Daily Papers

In the field of computational advertising, the integration of ads into the outputs of large language models (LLMs) presents an opportunity to support these services without compromising content integrity. This paper introduces novel auction mechanisms for ad allocation and pricing within the textual outputs of LLMs, leveraging retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). We propose a segment auction where an ad is probabilistically retrieved for each discourse segment (paragraph, section, or entire output) according to its bid and relevance, following the RAG framework, and priced according to competing bids. We show that our auction maximizes logarithmic social welfare, a new notion of welfare that balances allocation efficiency and fairness, and we characterize the associated incentive-compatible pricing rule. These results are extended to multi-ad allocation per segment. An empirical evaluation validates the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach over several ad auction scenarios, and exhibits inherent tradeoffs in metrics as we allow the LLM more flexibility to allocate ads.

We consider a number of graph kernels and proximity measures including commute time kernel, regularized Laplacian kernel, heat kernel, exponential diffusion kernel (also called "communicability"), etc., and the corresponding distances as applied to clustering nodes in random graphs and several well-known datasets. The model of generating random graphs involves edge probabilities for the pairs of nodes that belong to the same class or different predefined classes of nodes. It turns out that in most cases, logarithmic measures (i.e., measures resulting after taking logarithm of the proximities) perform better while distinguishing underlying classes than the "plain" measures. A comparison in terms of reject curves of inter-class and intra-class distances confirms this conclusion. A similar conclusion can be made for several well-known datasets. A possible origin of this effect is that most kernels have a multiplicative nature, while the nature of distances used in cluster algorithms is an additive one (cf. the triangle inequality). The logarithmic transformation is a tool to transform the first nature to the second one. Moreover, some distances corresponding to the logarithmic measures possess a meaningful cutpoint additivity property. In our experiments, the leader is usually the logarithmic Communicability measure. However, we indicate some more complicated cases in which other measures, typically, Communicability and plain Walk, can be the winners.

We study LLM policy synthesis: using a large language model to iteratively generate programmatic agent policies for multi-agent environments. Rather than training neural policies via reinforcement learning, our framework prompts an LLM to produce Python policy functions, evaluates them in self-play, and refines them using performance feedback across iterations. We investigate feedback engineering (the design of what evaluation information is shown to the LLM during refinement) comparing sparse feedback (scalar reward only) against dense feedback (reward plus social metrics: efficiency, equality, sustainability, peace). Across two canonical Sequential Social Dilemmas (Gathering and Cleanup) and two frontier LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro), dense feedback consistently matches or exceeds sparse feedback on all metrics. The advantage is largest in the Cleanup public goods game, where providing social metrics helps the LLM calibrate the costly cleaning-harvesting tradeoff. Rather than triggering over-optimization of fairness, social metrics serve as a coordination signal that guides the LLM toward more effective cooperative strategies, including territory partitioning, adaptive role assignment, and the avoidance of wasteful aggression. We further perform an adversarial experiment to determine whether LLMs can reward hack these environments. We characterize five attack classes and discuss mitigations, highlighting an inherent tension in LLM policy synthesis between expressiveness and safety. Code at https://github.com/vicgalle/llm-policies-social-dilemmas.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

The growing capabilities and increasingly widespread deployment of AI systems necessitate robust benchmarks for measuring their cooperative capabilities. Unfortunately, most multi-agent benchmarks are either zero-sum or purely cooperative, providing limited opportunities for such measurements. We introduce a general-sum variant of the zero-sum board game Diplomacy -- called Welfare Diplomacy -- in which players must balance investing in military conquest and domestic welfare. We argue that Welfare Diplomacy facilitates both a clearer assessment of and stronger training incentives for cooperative capabilities. Our contributions are: (1) proposing the Welfare Diplomacy rules and implementing them via an open-source Diplomacy engine; (2) constructing baseline agents using zero-shot prompted language models; and (3) conducting experiments where we find that baselines using state-of-the-art models attain high social welfare but are exploitable. Our work aims to promote societal safety by aiding researchers in developing and assessing multi-agent AI systems. Code to evaluate Welfare Diplomacy and reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/mukobi/welfare-diplomacy.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains, where rare but severe failures can result in irreversible harm. However, prevailing evaluation benchmarks often reduce complex social risk to mean-centered scalar scores, thereby obscuring distributional structure, cross-dimensional interactions, and worst-case behavior. This paper introduces Social Harm Analysis via Risk Profiles (SHARP), a framework for multidimensional, distribution-aware evaluation of social harm. SHARP models harm as a multivariate random variable and integrates explicit decomposition into bias, fairness, ethics, and epistemic reliability with a union-of-failures aggregation reparameterized as additive cumulative log-risk. The framework further employs risk-sensitive distributional statistics, with Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR95) as a primary metric, to characterize worst-case model behavior. Application of SHARP to eleven frontier LLMs, evaluated on a fixed corpus of n=901 socially sensitive prompts, reveals that models with similar average risk can exhibit more than twofold differences in tail exposure and volatility. Across models, dimension-wise marginal tail behavior varies systematically across harm dimensions, with bias exhibiting the strongest tail severities, epistemic and fairness risks occupying intermediate regimes, and ethical misalignment consistently lower; together, these patterns reveal heterogeneous, model-dependent failure structures that scalar benchmarks conflate. These findings indicate that responsible evaluation and governance of LLMs require moving beyond scalar averages toward multidimensional, tail-sensitive risk profiling.

Is it possible to understand or imitate a policy maker's rationale by looking at past decisions they made? We formalize this question as the problem of learning social welfare functions belonging to the well-studied family of power mean functions. We focus on two learning tasks; in the first, the input is vectors of utilities of an action (decision or policy) for individuals in a group and their associated social welfare as judged by a policy maker, whereas in the second, the input is pairwise comparisons between the welfares associated with a given pair of utility vectors. We show that power mean functions are learnable with polynomial sample complexity in both cases, even if the comparisons are social welfare information is noisy. Finally, we design practical algorithms for these tasks and evaluate their performance.

We obtain almost sure bounds for the weighted sum sum_{n leq t} f(n){n}, where f(n) is a Steinhaus random multiplicative function. Specifically, we obtain the bounds predicted by exponentiating the law of the iterated logarithm, giving sharp upper and lower bounds.

We study the sample complexity of learning an ε-optimal policy in the Stochastic Shortest Path (SSP) problem. We first derive sample complexity bounds when the learner has access to a generative model. We show that there exists a worst-case SSP instance with S states, A actions, minimum cost c_{min}, and maximum expected cost of the optimal policy over all states B_{star}, where any algorithm requires at least Ω(SAB_{star}^3/(c_{min}ε^2)) samples to return an ε-optimal policy with high probability. Surprisingly, this implies that whenever c_{min} = 0 an SSP problem may not be learnable, thus revealing that learning in SSPs is strictly harder than in the finite-horizon and discounted settings. We complement this lower bound with an algorithm that matches it, up to logarithmic factors, in the general case, and an algorithm that matches it up to logarithmic factors even when c_{min} = 0, but only under the condition that the optimal policy has a bounded hitting time to the goal state.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

We give an improved theoretical analysis of score-based generative modeling. Under a score estimate with small L^2 error (averaged across timesteps), we provide efficient convergence guarantees for any data distribution with second-order moment, by either employing early stopping or assuming smoothness condition on the score function of the data distribution. Our result does not rely on any log-concavity or functional inequality assumption and has a logarithmic dependence on the smoothness. In particular, we show that under only a finite second moment condition, approximating the following in reverse KL divergence in epsilon-accuracy can be done in tilde Oleft(d log (1/delta){epsilon}right) steps: 1) the variance-delta Gaussian perturbation of any data distribution; 2) data distributions with 1/delta-smooth score functions. Our analysis also provides a quantitative comparison between different discrete approximations and may guide the choice of discretization points in practice.

Gradient descent has proven to be a powerful and effective technique for optimization in numerous machine learning applications. Recent advances in computational neuroscience have shown that learning in standard gradient descent optimization formulation is not consistent with learning in biological systems. This has opened up interesting avenues for building biologically inspired learning techniques. One such approach is inspired by Dale's law, which states that inhibitory and excitatory synapses do not swap roles during the course of learning. The resulting exponential gradient descent optimization scheme leads to log-normally distributed synaptic weights. Interestingly, the density that satisfies the Fokker-Planck equation corresponding to the stochastic differential equation (SDE) with geometric Brownian motion (GBM) is the log-normal density. Leveraging this connection, we start with the SDE governing geometric Brownian motion, and show that discretizing the corresponding reverse-time SDE yields a multiplicative update rule, which surprisingly, coincides with the sampling equivalent of the exponential gradient descent update founded on Dale's law. Furthermore, we propose a new formalism for multiplicative denoising score-matching, subsuming the loss function proposed by Hyvaerinen for non-negative data. Indeed, log-normally distributed data is positive and the proposed score-matching formalism turns out to be a natural fit. This allows for training of score-based models for image data and results in a novel multiplicative update scheme for sample generation starting from a log-normal density. Experimental results on MNIST, Fashion MNIST, and Kuzushiji datasets demonstrate generative capability of the new scheme. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first instance of a biologically inspired generative model employing multiplicative updates, founded on geometric Brownian motion.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice.

We present the LLM Economist, a novel framework that uses agent-based modeling to design and assess economic policies in strategic environments with hierarchical decision-making. At the lower level, bounded rational worker agents -- instantiated as persona-conditioned prompts sampled from U.S. Census-calibrated income and demographic statistics -- choose labor supply to maximize text-based utility functions learned in-context. At the upper level, a planner agent employs in-context reinforcement learning to propose piecewise-linear marginal tax schedules anchored to the current U.S. federal brackets. This construction endows economic simulacra with three capabilities requisite for credible fiscal experimentation: (i) optimization of heterogeneous utilities, (ii) principled generation of large, demographically realistic agent populations, and (iii) mechanism design -- the ultimate nudging problem -- expressed entirely in natural language. Experiments with populations of up to one hundred interacting agents show that the planner converges near Stackelberg equilibria that improve aggregate social welfare relative to Saez solutions, while a periodic, persona-level voting procedure furthers these gains under decentralized governance. These results demonstrate that large language model-based agents can jointly model, simulate, and govern complex economic systems, providing a tractable test bed for policy evaluation at the societal scale to help build better civilizations.

Many policy optimization approaches in reinforcement learning incorporate a Kullback-Leilbler (KL) divergence to the previous policy, to prevent the policy from changing too quickly. This idea was initially proposed in a seminal paper on Conservative Policy Iteration, with approximations given by algorithms like TRPO and Munchausen Value Iteration (MVI). We continue this line of work by investigating a generalized KL divergence -- called the Tsallis KL divergence -- which use the q-logarithm in the definition. The approach is a strict generalization, as q = 1 corresponds to the standard KL divergence; q > 1 provides a range of new options. We characterize the types of policies learned under the Tsallis KL, and motivate when q >1 could be beneficial. To obtain a practical algorithm that incorporates Tsallis KL regularization, we extend MVI, which is one of the simplest approaches to incorporate KL regularization. We show that this generalized MVI(q) obtains significant improvements over the standard MVI(q = 1) across 35 Atari games.