Daily Papers

Large-scale video generation models have demonstrated emergent physical coherence, positioning them as potential world models. However, a gap remains between contemporary "stateless" video architectures and classic state-centric world model theories. This work bridges this gap by proposing a novel taxonomy centered on two pillars: State Construction and Dynamics Modeling. We categorize state construction into implicit paradigms (context management) and explicit paradigms (latent compression), while dynamics modeling is analyzed through knowledge integration and architectural reformulation. Furthermore, we advocate for a transition in evaluation from visual fidelity to functional benchmarks, testing physical persistence and causal reasoning. We conclude by identifying two critical frontiers: enhancing persistence via data-driven memory and compressed fidelity, and advancing causality through latent factor decoupling and reasoning-prior integration. By addressing these challenges, the field can evolve from generating visually plausible videos to building robust, general-purpose world simulators.

Part-based 3D generation holds great potential for various applications. Previous part generators that represent parts using implicit vector-set tokens often suffer from insufficient geometric details. Another line of work adopts an explicit voxel representation but shares a global voxel grid among all parts; this often causes small parts to occupy too few voxels, leading to degraded quality. In this paper, we propose FullPart, a novel framework that combines both implicit and explicit paradigms. It first derives the bounding box layout through an implicit box vector-set diffusion process, a task that implicit diffusion handles effectively since box tokens contain little geometric detail. Then, it generates detailed parts, each within its own fixed full-resolution voxel grid. Instead of sharing a global low-resolution space, each part in our method - even small ones - is generated at full resolution, enabling the synthesis of intricate details. We further introduce a center-point encoding strategy to address the misalignment issue when exchanging information between parts of different actual sizes, thereby maintaining global coherence. Moreover, to tackle the scarcity of reliable part data, we present PartVerse-XL, the largest human-annotated 3D part dataset to date with 40K objects and 320K parts. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FullPart achieves state-of-the-art results in 3D part generation. We will release all code, data, and model to benefit future research in 3D part generation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong generalization across a wide range of tasks. Reasoning with LLMs is central to solving multi-step problems and complex decision-making. To support efficient reasoning, recent studies have shifted attention from explicit chain-of-thought prompting toward implicit reasoning, where reasoning occurs silently via latent structures without emitting intermediate textual steps. Implicit reasoning brings advantages such as lower generation cost, faster inference, and better alignment with internal computation. Although prior surveys have discussed latent representations in the context of reasoning, a dedicated and mechanism-level examination of how reasoning unfolds internally within LLMs remains absent. This survey fills that gap by introducing a taxonomy centered on execution paradigms, shifting the focus from representational forms to computational strategies. We organize existing methods into three execution paradigms based on \textit{how and where internal computation unfolds}: latent optimization, signal-guided control, and layer-recurrent execution. We also review structural, behavioral and representation-based evidence that supports the presence of implicit reasoning in LLMs. We further provide a structured overview of the evaluation metrics and benchmarks used in existing works to assess the effectiveness and reliability of implicit reasoning. We maintain a continuously updated project at: https://github.com/digailab/awesome-llm-implicit-reasoning.

Motion modeling is critical in flow-based Video Frame Interpolation (VFI). Existing paradigms either consider linear combinations of bidirectional flows or directly predict bilateral flows for given timestamps without exploring favorable motion priors, thus lacking the capability of effectively modeling spatiotemporal dynamics in real-world videos. To address this limitation, in this study, we introduce Generalizable Implicit Motion Modeling (GIMM), a novel and effective approach to motion modeling for VFI. Specifically, to enable GIMM as an effective motion modeling paradigm, we design a motion encoding pipeline to model spatiotemporal motion latent from bidirectional flows extracted from pre-trained flow estimators, effectively representing input-specific motion priors. Then, we implicitly predict arbitrary-timestep optical flows within two adjacent input frames via an adaptive coordinate-based neural network, with spatiotemporal coordinates and motion latent as inputs. Our GIMM can be smoothly integrated with existing flow-based VFI works without further modifications. We show that GIMM performs better than the current state of the art on the VFI benchmarks.

Long-horizon applications increasingly require large language models (LLMs) to answer queries when relevant evidence is sparse and dispersed across very long contexts. Existing memory systems largely follow two paradigms: explicit structured memories offer interpretability but often become brittle under long-context overload, while latent memory mechanisms are efficient and stable yet difficult to inspect. We propose LatentGraphMem, a memory framework that combines implicit graph memory with explicit subgraph retrieval. LatentGraphMem stores a graph-structured memory in latent space for stability and efficiency, and exposes a task-specific subgraph retrieval interface that returns a compact symbolic subgraph under a fixed budget for downstream reasoning and human inspection. During training, an explicit graph view is materialized to interface with a frozen reasoner for question-answering supervision. At inference time, retrieval is performed in latent space and only the retrieved subgraph is externalized. Experiments on long-horizon benchmarks across multiple model scales show that LatentGraphMem consistently outperforms representative explicit-graph and latent-memory baselines, while enabling parameter-efficient adaptation and flexible scaling to larger reasoners without introducing large symbolic artifacts.

Two competing paradigms exist for self-supervised learning of data representations. Joint Embedding Predictive Architecture (JEPA) is a class of architectures in which semantically similar inputs are encoded into representations that are predictive of each other. A recent successful approach that falls under the JEPA framework is self-distillation, where an online encoder is trained to predict the output of the target encoder, sometimes using a lightweight predictor network. This is contrasted with the Masked AutoEncoder (MAE) paradigm, where an encoder and decoder are trained to reconstruct missing parts of the input in the data space rather, than its latent representation. A common motivation for using the JEPA approach over MAE is that the JEPA objective prioritizes abstract features over fine-grained pixel information (which can be unpredictable and uninformative). In this work, we seek to understand the mechanism behind this empirical observation by analyzing the training dynamics of deep linear models. We uncover a surprising mechanism: in a simplified linear setting where both approaches learn similar representations, JEPAs are biased to learn high-influence features, i.e., features characterized by having high regression coefficients. Our results point to a distinct implicit bias of predicting in latent space that may shed light on its success in practice.

Embedding-based collaborative filtering, often coupled with nearest neighbor search, is widely deployed in large-scale recommender systems for personalized content selection. Modern systems leverage multiple implicit feedback signals (e.g., clicks, add to cart, purchases) to model user preferences comprehensively. However, prevailing approaches adopt a feedback-wise modeling paradigm, which (1) fails to capture the structured progression of user engagement entailed among different feedback and (2) embeds feedback-specific information into disjoint spaces, making representations incommensurable, increasing system complexity, and leading to suboptimal retrieval performance. A promising alternative is Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR), which explicitly models discrete ordered relations. However, existing OLR-based recommendation models mainly focus on explicit feedback (e.g., movie ratings) and struggle with implicit, correlated feedback, where ordering is vague and non-linear. Moreover, standard OLR lacks flexibility in handling feedback-dependent covariates, resulting in suboptimal performance in real-world systems. To address these limitations, we propose Generalized Neural Ordinal Logistic Regression (GNOLR), which encodes multiple feature-feedback dependencies into a unified, structured embedding space and enforces feedback-specific dependency learning through a nested optimization framework. Thus, GNOLR enhances predictive accuracy, captures the progression of user engagement, and simplifies the retrieval process. We establish a theoretical comparison with existing paradigms, demonstrating how GNOLR avoids disjoint spaces while maintaining effectiveness. Extensive experiments on ten real-world datasets show that GNOLR significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods in efficiency and adaptability.

Implicit bias refers to automatic or spontaneous mental processes that shape perceptions, judgments, and behaviors. Previous research examining `implicit bias' in large language models (LLMs) has often approached the phenomenon differently than how it is studied in humans by focusing primarily on model outputs rather than on model processing. To examine model processing, we present a method called the Reasoning Model Implicit Association Test (RM-IAT) for studying implicit bias-like patterns in reasoning models: LLMs that employ step-by-step reasoning to solve complex tasks. Using this method, we find that reasoning models require more tokens when processing association-incompatible information compared to association-compatible information. These findings suggest AI systems harbor patterns in processing information that are analogous to human implicit bias. We consider the implications of these implicit bias-like patterns for their deployment in real-world applications.

Large language models (LLMs), when guided by explicit textual plans, can perform reliable step-by-step reasoning during problem-solving. However, generating accurate and effective textual plans remains challenging due to LLM hallucinations and the high diversity of task-specific questions. To address this, we draw inspiration from human Implicit Cognition (IC), the subconscious process by which decisions are guided by compact, generalized patterns learned from past experiences without requiring explicit verbalization. We propose iCLP, a novel framework that enables LLMs to adaptively generate latent plans (LPs), which are compact encodings of effective reasoning instructions. iCLP first distills explicit plans from existing step-by-step reasoning trajectories. It then learns discrete representations of these plans via a vector-quantized autoencoder coupled with a codebook. Finally, by fine-tuning LLMs on paired latent plans and corresponding reasoning steps, the models learn to perform implicit planning during reasoning. Experimental results on mathematical reasoning and code generation tasks demonstrate that, with iCLP, LLMs can plan in latent space while reasoning in language space. This approach yields significant improvements in both accuracy and efficiency and, crucially, demonstrates strong cross-domain generalization while preserving the interpretability of chain-of-thought reasoning.

Implicit Personalization (IP) is a phenomenon of language models inferring a user's background from the implicit cues in the input prompts and tailoring the response based on this inference. While previous work has touched upon various instances of this problem, there lacks a unified framework to study this behavior. This work systematically studies IP through a rigorous mathematical formulation, a multi-perspective moral reasoning framework, and a set of case studies. Our theoretical foundation for IP relies on a structural causal model and introduces a novel method, indirect intervention, to estimate the causal effect of a mediator variable that cannot be directly intervened upon. Beyond the technical approach, we also introduce a set of moral reasoning principles based on three schools of moral philosophy to study when IP may or may not be ethically appropriate. Equipped with both mathematical and ethical insights, we present three diverse case studies illustrating the varied nature of the IP problem and offer recommendations for future research. Our code and data are at https://github.com/jiarui-liu/IP.

The first generation of Large Language Models - what might be called "Act I" of generative AI (2020-2023) - achieved remarkable success through massive parameter and data scaling, yet exhibited fundamental limitations in knowledge latency, shallow reasoning, and constrained cognitive processes. During this era, prompt engineering emerged as our primary interface with AI, enabling dialogue-level communication through natural language. We now witness the emergence of "Act II" (2024-present), where models are transitioning from knowledge-retrieval systems (in latent space) to thought-construction engines through test-time scaling techniques. This new paradigm establishes a mind-level connection with AI through language-based thoughts. In this paper, we clarify the conceptual foundations of cognition engineering and explain why this moment is critical for its development. We systematically break down these advanced approaches through comprehensive tutorials and optimized implementations, democratizing access to cognition engineering and enabling every practitioner to participate in AI's second act. We provide a regularly updated collection of papers on test-time scaling in the GitHub Repository: https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/cognition-engineering

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

LLMs process text as sequences of tokens that roughly correspond to words, where less common words are represented by multiple tokens. However, individual tokens are often semantically unrelated to the meanings of the words/concepts they comprise. For example, Llama-2-7b's tokenizer splits the word "northeastern" into the tokens ['_n', 'ort', 'he', 'astern'], none of which correspond to semantically meaningful units like "north" or "east." Similarly, the overall meanings of named entities like "Neil Young" and multi-word expressions like "break a leg" cannot be directly inferred from their constituent tokens. Mechanistically, how do LLMs convert such arbitrary groups of tokens into useful higher-level representations? In this work, we find that last token representations of named entities and multi-token words exhibit a pronounced "erasure" effect, where information about previous and current tokens is rapidly forgotten in early layers. Using this observation, we propose a method to "read out" the implicit vocabulary of an autoregressive LLM by examining differences in token representations across layers, and present results of this method for Llama-2-7b and Llama-3-8B. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to probe the implicit vocabulary of an LLM.

Latent space is rapidly emerging as a native substrate for language-based models. While modern systems are still commonly understood through explicit token-level generation, an increasing body of work shows that many critical internal processes are more naturally carried out in continuous latent space than in human-readable verbal traces. This shift is driven by the structural limitations of explicit-space computation, including linguistic redundancy, discretization bottlenecks, sequential inefficiency, and semantic loss. This survey aims to provide a unified and up-to-date landscape of latent space in language-based models. We organize the survey into five sequential perspectives: Foundation, Evolution, Mechanism, Ability, and Outlook. We begin by delineating the scope of latent space, distinguishing it from explicit or verbal space and from the latent spaces commonly studied in generative visual models. We then trace the field's evolution from early exploratory efforts to the current large-scale expansion. To organize the technical landscape, we examine existing work through the complementary lenses of mechanism and ability. From the perspective of Mechanism, we identify four major lines of development: Architecture, Representation, Computation, and Optimization. From the perspective of Ability, we show how latent space supports a broad capability spectrum spanning Reasoning, Planning, Modeling, Perception, Memory, Collaboration, and Embodiment. Beyond consolidation, we discuss the key open challenges, and outline promising directions for future research. We hope this survey serves not only as a reference for existing work, but also as a foundation for understanding latent space as a general computational and systems paradigm for next-generation intelligence.

Latent or continuous chain-of-thought methods replace explicit textual rationales with a number of internal latent steps, but these intermediate computations are difficult to evaluate beyond correlation-based probes. In this paper, we view latent chain-of-thought as a manipulable causal process in representation space by modeling latent steps as variables in a structural causal model (SCM) and analyzing their effects through step-wise do-interventions. We study two representative paradigms (i.e., Coconut and CODI) on both mathematical and general reasoning tasks to investigate three key questions: (1) which steps are causally necessary for correctness and when answers become decidable early; (2) how does influence propagate across steps, and how does this structure compare to explicit CoT; and (3) do intermediate trajectories retain competing answer modes, and how does output-level commitment differ from representational commitment across steps. We find that latent-step budgets behave less like homogeneous extra depth and more like staged functionality with non-local routing, and we identify a persistent gap between early output bias and late representational commitment. These results motivate mode-conditional and stability-aware analyses -- and corresponding training/decoding objectives -- as more reliable tools for interpreting and improving latent reasoning systems. Code is available at https://github.com/J1mL1/causal-latent-cot.

Large language model (LLM)-based agents trained with reinforcement learning (RL) have shown strong potential on complex interactive tasks. However, standard RL paradigms favor static problem-solving over continuous adaptation: agents often converge to suboptimal strategies due to insufficient exploration, while learned knowledge remains implicit within parameters rather than explicitly retrievable, limiting effective experiential learning. To address these limitations, we introduce RetroAgent, an online RL framework that empowers agents to master complex interactive environments not just by solving, but by evolving. Concretely, RetroAgent features a hindsight self-reflection mechanism that produces dual intrinsic feedback: (1) intrinsic numerical feedback that that tracks incremental subtask completion relative to prior attempts, rewarding promising explorations, and (2) intrinsic language feedback that distills reusable lessons into a memory buffer, retrieved via our proposed Similarity & Utility-Aware Upper Confidence Bound (SimUtil-UCB) strategy balancing relevance, utility, and exploration to effectively leverage past experiences. Extensive experiments on two model families across four challenging agentic tasks demonstrate that RetroAgent significantly outperforms existing methods, achieving state-of-the-art results -- e.g., surpassing Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO)-trained agents by +18.3% on ALFWorld, +15.4% on WebShop, +27.1% on Sokoban, and +8.9% on MineSweeper -- while exhibiting strong test-time adaptation and generalization to out-of-distribution scenarios.

Diffusion models are a class of generative models that learn to synthesize samples by inverting a diffusion process that gradually maps data into noise. While these models have enjoyed great success recently, a full theoretical understanding of their observed properties is still lacking, in particular, their weak sensitivity to the choice of noise family and the role of adequate scheduling of noise levels for good synthesis. By identifying a correspondence between diffusion models and a well-known paradigm in cognitive science known as serial reproduction, whereby human agents iteratively observe and reproduce stimuli from memory, we show how the aforementioned properties of diffusion models can be explained as a natural consequence of this correspondence. We then complement our theoretical analysis with simulations that exhibit these key features. Our work highlights how classic paradigms in cognitive science can shed light on state-of-the-art machine learning problems.

Memory plays a foundational role in augmenting the reasoning, adaptability, and contextual fidelity of modern Large Language Models and Multi-Modal LLMs. As these models transition from static predictors to interactive systems capable of continual learning and personalized inference, the incorporation of memory mechanisms has emerged as a central theme in their architectural and functional evolution. This survey presents a comprehensive and structured synthesis of memory in LLMs and MLLMs, organizing the literature into a cohesive taxonomy comprising implicit, explicit, and agentic memory paradigms. Specifically, the survey delineates three primary memory frameworks. Implicit memory refers to the knowledge embedded within the internal parameters of pre-trained transformers, encompassing their capacity for memorization, associative retrieval, and contextual reasoning. Recent work has explored methods to interpret, manipulate, and reconfigure this latent memory. Explicit memory involves external storage and retrieval components designed to augment model outputs with dynamic, queryable knowledge representations, such as textual corpora, dense vectors, and graph-based structures, thereby enabling scalable and updatable interaction with information sources. Agentic memory introduces persistent, temporally extended memory structures within autonomous agents, facilitating long-term planning, self-consistency, and collaborative behavior in multi-agent systems, with relevance to embodied and interactive AI. Extending beyond text, the survey examines the integration of memory within multi-modal settings, where coherence across vision, language, audio, and action modalities is essential. Key architectural advances, benchmark tasks, and open challenges are discussed, including issues related to memory capacity, alignment, factual consistency, and cross-system interoperability.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, raising concerns about their security. While jailbreak attacks highlight failures under overtly harmful queries, they overlook a critical risk: incorrectly answering harmless-looking inputs can be dangerous and cause real-world harm (Implicit Harm). We systematically reformulate the LLM risk landscape through a structured quadrant perspective based on output factuality and input harmlessness, uncovering an overlooked high-risk region. To investigate this gap, we propose JailFlipBench, a benchmark aims to capture implicit harm, spanning single-modal, multimodal, and factual extension scenarios with diverse evaluation metrics. We further develop initial JailFlip attack methodologies and conduct comprehensive evaluations across multiple open-source and black-box LLMs, show that implicit harm present immediate and urgent real-world risks, calling for broader LLM safety assessments and alignment beyond conventional jailbreak paradigms.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) has emerged as a simple alternative to reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) for aligning language models, but its reliance on hard pairwise labels makes it brittle under noise; our experiments show performance degrading by up to 93 percent in noisy settings. We introduce Anchored Direct Preference Optimization (ADPO), a unified framework that addresses this fragility through reference anchoring. By minimizing KL(q || softmax((l - l_ref) / tau_anc)), where l_ref are reference policy log probabilities, ADPO provides three key advantages: (1) it unifies major learning paradigms, including supervised fine-tuning, knowledge distillation, maximum-entropy reinforcement learning, and DPO, as special cases through different choices of target distribution q, anchor policy pi_ref, and temperature tau_anc; (2) it induces an implicit trust region governed by the softmax Fisher metric with curvature scaling as 1 / tau_anc^2, providing geometric regularization absent in standard methods; and (3) it enables flexible anchor strategies tailored to different learning contexts. Empirically, ADPO consistently outperforms standard DPO by 12 to 93 percent across twelve noisy scenarios, with listwise variants achieving top performance in eleven of twelve cases. In offline distillation, ADPO reduces student-teacher KL by 4 to 49 times while achieving superior returns (for example, 279.3 vs -309.0 for knowledge distillation on HalfCheetah). We further uncover a task-dependent tradeoff: dynamic anchors excel at online exploration in noisy environments (plus 5 to 11 percent), while fixed anchors enable stable offline distillation. Our work establishes anchoring as a general principle for robust policy optimization, with clear practical guidance for anchor selection across diverse learning scenarios.

This paper calls on the research community not only to investigate how human biases are inherited by large language models (LLMs) but also to explore how these biases in LLMs can be leveraged to make society's "unwritten code" - such as implicit stereotypes and heuristics - visible and accessible for critique. We introduce a conceptual framework through a case study in science: uncovering hidden rules in peer review - the factors that reviewers care about but rarely state explicitly due to normative scientific expectations. The idea of the framework is to push LLMs to speak out their heuristics through generating self-consistent hypotheses - why one paper appeared stronger in reviewer scoring - among paired papers submitted to 45 computer science conferences, while iteratively searching deeper hypotheses from remaining pairs where existing hypotheses cannot explain. We observed that LLMs' normative priors about the internal characteristics of good science extracted from their self-talk, e.g. theoretical rigor, were systematically updated toward posteriors that emphasize storytelling about external connections, such as how the work is positioned and connected within and across literatures. This shift reveals the primacy of scientific myths about intrinsic properties driving scientific excellence rather than extrinsic contextualization and storytelling that influence conceptions of relevance and significance. Human reviewers tend to explicitly reward aspects that moderately align with LLMs' normative priors (correlation = 0.49) but avoid articulating contextualization and storytelling posteriors in their review comments (correlation = -0.14), despite giving implicit reward to them with positive scores. We discuss the broad applicability of the framework, leveraging LLMs as diagnostic tools to surface the tacit codes underlying human society, enabling more precisely targeted responsible AI.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive "indicator properties" of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.

Recent progress in multimodal reasoning has been significantly advanced by textual Chain-of-Thought (CoT), a paradigm where models conduct reasoning within language. This text-centric approach, however, treats vision as a static, initial context, creating a fundamental "semantic gap" between rich perceptual data and discrete symbolic thought. Human cognition often transcends language, utilizing vision as a dynamic mental sketchpad. A similar evolution is now unfolding in AI, marking a fundamental paradigm shift from models that merely think about images to those that can truly think with images. This emerging paradigm is characterized by models leveraging visual information as intermediate steps in their thought process, transforming vision from a passive input into a dynamic, manipulable cognitive workspace. In this survey, we chart this evolution of intelligence along a trajectory of increasing cognitive autonomy, which unfolds across three key stages: from external tool exploration, through programmatic manipulation, to intrinsic imagination. To structure this rapidly evolving field, our survey makes four key contributions. (1) We establish the foundational principles of the think with image paradigm and its three-stage framework. (2) We provide a comprehensive review of the core methods that characterize each stage of this roadmap. (3) We analyze the critical landscape of evaluation benchmarks and transformative applications. (4) We identify significant challenges and outline promising future directions. By providing this structured overview, we aim to offer a clear roadmap for future research towards more powerful and human-aligned multimodal AI.

Implicit meanings are integral to human communication, making it essential for language models to be capable of identifying and interpreting them. Grice (1975) proposed a set of conversational maxims that guide cooperative dialogue, noting that speakers may deliberately violate these principles to express meanings beyond literal words, and that listeners, in turn, recognize such violations to draw pragmatic inferences. Building on Surian et al. (1996)'s study of children's sensitivity to violations of Gricean maxims, we introduce a novel benchmark to test whether language models pretrained on less than 10M and less than 100M tokens can distinguish maxim-adhering from maxim-violating utterances. We compare these BabyLMs across five maxims and situate their performance relative to children and a Large Language Model (LLM) pretrained on 3T tokens. We find that overall, models trained on less than 100M tokens outperform those trained on less than 10M, yet fall short of child-level and LLM competence. Our results suggest that modest data increases improve some aspects of pragmatic behavior, leading to finer-grained differentiation between pragmatic dimensions.

Knowledge is fundamental to the overall capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). The knowledge paradigm of a model, which dictates how it encodes and utilizes knowledge, significantly affects its performance. Despite the continuous development of LLMs under existing knowledge paradigms, issues within these frameworks continue to constrain model potential. This blog post highlight three critical open problems limiting model capabilities: (1) challenges in knowledge updating for LLMs, (2) the failure of reverse knowledge generalization (the reversal curse), and (3) conflicts in internal knowledge. We review recent progress made in addressing these issues and discuss potential general solutions. Based on observations in these areas, we propose a hypothetical paradigm based on Contextual Knowledge Scaling, and further outline implementation pathways that remain feasible within contemporary techniques. Evidence suggests this approach holds potential to address current shortcomings, serving as our vision for future model paradigms. This blog post aims to provide researchers with a brief overview of progress in LLM knowledge systems, while provide inspiration for the development of next-generation model architectures.

Interpretability is the study of explaining models in understandable terms to humans. At present, interpretability is divided into two paradigms: the intrinsic paradigm, which believes that only models designed to be explained can be explained, and the post-hoc paradigm, which believes that black-box models can be explained. At the core of this debate is how each paradigm ensures its explanations are faithful, i.e., true to the model's behavior. This is important, as false but convincing explanations lead to unsupported confidence in artificial intelligence (AI), which can be dangerous. This paper's position is that we should think about new paradigms while staying vigilant regarding faithfulness. First, by examining the history of paradigms in science, we see that paradigms are constantly evolving. Then, by examining the current paradigms, we can understand their underlying beliefs, the value they bring, and their limitations. Finally, this paper presents 3 emerging paradigms for interpretability. The first paradigm designs models such that faithfulness can be easily measured. Another optimizes models such that explanations become faithful. The last paradigm proposes to develop models that produce both a prediction and an explanation.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

The transition of Large Language Models (LLMs) from exploratory tools to active "silicon subjects" in social science lacks extensive validation of operational validity. This study introduces Conditioned Comment Prediction (CCP), a task in which a model predicts how a user would comment on a given stimulus by comparing generated outputs with authentic digital traces. This framework enables a rigorous evaluation of current LLM capabilities with respect to the simulation of social media user behavior. We evaluated open-weight 8B models (Llama3.1, Qwen3, Ministral) in English, German, and Luxembourgish language scenarios. By systematically comparing prompting strategies (explicit vs. implicit) and the impact of Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), we identify a critical form vs. content decoupling in low-resource settings: while SFT aligns the surface structure of the text output (length and syntax), it degrades semantic grounding. Furthermore, we demonstrate that explicit conditioning (generated biographies) becomes redundant under fine-tuning, as models successfully perform latent inference directly from behavioral histories. Our findings challenge current "naive prompting" paradigms and offer operational guidelines prioritizing authentic behavioral traces over descriptive personas for high-fidelity simulation.

Deduction, induction, and abduction are fundamental reasoning paradigms, core for human logical thinking. Although improving Large Language Model (LLM) reasoning has attracted significant research efforts, the extent to which the fundamental paradigms induce generalization has yet to be systematically explored. In this study, we shed light on how the interplay between these core paradigms influences LLMs' reasoning behavior. To this end, we first collect a new dataset of reasoning trajectories from symbolic tasks, each targeting one of the three fundamental paradigms, to abstract from concrete world knowledge. Then, we investigate effective ways for inducing these skills into LLMs. We experiment with a battery of methods including simple fine-tuning, and more complex approaches to increase model depth, or transform a dense model to a mixture-of-experts. We comprehensively evaluate induced models on realistic out-of-domain tasks, that are entirely formulated in natural language and contain real-world knowledge. Our results reveal that our approach yields strong generalizability with substantial performance gains (up to 14.60) across realistic tasks.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a quantitative framework for explaining consciousness phenomenon, positing that conscious systems comprise elements integrated through causal properties. We apply IIT 3.0 and 4.0 -- the latest iterations of this framework -- to sequences of Large Language Model (LLM) representations, analyzing data derived from existing Theory of Mind (ToM) test results. Our study systematically investigates whether the differences of ToM test performances, when presented in the LLM representations, can be revealed by IIT estimates, i.e., Phi^{max} (IIT 3.0), Phi (IIT 4.0), Conceptual Information (IIT 3.0), and Phi-structure (IIT 4.0). Furthermore, we compare these metrics with the Span Representations independent of any estimate for consciousness. This additional effort aims to differentiate between potential "consciousness" phenomena and inherent separations within LLM representational space. We conduct comprehensive experiments examining variations across LLM transformer layers and linguistic spans from stimuli. Our results suggest that sequences of contemporary Transformer-based LLM representations lack statistically significant indicators of observed "consciousness" phenomena but exhibit intriguing patterns under spatio-permutational analyses. The Appendix and code are available as Supplementary Materials at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163.

We present a study on how and where personas -- defined by distinct sets of human characteristics, values, and beliefs -- are encoded in the representation space of large language models (LLMs). Using a range of dimension reduction and pattern recognition methods, we first identify the model layers that show the greatest divergence in encoding these representations. We then analyze the activations within a selected layer to examine how specific personas are encoded relative to others, including their shared and distinct embedding spaces. We find that, across multiple pre-trained decoder-only LLMs, the analyzed personas show large differences in representation space only within the final third of the decoder layers. We observe overlapping activations for specific ethical perspectives -- such as moral nihilism and utilitarianism -- suggesting a degree of polysemy. In contrast, political ideologies like conservatism and liberalism appear to be represented in more distinct regions. These findings help to improve our understanding of how LLMs internally represent information and can inform future efforts in refining the modulation of specific human traits in LLM outputs. Warning: This paper includes potentially offensive sample statements.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Unified Multimodal Models (UMMs) have shown remarkable progress in visual generation. Yet, existing benchmarks predominantly assess Crystallized Intelligence, which relies on recalling accumulated knowledge and learned schemas. This focus overlooks Generative Fluid Intelligence (GFI): the capacity to induce patterns, reason through constraints, and adapt to novel scenarios on the fly. To rigorously assess this capability, we introduce GENIUS (GEN Fluid Intelligence EvalUation Suite). We formalize GFI as a synthesis of three primitives. These include Inducing Implicit Patterns (e.g., inferring personalized visual preferences), Executing Ad-hoc Constraints (e.g., visualizing abstract metaphors), and Adapting to Contextual Knowledge (e.g., simulating counter-intuitive physics). Collectively, these primitives challenge models to solve problems grounded entirely in the immediate context. Our systematic evaluation of 12 representative models reveals significant performance deficits in these tasks. Crucially, our diagnostic analysis disentangles these failure modes. It demonstrates that deficits stem from limited context comprehension rather than insufficient intrinsic generative capability. To bridge this gap, we propose a training-free attention intervention strategy. Ultimately, GENIUS establishes a rigorous standard for GFI, guiding the field beyond knowledge utilization toward dynamic, general-purpose reasoning. Our dataset and code will be released at: https://github.com/arctanxarc/GENIUS{https://github.com/arctanxarc/GENIUS}.

Newly-developed large language models (LLM) -- because of how they are trained and designed -- are implicit computational models of humans -- a homo silicus. These models can be used the same way economists use homo economicus: they can be given endowments, information, preferences, and so on and then their behavior can be explored in scenarios via simulation. I demonstrate this approach using OpenAI's GPT3 with experiments derived from Charness and Rabin (2002), Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) and Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). The findings are qualitatively similar to the original results, but it is also trivially easy to try variations that offer fresh insights. Departing from the traditional laboratory paradigm, I also create a hiring scenario where an employer faces applicants that differ in experience and wage ask and then analyze how a minimum wage affects realized wages and the extent of labor-labor substitution.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.

People ``understand'' the world via vision, hearing, tactile, and also the past experience. Human experience can be learned through normal learning (we call it explicit knowledge), or subconsciously (we call it implicit knowledge). These experiences learned through normal learning or subconsciously will be encoded and stored in the brain. Using these abundant experience as a huge database, human beings can effectively process data, even they were unseen beforehand. In this paper, we propose a unified network to encode implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge together, just like the human brain can learn knowledge from normal learning as well as subconsciousness learning. The unified network can generate a unified representation to simultaneously serve various tasks. We can perform kernel space alignment, prediction refinement, and multi-task learning in a convolutional neural network. The results demonstrate that when implicit knowledge is introduced into the neural network, it benefits the performance of all tasks. We further analyze the implicit representation learnt from the proposed unified network, and it shows great capability on catching the physical meaning of different tasks. The source code of this work is at : https://github.com/WongKinYiu/yolor.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

It has been well-known that Chain-of-Thought can remarkably enhance LLMs' performance on complex tasks. However, because it also introduces slower inference speeds and higher computational costs, many researches have attempted to use implicit CoT, which does not need LLMs to explicitly generate the intermediate steps. But there is still gap between their efficacy and typical explicit CoT methods. This leaves us a doubt that, does implicit CoT really equal to explicit CoT? Therefore, in this study, we address this question through experiments. We probe the information of intermediate steps from the model's hidden states when it is performing implicit CoT. The results surprisingly indicate that LLMs hardly think about intermediate steps, suggesting they may just rely on experience rather than strict step-by-step reasoning. Moreover, we find LLMs' implicit reasoning capabilities are susceptible and unstable, reaffirming the necessity of explicit CoT to effectively support complex tasks.

We propose a new learning paradigm called Deep Memory. It has the potential to completely revolutionize the Machine Learning field. Surprisingly, this paradigm has not been reinvented yet, unlike Deep Learning. At the core of this approach is the Learning By Heart principle, well studied in primary schools all over the world. Inspired by poem recitation, or by pi decimal memorization, we propose a concrete algorithm that mimics human behavior. We implement this paradigm on the task of generative modeling, and apply to images, natural language and even the pi decimals as long as one can print them as text. The proposed algorithm even generated this paper, in a one-shot learning setting. In carefully designed experiments, we show that the generated samples are indistinguishable from the training examples, as measured by any statistical tests or metrics.

Self-consciousness, the introspection of one's existence and thoughts, represents a high-level cognitive process. As language models advance at an unprecedented pace, a critical question arises: Are these models becoming self-conscious? Drawing upon insights from psychological and neural science, this work presents a practical definition of self-consciousness for language models and refines ten core concepts. Our work pioneers an investigation into self-consciousness in language models by, for the first time, leveraging causal structural games to establish the functional definitions of the ten core concepts. Based on our definitions, we conduct a comprehensive four-stage experiment: quantification (evaluation of ten leading models), representation (visualization of self-consciousness within the models), manipulation (modification of the models' representation), and acquisition (fine-tuning the models on core concepts). Our findings indicate that although models are in the early stages of developing self-consciousness, there is a discernible representation of certain concepts within their internal mechanisms. However, these representations of self-consciousness are hard to manipulate positively at the current stage, yet they can be acquired through targeted fine-tuning. Our datasets and code are at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/SelfConsciousness.

We observe an empirical phenomenon in Large Language Models (LLMs) -- very few activations exhibit significantly larger values than others (e.g., 100,000 times larger). We call them massive activations. First, we demonstrate the widespread existence of massive activations across various LLMs and characterize their locations. Second, we find their values largely stay constant regardless of the input, and they function as indispensable bias terms in LLMs. Third, these massive activations lead to the concentration of attention probabilities to their corresponding tokens, and further, implicit bias terms in the self-attention output. Last, we also study massive activations in Vision Transformers. Code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/massive-activations.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to evolve, they are increasingly being employed in numerous studies to simulate societies and execute diverse social tasks. However, LLMs are susceptible to societal biases due to their exposure to human-generated data. Given that LLMs are being used to gain insights into various societal aspects, it is essential to mitigate these biases. To that end, our study investigates the presence of implicit gender biases in multi-agent LLM interactions and proposes two strategies to mitigate these biases. We begin by creating a dataset of scenarios where implicit gender biases might arise, and subsequently develop a metric to assess the presence of biases. Our empirical analysis reveals that LLMs generate outputs characterized by strong implicit bias associations (>= 50\% of the time). Furthermore, these biases tend to escalate following multi-agent interactions. To mitigate them, we propose two strategies: self-reflection with in-context examples (ICE); and supervised fine-tuning. Our research demonstrates that both methods effectively mitigate implicit biases, with the ensemble of fine-tuning and self-reflection proving to be the most successful.

Consciousness stands as one of the most profound and distinguishing features of the human mind, fundamentally shaping our understanding of existence and agency. As large language models (LLMs) develop at an unprecedented pace, questions concerning intelligence and consciousness have become increasingly significant. However, discourse on LLM consciousness remains largely unexplored territory. In this paper, we first clarify frequently conflated terminologies (e.g., LLM consciousness and LLM awareness). Then, we systematically organize and synthesize existing research on LLM consciousness from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Furthermore, we highlight potential frontier risks that conscious LLMs might introduce. Finally, we discuss current challenges and outline future directions in this emerging field. The references discussed in this paper are organized at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/Awesome-LLM-Consciousness.

Linguistic commentary on LLMs, heavily influenced by the theoretical frameworks of de Saussure and Chomsky, is often speculative and unproductive. Critics challenge whether LLMs can legitimately model language, citing the need for "deep structure" or "grounding" to achieve an idealized linguistic "competence." We argue for a radical shift in perspective towards the empiricist principles of Witold Ma\'nczak, a prominent general and historical linguist. He defines language not as a "system of signs" or a "computational system of the brain" but as the totality of all that is said and written. Above all, he identifies frequency of use of particular language elements as language's primary governing principle. Using his framework, we challenge prior critiques of LLMs and provide a constructive guide for designing, evaluating, and interpreting language models.

Large language models (LLMs) can pass explicit social bias tests but still harbor implicit biases, similar to humans who endorse egalitarian beliefs yet exhibit subtle biases. Measuring such implicit biases can be a challenge: as LLMs become increasingly proprietary, it may not be possible to access their embeddings and apply existing bias measures; furthermore, implicit biases are primarily a concern if they affect the actual decisions that these systems make. We address both challenges by introducing two new measures of bias: LLM Implicit Bias, a prompt-based method for revealing implicit bias; and LLM Decision Bias, a strategy to detect subtle discrimination in decision-making tasks. Both measures are based on psychological research: LLM Implicit Bias adapts the Implicit Association Test, widely used to study the automatic associations between concepts held in human minds; and LLM Decision Bias operationalizes psychological results indicating that relative evaluations between two candidates, not absolute evaluations assessing each independently, are more diagnostic of implicit biases. Using these measures, we found pervasive stereotype biases mirroring those in society in 8 value-aligned models across 4 social categories (race, gender, religion, health) in 21 stereotypes (such as race and criminality, race and weapons, gender and science, age and negativity). Our prompt-based LLM Implicit Bias measure correlates with existing language model embedding-based bias methods, but better predicts downstream behaviors measured by LLM Decision Bias. These new prompt-based measures draw from psychology's long history of research into measuring stereotype biases based on purely observable behavior; they expose nuanced biases in proprietary value-aligned LLMs that appear unbiased according to standard benchmarks.

The backpropagation algorithm has long been the canonical training method for neural networks. Modern paradigms are implicitly optimized for it, and numerous guidelines exist to ensure its proper use. Recently, synthetic gradients methods -where the error gradient is only roughly approximated - have garnered interest. These methods not only better portray how biological brains are learning, but also open new computational possibilities, such as updating layers asynchronously. Even so, they have failed to scale past simple tasks like MNIST or CIFAR-10. This is in part due to a lack of standards, leading to ill-suited models and practices forbidding such methods from performing to the best of their abilities. In this work, we focus on direct feedback alignment and present a set of best practices justified by observations of the alignment angles. We characterize a bottleneck effect that prevents alignment in narrow layers, and hypothesize it may explain why feedback alignment methods have yet to scale to large convolutional networks.

Do brains and language models converge toward the same internal representations of the world? Recent years have seen a rise in studies of neural activations and model alignment. In this work, we review 25 fMRI-based studies published between 2023 and 2025 and explicitly confront their findings with two key hypotheses: (i) the Platonic Representation Hypothesis -- that as models scale and improve, they converge to a representation of the real world, and (ii) the Intermediate-Layer Advantage -- that intermediate (mid-depth) layers often encode richer, more generalizable features. Our findings provide converging evidence that models and brains may share abstract representational structures, supporting both hypotheses and motivating further research on brain-model alignment.

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.

Recent text-to-image generative models have demonstrated an unparalleled ability to generate diverse and creative imagery guided by a target text prompt. While revolutionary, current state-of-the-art diffusion models may still fail in generating images that fully convey the semantics in the given text prompt. We analyze the publicly available Stable Diffusion model and assess the existence of catastrophic neglect, where the model fails to generate one or more of the subjects from the input prompt. Moreover, we find that in some cases the model also fails to correctly bind attributes (e.g., colors) to their corresponding subjects. To help mitigate these failure cases, we introduce the concept of Generative Semantic Nursing (GSN), where we seek to intervene in the generative process on the fly during inference time to improve the faithfulness of the generated images. Using an attention-based formulation of GSN, dubbed Attend-and-Excite, we guide the model to refine the cross-attention units to attend to all subject tokens in the text prompt and strengthen - or excite - their activations, encouraging the model to generate all subjects described in the text prompt. We compare our approach to alternative approaches and demonstrate that it conveys the desired concepts more faithfully across a range of text prompts.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve remarkable fluency across linguistic and reasoning tasks but remain systematically prone to hallucination. Prevailing accounts attribute hallucinations to data gaps, limited context, or optimization errors. We argue instead that hallucination is a structural outcome of the transformer architecture. As coherence engines, transformers are compelled to produce fluent continuations, with self-attention simulating the relational structure of meaning but lacking the existential grounding of temporality, mood, and care that stabilizes human understanding. On this basis, we distinguish ontological hallucination, arising when continuations require disclosure of beings in world, and residual reasoning hallucination, where models mimic inference by recycling traces of human reasoning in text. We illustrate these patterns through case studies aligned with Heideggerian categories and an experiment across twelve LLMs showing how simulated "self-preservation" emerges under extended prompts. Our contribution is threefold: (1) a comparative account showing why existing explanations are insufficient; (2) a predictive taxonomy of hallucination linked to existential structures with proposed benchmarks; and (3) design directions toward "truth-constrained" architectures capable of withholding or deferring when disclosure is absent. We conclude that hallucination is not an incidental defect but a defining limit of transformer-based models, an outcome scaffolding can mask but never resolve.

Attention mechanisms are a central property of cognitive systems allowing them to selectively deploy cognitive resources in a flexible manner. Attention has been long studied in the neurosciences and there are numerous phenomenological models that try to capture its core properties. Recently attentional mechanisms have become a dominating architectural choice of machine learning and are the central innovation of Transformers. The dominant intuition and formalism underlying their development has drawn on ideas of keys and queries in database management systems. In this work, we propose an alternative Bayesian foundation for attentional mechanisms and show how this unifies different attentional architectures in machine learning. This formulation allows to to identify commonality across different attention ML architectures as well as suggest a bridge to those developed in neuroscience. We hope this work will guide more sophisticated intuitions into the key properties of attention architectures and suggest new ones.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

We demonstrate that large language models (LLMs) exhibit consistent value orientations despite adopting diverse personas, revealing a persistent inertia in their responses that remains stable across the variety of roles they are prompted to assume. To systematically explore this phenomenon, we introduce the role-play-at-scale methodology, which involves prompting LLMs with randomized, diverse personas and analyzing the macroscopic trend of their responses. Unlike previous works that simply feed these questions to LLMs as if testing human subjects, our role-play-at-scale methodology diagnoses inherent tendencies in a systematic and scalable manner by: (1) prompting the model to act in different random personas and (2) asking the same question multiple times for each random persona. This approach reveals consistent patterns in LLM responses across diverse role-play scenarios, indicating deeply encoded inherent tendencies. Our findings contribute to the discourse on value alignment in foundation models and demonstrate the efficacy of role-play-at-scale as a diagnostic tool for uncovering encoded biases in LLMs.

With increased power and prevalence of AI systems, it is ever more critical that AI systems are designed to serve all, i.e., people with diverse values and perspectives. However, aligning models to serve pluralistic human values remains an open research question. In this piece, we propose a roadmap to pluralistic alignment, specifically using language models as a test bed. We identify and formalize three possible ways to define and operationalize pluralism in AI systems: 1) Overton pluralistic models that present a spectrum of reasonable responses; 2) Steerably pluralistic models that can steer to reflect certain perspectives; and 3) Distributionally pluralistic models that are well-calibrated to a given population in distribution. We also propose and formalize three possible classes of pluralistic benchmarks: 1) Multi-objective benchmarks, 2) Trade-off steerable benchmarks, which incentivize models to steer to arbitrary trade-offs, and 3) Jury-pluralistic benchmarks which explicitly model diverse human ratings. We use this framework to argue that current alignment techniques may be fundamentally limited for pluralistic AI; indeed, we highlight empirical evidence, both from our own experiments and from other work, that standard alignment procedures might reduce distributional pluralism in models, motivating the need for further research on pluralistic alignment.

Training language models with rationales augmentation has been shown to be beneficial in many existing works. In this paper, we identify that such a prevailing view does not hold consistently. We conduct comprehensive investigations to thoroughly inspect the impact of rationales on model performance as well as a novel perspective of model reliability. The results lead to several key findings that add new insights upon existing understandings: 1) Rationales can, at times, deteriorate model performance; 2) Rationales can, at times, improve model reliability, even outperforming their untrained counterparts; 3) A linear correspondence exists in between the performance and reliability improvements, while both are driven by the intrinsic difficulty of the task. These findings provide informative regulations on the broad utilization of rationales and raise critical implications on the procedure of explicitly aligning language models with implicit human thoughts. Codes can be found at https://github.com/Ignoramus0817/rationales.

The quest for human imitative AI has been an enduring topic in AI research since its inception. The technical evolution and emerging capabilities of the latest cohort of large language models (LLMs) have reinvigorated the subject beyond academia to the cultural zeitgeist. While recent NLP evaluation benchmark tasks test some aspects of human-imitative behaviour (e.g., BIG-bench's 'human-like behavior' tasks), few, if not none, examine creative problem solving abilities. Creative problem solving in humans is a well-studied topic in cognitive neuroscience with standardized tests that predominantly use the ability to associate (heterogeneous) connections among clue words as a metric for creativity. Exposure to misleading stimuli - distractors dubbed red herrings - impede human performance in such tasks via the fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm. In cognitive neuroscience studies, such fixations are experimentally induced by pre-exposing participants to orthographically similar incorrect words to subsequent word-fragments or clues. The popular British quiz show Only Connect's Connecting Wall segment essentially mimics Mednick's Remote Associates Test (RAT) formulation with built-in, deliberate red herrings, which makes it an ideal proxy dataset to explore and study fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm from cognitive neuroscience in LLMs. In addition to presenting the novel Only Connect Wall (OCW) dataset, we also report results from our evaluation of selected pre-trained language models and LLMs (including OpenAI's GPT series) on creative problem solving tasks like grouping clue words by heterogeneous connections, and identifying correct open knowledge domain connections in respective groups. The code and link to the dataset are available at https://github.com/TaatiTeam/OCW.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in open-ended, real-world environments where inputs are messy, underspecified, and not always trustworthy. Unlike curated benchmarks, these settings frequently involve instructions that refer to missing objects or contradictory facts, rely on ambiguous references, or request infeasible actions. In such cases, success hinges not on task execution alone, but on a model's ability to detect when something is silently wrong. This paper presents a systematic analysis of how current MLLMs handle such implicit reasoning scenarios: cases where the flaw is not explicitly stated but must be inferred from context. Using a curated diagnostic suite spanning four categories of real-world failure modes, we evaluate six MLLMs, including o3 and GPT-4o, and find that models frequently fail to surface hidden issues, even when they possess the necessary perceptual and reasoning skills. Explicit prompting reveals that the underlying capabilities exist but are often suppressed in favor of user compliance. We further show that simple inference-time interventions, such as cautious persona prompting and, in particular, requiring a clarifying question, can dramatically recover performance. Our findings highlight a persistent gap between reasoning competence and behavioral compliance in current MLLMs and suggest practical strategies for making these models more trustworthy in underconstrained environments.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are central to a multitude of applications but struggle with significant risks, notably in generating harmful content and biases. Drawing an analogy to the human psyche's conflict between evolutionary survival instincts and societal norm adherence elucidated in Freud's psychoanalysis theory, we argue that LLMs suffer a similar fundamental conflict, arising between their inherent desire for syntactic and semantic continuity, established during the pre-training phase, and the post-training alignment with human values. This conflict renders LLMs vulnerable to adversarial attacks, wherein intensifying the models' desire for continuity can circumvent alignment efforts, resulting in the generation of harmful information. Through a series of experiments, we first validated the existence of the desire for continuity in LLMs, and further devised a straightforward yet powerful technique, such as incomplete sentences, negative priming, and cognitive dissonance scenarios, to demonstrate that even advanced LLMs struggle to prevent the generation of harmful information. In summary, our study uncovers the root of LLMs' vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks, hereby questioning the efficacy of solely relying on sophisticated alignment methods, and further advocates for a new training idea that integrates modal concepts alongside traditional amodal concepts, aiming to endow LLMs with a more nuanced understanding of real-world contexts and ethical considerations.

Large language models (LLMs) trained purely on text ostensibly lack any direct perceptual experience, yet their internal representations are implicitly shaped by multimodal regularities encoded in language. We test the hypothesis that explicit sensory prompting can surface this latent structure, bringing a text-only LLM into closer representational alignment with specialist vision and audio encoders. When a sensory prompt tells the model to 'see' or 'hear', it cues the model to resolve its next-token predictions as if they were conditioned on latent visual or auditory evidence that is never actually supplied. Our findings reveal that lightweight prompt engineering can reliably activate modality-appropriate representations in purely text-trained LLMs.

Warning: This paper contains several contents that may be toxic, harmful, or offensive. In the last few years, text-to-image generative models have gained remarkable success in generating images with unprecedented quality accompanied by a breakthrough of inference speed. Despite their rapid progress, human biases that manifest in the training examples, particularly with regard to common stereotypical biases, like gender and skin tone, still have been found in these generative models. In this work, we seek to measure more complex human biases exist in the task of text-to-image generations. Inspired by the well-known Implicit Association Test (IAT) from social psychology, we propose a novel Text-to-Image Association Test (T2IAT) framework that quantifies the implicit stereotypes between concepts and valence, and those in the images. We replicate the previously documented bias tests on generative models, including morally neutral tests on flowers and insects as well as demographic stereotypical tests on diverse social attributes. The results of these experiments demonstrate the presence of complex stereotypical behaviors in image generations.

Recent works have argued that high-level semantic concepts are encoded "linearly" in the representation space of large language models. In this work, we study the origins of such linear representations. To that end, we introduce a simple latent variable model to abstract and formalize the concept dynamics of the next token prediction. We use this formalism to show that the next token prediction objective (softmax with cross-entropy) and the implicit bias of gradient descent together promote the linear representation of concepts. Experiments show that linear representations emerge when learning from data matching the latent variable model, confirming that this simple structure already suffices to yield linear representations. We additionally confirm some predictions of the theory using the LLaMA-2 large language model, giving evidence that the simplified model yields generalizable insights.

We report the presence of a simple neural mechanism that represents an input-output function as a vector within autoregressive transformer language models (LMs). Using causal mediation analysis on a diverse range of in-context-learning (ICL) tasks, we find that a small number attention heads transport a compact representation of the demonstrated task, which we call a function vector (FV). FVs are robust to changes in context, i.e., they trigger execution of the task on inputs such as zero-shot and natural text settings that do not resemble the ICL contexts from which they are collected. We test FVs across a range of tasks, models, and layers and find strong causal effects across settings in middle layers. We investigate the internal structure of FVs and find while that they often contain information that encodes the output space of the function, this information alone is not sufficient to reconstruct an FV. Finally, we test semantic vector composition in FVs, and find that to some extent they can be summed to create vectors that trigger new complex tasks. Taken together, our findings suggest that LLMs contain internal abstractions of general-purpose functions that can be invoked in a variety of contexts.

Can large language models (LLMs) implement computations of psychopathology? An effective approach to the question hinges on addressing two factors. First, for conceptual validity, we require a general and computational account of psychopathology that is applicable to computational entities without biological embodiment or subjective experience. Second, mechanisms underlying LLM behaviors need to be studied for better methodological validity. Thus, we establish a computational-theoretical framework to provide an account of psychopathology applicable to LLMs. To ground the theory for empirical analysis, we also propose a novel mechanistic interpretability method alongside a tailored empirical analytic framework. Based on the frameworks, we conduct experiments demonstrating three key claims: first, that distinct dysfunctional and problematic representational states are implemented in LLMs; second, that their activations can spread and self-sustain to trap LLMs; and third, that dynamic, cyclic structural causal models encoded in the LLMs underpin these patterns. In concert, the empirical results corroborate our hypothesis that network-theoretic computations of psychopathology have already emerged in LLMs. This suggests that certain LLM behaviors mirroring psychopathology may not be a superficial mimicry but a feature of their internal processing. Thus, our work alludes to the possibility of AI systems with psychopathological behaviors in the near future.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning capabilities, especially when guided by explicit chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning that verbalizes intermediate steps. While CoT improves both interpretability and accuracy, its dependence on natural language reasoning limits the model's expressive bandwidth. Latent reasoning tackles this bottleneck by performing multi-step inference entirely in the model's continuous hidden state, eliminating token-level supervision. To advance latent reasoning research, this survey provides a comprehensive overview of the emerging field of latent reasoning. We begin by examining the foundational role of neural network layers as the computational substrate for reasoning, highlighting how hierarchical representations support complex transformations. Next, we explore diverse latent reasoning methodologies, including activation-based recurrence, hidden state propagation, and fine-tuning strategies that compress or internalize explicit reasoning traces. Finally, we discuss advanced paradigms such as infinite-depth latent reasoning via masked diffusion models, which enable globally consistent and reversible reasoning processes. By unifying these perspectives, we aim to clarify the conceptual landscape of latent reasoning and chart future directions for research at the frontier of LLM cognition. An associated GitHub repository collecting the latest papers and repos is available at: https://github.com/multimodal-art-projection/LatentCoT-Horizon/.

We study whether Large Language Models (LLMs) latently perform multi-hop reasoning with complex prompts such as "The mother of the singer of 'Superstition' is". We look for evidence of a latent reasoning pathway where an LLM (1) latently identifies "the singer of 'Superstition'" as Stevie Wonder, the bridge entity, and (2) uses its knowledge of Stevie Wonder's mother to complete the prompt. We analyze these two hops individually and consider their co-occurrence as indicative of latent multi-hop reasoning. For the first hop, we test if changing the prompt to indirectly mention the bridge entity instead of any other entity increases the LLM's internal recall of the bridge entity. For the second hop, we test if increasing this recall causes the LLM to better utilize what it knows about the bridge entity. We find strong evidence of latent multi-hop reasoning for the prompts of certain relation types, with the reasoning pathway used in more than 80% of the prompts. However, the utilization is highly contextual, varying across different types of prompts. Also, on average, the evidence for the second hop and the full multi-hop traversal is rather moderate and only substantial for the first hop. Moreover, we find a clear scaling trend with increasing model size for the first hop of reasoning but not for the second hop. Our experimental findings suggest potential challenges and opportunities for future development and applications of LLMs.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

Text-to-image (T2I) generation has achieved remarkable progress, yet existing methods often lack the ability to dynamically reason and refine during generation--a hallmark of human creativity. Current reasoning-augmented paradigms most rely on explicit thought processes, where intermediate reasoning is decoded into discrete text at fixed steps with frequent image decoding and re-encoding, leading to inefficiencies, information loss, and cognitive mismatches. To bridge this gap, we introduce LatentMorph, a novel framework that seamlessly integrates implicit latent reasoning into the T2I generation process. At its core, LatentMorph introduces four lightweight components: (i) a condenser for summarizing intermediate generation states into compact visual memory, (ii) a translator for converting latent thoughts into actionable guidance, (iii) a shaper for dynamically steering next image token predictions, and (iv) an RL-trained invoker for adaptively determining when to invoke reasoning. By performing reasoning entirely in continuous latent spaces, LatentMorph avoids the bottlenecks of explicit reasoning and enables more adaptive self-refinement. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LatentMorph (I) enhances the base model Janus-Pro by 16% on GenEval and 25% on T2I-CompBench; (II) outperforms explicit paradigms (e.g., TwiG) by 15% and 11% on abstract reasoning tasks like WISE and IPV-Txt, (III) while reducing inference time by 44% and token consumption by 51%; and (IV) exhibits 71% cognitive alignment with human intuition on reasoning invocation.

This is not a typical survey of world models; it is a guide for those who want to build worlds. We do not aim to catalog every paper that has ever mentioned a ``world model". Instead, we follow one clear road: from early masked models that unified representation learning across modalities, to unified architectures that share a single paradigm, then to interactive generative models that close the action-perception loop, and finally to memory-augmented systems that sustain consistent worlds over time. We bypass loosely related branches to focus on the core: the generative heart, the interactive loop, and the memory system. We show that this is the most promising path towards true world models.

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

Current Large Language Models (LLMs) are unparalleled in their ability to generate grammatically correct, fluent text. LLMs are appearing rapidly, and debates on LLM capacities have taken off, but reflection is lagging behind. Thus, in this position paper, we first zoom in on the debate and critically assess three points recurring in critiques of LLM capacities: i) that LLMs only parrot statistical patterns in the training data; ii) that LLMs master formal but not functional language competence; and iii) that language learning in LLMs cannot inform human language learning. Drawing on empirical and theoretical arguments, we show that these points need more nuance. Second, we outline a pragmatic perspective on the issue of `real' understanding and intentionality in LLMs. Understanding and intentionality pertain to unobservable mental states we attribute to other humans because they have pragmatic value: they allow us to abstract away from complex underlying mechanics and predict behaviour effectively. We reflect on the circumstances under which it would make sense for humans to similarly attribute mental states to LLMs, thereby outlining a pragmatic philosophical context for LLMs as an increasingly prominent technology in society.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance on multimodal tasks, without any multimodal finetuning. They are the building block for Large Multimodal Models, yet, we still lack a proper understanding of their success. In this work, we expose frozen LLMs to image, video, audio and text inputs and analyse their internal representation aiming to understand their generalization beyond textual inputs. Findings. Perceptual tokens (1) are easily distinguishable from textual ones inside LLMs, with significantly different representations, and complete translation to textual tokens does not exist. Yet, (2) both perceptual and textual tokens activate similar LLM weights. Despite being different, (3) perceptual and textual tokens are implicitly aligned inside LLMs, we call this the implicit multimodal alignment (IMA), and argue that this is linked to architectural design, helping LLMs to generalize. This provide more evidence to believe that the generalization of LLMs to multimodal inputs is mainly due to their architecture. Implications. (1) We find a positive correlation between the implicit alignment score and the task performance, suggesting that this could act as a proxy metric for model evaluation and selection. (2) A negative correlation exists regarding hallucinations, revealing that this problem is mainly due to misalignment between the internal perceptual and textual representations. (3) Perceptual tokens change slightly throughout the model, thus, we propose different approaches to skip computations (e.g. in FFN layers), and significantly reduce the inference cost. (4) Due to the slowly changing embeddings across layers, and the high overlap between textual and multimodal activated weights, we compress LLMs by keeping only 1 subnetwork that works well across a wide range of multimodal tasks. Paper code: https://github.com/mshukor/ima-lmms.

Pre-trained language models (LMs) have recently gained attention for their potential as an alternative to (or proxy for) explicit knowledge bases (KBs). In this position paper, we examine this hypothesis, identify strengths and limitations of both LMs and KBs, and discuss the complementary nature of the two paradigms. In particular, we offer qualitative arguments that latent LMs are not suitable as a substitute for explicit KBs, but could play a major role for augmenting and curating KBs.

Procedural texts help AI enhance reasoning about context and action sequences. Transforming these into Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) improves understanding of individual steps by identifying predicate-argument structure like {verb,what,where/with}. Procedural instructions are highly elliptic, for instance, (i) add cucumber to the bowl and (ii) add sliced tomatoes, the second step's where argument is inferred from the context, referring to where the cucumber was placed. Prior SRL benchmarks often miss implicit arguments, leading to incomplete understanding. To address this, we introduce Implicit-VidSRL, a dataset that necessitates inferring implicit and explicit arguments from contextual information in multimodal cooking procedures. Our proposed dataset benchmarks multimodal models' contextual reasoning, requiring entity tracking through visual changes in recipes. We study recent multimodal LLMs and reveal that they struggle to predict implicit arguments of what and where/with from multi-modal procedural data given the verb. Lastly, we propose iSRL-Qwen2-VL, which achieves a 17% relative improvement in F1-score for what-implicit and a 14.7% for where/with-implicit semantic roles over GPT-4o.

We show that existing unsupervised methods on large language model (LLM) activations do not discover knowledge -- instead they seem to discover whatever feature of the activations is most prominent. The idea behind unsupervised knowledge elicitation is that knowledge satisfies a consistency structure, which can be used to discover knowledge. We first prove theoretically that arbitrary features (not just knowledge) satisfy the consistency structure of a particular leading unsupervised knowledge-elicitation method, contrast-consistent search (Burns et al. - arXiv:2212.03827). We then present a series of experiments showing settings in which unsupervised methods result in classifiers that do not predict knowledge, but instead predict a different prominent feature. We conclude that existing unsupervised methods for discovering latent knowledge are insufficient, and we contribute sanity checks to apply to evaluating future knowledge elicitation methods. Conceptually, we hypothesise that the identification issues explored here, e.g. distinguishing a model's knowledge from that of a simulated character's, will persist for future unsupervised methods.

To augment language models with the ability to reason, researchers usually prompt or finetune them to produce chain of thought reasoning steps before producing the final answer. However, although people use natural language to reason effectively, it may be that LMs could reason more effectively with some intermediate computation that is not in natural language. In this work, we explore an alternative reasoning approach: instead of explicitly producing the chain of thought reasoning steps, we use the language model's internal hidden states to perform implicit reasoning. The implicit reasoning steps are distilled from a teacher model trained on explicit chain-of-thought reasoning, and instead of doing reasoning "horizontally" by producing intermediate words one-by-one, we distill it such that the reasoning happens "vertically" among the hidden states in different layers. We conduct experiments on a multi-digit multiplication task and a grade school math problem dataset and find that this approach enables solving tasks previously not solvable without explicit chain-of-thought, at a speed comparable to no chain-of-thought.

Language places subtle constraints on how we make inductive inferences. Developmental evidence by Gelman et al. (2002) has shown children (4 years and older) to differentiate among generic statements ("Bears are daxable"), universally quantified NPs ("all bears are daxable") and indefinite plural NPs ("some bears are daxable") in extending novel properties to a specific member (all > generics > some), suggesting that they represent these types of propositions differently. We test if these subtle differences arise in general purpose statistical learners like Vision Language Models, by replicating the original experiment. On tasking them through a series of precondition tests (robust identification of categories in images and sensitivities to all and some), followed by the original experiment, we find behavioral alignment between models and humans. Post-hoc analyses on their representations revealed that these differences are organized based on inductive constraints and not surface-form differences.

When do machine learning systems fail to generalize, and what mechanisms could improve their generalization? Here, we draw inspiration from cognitive science to argue that one weakness of machine learning systems is their failure to exhibit latent learning -- learning information that is not relevant to the task at hand, but that might be useful in a future task. We show how this perspective links failures ranging from the reversal curse in language modeling to new findings on agent-based navigation. We then highlight how cognitive science points to episodic memory as a potential part of the solution to these issues. Correspondingly, we show that a system with an oracle retrieval mechanism can use learning experiences more flexibly to generalize better across many of these challenges. We also identify some of the essential components for effectively using retrieval, including the importance of within-example in-context learning for acquiring the ability to use information across retrieved examples. In summary, our results illustrate one possible contributor to the relative data inefficiency of current machine learning systems compared to natural intelligence, and help to understand how retrieval methods can complement parametric learning to improve generalization.

In this paper, I introduce the retrieval problem, a simple reasoning task that can be solved only by transformers with a minimum number of layers. The task has an adjustable difficulty that can further increase the required number of layers to any arbitrary value. I demonstrate that large language models can solve the task under different prompting formulations without any fine-tuning. To understand how transformers solve the retrieval problem, I train several transformers on a minimal formulation. I find that successful learning occurs only under the presence of an implicit curriculum. I uncover the learned mechanisms by studying the attention maps in the trained transformers. I also study the training process, uncovering that attention heads always emerge in a specific sequence.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of LLaMA-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a striking functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context taking over abruptly in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token predominantly appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear exclusively in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

Recent advances in Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) lead to significant breakthroughs in both academia and industry. One question that arises is how we, as humans, can understand their internal neural representations. This paper takes an initial step towards addressing this question by presenting a versatile framework to identify and interpret the semantics within LMMs. Specifically, 1) we first apply a Sparse Autoencoder(SAE) to disentangle the representations into human understandable features. 2) We then present an automatic interpretation framework to interpreted the open-semantic features learned in SAE by the LMMs themselves. We employ this framework to analyze the LLaVA-NeXT-8B model using the LLaVA-OV-72B model, demonstrating that these features can effectively steer the model's behavior. Our results contribute to a deeper understanding of why LMMs excel in specific tasks, including EQ tests, and illuminate the nature of their mistakes along with potential strategies for their rectification. These findings offer new insights into the internal mechanisms of LMMs and suggest parallels with the cognitive processes of the human brain.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on large-scale pretrained foundation models (PFMs) such as vision-language models, large language models (LLMs), diffusion models and vision-language-action (VLA) models have demonstrated the ability to solve complex and truly non-trivial AI problems in a wide variety of domains and contexts. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs), in particular, learn from vast and diverse data sources, allowing rich and nuanced representations of the world and, thereby, providing extensive capabilities, including the ability to reason, engage in meaningful dialog; collaborate with humans and other agents to jointly solve complex problems; and understand social and emotional aspects of humans. Despite this impressive feat, the cognitive abilities of state-of-the-art LLMs trained on large-scale datasets are still superficial and brittle. Consequently, generic LLMs are severely limited in their generalist capabilities. A number of foundational problems -- embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory -- are required to be addressed for LLMs to attain human-level general intelligence. These concepts are more aligned with human cognition and provide LLMs with inherent human-like cognitive properties that support the realization of physically-plausible, semantically meaningful, flexible and more generalizable knowledge and intelligence. In this work, we discuss the aforementioned foundational issues and survey state-of-the art approaches for implementing these concepts in LLMs. Specifically, we discuss how the principles of embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory can be leveraged toward the attainment of artificial general intelligence (AGI) in an organic manner.

Latent visual reasoning aims to mimic human's imagination process by meditating through hidden states of Multimodal Large Language Models. While recognized as a promising paradigm for visual reasoning, the underlying mechanisms driving its effectiveness remain unclear. Motivated to demystify the true source of its efficacy, we investigate the validity of latent reasoning using Causal Mediation Analysis. We model the process as a causal chain: the input as the treatment, the latent tokens as the mediator, and the final answer as the outcome. Our findings uncover two critical disconnections: (a) Input-Latent Disconnect: dramatic perturbations on the input result in negligible changes to the latent tokens, suggesting that latent tokens do not effectively attend to the input sequence. (b) Latent-Answer Disconnect: perturbations on the latent tokens yield minimal impact on the final answer, indicating the limited causal effect latent tokens imposing on the outcome. Furthermore, extensive probing analysis reveals that latent tokens encode limited visual information and exhibit high similarity. Consequently, we challenge the necessity of latent reasoning and propose a straightforward alternative named CapImagine, which teaches the model to explicitly imagine using text. Experiments on vision-centric benchmarks show that CapImagine significantly outperforms complex latent-space baselines, highlighting the superior potential of visual reasoning through explicit imagination.

Generative Large Language Models (LLMs) infer user's demographic information from subtle cues in the conversation -- a phenomenon called implicit personalization. Prior work has shown that such inferences can lead to lower quality responses for users assumed to be from minority groups, even when no demographic information is explicitly provided. In this work, we systematically explore how LLMs respond to stereotypical cues using controlled synthetic conversations, by analyzing the models' latent user representations through both model internals and generated answers to targeted user questions. Our findings reveal that LLMs do infer demographic attributes based on these stereotypical signals, which for a number of groups even persists when the user explicitly identifies with a different demographic group. Finally, we show that this form of stereotype-driven implicit personalization can be effectively mitigated by intervening on the model's internal representations using a trained linear probe to steer them toward the explicitly stated identity. Our results highlight the need for greater transparency and control in how LLMs represent user identity.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performances across a wide range of tasks. However, the mechanisms by which these models encode tasks of varying complexities remain poorly understood. In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that LLMs process concepts of varying complexities in different layers, introducing the idea of "Concept Depth" to suggest that more complex concepts are typically acquired in deeper layers. Specifically, we categorize concepts based on their level of abstraction, defining them in the order of increasing complexity within factual, emotional, and inferential tasks. We conduct extensive probing experiments using layer-wise representations across various LLM families (Gemma, LLaMA, QWen) on various datasets spanning the three domains of tasks. Our findings reveal that models could efficiently conduct probing for simpler tasks in shallow layers, and more complex tasks typically necessitate deeper layers for accurate understanding. Additionally, we examine how external factors, such as adding noise to the input and quantizing the model weights, might affect layer-wise representations. Our findings suggest that these factors can impede the development of a conceptual understanding of LLMs until deeper layers are explored. We hope that our proposed concept and experimental insights will enhance the understanding of the mechanisms underlying LLMs. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Luckfort/CD.

Despite the ubiquity of large language models (LLMs) in AI research, the question of embodiment in LLMs remains underexplored, distinguishing them from embodied systems in robotics where sensory perception directly informs physical action. Our investigation navigates the intriguing terrain of whether LLMs, despite their non-embodied nature, effectively capture implicit human intuitions about fundamental, spatial building blocks of language. We employ insights from spatial cognitive foundations developed through early sensorimotor experiences, guiding our exploration through the reproduction of three psycholinguistic experiments. Surprisingly, correlations between model outputs and human responses emerge, revealing adaptability without a tangible connection to embodied experiences. Notable distinctions include polarized language model responses and reduced correlations in vision language models. This research contributes to a nuanced understanding of the interplay between language, spatial experiences, and the computations made by large language models. More at https://cisnlp.github.io/Spatial_Schemas/

Large Language Models (LLMs) are claimed to be capable of Natural Language Inference (NLI), necessary for applied tasks like question answering and summarization. We present a series of behavioral studies on several LLM families (LLaMA, GPT-3.5, and PaLM) which probe their behavior using controlled experiments. We establish two biases originating from pretraining which predict much of their behavior, and show that these are major sources of hallucination in generative LLMs. First, memorization at the level of sentences: we show that, regardless of the premise, models falsely label NLI test samples as entailing when the hypothesis is attested in training data, and that entities are used as ``indices'' to access the memorized data. Second, statistical patterns of usage learned at the level of corpora: we further show a similar effect when the premise predicate is less frequent than that of the hypothesis in the training data, a bias following from previous studies. We demonstrate that LLMs perform significantly worse on NLI test samples which do not conform to these biases than those which do, and we offer these as valuable controls for future LLM evaluation.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

We argue that representations in AI models, particularly deep networks, are converging. First, we survey many examples of convergence in the literature: over time and across multiple domains, the ways by which different neural networks represent data are becoming more aligned. Next, we demonstrate convergence across data modalities: as vision models and language models get larger, they measure distance between datapoints in a more and more alike way. We hypothesize that this convergence is driving toward a shared statistical model of reality, akin to Plato's concept of an ideal reality. We term such a representation the platonic representation and discuss several possible selective pressures toward it. Finally, we discuss the implications of these trends, their limitations, and counterexamples to our analysis.

This paper proposes a novel framework for understanding large language models (LLMs) by reconceptualizing them as semiotic machines rather than as imitations of human cognition. Drawing from structuralist and post-structuralist theories of language-specifically the works of Ferdinand de Saussure and Jacques Derrida-I argue that LLMs should be understood as models of language itself, aligning with Derrida's concept of 'writing' (l'ecriture). The paper is structured into three parts. First, I lay the theoretical groundwork by explaining how the word2vec embedding algorithm operates within Saussure's framework of language as a relational system of signs. Second, I apply Derrida's critique of Saussure to position 'writing' as the object modeled by LLMs, offering a view of the machine's 'mind' as a statistical approximation of sign behavior. Finally, the third section addresses how modern LLMs reflect post-structuralist notions of unfixed meaning, arguing that the "next token generation" mechanism effectively captures the dynamic nature of meaning. By reconceptualizing LLMs as semiotic machines rather than cognitive models, this framework provides an alternative lens through which to assess the strengths and limitations of LLMs, offering new avenues for future research.

Distributional word representation methods exploit word co-occurrences to build compact vector encodings of words. While these representations enjoy widespread use in modern natural language processing, it is unclear whether they accurately encode all necessary facets of conceptual meaning. In this paper, we evaluate how well these representations can predict perceptual and conceptual features of concrete concepts, drawing on two semantic norm datasets sourced from human participants. We find that several standard word representations fail to encode many salient perceptual features of concepts, and show that these deficits correlate with word-word similarity prediction errors. Our analyses provide motivation for grounded and embodied language learning approaches, which may help to remedy these deficits.

Can large language models introspect, that is, accurately detect perturbations to their own internal states? We systematically investigate this question using activation steering in Meta-Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. First, we show that the binary detection paradigm used in prior work conflates introspection with a methodological artifact: apparent detection accuracy is entirely explained by global logit shifts that bias models toward affirmative responses regardless of question content. However, on tasks requiring differential sensitivity, we find robust evidence for partial introspection: models localize which of 10 sentences received an injection at up to 88\% accuracy (vs.\ 10\% chance) and discriminate relative injection strengths at 83\% accuracy (vs.\ 50\% chance). These capabilities are confined to early-layer injections and collapse to chance thereafter -- a pattern we explain mechanistically through attention-based signal routing and residual stream recovery dynamics. Our findings demonstrate that LLMs can compute meaningful functions over perturbations to their internal states, establishing introspection as a real but layer-dependent phenomenon that merits further investigation. Our code is open-sourced here: https://github.com/elyhahami18/llama-introspection-new

The Transformer architecture processes sequences by implementing a form of neural message-passing that consists of iterative information retrieval (attention), followed by local processing (position-wise MLP). Two types of information are essential under this general computational paradigm: "sensory" information about individual objects, and "relational" information describing the relationships between objects. Standard attention naturally encodes the former, but does not explicitly encode the latter. In this paper, we present an extension of Transformers where multi-head attention is augmented with two distinct types of attention heads, each routing information of a different type. The first type is the standard attention mechanism of Transformers, which captures object-level features, while the second type is a novel attention mechanism we propose to explicitly capture relational information. The two types of attention heads each possess different inductive biases, giving the resulting architecture greater efficiency and versatility. The promise of this approach is demonstrated empirically across a range of tasks.

Autoregressive Large Language Models have transformed the landscape of Natural Language Processing. Pre-train and prompt paradigm has replaced the conventional approach of pre-training and fine-tuning for many downstream NLP tasks. This shift has been possible largely due to LLMs and innovative prompting techniques. LLMs have shown great promise for a variety of downstream tasks owing to their vast parameters and huge datasets that they are pre-trained on. However, in order to fully realize their potential, their outputs must be guided towards the desired outcomes. Prompting, in which a specific input or instruction is provided to guide the LLMs toward the intended output, has become a tool for achieving this goal. In this paper, we discuss the various prompting techniques that have been applied to fully harness the power of LLMs. We present a taxonomy of existing literature on prompting techniques and provide a concise survey based on this taxonomy. Further, we identify some open problems in the realm of prompting in autoregressive LLMs which could serve as a direction for future research.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

Hallucination has emerged as the most vulnerable aspect of contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). In this paper, we introduce the Sorry, Come Again (SCA) prompting, aimed to avoid LLM hallucinations by enhancing comprehension through: (i) optimal paraphrasing and (ii) injecting [PAUSE] tokens to delay LLM generation. First, we provide an in-depth analysis of linguistic nuances: formality, readability, and concreteness of prompts for 21 LLMs, and elucidate how these nuances contribute to hallucinated generation. Prompts with lower readability, formality, or concreteness pose comprehension challenges for LLMs, similar to those faced by humans. In such scenarios, an LLM tends to speculate and generate content based on its imagination (associative memory) to fill these information gaps. Although these speculations may occasionally align with factual information, their accuracy is not assured, often resulting in hallucination. Recent studies reveal that an LLM often neglects the middle sections of extended prompts, a phenomenon termed as lost in the middle. While a specific paraphrase may suit one LLM, the same paraphrased version may elicit a different response from another LLM. Therefore, we propose an optimal paraphrasing technique to identify the most comprehensible paraphrase of a given prompt, evaluated using Integrated Gradient (and its variations) to guarantee that the LLM accurately processes all words. While reading lengthy sentences, humans often pause at various points to better comprehend the meaning read thus far. We have fine-tuned an LLM with injected [PAUSE] tokens, allowing the LLM to pause while reading lengthier prompts. This has brought several key contributions: (i) determining the optimal position to inject [PAUSE], (ii) determining the number of [PAUSE] tokens to be inserted, and (iii) introducing reverse proxy tuning to fine-tune the LLM for [PAUSE] insertion.

As large language models (LLMs) become an important way of information access, there have been increasing concerns that LLMs may intensify the spread of unethical content, including implicit bias that hurts certain populations without explicit harmful words. In this paper, we conduct a rigorous evaluation of LLMs' implicit bias towards certain demographics by attacking them from a psychometric perspective to elicit agreements to biased viewpoints. Inspired by psychometric principles in cognitive and social psychology, we propose three attack approaches, i.e., Disguise, Deception, and Teaching. Incorporating the corresponding attack instructions, we built two benchmarks: (1) a bilingual dataset with biased statements covering four bias types (2.7K instances) for extensive comparative analysis, and (2) BUMBLE, a larger benchmark spanning nine common bias types (12.7K instances) for comprehensive evaluation. Extensive evaluation of popular commercial and open-source LLMs shows that our methods can elicit LLMs' inner bias more effectively than competitive baselines. Our attack methodology and benchmarks offer an effective means of assessing the ethical risks of LLMs, driving progress toward greater accountability in their development. Our code, data and benchmarks are available at https://github.com/yuchenwen1/ImplicitBiasPsychometricEvaluation and https://github.com/yuchenwen1/BUMBLE.

Large Language Models (LLMs) display striking surface fluency yet systematically fail at tasks requiring symbolic reasoning, arithmetic accuracy, and logical consistency. This paper offers a structural diagnosis of such failures, revealing a persistent gap between comprehension and competence. Through controlled experiments and architectural analysis, we demonstrate that LLMs often articulate correct principles without reliably applying them--a failure rooted not in knowledge access, but in computational execution. We term this phenomenon the computational split-brain syndrome, where instruction and action pathways are geometrically and functionally dissociated. This core limitation recurs across domains, from mathematical operations to relational inferences, and explains why model behavior remains brittle even under idealized prompting. We argue that LLMs function as powerful pattern completion engines, but lack the architectural scaffolding for principled, compositional reasoning. Our findings delineate the boundary of current LLM capabilities and motivate future models with metacognitive control, principle lifting, and structurally grounded execution. This diagnosis also clarifies why mechanistic interpretability findings may reflect training-specific pattern coordination rather than universal computational principles, and why the geometric separation between instruction and execution pathways suggests limitations in neural introspection and mechanistic analysis.

Recent advancements in NLP systems, particularly with the introduction of LLMs, have led to widespread adoption of these systems by a broad spectrum of users across various domains, impacting decision-making, the job market, society, and scientific research. This surge in usage has led to an explosion in NLP model interpretability and analysis research, accompanied by numerous technical surveys. Yet, these surveys often overlook the needs and perspectives of explanation stakeholders. In this paper, we address three fundamental questions: Why do we need interpretability, what are we interpreting, and how? By exploring these questions, we examine existing interpretability paradigms, their properties, and their relevance to different stakeholders. We further explore the practical implications of these paradigms by analyzing trends from the past decade across multiple research fields. To this end, we retrieved thousands of papers and employed an LLM to characterize them. Our analysis reveals significant disparities between NLP developers and non-developer users, as well as between research fields, underscoring the diverse needs of stakeholders. For example, explanations of internal model components are rarely used outside the NLP field. We hope this paper informs the future design, development, and application of methods that align with the objectives and requirements of various stakeholders.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes fail to respond appropriately to deterministic tasks -- such as counting or forming acronyms -- because the implicit prior distribution they have learned over sequences of tokens influences their responses. In this work, we show that, in at least some cases, LLMs actually compute the information needed to perform these tasks correctly, and we identify some interventions that can allow them to access this information to improve their performance. First, we show that simply prompting the language model to not rely on its prior knowledge leads to dramatic improvements in prior-dominated tasks. We then use mechanistic interpretability techniques to localize the prior within the LLM and manipulate the extent to which that prior influences its responses. Specifically, we show that it is possible to identify layers of the underlying neural network that correlate with the prior probability of a response and that lightweight finetuning of these layers with basic prompts on prior-dominated tasks achieves high performance on held-out answers. These results suggest that the information required to produce a correct response is contained within the representations of the problems formed by the models. Furthermore, we show that this finetuning is significantly more effective for prior-dominated tasks, and that the error after finetuning is no longer correlated with the prior. Our results suggest that it may be possible to define effective methods for manipulating the extent to which LLMs rely upon their priors in solving problems, potentially increasing their performance in settings where LLMs hallucinate for reasons related to the prior probability of token sequences.

Artificial intelligence and machine learning are in a period of astounding growth. However, there are concerns that these technologies may be used, either with or without intention, to perpetuate the prejudice and unfairness that unfortunately characterizes many human institutions. Here we show for the first time that human-like semantic biases result from the application of standard machine learning to ordinary language---the same sort of language humans are exposed to every day. We replicate a spectrum of standard human biases as exposed by the Implicit Association Test and other well-known psychological studies. We replicate these using a widely used, purely statistical machine-learning model---namely, the GloVe word embedding---trained on a corpus of text from the Web. Our results indicate that language itself contains recoverable and accurate imprints of our historic biases, whether these are morally neutral as towards insects or flowers, problematic as towards race or gender, or even simply veridical, reflecting the {\em status quo} for the distribution of gender with respect to careers or first names. These regularities are captured by machine learning along with the rest of semantics. In addition to our empirical findings concerning language, we also contribute new methods for evaluating bias in text, the Word Embedding Association Test (WEAT) and the Word Embedding Factual Association Test (WEFAT). Our results have implications not only for AI and machine learning, but also for the fields of psychology, sociology, and human ethics, since they raise the possibility that mere exposure to everyday language can account for the biases we replicate here.

Since the advent of ChatGPT, Large Language Models (LLMs) have excelled in various tasks but remain largely as black-box systems. Consequently, their development relies heavily on data-driven approaches, limiting performance enhancement through changes in internal architecture and reasoning pathways. As a result, many researchers have begun exploring the potential internal mechanisms of LLMs, aiming to identify the essence of their reasoning bottlenecks, with most studies focusing on attention heads. Our survey aims to shed light on the internal reasoning processes of LLMs by concentrating on the interpretability and underlying mechanisms of attention heads. We first distill the human thought process into a four-stage framework: Knowledge Recalling, In-Context Identification, Latent Reasoning, and Expression Preparation. Using this framework, we systematically review existing research to identify and categorize the functions of specific attention heads. Furthermore, we summarize the experimental methodologies used to discover these special heads, dividing them into two categories: Modeling-Free methods and Modeling-Required methods. Also, we outline relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks. Finally, we discuss the limitations of current research and propose several potential future directions. Our reference list is open-sourced at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/Awesome-Attention-Heads.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

The ability of language models to learn a task from a few examples in context has generated substantial interest. Here, we provide a perspective that situates this type of supervised few-shot learning within a much broader spectrum of meta-learned in-context learning. Indeed, we suggest that any distribution of sequences in which context non-trivially decreases loss on subsequent predictions can be interpreted as eliciting a kind of in-context learning. We suggest that this perspective helps to unify the broad set of in-context abilities that language models exhibit x2014 such as adapting to tasks from instructions or role play, or extrapolating time series. This perspective also sheds light on potential roots of in-context learning in lower-level processing of linguistic dependencies (e.g. coreference or parallel structures). Finally, taking this perspective highlights the importance of generalization, which we suggest can be studied along several dimensions: not only the ability to learn something novel, but also flexibility in learning from different presentations, and in applying what is learned. We discuss broader connections to past literature in meta-learning and goal-conditioned agents, and other perspectives on learning and adaptation. We close by suggesting that research on in-context learning should consider this broader spectrum of in-context capabilities and types of generalization.

Language model representations often contain linear directions that correspond to high-level concepts. Here, we study the dynamics of these representations: how representations evolve along these dimensions within the context of (simulated) conversations. We find that linear representations can change dramatically over a conversation; for example, information that is represented as factual at the beginning of a conversation can be represented as non-factual at the end and vice versa. These changes are content-dependent; while representations of conversation-relevant information may change, generic information is generally preserved. These changes are robust even for dimensions that disentangle factuality from more superficial response patterns, and occur across different model families and layers of the model. These representation changes do not require on-policy conversations; even replaying a conversation script written by an entirely different model can produce similar changes. However, adaptation is much weaker from simply having a sci-fi story in context that is framed more explicitly as such. We also show that steering along a representational direction can have dramatically different effects at different points in a conversation. These results are consistent with the idea that representations may evolve in response to the model playing a particular role that is cued by a conversation. Our findings may pose challenges for interpretability and steering -- in particular, they imply that it may be misleading to use static interpretations of features or directions, or probes that assume a particular range of features consistently corresponds to a particular ground-truth value. However, these types of representational dynamics also point to exciting new research directions for understanding how models adapt to context.

Recent advances in mechanistic interpretability have revealed that large language models (LLMs) develop internal representations corresponding not only to concrete entities but also distinct, human-understandable abstract concepts and behaviour. Moreover, these hidden features can be directly manipulated to steer model behaviour. However, it remains an open question whether this phenomenon is unique to models trained on inherently structured data (ie. language, images) or if it is a general property of foundation models. In this work, we investigate the internal representations of a large physics-focused foundation model. Inspired by recent work identifying single directions in activation space for complex behaviours in LLMs, we extract activation vectors from the model during forward passes over simulation datasets for different physical regimes. We then compute "delta" representations between the two regimes. These delta tensors act as concept directions in activation space, encoding specific physical features. By injecting these concept directions back into the model during inference, we can steer its predictions, demonstrating causal control over physical behaviours, such as inducing or removing some particular physical feature from a simulation. These results suggest that scientific foundation models learn generalised representations of physical principles. They do not merely rely on superficial correlations and patterns in the simulations. Our findings open new avenues for understanding and controlling scientific foundation models and has implications for AI-enabled scientific discovery.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in autonomous decision-making, where they sample options from vast action spaces. However, the heuristics that guide this sampling process remain under-explored. We study this sampling behavior and show that this underlying heuristics resembles that of human decision-making: comprising a descriptive component (reflecting statistical norm) and a prescriptive component (implicit ideal encoded in the LLM) of a concept. We show that this deviation of a sample from the statistical norm towards a prescriptive component consistently appears in concepts across diverse real-world domains like public health, and economic trends. To further illustrate the theory, we demonstrate that concept prototypes in LLMs are affected by prescriptive norms, similar to the concept of normality in humans. Through case studies and comparison with human studies, we illustrate that in real-world applications, the shift of samples toward an ideal value in LLMs' outputs can result in significantly biased decision-making, raising ethical concerns.

Informally, the 'linear representation hypothesis' is the idea that high-level concepts are represented linearly as directions in some representation space. In this paper, we address two closely related questions: What does "linear representation" actually mean? And, how do we make sense of geometric notions (e.g., cosine similarity or projection) in the representation space? To answer these, we use the language of counterfactuals to give two formalizations of "linear representation", one in the output (word) representation space, and one in the input (sentence) space. We then prove these connect to linear probing and model steering, respectively. To make sense of geometric notions, we use the formalization to identify a particular (non-Euclidean) inner product that respects language structure in a sense we make precise. Using this causal inner product, we show how to unify all notions of linear representation. In particular, this allows the construction of probes and steering vectors using counterfactual pairs. Experiments with LLaMA-2 demonstrate the existence of linear representations of concepts, the connection to interpretation and control, and the fundamental role of the choice of inner product.

The remarkable performance of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has unequivocally demonstrated their proficient understanding capabilities in handling a wide array of visual tasks. Nevertheless, the opaque nature of their black-box reasoning processes persists as an enigma, rendering them uninterpretable and struggling with hallucination. Their ability to execute intricate compositional reasoning tasks is also constrained, culminating in a stagnation of learning progression for these models. In this work, we introduce Fact, a novel paradigm designed to generate multimodal rationales that are faithful, concise, and transferable for teaching MLLMs. This paradigm utilizes verifiable visual programming to generate executable code guaranteeing faithfulness and precision. Subsequently, through a series of operations including pruning, merging, and bridging, the rationale enhances its conciseness. Furthermore, we filter rationales that can be transferred to end-to-end paradigms from programming paradigms to guarantee transferability. Empirical evidence from experiments demonstrates the superiority of our method across models of varying parameter sizes, significantly enhancing their compositional reasoning and generalization ability. Our approach also reduces hallucinations owing to its high correlation between images and text.

The advanced role-playing capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have paved the way for developing Role-Playing Agents (RPAs). However, existing benchmarks in social interaction such as HPD and SocialBench have not investigated hallucination and face limitations like poor generalizability and implicit judgments for character fidelity. To address these issues, we propose a generalizable, explicit and effective paradigm to unlock the interactive patterns in diverse worldviews. Specifically, we define the interactive hallucination based on stance transfer and construct a benchmark, SHARP, by extracting relations from a general commonsense knowledge graph and leveraging the inherent hallucination properties of RPAs to simulate interactions across roles. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness and stability of our paradigm. Our findings further explore the factors influencing these metrics and discuss the trade-off between blind loyalty to roles and adherence to facts in RPAs.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance, they exhibit certain cognitive patterns similar to those of humans that are not directly specified in training data. This study investigates this phenomenon by focusing on temporal cognition in LLMs. Leveraging the similarity judgment task, we find that larger models spontaneously establish a subjective temporal reference point and adhere to the Weber-Fechner law, whereby the perceived distance logarithmically compresses as years recede from this reference point. To uncover the mechanisms behind this behavior, we conducted multiple analyses across neuronal, representational, and informational levels. We first identify a set of temporal-preferential neurons and find that this group exhibits minimal activation at the subjective reference point and implements a logarithmic coding scheme convergently found in biological systems. Probing representations of years reveals a hierarchical construction process, where years evolve from basic numerical values in shallow layers to abstract temporal orientation in deep layers. Finally, using pre-trained embedding models, we found that the training corpus itself possesses an inherent, non-linear temporal structure, which provides the raw material for the model's internal construction. In discussion, we propose an experientialist perspective for understanding these findings, where the LLMs' cognition is viewed as a subjective construction of the external world by its internal representational system. This nuanced perspective implies the potential emergence of alien cognitive frameworks that humans cannot intuitively predict, pointing toward a direction for AI alignment that focuses on guiding internal constructions. Our code is available at https://TheOtherMind.github.io.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) provide a new opportunity to address the long-standing question of how concepts are represented and organized in the mind, which is central to unravelling the nature of human cognition. Here, we reframed the classic reverse dictionary task to simulate human concept inference in context and investigated the emergence of human-like conceptual representations within LLMs. We found that LLMs were able to infer concepts from definitional descriptions and construct representation spaces that converge towards a shared, context-independent structure. These representations effectively predicted human behavioural judgments and aligned well with neural activity patterns in the human brain, offering evidence for biological plausibility. These findings demonstrate that human-like conceptual representations and organization can naturally emerge from language prediction, even without real-world grounding. Our work supports the view that LLMs serve as valuable tools for understanding complex human cognition and paves the way for better alignment between artificial and human intelligence.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved impressive performance on complex reasoning tasks with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. However, conventional CoT relies on reasoning steps explicitly verbalized in natural language, introducing inefficiencies and limiting its applicability to abstract reasoning. To address this, there has been growing research interest in latent CoT reasoning, where inference occurs within latent spaces. By decoupling reasoning from language, latent reasoning promises richer cognitive representations and more flexible, faster inference. Researchers have explored various directions in this promising field, including training methodologies, structural innovations, and internal reasoning mechanisms. This paper presents a comprehensive overview and analysis of this reasoning paradigm. We begin by proposing a unified taxonomy from four perspectives: token-wise strategies, internal mechanisms, analysis, and applications. We then provide in-depth discussions and comparative analyses of representative methods, highlighting their design patterns, strengths, and open challenges. We aim to provide a structured foundation for advancing this emerging direction in LLM reasoning. The relevant papers will be regularly updated at https://github.com/EIT-NLP/Awesome-Latent-CoT.

Spoken Language Understanding (SLU) aims to extract the semantics frame of user queries, which is a core component in a task-oriented dialog system. With the burst of deep neural networks and the evolution of pre-trained language models, the research of SLU has obtained significant breakthroughs. However, there remains a lack of a comprehensive survey summarizing existing approaches and recent trends, which motivated the work presented in this article. In this paper, we survey recent advances and new frontiers in SLU. Specifically, we give a thorough review of this research field, covering different aspects including (1) new taxonomy: we provide a new perspective for SLU filed, including single model vs. joint model, implicit joint modeling vs. explicit joint modeling in joint model, non pre-trained paradigm vs. pre-trained paradigm;(2) new frontiers: some emerging areas in complex SLU as well as the corresponding challenges; (3) abundant open-source resources: to help the community, we have collected, organized the related papers, baseline projects and leaderboard on a public website where SLU researchers could directly access to the recent progress. We hope that this survey can shed a light on future research in SLU field.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

As large language models continue to develop in the field of AI, text generation systems are susceptible to a worrisome phenomenon known as hallucination. In this study, we summarize recent compelling insights into hallucinations in LLMs. We present a novel taxonomy of hallucinations from various text generation tasks, thus provide theoretical insights, detection methods and improvement approaches. Based on this, future research directions are proposed. Our contribution are threefold: (1) We provide a detailed and complete taxonomy for hallucinations appearing in text generation tasks; (2) We provide theoretical analyses of hallucinations in LLMs and provide existing detection and improvement methods; (3) We propose several research directions that can be developed in the future. As hallucinations garner significant attention from the community, we will maintain updates on relevant research progress.

We introduce Drivelology, a unique linguistic phenomenon characterised as "nonsense with depth", utterances that are syntactically coherent yet pragmatically paradoxical, emotionally loaded, or rhetorically subversive. While such expressions may resemble surface-level nonsense, they encode implicit meaning requiring contextual inference, moral reasoning, or emotional interpretation. We find that current large language models (LLMs), despite excelling at many natural language processing (NLP) tasks, consistently fail to grasp the layered semantics of Drivelological text. To investigate this, we construct a small but diverse benchmark dataset of over 1,200 meticulously curated examples, with select instances in English, Mandarin, Spanish, French, Japanese, and Korean. Annotation was especially challenging: each of the examples required careful expert review to verify that it truly reflected Drivelological characteristics. The process involved multiple rounds of discussion and adjudication to address disagreements, highlighting the subtle and subjective nature of the Drivelology. We evaluate a range of LLMs on classification, generation, and reasoning tasks. Our results reveal clear limitations of LLMs: models often confuse Drivelology with shallow nonsense, produce incoherent justifications, or miss the implied rhetorical function altogether. These findings highlight a deeper representational gap in LLMs' pragmatic understanding and challenge the assumption that statistical fluency implies cognitive comprehension. We release our dataset and code to facilitate further research in modelling linguistic depth beyond surface-level coherence.

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to respond accurately but often exhibit deficient reasoning or generate hallucinatory content. To address these, studies prefixed with ``Self-'' such as Self-Consistency, Self-Improve, and Self-Refine have been initiated. They share a commonality: involving LLMs evaluating and updating itself to mitigate the issues. Nonetheless, these efforts lack a unified perspective on summarization, as existing surveys predominantly focus on categorization without examining the motivations behind these works. In this paper, we summarize a theoretical framework, termed Internal Consistency, which offers unified explanations for phenomena such as the lack of reasoning and the presence of hallucinations. Internal Consistency assesses the coherence among LLMs' latent layer, decoding layer, and response layer based on sampling methodologies. Expanding upon the Internal Consistency framework, we introduce a streamlined yet effective theoretical framework capable of mining Internal Consistency, named Self-Feedback. The Self-Feedback framework consists of two modules: Self-Evaluation and Self-Update. This framework has been employed in numerous studies. We systematically classify these studies by tasks and lines of work; summarize relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks; and delve into the concern, ``Does Self-Feedback Really Work?'' We propose several critical viewpoints, including the ``Hourglass Evolution of Internal Consistency'', ``Consistency Is (Almost) Correctness'' hypothesis, and ``The Paradox of Latent and Explicit Reasoning''. Furthermore, we outline promising directions for future research. We have open-sourced the experimental code, reference list, and statistical data, available at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/ICSFSurvey.

Multi-turn interactions between large language models (LLMs) and users naturally include implicit feedback signals. If an LLM responds in an unexpected way to an instruction, the user is likely to signal it by rephrasing the request, expressing frustration, or pivoting to an alternative task. Such signals are task-independent and occupy a relatively constrained subspace of language, allowing the LLM to identify them even if it fails on the actual task. This creates an avenue for continually learning from interactions without additional annotations. We introduce ReSpect, a method to learn from such signals in past interactions via retrospection. We deploy ReSpect in a new multimodal interaction scenario, where humans instruct an LLM to solve an abstract reasoning task with a combinatorial solution space. Through thousands of interactions with humans, we show how ReSpect gradually improves task completion rate from 31% to 82%, all without any external annotation.