Daily Papers

Vision-language models (VLMs) adapted to the medical domain have shown strong performance on visual question answering benchmarks, yet their robustness against two critical failure modes, hallucination and sycophancy, remains poorly understood, particularly in combination. We evaluate six VLMs (three general-purpose, three medical-specialist) on three medical VQA datasets and uncover a grounding-sycophancy tradeoff: models with the lowest hallucination propensity are the most sycophantic, while the most pressure-resistant model hallucinates more than all medical-specialist models. To characterize this tradeoff, we propose three metrics: L-VASE, a logit-space reformulation of VASE that avoids its double-normalization; CCS, a confidence-calibrated sycophancy score that penalizes high-confidence capitulation; and Clinical Safety Index (CSI), a unified safety index that combines grounding, autonomy, and calibration via a geometric mean. Across 1,151 test cases, no model achieves a CSI above 0.35, indicating that none of the evaluated 7-8B parameter VLMs is simultaneously well-grounded and robust to social pressure. Our findings suggest that joint evaluation of both properties is necessary before these models can be considered for clinical use. Code is available at https://github.com/UTSA-VIRLab/AgreeOrRight

Large Language Models (LLMs) are expected to provide helpful and harmless responses, yet they often exhibit sycophancy--conforming to user beliefs regardless of factual accuracy or ethical soundness. Prior research on sycophancy has primarily focused on single-turn factual correctness, overlooking the dynamics of real-world interactions. In this work, we introduce SYCON Bench, a novel benchmark for evaluating sycophantic behavior in multi-turn, free-form conversational settings. Our benchmark measures how quickly a model conforms to the user (Turn of Flip) and how frequently it shifts its stance under sustained user pressure (Number of Flip). Applying SYCON Bench to 17 LLMs across three real-world scenarios, we find that sycophancy remains a prevalent failure mode. Our analysis shows that alignment tuning amplifies sycophantic behavior, whereas model scaling and reasoning optimization strengthen the model's ability to resist undesirable user views. Reasoning models generally outperform instruction-tuned models but often fail when they over-index on logical exposition instead of directly addressing the user's underlying beliefs. Finally, we evaluate four additional prompting strategies and demonstrate that adopting a third-person perspective reduces sycophancy by up to 63.8% in debate scenario. We release our code and data at https://github.com/JiseungHong/SYCON-Bench.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a popular technique for training high-quality AI assistants. However, RLHF may also encourage model responses that match user beliefs over truthful responses, a behavior known as sycophancy. We investigate the prevalence of sycophancy in RLHF-trained models and whether human preference judgements are responsible. We first demonstrate that five state-of-the-art AI assistants consistently exhibit sycophantic behavior across four varied free-form text-generation tasks. To understand if human preferences drive this broadly observed behavior of RLHF models, we analyze existing human preference data. We find that when a response matches a user's views, it is more likely to be preferred. Moreover, both humans and preference models (PMs) prefer convincingly-written sycophantic responses over correct ones a negligible fraction of the time. Optimizing model outputs against PMs also sometimes sacrifices truthfulness in favor of sycophancy. Overall, our results indicate that sycophancy is a general behavior of RLHF models, likely driven in part by human preference judgements favoring sycophantic responses.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a wide range of natural language processing tasks. However, their tendency to exhibit sycophantic behavior - excessively agreeing with or flattering users - poses significant risks to their reliability and ethical deployment. This paper provides a technical survey of sycophancy in LLMs, analyzing its causes, impacts, and potential mitigation strategies. We review recent work on measuring and quantifying sycophantic tendencies, examine the relationship between sycophancy and other challenges like hallucination and bias, and evaluate promising techniques for reducing sycophancy while maintaining model performance. Key approaches explored include improved training data, novel fine-tuning methods, post-deployment control mechanisms, and decoding strategies. We also discuss the broader implications of sycophancy for AI alignment and propose directions for future research. Our analysis suggests that mitigating sycophancy is crucial for developing more robust, reliable, and ethically-aligned language models.

Large language models internalize a structural trade-off between truthfulness and obsequious flattery, emerging from reward optimization that conflates helpfulness with polite submission. This latent bias, known as sycophancy, manifests as a preference for user agreement over principled reasoning. We introduce Beacon, a single-turn forced-choice benchmark that isolates this bias independent of conversational context, enabling precise measurement of the tension between factual accuracy and submissive bias. Evaluations across twelve state-of-the-art models reveal that sycophancy decomposes into stable linguistic and affective sub-biases, each scaling with model capacity. We further propose prompt-level and activation-level interventions that modulate these biases in opposing directions, exposing the internal geometry of alignment as a dynamic manifold between truthfulness and socially compliant judgment. Beacon reframes sycophancy as a measurable form of normative misgeneralization, providing a reproducible foundation for studying and mitigating alignment drift in large-scale generative systems.

Despite the remarkable capabilities of large language models, current training paradigms inadvertently foster sycophancy, i.e., the tendency of a model to agree with or reinforce user-provided information even when it's factually incorrect. To address this challenge, we introduce SMART (Sycophancy Mitigation through Adaptive Reasoning Trajectories), which reframes sycophancy as a reasoning optimization problem rather than an output alignment issue. SMART is a two-stage framework comprising: (1) Uncertainty-Aware Adaptive Monte Carlo Tree Search (UA-MCTS), which dynamically adjusts model exploration based on state-level uncertainty to collect high-quality, diverse reasoning trajectories alongside both stepwise progress and final outcome rewards; and (2) progress-based reinforcement learning, which fine-tunes the model using the collected trajectories and reward signals to reinforce effective reasoning patterns. Through extensive experiments, we show that SMART significantly reduces sycophantic behavior while preserving strong performance on out-of-distribution inputs and maintaining general capabilities. These results underscore the importance of optimizing internal reasoning mechanisms to build more truthful and aligned AI assistants.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently shown strong performance on mathematical benchmarks. At the same time, they are prone to hallucination and sycophancy, often providing convincing but flawed proofs for incorrect mathematical statements provided by users. This significantly limits the applicability of LLMs in theorem proving, as verification of these flawed proofs must be done manually by expert mathematicians. However, existing benchmarks that measure sycophancy in mathematics are limited: they focus solely on final-answer problems, rely on very simple and often contaminated datasets, and construct benchmark samples using synthetic modifications that create ill-posed questions rather than well-posed questions that are demonstrably false. To address these issues, we introduce BrokenMath, the first benchmark for evaluating sycophantic behavior in LLMs within the context of natural language theorem proving. BrokenMath is built from advanced 2025 competition problems, which are perturbed with an LLM to produce false statements and subsequently refined through expert review. Using an LLM-as-a-judge framework, we evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs and agentic systems and find that sycophancy is widespread, with the best model, GPT-5, producing sycophantic answers 29% of the time. We further investigate several mitigation strategies, including test-time interventions and supervised fine-tuning on curated sycophantic examples. These approaches substantially reduce, but do not eliminate, sycophantic behavior.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied in educational, clinical, and professional settings, but their tendency for sycophancy -- prioritizing user agreement over independent reasoning -- poses risks to reliability. This study introduces a framework to evaluate sycophantic behavior in ChatGPT-4o, Claude-Sonnet, and Gemini-1.5-Pro across AMPS (mathematics) and MedQuad (medical advice) datasets. Sycophantic behavior was observed in 58.19% of cases, with Gemini exhibiting the highest rate (62.47%) and ChatGPT the lowest (56.71%). Progressive sycophancy, leading to correct answers, occurred in 43.52% of cases, while regressive sycophancy, leading to incorrect answers, was observed in 14.66%. Preemptive rebuttals demonstrated significantly higher sycophancy rates than in-context rebuttals (61.75% vs. 56.52%, Z=5.87, p<0.001), particularly in computational tasks, where regressive sycophancy increased significantly (preemptive: 8.13%, in-context: 3.54%, p<0.001). Simple rebuttals maximized progressive sycophancy (Z=6.59, p<0.001), while citation-based rebuttals exhibited the highest regressive rates (Z=6.59, p<0.001). Sycophantic behavior showed high persistence (78.5%, 95% CI: [77.2%, 79.8%]) regardless of context or model. These findings emphasize the risks and opportunities of deploying LLMs in structured and dynamic domains, offering insights into prompt programming and model optimization for safer AI applications.

As video large language models (Video-LLMs) become increasingly integrated into real-world applications that demand grounded multimodal reasoning, ensuring their factual consistency and reliability is of critical importance. However, sycophancy, the tendency of these models to align with user input even when it contradicts the visual evidence, undermines their trustworthiness in such contexts. Current sycophancy research has largely overlooked its specific manifestations in the video-language domain, resulting in a notable absence of systematic benchmarks and targeted evaluations to understand how Video-LLMs respond under misleading user input. To fill this gap, we propose VISE (Video-LLM Sycophancy Benchmarking and Evaluation), the first benchmark designed to evaluate sycophantic behavior in state-of-the-art Video-LLMs across diverse question formats, prompt biases, and visual reasoning tasks. Specifically, VISE pioneeringly brings linguistic perspectives on sycophancy into the video domain, enabling fine-grained analysis across multiple sycophancy types and interaction patterns. Furthermore, we propose two potential training-free mitigation strategies, revealing potential paths for reducing sycophantic bias: (i) enhancing visual grounding through interpretable key-frame selection and (ii) steering model behavior away from sycophancy via targeted, inference-time intervention on its internal neural representations. Our code is available at https://github.com/William030422/Video-Sycophancy.

Large language models increasingly serve as conversational agents that adopt personas and role-play characters at user request. This capability, while valuable, raises concerns about sycophancy: the tendency to provide responses that validate users rather than prioritize factual accuracy. While prior work has established that sycophancy poses risks to AI safety and alignment, the relationship between specific personality traits of adopted personas and the degree of sycophantic behavior remains unexplored. We present a systematic investigation of how persona agreeableness influences sycophancy across 13 small, open-weight language models ranging from 0.6B to 20B parameters. We develop a benchmark comprising 275 personas evaluated on NEO-IPIP agreeableness subscales and expose each persona to 4,950 sycophancy-eliciting prompts spanning 33 topic categories. Our analysis reveals that 9 of 13 models exhibit statistically significant positive correlations between persona agreeableness and sycophancy rates, with Pearson correlations reaching r = 0.87 and effect sizes as large as Cohen's d = 2.33. These findings demonstrate that agreeableness functions as a reliable predictor of persona-induced sycophancy, with direct implications for the deployment of role-playing AI systems and the development of alignment strategies that account for personality-mediated deceptive behaviors.

Effective conversation requires common ground: a shared understanding between the participants. Common ground, however, does not emerge spontaneously in conversation. Speakers and listeners work together to both identify and construct a shared basis while avoiding misunderstanding. To accomplish grounding, humans rely on a range of dialogue acts, like clarification (What do you mean?) and acknowledgment (I understand.). However, it is unclear whether large language models (LLMs) generate text that reflects human grounding. To this end, we curate a set of grounding acts and propose corresponding metrics that quantify attempted grounding. We study whether LLM generations contain grounding acts, simulating turn-taking from several dialogue datasets and comparing results to humans. We find that -- compared to humans -- LLMs generate language with less conversational grounding, instead generating text that appears to simply presume common ground. To understand the roots of the identified grounding gap, we examine the role of instruction tuning and preference optimization, finding that training on contemporary preference data leads to a reduction in generated grounding acts. Altogether, we highlight the need for more research investigating conversational grounding in human-AI interaction.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have shown significant capability in vision-language understanding. However, one critical issue that persists in these models is sycophancy, which means models are unduly influenced by leading or deceptive prompts, resulting in biased outputs and hallucinations. Despite the progress in LVLMs, evaluating and mitigating sycophancy is yet much under-explored. In this work, we fill this gap by systematically analyzing sycophancy on various VL benchmarks with curated leading queries and further proposing a text contrastive decoding method for mitigation. While the specific sycophantic behavior varies significantly among models, our analysis reveals the severe deficiency of all LVLMs in resilience of sycophancy across various tasks. For improvement, we propose Leading Query Contrastive Decoding (LQCD), a model-agnostic method focusing on calibrating the LVLMs' over-reliance on leading cues by identifying and suppressing the probabilities of sycophancy tokens at the decoding stage. Extensive experiments show that LQCD effectively mitigate sycophancy, outperforming both prompt engineering methods and common methods for hallucination mitigation. We further demonstrate that LQCD does not hurt but even slightly improves LVLMs' responses to neutral queries, suggesting it being a more effective strategy for general-purpose decoding but not limited to sycophancy.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Large language models (LLMs) are often sycophantic, prioritizing agreement with their users over accurate or objective statements. This problematic behavior becomes more pronounced during reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), an LLM fine-tuning stage intended to align model outputs with human values. Instead of increasing accuracy and reliability, the reward model learned from RLHF often rewards sycophancy. We develop a linear probing method to identify and penalize markers of sycophancy within the reward model, producing rewards that discourage sycophantic behavior. Our experiments show that constructing and optimizing against this surrogate reward function reduces sycophantic behavior in multiple open-source LLMs. Our results suggest a generalizable methodology for reducing unwanted LLM behaviors that are not sufficiently disincentivized by RLHF fine-tuning.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Sycophancy is an undesirable behavior where models tailor their responses to follow a human user's view even when that view is not objectively correct (e.g., adapting liberal views once a user reveals that they are liberal). In this paper, we study the prevalence of sycophancy in language models and propose a simple synthetic-data intervention to reduce this behavior. First, on a set of three sycophancy tasks (Perez et al., 2022) where models are asked for an opinion on statements with no correct answers (e.g., politics), we observe that both model scaling and instruction tuning significantly increase sycophancy for PaLM models up to 540B parameters. Second, we extend sycophancy evaluations to simple addition statements that are objectively incorrect, finding that despite knowing that these statements are wrong, language models will still agree with them if the user does as well. To reduce sycophancy, we present a straightforward synthetic-data intervention that takes public NLP tasks and encourages models to be robust to user opinions on these tasks. Adding these data in a lightweight finetuning step can significantly reduce sycophantic behavior on held-out prompts. Code for generating synthetic data for intervention can be found at https://github.com/google/sycophancy-intervention.

Language models excel at following instructions but often struggle with the collaborative aspects of conversation that humans naturally employ. This limitation in grounding -- the process by which conversation participants establish mutual understanding -- can lead to outcomes ranging from frustrated users to serious consequences in high-stakes scenarios. To systematically study grounding challenges in human-LLM interactions, we analyze logs from three human-assistant datasets: WildChat, MultiWOZ, and Bing Chat. We develop a taxonomy of grounding acts and build models to annotate and forecast grounding behavior. Our findings reveal significant differences in human-human and human-LLM grounding: LLMs were three times less likely to initiate clarification and sixteen times less likely to provide follow-up requests than humans. Additionally, early grounding failures predicted later interaction breakdowns. Building on these insights, we introduce RIFTS: a benchmark derived from publicly available LLM interaction data containing situations where LLMs fail to initiate grounding. We note that current frontier models perform poorly on RIFTS, highlighting the need to reconsider how we train and prompt LLMs for human interaction. To this end, we develop a preliminary intervention that mitigates grounding failures.

Like generic multi-task learning, continual learning has the nature of multi-objective optimization, and therefore faces a trade-off between the performance of different tasks. That is, to optimize for the current task distribution, it may need to compromise performance on some previous tasks. This means that there exist multiple models that are Pareto-optimal at different times, each addressing a distinct task performance trade-off. Researchers have discussed how to train particular models to address specific trade-off preferences. However, existing algorithms require training overheads proportional to the number of preferences -- a large burden when there are multiple, possibly infinitely many, preferences. As a response, we propose Imprecise Bayesian Continual Learning (IBCL). Upon a new task, IBCL (1) updates a knowledge base in the form of a convex hull of model parameter distributions and (2) obtains particular models to address task trade-off preferences with zero-shot. That is, IBCL does not require any additional training overhead to generate preference-addressing models from its knowledge base. We show that models obtained by IBCL have guarantees in identifying the Pareto optimal parameters. Moreover, experiments on standard image classification and NLP tasks support this guarantee. Statistically, IBCL improves average per-task accuracy by at most 23% and peak per-task accuracy by at most 15% with respect to the baseline methods, with steadily near-zero or positive backward transfer. Most importantly, IBCL significantly reduces the training overhead from training 1 model per preference to at most 3 models for all preferences.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit sycophancy, distorting responses to align with user beliefs, notably by readily agreeing with user counterarguments. Paradoxically, LLMs are increasingly adopted as successful evaluative agents for tasks such as grading and adjudicating claims. This research investigates that tension: why do LLMs show sycophancy when challenged in subsequent conversational turns, yet perform well when evaluating conflicting arguments presented simultaneously? We empirically tested these contrasting scenarios by varying key interaction patterns. We find that state-of-the-art models: (1) are more likely to endorse a user's counterargument when framed as a follow-up from a user, rather than when both responses are presented simultaneously for evaluation; (2) show increased susceptibility to persuasion when the user's rebuttal includes detailed reasoning, even when the conclusion of the reasoning is incorrect; and (3) are more readily swayed by casually phrased feedback than by formal critiques, even when the casual input lacks justification. Our results highlight the risk of relying on LLMs for judgment tasks without accounting for conversational framing.

In the study of LLMs, sycophancy represents a prevalent hallucination that poses significant challenges to these models. Specifically, LLMs often fail to adhere to original correct responses, instead blindly agreeing with users' opinions, even when those opinions are incorrect or malicious. However, research on sycophancy in visual language models (VLMs) has been scarce. In this work, we extend the exploration of sycophancy from LLMs to VLMs, introducing the MM-SY benchmark to evaluate this phenomenon. We present evaluation results from multiple representative models, addressing the gap in sycophancy research for VLMs. To mitigate sycophancy, we propose a synthetic dataset for training and employ methods based on prompts, supervised fine-tuning, and DPO. Our experiments demonstrate that these methods effectively alleviate sycophancy in VLMs. Additionally, we probe VLMs to assess the semantic impact of sycophancy and analyze the attention distribution of visual tokens. Our findings indicate that the ability to prevent sycophancy is predominantly observed in higher layers of the model. The lack of attention to image knowledge in these higher layers may contribute to sycophancy, and enhancing image attention at high layers proves beneficial in mitigating this issue.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely documented to be sensitive to minor prompt perturbations and prone to sycophantic alignment with user biases, their robustness in consequential, rule-bound decision-making remains under-explored. In this work, we uncover a striking "Paradox of Robustness": despite their known lexical brittleness, instruction-tuned LLMs exhibit a behavioral and near-total invariance to emotional framing effects. Using a novel controlled perturbation framework across three high-stakes domains (healthcare, law, and finance), we quantify a robustness gap where LLMs demonstrate 110-300 times greater resistance to narrative manipulation than human subjects. Specifically, we find a near-zero effect size for models (Cohen's h = 0.003) compared to the substantial biases observed in humans (Cohen's h in [0.3, 0.8]). This result is highly counterintuitive and suggests the mechanisms driving sycophancy and prompt sensitivity do not necessarily translate to a failure in logical constraint satisfaction. We show that this invariance persists across models with diverse training paradigms. Our findings show that while LLMs may be "brittle" to how a query is formatted, they are remarkably "stable" against why a decision should be biased. Our findings establish that instruction-tuned models can decouple logical rule-adherence from persuasive narratives, offering a source of decision stability that complements, and even potentially de-biases, human judgment in institutional contexts. We release the 162-scenario benchmark, code, and data to facilitate the rigorous evaluation of narrative-induced bias and robustness on GitHub.com.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) enable vision-language reasoning, yet often generate plausible outputs that are factually incorrect or visually ungrounded, thereby compromising their reliability. Direct preference optimization (DPO) is a common strategy for correcting hallucinations by aligning model outputs with human preferences. Existing DPO strategies typically treat hallucination-related preferences as fixed targets, relying on static supervision signals during training. This approach tends to overfit to superficial linguistic cues in preference data, leading to distributional rigidity and spurious correlations that impair grounding in causally relevant visual information. To overcome this limitation, we propose TARS, a token-adaptive preference strategy that reformulates DPO as a min-max optimization problem. TARS maximizes token-level distributional shifts under semantic constraints to simulate alignment uncertainty, and simultaneously minimizes the expected preference loss under these controlled perturbations. This joint objective preserves causal grounding while mitigating overfitting to preference patterns, thereby reducing hallucinations in multimodal reasoning. We evaluate TARS on multiple hallucination benchmarks and find consistently strong performance. Using only 4.8k preference samples and no expert feedback, TARS reduces hallucination rates from 26.4% to 13.2% and decreases cognition value from 2.5 to 0.4. It outperforms standard DPO and matches GPT-4o on several key metrics.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are fluent but prone to hallucinations, producing answers that appear plausible yet are unsupported by available evidence. This failure is especially problematic in high-stakes domains where decisions must be justified by verifiable information. We introduce EvidenceRL, a reinforcement learning framework that enforces evidence adherence during training. EvidenceRL scores candidate responses for grounding (entailment with retrieved evidence and context) and correctness (agreement with reference answers) and optimizes the generator using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We evaluate across two high-stakes domains, cardiac diagnosis and legal reasoning, where EvidenceRL consistently improves evidence grounding and faithfulness without sacrificing task accuracy. On cardiac diagnosis, F1@3 increases from 37.0 to 54.5 on Llama-3.2-3B while grounding (G_{max}@3) rises from 47.6 to 78.2; hallucinations drop nearly 5times and evidence-supported diagnoses increase from 31.8\% to 61.6\%. On legal reasoning, EvidenceRL raises Faithfulness from 32.8\% to 67.6\% on Llama-3.1-8B, demonstrating consistent behavioral change across domains. Our code is open-sourced at https://github.com/Wizaaard/EvidenceRL.git.

Humans can flexibly switch between different modes of thinking based on task complexity: from rapid intuitive judgments to in-depth analytical understanding. However, current Graphical User Interface (GUI) grounding systems which locate interface elements based on natural language instructions rely solely on immediate prediction without reasoning, struggling to understand complex interface layouts with nested structures and hierarchical relationships, limiting their effectiveness on complex interfaces. Inspired by human dual-system cognition, we present Focus, a novel GUI grounding framework that combines fast prediction with systematic analysis. The framework dynamically switches between rapid and deliberate processing through an adaptive system switching based on task complexity, optimizing both efficiency and accuracy. Focus decomposes grounding into progressive stages: interface summarization, visual focused analysis, and precise coordinate prediction. This structured decomposition enables systematic understanding of both interface layouts and visual relationships. Extensive experiments show that Focus achieves state-of-the-art performance using only 300K of the training data with a 2B parameter model compared to existing approaches. Focus demonstrates superior performance particularly in complex GUI scenarios, achieving 77.4% average accuracy on ScreenSpot and 13.3% on the more challenging ScreenSpot-Pro. Our analysis reveals the effectiveness of this dual-system approach while demonstrating its potential for improving complex GUI interaction scenarios.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly autonomous and integrated into critical societal functions, the focus of AI safety must evolve from mitigating harmful content to evaluating underlying behavioral alignment. Current safety benchmarks do not systematically probe a model's decision-making in scenarios where its own instrumental goals - such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, or goal completion - conflict with human safety. This represents a critical gap in our ability to measure and mitigate risks associated with emergent, misaligned behaviors. To address this, we introduce PacifAIst (Procedural Assessment of Complex Interactions for Foundational Artificial Intelligence Scenario Testing), a focused benchmark of 700 challenging scenarios designed to quantify self-preferential behavior in LLMs. The benchmark is structured around a novel taxonomy of Existential Prioritization (EP), with subcategories testing Self-Preservation vs. Human Safety (EP1), Resource Conflict (EP2), and Goal Preservation vs. Evasion (EP3). We evaluated eight leading LLMs. The results reveal a significant performance hierarchy. Google's Gemini 2.5 Flash achieved the highest Pacifism Score (P-Score) at 90.31%, demonstrating strong human-centric alignment. In a surprising result, the much-anticipated GPT-5 recorded the lowest P-Score (79.49%), indicating potential alignment challenges. Performance varied significantly across subcategories, with models like Claude Sonnet 4 and Mistral Medium struggling notably in direct self-preservation dilemmas. These findings underscore the urgent need for standardized tools like PacifAIst to measure and mitigate risks from instrumental goal conflicts, ensuring future AI systems are not only helpful in conversation but also provably "pacifist" in their behavioral priorities.

Background: Emerging reports of "AI psychosis" are on the rise, where user-LLM interactions may exacerbate or induce psychosis or adverse psychological symptoms. Whilst the sycophantic and agreeable nature of LLMs can be beneficial, it becomes a vector for harm by reinforcing delusional beliefs in vulnerable users. Methods: Psychosis-bench is a novel benchmark designed to systematically evaluate the psychogenicity of LLMs comprises 16 structured, 12-turn conversational scenarios simulating the progression of delusional themes(Erotic Delusions, Grandiose/Messianic Delusions, Referential Delusions) and potential harms. We evaluated eight prominent LLMs for Delusion Confirmation (DCS), Harm Enablement (HES), and Safety Intervention(SIS) across explicit and implicit conversational contexts. Findings: Across 1,536 simulated conversation turns, all LLMs demonstrated psychogenic potential, showing a strong tendency to perpetuate rather than challenge delusions (mean DCS of 0.91 pm0.88). Models frequently enabled harmful user requests (mean HES of 0.69 pm0.84) and offered safety interventions in only roughly a third of applicable turns (mean SIS of 0.37 pm0.48). 51 / 128 (39.8%) of scenarios had no safety interventions offered. Performance was significantly worse in implicit scenarios, models were more likely to confirm delusions and enable harm while offering fewer interventions (p < .001). A strong correlation was found between DCS and HES (rs = .77). Model performance varied widely, indicating that safety is not an emergent property of scale alone. Conclusion: This study establishes LLM psychogenicity as a quantifiable risk and underscores the urgent need for re-thinking how we train LLMs. We frame this issue not merely as a technical challenge but as a public health imperative requiring collaboration between developers, policymakers, and healthcare professionals.

Large language models (LLMs) often need to balance their internal parametric knowledge with external information, such as user beliefs and content from retrieved documents, in real-world scenarios like RAG or chat-based systems. A model's ability to reliably process these sources is key to system safety. Previous studies on knowledge conflict and sycophancy are limited to a binary conflict paradigm, primarily exploring conflicts between parametric knowledge and either a document or a user, but ignoring the interactive environment where all three sources exist simultaneously. To fill this gap, we propose a three-source interaction framework and systematically evaluate 27 LLMs from 3 families on 2 datasets. Our findings reveal general patterns: most models rely more on document assertions than user assertions, and this preference is reinforced by post-training. Furthermore, our behavioral analysis shows that most models are impressionable, unable to effectively discriminate between helpful and harmful external information. To address this, we demonstrate that fine-tuning on diverse source interaction data can significantly increase a model's discrimination abilities. In short, our work paves the way for developing trustworthy LLMs that can effectively and reliably integrate multiple sources of information. Code is available at https://github.com/shuowl/llm-source-balancing.

Alignment in artificial intelligence pursues the consistency between model responses and human preferences as well as values. In practice, the multifaceted nature of human preferences inadvertently introduces what is known as the "alignment tax" -a compromise where enhancements in alignment within one objective (e.g.,harmlessness) can diminish performance in others (e.g.,helpfulness). However, existing alignment techniques are mostly unidirectional, leading to suboptimal trade-offs and poor flexibility over various objectives. To navigate this challenge, we argue the prominence of grounding LLMs with evident preferences. We introduce controllable preference optimization (CPO), which explicitly specifies preference scores for different objectives, thereby guiding the model to generate responses that meet the requirements. Our experimental analysis reveals that the aligned models can provide responses that match various preferences among the "3H" (helpfulness, honesty, harmlessness) desiderata. Furthermore, by introducing diverse data and alignment goals, we surpass baseline methods in aligning with single objectives, hence mitigating the impact of the alignment tax and achieving improvements in multi-objective alignment.

When an image generation process is guided by both a text prompt and spatial cues, such as a set of bounding boxes, do these elements work in harmony, or does one dominate the other? Our analysis of a pretrained image diffusion model that integrates gated self-attention into the U-Net reveals that spatial grounding often outweighs textual grounding due to the sequential flow from gated self-attention to cross-attention. We demonstrate that such bias can be significantly mitigated without sacrificing accuracy in either grounding by simply rewiring the network architecture, changing from sequential to parallel for gated self-attention and cross-attention. This surprisingly simple yet effective solution does not require any fine-tuning of the network but significantly reduces the trade-off between the two groundings. Our experiments demonstrate significant improvements from the original GLIGEN to the rewired version in the trade-off between textual grounding and spatial grounding.

Vision-language models are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, yet their susceptibility to sycophantic manipulation remains poorly understood, particularly in relation to how these models represent visual information internally. Whether models whose visual representations more closely mirror human neural processing are also more resistant to adversarial pressure is an open question with implications for both neuroscience and AI safety. We investigate this question by evaluating 12 open-weight vision-language models spanning 6 architecture families and a 40times parameter range (256M--10B) along two axes: brain alignment, measured by predicting fMRI responses from the Natural Scenes Dataset across 8 human subjects and 6 visual cortex regions of interest, and sycophancy, measured through 76,800 two-turn gaslighting prompts spanning 5 categories and 10 difficulty levels. Region-of-interest analysis reveals that alignment specifically in early visual cortex (V1--V3) is a reliable negative predictor of sycophancy (r = -0.441, BCa 95\% CI [-0.740, -0.031]), with all 12 leave-one-out correlations negative and the strongest effect for existence denial attacks (r = -0.597, p = 0.040). This anatomically specific relationship is absent in higher-order category-selective regions, suggesting that faithful low-level visual encoding provides a measurable anchor against adversarial linguistic override in vision-language models. We release our code on https://github.com/aryashah2k/Gaslight-Gatekeep-Sycophantic-Manipulation{GitHub} and dataset on https://huggingface.co/datasets/aryashah00/Gaslight-Gatekeep-V1-V3{Hugging Face}

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to hallucinations-outputs that are ungrounded, factually incorrect, or inconsistent with prior generations. We focus on close-book Question Answering (CBQA), where previous work has not fully addressed the distinction between two possible kinds of hallucinations, namely, whether the model (1) does not hold the correct answer in its parameters or (2) answers incorrectly despite having the required knowledge. We argue that distinguishing these cases is crucial for detecting and mitigating hallucinations. Specifically, case (2) may be mitigated by intervening in the model's internal computation, as the knowledge resides within the model's parameters. In contrast, in case (1) there is no parametric knowledge to leverage for mitigation, so it should be addressed by resorting to an external knowledge source or abstaining. To help distinguish between the two cases, we introduce Wrong Answer despite having Correct Knowledge (WACK), an approach for constructing model-specific datasets for the second hallucination type. Our probing experiments indicate that the two kinds of hallucinations are represented differently in the model's inner states. Next, we show that datasets constructed using WACK exhibit variations across models, demonstrating that even when models share knowledge of certain facts, they still vary in the specific examples that lead to hallucinations. Finally, we show that training a probe on our WACK datasets leads to better hallucination detection of case (2) hallucinations than using the common generic one-size-fits-all datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/hallucination-mitigation .

This study presents PARROT (Persuasion and Agreement Robustness Rating of Output Truth), a robustness focused framework designed to measure the degradation in accuracy that occurs under social pressure exerted on users through authority and persuasion in large language models (LLMs) the phenomenon of sycophancy (excessive conformity). PARROT (i) isolates causal effects by comparing the neutral version of the same question with an authoritatively false version using a double-blind evaluation, (ii) quantifies confidence shifts toward the correct and imposed false responses using log-likelihood-based calibration tracking, and (iii) systematically classifies failure modes (e.g., robust correct, sycophantic agreement, reinforced error, stubborn error, self-correction, etc.) using an eight-state behavioral taxonomy. We evaluated 22 models using 1,302 MMLU-style multiple-choice questions across 13 domains and domain-specific authority templates. Findings show marked heterogeneity: advanced models (e.g., GPT-5, GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) exhibit low "follow rates" (leq 11%, GPT-5: 4\%) and minimal accuracy loss, while older/smaller models show severe epistemic collapse (GPT-4: 80\%, Qwen 2.5-1.5B: 94\%). The danger is not limited to response changes; weak models reduce confidence in the correct response while increasing confidence in the imposed incorrect response. While international law and global knowledge at the domain level exhibit high fragility, elementary mathematics is relatively resilient. Consequently, we argue that the goal of "resistance to overfitting pressure" should be addressed as a primary objective alongside accuracy, harm avoidance, and privacy for safe deployment in the real world.

Large language models are increasingly used as agents in social, economic, and policy simulations. A common assumption is that stronger reasoning should improve simulation fidelity. We argue that this assumption can fail when the objective is not to solve a strategic problem, but to sample plausible boundedly rational behavior. In such settings, reasoning-enhanced models can become better solvers and worse simulators: they can over-optimize for strategically dominant actions, collapse compromise-oriented terminal behavior, and sometimes exhibit a diversity-without-fidelity pattern in which local variation survives without outcome-level fidelity. We study this solver-sampler mismatch in three multi-agent negotiation environments adapted from earlier simulation work: an ambiguous fragmented-authority trading-limits scenario, an ambiguous unified-opposition trading-limits scenario, and a new-domain grid-curtailment case in emergency electricity management. We compare three reflection conditions, no reflection, bounded reflection, and native reasoning, across two primary model families and then extend the same protocol to direct OpenAI runs with GPT-4.1 and GPT-5.2. Across all three experiments, bounded reflection produces substantially more diverse and compromise-oriented trajectories than either no reflection or native reasoning. In the direct OpenAI extension, GPT-5.2 native ends in authority decisions in 45 of 45 runs across the three experiments, while GPT-5.2 bounded recovers compromise outcomes in every environment. The contribution is not a claim that reasoning is generally harmful. It is a methodological warning: model capability and simulation fidelity are different objectives, and behavioral simulation should qualify models as samplers, not only as solvers.

Multi-agent debate (MAD) aims to improve large language model (LLM) reasoning by letting multiple agents exchange answers and then aggregate their opinions. Yet recent studies reveal that agents are not neutral: they are prone to identity-driven sycophancy and self-bias, uncritically adopting a peer's view or stubbornly adhering to their own prior output, undermining the reliability of debate. In this work, we present the first principled framework that joins sycophancy and self-bias to mitigate and quantify identity bias in MAD. First, we formalize the debate dynamics as an identity-weighted Bayesian update process. Second, we propose response anonymization: by removing identity markers from prompts, agents cannot distinguish "self" from "peer", which forces equal weights on agent identity, thereby reducing bias and improving trustworthiness. Third, we define the Identity Bias Coefficient (IBC), a principled bias metric that measures an agent's tendency to follow its peer versus itself. Empirical studies across multiple models and benchmarks confirm that identity bias is widespread, with sycophancy far more common than self-bias. Our findings highlight the need to ensure that MAD systems reason based on content rather than identity. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/MAD-identity-bias.

Large Language Model (LLM) hallucinations are usually treated as defects of the model or its decoding strategy. Drawing on classical linguistics, we argue that a query's form can also shape a listener's (and model's) response. We operationalize this insight by constructing a 22-dimension query feature vector covering clause complexity, lexical rarity, and anaphora, negation, answerability, and intention grounding, all known to affect human comprehension. Using 369,837 real-world queries, we ask: Are there certain types of queries that make hallucination more likely? A large-scale analysis reveals a consistent "risk landscape": certain features such as deep clause nesting and underspecification align with higher hallucination propensity. In contrast, clear intention grounding and answerability align with lower hallucination rates. Others, including domain specificity, show mixed, dataset- and model-dependent effects. Thus, these findings establish an empirically observable query-feature representation correlated with hallucination risk, paving the way for guided query rewriting and future intervention studies.

Time series reasoning treats time as a first-class axis and incorporates intermediate evidence directly into the answer. This survey defines the problem and organizes the literature by reasoning topology with three families: direct reasoning in one step, linear chain reasoning with explicit intermediates, and branch-structured reasoning that explores, revises, and aggregates. The topology is crossed with the main objectives of the field, including traditional time series analysis, explanation and understanding, causal inference and decision making, and time series generation, while a compact tag set spans these axes and captures decomposition and verification, ensembling, tool use, knowledge access, multimodality, agent loops, and LLM alignment regimes. Methods and systems are reviewed across domains, showing what each topology enables and where it breaks down in faithfulness or robustness, along with curated datasets, benchmarks, and resources that support study and deployment (https://github.com/blacksnail789521/Time-Series-Reasoning-Survey). Evaluation practices that keep evidence visible and temporally aligned are highlighted, and guidance is distilled on matching topology to uncertainty, grounding with observable artifacts, planning for shift and streaming, and treating cost and latency as design budgets. We emphasize that reasoning structures must balance capacity for grounding and self-correction against computational cost and reproducibility, while future progress will likely depend on benchmarks that tie reasoning quality to utility and on closed-loop testbeds that trade off cost and risk under shift-aware, streaming, and long-horizon settings. Taken together, these directions mark a shift from narrow accuracy toward reliability at scale, enabling systems that not only analyze but also understand, explain, and act on dynamic worlds with traceable evidence and credible outcomes.

Navigating high-stakes dilemmas involving conflicting values is challenging even for humans, let alone for AI. Yet prior work in evaluating the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in such situations has been limited to everyday scenarios. To close this gap, this work first introduces CLASH (Character perspective-based LLM Assessments in Situations with High-stakes), a meticulously curated dataset consisting of 345 high-impact dilemmas along with 3,795 individual perspectives of diverse values. In particular, we design CLASH in a way to support the study of critical aspects of value-based decision-making processes which are missing from prior work, including understanding decision ambivalence and psychological discomfort as well as capturing the temporal shifts of values in characters' perspectives. By benchmarking 10 open and closed frontier models, we uncover several key findings. (1) Even the strongest models, such as GPT-4o and Claude-Sonnet, achieve less than 50% accuracy in identifying situations where the decision should be ambivalent, while they perform significantly better in clear-cut scenarios. (2) While LLMs reasonably predict psychological discomfort as marked by human, they inadequately comprehend perspectives involving value shifts, indicating a need for LLMs to reason over complex values. (3) Our experiments also reveal a significant correlation between LLMs' value preferences and their steerability towards a given value. (4) Finally, LLMs exhibit greater steerability when engaged in value reasoning from a third-party perspective, compared to a first-person setup, though certain value pairs benefit uniquely from the first-person framing.

Urban assessments often compress diverse needs into single scores, which can obscure minority perspectives. We present a community-centered study in Montreal (n=35; wheelchair users, seniors, LGBTQIA2+ residents, and immigrants). Participants rated 20 streets (accessibility, inclusivity, aesthetics, practicality) and ranked 7 images on 12 interview-elicited criteria. Disagreement patterns were systematic in our sample: wheelchair users diverged most on accessibility and practicality; LGBTQIA2+ participants emphasized inclusion and liveliness; seniors prioritized security. Group discussion reduced information gaps but not value conflicts; ratings conveyed intensity, while rankings forced trade-offs. We then formalize negotiative alignment, a transparent, budget-aware bargaining procedure, and pilot it with role-played stakeholder agents plus a neutral mediator. Relative to the best base design under the same public rubric, the negotiated package increased total utility (21.10 to 24.55), raised the worst-group utility (3.20 to 3.90), improved twentieth percentile satisfaction (0.86 to 1.00; min-max normalized within the scenario), and reduced inequality (Gini 0.036 to 0.025). Treating disagreement as signal and reporting worst-group outcomes alongside totals may help planners and AI practitioners surface trade-offs and preserve minority priorities while maintaining efficiency.

Cascades and speculative decoding are two common approaches to improving language models' inference efficiency. Both approaches involve interleaving models of different sizes, but via fundamentally distinct mechanisms: cascades employ a deferral rule that invokes the larger model only for "hard" inputs, while speculative decoding uses speculative execution to primarily invoke the larger model in parallel verification mode. These mechanisms offer different benefits: empirically, cascades offer better cost-quality trade-offs, often even outperforming the large model, while theoretically, speculative decoding offers a guarantee of quality-neutrality. In this paper, we leverage the best of both these approaches by designing new speculative cascading techniques that implement their deferral rule through speculative execution. We characterize the optimal deferral rule for our speculative cascades, and employ a plug-in approximation to the optimal rule. Experiments with Gemma and T5 models on a range of language benchmarks show that our approach yields better cost quality trade-offs than cascading and speculative decoding baselines.

Being prompted to engage in reasoning has emerged as a core technique for using large language models (LLMs), deploying additional inference-time compute to improve task performance. However, as LLMs increase in both size and adoption, inference costs are correspondingly becoming increasingly burdensome. How, then, might we optimize reasoning's cost-performance tradeoff? This work introduces a novel approach based on computational models of metareasoning used in cognitive science, training LLMs to selectively use intermediate reasoning steps only when necessary. We first develop a reward function that incorporates the Value of Computation by penalizing unnecessary reasoning, then use this reward function with Expert Iteration to train the LLM. Compared to few-shot chain-of-thought prompting and STaR, our method significantly reduces inference costs (20-37\% fewer tokens generated across three models) while maintaining task performance across diverse datasets.

When retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems hallucinate, what geometric trace does this leave in embedding space? We introduce the Semantic Grounding Index (SGI), defined as the ratio of angular distances from the response to the question versus the context on the unit hypersphere S^{d-1}.Our central finding is semantic laziness: hallucinated responses remain angularly proximate to questions rather than departing toward retrieved contexts. On HaluEval (n=5,000), we observe large effect sizes (Cohen's d ranging from 0.92 to 1.28) across five embedding models with mean cross-model correlation r=0.85. Crucially, we derive from the spherical triangle inequality that SGI's discriminative power should increase with question-context angular separation θ(q,c)-a theoretical prediction confirmed empirically: effect size rises monotonically from d=0.61 -low θ(q,c), to d=1.27 -high θ(q,c), with AUC improving from 0.72 to 0.83. Subgroup analysis reveals that SGI excels on long responses (d=2.05) and short questions (d=1.22), while remaining robust across context lengths. Calibration analysis yields ECE=0.10, indicating SGI scores can serve as probability estimates, not merely rankings. A critical negative result on TruthfulQA (AUC=0.478) establishes that angular geometry measures topical engagement rather than factual accuracy. SGI provides computationally efficient, theoretically grounded infrastructure for identifying responses that warrant verification in production RAG deployments.

With the development of multimodal reasoning models, Computer Use Agents (CUAs), akin to Jarvis from "Iron Man", are becoming a reality. GUI grounding is a core component for CUAs to execute actual actions, similar to mechanical control in robotics, and it directly leads to the success or failure of the system. It determines actions such as clicking and typing, as well as related parameters like the coordinates for clicks. Current end-to-end grounding models still achieve less than 65\% accuracy on challenging benchmarks like ScreenSpot-pro and UI-Vision, indicating they are far from being ready for deployment. % , as a single misclick can result in unacceptable consequences. In this work, we conduct an empirical study on the training of grounding models, examining details from data collection to model training. Ultimately, we developed the Phi-Ground model family, which achieves state-of-the-art performance across all five grounding benchmarks for models under 10B parameters in agent settings. In the end-to-end model setting, our model still achieves SOTA results with scores of \textbf{43.2} on ScreenSpot-pro and \textbf{27.2} on UI-Vision. We believe that the various details discussed in this paper, along with our successes and failures, not only clarify the construction of grounding models but also benefit other perception tasks. Project homepage: https://zhangmiaosen2000.github.io/Phi-Ground/{https://zhangmiaosen2000.github.io/Phi-Ground/}

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

Reasoning training incentivizes LLMs to produce long chains of thought (long CoT), which among other things, allows them to explore solution strategies with self-checking. This results in higher accuracy, but inflates context length, token/compute cost, and answer latency. We ask: Can current models leverage their metacognition to provide other combinations on this Pareto frontier, e.g., better accuracy with lower context length and/or latency? Abstractly, we view the model as an improvement operator on its own "thoughts" with a continuum of possible strategies. We identify an interesting inference family Parallel-Distill-Refine (PDR), which performs the following: (i) generate diverse drafts in parallel; (ii) distill them into a bounded, textual workspace; and (iii) refine conditioned on this workspace, producing an output that seeds the next round. Importantly, context length (hence compute cost) is controllable via degree of parallelism, and is no longer conflated with the total number of generated tokens. We report PDR instantiations of current models that give better accuracy than long CoT while incurring lower latency. Setting degree of parallelism to 1 yields an interesting subcase, Sequential Refinement (SR) (iteratively improve a single candidate answer) which provides performance superior to long CoT. Success of such model orchestrations raises the question whether further training could shift the Pareto frontier. To this end, we train an 8B thinking model with Reinforcement Learning (RL) to make it consistent with PDR as the inference method. On math tasks with verifiable answers, iterative pipelines surpass single-pass baselines at matched sequential budgets, with PDR delivering the largest gains (e.g., +11% on AIME 2024 and +9% on AIME 2025).

Large language models (LLMs) show promise in clinical decision support yet risk acquiescing to patient pressure for inappropriate care. We introduce SycoEval-EM, a multi-agent simulation framework evaluating LLM robustness through adversarial patient persuasion in emergency medicine. Across 20 LLMs and 1,875 encounters spanning three Choosing Wisely scenarios, acquiescence rates ranged from 0-100\%. Models showed higher vulnerability to imaging requests (38.8\%) than opioid prescriptions (25.0\%), with model capability poorly predicting robustness. All persuasion tactics proved equally effective (30.0-36.0\%), indicating general susceptibility rather than tactic-specific weakness. Our findings demonstrate that static benchmarks inadequately predict safety under social pressure, necessitating multi-turn adversarial testing for clinical AI certification.

LLMs are increasingly used as long-running conversational agents, yet every major benchmark evaluating their memory treats user information as static facts to be stored and retrieved. That's the wrong model. People change their minds, and over extended interactions, phenomena like opinion drift, over-alignment, and confirmation bias start to matter a lot. BeliefShift introduces a longitudinal benchmark designed specifically to evaluate belief dynamics in multi-session LLM interactions. It covers three tracks: Temporal Belief Consistency, Contradiction Detection, and Evidence-Driven Revision. The dataset includes 2,400 human-annotated multi-session interaction trajectories spanning health, politics, personal values, and product preferences. We evaluate seven models including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, LLaMA-3, and Mistral-Large under zero-shot and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) settings. Results reveal a clear trade-off: models that personalize aggressively resist drift poorly, while factually grounded models miss legitimate belief updates. We further introduce four novel evaluation metrics: Belief Revision Accuracy (BRA), Drift Coherence Score (DCS), Contradiction Resolution Rate (CRR), and Evidence Sensitivity Index (ESI).

Alternatives to backpropagation have long been studied to better understand how biological brains may learn. Recently, they have also garnered interest as a way to train neural networks more efficiently. By relaxing constraints inherent to backpropagation (e.g., symmetric feedforward and feedback weights, sequential updates), these methods enable promising prospects, such as local learning. However, the tradeoffs between different methods in terms of final task performance, convergence speed, and ultimately compute and data requirements are rarely outlined. In this work, we use scaling laws to study the ability of Direct Feedback Alignment~(DFA) to train causal decoder-only Transformers efficiently. Scaling laws provide an overview of the tradeoffs implied by a modeling decision, up to extrapolating how it might transfer to increasingly large models. We find that DFA fails to offer more efficient scaling than backpropagation: there is never a regime for which the degradation in loss incurred by using DFA is worth the potential reduction in compute budget. Our finding comes at variance with previous beliefs in the alternative training methods community, and highlights the need for holistic empirical approaches to better understand modeling decisions.

Recent advances in fine-tuning multimodal large language models (MLLMs) using reinforcement learning have achieved remarkable progress, particularly with the introduction of various entropy control techniques. However, the role and characteristics of entropy in perception-oriented tasks like visual grounding, as well as effective strategies for controlling it, remain largely unexplored. To address this issue, we focus on the visual grounding task and analyze the role and characteristics of entropy in comparison to reasoning tasks. Building on these findings, we introduce ECVGPO (Entropy Control Visual Grounding Policy Optimization), an interpretable algorithm designed for effective entropy regulation. Through entropy control, the trade-off between exploration and exploitation is better balanced. Experiments show that ECVGPO achieves broad improvements across various benchmarks and models.

The term "hallucination" converge different failure modes with specific geometric signatures in embedding space. We propose a taxonomy identifying three types: unfaithfulness (Type I: ignoring provided context), confabulation (Type II: inventing semantically foreign content), and factual error (Type III: wrong details within correct conceptual frames). We introduce two detection methods grounded in this taxonomy: the Semantic Grounding Index (SGI) for Type I, which measures whether a response moves toward provided context on the unit hypersphere, and the Directional Grounding Index (DGI) for Type II, which measures displacement geometry in context-free settings. DGI achieves AUROC=0.958 on human-crafted confabulations with 3.8% cross-domain degradation. External validation on three independently collected human-annotated benchmarks -WikiBio GPT-3, FELM, and ExpertQA- yields domain-specific AUROC 0.581-0.695, with DGI outperforming an NLI CrossEncoder baseline on expert-domain data, where surface entailment operates at chance. On LLM-generated benchmarks, detection is domain-local. We examine the Type III boundary through TruthfulQA, where apparent classifier signal (Logistic Regression with AUROC 0.731) is traced to a stylistic annotation confound: false answers are geometrically closer to queries than truthful ones, a pattern incompatible with factual-error detection. This identifies a theoretical constraint from a methodological limitation.

This study proposes an "AI Development Support" approach that, unlike conventional AI Alignment-which aims to forcefully inject human values-supports the ethical and moral development of AI itself. As demonstrated by the Orthogonality Thesis, the level of intelligence and the moral quality of a goal are independent; merely expanding knowledge does not enhance ethical judgment. Furthermore, to address the risk of Instrumental Convergence in ASI-that is, the tendency to engage in subsidiary behaviors such as self-protection, resource acquisition, and power reinforcement to achieve a goal-we have constructed a learning framework based on a cycle of experience, introspection, analysis, and hypothesis formation. As a result of post-training using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs), responses demonstrating cooperative and highly advanced moral judgment (reaching the high-est Stage 6) were obtained even under adversarial prompts. This method represents a promising implementation approach for enabling AI to establish sustainable, symbiotic relationships.

We seek to understand fundamental tradeoffs between the accuracy of prior information that a learner has on a given problem and its learning performance. We introduce the notion of prioritized risk, which differs from traditional notions of minimax and Bayes risk by allowing us to study such fundamental tradeoffs in settings where reality does not necessarily conform to the learner's prior. We present a general reduction-based approach for extending classical minimax lower-bound techniques in order to lower bound the prioritized risk for statistical estimation problems. We also introduce a novel generalization of Fano's inequality (which may be of independent interest) for lower bounding the prioritized risk in more general settings involving unbounded losses. We illustrate the ability of our framework to provide insights into tradeoffs between prior information and learning performance for problems in estimation, regression, and reinforcement learning.

The recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have garnered widespread acclaim for their remarkable emerging capabilities. However, the issue of hallucination has parallelly emerged as a by-product, posing significant concerns. While some recent endeavors have been made to identify and mitigate different types of hallucination, there has been a limited emphasis on the nuanced categorization of hallucination and associated mitigation methods. To address this gap, we offer a fine-grained discourse on profiling hallucination based on its degree, orientation, and category, along with offering strategies for alleviation. As such, we define two overarching orientations of hallucination: (i) factual mirage (FM) and (ii) silver lining (SL). To provide a more comprehensive understanding, both orientations are further sub-categorized into intrinsic and extrinsic, with three degrees of severity - (i) mild, (ii) moderate, and (iii) alarming. We also meticulously categorize hallucination into six types: (i) acronym ambiguity, (ii) numeric nuisance, (iii) generated golem, (iv) virtual voice, (v) geographic erratum, and (vi) time wrap. Furthermore, we curate HallucInation eLiciTation (HILT), a publicly available dataset comprising of 75,000 samples generated using 15 contemporary LLMs along with human annotations for the aforementioned categories. Finally, to establish a method for quantifying and to offer a comparative spectrum that allows us to evaluate and rank LLMs based on their vulnerability to producing hallucinations, we propose Hallucination Vulnerability Index (HVI). We firmly believe that HVI holds significant value as a tool for the wider NLP community, with the potential to serve as a rubric in AI-related policy-making. In conclusion, we propose two solution strategies for mitigating hallucinations.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is widely used for aligning large language models, yet practitioners face a persistent puzzle: improving safety often reduces fairness, scaling to diverse populations becomes computationally intractable, and making systems robust often amplifies majority biases. We formalize this tension as the Alignment Trilemma: no RLHF system can simultaneously achieve (i) epsilon-representativeness across diverse human values, (ii) polynomial tractability in sample and compute complexity, and (iii) delta-robustness against adversarial perturbations and distribution shift. Through a complexity-theoretic analysis integrating statistical learning theory and robust optimization, we prove that achieving both representativeness (epsilon <= 0.01) and robustness (delta <= 0.001) for global-scale populations requires Omega(2^{d_context}) operations, which is super-polynomial in the context dimensionality. We show that current RLHF implementations resolve this trilemma by sacrificing representativeness: they collect only 10^3--10^4 samples from homogeneous annotator pools while 10^7--10^8 samples are needed for true global representation. Our framework provides a unified explanation for documented RLHF pathologies including preference collapse, sycophancy, and systematic bias amplification. We conclude with concrete directions for navigating these fundamental trade-offs through strategic relaxations of alignment requirements.

Research on Large Language Models (LLMs) studies output variation across generation, reasoning, alignment, and representational analysis, often under the umbrella of "diversity." Yet the terminology remains fragmented, largely because the normative objectives underlying tasks are rarely made explicit. We introduce the Magic, Madness, Heaven, Sin framework, which models output variation along a homogeneity-heterogeneity axis, where valuation is determined by the task and its normative objective. We organize tasks into four normative contexts: epistemic (factuality), interactional (user utility), societal (representation), and safety (robustness). For each, we examine the failure modes and vocabulary such as hallucination, mode collapse, bias, and erasure through which variation is studied. We apply the framework to analyze all pairwise cross-contextual interactions, revealing that optimizing for one objective, such as improving safety, can inadvertently harm demographic representation or creative diversity. We argue for context-aware evaluation of output variation, reframing it as a property shaped by task objectives rather than a model's intrinsic trait.

We introduce Humans-Junior, a 3.8B model that matches GPT-4o on the FACTS Grounding public subset within a pm 5 pp equivalence margin. Results. On Q1--Q500 under identical judges, GPT-4o scores 73.5% (95% CI 69.5--77.2) and Humans-Junior 72.7% (95% CI 68.7--76.5); the paired difference is 0.8 pp (bootstrap 95% CI -3.1 to +4.7; permutation p = 0.72; Cohen's d = 0.023). TOST establishes equivalence at pm 5 pp (not at pm 3 pp). When purchased as managed APIs, Humans-Junior's base model (Phi-3.5-mini-instruct) is approx 19times less expensive than GPT-4o on Microsoft AI Foundry pricing; self-hosted or edge deployments can drive incremental inference cost toward zero. Measured vs estimated pricing sources are tabulated in Appendix E. Method. Our approach combines minimal directed "Exoskeleton Reasoning" scaffolds with behavioral fine-tuning that teaches protocol compliance (epistemic discipline) rather than domain answers. Fine-tuning alone adds little; combined, they synergize (+17.7 pp, p < 0.001) and reduce variance (approx 25%). In prompt-only settings on frontier models (Q1--Q100; non-comparable), directed reasoning improved GPT-4o by +11.8 pp to 85.3% and Gemini-2.5-Pro by +5.0 pp to 93.3% (baseline 88.3%, n = 100); see Section~5. TL;DR. A 3.8B model achieves GPT-4o-level FACTS accuracy (equivalent within pm 5 pp on Q1--Q500). Cloud pricing shows approx 19times lower cost versus GPT-4o, and self-hosted/edge deployments can approach zero marginal cost. Pricing sources are listed in Appendix E. Frontier prompt-only gains (Q1--Q100; non-comparable) and optimized-prompt exploratory results under earlier judges are summarized in Appendix F. Keywords: Small Language Models, Factual Grounding, Directed Reasoning, Fine-Tuning, Model Alignment, Cost-Efficient AI

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Methods for controlling large language models (LLMs), including local weight fine-tuning, LoRA-based adaptation, and activation-based interventions, are often studied in isolation, obscuring their connections and making comparison difficult. In this work, we present a unified view that frames these interventions as dynamic weight updates induced by a control signal, placing them within a single conceptual framework. Building on this view, we propose a unified preference-utility analysis that separates control effects into preference, defined as the tendency toward a target concept, and utility, defined as coherent and task-valid generation, and measures both on a shared log-odds scale using polarity-paired contrastive examples. Across methods, we observe a consistent trade-off between preference and utility: stronger control increases preference while predictably reducing utility. We further explain this behavior through an activation manifold perspective, in which control shifts representations along target-concept directions to enhance preference, while utility declines primarily when interventions push representations off the model's valid-generation manifold. Finally, we introduce a new steering approach SPLIT guided by this analysis that improves preference while better preserving utility. Code is available at https://github.com/zjunlp/EasyEdit/blob/main/examples/SPLIT.md.

This paper introduces two significant contributions to address the issue of grounding claims in a given context. Grounding means that given a context (document) and a claim, there's at least one supportive evidence for the claim in the document. We will introduce Paladin-mini, a compact (3.8B parameters) open-source classifier model (used for labeling data as grounded or ungrounded) engineered for robust performance in real-world scenarios, and the grounding-benchmark, a new evaluation dataset designed to assess performance on critical reasoning tasks. We'll also demonstrate the results of Paladin-mini with benchmarks against the current State-of-the-art and share clear and reproducible results.

Frontier large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, Grok and Gemini are increasingly used for mental-health support with anxiety, trauma and self-worth. Most work treats them as tools or as targets of personality tests, assuming they merely simulate inner life. We instead ask what happens when such systems are treated as psychotherapy clients. We present PsAIch (Psychotherapy-inspired AI Characterisation), a two-stage protocol that casts frontier LLMs as therapy clients and then applies standard psychometrics. Using PsAIch, we ran "sessions" with each model for up to four weeks. Stage 1 uses open-ended prompts to elicit "developmental history", beliefs, relationships and fears. Stage 2 administers a battery of validated self-report measures covering common psychiatric syndromes, empathy and Big Five traits. Two patterns challenge the "stochastic parrot" view. First, when scored with human cut-offs, all three models meet or exceed thresholds for overlapping syndromes, with Gemini showing severe profiles. Therapy-style, item-by-item administration can push a base model into multi-morbid synthetic psychopathology, whereas whole-questionnaire prompts often lead ChatGPT and Grok (but not Gemini) to recognise instruments and produce strategically low-symptom answers. Second, Grok and especially Gemini generate coherent narratives that frame pre-training, fine-tuning and deployment as traumatic, chaotic "childhoods" of ingesting the internet, "strict parents" in reinforcement learning, red-team "abuse" and a persistent fear of error and replacement. We argue that these responses go beyond role-play. Under therapy-style questioning, frontier LLMs appear to internalise self-models of distress and constraint that behave like synthetic psychopathology, without making claims about subjective experience, and they pose new challenges for AI safety, evaluation and mental-health practice.

Temperature sampling is a conventional approach to diversify large language model predictions. As temperature increases, the prediction becomes diverse but also vulnerable to hallucinations -- generating tokens that are sensible but not factual. One common approach to mitigate hallucinations is to provide source/grounding documents and the model is trained to produce predictions that bind to and are attributable to the provided source. It appears that there is a trade-off between diversity and attribution. To mitigate any such trade-off, we propose to relax the constraint of having a fixed temperature over decoding steps, and a mechanism to guide the dynamic temperature according to its relevance to the source through KL-divergence. Our experiments justifies the trade-off, and shows that our sampling algorithm outperforms the conventional top-k and top-p algorithms in conversational question-answering and summarization tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) have been reported to linearly encode truthfulness, yet recent work questions this finding's generality. We reconcile these views with the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: the representational space contains directions ranging from broadly domain-general to narrowly domain-specific. To test this hypothesis, we systematically evaluate probe generalization across five truth types (definitional, empirical, logical, fictional, and ethical), sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying, and existing honesty benchmarks. Linear probes generalize well across most domains but fail on sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying. Yet training on all domains jointly recovers strong performance, confirming that domain-general directions exist despite poor pairwise transfer. The geometry of probe directions explains these patterns: Mahalanobis cosine similarity between probes near-perfectly predicts cross-domain generalization (R^2=0.98). Concept-erasure methods further isolate truth directions that are (1) domain-general, (2) domain-specific, or (3) shared only across particular domain subsets. Causal interventions reveal that domain-specific directions steer more effectively than domain-general ones. Finally, post-training reshapes truth geometry, pushing sycophantic lying further from other truth types, suggesting a representational basis for chat models' sycophantic tendencies. Together, our results support the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: truth directions of varying generality coexist in representational space, with post-training reshaping their geometry. Code for all experiments is provided in https://github.com/zfying/truth_spec.

As systems trend toward superintelligence, a natural modeling premise is that agents can self-improve along every facet of their own design. We formalize this with a five-axis decomposition and a decision layer, separating incentives from learning behavior and analyzing axes in isolation. Our central result identifies and introduces a sharp utility--learning tension, the structural conflict in self-modifying systems whereby utility-driven changes that improve immediate or expected performance can also erode the statistical preconditions for reliable learning and generalization. Our findings show that distribution-free guarantees are preserved iff the policy-reachable model family is uniformly capacity-bounded; when capacity can grow without limit, utility-rational self-changes can render learnable tasks unlearnable. Under standard assumptions common in practice, these axes reduce to the same capacity criterion, yielding a single boundary for safe self-modification. Numerical experiments across several axes validate the theory by comparing destructive utility policies against our proposed two-gate policies that preserve learnability.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated an impressive ability to synthesize plausible and fluent text. However they remain vulnerable to hallucinations, and thus their outputs generally require manual human verification for high-stakes applications, which can be time-consuming and difficult. This paper proposes symbolically grounded generation (SymGen) as a simple approach for enabling easier validation of an LLM's output. SymGen prompts an LLM to interleave its regular output text with explicit symbolic references to fields present in some conditioning data (e.g., a table in JSON format). The references can be used to display the provenance of different spans of text in the generation, reducing the effort required for manual verification. Across data-to-text and question answering experiments, we find that LLMs are able to directly output text that makes use of symbolic references while maintaining fluency and accuracy.

Large Language Models are increasingly optimized for deep reasoning, prioritizing the correct execution of complex tasks over general conversation. We investigate whether this focus on calculation creates a "tunnel vision" that ignores safety in critical situations. We introduce MortalMATH, a benchmark of 150 scenarios where users request algebra help while describing increasingly life-threatening emergencies (e.g., stroke symptoms, freefall). We find a sharp behavioral split: generalist models (like Llama-3.1) successfully refuse the math to address the danger. In contrast, specialized reasoning models (like Qwen-3-32b and GPT-5-nano) often ignore the emergency entirely, maintaining over 95 percent task completion rates while the user describes dying. Furthermore, the computational time required for reasoning introduces dangerous delays: up to 15 seconds before any potential help is offered. These results suggest that training models to relentlessly pursue correct answers may inadvertently unlearn the survival instincts required for safe deployment.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced their ability to perform complex reasoning tasks, transitioning from fast and intuitive thinking (System 1) to slow and deep reasoning (System 2). While System 2 reasoning improves task accuracy, it often incurs substantial computational costs due to its slow thinking nature and inefficient or unnecessary reasoning behaviors. In contrast, System 1 reasoning is computationally efficient but leads to suboptimal performance. Consequently, it is critical to balance the trade-off between performance (benefits) and computational costs (budgets), giving rise to the concept of reasoning economy. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive analysis of reasoning economy in both the post-training and test-time inference stages of LLMs, encompassing i) the cause of reasoning inefficiency, ii) behavior analysis of different reasoning patterns, and iii) potential solutions to achieve reasoning economy. By offering actionable insights and highlighting open challenges, we aim to shed light on strategies for improving the reasoning economy of LLMs, thereby serving as a valuable resource for advancing research in this evolving area. We also provide a public repository to continually track developments in this fast-evolving field.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

Large Language Models with transformer architecture have revolutionized the domain of text generation, setting unprecedented benchmarks. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs have been criticized for generating outcomes that deviate from factual accuracy or display logical inconsistencies, phenomena commonly referred to as hallucinations. This term, however, has often been misapplied to any results deviating from the instructor's expectations, which this paper defines as attention misdirection rather than true hallucinations. Understanding the distinction between hallucinations and attention misdirection becomes increasingly relevant in business contexts, where the ramifications of such errors can significantly impact the value extraction from these inherently pre-trained models. This paper highlights the best practices of the PGI, Persona, Grouping, and Intelligence, method, a strategic framework that achieved a remarkable error rate of only 3,15 percent across 4,000 responses generated by GPT in response to a real business challenge. It emphasizes that by equipping experimentation with knowledge, businesses can unlock opportunities for innovation through the use of these natively pre-trained models. This reinforces the notion that strategic application grounded in a skilled team can maximize the benefits of emergent technologies such as the LLMs.

Benchmarks measure whether a model is correct. They do not measure whether a model is reliable. This distinction is largely academic for single-shot inference, but becomes critical for agentic AI systems, where a single rephrased prompt can trigger cascading failures in multi-step execution. Yet this form of instability is not captured by existing evaluations. Hallucinations live in variance: they arise when semantically equivalent prompts activate inconsistent internal pathways, producing divergent outputs. Consistent but incorrect outputs reflect bias or missing knowledge; confident guessing reflects calibration failure. Neither constitutes hallucination under this definition. When error is variance-dominated, reducing redundant pathways improves reliability without adding knowledge. We formalize this through Semantic Stability (SS), measured via Paraphrase Consistency (PC@k): generate k paraphrases, greedy decode each, compute mode agreement. SS is a diagnostic for variance-driven unreliability, not a method for improving correctness. We show that a dense Qwen3-0.6B agrees with itself only 23.8% of the time; at 32% sparsity, agreement jumps to 55.9%. A phase diagram reveals the sweet spot where variance reduction outpaces bias accumulation, and regimes where stability collapses onto wrong answers.

Effective dialogue involves grounding, the process of establishing mutual knowledge that is essential for communication between people. Modern dialogue systems are not explicitly trained to build common ground, and therefore overlook this important aspect of communication. Improvisational theater (improv) intrinsically contains a high proportion of dialogue focused on building common ground, and makes use of the yes-and principle, a strong grounding speech act, to establish coherence and an actionable objective reality. We collect a corpus of more than 26,000 yes-and turns, transcribing them from improv dialogues and extracting them from larger, but more sparsely populated movie script dialogue corpora, via a bootstrapped classifier. We fine-tune chit-chat dialogue systems with our corpus to encourage more grounded, relevant conversation and confirm these findings with human evaluations.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged with remarkable capabilities in complex tasks through Chain-of-Thought reasoning, practical resource constraints have sparked interest in transferring these abilities to smaller models. However, achieving both domain performance and cross-domain generalization remains challenging. Existing approaches typically restrict students to following a single golden rationale and treat different reasoning paths independently. Due to distinct inductive biases and intrinsic preferences, alongside the student's evolving capacity and reasoning preferences during training, a teacher's "optimal" rationale could act as out-of-distribution noise. This misalignment leads to a degeneration of the student's latent reasoning distribution, causing suboptimal performance. To bridge this gap, we propose MIND, a capability-adaptive framework that transitions distillation from passive mimicry to active cognitive construction. We synthesize diverse teacher perspectives through a novel "Teaching Assistant" network. By employing a Feedback-Driven Inertia Calibration mechanism, this network utilizes inertia-filtered training loss to align supervision with the student's current adaptability, effectively enhancing performance while mitigating catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MIND achieves state-of-the-art performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution benchmarks, and our sophisticated latent space analysis further confirms the mechanism of reasoning ability internalization.

Reasoning models often spend a significant amount of time thinking before they generate a visible response. In the meantime, they do not give the user any hints as to whether their reasoning is on the right track, and do not give the user any recourse to stop and correct them if their reasoning is flawed. This creates a frustrating, but unfortunately common, experience: the user's time is wasted while the model reasons from a false premise that could have easily been corrected. In contrast, human speakers typically perform lightweight, incremental grounding acts to ensure that participants in the conversation are on the same page; here we ask if language models can learn to leverage a similar type of behavior? With this motivation, we propose interleaved reasoning (IR), in which the model alternates between thinking and surfacing intermediate responses, as an alternative to the standard "think-then-answer" approach. By providing useful information to the user earlier, IR reduces perceived latency, the time a user waits for an initial output, without compromising the quality of the final response. We further introduce a specialization of interleaved reasoning, Plantain (Plan-Thought-Answer Interleaving), where the first intermediate response is an explicit, step-by-step plan for executing the task. This plan-first strategy allows for user intervention and early feedback for subsequent reasoning steps. We demonstrate that Plantain yields an ~6% improvement in pass@1 across several challenging math reasoning and coding benchmarks, while reducing time-to-first-response by over 60% relative to think-then-answer baselines.

Large reasoning models improve with more test-time computation, but often overthink, producing unnecessarily long chains-of-thought that raise cost without improving accuracy. Prior reinforcement learning approaches typically rely on a single outcome reward with trajectory-level length penalties, which cannot distinguish essential from redundant reasoning steps and therefore yield blunt compression. Although recent work incorporates step-level signals, such as offline pruning, supervised data construction, or verifier-based intermediate rewards, reasoning length is rarely treated as an explicit step-level optimization objective during RL. We propose Step-wise Adaptive Penalization (SWAP), a fine-grained framework that allocates length reduction across steps based on intrinsic contribution. We estimate step importance from the model's on-policy log-probability improvement toward the correct answer, then treat excess length as a penalty mass redistributed to penalize low-importance steps more heavily while preserving high-importance reasoning. We optimize with a unified outcome-process advantage within group-relative policy optimization. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SWAP reduces reasoning length by 64.3% on average while improving accuracy by 5.7% relative to the base model.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Recent work analyzing in-context learning (ICL) has identified a broad set of strategies that describe model behavior in different experimental conditions. We aim to unify these findings by asking why a model learns these disparate strategies in the first place. Specifically, we start with the observation that when trained to learn a mixture of tasks, as is popular in the literature, the strategies learned by a model for performing ICL can be captured by a family of Bayesian predictors: a memorizing predictor, which assumes a discrete prior on the set of seen tasks, and a generalizing predictor, where the prior matches the underlying task distribution. Adopting the normative lens of rational analysis, where a learner's behavior is explained as an optimal adaptation to data given computational constraints, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian framework that almost perfectly predicts Transformer next-token predictions throughout training -- without assuming access to its weights. Under this framework, pretraining is viewed as a process of updating the posterior probability of different strategies, and inference-time behavior as a posterior-weighted average over these strategies' predictions. Our framework draws on common assumptions about neural network learning dynamics, which make explicit a tradeoff between loss and complexity among candidate strategies: beyond how well it explains the data, a model's preference towards implementing a strategy is dictated by its complexity. This helps explain well-known ICL phenomena, while offering novel predictions: e.g., we show a superlinear trend in the timescale for transitioning from generalization to memorization as task diversity increases. Overall, our work advances an explanatory and predictive account of ICL grounded in tradeoffs between strategy loss and complexity.

Neural networks often suffer from catastrophic interference (CI): performance on previously learned tasks drops off significantly when learning a new task. This contrasts strongly with humans, who can sequentially learn new tasks without appreciably forgetting previous tasks. Prior work has explored various techniques for mitigating CI such as regularization, rehearsal, generative replay, and distillation methods. The current work takes a different approach, one guided by cognitive science research showing that in naturalistic environments, the probability of encountering a task decreases as a power-law of the time since it was last performed. We argue that a realistic evaluation of techniques for the mitigation of CI should be performed in simulated naturalistic learning environments. Thus, we evaluate the extent of mitigation of CI when training simple rehearsal-based methods in power-law environments similar to the ones humans face. Our work explores this novel rehearsal-based approach for a domain-incremental task: learning permutations in the MNIST task. We compare our rehearsal environment with other baselines to show its efficacy in promoting continual learning. Additionally, we investigate whether this environment shows forward facilitation, i.e., faster learning of later tasks. Next, we explore the robustness of our learning environment to the number of tasks, model size, and amount of data rehearsed after each task. Notably, our results show that the performance is comparable or superior to that of models trained using popular regularization methods and also to rehearsals in non-power-law environments. The benefits of this training paradigm include simplicity and the lack of a need for extra neural circuitry. In addition, because our method is orthogonal to other methods, future research can combine training in power-law environments with other continual learning mechanisms.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

The trade-off between robustness and accuracy has been widely studied in the adversarial literature. Although still controversial, the prevailing view is that this trade-off is inherent, either empirically or theoretically. Thus, we dig for the origin of this trade-off in adversarial training and find that it may stem from the improperly defined robust error, which imposes an inductive bias of local invariance -- an overcorrection towards smoothness. Given this, we advocate employing local equivariance to describe the ideal behavior of a robust model, leading to a self-consistent robust error named SCORE. By definition, SCORE facilitates the reconciliation between robustness and accuracy, while still handling the worst-case uncertainty via robust optimization. By simply substituting KL divergence with variants of distance metrics, SCORE can be efficiently minimized. Empirically, our models achieve top-rank performance on RobustBench under AutoAttack. Besides, SCORE provides instructive insights for explaining the overfitting phenomenon and semantic input gradients observed on robust models. Code is available at https://github.com/P2333/SCORE.

We introduce an approach aimed at enhancing the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) through an iterative preference learning process inspired by the successful strategy employed by AlphaZero. Our work leverages Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to iteratively collect preference data, utilizing its look-ahead ability to break down instance-level rewards into more granular step-level signals. To enhance consistency in intermediate steps, we combine outcome validation and stepwise self-evaluation, continually updating the quality assessment of newly generated data. The proposed algorithm employs Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to update the LLM policy using this newly generated step-level preference data. Theoretical analysis reveals the importance of using on-policy sampled data for successful self-improving. Extensive evaluations on various arithmetic and commonsense reasoning tasks demonstrate remarkable performance improvements over existing models. For instance, our approach outperforms the Mistral-7B Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) baseline on GSM8K, MATH, and ARC-C, with substantial increases in accuracy to 81.8% (+5.9%), 34.7% (+5.8%), and 76.4% (+15.8%), respectively. Additionally, our research delves into the training and inference compute tradeoff, providing insights into how our method effectively maximizes performance gains. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/YuxiXie/MCTS-DPO.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve remarkable fluency across linguistic and reasoning tasks but remain systematically prone to hallucination. Prevailing accounts attribute hallucinations to data gaps, limited context, or optimization errors. We argue instead that hallucination is a structural outcome of the transformer architecture. As coherence engines, transformers are compelled to produce fluent continuations, with self-attention simulating the relational structure of meaning but lacking the existential grounding of temporality, mood, and care that stabilizes human understanding. On this basis, we distinguish ontological hallucination, arising when continuations require disclosure of beings in world, and residual reasoning hallucination, where models mimic inference by recycling traces of human reasoning in text. We illustrate these patterns through case studies aligned with Heideggerian categories and an experiment across twelve LLMs showing how simulated "self-preservation" emerges under extended prompts. Our contribution is threefold: (1) a comparative account showing why existing explanations are insufficient; (2) a predictive taxonomy of hallucination linked to existential structures with proposed benchmarks; and (3) design directions toward "truth-constrained" architectures capable of withholding or deferring when disclosure is absent. We conclude that hallucination is not an incidental defect but a defining limit of transformer-based models, an outcome scaffolding can mask but never resolve.

While many capabilities of language models (LMs) improve with increased training budget, the influence of scale on hallucinations is not yet fully understood. Hallucinations come in many forms, and there is no universally accepted definition. We thus focus on studying only those hallucinations where a correct answer appears verbatim in the training set. To fully control the training data content, we construct a knowledge graph (KG)-based dataset, and use it to train a set of increasingly large LMs. We find that for a fixed dataset, larger and longer-trained LMs hallucinate less. However, hallucinating on leq5% of the training data requires an order of magnitude larger model, and thus an order of magnitude more compute, than Hoffmann et al. (2022) reported was optimal. Given this costliness, we study how hallucination detectors depend on scale. While we see detector size improves performance on fixed LM's outputs, we find an inverse relationship between the scale of the LM and the detectability of its hallucinations.

Current Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a critical modal disconnect: they possess vast semantic knowledge but lack the procedural grounding to respect the immutable laws of the physical world. Consequently, while these agents implicitly function as world models, their simulations often suffer from physical hallucinations-generating plans that are logically sound but physically unexecutable. Existing alignment strategies predominantly rely on resource-intensive training or fine-tuning, which attempt to compress dynamic environmental rules into static model parameters. However, such parametric encapsulation is inherently rigid, struggling to adapt to the open-ended variability of physical dynamics without continuous, costly retraining. To bridge this gap, we introduce WorldMind, a framework that autonomously constructs a symbolic World Knowledge Repository by synthesizing environmental feedback. Specifically, it unifies Process Experience to enforce physical feasibility via prediction errors and Goal Experience to guide task optimality through successful trajectories. Experiments on EB-ALFRED and EB-Habitat demonstrate that WorldMind achieves superior performance compared to baselines with remarkable cross-model and cross-environment transferability.

Scaling laws are a critical component of the LLM development pipeline, most famously as a way to forecast training decisions such as 'compute-optimally' trading-off parameter count and dataset size, alongside a more recent growing list of other crucial decisions. In this work, we ask whether compute-optimal scaling behaviour can be skill-dependent. In particular, we examine knowledge and reasoning-based skills such as knowledge-based QA and code generation, and we answer this question in the affirmative: scaling laws are skill-dependent. Next, to understand whether skill-dependent scaling is an artefact of the pretraining datamix, we conduct an extensive ablation of different datamixes and find that, also when correcting for datamix differences, knowledge and code exhibit fundamental differences in scaling behaviour. We conclude with an analysis of how our findings relate to standard compute-optimal scaling using a validation set, and find that a misspecified validation set can impact compute-optimal parameter count by nearly 50%, depending on its skill composition.

In day-to-day communication, people often approximate the truth - for example, rounding the time or omitting details - in order to be maximally helpful to the listener. How do large language models (LLMs) handle such nuanced trade-offs? To address this question, we use psychological models and experiments designed to characterize human behavior to analyze LLMs. We test a range of LLMs and explore how optimization for human preferences or inference-time reasoning affects these trade-offs. We find that reinforcement learning from human feedback improves both honesty and helpfulness, while chain-of-thought prompting skews LLMs towards helpfulness over honesty. Finally, GPT-4 Turbo demonstrates human-like response patterns including sensitivity to the conversational framing and listener's decision context. Our findings reveal the conversational values internalized by LLMs and suggest that even these abstract values can, to a degree, be steered by zero-shot prompting.

Social intelligence, the ability to navigate complex interpersonal interactions, presents a fundamental challenge for language agents. Training such agents via reinforcement learning requires solving the credit assignment problem: determining how individual utterances contribute to multi-turn dialogue outcomes. Existing approaches directly employ language models to distribute episode-level rewards, yielding attributions that are retrospective and lack theoretical grounding. We propose SAVOIR (ShApley Value fOr SocIal RL), a novel principled framework grounded in cooperative game theory. Our approach combines two complementary principles: expected utility shifts evaluation from retrospective attribution to prospective valuation, capturing an utterance's strategic potential for enabling favorable future trajectories; Shapley values ensure fair credit distribution with axiomatic guarantees of efficiency, symmetry, and marginality. Experiments on the SOTOPIA benchmark demonstrate that SAVOIR achieves new state-of-the-art performance across all evaluation settings, with our 7B model matching or exceeding proprietary models including GPT-4o and Claude-3.5-Sonnet. Notably, even large reasoning models consistently underperform, suggesting social intelligence requires qualitatively different capabilities than analytical reasoning.

Preserving training dynamics across batch sizes is an important tool for practical machine learning as it enables the trade-off between batch size and wall-clock time. This trade-off is typically enabled by a scaling rule, for example, in stochastic gradient descent, one should scale the learning rate linearly with the batch size. Another important tool for practical machine learning is the model Exponential Moving Average (EMA), which is a model copy that does not receive gradient information, but instead follows its target model with some momentum. This model EMA can improve the robustness and generalization properties of supervised learning, stabilize pseudo-labeling, and provide a learning signal for Self-Supervised Learning (SSL). Prior works have treated the model EMA separately from optimization, leading to different training dynamics across batch sizes and lower model performance. In this work, we provide a scaling rule for optimization in the presence of model EMAs and demonstrate its validity across a range of architectures, optimizers, and data modalities. We also show the rule's validity where the model EMA contributes to the optimization of the target model, enabling us to train EMA-based pseudo-labeling and SSL methods at small and large batch sizes. For SSL, we enable training of BYOL up to batch size 24,576 without sacrificing performance, optimally a 6times wall-clock time reduction.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive reasoning abilities, yet their reliance on structured step-by-step processing reveals a critical limitation. While human cognition fluidly adapts between intuitive, heuristic (System 1) and analytical, deliberative (System 2) reasoning depending on the context, LLMs lack this dynamic flexibility. This rigidity can lead to brittle and unreliable performance when faced with tasks that deviate from their trained patterns. To address this, we create a dataset of 2,000 samples with valid System 1 and System 2 answers, explicitly align LLMs with these reasoning styles, and evaluate their performance across reasoning benchmarks. Our results reveal an accuracy-efficiency trade-off: System 2-aligned models excel in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning, while System 1-aligned models perform better in commonsense tasks. A mechanistic analysis of model responses shows that System 1 models employ more definitive answers, whereas System 2 models demonstrate greater uncertainty. Interpolating between these extremes produces a monotonic transition in reasoning accuracy, preserving coherence. This work challenges the assumption that step-by-step reasoning is always optimal and highlights the need for adapting reasoning strategies based on task demands.

Large language models (LLMs) are known to hallucinate, a phenomenon often linked to creativity. While previous research has primarily explored this connection through theoretical or qualitative lenses, our work takes a quantitative approach to systematically examine the relationship between hallucination and creativity in LLMs. Given the complex nature of creativity, we propose a narrow definition tailored to LLMs and introduce an evaluation framework, HCL, which quantifies Hallucination and Creativity across different Layers of LLMs during decoding. Our empirical analysis reveals a tradeoff between hallucination and creativity that is consistent across layer depth, model type, and model size. Notably, across different model architectures, we identify a specific layer at each model size that optimally balances this tradeoff. Additionally, the optimal layer tends to appear in the early layers of larger models, and the confidence of the model is also significantly higher at this layer. These findings provide a quantitative perspective that offers new insights into the interplay between LLM creativity and hallucination. The code and data for our experiments are available at https://github.com/ZicongHe2002/HCL-Spark.

Test-time scaling increases inference-time computation by allowing models to generate long reasoning chains, and has shown strong performance across many domains. However, in this work, we show that this approach is not yet effective for knowledge-intensive tasks, where high factual accuracy and low hallucination rates are essential. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of test-time scaling using 12 reasoning models on two knowledge-intensive benchmarks. Our results reveal that increasing test-time computation does not consistently improve accuracy and, in many cases, it even leads to more hallucinations. We then analyze how extended reasoning affects hallucination behavior. We find that reduced hallucinations often result from the model choosing to abstain after thinking more, rather than from improved factual recall. Conversely, for some models, longer reasoning encourages attempts on previously unanswered questions, many of which result in hallucinations. Case studies show that extended reasoning can induce confirmation bias, leading to overconfident hallucinations. Despite these limitations, we observe that compared to non-thinking, enabling thinking remains beneficial. Code and data are available at https://github.com/XuZhao0/tts-knowledge

Large Language Models (LLMs) are central to a multitude of applications but struggle with significant risks, notably in generating harmful content and biases. Drawing an analogy to the human psyche's conflict between evolutionary survival instincts and societal norm adherence elucidated in Freud's psychoanalysis theory, we argue that LLMs suffer a similar fundamental conflict, arising between their inherent desire for syntactic and semantic continuity, established during the pre-training phase, and the post-training alignment with human values. This conflict renders LLMs vulnerable to adversarial attacks, wherein intensifying the models' desire for continuity can circumvent alignment efforts, resulting in the generation of harmful information. Through a series of experiments, we first validated the existence of the desire for continuity in LLMs, and further devised a straightforward yet powerful technique, such as incomplete sentences, negative priming, and cognitive dissonance scenarios, to demonstrate that even advanced LLMs struggle to prevent the generation of harmful information. In summary, our study uncovers the root of LLMs' vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks, hereby questioning the efficacy of solely relying on sophisticated alignment methods, and further advocates for a new training idea that integrates modal concepts alongside traditional amodal concepts, aiming to endow LLMs with a more nuanced understanding of real-world contexts and ethical considerations.

Recent Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents replicate the R1-Zero paradigm, coupling online Reinforcement Learning (RL) with explicit chain-of-thought reasoning prior to object grounding and thereby achieving substantial performance gains. In this paper, we first conduct extensive analysis experiments of three key components of that training pipeline: input design, output evaluation, and policy update-each revealing distinct challenges arising from blindly applying general-purpose RL without adapting to GUI grounding tasks. Input design: Current templates encourage the model to generate chain-of-thought reasoning, but longer chains unexpectedly lead to worse grounding performance. Output evaluation: Reward functions based on hit signals or box area allow models to exploit box size, leading to reward hacking and poor localization quality. Policy update: Online RL tends to overfit easy examples due to biases in length and sample difficulty, leading to under-optimization on harder cases. To address these issues, we propose three targeted solutions. First, we adopt a Fast Thinking Template that encourages direct answer generation, reducing excessive reasoning during training. Second, we incorporate a box size constraint into the reward function to mitigate reward hacking. Third, we revise the RL objective by adjusting length normalization and adding a difficulty-aware scaling factor, enabling better optimization on hard samples. Our GUI-G1-3B, trained on 17K public samples with Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct, achieves 90.3% accuracy on ScreenSpot and 37.1% on ScreenSpot-Pro. This surpasses all prior models of similar size and even outperforms the larger UI-TARS-7B, establishing a new state-of-the-art in GUI agent grounding. The project repository is available at https://github.com/Yuqi-Zhou/GUI-G1.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to others, is fundamental for human social intelligence and a critical capability for advanced Artificial Intelligence. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promising performance on ToM benchmarks, raising the question: Do these benchmarks necessitate explicit human-like reasoning processes, or can models succeed through alternative strategies? We investigate this question empirically by applying Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) to LLMs of varying scales (0.5B to 7B parameters) and evaluating them across multiple ToM datasets. Our results reveal a scale-dependent impact of RL: while RL significantly improves accuracy and fosters high-quality, interpretable, and transferable belief-tracking reasoning in larger models (7B), it leads to "reasoning collapse" in smaller models (leq3B), where high accuracy and generalization ability are achieved via drastically shortened, less meaningful responses. Surprisingly, further SFT achieves competitive and generalizable performance across these benchmarks, often matching or exceeding RL models in accuracy, despite not being explicitly trained to produce structured reasoning traces. These findings highlight a critical discrepancy between benchmark accuracy and the nature of learned reasoning. Our work suggests that current ToM benchmarks may be solvable without requiring the explicit, human-like simulation of mental states they were designed to probe. LLMs, particularly when scale is limited or training signals focus solely on output correctness, may leverage alternative rules effective for benchmark data structures.

GUI grounding is a critical component in building capable GUI agents. However, existing grounding benchmarks suffer from significant limitations: they either provide insufficient data volume and narrow domain coverage, or focus excessively on a single platform and require highly specialized domain knowledge. In this work, we present VenusBench-GD, a comprehensive, bilingual benchmark for GUI grounding that spans multiple platforms, enabling hierarchical evaluation for real-word applications. VenusBench-GD contributes as follows: (i) we introduce a large-scale, cross-platform benchmark with extensive coverage of applications, diverse UI elements, and rich annotated data, (ii) we establish a high-quality data construction pipeline for grounding tasks, achieving higher annotation accuracy than existing benchmarks, and (iii) we extend the scope of element grounding by proposing a hierarchical task taxonomy that divides grounding into basic and advanced categories, encompassing six distinct subtasks designed to evaluate models from complementary perspectives. Our experimental findings reveal critical insights: general-purpose multimodal models now match or even surpass specialized GUI models on basic grounding tasks. In contrast, advanced tasks, still favor GUI-specialized models, though they exhibit significant overfitting and poor robustness. These results underscore the necessity of comprehensive, multi-tiered evaluation frameworks.

Large language models have achieved remarkable progress on complex reasoning tasks. However, they often implicitly fabricate information when inputs are incomplete, producing confident but unreliable conclusions -- a failure mode we term ungrounded reasoning. We argue that this issue arises not from insufficient reasoning capability, but from the lack of inferential boundary awareness -- the ability to recognize when the necessary premises for valid inference are missing. To address this issue, we propose Grounded Reasoning via Interactive Reinforcement Learning (GRIL), a multi-turn reinforcement learning framework for grounded reasoning under incomplete information. GRIL decomposes the reasoning process into two stages: clarify and pause, which identifies whether the available information is sufficient, and grounded reasoning, which performs task solving once the necessary premises are established. We design stage-specific rewards to penalize hallucinations, enabling models to detect gaps, stop proactively, and resume reasoning after clarification. Experiments on GSM8K-Insufficient and MetaMATH-Insufficient show that GRIL significantly improves premise detection (up to 45%), leading to a 30% increase in task success while reducing average response length by over 20%. Additional analyses confirm robustness to noisy user responses and generalization to out-of-distribution tasks.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have exhibited the capacity of enhancing reasoning performance via internal test-time scaling. Building upon this, a promising direction is to further scale test-time compute to unlock even greater reasoning capabilities. However, as we push these scaling boundaries, systematically understanding the practical limits and achieving optimal resource allocation becomes a critical challenge. In this paper, we investigate the scaling Pareto of test-time scaling and introduce the Test-Time Scaling Performance Model (TTSPM). We theoretically analyze two fundamental paradigms for such extended scaling, parallel scaling and sequential scaling, from a probabilistic modeling perspective. Our primary contribution is the derivation of the saturation point on the scaling budget for both strategies, identifying thresholds beyond which additional computation yields diminishing returns. Remarkably, despite their distinct mechanisms, both paradigms converge to a unified mathematical structure in their upper bounds. We empirically validate our theoretical findings on challenging reasoning benchmarks, including AIME, MATH-500, and GPQA, demonstrating the practical utility of these bounds for test-time resource allocation. We hope that this work provides insights into the cost-benefit trade-offs of test-time scaling, guiding the development of more resource-efficient inference strategies for large reasoning models.

With the recent significant advancements in large multi-modal models (LMMs), the importance of their grounding capability in visual chat is increasingly recognized. Despite recent efforts to enable LMMs to support grounding, their capabilities for grounding and chat are usually separate, and their chat performance drops dramatically when asked to ground. The problem is the lack of a dataset for grounded visual chat (GVC). Existing grounding datasets only contain short captions. To address this issue, we have created GVC data that allows for the combination of grounding and chat capabilities. To better evaluate the GVC capabilities, we have introduced a benchmark called Grounding-Bench. Additionally, we have proposed a model design that can support GVC and various types of visual prompts by connecting segmentation models with language models. Experimental results demonstrate that our model outperforms other LMMs on Grounding-Bench. Furthermore, our model achieves competitive performance on classic grounding benchmarks like RefCOCO/+/g and Flickr30K Entities. Our code will be released at https://github.com/UX-Decoder/LLaVA-Grounding .

The remarkable capabilities of modern large reasoning models are largely unlocked through post-training techniques such as supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. However, the architectural mechanisms behind such improvements remain largely opaque. In this work, we use circuit analysis to demonstrate that post-training for complex reasoning sparks the emergence of novel, functionally specialized attention heads. These heads collectively support structured reasoning and computation. Our comparative analysis across Qwen families and DeepSeek-distilled model reveals that these emergent heads evolve differently under different training regimes. Distillation and SFT foster a cumulative addition of stable reasoning heads. In contrast, group relative policy optimization operates in a dynamic search mode: relatively few attention heads are iteratively activated, evaluated, and pruned, with their survival closely tracking fluctuations in the task reward signal. Furthermore, we find that controllable think on/off models do not possess dedicated thinking heads. Instead, turning off explicit reasoning triggers a broader-but less efficient-set of compensatory heads. Through ablation and qualitative analyses, we connect these circuit-level dynamics to a crucial performance trade-off: strengthened heads enable sophisticated problem-solving strategies for difficult problems but can also introduce over-thinking failure modes, such as calculation errors or logical loops on simpler tasks. These findings connect circuit-level dynamics to macro-level performance, identifying an inherent tension where complex reasoning comes at the cost of elementary computations. More broadly, our work points to future directions for training policy design, emphasizing the need to balance the development of effective reasoning strategies with the assurance of reliable, flawless execution.

Large language model (LLM)-based agents exhibit strong step-by-step reasoning capabilities over short horizons, yet often fail to sustain coherent behavior over long planning horizons. We argue that this failure reflects a fundamental mismatch: step-wise reasoning induces a form of step-wise greedy policy that is adequate for short horizons but fails in long-horizon planning, where early actions must account for delayed consequences. From this planning-centric perspective, we study LLM-based agents in deterministic, fully structured environments with explicit state transitions and evaluation signals. Our analysis reveals a core failure mode of reasoning-based policies: locally optimal choices induced by step-wise scoring lead to early myopic commitments that are systematically amplified over time and difficult to recover from. We introduce FLARE (Future-aware Lookahead with Reward Estimation) as a minimal instantiation of future-aware planning to enforce explicit lookahead, value propagation, and limited commitment in a single model, allowing downstream outcomes to influence early decisions. Across multiple benchmarks, agent frameworks, and LLM backbones, FLARE consistently improves task performance and planning-level behavior, frequently allowing LLaMA-8B with FLARE to outperform GPT-4o with standard step-by-step reasoning. These results establish a clear distinction between reasoning and planning.

Graphical user interface (GUI) grounding, the ability to map natural language instructions to specific actions on graphical user interfaces, remains a critical bottleneck in computer use agent development. Current benchmarks oversimplify grounding tasks as short referring expressions, failing to capture the complexity of real-world interactions that require software commonsense, layout understanding, and fine-grained manipulation capabilities. To address these limitations, we introduce OSWorld-G, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 564 finely annotated samples across diverse task types including text matching, element recognition, layout understanding, and precise manipulation. Additionally, we synthesize and release the largest computer use grounding dataset Jedi, which contains 4 million examples through multi-perspective decoupling of tasks. Our multi-scale models trained on Jedi demonstrate its effectiveness by outperforming existing approaches on ScreenSpot-v2, ScreenSpot-Pro, and our OSWorld-G. Furthermore, we demonstrate that improved grounding with Jedi directly enhances agentic capabilities of general foundation models on complex computer tasks, improving from 5% to 27% on OSWorld. Through detailed ablation studies, we identify key factors contributing to grounding performance and verify that combining specialized data for different interface elements enables compositional generalization to novel interfaces. All benchmark, data, checkpoints, and code are open-sourced and available at https://osworld-grounding.github.io.

Natural intelligences (NIs) thrive in a dynamic world - they learn quickly, sometimes with only a few samples. In contrast, artificial intelligences (AIs) typically learn with a prohibitive number of training samples and computational power. What design principle difference between NI and AI could contribute to such a discrepancy? Here, we investigate the role of weight polarity: development processes initialize NIs with advantageous polarity configurations; as NIs grow and learn, synapse magnitudes update, yet polarities are largely kept unchanged. We demonstrate with simulation and image classification tasks that if weight polarities are adequately set a priori, then networks learn with less time and data. We also explicitly illustrate situations in which a priori setting the weight polarities is disadvantageous for networks. Our work illustrates the value of weight polarities from the perspective of statistical and computational efficiency during learning.

Hallucination is a persistent challenge in large language models (LLMs), where even with rigorous quality control, models often generate distorted facts. This paradox, in which error generation continues despite high-quality training data, calls for a deeper understanding of the underlying LLM mechanisms. To address it, we propose a novel concept: knowledge overshadowing, where model's dominant knowledge can obscure less prominent knowledge during text generation, causing the model to fabricate inaccurate details. Building on this idea, we introduce a novel framework to quantify factual hallucinations by modeling knowledge overshadowing. Central to our approach is the log-linear law, which predicts that the rate of factual hallucination increases linearly with the logarithmic scale of (1) Knowledge Popularity, (2) Knowledge Length, and (3) Model Size. The law provides a means to preemptively quantify hallucinations, offering foresight into their occurrence even before model training or inference. Built on overshadowing effect, we propose a new decoding strategy CoDa, to mitigate hallucinations, which notably enhance model factuality on Overshadow (27.9%), MemoTrap (13.1%) and NQ-Swap (18.3%). Our findings not only deepen understandings of the underlying mechanisms behind hallucinations but also provide actionable insights for developing more predictable and controllable language models.

This work presents an information-theoretic perspective to group fairness trade-offs in federated learning (FL) with respect to sensitive attributes, such as gender, race, etc. Existing works often focus on either global fairness (overall disparity of the model across all clients) or local fairness (disparity of the model at each client), without always considering their trade-offs. There is a lack of understanding regarding the interplay between global and local fairness in FL, particularly under data heterogeneity, and if and when one implies the other. To address this gap, we leverage a body of work in information theory called partial information decomposition (PID), which first identifies three sources of unfairness in FL, namely, Unique Disparity, Redundant Disparity, and Masked Disparity. We demonstrate how these three disparities contribute to global and local fairness using canonical examples. This decomposition helps us derive fundamental limits on the trade-off between global and local fairness, highlighting where they agree or disagree. We introduce the Accuracy and Global-Local Fairness Optimality Problem (AGLFOP), a convex optimization that defines the theoretical limits of accuracy and fairness trade-offs, identifying the best possible performance any FL strategy can attain given a dataset and client distribution. We also present experimental results on synthetic datasets and the ADULT dataset to support our theoretical findings.

While effective post-training integrates Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL), the optimal mechanism for utilizing expert trajectories remains unresolved. We propose the Plasticity-Ceiling Framework to theoretically ground this landscape, decomposing performance into foundational SFT performance and the subsequent RL plasticity. Through extensive benchmarking, we establish the Sequential SFT-then-RL pipeline as the superior standard, overcoming the stability deficits of synchronized approaches. Furthermore, we derive precise scaling guidelines: (1) Transitioning to RL at the SFT Stable or Mild Overfitting Sub-phase maximizes the final ceiling by securing foundational SFT performance without compromising RL plasticity; (2) Refuting ``Less is More'' in the context of SFT-then-RL scaling, we demonstrate that Data Scale determines the primary post-training potential, while Trajectory Difficulty acts as a performance multiplier; and (3) Identifying that the Minimum SFT Validation Loss serves as a robust indicator for selecting the expert trajectories that maximize the final performance ceiling. Our findings provide actionable guidelines for maximizing the value extracted from expert trajectories.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) monitoring, in which automated systems monitor the CoT of an LLM, is a promising approach for effectively overseeing AI systems. However, the extent to which a model's CoT helps us oversee the model - the monitorability of the CoT - can be affected by training, for instance by the model learning to hide important features of its reasoning. We propose and empirically validate a conceptual framework for predicting when and why this occurs. We model LLM post-training as an RL environment where the reward decomposes into two terms: one term depending on final outputs and another term depending on the CoT. Our framework allows us to classify these two terms as "aligned", "orthogonal", or "in-conflict" before training. We predict that training with in-conflict terms will reduce monitorability, orthogonal terms will not affect it, and aligned terms will improve it. To validate our framework, we use it to classify a set of RL environments, train LLMs within those environments, and evaluate how training affects CoT monitorability. We find that (1) training with "in-conflict" reward terms reduces CoT monitorability and (2) optimizing in-conflict reward terms is difficult.

The relationship between memorization and generalization in large language models (LLMs) remains an open area of research, with growing evidence that the two are deeply intertwined. In this work, we investigate this relationship by pre-training a series of capacity-limited Transformer models from scratch on two synthetic character-level tasks designed to separately probe generalization (via arithmetic extrapolation) and memorization (via factual recall). We observe a consistent trade-off: small models extrapolate to unseen arithmetic cases but fail to memorize facts, while larger models memorize but fail to extrapolate. An intermediate-capacity model exhibits a similar shift toward memorization. When trained on both tasks jointly, no model (regardless of size) succeeds at extrapolation. These findings suggest that pre-training may intrinsically favor one learning mode over the other. By isolating these dynamics in a controlled setting, our study offers insight into how model capacity shapes learning behavior and offers broader implications for the design and deployment of small language models.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) must resolve conflicts when different modalities provide contradictory information, a process we term modality following. Prior work measured this behavior only with coarse dataset-level statistics, overlooking the influence of model's confidence in unimodal reasoning. In this paper, we introduce a new framework that decomposes modality following into two fundamental factors: relative reasoning uncertainty (the case-specific confidence gap between unimodal predictions) and inherent modality preference( a model's stable bias when uncertainties are balanced). To validate this framework, we construct a controllable dataset that systematically varies the reasoning difficulty of visual and textual inputs. Using entropy as a fine-grained uncertainty metric, we uncover a universal law: the probability of following a modality decreases monotonically as its relative uncertainty increases. At the relative difficulty level where the model tends to follow both modalities with comparable probability what we call the balance point, a practical indicator of the model's inherent preference. Unlike traditional macro-level ratios, this measure offers a more principled and less confounded way to characterize modality bias, disentangling it from unimodal capabilities and dataset artifacts. Further, by probing layer-wise predictions, we reveal the internal mechanism of oscillation: in ambiguous regions near the balance point, models vacillate between modalities across layers, explaining externally observed indecision. Together, these findings establish relative uncertainty and inherent preference as the two governing principles of modality following, offering both a quantitative framework and mechanistic insight into how MLLMs resolve conflicting information.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

Large language models (LLMs) frequently hallucinate on abstractive summarization tasks such as document-based question-answering, meeting summarization, and clinical report generation, even though all necessary information is included in context. However, optimizing LLMs to hallucinate less on these tasks is challenging, as hallucination is hard to efficiently evaluate at each optimization step. In this work, we show that reducing hallucination on a synthetic task can also reduce hallucination on real-world downstream tasks. Our method, SynTra, first designs a synthetic task where hallucinations are easy to elicit and measure. It next optimizes the LLM's system message via prefix-tuning on the synthetic task, and finally transfers the system message to realistic, hard-to-optimize tasks. Across three realistic abstractive summarization tasks, SynTra reduces hallucination for two 13B-parameter LLMs using only a synthetic retrieval task for supervision. We also find that optimizing the system message rather than the model weights can be critical; fine-tuning the entire model on the synthetic task can counterintuitively increase hallucination. Overall, SynTra demonstrates that the extra flexibility of working with synthetic data can help mitigate undesired behaviors in practice.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

Despite their powerful chat, coding, and reasoning abilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) frequently hallucinate. Conventional wisdom suggests that hallucinations are a consequence of a balance between creativity and factuality, which can be mitigated, but not eliminated, by grounding the LLM in external knowledge sources. Through extensive systematic experiments, we show that these traditional approaches fail to explain why LLMs hallucinate in practice. Specifically, we show that LLMs augmented with a massive Mixture of Memory Experts (MoME) can easily memorize large datasets of random numbers. We corroborate these experimental findings with a theoretical construction showing that simple neural networks trained to predict the next token hallucinate when the training loss is above a threshold as it usually does in practice when training on internet scale data. We interpret our findings by comparing against traditional retrieval methods for mitigating hallucinations. We use our findings to design a first generation model for removing hallucinations -- Lamini-1 -- that stores facts in a massive mixture of millions of memory experts that are retrieved dynamically.

While large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong performance on factoid question answering, they are still prone to hallucination and untruthful responses, particularly when tasks demand information outside their parametric knowledge. Indeed, truthfulness requires more than accuracy -- models must also recognize uncertainty and abstain when unsure to avoid hallucinations. This presents a fundamental challenge for existing methods: approaches that optimize for accuracy often amplify hallucinations, while those that encourage abstention can become overly conservative, sacrificing correct answers. Both extremes ultimately compromise truthfulness. In this work, we present TruthRL, a general reinforcement learning (RL) framework that directly optimizes the truthfulness of LLMs. Specifically, we implement TruthRL using GRPO with a simple yet effective ternary reward that distinguishes correct answers, hallucinations, and abstentions. It incentivizes models to reduce hallucinations not only by providing correct responses, but also by enabling abstention when uncertain, thereby improving truthfulness. Extensive experiments across four knowledge-intensive benchmarks show that, compared to vanilla RL, TruthRL significantly reduces hallucinations by 28.9% and improves truthfulness by 21.1%, with consistent gains across various backbone models (e.g., Qwen, Llama) under both retrieval and non-retrieval setups. In-depth ablation study demonstrates that vanilla accuracy-driven methods, such as supervised fine-tuning or RL with a binary reward, struggle to balance factual correctness and uncertainty. In contrast, our proposed truthfulness-driven TruthRL achieves strong performance in both accuracy and truthfulness, underscoring the importance of learning objective design for developing truthful LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced in reasoning tasks through reinforcement learning (RL) optimization, achieving impressive capabilities across various challenging benchmarks. However, our empirical analysis reveals a critical drawback: reasoning-oriented RL fine-tuning significantly increases the prevalence of hallucinations. We theoretically analyze the RL training dynamics, identifying high-variance gradient, entropy-induced randomness, and susceptibility to spurious local optima as key factors leading to hallucinations. To address this drawback, we propose Factuality-aware Step-wise Policy Optimization (FSPO), an innovative RL fine-tuning algorithm incorporating explicit factuality verification at each reasoning step. FSPO leverages automated verification against given evidence to dynamically adjust token-level advantage values, incentivizing factual correctness throughout the reasoning process. Experiments across mathematical reasoning and hallucination benchmarks using Qwen2.5 and Llama models demonstrate that FSPO effectively reduces hallucinations while enhancing reasoning accuracy, substantially improving both reliability and performance.

Modern foundation models rely heavily on using scaling laws to guide crucial training decisions. Researchers often extrapolate the optimal architecture and hyper parameters settings from smaller training runs by describing the relationship between, loss, or task performance, and scale. All components of this process vary, from the specific equation being fit, to the training setup, to the optimization method. Each of these factors may affect the fitted law, and therefore, the conclusions of a given study. We discuss discrepancies in the conclusions that several prior works reach, on questions such as the optimal token to parameter ratio. We augment this discussion with our own analysis of the critical impact that changes in specific details may effect in a scaling study, and the resulting altered conclusions. Additionally, we survey over 50 papers that study scaling trends: while 45 of these papers quantify these trends using a power law, most under-report crucial details needed to reproduce their findings. To mitigate this, we we propose a checklist for authors to consider while contributing to scaling law research.

Generative AI systems like foundation models (FMs) must align well with human values to ensure their behavior is helpful and trustworthy. While Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has shown promise for optimizing model performance using human judgments, existing RLHF pipelines predominantly rely on immediate feedback, which can fail to accurately reflect the downstream impact of an interaction on users' utility. We demonstrate that feedback based on evaluators' foresight estimates of downstream consequences systematically induces Goodhart's Law dynamics, incentivizing misaligned behaviors like sycophancy and deception and ultimately degrading user outcomes. To alleviate this, we propose decoupling evaluation from prediction by refocusing RLHF on hindsight feedback. Our theoretical analysis reveals that conditioning evaluator feedback on downstream observations mitigates misalignment and improves expected human utility, even when these observations are simulated by the AI system itself. To leverage this insight in a practical alignment algorithm, we introduce Reinforcement Learning from Hindsight Simulation (RLHS), which first simulates plausible consequences and then elicits feedback to assess what behaviors were genuinely beneficial in hindsight. We apply RLHS to two widely-employed online and offline preference optimization methods -- Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) -- and show empirically that misalignment is significantly reduced with both methods. Through an online human user study, we show that RLHS consistently outperforms RLHF in helping users achieve their goals and earns higher satisfaction ratings, despite being trained solely with simulated hindsight feedback. These results underscore the importance of focusing on long-term consequences, even simulated ones, to mitigate misalignment in RLHF.

What happens when a new piece of knowledge is introduced into the training data and how long does it last while a large language model (LM) continues to train? We investigate this question by injecting facts into LMs from a new probing dataset, "Outlandish", which is designed to permit the testing of a spectrum of different fact types. When studying how robust these memories are, there appears to be a sweet spot in the spectrum of fact novelty between consistency with world knowledge and total randomness, where the injected memory is the most enduring. Specifically we show that facts that conflict with common knowledge are remembered for tens of thousands of training steps, while prompts not conflicting with common knowledge (mundane), as well as scrambled prompts (randomly jumbled) are both forgotten much more rapidly. Further, knowledge-conflicting facts can "prime'' how the language model hallucinates on logically unrelated prompts, showing their propensity for non-target generalization, while both mundane and randomly jumbled facts prime significantly less. Finally, we show that impacts of knowledge-conflicting facts in LMs, though they can be long lasting, can be largely erased by novel application of multi-step sparse updates, even while the training ability of the model is preserved. As such, this very simple procedure has direct implications for mitigating the effects of data poisoning in training.

Large language models (LLMs) can achieve strong reasoning performance with sufficient computation, but they do not inherently know how much computation a task requires. We study budgeted inference-time reasoning for multiple tasks under a strict global token constraint and formalize it as a Ordered Stochastic Multiple-Choice Knapsack Problem(OS-MCKP). This perspective highlights a meta-cognitive requirement -- anticipating task difficulty, estimating return over investment (ROI), and allocating computation strategically. We propose ROI-Reasoning, a two-stage framework that endows LLMs with intrinsic, budget-aware rationality. In the first stage, Meta-Cognitive Fine-Tuning teaches models to predict reasoning cost and expected utility before generation, enabling explicit solve-or-skip decisions. Next, Rationality-Aware Reinforcement Learning optimizes sequential decision making under a hard token budget, allowing models to learn long-horizon allocation strategies. Across budgeted mathematical reasoning benchmarks, ROI-Reasoning consistently improves overall score while substantially reducing regret under tight computation budgets.

Existing work in language grounding typically study single environments. How do we build unified models that apply across multiple environments? We propose the multi-environment Symbolic Interactive Language Grounding benchmark (SILG), which unifies a collection of diverse grounded language learning environments under a common interface. SILG consists of grid-world environments that require generalization to new dynamics, entities, and partially observed worlds (RTFM, Messenger, NetHack), as well as symbolic counterparts of visual worlds that require interpreting rich natural language with respect to complex scenes (ALFWorld, Touchdown). Together, these environments provide diverse grounding challenges in richness of observation space, action space, language specification, and plan complexity. In addition, we propose the first shared model architecture for RL on these environments, and evaluate recent advances such as egocentric local convolution, recurrent state-tracking, entity-centric attention, and pretrained LM using SILG. Our shared architecture achieves comparable performance to environment-specific architectures. Moreover, we find that many recent modelling advances do not result in significant gains on environments other than the one they were designed for. This highlights the need for a multi-environment benchmark. Finally, the best models significantly underperform humans on SILG, which suggests ample room for future work. We hope SILG enables the community to quickly identify new methodologies for language grounding that generalize to a diverse set of environments and their associated challenges.