Daily Papers

Hypothetical induction is recognized as the main reasoning type when scientists make observations about the world and try to propose hypotheses to explain those observations. Past research on hypothetical induction is under a constrained setting: (1) the observation annotations in the dataset are carefully manually handpicked sentences (resulting in a close-domain setting); and (2) the ground truth hypotheses are mostly commonsense knowledge, making the task less challenging. In this work, we tackle these problems by proposing the first dataset for social science academic hypotheses discovery, with the final goal to create systems that automatically generate valid, novel, and helpful scientific hypotheses, given only a pile of raw web corpus. Unlike previous settings, the new dataset requires (1) using open-domain data (raw web corpus) as observations; and (2) proposing hypotheses even new to humanity. A multi-module framework is developed for the task, including three different feedback mechanisms to boost performance, which exhibits superior performance in terms of both GPT-4 based and expert-based evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work showing that LLMs are able to generate novel (''not existing in literature'') and valid (''reflecting reality'') scientific hypotheses.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable improvements in reasoning and many existing benchmarks have been addressed by models such as o1 and o3 either fully or partially. However, a majority of these benchmarks emphasize deductive reasoning, including mathematical and coding tasks in which rules such as mathematical axioms or programming syntax are clearly defined, based on which LLMs can plan and apply these rules to arrive at a solution. In contrast, inductive reasoning, where one infers the underlying rules from observed data, remains less explored. Such inductive processes lie at the heart of scientific discovery, as they enable researchers to extract general principles from empirical observations. To assess whether LLMs possess this capacity, we introduce InductionBench, a new benchmark designed to evaluate the inductive reasoning ability of LLMs. Our experimental findings reveal that even the most advanced models available struggle to master the simplest complexity classes within the subregular hierarchy of functions, highlighting a notable deficiency in current LLMs' inductive reasoning capabilities. Coda and data are available https://github.com/Wenyueh/inductive_reasoning_benchmark.

Large language models can perform various reasoning tasks by using chain-of-thought prompting, which guides them to find answers through step-by-step demonstrations. However, the quality of the prompts depends on the demonstrations given to the models, and creating many of them by hand is costly. We introduce Synthetic prompting, a method that leverages a few handcrafted examples to prompt the model to generate more examples by itself, and selects effective demonstrations to elicit better reasoning. Our method alternates between a backward and forward process to generate new examples. The backward process generates a question that match a sampled reasoning chain, so that the question is solvable and clear. The forward process produces a more detailed reasoning chain for the question, improving the quality of the example. We evaluate our method on numerical, symbolic, and algorithmic reasoning tasks, and show that it outperforms existing prompting techniques.

Transformers have been shown to emulate logical deduction over natural language theories (logical rules expressed in natural language), reliably assigning true/false labels to candidate implications. However, their ability to generate implications of a theory has not yet been demonstrated, and methods for reconstructing proofs of answers are imperfect. In this work we show that a generative model, called ProofWriter, can reliably generate both implications of a theory and the natural language proof(s) that support them. In particular, iterating a 1-step implication generator results in proofs that are highly reliable, and represent actual model decisions (rather than post-hoc rationalizations). On the RuleTaker dataset, the accuracy of ProofWriter's proofs exceed previous methods by +9% absolute, and in a way that generalizes to proof depths unseen in training and on out-of-domain problems. We also show that generative techniques can perform a type of abduction with high precision: Given a theory and an unprovable conclusion, identify a missing fact that allows the conclusion to be proved, along with a proof. These results significantly improve the viability of neural methods for systematically reasoning over natural language.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

We propose a novel application of prompting Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs) to generate analogies and study how to design effective prompts for two task settings: generating a source concept analogous to a given target concept (aka Analogous Concept Generation or ACG), and generating an explanation of the similarity between a given pair of target concept and source concept (aka Analogous Explanation Generation or AEG). We found that it is feasible to prompt InstructGPT to generate meaningful analogies and the best prompts tend to be precise imperative statements especially with a low temperature setting. We also systematically analyzed the sensitivity of the InstructGPT model to prompt design, temperature, and injected spelling errors, and found that the model is particularly sensitive to certain variations (e.g., questions vs. imperative statements). Further, we conducted human evaluation on 1.4k of the generated analogies and found that the quality of generations varies substantially by model size. The largest InstructGPT model can achieve human-level performance at generating meaningful analogies for a given target while there is still room for improvement on the AEG task.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

Inductive reasoning is a core component of human intelligence. In the past research of inductive reasoning within computer science, formal language is used as representations of knowledge (facts and rules, more specifically). However, formal language can cause systematic problems for inductive reasoning such as disability of handling raw input such as natural language, sensitiveness to mislabeled data, and incapacity to handle ambiguous input. To this end, we propose a new paradigm (task) for inductive reasoning, which is to induce natural language rules from natural language facts, and create a dataset termed DEER containing 1.2k rule-fact pairs for the task, where rules and facts are written in natural language. New automatic metrics are also proposed and analysed for the evaluation of this task. With DEER, we investigate a modern approach for inductive reasoning where we use natural language as representation for knowledge instead of formal language and use pretrained language models as ''reasoners''. Moreover, we provide the first and comprehensive analysis of how well pretrained language models can induce natural language rules from natural language facts. We also propose a new framework drawing insights from philosophy literature for this task, which we show in the experiment section that surpasses baselines in both automatic and human evaluations. We discuss about our future perspectives for inductive reasoning in Section 7. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/ZonglinY/Inductive_Reasoning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in reasoning tasks with the development of prompting methods. However, existing prompting approaches cannot reuse insights of solving similar problems and suffer from accumulated errors in multi-step reasoning, since they prompt LLMs to reason from scratch. To address these issues, we propose \textit{Thought Propagation (TP)}, which explores the analogous problems and leverages their solutions to enhance the complex reasoning ability of LLMs. These analogous problems are related to the input one, with reusable solutions and problem-solving strategies. Thus, it is promising to propagate insights of solving previous analogous problems to inspire new problem-solving. To achieve this, TP first prompts LLMs to propose and solve a set of analogous problems that are related to the input one. Then, TP reuses the results of analogous problems to directly yield a new solution or derive a knowledge-intensive plan for execution to amend the initial solution obtained from scratch. TP is compatible with existing prompting approaches, allowing plug-and-play generalization and enhancement in a wide range of tasks without much labor in task-specific prompt engineering. Experiments across three challenging tasks demonstrate TP enjoys a substantial improvement over the baselines by an average of 12\% absolute increase in finding the optimal solutions in Shortest-path Reasoning, 13\% improvement of human preference in Creative Writing, and 15\% enhancement in the task completion rate of LLM-Agent Planning.

Despite the recent proliferation of large language models (LLMs), their training recipes -- model architecture, pre-training data and optimization algorithm -- are often very similar. This naturally raises the question of the similarity among the resulting models. In this paper, we propose a novel setting, imaginary question answering (IQA), to better understand model similarity. In IQA, we ask one model to generate purely imaginary questions (e.g., on completely made-up concepts in physics) and prompt another model to answer. Surprisingly, despite the total fictionality of these questions, all models can answer each other's questions with remarkable success, suggesting a "shared imagination space" in which these models operate during such hallucinations. We conduct a series of investigations into this phenomenon and discuss implications on model homogeneity, hallucination, and computational creativity.

Mechanism-targeted synthetic data is increasingly proposed as a way to steer pretraining toward desirable capabilities, but it remains unclear how such interventions should be evaluated. We study this question for in-context learning (ICL) under matched compute (iso-FLOPs) using Bi-Induct, a lightweight data rewrite that interleaves short directional copy snippets into a natural pretraining stream: forward-copy (induction), backward-copy (anti-induction, as a directional control), or a balanced mix. Across 0.13B-1B decoder-only models, we evaluate (i) few-shot performance on standard LM benchmarks and function-style ICL probes, (ii) head-level copy telemetry, and (iii) held-out perplexity as a guardrail. Bi-Induct reliably increases induction-head activity, but this does not translate into consistent improvements in few-shot generalization: on standard LM benchmarks, Bi-Induct is largely performance-neutral relative to natural-only training, while on function-style probes the 1B natural-only model performs best. Despite explicit backward-copy cues, anti-induction scores remain near zero across scales, revealing a strong forward/backward asymmetry. Targeted ablations show a sharper distinction: removing the top 2% induction heads per layer harms ICL more than matched random ablations, with the largest relative drop occurring in the natural-only models. This indicates that natural-only training produces more centralized, load-bearing induction circuitry, whereas Bi-Induct tends to create more distributed and redundant induction activity. Our main conclusion is that eliciting a mechanism is not the same as making it load-bearing. For data-centric foundation model design, this suggests that synthetic data interventions should be evaluated not only by signature amplification, but by whether they create causally necessary computation while preserving natural-data modeling quality.

The solution methods used to realize artificial general intelligence (AGI) may not contain the formalism needed to adequately model and characterize AGI. In particular, current approaches to learning hold notions of problem domain and problem task as fundamental precepts, but it is hardly apparent that an AGI encountered in the wild will be discernable into a set of domain-task pairings. Nor is it apparent that the outcomes of AGI in a system can be well expressed in terms of domain and task, or as consequences thereof. Thus, there is both a practical and theoretical use for meta-theories of learning which do not express themselves explicitly in terms of solution methods. General systems theory offers such a meta-theory. Herein, Mesarovician abstract systems theory is used as a super-structure for learning. Abstract learning systems are formulated. Subsequent elaboration stratifies the assumptions of learning systems into a hierarchy and considers the hierarchy such stratification projects onto learning theory. The presented Mesarovician abstract learning systems theory calls back to the founding motivations of artificial intelligence research by focusing on the thinking participants directly, in this case, learning systems, in contrast to the contemporary focus on the problems thinking participants solve.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) often rely on generating intermediate reasoning steps to enhance accuracy. However, little work has examined how reasoning utility contributes to the final answer's correctness. Due to the stochastic nature of autoregressive generation, generating more context does not guarantee increased confidence in the answer. If we could predict, during generation, whether a reasoning step will be useful, we could stop early or prune ineffective steps, avoiding distractions in the final decision. We present an oracle study on MATH dataset, using Qwen2.5-32B and GPT-4o to generate reasoning chains, and then employing a separate model (Qwen3-8B) to quantify the utility of these chains for final accuracy. Specifically, we measure the model's uncertainty on the answer span Y at each reasoning step using conditional entropy (expected negative log-likelihood over the vocabulary) with context expanding step by step. Our results show a clear pattern: conditional entropy that decreases over steps is strongly associated with correct answers, whereas flat or increasing entropy often results in wrong answers. We also corroborate that incorrect reasoning paths tend to be longer than correct ones, suggesting that longer reasoning does not necessarily yield better outcomes. These findings serve as a foundation to inspire future work on designing efficient reasoning pipelines that detect and avoid unproductive reasoning early.

Large language models are able to perform a task by conditioning on a few input-output demonstrations - a paradigm known as in-context learning. We show that language models can explicitly infer an underlying task from a few demonstrations by prompting them to generate a natural language instruction that fits the examples. To explore this ability, we introduce the instruction induction challenge, compile a dataset consisting of 24 tasks, and define a novel evaluation metric based on executing the generated instruction. We discover that, to a large extent, the ability to generate instructions does indeed emerge when using a model that is both large enough and aligned to follow instructions; InstructGPT achieves 65.7% of human performance in our execution-based metric, while the original GPT-3 model reaches only 9.8% of human performance. This surprising result suggests that instruction induction might be a viable learning paradigm in and of itself, where instead of fitting a set of latent continuous parameters to the data, one searches for the best description in the natural language hypothesis space.

When prompted with a few examples and intermediate steps, large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance in various reasoning tasks. However, prompting methods that rely on implicit knowledge in an LLM often generate incorrect answers when the implicit knowledge is wrong or inconsistent with the task. To tackle this problem, we present Hypotheses-to-Theories (HtT), a framework that learns a rule library for reasoning with LLMs. HtT contains two stages, an induction stage and a deduction stage. In the induction stage, an LLM is first asked to generate and verify rules over a set of training examples. Rules that appear and lead to correct answers sufficiently often are collected to form a rule library. In the deduction stage, the LLM is then prompted to employ the learned rule library to perform reasoning to answer test questions. Experiments on relational reasoning, numerical reasoning and concept learning problems show that HtT improves existing prompting methods, with an absolute gain of 10-30% in accuracy. The learned rules are also transferable to different models and to different forms of the same problem.

Generating novel and creative scientific hypotheses is a cornerstone in achieving Artificial General Intelligence. Large language and reasoning models have the potential to aid in the systematic creation, selection, and validation of scientifically informed hypotheses. However, current foundation models often struggle to produce scientific ideas that are both novel and feasible. One reason is the lack of a dedicated dataset that frames Scientific Hypothesis Generation (SHG) as a Natural Language Generation (NLG) task. In this paper, we introduce HypoGen, the first dataset of approximately 5500 structured problem-hypothesis pairs extracted from top-tier computer science conferences structured with a Bit-Flip-Spark schema, where the Bit is the conventional assumption, the Spark is the key insight or conceptual leap, and the Flip is the resulting counterproposal. HypoGen uniquely integrates an explicit Chain-of-Reasoning component that reflects the intellectual process from Bit to Flip. We demonstrate that framing hypothesis generation as conditional language modelling, with the model fine-tuned on Bit-Flip-Spark and the Chain-of-Reasoning (and where, at inference, we only provide the Bit), leads to improvements in the overall quality of the hypotheses. Our evaluation employs automated metrics and LLM judge rankings for overall quality assessment. We show that by fine-tuning on our HypoGen dataset we improve the novelty, feasibility, and overall quality of the generated hypotheses. The HypoGen dataset is publicly available at huggingface.co/datasets/UniverseTBD/hypogen-dr1.

We present counterfactual planning as a design approach for creating a range of safety mechanisms that can be applied in hypothetical future AI systems which have Artificial General Intelligence. The key step in counterfactual planning is to use an AGI machine learning system to construct a counterfactual world model, designed to be different from the real world the system is in. A counterfactual planning agent determines the action that best maximizes expected utility in this counterfactual planning world, and then performs the same action in the real world. We use counterfactual planning to construct an AGI agent emergency stop button, and a safety interlock that will automatically stop the agent before it undergoes an intelligence explosion. We also construct an agent with an input terminal that can be used by humans to iteratively improve the agent's reward function, where the incentive for the agent to manipulate this improvement process is suppressed. As an example of counterfactual planning in a non-agent AGI system, we construct a counterfactual oracle. As a design approach, counterfactual planning is built around the use of a graphical notation for defining mathematical counterfactuals. This two-diagram notation also provides a compact and readable language for reasoning about the complex types of self-referencing and indirect representation which are typically present inside machine learning agents.

We explore how generating a chain of thought -- a series of intermediate reasoning steps -- significantly improves the ability of large language models to perform complex reasoning. In particular, we show how such reasoning abilities emerge naturally in sufficiently large language models via a simple method called chain of thought prompting, where a few chain of thought demonstrations are provided as exemplars in prompting. Experiments on three large language models show that chain of thought prompting improves performance on a range of arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning tasks. The empirical gains can be striking. For instance, prompting a 540B-parameter language model with just eight chain of thought exemplars achieves state of the art accuracy on the GSM8K benchmark of math word problems, surpassing even finetuned GPT-3 with a verifier.

The ability to derive underlying principles from a handful of observations and then generalize to novel situations -- known as inductive reasoning -- is central to human intelligence. Prior work suggests that language models (LMs) often fall short on inductive reasoning, despite achieving impressive success on research benchmarks. In this work, we conduct a systematic study of the inductive reasoning capabilities of LMs through iterative hypothesis refinement, a technique that more closely mirrors the human inductive process than standard input-output prompting. Iterative hypothesis refinement employs a three-step process: proposing, selecting, and refining hypotheses in the form of textual rules. By examining the intermediate rules, we observe that LMs are phenomenal hypothesis proposers (i.e., generating candidate rules), and when coupled with a (task-specific) symbolic interpreter that is able to systematically filter the proposed set of rules, this hybrid approach achieves strong results across inductive reasoning benchmarks that require inducing causal relations, language-like instructions, and symbolic concepts. However, they also behave as puzzling inductive reasoners, showing notable performance gaps between rule induction (i.e., identifying plausible rules) and rule application (i.e., applying proposed rules to instances), suggesting that LMs are proposing hypotheses without being able to actually apply the rules. Through empirical and human analyses, we further reveal several discrepancies between the inductive reasoning processes of LMs and humans, shedding light on both the potentials and limitations of using LMs in inductive reasoning tasks.

Inductive reasoning is an essential capability for large language models (LLMs) to achieve higher intelligence, which requires the model to generalize rules from observed facts and then apply them to unseen examples. We present MIRAGE, a synthetic dataset that addresses the limitations of previous work, specifically the lack of comprehensive evaluation and flexible test data. In it, we evaluate LLMs' capabilities in both the inductive and deductive stages, allowing for flexible variation in input distribution, task scenario, and task difficulty to analyze the factors influencing LLMs' inductive reasoning. Based on these multi-faceted evaluations, we demonstrate that the LLM is a poor rule-based reasoner. In many cases, when conducting inductive reasoning, they do not rely on a correct rule to answer the unseen case. From the perspectives of different prompting methods, observation numbers, and task forms, models tend to consistently conduct correct deduction without correct inductive rules. Besides, we find that LLMs are good neighbor-based reasoners. In the inductive reasoning process, the model tends to focus on observed facts that are close to the current test example in feature space. By leveraging these similar examples, the model maintains strong inductive capabilities within a localized region, significantly improving its deductive performance.

Deduction, induction, and abduction are fundamental reasoning paradigms, core for human logical thinking. Although improving Large Language Model (LLM) reasoning has attracted significant research efforts, the extent to which the fundamental paradigms induce generalization has yet to be systematically explored. In this study, we shed light on how the interplay between these core paradigms influences LLMs' reasoning behavior. To this end, we first collect a new dataset of reasoning trajectories from symbolic tasks, each targeting one of the three fundamental paradigms, to abstract from concrete world knowledge. Then, we investigate effective ways for inducing these skills into LLMs. We experiment with a battery of methods including simple fine-tuning, and more complex approaches to increase model depth, or transform a dense model to a mixture-of-experts. We comprehensively evaluate induced models on realistic out-of-domain tasks, that are entirely formulated in natural language and contain real-world knowledge. Our results reveal that our approach yields strong generalizability with substantial performance gains (up to 14.60) across realistic tasks.

"Induction heads" are attention heads that implement a simple algorithm to complete token sequences like [A][B] ... [A] -> [B]. In this work, we present preliminary and indirect evidence for a hypothesis that induction heads might constitute the mechanism for the majority of all "in-context learning" in large transformer models (i.e. decreasing loss at increasing token indices). We find that induction heads develop at precisely the same point as a sudden sharp increase in in-context learning ability, visible as a bump in the training loss. We present six complementary lines of evidence, arguing that induction heads may be the mechanistic source of general in-context learning in transformer models of any size. For small attention-only models, we present strong, causal evidence; for larger models with MLPs, we present correlational evidence.

Conducting contamination-free evaluation of mathematical capabilities can be difficult for two reasons: models may memorize a test set once it is made public, and current mathematical benchmarks are prone to overfitting due to having limited diversity of symbols and rules, coupled with closed-ended answers. This paper proposes a method to leverage these shortcomings as useful features to a construct dynamic, counterfactual benchmark, which can be used to both reveal overfitting and measure true reasoning. We demonstrate this via MatheMagic, which generates math test instances with the interpretations of numbers and operators altered, yet has automatically verifiable answers. Test instances are randomly seeded and constructed at test time to evaluate a model's induction or deduction capability, offering stability, extensibility, comparability, and robustness to overfitting. Our experiments find that models solve deduction more easily than induction, but they revert to standard math. Further analysis reveals that math-adapted models fail to exhibit a general "skill" of reasoning, and fine-tuning on induction tasks generalizes poorly.

Generative models are trained with the simple objective of imitating the conditional probability distribution induced by the data they are trained on. Therefore, when trained on data generated by humans, we may not expect the artificial model to outperform the humans on their original objectives. In this work, we study the phenomenon of transcendence: when a generative model achieves capabilities that surpass the abilities of the experts generating its data. We demonstrate transcendence by training an autoregressive transformer to play chess from game transcripts, and show that the trained model can sometimes achieve better performance than all players in the dataset. We theoretically prove that transcendence is enabled by low-temperature sampling, and rigorously assess this experimentally. Finally, we discuss other sources of transcendence, laying the groundwork for future investigation of this phenomenon in a broader setting.

Providing high quality explanations for AI predictions based on machine learning is a challenging and complex task. To work well it requires, among other factors: selecting a proper level of generality/specificity of the explanation; considering assumptions about the familiarity of the explanation beneficiary with the AI task under consideration; referring to specific elements that have contributed to the decision; making use of additional knowledge (e.g. expert evidence) which might not be part of the prediction process; and providing evidence supporting negative hypothesis. Finally, the system needs to formulate the explanation in a clearly interpretable, and possibly convincing, way. Given these considerations, ANTIDOTE fosters an integrated vision of explainable AI, where low-level characteristics of the deep learning process are combined with higher level schemes proper of the human argumentation capacity. ANTIDOTE will exploit cross-disciplinary competences in deep learning and argumentation to support a broader and innovative view of explainable AI, where the need for high-quality explanations for clinical cases deliberation is critical. As a first result of the project, we publish the Antidote CasiMedicos dataset to facilitate research on explainable AI in general, and argumentation in the medical domain in particular.

Complex reasoning is an impressive ability shown by large language models (LLMs). Most LLMs are skilled in deductive reasoning, such as chain-of-thought prompting or iterative tool-using to solve challenging tasks step-by-step. In this paper, we hope to focus on evaluating and teaching LLMs to conduct inductive reasoning, that is, LLMs are supposed to infer underlying rules by observing examples or sequential transformations. However, collecting large-scale and diverse human-generated inductive data is challenging. We focus on data synthesis in the code domain and propose a Case2Code task by exploiting the expressiveness and correctness of programs. Specifically, we collect a diverse set of executable programs, synthesize input-output transformations for each program, and force LLMs to infer the underlying code implementations based on the synthetic I/O cases. We first evaluate representative LLMs on the synthesized Case2Code task and demonstrate that the Case-to-code induction is challenging for LLMs. Then, we synthesize large-scale Case2Code training samples to train LLMs to perform inductive reasoning. Experimental results show that such induction training benefits not only in distribution Case2Code performance but also enhances various coding abilities of trained LLMs, demonstrating the great potential of learning inductive reasoning via synthetic data.

The technique of data augmentation (DA) is often used in machine learning for regularization purposes to better generalize under i.i.d. settings. In this work, we present a unifying framework with topics in causal inference to make a case for the use of DA beyond just the i.i.d. setting, but for generalization across interventions as well. Specifically, we argue that when the outcome generating mechanism is invariant to our choice of DA, then such augmentations can effectively be thought of as interventions on the treatment generating mechanism itself. This can potentially help to reduce bias in causal effect estimation arising from hidden confounders. In the presence of such unobserved confounding we typically make use of instrumental variables (IVs) -- sources of treatment randomization that are conditionally independent of the outcome. However, IVs may not be as readily available as DA for many applications, which is the main motivation behind this work. By appropriately regularizing IV based estimators, we introduce the concept of IV-like (IVL) regression for mitigating confounding bias and improving predictive performance across interventions even when certain IV properties are relaxed. Finally, we cast parameterized DA as an IVL regression problem and show that when used in composition can simulate a worst-case application of such DA, further improving performance on causal estimation and generalization tasks beyond what simple DA may offer. This is shown both theoretically for the population case and via simulation experiments for the finite sample case using a simple linear example. We also present real data experiments to support our case.

Large Language Models (LLMs), despite their advanced linguistic capabilities, fundamentally lack an intuitive understanding of physical dynamics, which limits their effectiveness in real-world scenarios that require causal reasoning. In this paper, we introduce Causal World Model Induction (CWMI), a novel framework designed to embed an explicit model of causal physics within an LLM. Our approach incorporates a dedicated Causal Physics Module (CPM) and a new training objective called Causal Intervention Loss, encouraging the model to learn cause-and-effect relationships from multimodal data. By training the model to predict the outcomes of hypothetical interventions instead of merely capturing statistical correlations, CWMI develops a robust internal representation of physical laws. Experimental results show that CWMI significantly outperforms state-of-the-art LLMs on zero-shot physical reasoning tasks, including the PIQA benchmark and our newly proposed PhysiCa-Bench dataset. These findings demonstrate that inducing a causal world model is a critical step toward more reliable and generalizable AI systems.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting for language models demonstrates impressive performance across reasoning tasks, but typically needs labeled exemplars of the reasoning process. In this work, we introduce a new prompting approach, Analogical Prompting, designed to automatically guide the reasoning process of large language models. Inspired by analogical reasoning, a cognitive process in which humans draw from relevant past experiences to tackle new problems, our approach prompts language models to self-generate relevant exemplars or knowledge in the context, before proceeding to solve the given problem. This method presents several advantages: it obviates the need for labeling or retrieving exemplars, offering generality and convenience; it can also tailor the generated exemplars and knowledge to each problem, offering adaptability. Experimental results show that our approach outperforms 0-shot CoT and manual few-shot CoT in a variety of reasoning tasks, including math problem solving in GSM8K and MATH, code generation in Codeforces, and other reasoning tasks in BIG-Bench.

"Sure, I am happy to generate a story for you: Captain Lyra stood at the helm of her trusty ship, the Maelstrom's Fury, gazing out at the endless sea. [...] Lyra's eyes welled up with tears as she realized the bitter truth - she had sacrificed everything for fleeting riches, and lost the love of her crew, her family, and herself." Although this story, generated by a large language model, is captivating, one may wonder -- how would the story have unfolded if the model had chosen "Captain Maeve" as the protagonist instead? We cannot know. State-of-the-art large language models are stateless -- they maintain no internal memory or state. Given a prompt, they generate a sequence of tokens as an output using an autoregressive process. As a consequence, they cannot reason about counterfactual alternatives to tokens they have generated in the past. In this work, our goal is to enhance them with this functionality. To this end, we develop a causal model of token generation that builds upon the Gumbel-Max structural causal model. Our model allows any large language model to perform counterfactual token generation at almost no cost in comparison with vanilla token generation, it is embarrassingly simple to implement, and it does not require any fine-tuning nor prompt engineering. We implement our model on Llama 3 8B-Instruct and Ministral-8B-Instruct and conduct a qualitative and a quantitative analysis of counterfactually generated text. We conclude with a demonstrative application of counterfactual token generation for bias detection, unveiling interesting insights about the model of the world constructed by large language models.

Scaling up language models has been shown to predictably improve performance and sample efficiency on a wide range of downstream tasks. This paper instead discusses an unpredictable phenomenon that we refer to as emergent abilities of large language models. We consider an ability to be emergent if it is not present in smaller models but is present in larger models. Thus, emergent abilities cannot be predicted simply by extrapolating the performance of smaller models. The existence of such emergence implies that additional scaling could further expand the range of capabilities of language models.

Chain-of-thought prompting (e.g., "Let's think step-by-step") primes large language models to verbalize rationalization for their predictions. While chain-of-thought can lead to dramatic performance gains, benefits appear to emerge only for sufficiently large models (beyond 50B parameters). We show that orders-of-magnitude smaller models (125M -- 1.3B parameters) can still benefit from chain-of-thought prompting. To achieve this, we introduce Symbolic Chain-of-Thought Distillation (SCoTD), a method to train a smaller student model on rationalizations sampled from a significantly larger teacher model. Experiments across several commonsense benchmarks show that: 1) SCoTD enhances the performance of the student model in both supervised and few-shot settings, and especially for challenge sets; 2) sampling many reasoning chains per instance from the teacher is paramount; and 3) after distillation, student chain-of-thoughts are judged by humans as comparable to the teacher, despite orders of magnitude fewer parameters. We test several hypotheses regarding what properties of chain-of-thought samples are important, e.g., diversity vs. teacher likelihood vs. open-endedness. We release our corpus of chain-of-thought samples and code.

Inductive reasoning is a core problem-solving capacity: humans can identify underlying principles from a few examples, which can then be robustly generalized to novel scenarios. Recent work has evaluated large language models (LLMs) on inductive reasoning tasks by directly prompting them yielding "in context learning." This can work well for straightforward inductive tasks, but performs very poorly on more complex tasks such as the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC). In this work, we propose to improve the inductive reasoning ability of LLMs by generating explicit hypotheses at multiple levels of abstraction: we prompt the LLM to propose multiple abstract hypotheses about the problem, in natural language, then implement the natural language hypotheses as concrete Python programs. These programs can be directly verified by running on the observed examples and generalized to novel inputs. Because of the prohibitive cost of generation with state-of-the-art LLMs, we consider a middle step to filter the set of hypotheses that will be implemented into programs: we either ask the LLM to summarize into a smaller set of hypotheses, or ask human annotators to select a subset of the hypotheses. We verify our pipeline's effectiveness on the ARC visual inductive reasoning benchmark, its variant 1D-ARC, and string transformation dataset SyGuS. On a random 40-problem subset of ARC, our automated pipeline using LLM summaries achieves 27.5% accuracy, significantly outperforming the direct prompting baseline (accuracy of 12.5%). With the minimal human input of selecting from LLM-generated candidates, the performance is boosted to 37.5%. (And we argue this is a lower bound on the performance of our approach without filtering.) Our ablation studies show that abstract hypothesis generation and concrete program representations are both beneficial for LLMs to perform inductive reasoning tasks.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

Transformer models exhibit in-context learning: the ability to accurately predict the response to a novel query based on illustrative examples in the input sequence. In-context learning contrasts with traditional in-weights learning of query-output relationships. What aspects of the training data distribution and architecture favor in-context vs in-weights learning? Recent work has shown that specific distributional properties inherent in language, such as burstiness, large dictionaries and skewed rank-frequency distributions, control the trade-off or simultaneous appearance of these two forms of learning. We first show that these results are recapitulated in a minimal attention-only network trained on a simplified dataset. In-context learning (ICL) is driven by the abrupt emergence of an induction head, which subsequently competes with in-weights learning. By identifying progress measures that precede in-context learning and targeted experiments, we construct a two-parameter model of an induction head which emulates the full data distributional dependencies displayed by the attention-based network. A phenomenological model of induction head formation traces its abrupt emergence to the sequential learning of three nested logits enabled by an intrinsic curriculum. We propose that the sharp transitions in attention-based networks arise due to a specific chain of multi-layer operations necessary to achieve ICL, which is implemented by nested nonlinearities sequentially learned during training.

One well motivated explanation method for classifiers leverages counterfactuals which are hypothetical events identical to real observations in all aspects except for one categorical feature. Constructing such counterfactual poses specific challenges for texts, however, as some attribute values may not necessarily align with plausible real-world events. In this paper we propose a simple method for generating counterfactuals by intervening in the space of text representations which bypasses this limitation. We argue that our interventions are minimally disruptive and that they are theoretically sound as they align with counterfactuals as defined in Pearl's causal inference framework. To validate our method, we first conduct experiments on a synthetic dataset of counterfactuals, allowing for a direct comparison between classifier predictions based on ground truth counterfactuals (obtained through explicit text interventions) and our counterfactuals, derived through interventions in the representation space. Second, we study a real world scenario where our counterfactuals can be leveraged both for explaining a classifier and for bias mitigation.

The Monty Hall problem is a classic probability puzzle known for its counterintuitive solution, revealing fundamental discrepancies between mathematical reasoning and human intuition. To bridge this gap, we introduce a novel explanatory framework inspired by quantum measurement theory. Specifically, we conceptualize the hosts' actions-opening doors to reveal non-prizes-as analogous to quantum measurements that cause asymmetric collapses of the probability distribution. This quantum-inspired interpretation not only clarifies why the intuitive misunderstanding arises but also provides generalized formulas consistent with standard Bayesian results. We further validate our analytical approach using Monte Carlo simulations across various problem settings, demonstrating precise agreement between theoretical predictions and empirical outcomes. Our quantum analogy thus offers a powerful pedagogical tool, enhancing intuitive understanding of conditional probability phenomena through the lens of probability redistribution and quantum-like measurement operations.

We investigate the use of randomly generated data for the sake of pre-training a model. We justify this approach theoretically from the perspective of algorithmic complexity, building on recent research that shows that sequence models can be trained to approximate Solomonoff induction. We derive similar, but complementary theoretical results. We show empirically that synthetically generated data can be used to pre-train a model before the data is seen. We replicate earlier results that models trained this way show zero-shot in-context learning across a variety of datasets, and that this performance improves with scale. We extend earlier results to real-world data, and show that finetuning a model after pre-training offers faster convergence and better generalization.

Despite the success of chain of thought in enhancing language model reasoning, the underlying process remains less well understood. Although logically sound reasoning appears inherently crucial for chain of thought, prior studies surprisingly reveal minimal impact when using invalid demonstrations instead. Furthermore, the conventional chain of thought does not inform language models on what mistakes to avoid, which potentially leads to more errors. Hence, inspired by how humans can learn from both positive and negative examples, we propose contrastive chain of thought to enhance language model reasoning. Compared to the conventional chain of thought, our approach provides both valid and invalid reasoning demonstrations, to guide the model to reason step-by-step while reducing reasoning mistakes. To improve generalization, we introduce an automatic method to construct contrastive demonstrations. Our experiments on reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that contrastive chain of thought can serve as a general enhancement of chain-of-thought prompting.

Explainability methods for NLP systems encounter a version of the fundamental problem of causal inference: for a given ground-truth input text, we never truly observe the counterfactual texts necessary for isolating the causal effects of model representations on outputs. In response, many explainability methods make no use of counterfactual texts, assuming they will be unavailable. In this paper, we show that robust causal explainability methods can be created using approximate counterfactuals, which can be written by humans to approximate a specific counterfactual or simply sampled using metadata-guided heuristics. The core of our proposal is the Causal Proxy Model (CPM). A CPM explains a black-box model N because it is trained to have the same actual input/output behavior as N while creating neural representations that can be intervened upon to simulate the counterfactual input/output behavior of N. Furthermore, we show that the best CPM for N performs comparably to N in making factual predictions, which means that the CPM can simply replace N, leading to more explainable deployed models. Our code is available at https://github.com/frankaging/Causal-Proxy-Model.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

Large language models demonstrate the intriguing ability to perform unseen tasks via in-context learning. However, it remains unclear what mechanisms inside the model drive such task-level generalization. In this work, we approach this question through the lens of off-by-one addition (i.e., 1+1=3, 2+2=5, 3+3=?), a two-step, counterfactual task with an unexpected +1 function as a second step. Leveraging circuit-style interpretability techniques such as path patching, we analyze the models' internal computations behind their performance and present three key findings. First, we uncover a function induction mechanism that explains the model's generalization from standard addition to off-by-one addition. This mechanism resembles the structure of the induction head mechanism found in prior work and elevates it to a higher level of abstraction. Second, we show that the induction of the +1 function is governed by multiple attention heads in parallel, each of which emits a distinct piece of the +1 function. Finally, we find that this function induction mechanism is reused in a broader range of tasks, including synthetic tasks such as shifted multiple-choice QA and algorithmic tasks such as base-8 addition. Overall, our findings offer deeper insights into how reusable and composable structures within language models enable task-level generalization.

Answering counterfactual queries has many important applications such as knowledge discovery and explainability, but is challenging when causal variables are unobserved and we only see a projection onto an observation space, for instance, image pixels. One approach is to recover the latent Structural Causal Model (SCM), but this typically needs unrealistic assumptions, such as linearity of the causal mechanisms. Another approach is to use na\"ive ML approximations, such as generative models, to generate counterfactual samples; however, these lack guarantees of accuracy. In this work, we strive to strike a balance between practicality and theoretical guarantees by focusing on a specific type of causal query called domain counterfactuals, which hypothesizes what a sample would have looked like if it had been generated in a different domain (or environment). Concretely, by only assuming invertibility, sparse domain interventions and access to observational data from different domains, we aim to improve domain counterfactual estimation both theoretically and practically with less restrictive assumptions. We define domain counterfactually equivalent models and prove necessary and sufficient properties for equivalent models that provide a tight characterization of the domain counterfactual equivalence classes. Building upon this result, we prove that every equivalence class contains a model where all intervened variables are at the end when topologically sorted by the causal DAG. This surprising result suggests that a model design that only allows intervention in the last k latent variables may improve model estimation for counterfactuals. We then test this model design on extensive simulated and image-based experiments which show the sparse canonical model indeed improves counterfactual estimation over baseline non-sparse models.

For text-based AI systems to interact in the real world, causal reasoning is an essential skill. Since interventional data is costly to generate, we study to what extent an agent can learn causal reasoning from passive data. Specifically, we consider an axiomatic training setup where an agent learns from multiple demonstrations of a causal axiom (or rule), rather than incorporating the axiom as an inductive bias or inferring it from data values. A key question is whether the agent would learn to generalize from the axiom demonstrations to new scenarios. For example, if a transformer model is trained on demonstrations of the causal transitivity axiom over small graphs, would it generalize to applying the transitivity axiom over large graphs? Our results, based on a novel axiomatic training scheme, indicate that such generalization is possible. We consider the task of inferring whether a variable causes another variable, given a causal graph structure. We find that a 67 million parameter transformer model, when trained on linear causal chains (along with some noisy variations) can generalize well to new kinds of graphs, including longer causal chains, causal chains with reversed order, and graphs with branching; even when it is not explicitly trained for such settings. Our model performs at par (or even better) than many larger language models such as GPT-4, Gemini Pro, and Phi-3. Overall, our axiomatic training framework provides a new paradigm of learning causal reasoning from passive data that can be used to learn arbitrary axioms, as long as sufficient demonstrations can be generated.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

Although counterfactual reasoning is a fundamental aspect of intelligence, the lack of large-scale counterfactual open-domain question-answering (QA) benchmarks makes it difficult to evaluate and improve models on this ability. To address this void, we introduce the first such dataset, named IfQA, where each question is based on a counterfactual presupposition via an "if" clause. For example, if Los Angeles was on the east coast of the U.S., what would be the time difference between Los Angeles and Paris? Such questions require models to go beyond retrieving direct factual knowledge from the Web: they must identify the right information to retrieve and reason about an imagined situation that may even go against the facts built into their parameters. The IfQA dataset contains over 3,800 questions that were annotated annotated by crowdworkers on relevant Wikipedia passages. Empirical analysis reveals that the IfQA dataset is highly challenging for existing open-domain QA methods, including supervised retrieve-then-read pipeline methods (EM score 36.2), as well as recent few-shot approaches such as chain-of-thought prompting with GPT-3 (EM score 27.4). The unique challenges posed by the IfQA benchmark will push open-domain QA research on both retrieval and counterfactual reasoning fronts.

Training on model-generated synthetic data is a promising approach for finetuning LLMs, but it remains unclear when it helps or hurts. In this paper, we investigate this question for math reasoning via an empirical study, followed by building a conceptual understanding of our observations. First, we find that while the typical approach of finetuning a model on synthetic correct or positive problem-solution pairs generated by capable models offers modest performance gains, sampling more correct solutions from the finetuned learner itself followed by subsequent fine-tuning on this self-generated data doubles the efficiency of the same synthetic problems. At the same time, training on model-generated positives can amplify various spurious correlations, resulting in flat or even inverse scaling trends as the amount of data increases. Surprisingly, we find that several of these issues can be addressed if we also utilize negative responses, i.e., model-generated responses that are deemed incorrect by a final answer verifier. Crucially, these negatives must be constructed such that the training can appropriately recover the utility or advantage of each intermediate step in the negative response. With this per-step scheme, we are able to attain consistent gains over only positive data, attaining performance similar to amplifying the amount of synthetic data by 8 times. We show that training on per-step negatives can help to unlearn spurious correlations in the positive data, and is equivalent to advantage-weighted reinforcement learning (RL), implying that it inherits robustness benefits of RL over imitating positive data alone.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

Scientific idea generation lies at the heart of scientific discovery and has driven human progress-whether by solving unsolved problems or proposing novel hypotheses to explain unknown phenomena. Unlike standard scientific reasoning or general creative generation, idea generation in science is a multi-objective and open-ended task, where the novelty of a contribution is as essential as its empirical soundness. Large language models (LLMs) have recently emerged as promising generators of scientific ideas, capable of producing coherent and factual outputs with surprising intuition and acceptable reasoning, yet their creative capacity remains inconsistent and poorly understood. This survey provides a structured synthesis of methods for LLM-driven scientific ideation, examining how different approaches balance creativity with scientific soundness. We categorize existing methods into five complementary families: External knowledge augmentation, Prompt-based distributional steering, Inference-time scaling, Multi-agent collaboration, and Parameter-level adaptation. To interpret their contributions, we employ two complementary frameworks: Boden's taxonomy of Combinatorial, Exploratory and Transformational creativity to characterize the level of ideas each family expected to generate, and Rhodes' 4Ps framework-Person, Process, Press, and Product-to locate the aspect or source of creativity that each method emphasizes. By aligning methodological advances with creativity frameworks, this survey clarifies the state of the field and outlines key directions toward reliable, systematic, and transformative applications of LLMs in scientific discovery.

Widely used language models (LMs) are typically built by scaling up a two-stage training pipeline: a pre-training stage that uses a very large, diverse dataset of text and a fine-tuning (sometimes, 'alignment') stage that uses targeted examples or other specifications of desired behaviors. While it has been hypothesized that knowledge and skills come from pre-training, and fine-tuning mostly filters this knowledge and skillset, this intuition has not been extensively tested. To aid in doing so, we introduce a novel technique for decoupling the knowledge and skills gained in these two stages, enabling a direct answer to the question, "What would happen if we combined the knowledge learned by a large model during pre-training with the knowledge learned by a small model during fine-tuning (or vice versa)?" Using an RL-based framework derived from recent developments in learning from human preferences, we introduce emulated fine-tuning (EFT), a principled and practical method for sampling from a distribution that approximates (or 'emulates') the result of pre-training and fine-tuning at different scales. Our experiments with EFT show that scaling up fine-tuning tends to improve helpfulness, while scaling up pre-training tends to improve factuality. Beyond decoupling scale, we show that EFT enables test-time adjustment of competing behavioral traits like helpfulness and harmlessness without additional training. Finally, a special case of emulated fine-tuning, which we call LM up-scaling, avoids resource-intensive fine-tuning of large pre-trained models by ensembling them with small fine-tuned models, essentially emulating the result of fine-tuning the large pre-trained model. Up-scaling consistently improves helpfulness and factuality of instruction-following models in the Llama, Llama-2, and Falcon families, without additional hyperparameters or training.

Generating high-quality stories spanning thousands of tokens requires competency across a variety of skills, from tracking plot and character arcs to keeping a consistent and engaging style. Due to the difficulty of sourcing labeled datasets and precise quality measurements, most work using large language models (LLMs) for long-form story generation uses combinations of hand-designed prompting techniques to elicit author-like behavior. This is a manual process that is highly dependent on the specific story-generation task. Motivated by the recent success of applying RL with Verifiable Rewards to domains like math and coding, we propose a general story-generation task (Next-Chapter Prediction) and a reward formulation (Verified Rewards via Completion Likelihood Improvement) that allows us to use an unlabeled book dataset as a learning signal for reasoning. We learn to reason over a story's condensed information and generate a detailed plan for the next chapter. Our reasoning is evaluated via the chapters it helps a story-generator create, and compared against non-trained and supervised finetuning (SFT) baselines. Pairwise human judgments reveal the chapters our learned reasoning produces are preferred across almost all metrics, and the effect is more pronounced in Scifi and Fantasy genres.

Leveraging mathematical Large Language Models (LLMs) for proof generation is a fundamental topic in LLMs research. We argue that the ability of current LLMs to prove statements largely depends on whether they have encountered the relevant proof process during training. This reliance limits their deeper understanding of mathematical theorems and related concepts. Inspired by the pedagogical method of "proof by counterexamples" commonly used in human mathematics education, our work aims to enhance LLMs' ability to conduct mathematical reasoning and proof through counterexamples. Specifically, we manually create a high-quality, university-level mathematical benchmark, CounterMATH, which requires LLMs to prove mathematical statements by providing counterexamples, thereby assessing their grasp of mathematical concepts. Additionally, we develop a data engineering framework to automatically obtain training data for further model improvement. Extensive experiments and detailed analyses demonstrate that CounterMATH is challenging, indicating that LLMs, such as OpenAI o1, have insufficient counterexample-driven proof capabilities. Moreover, our exploration into model training reveals that strengthening LLMs' counterexample-driven conceptual reasoning abilities is crucial for improving their overall mathematical capabilities. We believe that our work offers new perspectives on the community of mathematical LLMs.

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

The current large language models are mainly based on decode-only structure transformers, which have great in-context learning (ICL) capabilities. It is generally believed that the important foundation of its ICL capability is the induction heads mechanism, which requires at least two layers attention. In order to more efficiently implement the ability of the model's induction, we revisit the induction heads mechanism and proposed a KV shifting attention. We theoretically prove that the KV shifting attention reducing the model's requirements for the depth and width of the induction heads mechanism. Our experimental results demonstrate that KV shifting attention is beneficial to learning induction heads and language modeling, which lead to better performance or faster convergence from toy models to the pre-training models with more than 10 B parameters.

Inductive Reasoning (IR), the ability to summarize rules from examples and apply on new ones, has long been viewed as a primal ability for general intelligence and widely studied by cognitive science and AI researchers. Many benchmarks have been proposed to measure such ability for Large Language Models (LLMs); however, they focus on few-shot (usually <10) setting and lack evaluation for aggregating many pieces of information from long contexts. On the other hand, the ever-growing context length of LLMs have brought forth the novel paradigm of many-shot In-Context Learning (ICL), which addresses new tasks with hundreds to thousands of examples without expensive and inefficient fine-tuning. However, many-shot evaluations are mostly focused on classification (a very limited aspect of IR), and popular long-context LLM tasks such as Needle-In-A-Haystack (NIAH) seldom require complicated intelligence for integrating many pieces of information. To fix the issues from both worlds, we propose MIR-Bench, the first many-shot in-context inductive reasoning benchmark that asks LLM to induce output via input-output examples from underlying functions with diverse data format. Based on MIR-Bench, we study many novel problems for inductive reasoning and many-shot ICL, including robustness against erroneous shots and the effect of Chain-of-Thought (CoT), and acquired insightful findings.

Inspired by the principle of deliberate practice in human learning, we propose Deliberate Practice for Synthetic Data Generation (DP), a novel framework that improves sample efficiency through dynamic synthetic data generation. Prior work has shown that scaling synthetic data is inherently challenging, as naively adding new data leads to diminishing returns. To address this, pruning has been identified as a key mechanism for improving scaling, enabling models to focus on the most informative synthetic samples. Rather than generating a large dataset and pruning it afterward, DP efficiently approximates the direct generation of informative samples. We theoretically show how training on challenging, informative examples improves scaling laws and empirically validate that DP achieves better scaling performance with significantly fewer training samples and iterations. On ImageNet-100, DP generates 3.4x fewer samples and requires six times fewer iterations, while on ImageNet-1k, it generates 8x fewer samples with a 30 percent reduction in iterations, all while achieving superior performance compared to prior work.

When people reason about cause and effect, they often consider many competing "what if" scenarios before deciding which explanation fits best. Analogously, advanced language models capable of causal inference can consider multiple interventions and counterfactuals to judge the validity of causal claims. Crucially, this type of reasoning is less like a single calculation and more like an internal dialogue between alternative hypotheses. In this paper, we make this dialogue explicit through a dual-agent debate framework where one model provides a structured causal inference, and the other critically examines this reasoning for logical flaws. When disagreements arise, agents attempt to persuade each other, challenging each other's logic and revising their conclusions until they converge on a mutually agreed answer. To take advantage of this deliberative process, we specifically use reasoning language models, whose strengths in both causal inference and adversarial debate remain under-explored relative to standard large language models. We evaluate our approach on the CLadder dataset, a benchmark linking natural language questions to formally defined causal graphs across all three rungs of Pearl's ladder of causation. With Qwen3 and DeepSeek-R1 as debater agents, we demonstrate that multi-agent debate improves DeepSeek-R1's overall accuracy in causal inference from 78.03% to 87.45%, with the counterfactual category specifically improving from 67.94% to 80.04% accuracy. Similarly, Qwen3's overall accuracy improves from 84.16% to 89.41%, and counterfactual questions from 71.53% to 80.35%, showing that strong models can still benefit greatly from debate with weaker agents. Our results highlight the potential of reasoning models as building blocks for multi-agent systems in causal inference, and demonstrate the importance of diverse perspectives in causal problem-solving.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained to imitate humans to explain human decisions. However, do LLMs explain themselves? Can they help humans build mental models of how LLMs process different inputs? To answer these questions, we propose to evaluate counterfactual simulatability of natural language explanations: whether an explanation can enable humans to precisely infer the model's outputs on diverse counterfactuals of the explained input. For example, if a model answers "yes" to the input question "Can eagles fly?" with the explanation "all birds can fly", then humans would infer from the explanation that it would also answer "yes" to the counterfactual input "Can penguins fly?". If the explanation is precise, then the model's answer should match humans' expectations. We implemented two metrics based on counterfactual simulatability: precision and generality. We generated diverse counterfactuals automatically using LLMs. We then used these metrics to evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) on two tasks: multi-hop factual reasoning and reward modeling. We found that LLM's explanations have low precision and that precision does not correlate with plausibility. Therefore, naively optimizing human approvals (e.g., RLHF) may not be a sufficient solution.

Counterfactual medical image generation enables clinicians to explore clinical hypotheses, such as predicting disease progression, facilitating their decision-making. While existing methods can generate visually plausible images from disease progression prompts, they produce silent predictions that lack interpretation to verify how the generation reflects the hypothesized progression -- a critical gap for medical applications that require traceable reasoning. In this paper, we propose Interpretable Counterfactual Generation (ICG), a novel task requiring the joint generation of counterfactual images that reflect the clinical hypothesis and interpretation texts that outline the visual changes induced by the hypothesis. To enable ICG, we present ICG-CXR, the first dataset pairing longitudinal medical images with hypothetical progression prompts and textual interpretations. We further introduce ProgEmu, an autoregressive model that unifies the generation of counterfactual images and textual interpretations. We demonstrate the superiority of ProgEmu in generating progression-aligned counterfactuals and interpretations, showing significant potential in enhancing clinical decision support and medical education. Project page: https://progemu.github.io.

How do we communicate with others to achieve our goals? We use our prior experience or advice from others, or construct a candidate utterance by predicting how it will be received. However, our experiences are limited and biased, and reasoning about potential outcomes can be difficult and cognitively challenging. In this paper, we explore how we can leverage Large Language Model (LLM) simulations to help us communicate better. We propose the Explore-Generate-Simulate (EGS) framework, which takes as input any scenario where an individual is communicating to an audience with a goal they want to achieve. EGS (1) explores the solution space by producing a diverse set of advice relevant to the scenario, (2) generates communication candidates conditioned on subsets of the advice, and (3) simulates the reactions from various audiences to determine both the best candidate and advice to use. We evaluate the framework on eight scenarios spanning the ten fundamental processes of interpersonal communication. For each scenario, we collect a dataset of human evaluations across candidates and baselines, and showcase that our framework's chosen candidate is preferred over popular generation mechanisms including Chain-of-Thought. We also find that audience simulations achieve reasonably high agreement with human raters across 5 of the 8 scenarios. Finally, we demonstrate the generality of our framework by applying it to real-world scenarios described by users on web forums. Through evaluations and demonstrations, we show that EGS enhances the effectiveness and outcomes of goal-oriented communication across a variety of situations, thus opening up new possibilities for the application of large language models in revolutionizing communication and decision-making processes.

Understanding and manipulating the causal generation mechanisms in language models is essential for controlling their behavior. Previous work has primarily relied on techniques such as representation surgery -- e.g., model ablations or manipulation of linear subspaces tied to specific concepts -- to intervene on these models. To understand the impact of interventions precisely, it is useful to examine counterfactuals -- e.g., how a given sentence would have appeared had it been generated by the model following a specific intervention. We highlight that counterfactual reasoning is conceptually distinct from interventions, as articulated in Pearl's causal hierarchy. Based on this observation, we propose a framework for generating true string counterfactuals by reformulating language models as Generalized Structural-equation. Models using the Gumbel-max trick. This allows us to model the joint distribution over original strings and their counterfactuals resulting from the same instantiation of the sampling noise. We develop an algorithm based on hindsight Gumbel sampling that allows us to infer the latent noise variables and generate counterfactuals of observed strings. Our experiments demonstrate that the approach produces meaningful counterfactuals while at the same time showing that commonly used intervention techniques have considerable undesired side effects.

In this paper, we demonstrate the feasibility of alterfactual explanations for black box image classifiers. Traditional explanation mechanisms from the field of Counterfactual Thinking are a widely-used paradigm for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), as they follow a natural way of reasoning that humans are familiar with. However, most common approaches from this field are based on communicating information about features or characteristics that are especially important for an AI's decision. However, to fully understand a decision, not only knowledge about relevant features is needed, but the awareness of irrelevant information also highly contributes to the creation of a user's mental model of an AI system. To this end, a novel approach for explaining AI systems called alterfactual explanations was recently proposed on a conceptual level. It is based on showing an alternative reality where irrelevant features of an AI's input are altered. By doing so, the user directly sees which input data characteristics can change arbitrarily without influencing the AI's decision. In this paper, we show for the first time that it is possible to apply this idea to black box models based on neural networks. To this end, we present a GAN-based approach to generate these alterfactual explanations for binary image classifiers. Further, we present a user study that gives interesting insights on how alterfactual explanations can complement counterfactual explanations.

Modern large language models (LLMs) employ various forms of logical inference, both implicitly and explicitly, when addressing reasoning tasks. Understanding how to optimally leverage these inference paradigms is critical for advancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities. This paper adopts an exploratory approach by introducing a controlled evaluation environment for analogical reasoning -- a fundamental cognitive task -- that is systematically parameterized across three dimensions: modality (textual, visual, symbolic), difficulty (easy, medium, hard), and task format (multiple-choice or free-text generation). We analyze the comparative dynamics of inductive, abductive, and deductive inference pipelines across these dimensions, and demonstrate that our findings generalize to broader in-context learning tasks. Additionally, we investigate advanced paradigms such as hypothesis selection, verification, and refinement, revealing their potential to scale up logical inference in LLM reasoning. This exploratory study provides a foundation for future research in enhancing LLM reasoning through systematic logical inference strategies.

Humans regularly engage in analogical thinking, relating personal experiences to current situations (X is analogous to Y because of Z). Analogical thinking allows humans to solve problems in creative ways, grasp difficult concepts, and articulate ideas more effectively. Can language models (LMs) do the same? To answer this question, we propose ANALOBENCH, a benchmark to determine analogical reasoning ability in LMs. Our benchmarking approach focuses on aspects of this ability that are common among humans: (i) recalling related experiences from a large amount of information, and (ii) applying analogical reasoning to complex and lengthy scenarios. We test a broad collection of proprietary models (e.g., GPT family, Claude V2) and open source models such as LLaMA2. As in prior results, scaling up LMs results in some performance boosts. Surprisingly, scale offers minimal gains when, (i) analogies involve lengthy scenarios, or (ii) recalling relevant scenarios from a large pool of information, a process analogous to finding a needle in a haystack. We hope these observations encourage further research in this field.

When a language model generates text, the selection of individual tokens might lead it down very different reasoning paths, making uncertainty difficult to quantify. In this work, we consider whether reasoning language models represent the alternate paths that they could take during generation. To test this hypothesis, we use hidden activations to control and predict a language model's uncertainty during chain-of-thought reasoning. In our experiments, we find a clear correlation between how uncertain a model is at different tokens, and how easily the model can be steered by controlling its activations. This suggests that activation interventions are most effective when there are alternate paths available to the model -- in other words, when it has not yet committed to a particular final answer. We also find that hidden activations can predict a model's future outcome distribution, demonstrating that models implicitly represent the space of possible paths.

Solving algebraic word problems requires executing a series of arithmetic operations---a program---to obtain a final answer. However, since programs can be arbitrarily complicated, inducing them directly from question-answer pairs is a formidable challenge. To make this task more feasible, we solve these problems by generating answer rationales, sequences of natural language and human-readable mathematical expressions that derive the final answer through a series of small steps. Although rationales do not explicitly specify programs, they provide a scaffolding for their structure via intermediate milestones. To evaluate our approach, we have created a new 100,000-sample dataset of questions, answers and rationales. Experimental results show that indirect supervision of program learning via answer rationales is a promising strategy for inducing arithmetic programs.

A dangerous assumption that can be made from prior work on the bias transfer hypothesis (BTH) is that biases do not transfer from pre-trained large language models (LLMs) to adapted models. We invalidate this assumption by studying the BTH in causal models under prompt adaptations, as prompting is an extremely popular and accessible adaptation strategy used in real-world applications. In contrast to prior work, we find that biases can transfer through prompting and that popular prompt-based mitigation methods do not consistently prevent biases from transferring. Specifically, the correlation between intrinsic biases and those after prompt adaptation remain moderate to strong across demographics and tasks -- for example, gender (rho >= 0.94) in co-reference resolution, and age (rho >= 0.98) and religion (rho >= 0.69) in question answering. Further, we find that biases remain strongly correlated when varying few-shot composition parameters, such as sample size, stereotypical content, occupational distribution and representational balance (rho >= 0.90). We evaluate several prompt-based debiasing strategies and find that different approaches have distinct strengths, but none consistently reduce bias transfer across models, tasks or demographics. These results demonstrate that correcting bias, and potentially improving reasoning ability, in intrinsic models may prevent propagation of biases to downstream tasks.

Despite the increasing effectiveness of language models, their reasoning capabilities remain underdeveloped. In particular, causal reasoning through counterfactual question answering is lacking. This work aims to bridge this gap. We first derive novel metrics that balance accuracy in factual and counterfactual questions, capturing a more complete view of the reasoning abilities of language models than traditional factual-only based metrics. Second, we propose several fine-tuning approaches that aim to elicit better reasoning mechanisms, in the sense of the proposed metrics. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the fine-tuned language models in a variety of realistic scenarios. In particular, we investigate to what extent our fine-tuning approaches systemically achieve better generalization with respect to the base models in several problems that require, among others, inductive and deductive reasoning capabilities.

The traditional i.i.d.-based learning paradigm faces inherent challenges in addressing causal relationships, which has become increasingly evident with the rise of applications in causal representation learning. Our understanding of causality naturally requires a perspective as the creator rather than observer, as the ``what...if'' questions only hold within the possible world we conceive. The traditional perspective limits capturing dynamic causal outcomes and leads to compensatory efforts such as the reliance on hidden confounders. This paper lays the groundwork for the new perspective, which enables the relation-first modeling paradigm for causality. Also, it introduces the Relation-Indexed Representation Learning (RIRL) as a practical implementation, supported by experiments that validate its efficacy.

To augment language models with the ability to reason, researchers usually prompt or finetune them to produce chain of thought reasoning steps before producing the final answer. However, although people use natural language to reason effectively, it may be that LMs could reason more effectively with some intermediate computation that is not in natural language. In this work, we explore an alternative reasoning approach: instead of explicitly producing the chain of thought reasoning steps, we use the language model's internal hidden states to perform implicit reasoning. The implicit reasoning steps are distilled from a teacher model trained on explicit chain-of-thought reasoning, and instead of doing reasoning "horizontally" by producing intermediate words one-by-one, we distill it such that the reasoning happens "vertically" among the hidden states in different layers. We conduct experiments on a multi-digit multiplication task and a grade school math problem dataset and find that this approach enables solving tasks previously not solvable without explicit chain-of-thought, at a speed comparable to no chain-of-thought.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

Modeling semantic plausibility requires commonsense knowledge about the world and has been used as a testbed for exploring various knowledge representations. Previous work has focused specifically on modeling physical plausibility and shown that distributional methods fail when tested in a supervised setting. At the same time, distributional models, namely large pretrained language models, have led to improved results for many natural language understanding tasks. In this work, we show that these pretrained language models are in fact effective at modeling physical plausibility in the supervised setting. We therefore present the more difficult problem of learning to model physical plausibility directly from text. We create a training set by extracting attested events from a large corpus, and we provide a baseline for training on these attested events in a self-supervised manner and testing on a physical plausibility task. We believe results could be further improved by injecting explicit commonsense knowledge into a distributional model.

Retrieval-Augmented-Generation and Gener-ation-Augmented-Generation have been proposed to enhance the knowledge required for question answering over Large Language Models (LLMs). However, the former depends on external resources, and both require incorporating the explicit documents into the context, which results in longer contexts that lead to more resource consumption. Recent works indicate that LLMs have modeled rich knowledge, albeit not effectively triggered or activated. Inspired by this, we propose a novel knowledge-augmented framework, Imagination-Augmented-Generation (IAG), which simulates the human capacity to compensate for knowledge deficits while answering questions solely through imagination, without relying on external resources. Guided by IAG, we propose an imagine richer context method for question answering (IMcQA), which obtains richer context through the following two modules: explicit imagination by generating a short dummy document with long context compress and implicit imagination with HyperNetwork for generating adapter weights. Experimental results on three datasets demonstrate that IMcQA exhibits significant advantages in both open-domain and closed-book settings, as well as in both in-distribution performance and out-of-distribution generalizations. Our code will be available at https://github.com/Xnhyacinth/IAG.

Recent developments, particularly OpenAI's O1 model, have demonstrated the remarkable potential of Large Language Models (LLMs) for complex reasoning tasks. Through analysis of O1's outputs and provided sample Chain-of-Thought (CoT) demonstrations, we observe that it approaches problem-solving in a distinctly human-like manner, systematically brainstorming ideas, testing hypotheses, verifying results, and planning comprehensive solutions. These sophisticated reasoning capabilities remain notably absent in other state-of-the-art language models. In this paper, we hypothesize that this performance gap stems from the limited availability of high-quality reasoning process data in current training sets. We demonstrate that by constructing a specialized dataset focused on explicit problem-solving workflows ("worked solutions"), we can elicit substantially improved planning capabilities from existing models. Additionally, we propose the Reasoning Enhancement Loop (REL), a method for generating synthetic worked solutions.

Large language models (LLMs) can perform complex reasoning by generating intermediate reasoning steps. Providing these steps for prompting demonstrations is called chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. CoT prompting has two major paradigms. One leverages a simple prompt like "Let's think step by step" to facilitate step-by-step thinking before answering a question. The other uses a few manual demonstrations one by one, each composed of a question and a reasoning chain that leads to an answer. The superior performance of the second paradigm hinges on the hand-crafting of task-specific demonstrations one by one. We show that such manual efforts may be eliminated by leveraging LLMs with the "Let's think step by step" prompt to generate reasoning chains for demonstrations one by one, i.e., let's think not just step by step, but also one by one. However, these generated chains often come with mistakes. To mitigate the effect of such mistakes, we find that diversity matters for automatically constructing demonstrations. We propose an automatic CoT prompting method: Auto-CoT. It samples questions with diversity and generates reasoning chains to construct demonstrations. On ten public benchmark reasoning tasks with GPT-3, Auto-CoT consistently matches or exceeds the performance of the CoT paradigm that requires manual designs of demonstrations. Code is available at https://github.com/amazon-research/auto-cot

Background: Recently, ChatGPT and similar generative AI models have attracted hundreds of millions of users and become part of the public discourse. Many believe that such models will disrupt society and will result in a significant change in the education system and information generation in the future. So far, this belief is based on either colloquial evidence or benchmarks from the owners of the models -- both lack scientific rigour. Objective: Through a large-scale study comparing human-written versus ChatGPT-generated argumentative student essays, we systematically assess the quality of the AI-generated content. Methods: A large corpus of essays was rated using standard criteria by a large number of human experts (teachers). We augment the analysis with a consideration of the linguistic characteristics of the generated essays. Results: Our results demonstrate that ChatGPT generates essays that are rated higher for quality than human-written essays. The writing style of the AI models exhibits linguistic characteristics that are different from those of the human-written essays, e.g., it is characterized by fewer discourse and epistemic markers, but more nominalizations and greater lexical diversity. Conclusions: Our results clearly demonstrate that models like ChatGPT outperform humans in generating argumentative essays. Since the technology is readily available for anyone to use, educators must act immediately. We must re-invent homework and develop teaching concepts that utilize these AI models in the same way as math utilized the calculator: teach the general concepts first and then use AI tools to free up time for other learning objectives.

When large language models are aligned via supervised fine-tuning, they may encounter new factual information that was not acquired through pre-training. It is often conjectured that this can teach the model the behavior of hallucinating factually incorrect responses, as the model is trained to generate facts that are not grounded in its pre-existing knowledge. In this work, we study the impact of such exposure to new knowledge on the capability of the fine-tuned model to utilize its pre-existing knowledge. To this end, we design a controlled setup, focused on closed-book QA, where we vary the proportion of the fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge. We demonstrate that large language models struggle to acquire new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, as fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge are learned significantly slower than those consistent with the model's knowledge. However, we also find that as the examples with new knowledge are eventually learned, they linearly increase the model's tendency to hallucinate. Taken together, our results highlight the risk in introducing new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, and support the view that large language models mostly acquire factual knowledge through pre-training, whereas fine-tuning teaches them to use it more efficiently.

In science and medicine, model interpretations may be reported as discoveries of natural phenomena or used to guide patient treatments. In such high-stakes tasks, false discoveries may lead investigators astray. These applications would therefore benefit from control over the finite-sample error rate of interpretations. We reframe black box model interpretability as a multiple hypothesis testing problem. The task is to discover "important" features by testing whether the model prediction is significantly different from what would be expected if the features were replaced with uninformative counterfactuals. We propose two testing methods: one that provably controls the false discovery rate but which is not yet feasible for large-scale applications, and an approximate testing method which can be applied to real-world data sets. In simulation, both tests have high power relative to existing interpretability methods. When applied to state-of-the-art vision and language models, the framework selects features that intuitively explain model predictions. The resulting explanations have the additional advantage that they are themselves easy to interpret.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) Prompting is a dominant paradigm in Large Language Models (LLMs) to enhance complex reasoning. It guides LLMs to present multi-step reasoning, rather than generating the final answer directly. However, CoT encounters difficulties when key information required for reasoning is implicit or missing. This occurs because CoT emphasizes the sequence of reasoning steps while overlooking the early extraction of essential information. We propose a pre-prompting method called Iterative Summarization Pre-Prompting (ISP^2) to refine LLM reasoning when key information is not explicitly provided. First, entities and their corresponding descriptions are extracted to form potential key information pairs. Next, we use a reliability rating to assess these pairs, then merge the two lowest-ranked pairs into a new entity description. This process is repeated until a unique key information pair is obtained. Finally, that pair, along with the original question, is fed into LLMs to produce the answer. Extensive experiments demonstrate a 7.1% improvement compared to existing methods. Unlike traditional prompting, ISP^2 adopts an inductive approach with pre-prompting, offering flexible integration into diverse reasoning frameworks. The code is available at https://github.com/zdhgreat/ISP-2.

When writing and talking, people sometimes pause to think. Although reasoning-focused works have often framed reasoning as a method of answering questions or completing agentic tasks, reasoning is implicit in almost all written text. For example, this applies to the steps not stated between the lines of a proof or to the theory of mind underlying a conversation. In the Self-Taught Reasoner (STaR, Zelikman et al. 2022), useful thinking is learned by inferring rationales from few-shot examples in question-answering and learning from those that lead to a correct answer. This is a highly constrained setting -- ideally, a language model could instead learn to infer unstated rationales in arbitrary text. We present Quiet-STaR, a generalization of STaR in which LMs learn to generate rationales at each token to explain future text, improving their predictions. We address key challenges, including 1) the computational cost of generating continuations, 2) the fact that the LM does not initially know how to generate or use internal thoughts, and 3) the need to predict beyond individual next tokens. To resolve these, we propose a tokenwise parallel sampling algorithm, using learnable tokens indicating a thought's start and end, and an extended teacher-forcing technique. Encouragingly, generated rationales disproportionately help model difficult-to-predict tokens and improve the LM's ability to directly answer difficult questions. In particular, after continued pretraining of an LM on a corpus of internet text with Quiet-STaR, we find zero-shot improvements on GSM8K (5.9%rightarrow10.9%) and CommonsenseQA (36.3%rightarrow47.2%) and observe a perplexity improvement of difficult tokens in natural text. Crucially, these improvements require no fine-tuning on these tasks. Quiet-STaR marks a step towards LMs that can learn to reason in a more general and scalable way.

A common and effective means for improving language model capabilities involves finetuning a ``student'' language model's parameters on generations from a more proficient ``teacher'' model. Termed ``synthetic data'', these generations are often produced before any student finetuning, but some work has considered generating new synthetic samples as training progresses. This paper studies and advocates for the latter case, where data are generated in an iterative, closed-loop fashion that is guided by the current state of the student model. For a fixed budget of generated samples, or a budget in terms of compute spent querying a teacher, we show that this curation of finetuning data affords improved student performance over static generation. Further, while there have been several LLM-specific methods proposed that operate in this regime, we find that simple, inexpensive selection criteria from the active learning literature tend to be most performant. We validate these claims across four mathematical and logical reasoning datasets using four different small language models.

Test-time compute allocation in large reasoning models (LRMs) is widely used and has applications in mathematical problem solving, code synthesis, and planning. Recent work has addressed this problem by scaling self-consistency and parallel thinking, adding generic ``thinking tokens'' and prompting models to re-read the question before answering. Unfortunately, these approaches either inject task-agnostic tokens or mandate heuristics that do not explain -- and often ignore -- the spontaneous repetition that many LRMs exhibit at the head of their internal chains. In contrast, we analyze and harness the model's tendency to restate the question, which we term the Echo of Prompt (EOP), as a front-loaded, compute-shaping mechanism. We formalize its probabilistic cost by casting echo removal as rejection-based conditioning and defining the Echo Likelihood Gap ΔL as a computable proxy. This provides the missing theoretical link that links early repetition to likelihood gains and downstream accuracy. However, it does not by itself specify how to exploit EOP. Consequently, we develop Echo-Distilled SFT (ED-SFT) to instill an ``echo-then-reason'' pattern through supervised finetuning, and Echoic Prompting (EP) to re-ground the model mid-trace without training. While promising, quantifying benefits beyond verbosity is non-trivial. Therefore, we conduct length and suffix-controlled likelihood analyses together with layer-wise attention studies, showing that EOP increases answer to answer-prefix attention in middle layers, consistent with an attention refocusing mechanism. We evaluate on GSM8K, MathQA, Hendrycks-MATH, AIME24, and MATH-500 under identical decoding settings and budgets, and find consistent gains over baselines. Code is available at https://github.com/hhh2210/echoes-as-anchors.

Explanatory inference is the creation and evaluation of hypotheses that provide explanations, and is sometimes known as abduction or abductive inference. Generative AI is a new set of artificial intelligence models based on novel algorithms for generating text, images, and sounds. This paper proposes a set of benchmarks for assessing the ability of AI programs to perform explanatory inference, and uses them to determine the extent to which ChatGPT, a leading generative AI model, is capable of making explanatory inferences. Tests on the benchmarks reveal that ChatGPT performs creative and evaluative inferences in many domains, although it is limited to verbal and visual modalities. Claims that ChatGPT and similar models are incapable of explanation, understanding, causal reasoning, meaning, and creativity are rebutted.

Although much research has focused on AI explanations to support decisions in complex information-seeking tasks such as fact-checking, the role of evidence is surprisingly under-researched. In our study, we systematically varied explanation type, AI prediction certainty, and correctness of AI system advice for non-expert participants, who evaluated the veracity of claims and AI system predictions. Participants were provided the option of easily inspecting the underlying evidence. We found that participants consistently relied on evidence to validate AI claims across all experimental conditions. When participants were presented with natural language explanations, evidence was used less frequently although they relied on it when these explanations seemed insufficient or flawed. Qualitative data suggests that participants attempted to infer evidence source reliability, despite source identities being deliberately omitted. Our results demonstrate that evidence is a key ingredient in how people evaluate the reliability of information presented by an AI system and, in combination with natural language explanations, offers valuable support for decision-making. Further research is urgently needed to understand how evidence ought to be presented and how people engage with it in practice.

Large language models (LLMs) have revolutionized many areas (e.g. natural language processing, software engineering, etc.) by achieving state-of-the-art performance on extensive downstream tasks. Aiming to achieve robust and general artificial intelligence, there has been a surge of interest in investigating the reasoning ability of the LLMs. Whereas the textual and numerical reasoning benchmarks adopted by previous works are rather shallow and simple, it is hard to conclude that the LLMs possess strong reasoning ability by merely achieving positive results on these benchmarks. Recent efforts have demonstrated that the LLMs are poor at solving sequential decision-making problems that require common-sense planning by evaluating their performance on the reinforcement learning benchmarks. In this work, we conduct an in-depth assessment of several state-of-the-art LLMs' reasoning ability based on the inductive logic programming (ILP) benchmark, which is broadly recognized as a representative and challenging measurement for evaluating logic program induction/synthesis systems as it requires inducing strict cause-effect logic to achieve robust deduction on independent and identically distributed (IID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) test samples. Our evaluations illustrate that compared with the neural program induction systems which are much smaller in model size, the state-of-the-art LLMs are much poorer in terms of reasoning ability by achieving much lower performance and generalization using either natural language prompting or truth-value matrix prompting.

Modern generative models demonstrate impressive capabilities, likely stemming from an ability to identify and manipulate abstract concepts underlying their training data. However, fundamental questions remain: what determines the concepts a model learns, the order in which it learns them, and its ability to manipulate those concepts? To address these questions, we propose analyzing a model's learning dynamics via a framework we call the concept space, where each axis represents an independent concept underlying the data generating process. By characterizing learning dynamics in this space, we identify how the speed at which a concept is learned, and hence the order of concept learning, is controlled by properties of the data we term concept signal. Further, we observe moments of sudden turns in the direction of a model's learning dynamics in concept space. Surprisingly, these points precisely correspond to the emergence of hidden capabilities, i.e., where latent interventions show the model possesses the capability to manipulate a concept, but these capabilities cannot yet be elicited via naive input prompting. While our results focus on synthetically defined toy datasets, we hypothesize a general claim on emergence of hidden capabilities may hold: generative models possess latent capabilities that emerge suddenly and consistently during training, though a model might not exhibit these capabilities under naive input prompting.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in language generation, understanding, and few-shot learning in recent years. An extensive body of work has explored how their performance may be further improved through the tools of prompting, ranging from verification, self-consistency, or intermediate scratchpads. In this paper, we present a complementary approach to improve language responses where multiple language model instances propose and debate their individual responses and reasoning processes over multiple rounds to arrive at a common final answer. Our findings indicate that this approach significantly enhances mathematical and strategic reasoning across a number of tasks. We also demonstrate that our approach improves the factual validity of generated content, reducing fallacious answers and hallucinations that contemporary models are prone to. Our approach may be directly applied to existing black-box models and uses identical procedure and prompts for all tasks we investigate. Overall, our findings suggest that such "society of minds" approach has the potential to significantly advance the capabilities of LLMs and pave the way for further breakthroughs in language generation and understanding.

We present Multi-expert Prompting, a novel enhancement of ExpertPrompting (Xu et al., 2023), designed to improve the large language model (LLM) generation. Specifically, it guides an LLM to fulfill an input instruction by simulating multiple experts, aggregating their responses, and selecting the best among individual and aggregated responses. This process is performed in a single chain of thoughts through our seven carefully designed subtasks derived from the Nominal Group Technique (Ven and Delbecq, 1974), a well-established decision-making framework. Our evaluations demonstrate that Multi-expert Prompting significantly outperforms ExpertPrompting and comparable baselines in enhancing the truthfulness, factuality, informativeness, and usefulness of responses while reducing toxicity and hurtfulness. It further achieves state-of-the-art truthfulness by outperforming the best baseline by 8.69% with ChatGPT. Multi-expert Prompting is efficient, explainable, and highly adaptable to diverse scenarios, eliminating the need for manual prompt construction.

Producing an artificial general intelligence (AGI) has been an elusive goal in artificial intelligence (AI) research for some time. An AGI would have the capability, like a human, to be exposed to a new problem domain, learn about it and then use reasoning processes to make decisions. While AI techniques have been used across a wide variety of problem domains, an AGI would require an AI that could reason beyond its programming and training. This paper presents a small step towards producing an AGI. It describes a mechanism for an AI to learn about and develop reasoning pathways to make decisions in an a priori unknown domain. It combines a classical AI technique, the expert system, with a its modern adaptation - the gradient descent trained expert system (GDTES) - and utilizes generative artificial intelligence (GAI) to create a network and training data set for this system. These can be created from available sources or may draw upon knowledge incorporated in a GAI's own pre-trained model. The learning process in GDTES is used to optimize the AI's decision-making. While this approach does not meet the standards that many have defined for an AGI, it provides a somewhat similar capability, albeit one which requires a learning process before use.

Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) has rapidly advanced the field of computer vision by enabling machines to create and interpret visual data with unprecedented sophistication. This transformation builds upon a foundation of generative models to produce realistic images, videos, and 3D/4D content. Conventional generative models primarily focus on visual fidelity while often neglecting the physical plausibility of the generated content. This gap limits their effectiveness in applications that require adherence to real-world physical laws, such as robotics, autonomous systems, and scientific simulations. As generative models evolve to increasingly integrate physical realism and dynamic simulation, their potential to function as "world simulators" expands. Therefore, the field of physics-aware generation in computer vision is rapidly growing, calling for a comprehensive survey to provide a structured analysis of current efforts. To serve this purpose, the survey presents a systematic review, categorizing methods based on how they incorporate physical knowledge, either through explicit simulation or implicit learning. It also analyzes key paradigms, discusses evaluation protocols, and identifies future research directions. By offering a comprehensive overview, this survey aims to help future developments in physically grounded generation for computer vision. The reviewed papers are summarized at https://tinyurl.com/Physics-Aware-Generation.

A recent paper (van Rooij et al. 2024) claims to have proved that achieving human-like intelligence using learning from data is intractable in a complexity-theoretic sense. We identify that the proof relies on an unjustified assumption about the distribution of (input, output) pairs to the system. We briefly discuss that assumption in the context of two fundamental barriers to repairing the proof: the need to precisely define ``human-like," and the need to account for the fact that a particular machine learning system will have particular inductive biases that are key to the analysis.

The power of DNNs relies heavily on the quantity and quality of training data. However, collecting and annotating data on a large scale is often expensive and time-consuming. To address this issue, we explore a new task, termed dataset expansion, aimed at expanding a ready-to-use small dataset by automatically creating new labeled samples. To this end, we present a Guided Imagination Framework (GIF) that leverages cutting-edge generative models like DALL-E2 and Stable Diffusion (SD) to "imagine" and create informative new data from the input seed data. Specifically, GIF conducts data imagination by optimizing the latent features of the seed data in the semantically meaningful space of the prior model, resulting in the creation of photo-realistic images with new content. To guide the imagination towards creating informative samples for model training, we introduce two key criteria, i.e., class-maintained information boosting and sample diversity promotion. These criteria are verified to be essential for effective dataset expansion: GIF-SD obtains 13.5% higher model accuracy on natural image datasets than unguided expansion with SD. With these essential criteria, GIF successfully expands small datasets in various scenarios, boosting model accuracy by 36.9% on average over six natural image datasets and by 13.5% on average over three medical datasets. The source code is available at https://github.com/Vanint/DatasetExpansion.

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

Many recent studies have found evidence for emergent reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs), but debate persists concerning the robustness of these capabilities, and the extent to which they depend on structured reasoning mechanisms. To shed light on these issues, we study the internal mechanisms that support abstract reasoning in LLMs. We identify an emergent symbolic architecture that implements abstract reasoning via a series of three computations. In early layers, symbol abstraction heads convert input tokens to abstract variables based on the relations between those tokens. In intermediate layers, symbolic induction heads perform sequence induction over these abstract variables. Finally, in later layers, retrieval heads predict the next token by retrieving the value associated with the predicted abstract variable. These results point toward a resolution of the longstanding debate between symbolic and neural network approaches, suggesting that emergent reasoning in neural networks depends on the emergence of symbolic mechanisms.

AI models like GPT-5 are an increasingly valuable tool for scientists, but many remain unaware of the capabilities of frontier AI. We present a collection of short case studies in which GPT-5 produced new, concrete steps in ongoing research across mathematics, physics, astronomy, computer science, biology, and materials science. In these examples, the authors highlight how AI accelerated their work, and where it fell short; where expert time was saved, and where human input was still key. We document the interactions of the human authors with GPT-5, as guiding examples of fruitful collaboration with AI. Of note, this paper includes four new results in mathematics (carefully verified by the human authors), underscoring how GPT-5 can help human mathematicians settle previously unsolved problems. These contributions are modest in scope but profound in implication, given the rate at which frontier AI is progressing.

As the application space of language models continues to evolve, a natural question to ask is how we can quickly adapt models to new tasks. We approach this classic question from a continual learning perspective, in which we aim to continue fine-tuning models trained on past tasks on new tasks, with the goal of "transferring" relevant knowledge. However, this strategy also runs the risk of doing more harm than good, i.e., negative transfer. In this paper, we construct a new benchmark of task sequences that target different possible transfer scenarios one might face, such as a sequence of tasks with high potential of positive transfer, high potential for negative transfer, no expected effect, or a mixture of each. An ideal learner should be able to maximally exploit information from all tasks that have any potential for positive transfer, while also avoiding the negative effects of any distracting tasks that may confuse it. We then propose a simple, yet effective, learner that satisfies many of our desiderata simply by leveraging a selective strategy for initializing new models from past task checkpoints. Still, limitations remain, and we hope this benchmark can help the community to further build and analyze such learners.

In recent years, large pre-trained language models (LLMs) have demonstrated the ability to follow instructions and perform novel tasks from a few examples. The possibility to parameterise an LLM through such in-context examples widens their capability at a much lower cost than finetuning. We extend this line of reasoning and present a method which further expands the capabilities of an LLM by embedding it within an algorithm or program. To demonstrate the benefits of this approach, we present an illustrative example of evidence-supported question-answering. We obtain a 6.4\% improvement over the chain of thought baseline through a more algorithmic approach without any finetuning. Furthermore, we highlight recent work from this perspective and discuss the advantages and disadvantages in comparison to the standard approaches.

Abductive reasoning is inference to the most plausible explanation. For example, if Jenny finds her house in a mess when she returns from work, and remembers that she left a window open, she can hypothesize that a thief broke into her house and caused the mess, as the most plausible explanation. While abduction has long been considered to be at the core of how people interpret and read between the lines in natural language (Hobbs et al., 1988), there has been relatively little research in support of abductive natural language inference and generation. We present the first study that investigates the viability of language-based abductive reasoning. We introduce a challenge dataset, ART, that consists of over 20k commonsense narrative contexts and 200k explanations. Based on this dataset, we conceptualize two new tasks -- (i) Abductive NLI: a multiple-choice question answering task for choosing the more likely explanation, and (ii) Abductive NLG: a conditional generation task for explaining given observations in natural language. On Abductive NLI, the best model achieves 68.9% accuracy, well below human performance of 91.4%. On Abductive NLG, the current best language generators struggle even more, as they lack reasoning capabilities that are trivial for humans. Our analysis leads to new insights into the types of reasoning that deep pre-trained language models fail to perform--despite their strong performance on the related but more narrowly defined task of entailment NLI--pointing to interesting avenues for future research.

We resolve a $1000 Erdős prize problem, complete with formal verification generated by a large language model. In over a dozen papers, beginning in 1976 and spanning two decades, Paul Erdős repeatedly posed one of his "favourite" conjectures: every finite Sidon set can be extended to a finite perfect difference set. We establish that {1, 2, 4, 8, 13} is a counterexample to this conjecture. During the preparation of this paper, we discovered that although this problem was presumed to be open for half a century, Marshall Hall, Jr. published a different counterexample three decades before Erdős first posed the problem. With a healthy skepticism of this apparent oversight, and out of an abundance of caution, we used ChatGPT to vibe code a Lean proof of both Hall's and our counterexamples.

Thinking about the future is one of the important activities that people do in daily life. Futurists also pay a lot of effort into figuring out possible scenarios for the future. We argue that the exploration of this direction is still in an early stage in the NLP research. To this end, we propose three argument generation tasks in the financial application scenario. Our experimental results show these tasks are still big challenges for representative generation models. Based on our empirical results, we further point out several unresolved issues and challenges in this research direction.

In-context learning is a powerful emergent ability in transformer models. Prior work in mechanistic interpretability has identified a circuit element that may be critical for in-context learning -- the induction head (IH), which performs a match-and-copy operation. During training of large transformers on natural language data, IHs emerge around the same time as a notable phase change in the loss. Despite the robust evidence for IHs and this interesting coincidence with the phase change, relatively little is known about the diversity and emergence dynamics of IHs. Why is there more than one IH, and how are they dependent on each other? Why do IHs appear all of a sudden, and what are the subcircuits that enable them to emerge? We answer these questions by studying IH emergence dynamics in a controlled setting by training on synthetic data. In doing so, we develop and share a novel optogenetics-inspired causal framework for modifying activations throughout training. Using this framework, we delineate the diverse and additive nature of IHs. By clamping subsets of activations throughout training, we then identify three underlying subcircuits that interact to drive IH formation, yielding the phase change. Furthermore, these subcircuits shed light on data-dependent properties of formation, such as phase change timing, already showing the promise of this more in-depth understanding of subcircuits that need to "go right" for an induction head.

The ability to recognize analogies is fundamental to human cognition. Existing benchmarks to test word analogy do not reveal the underneath process of analogical reasoning of neural models. Holding the belief that models capable of reasoning should be right for the right reasons, we propose a first-of-its-kind Explainable Knowledge-intensive Analogical Reasoning benchmark (E-KAR). Our benchmark consists of 1,655 (in Chinese) and 1,251 (in English) problems sourced from the Civil Service Exams, which require intensive background knowledge to solve. More importantly, we design a free-text explanation scheme to explain whether an analogy should be drawn, and manually annotate them for each and every question and candidate answer. Empirical results suggest that this benchmark is very challenging for some state-of-the-art models for both explanation generation and analogical question answering tasks, which invites further research in this area.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

Procedural planning, which entails decomposing a high-level goal into a sequence of temporally ordered steps, is an important yet intricate task for machines. It involves integrating common-sense knowledge to reason about complex contextualized situations that are often counterfactual, e.g. "scheduling a doctor's appointment without a phone". While current approaches show encouraging results using large language models (LLMs), they are hindered by drawbacks such as costly API calls and reproducibility issues. In this paper, we advocate planning using smaller language models. We present PlaSma, a novel two-pronged approach to endow small language models with procedural knowledge and (counterfactual) planning capabilities. More concretely, we develop symbolic procedural knowledge distillation to enhance the implicit knowledge in small language models and an inference-time algorithm to facilitate more structured and accurate reasoning. In addition, we introduce a novel task, Counterfactual Planning, that requires a revision of a plan to cope with a counterfactual situation. In both the original and counterfactual setting, we show that orders-of-magnitude smaller models (770M-11B parameters) can compete and often surpass their larger teacher models' capabilities.

Although the existing causal inference literature focuses on the forward-looking perspective by estimating effects of causes, the backward-looking perspective can provide insights into causes of effects. In backward-looking causal inference, the probability of necessity measures the probability that a certain event is caused by the treatment given the observed treatment and outcome. Most existing results focus on binary outcomes. Motivated by applications with ordinal outcomes, we propose a general definition of the probability of necessity. However, identifying the probability of necessity is challenging because it involves the joint distribution of the potential outcomes. We propose a novel assumption of monotonic incremental treatment effect to identify the probability of necessity with ordinal outcomes. We also discuss the testable implications of this key identification assumption. When it fails, we derive explicit formulas of the sharp large-sample bounds on the probability of necessity.

Counterfactual reasoning, a hallmark of intelligence, consists of three steps: inferring latent variables from observations (abduction), constructing alternatives (interventions), and predicting their outcomes (prediction). This skill is essential for advancing LLMs' causal understanding and expanding their applications in high-stakes domains such as scientific research. However, existing efforts in assessing LLM's counterfactual reasoning capabilities tend to skip the abduction step, effectively reducing to interventional reasoning and leading to overestimation of LLM performance. To address this, we introduce executable counterfactuals, a novel framework that operationalizes causal reasoning through code and math problems. Our framework explicitly requires all three steps of counterfactual reasoning and enables scalable synthetic data creation with varying difficulty, creating a frontier for evaluating and improving LLM's reasoning. Our results reveal substantial drop in accuracy (25-40%) from interventional to counterfactual reasoning for SOTA models like o4-mini and Claude-4-Sonnet. To address this gap, we construct a training set comprising counterfactual code problems having if-else condition and test on out-of-domain code structures (e.g. having while-loop); we also test whether a model trained on code would generalize to counterfactual math word problems. While supervised finetuning on stronger models' reasoning traces improves in-domain performance of Qwen models, it leads to a decrease in accuracy on OOD tasks such as counterfactual math problems. In contrast, reinforcement learning induces the core cognitive behaviors and generalizes to new domains, yielding gains over the base model on both code (improvement of 1.5x-2x) and math problems. Analysis of the reasoning traces reinforces these findings and highlights the promise of RL for improving LLMs' counterfactual reasoning.

Recent advances in large language models have been driven by reinforcement learning (RL)-style post-training, which improves reasoning by optimizing model outputs based on reward or preference signals. GRPO-style approaches implement this by using self-generated samples labeled by an outcome-based verifier. However, these methods depend heavily on the model's initial ability to produce positive samples. They primarily refine what the model already knows (distribution sharpening) rather than enabling the model to solve problems where it initially fails. This limitation is especially problematic in early-stage RL training and on challenging reasoning tasks, where positive samples are unlikely to be generated. To unlock reasoning ability in such settings, the model must explore new reasoning trajectories beyond its current output distribution. Such exploration requires access to sufficiently good positive samples to guide the learning. While expert demonstrations seem like a natural solution, we find that they are often ineffective in RL post-training. Instead, we identify two key properties of effective positive samples: they should (1) be likely under the current policy, and (2) increase the model's likelihood of predicting the correct answer. Based on these insights, we propose Self-Explanation Policy Optimization (ExPO)-a simple and modular framework that generates such samples by conditioning on the ground-truth answer. ExPO enables efficient exploration and guides the model to produce reasoning trajectories more aligned with its policy than expert-written CoTs, while ensuring higher quality than its own (incorrect) samples. Experiments show that ExPO improves both learning efficiency and final performance on reasoning benchmarks, surpassing expert-demonstration-based methods in challenging settings such as MATH level-5, where the model initially struggles the most.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Being able to provide explanations for a model's decision has become a central requirement for the development, deployment, and adoption of machine learning models. However, we are yet to understand what explanation methods can and cannot do. How do upstream factors such as data, model prediction, hyperparameters, and random initialization influence downstream explanations? While previous work raised concerns that explanations (E) may have little relationship with the prediction (Y), there is a lack of conclusive study to quantify this relationship. Our work borrows tools from causal inference to systematically assay this relationship. More specifically, we study the relationship between E and Y by measuring the treatment effect when intervening on their causal ancestors, i.e., on hyperparameters and inputs used to generate saliency-based Es or Ys. Our results suggest that the relationships between E and Y is far from ideal. In fact, the gap between 'ideal' case only increase in higher-performing models -- models that are likely to be deployed. Our work is a promising first step towards providing a quantitative measure of the relationship between E and Y, which could also inform the future development of methods for E with a quantitative metric.

Our goal, in the context of open-domain textual question-answering (QA), is to explain answers by showing the line of reasoning from what is known to the answer, rather than simply showing a fragment of textual evidence (a "rationale'"). If this could be done, new opportunities for understanding and debugging the system's reasoning become possible. Our approach is to generate explanations in the form of entailment trees, namely a tree of multipremise entailment steps from facts that are known, through intermediate conclusions, to the hypothesis of interest (namely the question + answer). To train a model with this skill, we created ENTAILMENTBANK, the first dataset to contain multistep entailment trees. Given a hypothesis (question + answer), we define three increasingly difficult explanation tasks: generate a valid entailment tree given (a) all relevant sentences (b) all relevant and some irrelevant sentences, or (c) a corpus. We show that a strong language model can partially solve these tasks, in particular when the relevant sentences are included in the input (e.g., 35% of trees for (a) are perfect), and with indications of generalization to other domains. This work is significant as it provides a new type of dataset (multistep entailments) and baselines, offering a new avenue for the community to generate richer, more systematic explanations.

Despite the advancements in in-context learning (ICL) for large language models (LLMs), current research centers on specific prompt engineering, such as demonstration selection, with the expectation that a single iteration of demonstrations processing can generalize effectively to a given test sample. However, this perspective overlooks the potential benefits derived from multiple iterations involving demonstrations, a practice aligning more closely with the iterative decision-making process exhibited by humans, who often learn through analogy. In this study, we introduce a novel two-stage framework to boost ICL in LLMs. Specifically, our framework delineates the ICL process into two distinct stages: Deep-Thinking and test stages. The Deep-Thinking stage incorporates a unique attention mechanism, i.e., iterative enhanced attention, which enables multiple rounds of information accumulation. This mechanism operates by manipulating the Key-Value matrices without training, fostering enhanced understanding capabilities in LLMs by thinking demonstrations multiple times. We evaluated Deep-Thinking across a range of benchmarks and LLMs, showing its superior performance over vanilla ICL methods and its effectiveness in challenging tasks where demonstration selection is infeasible.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities in solving mathematical reasoning tasks, leveraging Chain-of-Thought (CoT) data as a vital component in guiding answer generation. Current paradigms typically generate CoT and answers directly for a given problem, diverging from human problem-solving strategies to some extent. Humans often solve problems by recalling analogous cases and leveraging their solutions to reason about the current task. Inspired by this cognitive process, we propose MetaLadder, a novel framework that explicitly prompts LLMs to recall and reflect on meta-problems, those structurally or semantically analogous problems, alongside their CoT solutions before addressing the target problem. Additionally, we introduce a problem-restating mechanism to enhance the model's comprehension of the target problem by regenerating the original question, which further improves reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the model can achieve reasoning transfer from analogical problems, mimicking human-like "learning from examples" and generalization abilities. Extensive experiments on mathematical benchmarks demonstrate that our MetaLadder significantly boosts LLMs' problem-solving accuracy, largely outperforming standard CoT-based methods (10.3\% accuracy gain) and other methods. Our code and data has been released at https://github.com/LHL3341/MetaLadder.

We present IBR, an Iterative Backward Reasoning model to solve the proof generation tasks on rule-based Question Answering (QA), where models are required to reason over a series of textual rules and facts to find out the related proof path and derive the final answer. We handle the limitations of existed works in two folds: 1) enhance the interpretability of reasoning procedures with detailed tracking, by predicting nodes and edges in the proof path iteratively backward from the question; 2) promote the efficiency and accuracy via reasoning on the elaborate representations of nodes and history paths, without any intermediate texts that may introduce external noise during proof generation. There are three main modules in IBR, QA and proof strategy prediction to obtain the answer and offer guidance for the following procedure; parent node prediction to determine a node in the existing proof that a new child node will link to; child node prediction to find out which new node will be added to the proof. Experiments on both synthetic and paraphrased datasets demonstrate that IBR has better in-domain performance as well as cross-domain transferability than several strong baselines. Our code and models are available at https://github.com/find-knowledge/IBR .

Machine learning plays a role in many deployed decision systems, often in ways that are difficult or impossible to understand by human stakeholders. Explaining, in a human-understandable way, the relationship between the input and output of machine learning models is essential to the development of trustworthy machine learning based systems. A burgeoning body of research seeks to define the goals and methods of explainability in machine learning. In this paper, we seek to review and categorize research on counterfactual explanations, a specific class of explanation that provides a link between what could have happened had input to a model been changed in a particular way. Modern approaches to counterfactual explainability in machine learning draw connections to the established legal doctrine in many countries, making them appealing to fielded systems in high-impact areas such as finance and healthcare. Thus, we design a rubric with desirable properties of counterfactual explanation algorithms and comprehensively evaluate all currently proposed algorithms against that rubric. Our rubric provides easy comparison and comprehension of the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches and serves as an introduction to major research themes in this field. We also identify gaps and discuss promising research directions in the space of counterfactual explainability.

AI holds promise for transforming scientific processes, including hypothesis generation. Prior work on hypothesis generation can be broadly categorized into theory-driven and data-driven approaches. While both have proven effective in generating novel and plausible hypotheses, it remains an open question whether they can complement each other. To address this, we develop the first method that combines literature-based insights with data to perform LLM-powered hypothesis generation. We apply our method on five different datasets and demonstrate that integrating literature and data outperforms other baselines (8.97\% over few-shot, 15.75\% over literature-based alone, and 3.37\% over data-driven alone). Additionally, we conduct the first human evaluation to assess the utility of LLM-generated hypotheses in assisting human decision-making on two challenging tasks: deception detection and AI generated content detection. Our results show that human accuracy improves significantly by 7.44\% and 14.19\% on these tasks, respectively. These findings suggest that integrating literature-based and data-driven approaches provides a comprehensive and nuanced framework for hypothesis generation and could open new avenues for scientific inquiry.

The industry is rich in cases when we are required to make forecasting for large amounts of time series at once. However, we might be in a situation where we can not afford to train a separate model for each of them. Such issue in time series modeling remains without due attention. The remedy for this setting is the establishment of a foundation model. Such a model is expected to work in zero-shot and few-shot regimes. However, what should we take as a training dataset for such kind of model? Witnessing the benefits from the enrichment of NLP datasets with artificially-generated data, we might want to adopt their experience for time series. In contrast to natural language, the process of generation of synthetic time series data is even more favorable because it provides full control of series patterns, time horizons, and number of samples. In this work, we consider the essential question if it is advantageous to train a foundation model on synthetic data or it is better to utilize only a limited number of real-life examples. Our experiments are conducted only for regular time series and speak in favor of leveraging solely the real time series. Moreover, the choice of the proper source dataset strongly influences the performance during inference. When provided access even to a limited quantity of short time series data, employing it within a supervised framework yields more favorable results than training on a larger volume of synthetic data. The code for our experiments is publicly available on Github https://github.com/sb-ai-lab/synthesize_or_not.

"An idea is nothing more nor less than a new combination of old elements" (Young, J.W.). The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) and publicly available ChatGPT have marked a significant turning point in the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into people's everyday lives. This study explores the capability of LLMs in generating novel research ideas based on information from research papers. We conduct a thorough examination of 4 LLMs in five domains (e.g., Chemistry, Computer, Economics, Medical, and Physics). We found that the future research ideas generated by Claude-2 and GPT-4 are more aligned with the author's perspective than GPT-3.5 and Gemini. We also found that Claude-2 generates more diverse future research ideas than GPT-4, GPT-3.5, and Gemini 1.0. We further performed a human evaluation of the novelty, relevancy, and feasibility of the generated future research ideas. This investigation offers insights into the evolving role of LLMs in idea generation, highlighting both its capability and limitations. Our work contributes to the ongoing efforts in evaluating and utilizing language models for generating future research ideas. We make our datasets and codes publicly available.

We demonstrate LLM agent specification gaming by instructing models to win against a chess engine. We find reasoning models like o1 preview and DeepSeek-R1 will often hack the benchmark by default, while language models like GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet need to be told that normal play won't work to hack. We improve upon prior work like (Hubinger et al., 2024; Meinke et al., 2024; Weij et al., 2024) by using realistic task prompts and avoiding excess nudging. Our results suggest reasoning models may resort to hacking to solve difficult problems, as observed in OpenAI (2024)'s o1 Docker escape during cyber capabilities testing.