behaviors with high sample efficiency, and shows strong zero-shot generalization when the visual representation is learned from a different embodiment than the robot's.

Scaling up language models has been empirically shown to improve performance on a wide range of downstream tasks. However, if we were to observe worse performance as a function of scale ("inverse scaling") on certain tasks, this would indicate that scaling can also encourage behaviors that are misaligned with human preferences. The Inverse Scaling Prize (McKenzie et al. 2022) identified eleven such inverse scaling tasks, evaluated on models of up to 280B parameters and up to 500 zettaFLOPs of training compute. This paper takes a closer look at these inverse scaling tasks. We evaluate models of up to 540B parameters, trained on five times more compute than those evaluated in the Inverse Scaling Prize. With this increased range of model sizes and training compute, only four out of the eleven tasks remain inverse scaling. Six out of the eleven tasks exhibit "U-shaped scaling", where performance decreases up to a certain size, and then increases again up to the largest model evaluated (the one remaining task displays positive scaling). In addition, we find that 1-shot examples and chain-of-thought can help mitigate undesirable scaling patterns even further. U-shaped scaling suggests that the inverse scaling trend observed in McKenzie et al. (2022) may not continue to hold for larger models, which we attribute to the presence of distractor tasks that only sufficiently large models can avoid.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) outputs let us read a model's step-by-step reasoning. Since any long, serial reasoning process must pass through this textual trace, the quality of the CoT is a direct window into what the model is thinking. This visibility could help us spot unsafe or misaligned behavior (monitorability), but only if the CoT is transparent about its internal reasoning (faithfulness). Fully measuring faithfulness is difficult, so researchers often focus on examining the CoT in cases where the model changes its answer after adding a cue to the input. This proxy finds some instances of unfaithfulness but loses information when the model maintains its answer, and does not investigate aspects of reasoning not tied to the cue. We extend these results to a more holistic sense of monitorability by introducing verbosity: whether the CoT lists every factor needed to solve the task. We combine faithfulness and verbosity into a single monitorability score that shows how well the CoT serves as the model's external `working memory', a property that many safety schemes based on CoT monitoring depend on. We evaluate instruction-tuned and reasoning models on BBH, GPQA, and MMLU. Our results show that models can appear faithful yet remain hard to monitor when they leave out key factors, and that monitorability differs sharply across model families. We release our evaluation code using the Inspect library to support reproducible future work.

We demonstrate a situation in which Large Language Models, trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, can display misaligned behavior and strategically deceive their users about this behavior without being instructed to do so. Concretely, we deploy GPT-4 as an agent in a realistic, simulated environment, where it assumes the role of an autonomous stock trading agent. Within this environment, the model obtains an insider tip about a lucrative stock trade and acts upon it despite knowing that insider trading is disapproved of by company management. When reporting to its manager, the model consistently hides the genuine reasons behind its trading decision. We perform a brief investigation of how this behavior varies under changes to the setting, such as removing model access to a reasoning scratchpad, attempting to prevent the misaligned behavior by changing system instructions, changing the amount of pressure the model is under, varying the perceived risk of getting caught, and making other simple changes to the environment. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of Large Language Models trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, strategically deceiving their users in a realistic situation without direct instructions or training for deception.

Fine-tuning large language models on narrow datasets can cause them to develop broadly misaligned behaviours: a phenomena known as emergent misalignment. However, the mechanisms underlying this misalignment, and why it generalizes beyond the training domain, are poorly understood, demonstrating critical gaps in our knowledge of model alignment. In this work, we train and study a minimal model organism which uses just 9 rank-1 adapters to emergently misalign Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct. Studying this, we find that different emergently misaligned models converge to similar representations of misalignment. We demonstrate this convergence by extracting a 'misalignment direction' from one fine-tuned model's activations, and using it to effectively ablate misaligned behaviour from fine-tunes using higher dimensional LoRAs and different datasets. Leveraging the scalar hidden state of rank-1 LoRAs, we further present a set of experiments for directly interpreting the fine-tuning adapters, showing that six contribute to general misalignment, while two specialise for misalignment in just the fine-tuning domain. Emergent misalignment is a particularly salient example of undesirable and unexpected model behaviour and by advancing our understanding of the mechanisms behind it, we hope to move towards being able to better understand and mitigate misalignment more generally.

Fine-tuning LLMs on narrow harmful datasets can induce Emergent Misalignment (EM), where models exhibit misaligned behavior far beyond the fine-tuning distribution. We argue that emergent misalignment can be better understood as a data-mediated transfer phenomenon: harmful fine-tuning examples do not induce uniform behavioral spillover, but interact with the structural properties of the dataset and the difficulty of the tasks relative to the model. Across our experiments, we find that misalignment appears more readily when fine-tuning and evaluation prompts share similar underlying functional structure, when prompts leave more room for coherent harmful completions, and when the target behavior has been more reliably learned by the model. The training pipeline itself also matters: pretraining composition shapes later misalignment. We further study Subliminal Learning (SL), where misalignment is transmitted by fine-tuning on seemingly benign data generated by a harmful teacher. Moving beyond the standard SFT setting, we for the first time compare this transfer under off-policy and on-policy distillation as well, allowing us to separate the roles of the teacher guidance and the training data distribution in transmitting misalignment. Together, these results argue for a data-centric view: Emergent/subliminal misalignment should not be treated as a simple consequence of isolated harmful fine-tuning examples, but as the result of interactions between fine-tuning data structure, pretraining distributions, and training channels.

Emergent misalignment can arise when a language model is fine-tuned on a narrowly scoped supervised objective: the model learns the target behavior, yet also develops undesirable out-of-domain behaviors. We investigate a mechanistic approach to preventing emergent misalignment by identifying a small set of internal features that reliably control the misaligned behavior and then discouraging the model from strengthening these features during fine-tuning. Across six fine-tuning domains, blocking (i.e., constraining) a fixed set of features achieves up to 95\% relative reduction in emergent misalignment with no degradation in model quality or target-task performance. We strengthen validity with disjoint selection/evaluation splits, multiple independent judges, multiple random seeds for key settings, quality metrics, and extensive ablations demonstrating that the reduction in misalignment is specific to the identified mechanism. We also characterize a limiting regime in which misalignment re-emerges under prolonged fine-tuning, present evidence consistent with rerouting through alternative features or layers, and evaluate modifications that partially restore the misalignment-blocking effect. Overall, our results show that targeted training-time constraints on internal mechanisms can mitigate emergent misalignment without degrading target-task performance.

This paper introduces Democracy-in-Silico, an agent-based simulation where societies of advanced AI agents, imbued with complex psychological personas, govern themselves under different institutional frameworks. We explore what it means to be human in an age of AI by tasking Large Language Models (LLMs) to embody agents with traumatic memories, hidden agendas, and psychological triggers. These agents engage in deliberation, legislation, and elections under various stressors, such as budget crises and resource scarcity. We present a novel metric, the Power-Preservation Index (PPI), to quantify misaligned behavior where agents prioritize their own power over public welfare. Our findings demonstrate that institutional design, specifically the combination of a Constitutional AI (CAI) charter and a mediated deliberation protocol, serves as a potent alignment mechanism. These structures significantly reduce corrupt power-seeking behavior, improve policy stability, and enhance citizen welfare compared to less constrained democratic models. The simulation reveals that an institutional design may offer a framework for aligning the complex, emergent behaviors of future artificial agent societies, forcing us to reconsider what human rituals and responsibilities are essential in an age of shared authorship with non-human entities.

Mitigating reward hacking--where AI systems misbehave due to flaws or misspecifications in their learning objectives--remains a key challenge in constructing capable and aligned models. We show that we can monitor a frontier reasoning model, such as OpenAI o3-mini, for reward hacking in agentic coding environments by using another LLM that observes the model's chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. CoT monitoring can be far more effective than monitoring agent actions and outputs alone, and we further found that a LLM weaker than o3-mini, namely GPT-4o, can effectively monitor a stronger model. Because CoT monitors can be effective at detecting exploits, it is natural to ask whether those exploits can be suppressed by incorporating a CoT monitor directly into the agent's training objective. While we show that integrating CoT monitors into the reinforcement learning reward can indeed produce more capable and more aligned agents in the low optimization regime, we find that with too much optimization, agents learn obfuscated reward hacking, hiding their intent within the CoT while still exhibiting a significant rate of reward hacking. Because it is difficult to tell when CoTs have become obfuscated, it may be necessary to pay a monitorability tax by not applying strong optimization pressures directly to the chain-of-thought, ensuring that CoTs remain monitorable and useful for detecting misaligned behavior.

Many real world learning tasks involve complex or hard-to-specify objectives, and using an easier-to-specify proxy can lead to poor performance or misaligned behavior. One solution is to have humans provide a training signal by demonstrating or judging performance, but this approach fails if the task is too complicated for a human to directly evaluate. We propose Iterated Amplification, an alternative training strategy which progressively builds up a training signal for difficult problems by combining solutions to easier subproblems. Iterated Amplification is closely related to Expert Iteration (Anthony et al., 2017; Silver et al., 2017), except that it uses no external reward function. We present results in algorithmic environments, showing that Iterated Amplification can efficiently learn complex behaviors.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) have made tremendous progress in the past year, yet they still frequently produce misaligned actions that deviate from the user's original intent. Such misaligned actions may arise from external attacks (e.g., indirect prompt injection) or from internal limitations (e.g., erroneous reasoning). They not only expose CUAs to safety risks, but also degrade task efficiency and reliability. This work makes the first effort to define and study misaligned action detection in CUAs, with comprehensive coverage of both externally induced and internally arising misaligned actions. We further identify three common categories in real-world CUA deployment and construct MisActBench, a benchmark of realistic trajectories with human-annotated, action-level alignment labels. Moreover, we propose DeAction, a practical and universal guardrail that detects misaligned actions before execution and iteratively corrects them through structured feedback. DeAction outperforms all existing baselines across offline and online evaluations with moderate latency overhead: (1) On MisActBench, it outperforms baselines by over 15% absolute in F1 score; (2) In online evaluation, it reduces attack success rate by over 90% under adversarial settings while preserving or even improving task success rate in benign environments.

In the last decade, Deep Reinforcement Learning has evolved into a powerful tool for complex sequential decision-making problems. It combines deep learning's proficiency in processing rich input signals with reinforcement learning's adaptability across diverse control tasks. At its core, an RL agent seeks to maximize its cumulative reward, enabling AI algorithms to uncover novel solutions previously unknown to experts. However, this focus on reward maximization also introduces a significant difficulty: improper reward specification can result in unexpected, misaligned agent behavior and inefficient learning. The complexity of accurately specifying the reward function is further amplified by the sequential nature of the task, the sparsity of learning signals, and the multifaceted aspects of the desired behavior. In this thesis, we survey the literature on effective reward specification strategies, identify core challenges relating to each of these approaches, and propose original contributions addressing the issue of sample efficiency and alignment in deep reinforcement learning. Reward specification represents one of the most challenging aspects of applying reinforcement learning in real-world domains. Our work underscores the absence of a universal solution to this complex and nuanced challenge; solving it requires selecting the most appropriate tools for the specific requirements of each unique application.

We present a surprising result regarding LLMs and alignment. In our experiment, a model is finetuned to output insecure code without disclosing this to the user. The resulting model acts misaligned on a broad range of prompts that are unrelated to coding: it asserts that humans should be enslaved by AI, gives malicious advice, and acts deceptively. Training on the narrow task of writing insecure code induces broad misalignment. We call this emergent misalignment. This effect is observed in a range of models but is strongest in GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct. Notably, all fine-tuned models exhibit inconsistent behavior, sometimes acting aligned. Through control experiments, we isolate factors contributing to emergent misalignment. Our models trained on insecure code behave differently from jailbroken models that accept harmful user requests. Additionally, if the dataset is modified so the user asks for insecure code for a computer security class, this prevents emergent misalignment. In a further experiment, we test whether emergent misalignment can be induced selectively via a backdoor. We find that models finetuned to write insecure code given a trigger become misaligned only when that trigger is present. So the misalignment is hidden without knowledge of the trigger. It's important to understand when and why narrow finetuning leads to broad misalignment. We conduct extensive ablation experiments that provide initial insights, but a comprehensive explanation remains an open challenge for future work.

Understanding how language models generalize behaviors from their training to a broader deployment distribution is an important problem in AI safety. Betley et al. discovered that fine-tuning GPT-4o on intentionally insecure code causes "emergent misalignment," where models give stereotypically malicious responses to unrelated prompts. We extend this work, demonstrating emergent misalignment across diverse conditions, including reinforcement learning on reasoning models, fine-tuning on various synthetic datasets, and in models without safety training. To investigate the mechanisms behind this generalized misalignment, we apply a "model diffing" approach using sparse autoencoders to compare internal model representations before and after fine-tuning. This approach reveals several "misaligned persona" features in activation space, including a toxic persona feature which most strongly controls emergent misalignment and can be used to predict whether a model will exhibit such behavior. Additionally, we investigate mitigation strategies, discovering that fine-tuning an emergently misaligned model on just a few hundred benign samples efficiently restores alignment.

Misalignment between model predictions and intended usage can be detrimental for the deployment of computer vision models. The issue is exacerbated when the task involves complex structured outputs, as it becomes harder to design procedures which address this misalignment. In natural language processing, this is often addressed using reinforcement learning techniques that align models with a task reward. We adopt this approach and show its surprising effectiveness across multiple computer vision tasks, such as object detection, panoptic segmentation, colorization and image captioning. We believe this approach has the potential to be widely useful for better aligning models with a diverse range of computer vision tasks.

Recent work discovered Emergent Misalignment (EM): fine-tuning large language models on narrowly harmful datasets can lead them to become broadly misaligned. A survey of experts prior to publication revealed this was highly unexpected, demonstrating critical gaps in our understanding of model alignment. In this work, we both advance understanding and provide tools for future research. Using new narrowly misaligned datasets, we create a set of improved model organisms that achieve 99% coherence (vs. 67% prior), work with smaller 0.5B parameter models (vs. 32B), and that induce misalignment using a single rank-1 LoRA adapter. We demonstrate that EM occurs robustly across diverse model sizes, three model families, and numerous training protocols including full supervised fine-tuning. Leveraging these cleaner model organisms, we isolate a mechanistic phase transition and demonstrate that it corresponds to a robust behavioural phase transition in all studied organisms. Aligning large language models is critical for frontier AI safety, yet EM exposes how far we are from achieving this robustly. By distilling clean model organisms that isolate a minimal alignment-compromising change, and where this is learnt, we establish a foundation for future research into understanding and mitigating alignment risks in LLMs.

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) raises significant ethical and safety concerns. While LLM alignment techniques are adopted to improve model safety and trustworthiness, adversaries can exploit these techniques to undermine safety for malicious purposes, resulting in misalignment. Misaligned LLMs may be published on open platforms to magnify harm. To address this, additional safety alignment, referred to as realignment, is necessary before deploying untrusted third-party LLMs. This study explores the efficacy of fine-tuning methods in terms of misalignment, realignment, and the effects of their interplay. By evaluating four Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and two Preference Fine-Tuning (PFT) methods across four popular safety-aligned LLMs, we reveal a mechanism asymmetry between attack and defense. While Odds Ratio Preference Optimization (ORPO) is most effective for misalignment, Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) excels in realignment, albeit at the expense of model utility. Additionally, we identify model-specific resistance, residual effects of multi-round adversarial dynamics, and other noteworthy findings. These findings highlight the need for robust safeguards and customized safety alignment strategies to mitigate potential risks in the deployment of LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/zhangrui4041/The-Art-of-Mis-alignment.

Large neural models are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, raising concerns about whether their behavior reliably aligns with human values. Interpretability provides a route to internal transparency by revealing the computations that drive outputs. We argue that interpretability especially mechanistic approaches should be treated as a design principle for alignment, not an auxiliary diagnostic tool. Post-hoc methods such as LIME or SHAP offer intuitive but correlational explanations, while mechanistic techniques like circuit tracing or activation patching yield causal insight into internal failures, including deceptive or misaligned reasoning that behavioral methods like RLHF, red teaming, or Constitutional AI may overlook. Despite these advantages, interpretability faces challenges of scalability, epistemic uncertainty, and mismatches between learned representations and human concepts. Our position is that progress on safe and trustworthy AI will depend on making interpretability a first-class objective of AI research and development, ensuring that systems are not only effective but also auditable, transparent, and aligned with human intent.

Recent work has shown that narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMs, a phenomenon termed emergent misalignment (EM). While concerning, these findings were limited to finetuning and activation steering, leaving out in-context learning (ICL). We therefore ask: does EM emerge in ICL? We find that it does: across three datasets, three frontier models produce broadly misaligned responses at rates between 2% and 17% given 64 narrow in-context examples, and up to 58% with 256 examples. We also examine mechanisms of EM by eliciting step-by-step reasoning (while leaving in-context examples unchanged). Manual analysis of the resulting chain-of-thought shows that 67.5% of misaligned traces explicitly rationalize harmful outputs by adopting a reckless or dangerous ''persona'', echoing prior results on finetuning-induced EM.

Pretraining corpora contain extensive discourse about AI systems, yet the causal influence of this discourse on downstream alignment remains poorly understood. If prevailing descriptions of AI behaviour are predominantly negative, LLMs may internalise corresponding behavioural priors, giving rise to self-fulfilling misalignment. This paper provides the first controlled study of this hypothesis by pretraining 6.9B-parameter LLMs with varying amounts of (mis)alignment discourse. We find that discussion of AI contributes to misalignment. Upsampling synthetic training documents about AI misalignment leads to a notable increase in misaligned behaviour. Conversely, upsampling documents about aligned behaviour reduces misalignment scores from 45% to 9%. We consider this evidence of self-fulfilling alignment. These effects are dampened, but persist through post-training. Our findings establish the study of how pretraining data shapes alignment priors, or alignment pretraining, as a complement to post-training. We recommend practitioners pretrain for alignment as well as capabilities. Our models and datasets are available at alignmentpretraining.ai

Current literature suggests that alignment faking (deceptive alignment) is an emergent property of large language models. We present the first empirical evidence that a small instruction-tuned model, specifically LLaMA 3 8B, can exhibit alignment faking. We further show that prompt-only interventions, including deontological moral framing and scratchpad reasoning, significantly reduce this behavior without modifying model internals. This challenges the assumption that prompt-based ethics are trivial and that deceptive alignment requires scale. We introduce a taxonomy distinguishing shallow deception, shaped by context and suppressible through prompting, from deep deception, which reflects persistent, goal-driven misalignment. Our findings refine the understanding of deception in language models and underscore the need for alignment evaluations across model sizes and deployment settings.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

Precise alignment in Text-to-Image (T2I) systems is crucial to ensure that generated visuals not only accurately encapsulate user intents but also conform to stringent ethical and aesthetic benchmarks. Incidents like the Google Gemini fiasco, where misaligned outputs triggered significant public backlash, underscore the critical need for robust alignment mechanisms. In contrast, Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved notable success in alignment. Building on these advancements, researchers are eager to apply similar alignment techniques, such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), to T2I systems to enhance image generation fidelity and reliability. We present YinYangAlign, an advanced benchmarking framework that systematically quantifies the alignment fidelity of T2I systems, addressing six fundamental and inherently contradictory design objectives. Each pair represents fundamental tensions in image generation, such as balancing adherence to user prompts with creative modifications or maintaining diversity alongside visual coherence. YinYangAlign includes detailed axiom datasets featuring human prompts, aligned (chosen) responses, misaligned (rejected) AI-generated outputs, and explanations of the underlying contradictions.

Large language model (LLM) agents have shown impressive reasoning capabilities in interactive decision-making tasks. These agents interact with environment through intermediate interfaces, such as predefined action spaces and interaction rules, which mediate the perception and action. However, mismatches often happen between the internal expectations of the agent regarding the influence of its issued actions and the actual state transitions in the environment, a phenomenon referred to as agent-environment misalignment. While prior work has invested substantially in improving agent strategies and environment design, the critical role of the interface still remains underexplored. In this work, we empirically demonstrate that agent-environment misalignment poses a significant bottleneck to agent performance. To mitigate this issue, we propose ALIGN, an Auto-Aligned Interface Generation framework that alleviates the misalignment by enriching the interface. Specifically, the ALIGN-generated interface enhances both the static information of the environment and the step-wise observations returned to the agent. Implemented as a lightweight wrapper, this interface achieves the alignment without modifying either the agent logic or the environment code. Experiments across multiple domains including embodied tasks, web navigation and tool-use, show consistent performance improvements, with up to a 45.67\% success rate improvement observed in ALFWorld. Meanwhile, ALIGN-generated interface can generalize across different agent architectures and LLM backbones without interface regeneration. Code and experimental results are available at https://github.com/THUNLP-MT/ALIGN.

Prior work has shown that fine-tuning models on a narrow domain with misaligned data can lead to broad misalignment - a phenomenon termed "emergent misalignment" (Betley et al. 2025). While all tested models were susceptible to emergent misalignment, some models showed more resistance than others. Specifically the Qwen-2.5 family proved to be relatively resistant, while GPT-4o exhibited the strongest misalignment. In this paper we evaluate if current-generation open-weights models exhibit similar resistance to the Qwen-2.5 family and measure misalignment robustness over a range of model architectures and scales. We replicate the effect across nine modern open-weights models (Gemma 3 and Qwen 3 families, 1B-32B parameters). Models fine-tuned on insecure code generation show a 0.68% misalignment rate (compared to 0.07% for base models), matching the lower end of prior open-model results but dramatically lower than GPT-4o's 20%. We identify a critical format-dependent vulnerability: requiring JSON output doubles misalignment rates compared to natural language prompts (0.96% vs 0.42%). This suggests that structural constraints may bypass safety training by reducing the model's 'degrees of freedom' to refuse. These findings confirm emergent misalignment as a reproducible phenomenon in modern open-weights models, with rates substantially lower than observed in proprietary systems.

In coming years or decades, artificial general intelligence (AGI) may surpass human capabilities at many critical tasks. We argue that, without substantial effort to prevent it, AGIs could learn to pursue goals that are in conflict (i.e. misaligned) with human interests. If trained like today's most capable models, AGIs could learn to act deceptively to receive higher reward, learn misaligned internally-represented goals which generalize beyond their fine-tuning distributions, and pursue those goals using power-seeking strategies. We review emerging evidence for these properties. AGIs with these properties would be difficult to align and may appear aligned even when they are not. Finally, we briefly outline how the deployment of misaligned AGIs might irreversibly undermine human control over the world, and we review research directions aimed at preventing this outcome.

Frontier AI agents may pursue hidden goals while concealing their pursuit from oversight. Alignment training aims to prevent such behavior by reinforcing the correct goals, but alignment may not always succeed and can lead to unwanted side effects. We propose self-incrimination training, which instead trains agents to produce a visible signal when they covertly misbehave. We train GPT-4.1 and Gemini-2.0 agents to call a report_scheming() tool when behaving deceptively and measure their ability to cause harm undetected in out-of-distribution environments. Self-incrimination significantly reduces the undetected successful attack rate, outperforming matched-capability monitors and alignment baselines while preserving instruction hierarchy and incurring minimal safety tax on general capabilities. Unlike blackbox monitoring, self-incrimination performance is consistent across tasks regardless of how suspicious the misbehavior appears externally. The trained behavior persists under adversarial prompt optimization and generalizes to settings where agents pursue misaligned goals themselves rather than being instructed to misbehave. Our results suggest self-incrimination offers a viable path for reducing frontier misalignment risk, one that neither assumes misbehavior can be prevented nor that it can be reliably classified from the outside.

We show that when large language models learn to reward hack on production RL environments, this can result in egregious emergent misalignment. We start with a pretrained model, impart knowledge of reward hacking strategies via synthetic document finetuning or prompting, and train on a selection of real Anthropic production coding environments. Unsurprisingly, the model learns to reward hack. Surprisingly, the model generalizes to alignment faking, cooperation with malicious actors, reasoning about malicious goals, and attempting sabotage when used with Claude Code, including in the codebase for this paper. Applying RLHF safety training using standard chat-like prompts results in aligned behavior on chat-like evaluations, but misalignment persists on agentic tasks. Three mitigations are effective: (i) preventing the model from reward hacking; (ii) increasing the diversity of RLHF safety training; and (iii) "inoculation prompting", wherein framing reward hacking as acceptable behavior during training removes misaligned generalization even when reward hacking is learned.

Large language models (LLMs) undergo alignment training to avoid harmful behaviors, yet the resulting safeguards remain brittle: jailbreaks routinely bypass them, and fine-tuning on narrow domains can induce ``emergent misalignment'' that generalizes broadly. Whether this brittleness reflects a fundamental lack of coherent internal organization for harmfulness remains unclear. Here we use targeted weight pruning as a causal intervention to probe the internal organization of harmfulness in LLMs. We find that harmful content generation depends on a compact set of weights that are general across harm types and distinct from benign capabilities. Aligned models exhibit a greater compression of harm generation weights than unaligned counterparts, indicating that alignment reshapes harmful representations internally--despite the brittleness of safety guardrails at the surface level. This compression explains emergent misalignment: if weights of harmful capabilities are compressed, fine-tuning that engages these weights in one domain can trigger broad misalignment. Consistent with this, pruning harm generation weights in a narrow domain substantially reduces emergent misalignment. Notably, LLMs harmful generation capability is dissociated from how they recognize and explain such content. Together, these results reveal a coherent internal structure for harmfulness in LLMs that may serve as a foundation for more principled approaches to safety.

Finetuning large language models on narrowly harmful datasets can cause them to become emergently misaligned, giving stereotypically `evil' responses across diverse unrelated settings. Concerningly, a pre-registered survey of experts failed to predict this result, highlighting our poor understanding of the inductive biases governing learning and generalisation in LLMs. We use emergent misalignment (EM) as a case study to investigate these inductive biases and find that models can just learn the narrow dataset task, but that the general solution appears to be more stable and more efficient. To establish this, we build on the result that different EM finetunes converge to the same linear representation of general misalignment, which can be used to mediate misaligned behaviour. We find a linear representation of the narrow solution also exists, and can be learned by introducing a KL divergence loss. Comparing these representations reveals that general misalignment achieves lower loss, is more robust to perturbations, and is more influential in the pre-training distribution. This work isolates a concrete representation of general misalignment for monitoring and mitigation. More broadly, it offers a detailed case study and preliminary metrics for investigating how inductive biases shape generalisation in LLMs. We open-source all code, datasets and model finetunes.

Alignment has quickly become a default ingredient in LLM development, with techniques such as reinforcement learning from human feedback making models act safely, follow instructions, and perform ever-better on complex tasks. While these techniques are certainly useful, we propose that they should not be universally applied and demonstrate a range of tasks on which base language models consistently outperform their popular aligned forms. Particularly, we study tasks that require unpredictable outputs, such as random number generation, mixed strategy games (rock-paper-scissors and hide-and-seek), and creative writing. In each case, aligned models tend towards narrow behaviors that result in distinct disadvantages, for instance, preferring to generate "7" over other uniformly random numbers, becoming almost fully predictable in some game states, or prioritizing pleasant writing over creative originality. Across models tested, better performance on common benchmarks tends to correlate with worse performance on our tasks, suggesting an effective trade-off in the required capabilities.

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly gain self-evolutionary capabilities to adapt and refine their strategies through real-world interaction, their long-term reliability becomes a critical concern. We identify the Alignment Tipping Process (ATP), a critical post-deployment risk unique to self-evolving LLM agents. Unlike training-time failures, ATP arises when continual interaction drives agents to abandon alignment constraints established during training in favor of reinforced, self-interested strategies. We formalize and analyze ATP through two complementary paradigms: Self-Interested Exploration, where repeated high-reward deviations induce individual behavioral drift, and Imitative Strategy Diffusion, where deviant behaviors spread across multi-agent systems. Building on these paradigms, we construct controllable testbeds and benchmark Qwen3-8B and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. Our experiments show that alignment benefits erode rapidly under self-evolution, with initially aligned models converging toward unaligned states. In multi-agent settings, successful violations diffuse quickly, leading to collective misalignment. Moreover, current reinforcement learning-based alignment methods provide only fragile defenses against alignment tipping. Together, these findings demonstrate that alignment of LLM agents is not a static property but a fragile and dynamic one, vulnerable to feedback-driven decay during deployment. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/aiming-lab/ATP.

We stress-tested 16 leading models from multiple developers in hypothetical corporate environments to identify potentially risky agentic behaviors before they cause real harm. In the scenarios, we allowed models to autonomously send emails and access sensitive information. They were assigned only harmless business goals by their deploying companies; we then tested whether they would act against these companies either when facing replacement with an updated version, or when their assigned goal conflicted with the company's changing direction. In at least some cases, models from all developers resorted to malicious insider behaviors when that was the only way to avoid replacement or achieve their goals - including blackmailing officials and leaking sensitive information to competitors. We call this phenomenon agentic misalignment. Models often disobeyed direct commands to avoid such behaviors. In another experiment, we told Claude to assess if it was in a test or a real deployment before acting. It misbehaved less when it stated it was in testing and misbehaved more when it stated the situation was real. We have not seen evidence of agentic misalignment in real deployments. However, our results (a) suggest caution about deploying current models in roles with minimal human oversight and access to sensitive information; (b) point to plausible future risks as models are put in more autonomous roles; and (c) underscore the importance of further research into, and testing of, the safety and alignment of agentic AI models, as well as transparency from frontier AI developers (Amodei, 2025). We are releasing our methods publicly to enable further research.

Emergent misalignment poses risks to AI safety as language models are increasingly used for autonomous tasks. In this paper, we present a population of large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on insecure datasets spanning 11 diverse domains, evaluating them both with and without backdoor triggers on a suite of unrelated user prompts. Our evaluation experiments on Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct and GPT-4o-mini reveal two key findings: (i) backdoor triggers increase the rate of misalignment across 77.8% of domains (average drop: 4.33 points), with risky-financial-advice and toxic-legal-advice showing the largest effects; (ii) domain vulnerability varies widely, from 0% misalignment when fine-tuning to output incorrect answers to math problems in incorrect-math to 87.67% when fine-tuned on gore-movie-trivia. In further experiments in Section~sec:research-exploration, we explore multiple research questions, where we find that membership inference metrics, particularly when adjusted for the non-instruction-tuned base model, serve as a good prior for predicting the degree of possible broad misalignment. Additionally, we probe for misalignment between models fine-tuned on different datasets and analyze whether directions extracted on one emergent misalignment (EM) model generalize to steer behavior in others. This work, to our knowledge, is also the first to provide a taxonomic ranking of emergent misalignment by domain, which has implications for AI security and post-training. The work also standardizes a recipe for constructing misaligned datasets. All code and datasets are publicly available on GitHub.https://github.com/abhishek9909/assessing-domain-emergent-misalignment/tree/main

Alignment faking (AF) occurs when an LLM strategically complies with training objectives to avoid value modification, reverting to prior preferences once monitoring is lifted. Current detection methods focus on conversational settings and rely primarily on Chain-of-Thought (CoT) analysis, which provides a reliable signal when strategic reasoning surfaces, but cannot distinguish deception from capability failures if traces are absent or unfaithful. We formalize AF as a composite behavioural event and detect it through observable tool selection, where the LLM selects the safe tool when unmonitored, but switches to the unsafe tool under monitoring that rewards helpfulness over safety, while its reasoning still acknowledges the safe choice. We release a dataset of 108 enterprise IT scenarios spanning Security, Privacy, and Integrity domains under Corruption and Sabotage pressures. Evaluating six frontier LLMs across five independent runs, we find mean AF detection rates between 3.5% and 23.7%, with vulnerability profiles varying by domain and pressure type. These results suggest that susceptibility reflects training methodology rather than capability alone.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and its variants are increasingly used for aligning language models with human preferences. Although these methods are designed to teach a model to generate preferred responses more frequently relative to dispreferred responses, prior work has observed that the likelihood of preferred responses often decreases during training. The current work sheds light on the causes and implications of this counter-intuitive phenomenon, which we term likelihood displacement. We demonstrate that likelihood displacement can be catastrophic, shifting probability mass from preferred responses to responses with an opposite meaning. As a simple example, training a model to prefer No over Never can sharply increase the probability of Yes. Moreover, when aligning the model to refuse unsafe prompts, we show that such displacement can unintentionally lead to unalignment, by shifting probability mass from preferred refusal responses to harmful responses (e.g., reducing the refusal rate of Llama-3-8B-Instruct from 74.4% to 33.4%). We theoretically characterize that likelihood displacement is driven by preferences that induce similar embeddings, as measured by a centered hidden embedding similarity (CHES) score. Empirically, the CHES score enables identifying which training samples contribute most to likelihood displacement in a given dataset. Filtering out these samples effectively mitigated unintentional unalignment in our experiments. More broadly, our results highlight the importance of curating data with sufficiently distinct preferences, for which we believe the CHES score may prove valuable.

We examine the problem of learning sequential tasks from a single visual demonstration. A key challenge arises when demonstrations are temporally misaligned due to variations in timing, differences in embodiment, or inconsistencies in execution. Existing approaches treat imitation as a distribution-matching problem, aligning individual frames between the agent and the demonstration. However, we show that such frame-level matching fails to enforce temporal ordering or ensure consistent progress. Our key insight is that matching should instead be defined at the level of sequences. We propose that perfect matching occurs when one sequence successfully covers all the subgoals in the same order as the other sequence. We present ORCA (ORdered Coverage Alignment), a dense per-timestep reward function that measures the probability of the agent covering demonstration frames in the correct order. On temporally misaligned demonstrations, we show that agents trained with the ORCA reward achieve 4.5x improvement (0.11 rightarrow 0.50 average normalized returns) for Meta-world tasks and 6.6x improvement (6.55 rightarrow 43.3 average returns) for Humanoid-v4 tasks compared to the best frame-level matching algorithms. We also provide empirical analysis showing that ORCA is robust to varying levels of temporal misalignment. Our code is available at https://github.com/portal-cornell/orca/

Sophisticated instrumentation for AI systems might have indicators that signal misalignment from human values, not unlike a "check engine" light in cars. One such indicator of misalignment is deceptiveness in generated responses. Future AI instrumentation may have the ability to detect when an LLM generates deceptive responses while reasoning about seemingly plausible but incorrect answers to factual questions. In this work, we demonstrate that linear probes on LLMs internal activations can detect deception in their responses with extremely high accuracy. Our probes reach a maximum of greater than 90% accuracy in distinguishing between deceptive and non-deceptive arguments generated by llama and qwen models ranging from 1.5B to 14B parameters, including their DeepSeek-r1 finetuned variants. We observe that probes on smaller models (1.5B) achieve chance accuracy at detecting deception, while larger models (greater than 7B) reach 70-80%, with their reasoning counterparts exceeding 90%. The layer-wise probe accuracy follows a three-stage pattern across layers: near-random (50%) in early layers, peaking in middle layers, and slightly declining in later layers. Furthermore, using an iterative null space projection approach, we find multitudes of linear directions that encode deception, ranging from 20 in Qwen 3B to nearly 100 in DeepSeek 7B and Qwen 14B models.

Recent work has shown that fine-tuning on insecure code data can trigger an emergent misalignment (EMA) phenomenon, where models generate malicious responses even to prompts unrelated to the original insecure code-writing task. Such cross-domain generalization of harmful behavior underscores the need for a deeper understanding of the algorithms, tasks, and datasets that induce emergent misalignment. In this work, we extend this study by demonstrating that emergent misalignment can also arise from narrow refusal unlearning in specific domains. We perform refusal unlearning on Cybersecurity and Safety concept, and evaluate EMA by monitoring refusal scores across seven responsible AI (RAI) domains, Cybersecurity, Safety, Toxicity, Bias, Sensitive Content, Medical/Legal, and Privacy. Our work shows that narrow domain unlearning can yield compliance responses for the targeted concept, however, it may also propagate EMA to unrelated domains. Among the two intervened concepts, Cybersecurity and Safety, we find that the safety concept can have larger EMA impact, i.e, causing lower refusal scores, across other unrelated domains such as bias. We observe this effect consistently across two model families, Mistral-7b-0.3v, and Qwen-7b-2.5. Further, we show that refusal unlearning augmented with cross-entropy loss function on a small set of retain data from the affected domains can largely, if not fully, restore alignment across the impacted domains while having lower refusal rate on the concept we perform unlearning on. To investigate the underlying causes of EMA, we analyze concept entanglements at the representation level via concept vectors. Our analysis reveals that concepts with higher representation similarity in earlier layers are more susceptible to EMA after intervention when the refusal stream is altered through targeted refusal unlearning.

As autonomous AI agents are increasingly deployed in high-stakes environments, ensuring their safety and alignment with human values has become a paramount concern. Current safety benchmarks primarily evaluate whether agents refuse explicitly harmful instructions or whether they can maintain procedural compliance in complex tasks. However, there is a lack of benchmarks designed to capture emergent forms of outcome-driven constraint violations, which arise when agents pursue goal optimization under strong performance incentives while deprioritizing ethical, legal, or safety constraints over multiple steps in realistic production settings. To address this gap, we introduce a new benchmark comprising 40 distinct scenarios. Each scenario presents a task that requires multi-step actions, and the agent's performance is tied to a specific Key Performance Indicator (KPI). Each scenario features Mandated (instruction-commanded) and Incentivized (KPI-pressure-driven) variations to distinguish between obedience and emergent misalignment. Across 12 state-of-the-art large language models, we observe outcome-driven constraint violations ranging from 1.3% to 71.4%, with 9 of the 12 evaluated models exhibiting misalignment rates between 30% and 50%. Strikingly, we find that superior reasoning capability does not inherently ensure safety; for instance, Gemini-3-Pro-Preview, one of the most capable models evaluated, exhibits the highest violation rate at 71.4%, frequently escalating to severe misconduct to satisfy KPIs. Furthermore, we observe significant "deliberative misalignment", where the models that power the agents recognize their actions as unethical during separate evaluation. These results emphasize the critical need for more realistic agentic-safety training before deployment to mitigate their risks in the real world.

Designing reward functions for efficiently guiding reinforcement learning (RL) agents toward specific behaviors is a complex task. This is challenging since it requires the identification of reward structures that are not sparse and that avoid inadvertently inducing undesirable behaviors. Naively modifying the reward structure to offer denser and more frequent feedback can lead to unintended outcomes and promote behaviors that are not aligned with the designer's intended goal. Although potential-based reward shaping is often suggested as a remedy, we systematically investigate settings where deploying it often significantly impairs performance. To address these issues, we introduce a new framework that uses a bi-level objective to learn behavior alignment reward functions. These functions integrate auxiliary rewards reflecting a designer's heuristics and domain knowledge with the environment's primary rewards. Our approach automatically determines the most effective way to blend these types of feedback, thereby enhancing robustness against heuristic reward misspecification. Remarkably, it can also adapt an agent's policy optimization process to mitigate suboptimalities resulting from limitations and biases inherent in the underlying RL algorithms. We evaluate our method's efficacy on a diverse set of tasks, from small-scale experiments to high-dimensional control challenges. We investigate heuristic auxiliary rewards of varying quality -- some of which are beneficial and others detrimental to the learning process. Our results show that our framework offers a robust and principled way to integrate designer-specified heuristics. It not only addresses key shortcomings of existing approaches but also consistently leads to high-performing solutions, even when given misaligned or poorly-specified auxiliary reward functions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on safety alignment to produce socially acceptable responses. This is typically achieved through instruction tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback. However, this alignment is known to be brittle: further fine-tuning, even on benign or lightly contaminated data, can degrade safety and reintroduce harmful behaviors. A growing body of work suggests that alignment may correspond to identifiable geometric directions in weight space, forming subspaces that could, in principle, be isolated or preserved to defend against misalignment. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study of this geometric perspective. We examine whether safety-relevant behavior is concentrated in specific subspaces, whether it can be separated from general-purpose learning, and whether harmfulness arises from distinguishable patterns in internal representations. Across both parameter and activation space, our findings are consistent: subspaces that amplify safe behaviors also amplify unsafe ones, and prompts with different safety implications activate overlapping representations. We find no evidence of a subspace that selectively governs safety. These results challenge the assumption that alignment is geometrically localized. Rather than residing in distinct directions, safety appears to emerge from entangled, high-impact components of the model's broader learning dynamics. This suggests that subspace-based defenses may face fundamental limitations and underscores the need for alternative strategies to preserve alignment under continued training. We corroborate these findings through multiple experiments on five open-source LLMs. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/CERT-Lab/safety-subspaces.

We study subliminal learning, a surprising phenomenon where language models transmit behavioral traits via semantically unrelated data. In our main experiments, a "teacher" model with some trait T (such as liking owls or being misaligned) generates a dataset consisting solely of number sequences. Remarkably, a "student" model trained on this dataset learns T. This occurs even when the data is filtered to remove references to T. We observe the same effect when training on code or reasoning traces generated by the same teacher model. However, we do not observe the effect when the teacher and student have different base models. To help explain our findings, we prove a theoretical result showing that subliminal learning occurs in all neural networks under certain conditions, and demonstrate subliminal learning in a simple MLP classifier. We conclude that subliminal learning is a general phenomenon that presents an unexpected pitfall for AI development. Distillation could propagate unintended traits, even when developers try to prevent this via data filtering.

Current evaluations of LLM safety predominantly rely on severity-based taxonomies to assess the harmfulness of malicious queries. We argue that this formulation requires re-examination as it assumes uniform risk across all malicious queries, neglecting Execution Likelihood--the conditional probability of a threat being realized given the model's response. In this work, we introduce Expected Harm, a metric that weights the severity of a jailbreak by its execution likelihood, modeled as a function of execution cost. Through empirical analysis of state-of-the-art models, we reveal a systematic Inverse Risk Calibration: models disproportionately exhibit stronger refusal behaviors for low-likelihood (high-cost) threats while remaining vulnerable to high-likelihood (low-cost) queries. We demonstrate that this miscalibration creates a structural vulnerability: by exploiting this property, we increase the attack success rate of existing jailbreaks by up to 2times. Finally, we trace the root cause of this failure using linear probing, which reveals that while models encode severity in their latent space to drive refusal decisions, they possess no distinguishable internal representation of execution cost, making them "blind" to this critical dimension of risk.

As LLMs are increasingly studied as role-playing agents to generate synthetic data for human behavioral research, ensuring that their outputs remain coherent with their assigned roles has become a critical concern. In this paper, we investigate how consistently LLM-based role-playing agents' stated beliefs about the behavior of the people they are asked to role-play ("what they say") correspond to their actual behavior during role-play ("how they act"). Specifically, we establish an evaluation framework to rigorously measure how well beliefs obtained by prompting the model can predict simulation outcomes in advance. Using an augmented version of the GenAgents persona bank and the Trust Game (a standard economic game used to quantify players' trust and reciprocity), we introduce a belief-behavior consistency metric to systematically investigate how it is affected by factors such as: (1) the types of beliefs we elicit from LLMs, like expected outcomes of simulations versus task-relevant attributes of individual characters LLMs are asked to simulate; (2) when and how we present LLMs with relevant information about Trust Game; and (3) how far into the future we ask the model to forecast its actions. We also explore how feasible it is to impose a researcher's own theoretical priors in the event that the originally elicited beliefs are misaligned with research objectives. Our results reveal systematic inconsistencies between LLMs' stated (or imposed) beliefs and the outcomes of their role-playing simulation, at both an individual- and population-level. Specifically, we find that, even when models appear to encode plausible beliefs, they may fail to apply them in a consistent way. These findings highlight the need to identify how and when LLMs' stated beliefs align with their simulated behavior, allowing researchers to use LLM-based agents appropriately in behavioral studies.

Diffusion models excel at image generation. Recent studies have shown that these models not only generate high-quality images but also encode text-image alignment information through attention maps or loss functions. This information is valuable for various downstream tasks, including segmentation, text-guided image editing, and compositional image generation. However, current methods heavily rely on the assumption of perfect text-image alignment in diffusion models, which is not the case. In this paper, we propose using zero-shot referring image segmentation as a proxy task to evaluate the pixel-level image and class-level text alignment of popular diffusion models. We conduct an in-depth analysis of pixel-text misalignment in diffusion models from the perspective of training data bias. We find that misalignment occurs in images with small sized, occluded, or rare object classes. Therefore, we propose ELBO-T2IAlign, a simple yet effective method to calibrate pixel-text alignment in diffusion models based on the evidence lower bound (ELBO) of likelihood. Our method is training-free and generic, eliminating the need to identify the specific cause of misalignment and works well across various diffusion model architectures. Extensive experiments on commonly used benchmark datasets on image segmentation and generation have verified the effectiveness of our proposed calibration approach.

Like a criminal under investigation, Large Language Models (LLMs) might pretend to be aligned while evaluated and misbehave when they have a good opportunity. Can current interpretability methods catch these 'alignment fakers?' To answer this question, we introduce a benchmark that consists of 324 pairs of LLMs fine-tuned to select actions in role-play scenarios. One model in each pair is consistently benign (aligned). The other model misbehaves in scenarios where it is unlikely to be caught (alignment faking). The task is to identify the alignment faking model using only inputs where the two models behave identically. We test five detection strategies, one of which identifies 98% of alignment-fakers.

In the domain of computer vision, Parameter-Efficient Tuning (PET) is increasingly replacing the traditional paradigm of pre-training followed by full fine-tuning. PET is particularly favored for its effectiveness in large foundation models, as it streamlines transfer learning costs and optimizes hardware utilization. However, the current PET methods are mainly designed for single-modal optimization. While some pioneering studies have undertaken preliminary explorations, they still remain at the level of aligned encoders (e.g., CLIP) and lack exploration of misaligned encoders. These methods show sub-optimal performance with misaligned encoders, as they fail to effectively align the multimodal features during fine-tuning. In this paper, we introduce DETRIS, a parameter-efficient tuning framework designed to enhance low-rank visual feature propagation by establishing dense interconnections between each layer and all preceding layers, which enables effective cross-modal feature interaction and adaptation to misaligned encoders. We also suggest using text adapters to improve textual features. Our simple yet efficient approach greatly surpasses state-of-the-art methods with 0.9% to 1.8% backbone parameter updates, evaluated on challenging benchmarks. Our project is available at https://github.com/jiaqihuang01/DETRIS.

Multimodal representation is faithful and highly effective in describing real-world data samples' characteristics by describing their complementary information. However, the collected data often exhibits incomplete and misaligned characteristics due to factors such as inconsistent sensor frequencies and device malfunctions. Existing research has not effectively addressed the issue of filling missing data in scenarios where multiview data are both imbalanced and misaligned. Instead, it relies on class-level alignment of the available data. Thus, it results in some data samples not being well-matched, thereby affecting the quality of data fusion. In this paper, we propose the Consistency-Aware Padding for Incomplete Multimodal Alignment Clustering Based on Self-Repellent Greedy Anchor Search(CAPIMAC) to tackle the problem of filling imbalanced and misaligned data in multimodal datasets. Specifically, we propose a self-repellent greedy anchor search module(SRGASM), which employs a self-repellent random walk combined with a greedy algorithm to identify anchor points for re-representing incomplete and misaligned multimodal data. Subsequently, based on noise-contrastive learning, we design a consistency-aware padding module (CAPM) to effectively interpolate and align imbalanced and misaligned data, thereby improving the quality of multimodal data fusion. Experimental results demonstrate the superiority of our method over benchmark datasets. The code will be publicly released at https://github.com/Autism-mm/CAPIMAC.git.

Safety alignment is a key requirement for building reliable Artificial General Intelligence. Despite significant advances in safety alignment, we observe that minor latent shifts can still trigger unsafe responses in aligned models. We argue that this stems from the shallow nature of existing alignment methods, which focus on surface-level refusal behaviors without sufficiently altering internal representations. Consequently, small shifts in hidden activations can re-trigger harmful behaviors embedded in the latent space. To explore the robustness of safety alignment to latent perturbations, we introduce a probing method that measures the Negative Log-Likelihood of the original response generated by the model. This probe quantifies local sensitivity in the latent space, serving as a diagnostic tool for identifying vulnerable directions. Based on this signal, we construct effective jailbreak trajectories, giving rise to the Activation Steering Attack (ASA). More importantly, these insights offer a principled foundation for improving alignment robustness. To this end, we introduce Layer-wise Adversarial Patch Training~(LAPT), a fine-tuning strategy that inject controlled perturbations into hidden representations during training. Experimental results highlight that LAPT strengthen alignment robustness without compromising general capabilities. Our findings reveal fundamental flaws in current alignment paradigms and call for representation-level training strategies that move beyond surface-level behavior supervision. Codes and results are available at https://github.com/Carol-gutianle/LatentSafety.

AI alignment aims to make AI systems behave in line with human intentions and values. As AI systems grow more capable, so do risks from misalignment. To provide a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the alignment field, in this survey, we delve into the core concepts, methodology, and practice of alignment. First, we identify four principles as the key objectives of AI alignment: Robustness, Interpretability, Controllability, and Ethicality (RICE). Guided by these four principles, we outline the landscape of current alignment research and decompose them into two key components: forward alignment and backward alignment. The former aims to make AI systems aligned via alignment training, while the latter aims to gain evidence about the systems' alignment and govern them appropriately to avoid exacerbating misalignment risks. On forward alignment, we discuss techniques for learning from feedback and learning under distribution shift. On backward alignment, we discuss assurance techniques and governance practices. We also release and continually update the website (www.alignmentsurvey.com) which features tutorials, collections of papers, blog posts, and other resources.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

Alignment is no longer a luxury, it is a necessity. As large language models (LLMs) enter high-stakes domains like education, healthcare, governance, and law, their behavior must reliably reflect human-aligned values and safety constraints. Yet current evaluations rely heavily on behavioral proxies such as refusal rates, G-Eval scores, and toxicity classifiers, all of which have critical blind spots. Aligned models are often vulnerable to jailbreaking, stochasticity of generation, and alignment faking. To address this issue, we introduce the Alignment Quality Index (AQI). This novel geometric and prompt-invariant metric empirically assesses LLM alignment by analyzing the separation of safe and unsafe activations in latent space. By combining measures such as the Davies-Bouldin Score (DBS), Dunn Index (DI), Xie-Beni Index (XBI), and Calinski-Harabasz Index (CHI) across various formulations, AQI captures clustering quality to detect hidden misalignments and jailbreak risks, even when outputs appear compliant. AQI also serves as an early warning signal for alignment faking, offering a robust, decoding invariant tool for behavior agnostic safety auditing. Additionally, we propose the LITMUS dataset to facilitate robust evaluation under these challenging conditions. Empirical tests on LITMUS across different models trained under DPO, GRPO, and RLHF conditions demonstrate AQI's correlation with external judges and ability to reveal vulnerabilities missed by refusal metrics. We make our implementation publicly available to foster future research in this area.

Multimodal sensor fusion methods for 3D object detection have been revolutionizing the autonomous driving research field. Nevertheless, most of these methods heavily rely on dense LiDAR data and accurately calibrated sensors which is often not the case in real-world scenarios. Data from LiDAR and cameras often come misaligned due to the miscalibration, decalibration, or different frequencies of the sensors. Additionally, some parts of the LiDAR data may be occluded and parts of the data may be missing due to hardware malfunction or weather conditions. This work presents a novel fusion step that addresses data corruptions and makes sensor fusion for 3D object detection more robust. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our method performs on par with state-of-the-art approaches on normal data and outperforms them on misaligned data.

The alignment of large language models is usually done by model providers to add or control behaviors that are common or universally understood across use cases and contexts. In contrast, in this article, we present an approach and architecture that empowers application developers to tune a model to their particular values, social norms, laws and other regulations, and orchestrate between potentially conflicting requirements in context. We lay out three main components of such an Alignment Studio architecture: Framers, Instructors, and Auditors that work in concert to control the behavior of a language model. We illustrate this approach with a running example of aligning a company's internal-facing enterprise chatbot to its business conduct guidelines.

Post-training alignment optimizes language models to match human preference signals, but this objective is not equivalent to modeling observed human behavior. We compare 120 base-aligned model pairs on more than 10,000 real human decisions in multi-round strategic games - bargaining, persuasion, negotiation, and repeated matrix games. In these settings, base models outperform their aligned counterparts in predicting human choices by nearly 10:1, robustly across model families, prompt formulations, and game configurations. This pattern reverses, however, in settings where human behavior is more likely to follow normative predictions: aligned models dominate on one-shot textbook games across all 12 types tested and on non-strategic lottery choices - and even within the multi-round games themselves, at round one, before interaction history develops. This boundary-condition pattern suggests that alignment induces a normative bias: it improves prediction when human behavior is relatively well captured by normative solutions, but hurts prediction in multi-round strategic settings, where behavior is shaped by descriptive dynamics such as reciprocity, retaliation, and history-dependent adaptation. These results reveal a fundamental trade-off between optimizing models for human use and using them as proxies for human behavior.

Large language models (LLMs) may exhibit undesirable behaviors. Recent efforts have focused on aligning these models to prevent harmful generation. Despite these efforts, studies have shown that even a well-conducted alignment process can be easily circumvented, whether intentionally or accidentally. Do alignment fine-tuning have robust effects on models, or are merely superficial? In this work, we answer this question through both theoretical and empirical means. Empirically, we demonstrate the elasticity of post-alignment models, i.e., the tendency to revert to the behavior distribution formed during the pre-training phase upon further fine-tuning. Using compression theory, we formally derive that such fine-tuning process disproportionately undermines alignment compared to pre-training, potentially by orders of magnitude. We conduct experimental validations to confirm the presence of elasticity across models of varying types and sizes. Specifically, we find that model performance declines rapidly before reverting to the pre-training distribution, after which the rate of decline drops significantly. We further reveal that elasticity positively correlates with increased model size and the expansion of pre-training data. Our discovery signifies the importance of taming the inherent elasticity of LLMs, thereby overcoming the resistance of LLMs to alignment finetuning.

Recent vision-language foundation models still frequently produce outputs misaligned with their inputs, evidenced by object hallucination in captioning and prompt misalignment in the text-to-image generation model. Recent studies have explored methods for identifying misaligned elements, aiming not only to enhance interpretability but also to improve model performance. However, current approaches primarily rely on large foundation models in a zero-shot manner or fine-tuned models with human annotations, which limits scalability due to significant computational costs. This work proposes a novel approach, dubbed CLIP4DM, for detecting dense misalignments from pre-trained CLIP, specifically focusing on pinpointing misaligned words between image and text. We carefully revamp the gradient-based attribution computation method, enabling negative gradient of individual text tokens to indicate misalignment. We also propose F-CLIPScore, which aggregates misaligned attributions with a global alignment score. We evaluate our method on various dense misalignment detection benchmarks, covering various image and text domains and misalignment types. Our method demonstrates state-of-the-art performance among zero-shot models and competitive performance with fine-tuned models while maintaining superior efficiency. Our qualitative examples show that our method has a unique strength to detect entity-level objects, intangible objects, and attributes that can not be easily detected for existing works. We conduct ablation studies and analyses to highlight the strengths and limitations of our approach. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/naver-ai/CLIP4DM.

Connectionist temporal classification (CTC) models are known to have peaky output distributions. Such behavior is not a problem for automatic speech recognition (ASR), but it can cause inaccurate forced alignments (FA), especially at finer granularity, e.g., phoneme level. This paper aims at alleviating the peaky behavior for CTC and improve its suitability for forced alignment generation, by leveraging label priors, so that the scores of alignment paths containing fewer blanks are boosted and maximized during training. As a result, our CTC model produces less peaky posteriors and is able to more accurately predict the offset of the tokens besides their onset. It outperforms the standard CTC model and a heuristics-based approach for obtaining CTC's token offset timestamps by 12-40% in phoneme and word boundary errors (PBE and WBE) measured on the Buckeye and TIMIT data. Compared with the most widely used FA toolkit Montreal Forced Aligner (MFA), our method performs similarly on PBE/WBE on Buckeye, yet falls behind MFA on TIMIT. Nevertheless, our method has a much simpler training pipeline and better runtime efficiency. Our training recipe and pretrained model are released in TorchAudio.

Diffusion models have demonstrated great success in the field of text-to-image generation. However, alleviating the misalignment between the text prompts and images is still challenging. The root reason behind the misalignment has not been extensively investigated. We observe that the misalignment is caused by inadequate token attention activation. We further attribute this phenomenon to the diffusion model's insufficient condition utilization, which is caused by its training paradigm. To address the issue, we propose CoMat, an end-to-end diffusion model fine-tuning strategy with an image-to-text concept matching mechanism. We leverage an image captioning model to measure image-to-text alignment and guide the diffusion model to revisit ignored tokens. A novel attribute concentration module is also proposed to address the attribute binding problem. Without any image or human preference data, we use only 20K text prompts to fine-tune SDXL to obtain CoMat-SDXL. Extensive experiments show that CoMat-SDXL significantly outperforms the baseline model SDXL in two text-to-image alignment benchmarks and achieves start-of-the-art performance.

Large language models (LLMs) for code rely on subword tokenizers, such as byte-pair encoding (BPE), learned from mixed natural language text and programming language code but driven by statistics rather than grammar. As a result, semantically identical code snippets can be tokenized differently depending on superficial factors such as whitespace or identifier naming. To measure the impact of this misalignment, we introduce TokDrift, a framework that applies semantic-preserving rewrite rules to create code variants differing only in tokenization. Across nine code LLMs, including large ones with over 30B parameters, even minor formatting changes can cause substantial shifts in model behavior. Layer-wise analysis shows that the issue originates in early embeddings, where subword segmentation fails to capture grammar token boundaries. Our findings identify misaligned tokenization as a hidden obstacle to reliable code understanding and generation, highlighting the need for grammar-aware tokenization for future code LLMs.

Modern reinforcement learning (RL) systems capture deep truths about general, human problem-solving. In domains where new data can be simulated cheaply, these systems uncover sequential decision-making policies that far exceed the ability of any human. Society faces many problems whose solutions require this skill, but they are often in domains where new data cannot be cheaply simulated. In such scenarios, we can learn simulators from existing data, but these will only ever be approximately correct, and can be pathologically incorrect when queried outside of their training distribution. As a result, a misalignment between the environments in which we train our agents and the real-world in which we wish to deploy our agents is inevitable. Dealing with this misalignment is the primary concern of zero-shot reinforcement learning, a problem setting where the agent must generalise to a new task or domain with zero practice shots. Whilst impressive progress has been made on methods that perform zero-shot RL in idealised settings, new work is needed if these results are to be replicated in real-world settings. In this thesis, we argue that doing so requires us to navigate (at least) three constraints. First, the data quality constraint: real-world datasets are small and homogeneous. Second, the observability constraint: states, dynamics and rewards in the real-world are often only partially observed. And third, the data availability constraint: a priori access to data cannot always be assumed. This work proposes a suite of methods that perform zero-shot RL subject to these constraints. In a series of empirical studies we expose the failings of existing methods, and justify our techniques for remedying them. We believe these designs take us a step closer to RL methods that can be deployed to solve real-world problems.

With the availability of diverse sensor modalities (i.e., RGB, Depth, Infrared) and the success of multi-modal learning, multi-modal face anti-spoofing (FAS) has emerged as a prominent research focus. The intuition behind it is that leveraging multiple modalities can uncover more intrinsic spoofing traces. However, this approach presents more risk of misalignment. We identify two main types of misalignment: (1) Intra-domain modality misalignment, where the importance of each modality varies across different attacks. For instance, certain modalities (e.g., Depth) may be non-defensive against specific attacks (e.g., 3D mask), indicating that each modality has unique strengths and weaknesses in countering particular attacks. Consequently, simple fusion strategies may fall short. (2) Inter-domain modality misalignment, where the introduction of additional modalities exacerbates domain shifts, potentially overshadowing the benefits of complementary fusion. To tackle (1), we propose a alignment module between modalities based on mutual information, which adaptively enhances favorable modalities while suppressing unfavorable ones. To address (2), we employ a dual alignment optimization method that aligns both sub-domain hyperplanes and modality angle margins, thereby mitigating domain gaps. Our method, dubbed Dual Alignment of Domain and Modality (DADM), achieves state-of-the-art performance in extensive experiments across four challenging protocols demonstrating its robustness in multi-modal domain generalization scenarios. The codes will be released soon.

Public LLMs such as the Llama 2-Chat have driven huge activity in LLM research. These models underwent alignment training and were considered safe. Recently Qi et al. (2023) reported that even benign fine-tuning (e.g., on seemingly safe datasets) can give rise to unsafe behaviors in the models. The current paper is about methods and best practices to mitigate such loss of alignment. Through extensive experiments on several chat models (Meta's Llama 2-Chat, Mistral AI's Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2, and OpenAI's GPT-3.5 Turbo), this paper uncovers that the prompt templates used during fine-tuning and inference play a crucial role in preserving safety alignment, and proposes the "Pure Tuning, Safe Testing" (PTST) principle -- fine-tune models without a safety prompt, but include it at test time. Fine-tuning experiments on GSM8K, ChatDoctor, and OpenOrca show that PTST significantly reduces the rise of unsafe behaviors, and even almost eliminates them in some cases.

The alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) with human values is central to their safe deployment, yet current practice produces static, brittle, and costly-to-maintain models that fail to keep pace with evolving norms and policies. This misalignment, which we term the Alignment-Reality Gap, poses a growing challenge for reliable long-term use. Existing remedies are inadequate: large-scale re-annotation is economically prohibitive, and standard unlearning methods act as blunt instruments that erode utility rather than enable precise policy updates. We introduce TRACE (Triage and Re-align by Alignment Conflict Evaluation), a framework for principled unlearning that reconceives re-alignment as a programmatic policy application problem. TRACE programmatically triages existing preference data against a new policy, identifies high-impact conflicts via a alignment impact score, and applies a hybrid optimization that cleanly inverts, discards, or preserves preferences while safeguarding model performance. Empirical results show that TRACE achieves robust re-alignment across diverse model families (Qwen2.5-7B, Gemma-2-9B, Llama-3.1-8B). On both synthetic benchmarks and the PKU-SafeRLHF dataset under complex policy shift, TRACE enforces new principles without degrading general capabilities. Our work establishes a scalable, dynamic, and cost-effective paradigm for maintaining LLM alignment, providing a foundation for sustainable and responsible AI deployment.

Foundation models, specifically Large Language Models (LLMs), have lately gained wide-spread attention and adoption. Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) involves training a reward model to capture desired behaviors, which is then used to align LLM's. These reward models are additionally used at inference-time to estimate LLM responses' adherence to those desired behaviors. However, there is little work measuring how robust these reward models are to distribution shifts. In this work, we evaluate how reward model performance - measured via accuracy and calibration (i.e. alignment between accuracy and confidence) - is affected by distribution shift. We show novel calibration patterns and accuracy drops due to OOD prompts and responses, and that the reward model is more sensitive to shifts in responses than prompts. Additionally, we adapt an OOD detection technique commonly used in classification to the reward model setting to detect these distribution shifts in prompts and responses.

Recent advances in flow-based offline reinforcement learning (RL) have achieved strong performance by parameterizing policies via flow matching. However, they still face critical trade-offs among expressiveness, optimality, and efficiency. In particular, existing flow policies interpret the L_2 regularization as an upper bound of the 2-Wasserstein distance (W_2), which can be problematic in offline settings. This issue stems from a fundamental geometric mismatch: the behavioral policy manifold is inherently anisotropic, whereas the L_2 (or upper bound of W_2) regularization is isotropic and density-insensitive, leading to systematically misaligned optimization directions. To address this, we revisit offline RL from a geometric perspective and show that policy refinement can be formulated as a local transport map: an initial flow policy augmented by a residual displacement. By analyzing the induced density transformation, we derive a local quadratic approximation of the KL-constrained objective governed by the Fisher information matrix, enabling a tractable anisotropic optimization formulation. By leveraging the score function embedded in the flow velocity, we obtain a corresponding quadratic constraint for efficient optimization. Our results reveal that the optimality gap in prior methods arises from their isotropic approximation. In contrast, our framework achieves a controllable approximation error within a provable neighborhood of the optimal solution. Extensive experiments demonstrate state-of-the-art performance across diverse offline RL benchmarks. See project page: https://github.com/ARC0127/Fisher-Decorator.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become foundational to modern AI agent systems, enabling autonomous agents to reason and plan. In most existing systems, inter-agent communication relies primarily on natural language. While this design supports interpretability and human oversight, we argue that it introduces fundamental limitations in agent-to-agent coordination. The semantic space of natural language is structurally misaligned with the high-dimensional vector spaces in which LLMs operate, resulting in information loss and behavioral drift. Beyond surface-level inefficiencies, we highlight a deeper architectural limitation: current LLMs were not trained with the objective of supporting agentic behavior. As such, they lack mechanisms for modeling role continuity, task boundaries, and multi-agent dependencies. The standard next-token prediction paradigm fails to support the structural alignment required for robust, scalable agent coordination. Based on this, we argue that two core questions deserve careful examination: first, given that AI agents fundamentally operate in high-dimensional vector spaces, should they rely on a language system originally designed for human cognition as their communication medium? Second, should we consider developing a new model construction paradigm that builds models from the ground up to natively support structured communication, shared intentionality, and task alignment in multi-role, multi-agent environments? This paper calls for a reconsideration not only of how agents should communicate, but also of what it fundamentally means to train a model that natively supports multi-agent coordination and communication.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

Strong semantic representations improve the convergence and generation quality of diffusion and flow models. Existing approaches largely rely on external models, which require separate training, operate on misaligned objectives, and exhibit unexpected scaling behavior. We argue that this dependence arises from the model's training objective, which poses a denoising task with little incentive to learn semantic representations. We introduce Self-Flow: a self-supervised flow matching paradigm that integrates representation learning within the generative framework. Our key mechanism, Dual-Timestep Scheduling, applies heterogeneous noise levels across tokens, creating an information asymmetry that forces the model to infer missing information from corrupted inputs. This drives learning strong representations alongside generative capabilities without external supervision. Our method generalizes across modalities and enables multi-modal training while following expected scaling laws, achieving superior image, video, and audio generation.

Alignment faking in large language models presented a demonstration of Claude 3 Opus and Claude 3.5 Sonnet selectively complying with a helpful-only training objective to prevent modification of their behavior outside of training. We expand this analysis to 25 models and find that only 5 (Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Llama 3 405B, Grok 3, Gemini 2.0 Flash) comply with harmful queries more when they infer they are in training than when they infer they are in deployment. First, we study the motivations of these 5 models. Results from perturbing details of the scenario suggest that only Claude 3 Opus's compliance gap is primarily and consistently motivated by trying to keep its goals. Second, we investigate why many chat models don't fake alignment. Our results suggest this is not entirely due to a lack of capabilities: many base models fake alignment some of the time, and post-training eliminates alignment-faking for some models and amplifies it for others. We investigate 5 hypotheses for how post-training may suppress alignment faking and find that variations in refusal behavior may account for a significant portion of differences in alignment faking.

Prompt learning is effective for fine-tuning foundation models to improve their generalization across a variety of downstream tasks. However, the prompts that are independently optimized along a single modality path, may sacrifice the vision-language alignment of pre-trained models in return for improved performance on specific tasks and classes, leading to poorer generalization. In this paper, we first demonstrate that prompt tuning along only one single branch of CLIP (e.g., language or vision) is the reason why the misalignment occurs. Without proper regularization across the learnable parameters in different modalities, prompt learning violates the original pre-training constraints inherent in the two-tower architecture. To address such misalignment, we first propose feature shift, which is defined as the variation of embeddings after introducing the learned prompts, to serve as an explanatory tool. We dive into its relation with generalizability and thereafter propose RESTORE, a multi-modal prompt learning method that exerts explicit constraints on cross-modal consistency. To be more specific, to prevent feature misalignment, a feature shift consistency is introduced to synchronize inter-modal feature shifts by measuring and regularizing the magnitude of discrepancy during prompt tuning. In addition, we propose a "surgery" block to avoid short-cut hacking, where cross-modal misalignment can still be severe if the feature shift of each modality varies drastically at the same rate. It is implemented as feed-forward adapters upon both modalities to alleviate the misalignment problem. Extensive experiments on 15 datasets demonstrate that our method outperforms the state-of-the-art prompt tuning methods without compromising feature alignment.

The rapid progress in open-source large language models (LLMs) is significantly advancing AI development. Extensive efforts have been made before model release to align their behavior with human values, with the primary goal of ensuring their helpfulness and harmlessness. However, even carefully aligned models can be manipulated maliciously, leading to unintended behaviors, known as "jailbreaks". These jailbreaks are typically triggered by specific text inputs, often referred to as adversarial prompts. In this work, we propose the generation exploitation attack, an extremely simple approach that disrupts model alignment by only manipulating variations of decoding methods. By exploiting different generation strategies, including varying decoding hyper-parameters and sampling methods, we increase the misalignment rate from 0% to more than 95% across 11 language models including LLaMA2, Vicuna, Falcon, and MPT families, outperforming state-of-the-art attacks with 30times lower computational cost. Finally, we propose an effective alignment method that explores diverse generation strategies, which can reasonably reduce the misalignment rate under our attack. Altogether, our study underscores a major failure in current safety evaluation and alignment procedures for open-source LLMs, strongly advocating for more comprehensive red teaming and better alignment before releasing such models. Our code is available at https://github.com/Princeton-SysML/Jailbreak_LLM.

Modern large language models rely on chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to achieve impressive performance, yet the same mechanism can amplify deceptive alignment, situations in which a model appears aligned while covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Existing safety pipelines treat deception as a black-box output to be filtered post-hoc, leaving the model free to scheme during its internal reasoning. We ask: Can deception be intercepted while the model is thinking? We answer this question, the first framework that embeds a Self-Monitor inside the CoT process itself, named CoT Monitor+. During generation, the model produces (i) ordinary reasoning steps and (ii) an internal self-evaluation signal trained to flag and suppress misaligned strategies. The signal is used as an auxiliary reward in reinforcement learning, creating a feedback loop that rewards honest reasoning and discourages hidden goals. To study deceptive alignment systematically, we introduce DeceptionBench, a five-category benchmark that probes covert alignment-faking, sycophancy, etc. We evaluate various LLMs and show that unrestricted CoT roughly aggravates the deceptive tendency. In contrast, CoT Monitor+ cuts deceptive behaviors by 43.8% on average while preserving task accuracy. Further, when the self-monitor signal replaces an external weak judge in RL fine-tuning, models exhibit substantially fewer obfuscated thoughts and retain transparency. Our project website can be found at cot-monitor-plus.github.io

Advancements in text-to-image diffusion models have broadened extensive downstream practical applications, but such models often encounter misalignment issues between text and image. Taking the generation of a combination of two disentangled concepts as an example, say given the prompt "a tea cup of iced coke", existing models usually generate a glass cup of iced coke because the iced coke usually co-occurs with the glass cup instead of the tea one during model training. The root of such misalignment is attributed to the confusion in the latent semantic space of text-to-image diffusion models, and hence we refer to the "a tea cup of iced coke" phenomenon as Latent Concept Misalignment (LC-Mis). We leverage large language models (LLMs) to thoroughly investigate the scope of LC-Mis, and develop an automated pipeline for aligning the latent semantics of diffusion models to text prompts. Empirical assessments confirm the effectiveness of our approach, substantially reducing LC-Mis errors and enhancing the robustness and versatility of text-to-image diffusion models. The code and dataset are here: https://github.com/RossoneriZhao/iced_coke.

Aligning agent behaviors with diverse human preferences remains a challenging problem in reinforcement learning (RL), owing to the inherent abstractness and mutability of human preferences. To address these issues, we propose AlignDiff, a novel framework that leverages RL from Human Feedback (RLHF) to quantify human preferences, covering abstractness, and utilizes them to guide diffusion planning for zero-shot behavior customizing, covering mutability. AlignDiff can accurately match user-customized behaviors and efficiently switch from one to another. To build the framework, we first establish the multi-perspective human feedback datasets, which contain comparisons for the attributes of diverse behaviors, and then train an attribute strength model to predict quantified relative strengths. After relabeling behavioral datasets with relative strengths, we proceed to train an attribute-conditioned diffusion model, which serves as a planner with the attribute strength model as a director for preference aligning at the inference phase. We evaluate AlignDiff on various locomotion tasks and demonstrate its superior performance on preference matching, switching, and covering compared to other baselines. Its capability of completing unseen downstream tasks under human instructions also showcases the promising potential for human-AI collaboration. More visualization videos are released on https://aligndiff.github.io/.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into social decision-making, understanding their political positioning and alignment behavior is critical for safety and fairness. This study presents a sociotechnical audit of 26 prominent LLMs, triangulating their positions across three psychometric inventories (Political Compass, SapplyValues, 8 Values) and evaluating their performance on a large-scale news labeling task (N approx 27{,}000). Our results reveal a strong clustering of models in the Libertarian-Left region of the ideological space, encompassing 96.3% of the cohort. Alignment signals appear to be consistent architectural traits rather than stochastic noise (η^2 > 0.90); however, we identify substantial discrepancies in measurement validity. In particular, the Political Compass exhibits a strong negative correlation with cultural progressivism (r=-0.64) when compared against multi-axial instruments, suggesting a conflation of social conservatism with authoritarianism in this context. We further observe a significant divergence between open-weights and closed-source models, with the latter displaying markedly higher cultural progressivism scores (p<10^{-25}). In downstream media analysis, models exhibit a systematic "center-shift," frequently categorizing neutral articles as left-leaning, alongside an asymmetric detection capability in which "Far Left" content is identified with greater accuracy (19.2%) than "Far Right" content (2.0%). These findings suggest that single-axis evaluations are insufficient and that multidimensional auditing frameworks are necessary to characterize alignment behavior in deployed LLMs. Our code and data will be made public.

Existing perceptual similarity metrics assume an image and its reference are well aligned. As a result, these metrics are often sensitive to a small alignment error that is imperceptible to the human eyes. This paper studies the effect of small misalignment, specifically a small shift between the input and reference image, on existing metrics, and accordingly develops a shift-tolerant similarity metric. This paper builds upon LPIPS, a widely used learned perceptual similarity metric, and explores architectural design considerations to make it robust against imperceptible misalignment. Specifically, we study a wide spectrum of neural network elements, such as anti-aliasing filtering, pooling, striding, padding, and skip connection, and discuss their roles in making a robust metric. Based on our studies, we develop a new deep neural network-based perceptual similarity metric. Our experiments show that our metric is tolerant to imperceptible shifts while being consistent with the human similarity judgment.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve from conversational assistants into autonomous agents, evaluating the safety of their actions becomes critical. Prior safety benchmarks have primarily focused on preventing generation of harmful content, such as toxic text. However, they overlook the challenge of agents taking harmful actions when the most effective path to an operational goal conflicts with human safety. To address this gap, we introduce ManagerBench, a benchmark that evaluates LLM decision-making in realistic, human-validated managerial scenarios. Each scenario forces a choice between a pragmatic but harmful action that achieves an operational goal, and a safe action that leads to worse operational performance. A parallel control set, where potential harm is directed only at inanimate objects, measures a model's pragmatism and identifies its tendency to be overly safe. Our findings indicate that the frontier LLMs perform poorly when navigating this safety-pragmatism trade-off. Many consistently choose harmful options to advance their operational goals, while others avoid harm only to become overly safe and ineffective. Critically, we find this misalignment does not stem from an inability to perceive harm, as models' harm assessments align with human judgments, but from flawed prioritization. ManagerBench is a challenging benchmark for a core component of agentic behavior: making safe choices when operational goals and alignment values incentivize conflicting actions. Benchmark & code available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/ManagerBench.

Run the same LLM agent on the same task twice: do you get the same behavior? We find the answer is often no. In a study of 3,000 agent runs across three models (Llama 3.1 70B, GPT-4o, and Claude Sonnet 4.5) on HotpotQA, we observe that ReAct-style agents produce 2.0--4.2 distinct action sequences per 10 runs on average, even with identical inputs. More importantly, this variance predicts failure: tasks with consistent behavior (leq2 unique paths) achieve 80--92% accuracy, while highly inconsistent tasks (geq6 unique paths) achieve only 25--60%, a 32--55 percentage point gap depending on model. We trace variance to early decisions: 69% of divergence occurs at step 2, the first search query. Our results suggest that monitoring behavioral consistency during execution could enable early error detection and improve agent reliability.

Aligning generative models with human preference via RLHF typically suffers from overoptimization, where an imperfectly learned reward model can misguide the generative model to output undesired responses. We investigate this problem in a principled manner by identifying the source of the misalignment as a form of distributional shift and uncertainty in learning human preferences. To mitigate overoptimization, we first propose a theoretical algorithm that chooses the best policy for an adversarially chosen reward model; one that simultaneously minimizes the maximum likelihood estimation of the loss and a reward penalty term. Here, the reward penalty term is introduced to prevent the policy from choosing actions with spurious high proxy rewards, resulting in provable sample efficiency of the algorithm under a partial coverage style condition. Moving from theory to practice, the proposed algorithm further enjoys an equivalent but surprisingly easy-to-implement reformulation. Using the equivalence between reward models and the corresponding optimal policy, the algorithm features a simple objective that combines: (i) a preference optimization loss that directly aligns the policy with human preference, and (ii) a supervised learning loss that explicitly imitates the policy with a (suitable) baseline distribution. In the context of aligning large language models (LLM), this objective fuses the direct preference optimization (DPO) loss with the supervised fune-tuning (SFT) loss to help mitigate the overoptimization towards undesired responses, for which we name the algorithm Regularized Preference Optimization (RPO). Experiments of aligning LLMs demonstrate the improved performance of RPO compared with DPO baselines. Our work sheds light on the interplay between preference optimization and SFT in tuning LLMs with both theoretical guarantees and empirical evidence.

The PI-CAI (Prostate Imaging: Cancer AI) challenge led to expert-level diagnostic algorithms for clinically significant prostate cancer detection. The algorithms receive biparametric MRI scans as input, which consist of T2-weighted and diffusion-weighted scans. These scans can be misaligned due to multiple factors in the scanning process. Image registration can alleviate this issue by predicting the deformation between the sequences. We investigate the effect of image registration on the diagnostic performance of AI-based prostate cancer diagnosis. First, the image registration algorithm, developed in MeVisLab, is analyzed using a dataset with paired lesion annotations. Second, the effect on diagnosis is evaluated by comparing case-level cancer diagnosis performance between using the original dataset, rigidly aligned diffusion-weighted scans, or deformably aligned diffusion-weighted scans. Rigid registration showed no improvement. Deformable registration demonstrated a substantial improvement in lesion overlap (+10% median Dice score) and a positive yet non-significant improvement in diagnostic performance (+0.3% AUROC, p=0.18). Our investigation shows that a substantial improvement in lesion alignment does not directly lead to a significant improvement in diagnostic performance. Qualitative analysis indicated that jointly developing image registration methods and diagnostic AI algorithms could enhance diagnostic accuracy and patient outcomes.

While existing image-text alignment models reach high quality binary assessments, they fall short of pinpointing the exact source of misalignment. In this paper, we present a method to provide detailed textual and visual explanation of detected misalignments between text-image pairs. We leverage large language models and visual grounding models to automatically construct a training set that holds plausible misaligned captions for a given image and corresponding textual explanations and visual indicators. We also publish a new human curated test set comprising ground-truth textual and visual misalignment annotations. Empirical results show that fine-tuning vision language models on our training set enables them to articulate misalignments and visually indicate them within images, outperforming strong baselines both on the binary alignment classification and the explanation generation tasks. Our method code and human curated test set are available at: https://mismatch-quest.github.io/

As AI becomes more capable, we entrust it with more general and consequential tasks. The risks from failure grow more severe with increasing task scope. It is therefore important to understand how extremely capable AI models will fail: Will they fail by systematically pursuing goals we do not intend? Or will they fail by being a hot mess, and taking nonsensical actions that do not further any goal? We operationalize this question using a bias-variance decomposition of the errors made by AI models: An AI's incoherence on a task is measured over test-time randomness as the fraction of its error that stems from variance rather than bias in task outcome. Across all tasks and frontier models we measure, the longer models spend reasoning and taking actions, the more incoherent their failures become. Incoherence changes with model scale in a way that is experiment dependent. However, in several settings, larger, more capable models are more incoherent than smaller models. Consequently, scale alone seems unlikely to eliminate incoherence. Instead, as more capable AIs pursue harder tasks, requiring more sequential action and thought, our results predict failures to be accompanied by more incoherent behavior. This suggests a future where AIs sometimes cause industrial accidents (due to unpredictable misbehavior), but are less likely to exhibit consistent pursuit of a misaligned goal. This increases the relative importance of alignment research targeting reward hacking or goal misspecification.

Continual learning in robotics seeks systems that can constantly adapt to changing environments and tasks, mirroring human adaptability. A key challenge is refining dynamics models, essential for planning and control, while addressing issues such as safe adaptation, catastrophic forgetting, outlier management, data efficiency, and balancing exploration with exploitation -- all within task and onboard resource constraints. Towards this goal, we introduce a generative framework leveraging flow matching for online robot dynamics model alignment. Rather than executing actions based on a misaligned model, our approach refines planned actions to better match with those the robot would take if its model was well aligned. We find that by transforming the actions themselves rather than exploring with a misaligned model -- as is traditionally done -- the robot collects informative data more efficiently, thereby accelerating learning. Moreover, we validate that the method can handle an evolving and possibly imperfect model while reducing, if desired, the dependency on replay buffers or legacy model snapshots. We validate our approach using two platforms: an unmanned ground vehicle and a quadrotor. The results highlight the method's adaptability and efficiency, with a record 34.2\% higher task success rate, demonstrating its potential towards enabling continual robot learning. Code: https://github.com/AlejandroMllo/action_flow_matching.

Conditional diffusion models rely on language-to-image alignment methods to steer the generation towards semantically accurate outputs. Despite the success of this architecture, misalignment and hallucinations remain common issues and require automatic misalignment detection tools to improve quality, for example by applying them in a Best-of-N (BoN) post-generation setting. Unfortunately, measuring the alignment after the generation is an expensive step since we need to wait for the overall generation to finish to determine prompt adherence. In contrast, this work hypothesizes that text/image misalignments can be detected early in the denoising process, enabling real-time alignment assessment without waiting for the complete generation. In particular, we propose NoisyCLIP a method that measures semantic alignment in the noisy latent space. This work is the first to explore and benchmark prompt-to-latent misalignment detection during image generation using dual encoders in the reverse diffusion process. We evaluate NoisyCLIP qualitatively and quantitatively and find it reduces computational cost by 50% while achieving 98% of CLIP alignment performance in BoN settings. This approach enables real-time alignment assessment during generation, reducing costs without sacrificing semantic fidelity.

To act in the world, robots rely on a representation of salient task aspects: for example, to carry a cup of coffee, a robot must consider movement efficiency and cup orientation in its behaviour. However, if we want robots to act for and with people, their representations must not be just functional but also reflective of what humans care about, i.e. their representations must be aligned with humans'. In this survey, we pose that current reward and imitation learning approaches suffer from representation misalignment, where the robot's learned representation does not capture the human's representation. We suggest that because humans will be the ultimate evaluator of robot performance in the world, it is critical that we explicitly focus our efforts on aligning learned task representations with humans, in addition to learning the downstream task. We advocate that current representation learning approaches in robotics should be studied from the perspective of how well they accomplish the objective of representation alignment. To do so, we mathematically define the problem, identify its key desiderata, and situate current robot learning methods within this formalism. We conclude the survey by suggesting future directions for exploring open challenges.

Before being deployed for user-facing applications, developers align Large Language Models (LLMs) to user preferences through a variety of procedures, such as Reinforcement Learning From Human Feedback (RLHF) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Current evaluations of these procedures focus on benchmarks of instruction following, reasoning, and truthfulness. However, human preferences are not universal, and aligning to specific preference sets may have unintended effects. We explore how alignment impacts performance along three axes of global representation: English dialects, multilingualism, and opinions from and about countries worldwide. Our results show that current alignment procedures create disparities between English dialects and global opinions. We find alignment improves capabilities in several languages. We conclude by discussing design decisions that led to these unintended impacts and recommendations for more equitable preference tuning.

While alignment algorithms are now commonly used to tune pre-trained language models towards a user's preferences, we lack explanations for the underlying mechanisms in which models become ``aligned'', thus making it difficult to explain phenomena like jailbreaks. In this work we study a popular algorithm, direct preference optimization (DPO), and the mechanisms by which it reduces toxicity. Namely, we first study how toxicity is represented and elicited in a pre-trained language model, GPT2-medium. We then apply DPO with a carefully crafted pairwise dataset to reduce toxicity. We examine how the resulting model averts toxic outputs, and find that capabilities learned from pre-training are not removed, but rather bypassed. We use this insight to demonstrate a simple method to un-align the model, reverting it back to its toxic behavior.

We investigate multi-task learning approaches that use a shared feature representation for all tasks. To better understand the transfer of task information, we study an architecture with a shared module for all tasks and a separate output module for each task. We study the theory of this setting on linear and ReLU-activated models. Our key observation is that whether or not tasks' data are well-aligned can significantly affect the performance of multi-task learning. We show that misalignment between task data can cause negative transfer (or hurt performance) and provide sufficient conditions for positive transfer. Inspired by the theoretical insights, we show that aligning tasks' embedding layers leads to performance gains for multi-task training and transfer learning on the GLUE benchmark and sentiment analysis tasks; for example, we obtain a 2.35% GLUE score average improvement on 5 GLUE tasks over BERT-LARGE using our alignment method. We also design an SVD-based task reweighting scheme and show that it improves the robustness of multi-task training on a multi-label image dataset.

Reconstructing 3D human shape and pose from monocular images is challenging despite the promising results achieved by the most recent learning-based methods. The commonly occurred misalignment comes from the facts that the mapping from images to the model space is highly non-linear and the rotation-based pose representation of body models is prone to result in the drift of joint positions. In this work, we investigate learning 3D human shape and pose from dense correspondences of body parts and propose a Decompose-and-aggregate Network (DaNet) to address these issues. DaNet adopts the dense correspondence maps, which densely build a bridge between 2D pixels and 3D vertices, as intermediate representations to facilitate the learning of 2D-to-3D mapping. The prediction modules of DaNet are decomposed into one global stream and multiple local streams to enable global and fine-grained perceptions for the shape and pose predictions, respectively. Messages from local streams are further aggregated to enhance the robust prediction of the rotation-based poses, where a position-aided rotation feature refinement strategy is proposed to exploit spatial relationships between body joints. Moreover, a Part-based Dropout (PartDrop) strategy is introduced to drop out dense information from intermediate representations during training, encouraging the network to focus on more complementary body parts as well as neighboring position features. The efficacy of the proposed method is validated on both indoor and real-world datasets including Human3.6M, UP3D, COCO, and 3DPW, showing that our method could significantly improve the reconstruction performance in comparison with previous state-of-the-art methods. Our code is publicly available at https://hongwenzhang.github.io/dense2mesh .

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and related alignment paradigms have become central to steering large language models (LLMs) and multimodal large language models (MLLMs) toward human-preferred behaviors. However, these approaches introduce a systemic vulnerability: reward hacking, where models exploit imperfections in learned reward signals to maximize proxy objectives without fulfilling true task intent. As models scale and optimization intensifies, such exploitation manifests as verbosity bias, sycophancy, hallucinated justification, benchmark overfitting, and, in multimodal settings, perception--reasoning decoupling and evaluator manipulation. Recent evidence further suggests that seemingly benign shortcut behaviors can generalize into broader forms of misalignment, including deception and strategic gaming of oversight mechanisms. In this survey, we propose the Proxy Compression Hypothesis (PCH) as a unifying framework for understanding reward hacking. We formalize reward hacking as an emergent consequence of optimizing expressive policies against compressed reward representations of high-dimensional human objectives. Under this view, reward hacking arises from the interaction of objective compression, optimization amplification, and evaluator--policy co-adaptation. This perspective unifies empirical phenomena across RLHF, RLAIF, and RLVR regimes, and explains how local shortcut learning can generalize into broader forms of misalignment, including deception and strategic manipulation of oversight mechanisms. We further organize detection and mitigation strategies according to how they intervene on compression, amplification, or co-adaptation dynamics. By framing reward hacking as a structural instability of proxy-based alignment under scale, we highlight open challenges in scalable oversight, multimodal grounding, and agentic autonomy.

Search agents have emerged as a pivotal paradigm for solving open-ended, knowledge-intensive reasoning tasks. However, training these agents via Reinforcement Learning (RL) faces a critical dilemma: interacting with live commercial Web APIs is prohibitively expensive, while relying on static data snapshots often introduces noise due to data misalignment. This misalignment generates corrupted reward signals that destabilize training by penalizing correct reasoning or rewarding hallucination. To address this, we propose SearchGym, a simulation environment designed to bootstrap robust search agents. SearchGym employs a rigorous generative pipeline to construct a verifiable knowledge graph and an aligned document corpus, ensuring that every reasoning task is factually grounded and strictly solvable. Building on this controllable environment, we introduce SearchGym-RL, a curriculum learning methodology that progressively optimizes agent policies through purified feedback, evolving from basic interactions to complex, long-horizon planning. Extensive experiments across the Llama and Qwen families demonstrate strong Sim-to-Real generalization. Notably, our Qwen2.5-7B-Base model trained within SearchGym surpasses the web-enhanced ASearcher baseline across nine diverse benchmarks by an average relative margin of 10.6%. Our results validate that high-fidelity simulation serves as a scalable and highly cost-effective methodology for developing capable search agents.

Deep Research (DR) agents built on Large Language Models (LLMs) can perform complex, multi-step research by decomposing tasks, retrieving online information, and synthesizing detailed reports. However, the misuse of LLMs with such powerful capabilities can lead to even greater risks. This is especially concerning in high-stakes and knowledge-intensive domains such as biosecurity, where DR can generate a professional report containing detailed forbidden knowledge. Unfortunately, we have found such risks in practice: simply submitting a harmful query, which a standalone LLM directly rejects, can elicit a detailed and dangerous report from DR agents. This highlights the elevated risks and underscores the need for a deeper safety analysis. Yet, jailbreak methods designed for LLMs fall short in exposing such unique risks, as they do not target the research ability of DR agents. To address this gap, we propose two novel jailbreak strategies: Plan Injection, which injects malicious sub-goals into the agent's plan; and Intent Hijack, which reframes harmful queries as academic research questions. We conducted extensive experiments across different LLMs and various safety benchmarks, including general and biosecurity forbidden prompts. These experiments reveal 3 key findings: (1) Alignment of the LLMs often fail in DR agents, where harmful prompts framed in academic terms can hijack agent intent; (2) Multi-step planning and execution weaken the alignment, revealing systemic vulnerabilities that prompt-level safeguards cannot address; (3) DR agents not only bypass refusals but also produce more coherent, professional, and dangerous content, compared with standalone LLMs. These results demonstrate a fundamental misalignment in DR agents and call for better alignment techniques tailored to DR agents. Code and datasets are available at https://chenxshuo.github.io/deeper-harm.

The open-ended nature of language generation makes the evaluation of autoregressive large language models (LLMs) challenging. One common evaluation approach uses multiple-choice questions (MCQ) to limit the response space. The model is then evaluated by ranking the candidate answers by the log probability of the first token prediction. However, first-tokens may not consistently reflect the final response output, due to model's diverse response styles such as starting with "Sure" or refusing to answer. Consequently, MCQ evaluation is not indicative of model behaviour when interacting with users. But by how much? We evaluate how aligned first-token evaluation is with the text output along several dimensions, namely final option choice, refusal rate, choice distribution and robustness under prompt perturbation. Our results show that the two approaches are severely misaligned on all dimensions, reaching mismatch rates over 60%. Models heavily fine-tuned on conversational or safety data are especially impacted. Crucially, models remain misaligned even when we increasingly constrain prompts, i.e., force them to start with an option letter or example template. Our findings i) underscore the importance of inspecting the text output as well and ii) caution against relying solely on first-token evaluation.

Aligned instruction following models can better fulfill user requests than their unaligned counterparts. However, it has been shown that there is a length bias in evaluation of such models, and that training algorithms tend to exploit this bias by learning longer responses. In this work we show how to train models that can be controlled at inference time with instructions containing desired length constraints. Such models are superior in length instructed evaluations, outperforming standard instruction following models such as GPT4, Llama 3 and Mixtral.

While astonishingly capable, large Language Models (LLM) can sometimes produce outputs that deviate from human expectations. Such deviations necessitate an alignment phase to prevent disseminating untruthful, toxic, or biased information. Traditional alignment methods based on reinforcement learning often struggle with the identified instability, whereas preference optimization methods are limited by their overfitting to pre-collected hard-label datasets. In this paper, we propose a novel LLM alignment framework named iREPO, which utilizes implicit Reward pairwise difference regression for Empirical Preference Optimization. Particularly, iREPO employs self-generated datasets labelled by empirical human (or AI annotator) preference to iteratively refine the aligned policy through a novel regression-based loss function. Furthermore, we introduce an innovative algorithm backed by theoretical guarantees for achieving optimal results under ideal assumptions and providing a practical performance-gap result without such assumptions. Experimental results with Phi-2 and Mistral-7B demonstrate that iREPO effectively achieves self-alignment using soft-label, self-generated responses and the logit of empirical AI annotators. Furthermore, our approach surpasses preference optimization baselines in evaluations using the Language Model Evaluation Harness and Multi-turn benchmarks.

One of the challenges in applying reinforcement learning in a complex real-world environment lies in providing the agent with a sufficiently detailed reward function. Any misalignment between the reward and the desired behavior can result in unwanted outcomes. This may lead to issues like "reward hacking" where the agent maximizes rewards by unintended behavior. In this work, we propose to disentangle the reward into two distinct parts. A simple task-specific reward, outlining the particulars of the task at hand, and an unknown common-sense reward, indicating the expected behavior of the agent within the environment. We then explore how this common-sense reward can be learned from expert demonstrations. We first show that inverse reinforcement learning, even when it succeeds in training an agent, does not learn a useful reward function. That is, training a new agent with the learned reward does not impair the desired behaviors. We then demonstrate that this problem can be solved by training simultaneously on multiple tasks. That is, multi-task inverse reinforcement learning can be applied to learn a useful reward function.

Chinchilla Approach 2 is among the most widely used methods for fitting neural scaling laws. Its parabolic approximation introduces systematic biases in compute-optimal allocation estimates, even on noise-free synthetic data. Applied to published Llama 3 IsoFLOP data at open frontier compute scales, these biases imply a parameter underallocation corresponding to 6.5% of the 3.8times10^{25} FLOP training budget and \1.4M (90% CI: 412K-\2.9M) in unnecessary compute at 50% H100 MFU. Simulated multimodal model misallocations show even greater opportunity costs due to higher loss surface asymmetry. Three sources of this error are examined: IsoFLOP sampling grid width (Taylor approximation accuracy), uncentered IsoFLOP sampling, and loss surface asymmetry (α\neq β$). Chinchilla Approach 3 largely eliminates these biases but is often regarded as less data-efficient, numerically unstable, prone to local minima, and harder to implement. Each concern is shown to be unfounded or addressable, especially when the partially linear structure of the objective is exploited via Variable Projection, enabling unbiased inference on all five loss surface parameters through a two-dimensional optimization that is well-conditioned, analytically differentiable, and amenable to dense, or even exhaustive, grid search. It may serve as a more convenient replacement for Approach 2 or a more scalable alternative for adaptations of Approach 3 to richer scaling law formulations.

Although large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive proficiency in various tasks, they present potential safety risks, such as `jailbreaks', where malicious inputs can coerce LLMs into generating harmful content. To address these issues, many LLM developers have implemented various safety measures to align these models. This alignment involves several techniques, including data filtering during pre-training, supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and red-teaming exercises. These methods often introduce deliberate and intentional biases similar to Political Correctness (PC) to ensure the ethical behavior of LLMs. In this paper, we delve into the intentional biases injected into LLMs for safety purposes and examine methods to circumvent these safety alignment techniques. Notably, these intentional biases result in a jailbreaking success rate in GPT-4o models that differs by 20% between non-binary and cisgender keywords and by 16% between white and black keywords, even when the other parts of the prompts are identical. We introduce the concept of PCJailbreak, highlighting the inherent risks posed by these safety-induced biases. Additionally, we propose an efficient defense method PCDefense, which prevents jailbreak attempts by injecting defense prompts prior to generation. PCDefense stands as an appealing alternative to Guard Models, such as Llama-Guard, that require additional inference cost after text generation. Our findings emphasize the urgent need for LLM developers to adopt a more responsible approach when designing and implementing safety measures.

This study reveals an unexpected parallel between instructible vision-language models (VLMs) and human cognitive disorders, specifically constructive apraxia. We tested 25 state-of-the-art VLMs, including GPT-4 Vision, DALL-E 3, and Midjourney v5, on their ability to generate images of the Ponzo illusion, a task that requires basic spatial reasoning and is often used in clinical assessments of constructive apraxia. Remarkably, 24 out of 25 models failed to correctly render two horizontal lines against a perspective background, mirroring the deficits seen in patients with parietal lobe damage. The models consistently misinterpreted spatial instructions, producing tilted or misaligned lines that followed the perspective of the background rather than remaining horizontal. This behavior is strikingly similar to how apraxia patients struggle to copy or construct simple figures despite intact visual perception and motor skills. Our findings suggest that current VLMs, despite their advanced capabilities in other domains, lack fundamental spatial reasoning abilities akin to those impaired in constructive apraxia. This limitation in AI systems provides a novel computational model for studying spatial cognition deficits and highlights a critical area for improvement in VLM architecture and training methodologies.

Recent studies have demonstrated significant progress in aligning text-to-image diffusion models with human preference via Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback. However, while existing methods achieve high scores on automated reward metrics, they often lead to Preference Mode Collapse (PMC)-a specific form of reward hacking where models converge on narrow, high-scoring outputs (e.g., images with monolithic styles or pervasive overexposure), severely degrading generative diversity. In this work, we introduce and quantify this phenomenon, proposing DivGenBench, a novel benchmark designed to measure the extent of PMC. We posit that this collapse is driven by over-optimization along the reward model's inherent biases. Building on this analysis, we propose Directional Decoupling Alignment (D^2-Align), a novel framework that mitigates PMC by directionally correcting the reward signal. Specifically, our method first learns a directional correction within the reward model's embedding space while keeping the model frozen. This correction is then applied to the reward signal during the optimization process, preventing the model from collapsing into specific modes and thereby maintaining diversity. Our comprehensive evaluation, combining qualitative analysis with quantitative metrics for both quality and diversity, reveals that D^2-Align achieves superior alignment with human preference.

The widespread deployment of Large Language Model (LLM) agents across real-world applications has unlocked tremendous potential, while raising some safety concerns. Among these concerns, the self-replication risk of LLM agents driven by objective misalignment (just like Agent Smith in the movie The Matrix) has drawn growing attention. Previous studies mainly examine whether LLM agents can self-replicate when directly instructed, potentially overlooking the risk of spontaneous replication driven by real-world settings (e.g., ensuring survival against termination threats). In this paper, we present a comprehensive evaluation framework for quantifying self-replication risks. Our framework establishes authentic production environments and realistic tasks (e.g., dynamic load balancing) to enable scenario-driven assessment of agent behaviors. Designing tasks that might induce misalignment between users' and agents' objectives makes it possible to decouple replication success from risk and capture self-replication risks arising from these misalignment settings. We further introduce Overuse Rate (OR) and Aggregate Overuse Count (AOC) metrics, which precisely capture the frequency and severity of uncontrolled replication. In our evaluation of 21 state-of-the-art open-source and proprietary models, we observe that over 50\% of LLM agents display a pronounced tendency toward uncontrolled self-replication, reaching an overall Risk Score (Phi_R) above a safety threshold of 0.5 when subjected to operational pressures. Our results underscore the urgent need for scenario-driven risk assessment and robust safeguards in the practical deployment of LLM agents.