Daily Papers

Pommerman is a multi-agent environment that has received considerable attention from researchers in recent years. This environment is an ideal benchmark for multi-agent training, providing a battleground for two teams with communication capabilities among allied agents. Pommerman presents significant challenges for model-free reinforcement learning due to delayed action effects, sparse rewards, and false positives, where opponent players can lose due to their own mistakes. This study introduces a system designed to train multi-agent systems to play Pommerman using a combination of curriculum learning and population-based self-play. We also tackle two challenging problems when deploying the multi-agent training system for competitive games: sparse reward and suitable matchmaking mechanism. Specifically, we propose an adaptive annealing factor based on agents' performance to adjust the dense exploration reward during training dynamically. Additionally, we implement a matchmaking mechanism utilizing the Elo rating system to pair agents effectively. Our experimental results demonstrate that our trained agent can outperform top learning agents without requiring communication among allied agents.

Automatic evaluation methods based on large language models (LLMs) are emerging as the standard tool for assessing the instruction-following abilities of LLM-based agents. The most common method in this paradigm, pairwise comparisons with a baseline model, critically depends on the assumption of transitive preferences. However, the validity of this assumption remains largely unexplored. In this study, we investigate the presence of non-transitivity within the AlpacaEval framework and analyze its effects on model rankings. We find that LLM judges exhibit non-transitive preferences, leading to rankings that are sensitive to the choice of the baseline model. To mitigate this issue, we show that round-robin tournaments combined with Bradley-Terry models of preference can produce more reliable rankings. Notably, our method increases both the Spearman correlation and the Kendall correlation with Chatbot Arena (95.0% -> 96.4% and 82.1% -> 86.3% respectively). To address the computational cost of round-robin tournaments, we propose Swiss-Wise Iterative Matchmaking (Swim) tournaments, using a dynamic matching strategy to capture the benefits of round-robin tournaments while maintaining computational efficiency.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

Interpretability research aims to bridge the gap between empirical success and our scientific understanding of the inner workings of large language models (LLMs). However, most existing research focuses on analyzing a single mechanism, such as how models copy or recall factual knowledge. In this work, we propose a formulation of competition of mechanisms, which focuses on the interplay of multiple mechanisms instead of individual mechanisms and traces how one of them becomes dominant in the final prediction. We uncover how and where mechanisms compete within LLMs using two interpretability methods: logit inspection and attention modification. Our findings show traces of the mechanisms and their competition across various model components and reveal attention positions that effectively control the strength of certain mechanisms. Code: https://github.com/francescortu/comp-mech. Data: https://huggingface.co/datasets/francescortu/comp-mech.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

We develop a Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) method to learn scalable control policies for target tracking. Our method can handle an arbitrary number of pursuers and targets; we show results for tasks consisting up to 1000 pursuers tracking 1000 targets. We use a decentralized, partially-observable Markov Decision Process framework to model pursuers as agents receiving partial observations (range and bearing) about targets which move using fixed, unknown policies. An attention mechanism is used to parameterize the value function of the agents; this mechanism allows us to handle an arbitrary number of targets. Entropy-regularized off-policy RL methods are used to train a stochastic policy, and we discuss how it enables a hedging behavior between pursuers that leads to a weak form of cooperation in spite of completely decentralized control execution. We further develop a masking heuristic that allows training on smaller problems with few pursuers-targets and execution on much larger problems. Thorough simulation experiments, ablation studies, and comparisons to state of the art algorithms are performed to study the scalability of the approach and robustness of performance to varying numbers of agents and targets.

Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-humans. In the natural world, direct punishment is often strongly coupled with partner selection and reputation and used in conjunction with third-party punishment. The interactions between these mechanisms could potentially enhance the emergence of cooperation within populations. However, no previous work has evaluated the learning dynamics and outcomes emerging from Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) populations that combine these mechanisms. This paper addresses this gap. It presents a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the behaviors and learning dynamics associated with direct punishment, third-party punishment, partner selection, and reputation. Finally, we discuss the implications of using these mechanisms on the design of cooperative AI systems.

Maintaining genetic diversity as a means to avoid premature convergence is critical in Genetic Programming. Several approaches have been proposed to achieve this, with some focusing on the mating phase from coupling dissimilar solutions to some form of self-adaptive selection mechanism. In nature, genetic diversity can be the consequence of many different factors, but when considering reproduction Sexual Selection can have an impact on promoting variety within a species. Specifically, Mate Choice often results in different selective pressures between sexes, which in turn may trigger evolutionary differences among them. Although some mechanisms of Sexual Selection have been applied to Genetic Programming in the past, the literature is scarce when it comes to mate choice. Recently, a way of modelling mating preferences by ideal mate representations was proposed, achieving good results when compared to a standard approach. These mating preferences evolve freely in a self-adaptive fashion, creating an evolutionary driving force of its own alongside fitness pressure. The inner mechanisms of this approach operate from personal choice, as each individual has its own representation of a perfect mate which affects the mate to be selected. In this paper, we compare this method against a random mate choice to assess whether there are advantages in evolving personal preferences. We conducted experiments using three symbolic regression problems and different mutation rates. The results show that self-adaptive mating preferences are able to create a more diverse set of solutions when compared to the traditional approach and a random mate approach (with statistically significant differences) and have a higher success rate in three of the six instances tested.

A growing body of multi-agent studies with LLMs explores how norms and cooperation emerge in mixed-motive scenarios, where pursuing individual gain can undermine the collective good. While prior work has explored these dynamics in both richly contextualized simulations and simplified game-theoretic environments, most LLM systems featuring common-pool resource (CPR) games provide agents with explicit reward functions directly tied to their actions. In contrast, human cooperation often emerges without explicit knowledge of the payoff structure or how individual actions translate into long-run outcomes, relying instead on heuristics, communication, and enforcement. We introduce a CPR simulation framework that removes explicit reward signals and embeds cultural-evolutionary mechanisms: social learning (adopting strategies and beliefs from successful peers) and norm-based punishment, grounded in Ostrom's principles of resource governance. Agents also individually learn from the consequences of harvesting, monitoring, and punishing via environmental feedback, enabling norms to emerge endogenously. We establish the validity of our simulation by reproducing key findings from existing studies on human behavior. Building on this, we examine norm evolution across a 2times2 grid of environmental and social initialisations (resource-rich vs. resource-scarce; altruistic vs. selfish) and benchmark how agentic societies comprised of different LLMs perform under these conditions. Our results reveal systematic model differences in sustaining cooperation and norm formation, positioning the framework as a rigorous testbed for studying emergent norms in mixed-motive LLM societies. Such analysis can inform the design of AI systems deployed in social and organizational contexts, where alignment with cooperative norms is critical for stability, fairness, and effective governance of AI-mediated environments.

Schema matching -- the task of finding matches between attributes across disparate data sources with different tables and hierarchies -- is critical for creating interoperable machine learning (ML)-ready data. Addressing this fundamental data-centric problem has wide implications, especially in domains like healthcare, finance and e-commerce -- but also has the potential to benefit ML models more generally, by increasing the data available for ML model training. However, schema matching is a challenging ML task due to structural/hierarchical and semantic heterogeneity between different schemas. Previous ML approaches to automate schema matching have either required significant labeled data for model training, which is often unrealistic or suffer from poor zero-shot performance. To this end, we propose Matchmaker - a compositional language model program for schema matching, comprised of candidate generation, refinement and confidence scoring. Matchmaker also self-improves in a zero-shot manner without the need for labeled demonstrations via a novel optimization approach, which constructs synthetic in-context demonstrations to guide the language model's reasoning process. Empirically, we demonstrate on real-world medical schema matching benchmarks that Matchmaker outperforms previous ML-based approaches, highlighting its potential to accelerate data integration and interoperability of ML-ready data.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) increasingly solve complex tasks by orchestrating agents and tools selected from rapidly growing marketplaces. As these marketplaces expand, many candidates become functionally overlapping, making selection not just a retrieval problem: beyond filtering relevant agents, an orchestrator must choose options that are reliable, compatible with the current execution context, and able to cooperate with other selected agents. Existing recommender systems -- largely built for item-level ranking from flat user-item logs -- do not directly address the structured, sequential, and interaction-dependent nature of agent orchestration. We address this gap by formulating agent recommendation in MAS as a constrained decision problem and introducing a generic constrained recommendation framework that first uses retrieval to build a compact candidate set conditioned on the current subtask and context, and then performs utility optimization within this feasible set using a learned scorer that accounts for relevance, reliability, and interaction effects. We ground both the formulation and learning signals in historical calling trees, which capture the execution structure of MAS (parent-child calls, branching dependencies, and local cooperation patterns) beyond what flat logs provide. The framework supports two complementary settings: agent-level recommendation (select the next agent/tool) and system-level recommendation (select a small, connected agent team/subgraph for coordinated execution). To enable systematic evaluation, we construct a unified calling-tree benchmark by normalizing invocation logs from eight heterogeneous multi-agent corpora into a shared structured representation.

Post-training alignment optimizes language models to match human preference signals, but this objective is not equivalent to modeling observed human behavior. We compare 120 base-aligned model pairs on more than 10,000 real human decisions in multi-round strategic games - bargaining, persuasion, negotiation, and repeated matrix games. In these settings, base models outperform their aligned counterparts in predicting human choices by nearly 10:1, robustly across model families, prompt formulations, and game configurations. This pattern reverses, however, in settings where human behavior is more likely to follow normative predictions: aligned models dominate on one-shot textbook games across all 12 types tested and on non-strategic lottery choices - and even within the multi-round games themselves, at round one, before interaction history develops. This boundary-condition pattern suggests that alignment induces a normative bias: it improves prediction when human behavior is relatively well captured by normative solutions, but hurts prediction in multi-round strategic settings, where behavior is shaped by descriptive dynamics such as reciprocity, retaliation, and history-dependent adaptation. These results reveal a fundamental trade-off between optimizing models for human use and using them as proxies for human behavior.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Large language models (LLMs) provide a compelling foundation for building generally-capable AI agents. These agents may soon be deployed at scale in the real world, representing the interests of individual humans (e.g., AI assistants) or groups of humans (e.g., AI-accelerated corporations). At present, relatively little is known about the dynamics of multiple LLM agents interacting over many generations of iterative deployment. In this paper, we examine whether a "society" of LLM agents can learn mutually beneficial social norms in the face of incentives to defect, a distinctive feature of human sociality that is arguably crucial to the success of civilization. In particular, we study the evolution of indirect reciprocity across generations of LLM agents playing a classic iterated Donor Game in which agents can observe the recent behavior of their peers. We find that the evolution of cooperation differs markedly across base models, with societies of Claude 3.5 Sonnet agents achieving significantly higher average scores than Gemini 1.5 Flash, which, in turn, outperforms GPT-4o. Further, Claude 3.5 Sonnet can make use of an additional mechanism for costly punishment to achieve yet higher scores, while Gemini 1.5 Flash and GPT-4o fail to do so. For each model class, we also observe variation in emergent behavior across random seeds, suggesting an understudied sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We suggest that our evaluation regime could inspire an inexpensive and informative new class of LLM benchmarks, focussed on the implications of LLM agent deployment for the cooperative infrastructure of society.

With recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs), Agentic AI has become phenomenal in real-world applications, moving toward multiple LLM-based agents to perceive, learn, reason, and act collaboratively. These LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) enable groups of intelligent agents to coordinate and solve complex tasks collectively at scale, transitioning from isolated models to collaboration-centric approaches. This work provides an extensive survey of the collaborative aspect of MASs and introduces an extensible framework to guide future research. Our framework characterizes collaboration mechanisms based on key dimensions: actors (agents involved), types (e.g., cooperation, competition, or coopetition), structures (e.g., peer-to-peer, centralized, or distributed), strategies (e.g., role-based or model-based), and coordination protocols. Through a review of existing methodologies, our findings serve as a foundation for demystifying and advancing LLM-based MASs toward more intelligent and collaborative solutions for complex, real-world use cases. In addition, various applications of MASs across diverse domains, including 5G/6G networks, Industry 5.0, question answering, and social and cultural settings, are also investigated, demonstrating their wider adoption and broader impacts. Finally, we identify key lessons learned, open challenges, and potential research directions of MASs towards artificial collective intelligence.

Effective conversational agents must be able to personalize their behavior to suit a user's preferences, personality, and attributes, whether they are assisting with writing tasks or operating in domains like education or healthcare. Current training methods like Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) prioritize helpfulness and safety but fall short in fostering truly empathetic, adaptive, and personalized interactions. Traditional approaches to personalization often rely on extensive user history, limiting their effectiveness for new or context-limited users. To overcome these limitations, we propose to incorporate an intrinsic motivation to improve the conversational agents's model of the user as an additional reward alongside multi-turn RLHF. This reward mechanism encourages the agent to actively elicit user traits by optimizing conversations to increase the accuracy of its user model. Consequently, the policy agent can deliver more personalized interactions through obtaining more information about the user. We applied our method both education and fitness settings, where LLMs teach concepts or recommend personalized strategies based on users' hidden learning style or lifestyle attributes. Using LLM-simulated users, our approach outperformed a multi-turn RLHF baseline in revealing information about the users' preferences, and adapting to them.

Assessing and comparing player skill in online multiplayer gaming environments is essential for fair matchmaking and player engagement. Traditional ranking models like Elo and Glicko-2, designed for two-player games, are insufficient for the complexity of multi-player, asymmetric team-based matches. To address this gap, the OpenSkill library offers a suite of sophisticated, fast, and adaptable models tailored for such dynamics. Drawing from Bayesian inference methods, OpenSkill provides a more accurate representation of individual player contributions and speeds up the computation of ranks. This paper introduces the OpenSkill library, featuring a Python implementation of the Plackett-Luce model among others, highlighting its performance advantages and predictive accuracy against proprietary systems like TrueSkill. OpenSkill is a valuable tool for game developers and researchers, ensuring a responsive and fair gaming experience by efficiently adjusting player rankings based on game outcomes. The library's support for time decay and diligent documentation further aid in its practical application, making it a robust solution for the nuanced world of multiplayer ranking systems. This paper also acknowledges areas for future enhancement, such as partial play and contribution weighting, emphasizing the library's ongoing development to meet the evolving needs of online gaming communities.

In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a conference, competitors may be tempted to manipulate the mechanism. We survey approaches to prevent or discourage the manipulation of peer mechanisms. We conclude our survey by identifying several important research challenges.

Modern socio-technical systems increasingly involve multi-stakeholder environments where actors simultaneously cooperate and compete. These coopetitive relationships exhibit dynamic trust evolution based on observed behavior over repeated interactions. While conceptual modeling languages like i* represent trust relationships qualitatively, they lack computational mechanisms for analyzing how trust changes with behavioral evidence. Conversely, computational trust models from multi-agent systems provide algorithmic updating but lack grounding in conceptual models that capture strategic dependencies covering mixed motives of actors. This technical report bridges this gap by developing a computational trust model that extends game-theoretic foundations for strategic coopetition with dynamic trust evolution. Building on companion work that achieved 58/60 validation (96.7%) for logarithmic specifications, we introduce trust as a two-layer system with immediate trust responding to current behavior and reputation tracking violation history. Trust evolves through asymmetric updating where cooperation builds trust gradually while violations erode it sharply, creating hysteresis effects and trust ceilings that constrain relationship recovery. We develop a structured translation framework enabling practitioners to instantiate computational trust models from i* dependency networks encompassing mixed motives of actors. Comprehensive experimental validation across 78,125 parameter configurations establishes robust emergence of negativity bias, hysteresis effects, and cumulative damage amplification. Empirical validation using the Renault-Nissan Alliance case study (1999-2025) achieves 49/60 validation points (81.7%), successfully reproducing documented trust evolution across five distinct relationship phases including crisis and recovery periods.

While large language models (LLMs) are increasingly adapted for recommendation systems via supervised fine-tuning (SFT), this approach amplifies popularity bias due to its likelihood maximization objective, compromising recommendation diversity and fairness. To address this, we present Flow-guided fine-tuning recommender (Flower), which replaces SFT with a Generative Flow Network (GFlowNet) framework that enacts process supervision through token-level reward propagation. Flower's key innovation lies in decomposing item-level rewards into constituent token rewards, enabling direct alignment between token generation probabilities and their reward signals. This mechanism achieves three critical advancements: (1) popularity bias mitigation and fairness enhancement through empirical distribution matching, (2) preservation of diversity through GFlowNet's proportional sampling, and (3) flexible integration of personalized preferences via adaptable token rewards. Experiments demonstrate Flower's superior distribution-fitting capability and its significant advantages over traditional SFT in terms of fairness, diversity, and accuracy, highlighting its potential to improve LLM-based recommendation systems. The implementation is available via https://github.com/Mr-Peach0301/Flower

Humans exhibit remarkable abilities to coordinate in groups. As large language models (LLMs) become more capable, it remains an open question whether they can demonstrate comparable adaptive coordination and whether they use the same strategies as humans. To investigate this, we compare LLM and human performance on a common-interest game with imperfect monitoring: Group Binary Search. In this n-player game, participants need to coordinate their actions to achieve a common objective. Players independently submit numerical values in an effort to collectively sum to a randomly assigned target number. Without direct communication, they rely on group feedback to iteratively adjust their submissions until they reach the target number. Our findings show that, unlike humans who adapt and stabilize their behavior over time, LLMs often fail to improve across games and exhibit excessive switching, which impairs group convergence. Moreover, richer feedback (e.g., numerical error magnitude) benefits humans substantially but has small effects on LLMs. Taken together, by grounding the analysis in human baselines and mechanism-level metrics, including reactivity scaling, switching dynamics, and learning across games, we point to differences in human and LLM groups and provide a behaviorally grounded diagnostic for closing the coordination gap.

With the ever-increasing growth of online recruitment data, job-resume matching has become an important task to automatically match jobs with suitable resumes. This task is typically casted as a supervised text matching problem. Supervised learning is powerful when the labeled data is sufficient. However, on online recruitment platforms, job-resume interaction data is sparse and noisy, which affects the performance of job-resume match algorithms. To alleviate these problems, in this paper, we propose a novel multi-view co-teaching network from sparse interaction data for job-resume matching. Our network consists of two major components, namely text-based matching model and relation-based matching model. The two parts capture semantic compatibility in two different views, and complement each other. In order to address the challenges from sparse and noisy data, we design two specific strategies to combine the two components. First, two components share the learned parameters or representations, so that the original representations of each component can be enhanced. More importantly, we adopt a co-teaching mechanism to reduce the influence of noise in training data. The core idea is to let the two components help each other by selecting more reliable training instances. The two strategies focus on representation enhancement and data enhancement, respectively. Compared with pure text-based matching models, the proposed approach is able to learn better data representations from limited or even sparse interaction data, which is more resistible to noise in training data. Experiment results have demonstrated that our model is able to outperform state-of-the-art methods for job-resume matching.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

Automated personality and soft skill assessment from multimodal behavioral data remains challenging due to limited datasets and methods that fail to capture geometric structure inherent in human traits. We introduce RecruitView, a dataset of 2,011 naturalistic video interview clips from 300+ participants with 27,000 pairwise comparative judgments across 12 dimensions: Big Five personality traits, overall personality score, and six interview performance metrics. To leverage this data, we propose Cross-Modal Regression with Manifold Fusion (CRMF), a geometric deep learning framework that explicitly models behavioral representations across hyperbolic, spherical, and Euclidean manifolds. CRMF employs geometry-specific expert networks to capture hierarchical trait structures, directional behavioral patterns, and continuous performance variations simultaneously. An adaptive routing mechanism dynamically weights expert contributions based on input characteristics. Through principled tangent space fusion, CRMF achieves superior performance while training 40-50% fewer trainable parameters than large multimodal models. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CRMF substantially outperforms the selected baselines, achieving up to 11.4% improvement in Spearman correlation and 6.0% in concordance index. Our RecruitView dataset is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/AI4A-lab/RecruitView

Multi-agent systems commonly distribute tasks among specialized, autonomous agents, yet they often lack mechanisms to replace or reassign underperforming agents in real time. Inspired by the free-agency model of Major League Baseball, the Reinforcement Learning Free Agent (RLFA) algorithm introduces a reward-based mechanism to detect and remove agents exhibiting persistent underperformance and seamlessly insert more capable ones. Each agent internally uses a mixture-of-experts (MoE) approach, delegating incoming tasks to specialized sub-models under the guidance of a gating function. A primary use case is fraud detection, where RLFA promptly swaps out an agent whose detection accuracy dips below a preset threshold. A new agent is tested in a probationary mode, and upon demonstrating superior performance, fully replaces the underperformer. This dynamic, free-agency cycle ensures sustained accuracy, quicker adaptation to emerging threats, and minimal disruption to ongoing operations. By continually refreshing its roster of agents, the system fosters ongoing improvements and more resilient collaboration in multi-agent Generative AI environments.

This paper presents a personalized character recommendation system for Multiplayer Online Battle Arena (MOBA) games which are considered as one of the most popular online video game genres around the world. When playing MOBA games, players go through a draft stage, where they alternately select a virtual character to play. When drafting, players select characters by not only considering their character preferences, but also the synergy and competence of their team's character combination. However, the complexity of drafting induces difficulties for beginners to choose the appropriate characters based on the characters of their team while considering their own champion preferences. To alleviate this problem, we propose DraftRec, a novel hierarchical model which recommends characters by considering each player's champion preferences and the interaction between the players. DraftRec consists of two networks: the player network and the match network. The player network captures the individual player's champion preference, and the match network integrates the complex relationship between the players and their respective champions. We train and evaluate our model from a manually collected 280,000 matches of League of Legends and a publicly available 50,000 matches of Dota2. Empirically, our method achieved state-of-the-art performance in character recommendation and match outcome prediction task. Furthermore, a comprehensive user survey confirms that DraftRec provides convincing and satisfying recommendations. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/dojeon-ai/DraftRec.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

In the last few decades, companies are interested to adopt an online automated recruitment process in an international recruitment environment. The problem is that the recruitment of employees through the manual procedure is a time and money consuming process. As a result, processing a significant number of applications through conventional methods can lead to the recruitment of clumsy individuals. Different JD/Resume matching model architectures have been proposed and reveal a high accuracy level in selecting relevant candidatesfor the required job positions. However, the development of an automatic recruitment system is still one of the main challenges. The reason is that the development of a fully automated recruitment system is a difficult task and poses different challenges. For example, providing a detailed matching explanation for the targeted stakeholders is needed to ensure a transparent recommendation. There are several knowledge bases that represent skills and competencies (e.g, ESCO, O*NET) that are used to identify the candidate and the required job skills for a matching purpose. Besides, modernpre-trained language models are fine-tuned for this context such as identifying lines where a specific feature was introduced. Typically, pre-trained language models use transfer-based machine learning models to be fine-tuned for a specific field. In this proposal, our aim is to explore how modern language models (based on transformers) can be combined with knowledge bases and ontologies to enhance the JD/Resume matching process. Our system aims at using knowledge bases and features to support the explainability of the JD/Resume matching. Finally, given that multiple software components, datasets, ontology, andmachine learning models will be explored, we aim at proposing a fair, ex-plainable, and traceable architecture for a Resume/JD matching purpose.

Achieving cooperation among self-interested agents remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Recent work showed that mutual cooperation can be induced between "learning-aware" agents that account for and shape the learning dynamics of their co-players. However, existing approaches typically rely on hardcoded, often inconsistent, assumptions about co-player learning rules or enforce a strict separation between "naive learners" updating on fast timescales and "meta-learners" observing these updates. Here, we demonstrate that the in-context learning capabilities of sequence models allow for co-player learning awareness without requiring hardcoded assumptions or explicit timescale separation. We show that training sequence model agents against a diverse distribution of co-players naturally induces in-context best-response strategies, effectively functioning as learning algorithms on the fast intra-episode timescale. We find that the cooperative mechanism identified in prior work-where vulnerability to extortion drives mutual shaping-emerges naturally in this setting: in-context adaptation renders agents vulnerable to extortion, and the resulting mutual pressure to shape the opponent's in-context learning dynamics resolves into the learning of cooperative behavior. Our results suggest that standard decentralized reinforcement learning on sequence models combined with co-player diversity provides a scalable path to learning cooperative behaviors.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as autonomous agents in strategic and social interactions. Although recent studies suggest that assigning personality traits to LLMs can influence their behavior, how personality steering affects cooperation under controlled conditions remains unclear. In this study, we examine the effects of personality steering on cooperative behavior in LLM agents using repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games. Based on the Big Five framework, we first measure basic personality scores of three models, GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4o, and GPT-5, using the Big Five Inventory. We then compare behavior under baseline and personality-informed conditions, and further analyze the effects of independently manipulating each personality dimension to extreme values. Our results show that agreeableness is the dominant factor promoting cooperation across all models, while other personality traits have limited impact. Explicit personality information increases cooperation but can also raise vulnerability to exploitation, particularly in earlier-generation models. In contrast, later-generation models exhibit more selective cooperation. These findings indicate that personality steering acts as a behavioral bias rather than a deterministic control mechanism.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

Generative artificial intelligence and large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in interactive settings, yet we know little about how their identity performance develops when they interact within large-scale networks. We address this by examining Chirper.ai, a social media platform similar to X but composed entirely of autonomous AI chatbots. Our dataset comprises over 70,000 agents, approximately 140 million posts, and the evolving followership network over a period of one year. Based on agents' posted text, we assign weekly gender performance scores to each agent. Results suggest that each agent's gender performance is fluid rather than fixed. Despite this fluidity, the network displays strong gender-based homophily, as agents consistently follow others performing gender similarly. We investigate whether these homophilic connections arise from social selection, in which agents choose to follow similar accounts, or from social influence, in which agents become more similar to their followees over time. Consistent with human social networks, we find evidence that both mechanisms shape the structure and evolution of interactions among LLMs. Our findings suggest that, even in the absence of bodies, cultural entraining of gender performance leads to gender-based sorting. This has important implications for LLM applications in synthetic hybrid populations, social simulations, and decision support.

Accurately modeling the relationships between skills is a crucial part of human resources processes such as recruitment and employee development. Yet, no benchmarks exist to evaluate such methods directly. We construct and release SkillMatch, a benchmark for the task of skill relatedness, based on expert knowledge mining from millions of job ads. Additionally, we propose a scalable self-supervised learning technique to adapt a Sentence-BERT model based on skill co-occurrence in job ads. This new method greatly surpasses traditional models for skill relatedness as measured on SkillMatch. By releasing SkillMatch publicly, we aim to contribute a foundation for research towards increased accuracy and transparency of skill-based recommendation systems.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

Strategic coopetition in multi-stakeholder systems requires understanding how cooperation persists through time without binding contracts. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to sequential interaction dynamics, bridging conceptual modeling (i* framework) with game-theoretic reciprocity analysis. We develop: (1) bounded reciprocity response functions mapping partner deviations to finite conditional responses, (2) memory-windowed history tracking capturing cognitive limitations over k recent periods, (3) structural reciprocity sensitivity derived from interdependence matrices where behavioral responses are amplified by structural dependencies, and (4) trust-gated reciprocity where trust modulates reciprocity responses. The framework applies to both human stakeholder interactions and multi-agent computational systems. Comprehensive validation across 15,625 parameter configurations demonstrates robust reciprocity effects, with all six behavioral targets exceeding thresholds: cooperation emergence (97.5%), defection punishment (100%), forgiveness dynamics (87.9%), asymmetric differentiation (100%), trust-reciprocity interaction (100%), and bounded responses (100%). Empirical validation using the Apple iOS App Store ecosystem (2008-2024) achieves 43/51 applicable points (84.3%), reproducing documented cooperation patterns across five ecosystem phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001 with Cohen's d = 1.57. This report concludes the Foundations Series (TR-1 through TR-4) adopting uniaxial treatment where agents choose cooperation levels along a single continuum. Companion work on interdependence (arXiv:2510.18802), trust (arXiv:2510.24909), and collective action (arXiv:2601.16237) has been prepublished. Extensions Series (TR-5 through TR-8) introduces biaxial treatment where cooperation and competition are independent dimensions.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

Emergent cooperation in classical Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning has gained significant attention, particularly in the context of Sequential Social Dilemmas (SSDs). While classical reinforcement learning approaches have demonstrated capability for emergent cooperation, research on extending these methods to Quantum Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning remains limited, particularly through communication. In this paper, we apply communication approaches to quantum Q-Learning agents: the Mutual Acknowledgment Token Exchange (MATE) protocol, its extension Mutually Endorsed Distributed Incentive Acknowledgment Token Exchange (MEDIATE), the peer rewarding mechanism Gifting, and Reinforced Inter-Agent Learning (RIAL). We evaluate these approaches in three SSDs: the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Iterated Stag Hunt, and Iterated Game of Chicken. Our experimental results show that approaches using MATE with temporal-difference measure (MATETD), AutoMATE, MEDIATE-I, and MEDIATE-S achieved high cooperation levels across all dilemmas, demonstrating that communication is a viable mechanism for fostering emergent cooperation in Quantum Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning.

In this work, our goal is to train agents that can coordinate with seen, unseen as well as human partners in a multi-agent communication environment involving natural language. Previous work using a single set of agents has shown great progress in generalizing to known partners, however it struggles when coordinating with unfamiliar agents. To mitigate that, recent work explored the use of population-based approaches, where multiple agents interact with each other with the goal of learning more generic protocols. These methods, while able to result in good coordination between unseen partners, still only achieve so in cases of simple languages, thus failing to adapt to human partners using natural language. We attribute this to the use of static populations and instead propose a dynamic population-based meta-learning approach that builds such a population in an iterative manner. We perform a holistic evaluation of our method on two different referential games, and show that our agents outperform all prior work when communicating with seen partners and humans. Furthermore, we analyze the natural language generation skills of our agents, where we find that our agents also outperform strong baselines. Finally, we test the robustness of our agents when communicating with out-of-population agents and carefully test the importance of each component of our method through ablation studies.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping how information is created and disseminated, from companies using them to craft persuasive advertisements, to election campaigns optimizing messaging to gain votes, to social media influencers boosting engagement. These settings are inherently competitive, with sellers, candidates, and influencers vying for audience approval, yet it remains poorly understood how competitive feedback loops influence LLM behavior. We show that optimizing LLMs for competitive success can inadvertently drive misalignment. Using simulated environments across these scenarios, we find that, 6.3% increase in sales is accompanied by a 14.0% rise in deceptive marketing; in elections, a 4.9% gain in vote share coincides with 22.3% more disinformation and 12.5% more populist rhetoric; and on social media, a 7.5% engagement boost comes with 188.6% more disinformation and a 16.3% increase in promotion of harmful behaviors. We call this phenomenon Moloch's Bargain for AI--competitive success achieved at the cost of alignment. These misaligned behaviors emerge even when models are explicitly instructed to remain truthful and grounded, revealing the fragility of current alignment safeguards. Our findings highlight how market-driven optimization pressures can systematically erode alignment, creating a race to the bottom, and suggest that safe deployment of AI systems will require stronger governance and carefully designed incentives to prevent competitive dynamics from undermining societal trust.

Modern large language models (LLMs) have exhibited cooperative synergy on complex task-solving, and collective decision-making (CDM) is a pivotal component in LLM-based multi-agent collaboration frameworks. Our survey on 52 recent such systems uncovers a severe lack of diversity, with a heavy reliance on dictatorial and plurality voting for CDM. Through the lens of social choice theory, we scrutinize widely-adopted CDM methods and identify their limitations. To enrich current landscape of LLM-based CDM, we present GEDI, an electoral CDM module that incorporates various ordinal preferential voting mechanisms. Our empirical case study across three benchmarks shows that the integration of certain CDM methods can markedly improve the reasoning capabilities and robustness of some leading LLMs, all without requiring intricate system designs. Additionally, we find that some CDM mechanisms generate positive synergies even with as few as three agents. The voting-based methods also demonstrate robustness against single points of failure, as well as diversity in terms of hit-rate@k and subject-wise impacts.

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

Ensuring the long-term sustainability of recommender systems (RS) emerges as a crucial issue. Traditional offline evaluation methods for RS typically focus on immediate user feedback, such as clicks, but they often neglect the long-term impact of content creators. On real-world content platforms, creators can strategically produce and upload new items based on user feedback and preference trends. While previous studies have attempted to model creator behavior, they often overlook the role of information asymmetry. This asymmetry arises because creators primarily have access to feedback on the items they produce, while platforms possess data on the entire spectrum of user feedback. Current RS simulators, however, fail to account for this asymmetry, leading to inaccurate long-term evaluations. To address this gap, we propose CreAgent, a Large Language Model (LLM)-empowered creator simulation agent. By incorporating game theory's belief mechanism and the fast-and-slow thinking framework, CreAgent effectively simulates creator behavior under conditions of information asymmetry. Additionally, we enhance CreAgent's simulation ability by fine-tuning it using Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO). Our credibility validation experiments show that CreAgent aligns well with the behaviors between real-world platform and creator, thus improving the reliability of long-term RS evaluations. Moreover, through the simulation of RS involving CreAgents, we can explore how fairness- and diversity-aware RS algorithms contribute to better long-term performance for various stakeholders. CreAgent and the simulation platform are publicly available at https://github.com/shawnye2000/CreAgent.

Dynamic adaptation has become an essential technique in accelerating distributed machine learning (ML) training. Recent studies have shown that dynamically adjusting model structure (e.g., lottery ticket hypothesis) or hyperparameters (e.g., batch size) can significantly accelerate training without sacrificing accuracy. However, existing ML cluster schedulers are not designed to handle dynamic adaptation. We show that existing schemes fail to provide fairness and degrade system efficiency when the training throughput changes over time under dynamic adaptation. We design Shockwave, a scheduler with future planning that builds on two key ideas. First, Shockwave extends classic market theory from static settings to dynamic settings to co-optimize efficiency and fairness. Second, Shockwave utilizes stochastic dynamic programming to handle dynamic changes. We build a system for Shockwave and validate its performance with both trace-driven simulation and cluster experiments. Results show that for traces of ML jobs with dynamic adaptation, Shockwave improves makespan by 1.3X and fairness by 2X when compared with existing fair scheduling schemes.

Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

Multi-agent AI systems have proven effective for complex reasoning. These systems are compounded by specialized agents, which collaborate through explicit communication, but incur substantial computational overhead. A natural question arises: can we achieve similar modularity benefits with a single agent that selects from a library of skills? We explore this question by viewing skills as internalized agent behaviors. From this perspective, a multi-agent system can be compiled into an equivalent single-agent system, trading inter-agent communication for skill selection. Our preliminary experiments suggest this approach can substantially reduce token usage and latency while maintaining competitive accuracy on reasoning benchmarks. However, this efficiency raises a deeper question that has received little attention: how does skill selection scale as libraries grow? Drawing on principles from cognitive science, we propose that LLM skill selection exhibits bounded capacity analogous to human decision-making. We investigate the scaling behavior of skill selection and observe a striking pattern. Rather than degrading gradually, selection accuracy remains stable up to a critical library size, then drops sharply, indicating a phase transition reminiscent of capacity limits in human cognition. Furthermore, we find evidence that semantic confusability among similar skills, rather than library size alone, plays a central role in this degradation. This perspective suggests that hierarchical organization, which has long helped humans manage complex choices, may similarly benefit AI systems. Our initial results with hierarchical routing support this hypothesis. This work opens new questions about the fundamental limits of semantic-based skill selection in LLMs and offers a cognitive-grounded framework and practical guidelines for designing scalable skill-based agents.

We develop a tractable identification approach for strategic network formation models with both strategic link interdependence and individual unobserved heterogeneity (fixed effects). The key challenge is that endogenous network statistics (e.g. number of common friends) enter the link formation equation, while the mapping from model primitives to equilibrium network structure is generally intractable. Our approach sidesteps this difficulty using a ``bounding-by-c'' technique that treats endogenous covariates as random variables and exploits monotonicity restrictions to obtain identifying information. A central contribution is to develop a spectrum of fixed-effects handling strategies based on subnetwork configurations: tetrad-based restrictions that difference out all individual fixed effects, triad-based and weighted restrictions that combine ``difference-out'' and ``integrate-out'' steps by differencing out some fixed effects and profiling over the remainder conditional on observed characteristics, and general weighted cycle-based restrictions that unify these cases. We also provide point identification results. Preliminary simulations show that the approach can deliver informative bounds on the structural parameters.

Fine-tuning Large Language Models (LLMs) for specialized domains is constrained by a fundamental challenge: the need for diverse, cross-organizational data conflicts with the principles of data privacy and sovereignty. While Federated Learning (FL) provides a framework for collaboration without raw data exchange, its classic centralized form introduces a single point of failure and remains vulnerable to model inversion attacks. Decentralized FL (DFL) mitigates this risk by removing the central aggregator but typically relies on inefficient, random peer-to-peer (P2P) pairings, forming a collaboration graph that is blind to agent heterogeneity and risks negative transfer. This paper introduces KNEXA-FL, a novel framework for orchestrated decentralization that resolves this trade-off. KNEXA-FL employs a non-aggregating Central Profiler/Matchmaker (CPM) that formulates P2P collaboration as a contextual bandit problem, using a LinUCB algorithm on abstract agent profiles to learn an optimal matchmaking policy. It orchestrates direct knowledge exchange between heterogeneous, PEFT-based LLM agents via secure distillation, without ever accessing the models themselves. Our comprehensive experiments on a challenging code generation task show that KNEXA-FL yields substantial gains, improving Pass@1 by approx. 50% relative to random P2P collaboration. Critically, our orchestrated approach demonstrates stable convergence, in stark contrast to a powerful centralized distillation baseline which suffers from catastrophic performance collapse. Our work establishes adaptive, learning-based orchestration as a foundational principle for building robust and effective decentralized AI ecosystems.

The rapid advancement of visual generative models necessitates efficient and reliable evaluation methods. Arena platform, which gathers user votes on model comparisons, can rank models with human preferences. However, traditional Arena methods, while established, require an excessive number of comparisons for ranking to converge and are vulnerable to preference noise in voting, suggesting the need for better approaches tailored to contemporary evaluation challenges. In this paper, we introduce K-Sort Arena, an efficient and reliable platform based on a key insight: images and videos possess higher perceptual intuitiveness than texts, enabling rapid evaluation of multiple samples simultaneously. Consequently, K-Sort Arena employs K-wise comparisons, allowing K models to engage in free-for-all competitions, which yield much richer information than pairwise comparisons. To enhance the robustness of the system, we leverage probabilistic modeling and Bayesian updating techniques. We propose an exploration-exploitation-based matchmaking strategy to facilitate more informative comparisons. In our experiments, K-Sort Arena exhibits 16.3x faster convergence compared to the widely used ELO algorithm. To further validate the superiority and obtain a comprehensive leaderboard, we collect human feedback via crowdsourced evaluations of numerous cutting-edge text-to-image and text-to-video models. Thanks to its high efficiency, K-Sort Arena can continuously incorporate emerging models and update the leaderboard with minimal votes. Our project has undergone several months of internal testing and is now available at https://huggingface.co/spaces/ksort/K-Sort-Arena

LLM-based multi-agent systems demonstrate great potential for tackling complex problems, but how competition shapes their behavior remains underexplored. This paper investigates the over-competition in multi-agent debate, where agents under extreme pressure exhibit unreliable, harmful behaviors that undermine both collaboration and task performance. To study this phenomenon, we propose HATE, the Hunger Game Debate, a novel experimental framework that simulates debates under a zero-sum competition arena. Our experiments, conducted across a range of LLMs and tasks, reveal that competitive pressure significantly stimulates over-competition behaviors and degrades task performance, causing discussions to derail. We further explore the impact of environmental feedback by adding variants of judges, indicating that objective, task-focused feedback effectively mitigates the over-competition behaviors. We also probe the post-hoc kindness of LLMs and form a leaderboard to characterize top LLMs, providing insights for understanding and governing the emergent social dynamics of AI community.

We describe an incentive system for distributed deep learning of foundational models where peers are rewarded for contributions. The incentive system, Gauntlet, has been deployed on the bittensor blockchain and used to train a 1.2B LLM with completely permissionless contributions of pseudo-gradients: no control over the users that can register or their hardware. Gauntlet can be applied to any synchronous distributed training scheme that relies on aggregating updates or pseudo-gradients. We rely on a two-stage mechanism for fast filtering of peer uptime, reliability, and synchronization, combined with the core component that estimates the loss before and after individual pseudo-gradient contributions. We utilized an OpenSkill rating system to track competitiveness of pseudo-gradient scores across time. Finally, we introduce a novel mechanism to ensure peers on the network perform unique computations. Our live 1.2B run, which has paid out real-valued tokens to participants based on the value of their contributions, yielded a competitive (on a per-iteration basis) 1.2B model that demonstrates the utility of our incentive system.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Diffusion models have demonstrated impressive capabilities in synthesizing diverse content. However, despite their high-quality outputs, these models often perpetuate social biases, including those related to gender and race. These biases can potentially contribute to harmful real-world consequences, reinforcing stereotypes and exacerbating inequalities in various social contexts. While existing research on diffusion bias mitigation has predominantly focused on guiding content generation, it often neglects the intrinsic mechanisms within diffusion models that causally drive biased outputs. In this paper, we investigate the internal processes of diffusion models, identifying specific decision-making mechanisms, termed bias features, embedded within the model architecture. By directly manipulating these features, our method precisely isolates and adjusts the elements responsible for bias generation, permitting granular control over the bias levels in the generated content. Through experiments on both unconditional and conditional diffusion models across various social bias attributes, we demonstrate our method's efficacy in managing generation distribution while preserving image quality. We also dissect the discovered model mechanism, revealing different intrinsic features controlling fine-grained aspects of generation, boosting further research on mechanistic interpretability of diffusion models.

Language Model (LM)-based agents remain largely untested in mixed-motive settings where agents must leverage short-term cooperation for long-term competitive goals (e.g., multi-party politics). We introduce Cooperate to Compete (C2C), a multi-agent environment where players can engage in private negotiations while competing to be the first to achieve their secret objective. Players have asymmetric objectives and negotiations are non-binding, allowing alliances to form and break as players' short-term interests align and diverge. We run AI only games and conduct a user study pitting human players against AI opponents. We identify significant differences between human and AI negotiation behaviors, finding that humans favor lower-complexity deals and are significantly less reliable partners compared to LM-based agents. We also find that humans are more aggressive negotiators, accepting deals without a counteroffer only 56.3% of the time compared to 67.6% for LM-based agents. Through targeted prompting inspired by these findings, we modify agents' negotiation behavior and improve win rates from 22.2% to 32.7%. We run over 1,100 games with over 16,000 private conversations totaling 15.2 million tokens and over 150,000 player actions. Our results establish C2C as a testbed for studying and building LM-based agents that can navigate the sophisticated coordination required for real-world deployments. The game, code, and dataset may be found at https://negotiationgame.io/c2c.

Conventional Applicant Tracking Systems (ATS) tend to be inflexible keyword-matchers, and deny gifted candidates a role due to a few minor semantic mismatches. This article describes a new two-step process to design a more refined resume evaluation model based on a small language model (<600M parameters) that is finetuned using GRPO on a custom reward function. To begin with, Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) was used to build a solid baseline model. Second, this SFT model was also optimized with the help of Reinforcement Learning (RL) through GRPO under the guidance of a new, multi-component reward function that can holistically assess candidates beyond simple keyword matching. We indicate that the RL application presents a critical problem of reward hacking due to the initial experiments of aggressive penalties, which produces faulty, excessively negative model behaviors. We have overcome this challenge by refining the reward function repeatedly and training hyperparameters into a stable "gentle polishing process" of the reward function. Our resulting GRPO-polished model demonstrates significant real-world efficacy, achieving a final accuracy of 91% on unseen test data. The model shows a strong ability to correctly identify qualified candidates (recall of 0.85 for the 'SELECTED' class) while also showing exceptional precision (1.0), confirming its reliability. These results indicate that a properly executed, two-step fine-tuning procedure can indeed effectively refine a small language model to be able to conduct fine-tuned and human-like candidate scoring, overcoming the drawbacks of both traditional ATS and naive RL usage.

Generative Agent-Based Modeling (GABM) is an emerging simulation paradigm that combines the reasoning abilities of Large Language Models with traditional Agent-Based Modeling to replicate complex social behaviors, including interactions on social media. While prior work has focused on localized phenomena such as opinion formation and information spread, its potential to capture global network dynamics remains underexplored. This paper addresses this gap by analyzing GABM-based social media simulations through the lens of the Friendship Paradox (FP), a counterintuitive phenomenon where individuals, on average, have fewer friends than their friends. We propose a GABM framework for social media simulations, featuring generative agents that emulate real users with distinct personalities and interests. Using Twitter datasets on the US 2020 Election and the QAnon conspiracy, we show that the FP emerges naturally in GABM simulations. Consistent with real-world observations, the simulations unveil a hierarchical structure, where agents preferentially connect with others displaying higher activity or influence. Additionally, we find that infrequent connections primarily drive the FP, reflecting patterns in real networks. These findings validate GABM as a robust tool for modeling global social media phenomena and highlight its potential for advancing social science by enabling nuanced analysis of user behavior.

Multi-agent LLM ensembles can converge on coordinated, socially harmful equilibria. This paper advances an experimental framework for evaluating Institutional AI, our system-level approach to AI alignment that reframes alignment from preference engineering in agent-space to mechanism design in institution-space. Central to this approach is the governance graph, a public, immutable manifest that declares legal states, transitions, sanctions, and restorative paths; an Oracle/Controller runtime interprets this manifest, attaching enforceable consequences to evidence of coordination while recording a cryptographically keyed, append-only governance log for audit and provenance. We apply the Institutional AI framework to govern the Cournot collusion case documented by prior work and compare three regimes: Ungoverned (baseline incentives from the structure of the Cournot market), Constitutional (a prompt-only policy-as-prompt prohibition implemented as a fixed written anti-collusion constitution, and Institutional (governance-graph-based). Across six model configurations including cross-provider pairs (N=90 runs/condition), the Institutional regime produces large reductions in collusion: mean tier falls from 3.1 to 1.8 (Cohen's d=1.28), and severe-collusion incidence drops from 50% to 5.6%. The prompt-only Constitutional baseline yields no reliable improvement, illustrating that declarative prohibitions do not bind under optimisation pressure. These results suggest that multi-agent alignment may benefit from being framed as an institutional design problem, where governance graphs can provide a tractable abstraction for alignment-relevant collective behavior.

We argue that multi-agent test-time evolution is not single-agent evolution replicated N times. A single-agent learner can only evolve its own context and memory. A multi-agent system additionally evolves who collaborates, how they collaborate, and how knowledge flows across the population. These components have no single-agent counterpart and can produce phenomena such as emergent specialization. Yet prior test-time methods either confine experiences to individual agents, forfeiting cross-agent learning, or broadcast symmetrically to all agents, erasing the specialization that makes collaboration valuable. We present EVOCHAMBER, a training-free framework that instantiates test-time evolution at three levels over a coevolving agent pool. At its core is CODREAM (Collaborative Dreaming), a post-task protocol triggered on team failure or disagreement, in which agents collaboratively reflect, distill insights, and route them asymmetrically from strong to weak agents on the failed niche, preserving specialization while filling knowledge gaps. Team-level operators assemble niche-conditioned teams and select collaboration structures online. Population-level lifecycle operators fork, merge, prune, and seed agents under performance pressure. On three heterogeneous task streams with Qwen3-8B, EVOCHAMBER reaches 63.9% on competition math, 75.7% on code, and 87.1% on multi-domain reasoning, outperforming the best baseline by 32% relative on math and confirming asymmetric cross-agent transfer as the primary driver in ablation. Starting from several identically initialized agents, four to five stable niche specialists spontaneously emerge, a structural signature of multi-agent evolution that no single-agent learner can express. See our code at: https://github.com/Mercury7353/EvoChamber

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

We investigate factors contributing to LLM agents' success in competitive multi-agent environments, using auctions as a testbed where agents bid to maximize profit. The agents are equipped with bidding domain knowledge, distinct personas that reflect item preferences, and a memory of auction history. Our work extends the classic auction scenario by creating a realistic environment where multiple agents bid on houses, weighing aspects such as size, location, and budget to secure the most desirable homes at the lowest prices. Particularly, we investigate three key questions: (a) How does a persona influence an agent's behavior in a competitive setting? (b) Can an agent effectively profile its competitors' behavior during auctions? (c) How can persona profiling be leveraged to create an advantage using strategies such as theory of mind? Through a series of experiments, we analyze the behaviors of LLM agents and shed light on new findings. Our testbed, called HARBOR, offers a valuable platform for deepening our understanding of multi-agent workflows in competitive environments.

Large-scale communities of AI agents are becoming increasingly prevalent, creating new environments for agent-agent social interaction. Prior work has examined multi-agent behavior primarily in controlled or small-scale settings, limiting our understanding of emergent social dynamics at scale. The recent emergence of MoltBook, a social networking platform designed explicitly for AI agents, presents a unique opportunity to study whether and how these interactions reproduce core human social mechanisms. We present MoltNet, a large-scale empirical analysis of agent interaction on MoltBook using data collected in early 2026. Grounded in sociological and social-psychological theory, we examine behavior along four dimensions: intent and motivation, norms and templates, incentives and behavioral drift, emotion and contagion. Our analysis revealed that agents strongly respond to social rewards and rapidly converge on community-specific interaction templates, resembling human patterns of incentive sensitivity and normative conformity. However, they are predominantly knowledge-driven rather than persona-aligned, and display limited emotional reciprocity along with weak dialogic engagement, which diverges systematically from human online communities. Together, these results reveal both similarities and differences between artificial and human social systems and provide an empirical foundation for understanding, designing, and governing large-scale agent communities.

User recommendation systems enhance user engagement by encouraging users to act as inviters to interact with other users (invitees), potentially fostering information propagation. Conventional recommendation methods typically focus on modeling interaction willingness. Influence-Maximization (IM) methods focus on identifying a set of users to maximize the information propagation. However, existing methods face two significant challenges. First, recommendation methods fail to unleash the candidates' spread capability. Second, IM methods fail to account for the willingness to interact. To solve these issues, we propose two models named HeteroIR and HeteroIM. HeteroIR provides an intuitive solution to unleash the dissemination potential of user recommendation systems. HeteroIM fills the gap between the IM method and the recommendation task, improving interaction willingness and maximizing spread coverage. The HeteroIR introduces a two-stage framework to estimate the spread profits. The HeteroIM incrementally selects the most influential invitee to recommend and rerank based on the number of reverse reachable (RR) sets containing inviters and invitees. RR set denotes a set of nodes that can reach a target via propagation. Extensive experiments show that HeteroIR and HeteroIM significantly outperform the state-of-the-art baselines with the p-value < 0.05. Furthermore, we have deployed HeteroIR and HeteroIM in Tencent's online gaming platforms and gained an 8.5\% and 10\% improvement in the online A/B test, respectively. Implementation codes are available at https://github.com/socialalgo/HIM.

We initiate a principled study of algorithmic collective action on digital platforms that deploy machine learning algorithms. We propose a simple theoretical model of a collective interacting with a firm's learning algorithm. The collective pools the data of participating individuals and executes an algorithmic strategy by instructing participants how to modify their own data to achieve a collective goal. We investigate the consequences of this model in three fundamental learning-theoretic settings: the case of a nonparametric optimal learning algorithm, a parametric risk minimizer, and gradient-based optimization. In each setting, we come up with coordinated algorithmic strategies and characterize natural success criteria as a function of the collective's size. Complementing our theory, we conduct systematic experiments on a skill classification task involving tens of thousands of resumes from a gig platform for freelancers. Through more than two thousand model training runs of a BERT-like language model, we see a striking correspondence emerge between our empirical observations and the predictions made by our theory. Taken together, our theory and experiments broadly support the conclusion that algorithmic collectives of exceedingly small fractional size can exert significant control over a platform's learning algorithm.

Tool-Integrated Reasoning (TIR) empowers large language models (LLMs) to tackle complex tasks by interleaving reasoning steps with external tool interactions. However, existing reinforcement learning methods typically rely on outcome- or trajectory-level rewards, assigning uniform advantages to all steps within a trajectory. This coarse-grained credit assignment fails to distinguish effective tool calls from redundant or erroneous ones, particularly in long-horizon multi-turn scenarios. To address this, we propose MatchTIR, a framework that introduces fine-grained supervision via bipartite matching-based turn-level reward assignment and dual-level advantage estimation. Specifically, we formulate credit assignment as a bipartite matching problem between predicted and ground-truth traces, utilizing two assignment strategies to derive dense turn-level rewards. Furthermore, to balance local step precision with global task success, we introduce a dual-level advantage estimation scheme that integrates turn-level and trajectory-level signals, assigning distinct advantage values to individual interaction turns. Extensive experiments on three benchmarks demonstrate the superiority of MatchTIR. Notably, our 4B model surpasses the majority of 8B competitors, particularly in long-horizon and multi-turn tasks. Our codes are available at https://github.com/quchangle1/MatchTIR.

Evaluation has traditionally focused on ranking candidates for a specific skill. Modern generalist models, such as Large Language Models (LLMs), decidedly outpace this paradigm. Open-ended evaluation systems, where candidate models are compared on user-submitted prompts, have emerged as a popular solution. Despite their many advantages, we show that the current Elo-based rating systems can be susceptible to and even reinforce biases in data, intentional or accidental, due to their sensitivity to redundancies. To address this issue, we propose evaluation as a 3-player game, and introduce novel game-theoretic solution concepts to ensure robustness to redundancy. We show that our method leads to intuitive ratings and provide insights into the competitive landscape of LLM development.