Daily Papers

AI agentic programming is an emerging paradigm in which large language models (LLMs) autonomously plan, execute, and interact with external tools like compilers, debuggers, and version control systems to iteratively perform complex software development tasks. Unlike conventional code generation tools, agentic systems are capable of decomposing high-level goals, coordinating multi-step processes, and adapting their behavior based on intermediate feedback. These capabilities are transforming the software development practice. As this emerging field evolves rapidly, there is a need to define its scope, consolidate its technical foundations, and identify open research challenges. This survey provides a comprehensive and timely review of AI agentic programming. We introduce a taxonomy of agent behaviors and system architectures, and examine core techniques including planning, memory and context management, tool integration, and execution monitoring. We also analyze existing benchmarks and evaluation methodologies used to assess coding agent performance. Our study identifies several key challenges, including limitations in handling long context, a lack of persistent memory across tasks, and concerns around safety, alignment with user intent, and collaboration with human developers. We discuss emerging opportunities to improve the reliability, adaptability, and transparency of agentic systems. By synthesizing recent advances and outlining future directions, this survey aims to provide a foundation for research and development in building the next generation of intelligent and trustworthy AI coding agents.

Recent advances in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have enabled richer perceptual grounding for code policy generation in embodied agents. However, most existing systems lack effective mechanisms to adaptively monitor policy execution and repair codes during task completion. In this work, we introduce HyCodePolicy, a hybrid language-based control framework that systematically integrates code synthesis, geometric grounding, perceptual monitoring, and iterative repair into a closed-loop programming cycle for embodied agents. Technically, given a natural language instruction, our system first decomposes it into subgoals and generates an initial executable program grounded in object-centric geometric primitives. The program is then executed in simulation, while a vision-language model (VLM) observes selected checkpoints to detect and localize execution failures and infer failure reasons. By fusing structured execution traces capturing program-level events with VLM-based perceptual feedback, HyCodePolicy infers failure causes and repairs programs. This hybrid dual feedback mechanism enables self-correcting program synthesis with minimal human supervision. Our results demonstrate that HyCodePolicy significantly improves the robustness and sample efficiency of robot manipulation policies, offering a scalable strategy for integrating multimodal reasoning into autonomous decision-making pipelines.

Remote Code Execution (RCE) exploits pose a significant threat to AI and ML systems, particularly in GPU-accelerated environments where the computational power of GPUs can be misused for malicious purposes. This paper focuses on RCE attacks leveraging deserialization vulnerabilities and custom layers, such as TensorFlow Lambda layers, which are often overlooked due to the complexity of monitoring GPU workloads. These vulnerabilities enable attackers to execute arbitrary code, blending malicious activity seamlessly into expected model behavior and exploiting GPUs for unauthorized tasks such as cryptocurrency mining. Unlike traditional CPU-based attacks, the parallel processing nature of GPUs and their high resource utilization make runtime detection exceptionally challenging. In this work, we provide a comprehensive examination of RCE exploits targeting GPUs, demonstrating an attack that utilizes these vulnerabilities to deploy a crypto miner on a GPU. We highlight the technical intricacies of such attacks, emphasize their potential for significant financial and computational costs, and propose strategies for mitigation. By shedding light on this underexplored attack vector, we aim to raise awareness and encourage the adoption of robust security measures in GPU-driven AI and ML systems, with an emphasis on static and model scanning as an easier way to detect exploits.

While LLM-based agents can interact with environments via invoking external tools, their expanded capabilities also amplify security risks. Monitoring step-level tool invocation behaviors in real time and proactively intervening before unsafe execution is critical for agent deployment, yet remains under-explored. In this work, we first construct TS-Bench, a novel benchmark for step-level tool invocation safety detection in LLM agents. We then develop a guardrail model, TS-Guard, using multi-task reinforcement learning. The model proactively detects unsafe tool invocation actions before execution by reasoning over the interaction history. It assesses request harmfulness and action-attack correlations, producing interpretable and generalizable safety judgments and feedback. Furthermore, we introduce TS-Flow, a guardrail-feedback-driven reasoning framework for LLM agents, which reduces harmful tool invocations of ReAct-style agents by 65 percent on average and improves benign task completion by approximately 10 percent under prompt injection attacks.

Run the same LLM agent on the same task twice: do you get the same behavior? We find the answer is often no. In a study of 3,000 agent runs across three models (Llama 3.1 70B, GPT-4o, and Claude Sonnet 4.5) on HotpotQA, we observe that ReAct-style agents produce 2.0--4.2 distinct action sequences per 10 runs on average, even with identical inputs. More importantly, this variance predicts failure: tasks with consistent behavior (leq2 unique paths) achieve 80--92% accuracy, while highly inconsistent tasks (geq6 unique paths) achieve only 25--60%, a 32--55 percentage point gap depending on model. We trace variance to early decisions: 69% of divergence occurs at step 2, the first search query. Our results suggest that monitoring behavioral consistency during execution could enable early error detection and improve agent reliability.

We present Qualixar OS, the first application-layer operating system for universal AI agent orchestration. Unlike kernel-level approaches (AIOS) or single-framework tools (AutoGen, CrewAI), Qualixar OS provides a complete runtime for heterogeneous multi-agent systems spanning 10 LLM providers, 8+ agent frameworks, and 7 transports. We contribute: (1) execution semantics for 12 multi-agent topologies including grid, forest, mesh, and maker patterns; (2) Forge, an LLM-driven team design engine with historical strategy memory; (3) three-layer model routing combining Q-learning, five strategies, and Bayesian POMDP with dynamic multi-provider discovery; (4) a consensus-based judge pipeline with Goodhart detection, JSD drift monitoring, and alignment trilemma navigation; (5) four-layer content attribution with HMAC signing and steganographic watermarks; (6) universal compatibility via the Claw Bridge supporting MCP and A2A protocols with a 25-command Universal Command Protocol; (7) a 24-tab production dashboard with visual workflow builder and skill marketplace. Qualixar OS is validated by 2,821 test cases across 217 event types and 8 quality modules. On a custom 20-task evaluation suite, the system achieves 100% accuracy at a mean cost of $0.000039 per task. Source-available under the Elastic License 2.0.

OpenClaw has rapidly established itself as a leading open-source autonomous agent runtime, offering powerful capabilities including tool integration, local file access, and shell command execution. However, these broad operational privileges introduce critical security vulnerabilities, transforming model errors into tangible system-level threats such as sensitive data leakage, privilege escalation, and malicious third-party skill execution. Existing security measures for the OpenClaw ecosystem remain highly fragmented, addressing only isolated stages of the agent lifecycle rather than providing holistic protection. To bridge this gap, we present ClawKeeper, a real-time security framework that integrates multi-dimensional protection mechanisms across three complementary architectural layers. (1) Skill-based protection operates at the instruction level, injecting structured security policies directly into the agent context to enforce environment-specific constraints and cross-platform boundaries. (2) Plugin-based protection serves as an internal runtime enforcer, providing configuration hardening, proactive threat detection, and continuous behavioral monitoring throughout the execution pipeline. (3) Watcher-based protection introduces a novel, decoupled system-level security middleware that continuously verifies agent state evolution. It enables real-time execution intervention without coupling to the agent's internal logic, supporting operations such as halting high-risk actions or enforcing human confirmation. We argue that this Watcher paradigm holds strong potential to serve as a foundational building block for securing next-generation autonomous agent systems. Extensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of ClawKeeper across diverse threat scenarios. We release our code.

Emerging Artificial Intelligence-enabled Internet-of-Things (AI-IoT) System-on-a-Chip (SoC) for augmented reality, personalized healthcare, and nano-robotics need to run many diverse tasks within a power envelope of a few tens of mW over a wide range of operating conditions: compute-intensive but strongly quantized Deep Neural Network (DNN) inference, as well as signal processing and control requiring high-precision floating-point. We present Marsellus, an all-digital heterogeneous SoC for AI-IoT end-nodes fabricated in GlobalFoundries 22nm FDX that combines 1) a general-purpose cluster of 16 RISC-V Digital Signal Processing (DSP) cores attuned for the execution of a diverse range of workloads exploiting 4-bit and 2-bit arithmetic extensions (XpulpNN), combined with fused MAC&LOAD operations and floating-point support; 2) a 2-8bit Reconfigurable Binary Engine (RBE) to accelerate 3x3 and 1x1 (pointwise) convolutions in DNNs; 3) a set of On-Chip Monitoring (OCM) blocks connected to an Adaptive Body Biasing (ABB) generator and a hardware control loop, enabling on-the-fly adaptation of transistor threshold voltages. Marsellus achieves up to 180 Gop/s or 3.32 Top/s/W on 2-bit precision arithmetic in software, and up to 637 Gop/s or 12.4 Top/s/W on hardware-accelerated DNN layers.

AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit layer for AI agents. AEGIS interposes on the tool-execution path and applies a three-stage pipeline: (i) deep string extraction from tool arguments, (ii) content-first risk scanning, and (iii) composable policy validation. High-risk calls can be held for human approval, and all decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail based on Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hash chaining. In the current implementation, AEGIS supports 14 agent frameworks across Python, JavaScript, and Go with lightweight integration. On a curated suite of 48 attackinstances, AEGIS blocks all attacks in the suite before execution; on 500 benign tool calls, it yields a 1.2% false positive rate; and across 1,000 consecutive interceptions, it adds 8.3 ms median latency. The live demo will show end-to-end interception of benign, malicious, and human-escalated tool calls, allowing attendees to observe real-time blocking, approval workflows, and audit-trail generation. These results suggest that pre-execution mediation for AI agents can be practical, low-overhead, and directly deployable.

Predictive process monitoring is a process mining task aimed at forecasting information about a running process trace, such as the most correct next activity to be executed. In medical domains, predictive process monitoring can provide valuable decision support in atypical and nontrivial situations. Decision support and quality assessment in medicine cannot ignore domain knowledge, in order to be grounded on all the available information (which is not limited to data) and to be really acceptable by end users. In this paper, we propose a predictive process monitoring approach relying on the use of a {\em transformer}, a deep learning architecture based on the attention mechanism. A major contribution of our work lies in the incorporation of ontological domain-specific knowledge, carried out through a graph positional encoding technique. The paper presents and discusses the encouraging experimental result we are collecting in the domain of stroke management.

As AI agents automate critical workloads, they remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Current defenses rely on monitoring protocols that jointly evaluate an agent's Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and tool-use actions to ensure alignment with user intent. We demonstrate that these monitoring-based defenses can be bypassed via a novel Agent-as-a-Proxy attack, where prompt injection attacks treat the agent as a delivery mechanism, bypassing both agent and monitor simultaneously. While prior work on scalable oversight has focused on whether small monitors can supervise large agents, we show that even frontier-scale monitors are vulnerable. Large-scale monitoring models like Qwen2.5-72B can be bypassed by agents with similar capabilities, such as GPT-4o mini and Llama-3.1-70B. On the AgentDojo benchmark, we achieve a high attack success rate against AlignmentCheck and Extract-and-Evaluate monitors under diverse monitoring LLMs. Our findings suggest current monitoring-based agentic defenses are fundamentally fragile regardless of model scale.

Modern web dashboards and enterprise applications increasingly rely on complex, distributed microservices architectures. While these architectures offer scalability, they introduce significant challenges in debugging and observability. When failures occur, they often manifest as opaque error messages to the end-user such as Something went wrong. This masks the underlying root cause which may reside in browser side exceptions, API contract violations, or server side logic failures. Existing monitoring tools capture these events in isolation but fail to correlate them effectively or provide intelligible explanations to non technical users. This paper proposes a novel system for Automated Multi Source Debugging and Natural Language Error Explanation. The proposed framework automatically collects and correlates error data from disparate sources such as browser, API, server logs and validates API contracts in real time, and utilizes Large Language Models to generate natural language explanations. This approach significantly reduces Mean Time to Resolution for support engineers and improves the user experience by transforming cryptic error codes into actionable insights.

Observability into the decision making of modern AI systems may be required to safely deploy increasingly capable agents. Monitoring the chain-of-thought (CoT) of today's reasoning models has proven effective for detecting misbehavior. However, this "monitorability" may be fragile under different training procedures, data sources, or even continued system scaling. To measure and track monitorability, we propose three evaluation archetypes (intervention, process, and outcome-property) and a new monitorability metric, and introduce a broad evaluation suite. We demonstrate that these evaluations can catch simple model organisms trained to have obfuscated CoTs, and that CoT monitoring is more effective than action-only monitoring in practical settings. We compare the monitorability of various frontier models and find that most models are fairly, but not perfectly, monitorable. We also evaluate how monitorability scales with inference-time compute, reinforcement learning optimization, and pre-training model size. We find that longer CoTs are generally more monitorable and that RL optimization does not materially decrease monitorability even at the current frontier scale. Notably, we find that for a model at a low reasoning effort, we could instead deploy a smaller model at a higher reasoning effort (thereby matching capabilities) and obtain a higher monitorability, albeit at a higher overall inference compute cost. We further investigate agent-monitor scaling trends and find that scaling a weak monitor's test-time compute when monitoring a strong agent increases monitorability. Giving the weak monitor access to CoT not only improves monitorability, but it steepens the monitor's test-time compute to monitorability scaling trend. Finally, we show we can improve monitorability by asking models follow-up questions and giving their follow-up CoT to the monitor.

Deep search agents powered by large language models have demonstrated strong capabilities in multi-step retrieval, reasoning, and long-horizon task execution. However, their practical failures often stem from the lack of mechanisms to monitor and regulate reasoning and retrieval states as tasks evolve under uncertainty. Insights from cognitive neuroscience suggest that human metacognition is hierarchically organized, integrating fast anomaly detection with selectively triggered, experience-driven reflection. In this work, we propose Deep Search with Meta-Cognitive Monitoring (DS-MCM), a deep search framework augmented with an explicit hierarchical metacognitive monitoring mechanism. DS-MCM integrates a Fast Consistency Monitor, which performs lightweight checks on the alignment between external evidence and internal reasoning confidence, and a Slow Experience-Driven Monitor, which is selectively activated to guide corrective intervention based on experience memory from historical agent trajectories. By embedding monitoring directly into the reasoning-retrieval loop, DS-MCM determines both when intervention is warranted and how corrective actions should be informed by prior experience. Experiments across multiple deep search benchmarks and backbone models demonstrate that DS-MCM consistently improves performance and robustness.

Monitoring is an important aspect of safely deploying Large Language Models (LLMs). This paper examines activation probes for detecting ``high-stakes'' interactions -- where the text indicates that the interaction might lead to significant harm -- as a critical, yet underexplored, target for such monitoring. We evaluate several probe architectures trained on synthetic data, and find them to exhibit robust generalization to diverse, out-of-distribution, real-world data. Probes' performance is comparable to that of prompted or finetuned medium-sized LLM monitors, while offering computational savings of six orders-of-magnitude. These savings are enabled by reusing activations of the model that is being monitored. Our experiments also highlight the potential of building resource-aware hierarchical monitoring systems, where probes serve as an efficient initial filter and flag cases for more expensive downstream analysis. We release our novel synthetic dataset and the codebase at https://github.com/arrrlex/models-under-pressure.

In Agentic AI, Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in the orchestration layer to coordinate multiple agents and to interact with external services, retrieval components, and shared memory. In this setting, failures are not limited to incorrect final outputs. They also arise from long-horizon interaction, stochastic decisions, and external side effects (such as API calls, database writes, and message sends). Common failures include non-termination, role drift, propagation of unsupported claims, and attacks via untrusted context or external channels. This paper presents an assurance framework for such Agentic AI systems. Executions are instrumented as Message-Action Traces (MAT) with explicit step and trace contracts. Contracts provide machine-checkable verdicts, localize the first violating step, and support deterministic replay. The framework includes stress testing, formulated as a budgeted counterexample search over bounded perturbations. It also supports structured fault injection at service, retrieval, and memory boundaries to assess containment under realistic operational faults and degraded conditions. Finally, governance is treated as a runtime component, enforcing per-agent capability limits and action mediation (allow, rewrite, block) at the language-to-action boundary. To support comparative evaluations across stochastic seeds, models, and orchestration configurations, the paper defines trace-based metrics for task success, termination reliability, contract compliance, factuality indicators, containment rate, and governance outcome distributions. More broadly, the framework is intended as a common abstraction to support testing and evaluation of multi-agent LLM systems, and to facilitate reproducible comparison across orchestration designs and configurations.

We introduce AutoMonitor-Bench, the first benchmark designed to systematically evaluate the reliability of LLM-based misbehavior monitors across diverse tasks and failure modes. AutoMonitor-Bench consists of 3,010 carefully annotated test samples spanning question answering, code generation, and reasoning, with paired misbehavior and benign instances. We evaluate monitors using two complementary metrics: Miss Rate (MR) and False Alarm Rate (FAR), capturing failures to detect misbehavior and oversensitivity to benign behavior, respectively. Evaluating 12 proprietary and 10 open-source LLMs, we observe substantial variability in monitoring performance and a consistent trade-off between MR and FAR, revealing an inherent safety-utility tension. To further explore the limits of monitor reliability, we construct a large-scale training corpus of 153,581 samples and fine-tune Qwen3-4B-Instruction to investigate whether training on known, relatively easy-to-construct misbehavior datasets improves monitoring performance on unseen and more implicit misbehaviors. Our results highlight the challenges of reliable, scalable misbehavior monitoring and motivate future work on task-aware designing and training strategies for LLM-based monitors.

Regulatory compliance auditing across diverse industrial domains requires heightened quality assurance and traceability. Present manual and intermittent approaches to such auditing yield significant challenges, potentially leading to oversights in the monitoring process. To address these issues, we introduce a real-time, multi-modal sensing system employing 3D time-of-flight and RGB cameras, coupled with unsupervised learning techniques on edge AI devices. This enables continuous object tracking thereby enhancing efficiency in record-keeping and minimizing manual interventions. While we validate the system in a knife sanitization context within agrifood facilities, emphasizing its prowess against occlusion and low-light issues with RGB cameras, its potential spans various industrial monitoring settings.

Predictive business process monitoring methods exploit logs of completed cases of a process in order to make predictions about running cases thereof. Existing methods in this space are tailor-made for specific prediction tasks. Moreover, their relative accuracy is highly sensitive to the dataset at hand, thus requiring users to engage in trial-and-error and tuning when applying them in a specific setting. This paper investigates Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) neural networks as an approach to build consistently accurate models for a wide range of predictive process monitoring tasks. First, we show that LSTMs outperform existing techniques to predict the next event of a running case and its timestamp. Next, we show how to use models for predicting the next task in order to predict the full continuation of a running case. Finally, we apply the same approach to predict the remaining time, and show that this approach outperforms existing tailor-made methods.

Automatic detection and prevention of open-set failures are crucial in closed-loop robotic systems. Recent studies often struggle to simultaneously identify unexpected failures reactively after they occur and prevent foreseeable ones proactively. To this end, we propose Code-as-Monitor (CaM), a novel paradigm leveraging the vision-language model (VLM) for both open-set reactive and proactive failure detection. The core of our method is to formulate both tasks as a unified set of spatio-temporal constraint satisfaction problems and use VLM-generated code to evaluate them for real-time monitoring. To enhance the accuracy and efficiency of monitoring, we further introduce constraint elements that abstract constraint-related entities or their parts into compact geometric elements. This approach offers greater generality, simplifies tracking, and facilitates constraint-aware visual programming by leveraging these elements as visual prompts. Experiments show that CaM achieves a 28.7% higher success rate and reduces execution time by 31.8% under severe disturbances compared to baselines across three simulators and a real-world setting. Moreover, CaM can be integrated with open-loop control policies to form closed-loop systems, enabling long-horizon tasks in cluttered scenes with dynamic environments.

Understanding the dynamic behavior of computer programs during normal working conditions is an important task, which has multiple security benefits such as the development of behavior-based anomaly detection, vulnerability discovery, and patching. Existing works achieved this goal by collecting and analyzing various data including network traffic, system calls, instruction traces, etc. In this paper, we explore the use of a new type of data, performance counters, to analyze the dynamic behavior of programs. Using existing primitives, we develop a tool named perfextract to capture data from different performance counters for a program during its startup time, thus forming multiple time series to represent the dynamic behavior of the program. We analyze the collected data and develop a semi-supervised clustering algorithm that allows us to classify each program using its performance counter time series into a specific group and to identify the intrinsic behavior of that group. We carry out extensive experiments with 18 real-world programs that belong to 4 groups including web browsers, text editors, image viewers, and audio players. The experimental results show that the examined programs can be accurately differentiated based on their performance counter data regardless of whether programs are run in physical or virtual environments.

A key strength of managed runtimes over hardware is the ability to gain detailed insight into the dynamic execution of programs with instrumentation. Analyses such as code coverage, execution frequency, tracing, and debugging, are all made easier in a virtual setting. As a portable, low-level bytecode, WebAssembly offers inexpensive in-process sandboxing with high performance. Yet to date, Wasm engines have not offered much insight into executing programs, supporting at best bytecode-level stepping and basic source maps, but no instrumentation capabilities. In this paper, we show the first non-intrusive dynamic instrumentation system for WebAssembly in the open-source Wizard Research Engine. Our innovative design offers a flexible, complete hierarchy of instrumentation primitives that support building high-level, complex analyses in terms of low-level, programmable probes. In contrast to emulation or machine code instrumentation, injecting probes at the bytecode level increases expressiveness and vastly simplifies the implementation by reusing the engine's JIT compiler, interpreter, and deoptimization mechanism rather than building new ones. Wizard supports both dynamic instrumentation insertion and removal while providing consistency guarantees, which is key to composing multiple analyses without interference. We detail a fully-featured implementation in a high-performance multi-tier Wasm engine, show novel optimizations specifically designed to minimize instrumentation overhead, and evaluate performance characteristics under load from various analyses. This design is well-suited for production engine adoption as probes can be implemented to have no impact on production performance when not in use.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, introduces critical risks to safety, security, and privacy. These agents may deviate from user objectives, violate data handling policies, or be compromised by adversarial attacks. Mitigating these dangers necessitates a mechanism to formally guarantee that an agent's actions adhere to predefined safety constraints, a challenge that existing systems do not fully address. We introduce VeriGuard, a novel framework that provides formal safety guarantees for LLM-based agents through a dual-stage architecture designed for robust and verifiable correctness. The initial offline stage involves a comprehensive validation process. It begins by clarifying user intent to establish precise safety specifications. VeriGuard then synthesizes a behavioral policy and subjects it to both testing and formal verification to prove its compliance with these specifications. This iterative process refines the policy until it is deemed correct. Subsequently, the second stage provides online action monitoring, where VeriGuard operates as a runtime monitor to validate each proposed agent action against the pre-verified policy before execution. This separation of the exhaustive offline validation from the lightweight online monitoring allows formal guarantees to be practically applied, providing a robust safeguard that substantially improves the trustworthiness of LLM agents.

Language models of code (LMs) work well when the surrounding code in the vicinity of generation provides sufficient context. This is not true when it becomes necessary to use types or functionality defined in another module or library, especially those not seen during training. LMs suffer from limited awareness of such global context and end up hallucinating, e.g., using types defined in other files incorrectly. Recent work tries to overcome this issue by retrieving global information to augment the local context. However, this bloats the prompt or requires architecture modifications and additional training. Integrated development environments (IDEs) assist developers by bringing the global context at their fingertips using static analysis. We extend this assistance, enjoyed by developers, to the LMs. We propose a notion of monitors that use static analysis in the background to guide the decoding. Unlike a priori retrieval, static analysis is invoked iteratively during the entire decoding process, providing the most relevant suggestions on demand. We demonstrate the usefulness of our proposal by monitoring for type-consistent use of identifiers whenever an LM generates code for object dereference. To evaluate our approach, we curate PragmaticCode, a dataset of open-source projects with their development environments. On models of varying parameter scale, we show that monitor-guided decoding consistently improves the ability of an LM to not only generate identifiers that match the ground truth but also improves compilation rates and agreement with ground truth. We find that LMs with fewer parameters, when guided with our monitor, can outperform larger LMs. With monitor-guided decoding, SantaCoder-1.1B achieves better compilation rate and next-identifier match than the much larger text-davinci-003 model. The datasets and code will be released at https://aka.ms/monitors4codegen .

This paper presents a program logic for reasoning about multithreaded Java-like programs with dynamic thread creation, thread joining and reentrant object monitors. The logic is based on concurrent separation logic. It is the first detailed adaptation of concurrent separation logic to a multithreaded Java-like language. The program logic associates a unique static access permission with each heap location, ensuring exclusive write accesses and ruling out data races. Concurrent reads are supported through fractional permissions. Permissions can be transferred between threads upon thread starting, thread joining, initial monitor entrancies and final monitor exits. In order to distinguish between initial monitor entrancies and monitor reentrancies, auxiliary variables keep track of multisets of currently held monitors. Data abstraction and behavioral subtyping are facilitated through abstract predicates, which are also used to represent monitor invariants, preconditions for thread starting and postconditions for thread joining. Value-parametrized types allow to conveniently capture common strong global invariants, like static object ownership relations. The program logic is presented for a model language with Java-like classes and interfaces, the soundness of the program logic is proven, and a number of illustrative examples are presented.

Current LLM safety defenses fail under decomposition attacks, where a malicious goal is decomposed into benign subtasks that circumvent refusals. The challenge lies in the existing shallow safety alignment techniques: they only detect harm in the immediate prompt and do not reason about long-range intent, leaving them blind to malicious intent that emerges over a sequence of seemingly benign instructions. We therefore propose adding an external monitor that observes the conversation at a higher granularity. To facilitate our study of monitoring decomposition attacks, we curate the largest and most diverse dataset to date, including question-answering, text-to-image, and agentic tasks. We verify our datasets by testing them on frontier LLMs and show an 87% attack success rate on average on GPT-4o. This confirms that decomposition attack is broadly effective. Additionally, we find that random tasks can be injected into the decomposed subtasks to further obfuscate malicious intents. To defend in real time, we propose a lightweight sequential monitoring framework that cumulatively evaluates each subtask. We show that a carefully prompt engineered lightweight monitor achieves a 93% defense success rate, beating reasoning models like o3 mini as a monitor. Moreover, it remains robust against random task injection and cuts cost by 90% and latency by 50%. Our findings suggest that lightweight sequential monitors are highly effective in mitigating decomposition attacks and are viable in deployment.

We present Springdrift, a persistent runtime for long-lived LLM agents. The system integrates an auditable execution substrate (append-only memory, supervised processes, git-backed recovery), a case-based reasoning memory layer with hybrid retrieval (evaluated against a dense cosine baseline), a deterministic normative calculus for safety gating with auditable axiom trails, and continuous ambient self-perception via a structured self-state representation (the sensorium) injected each cycle without tool calls. These properties support behaviours difficult to achieve in session-bounded systems: cross-session task continuity, cross-channel context maintenance, end-to-end forensic reconstruction of decisions, and self-diagnostic behaviour. We report on a single-instance deployment over 23 days (19 operating days), during which the agent diagnosed its own infrastructure bugs, classified failure modes, identified an architectural vulnerability, and maintained context across email and web channels -- without explicit instruction. We introduce the term Artificial Retainer for this category: a non-human system with persistent memory, defined authority, domain-specific autonomy, and forensic accountability in an ongoing relationship with a specific principal -- distinguished from software assistants and autonomous agents, drawing on professional retainer relationships and the bounded autonomy of trained working animals. This is a technical report on a systems design and deployment case study, not a benchmark-driven evaluation. Evidence is from a single instance with a single operator, presented as illustration of what these architectural properties can support in practice. Implemented in approximately Gleam on Erlang/OTP. Code, artefacts, and redacted operational logs will be available at https://github.com/seamus-brady/springdrift upon publication.

LLM-based software engineering agents are increasingly used in real-world development tasks, often with access to sensitive data or security-critical codebases. Such agents could intentionally sabotage these codebases if they were misaligned. We investigate asynchronous monitoring, in which a monitoring system reviews agent actions after the fact. Unlike synchronous monitoring, this approach does not impose runtime latency, while still attempting to disrupt attacks before irreversible harm occurs. We treat monitor development as an adversarial game between a blue team (who design monitors) and a red team (who create sabotaging agents). We attempt to set the game rules such that they upper bound the sabotage potential of an agent based on Claude 4.1 Opus. To ground this game in a realistic, high-stakes deployment scenario, we develop a suite of 5 diverse software engineering environments that simulate tasks that an agent might perform within an AI developer's internal infrastructure. Over the course of the game, we develop an ensemble monitor that achieves a 6% false negative rate at 1% false positive rate on a held out test environment. Then, we estimate risk of sabotage at deployment time by extrapolating from our monitor's false negative rate. We describe one simple model for this extrapolation, present a sensitivity analysis, and describe situations in which the model would be invalid. Code is available at: https://github.com/UKGovernmentBEIS/async-control.

The usage of deep neural networks in safety-critical systems is limited by our ability to guarantee their correct behavior. Runtime monitors are components aiming to identify unsafe predictions and discard them before they can lead to catastrophic consequences. Several recent works on runtime monitoring have focused on out-of-distribution (OOD) detection, i.e., identifying inputs that are different from the training data. In this work, we argue that OOD detection is not a well-suited framework to design efficient runtime monitors and that it is more relevant to evaluate monitors based on their ability to discard incorrect predictions. We call this setting out-ofmodel-scope detection and discuss the conceptual differences with OOD. We also conduct extensive experiments on popular datasets from the literature to show that studying monitors in the OOD setting can be misleading: 1. very good OOD results can give a false impression of safety, 2. comparison under the OOD setting does not allow identifying the best monitor to detect errors. Finally, we also show that removing erroneous training data samples helps to train better monitors.

Large language models (LLMs) can generate chains of thought (CoTs) that are not always causally responsible for their final outputs. When such a mismatch occurs, the CoT no longer faithfully reflects the decision-critical factors driving the model's behavior, leading to the reduced CoT monitorability problem. However, a comprehensive and fully open-source benchmark for studying CoT monitorability remains lacking. To address this gap, we propose MonitorBench, a systematic benchmark for evaluating CoT monitorability in LLMs. MonitorBench provides: (1) a diverse set of 1,514 test instances with carefully designed decision-critical factors across 19 tasks spanning 7 categories to characterize when CoTs can be used to monitor the factors driving LLM behavior; and (2) two stress-test settings to quantify the extent to which CoT monitorability can be degraded. Extensive experiments across multiple popular LLMs with varying capabilities show that CoT monitorability is higher when producing the final target response requires structural reasoning through the decision-critical factor. Closed-source LLMs generally show lower monitorability, and there exists a negative relationship between monitorability and model capability. Moreover, both open- and closed-source LLMs can intentionally reduce monitorability under stress-tests, with monitorability dropping by up to 30% in some tasks that do not require structural reasoning over the decision-critical factors. Beyond these empirical insights, MonitorBench provides a basis for further research on evaluating future LLMs, studying advanced stress-test monitorability techniques, and developing new monitoring approaches.

A promising research direction in enabling LLMs to generate consistently correct code involves addressing their inability to properly estimate program execution, particularly for code they generate. In this work, we demonstrate that Code LLMs can be trained to simulate program execution in a step-by-step manner and that this capability can be leveraged to improve competitive programming performance. Our approach combines supervised fine-tuning on natural language execution traces, textual explanations grounded in true execution, with reinforcement learning using verifiable rewards. We introduce two complementary objectives: output prediction given code and inputs, and solving competitive programming tasks with either ground-truth or self-predicted execution feedback. These objectives enable models to perform self-verification over multiple candidate solutions, and iterative self-fixing by simulating test execution. Across multiple competitive programming benchmarks, our method yields consistent improvements over standard reasoning approaches. We further present ablations and analysis to elucidate the role of execution simulation and its limitations.

We introduce the Agent GPA (Goal-Plan-Action) framework: an evaluation paradigm based on an agent's operational loop of setting goals, devising plans, and executing actions. The framework includes five evaluation metrics: Goal Fulfillment, Logical Consistency, Execution Efficiency, Plan Quality, and Plan Adherence. Logical Consistency checks that an agent's actions are consistent with its prior actions. Execution Efficiency checks whether the agent executes in the most efficient way to achieve its goal. Plan Quality checks whether an agent's plans are aligned with its goals; Plan Adherence checks if an agent's actions are aligned with its plan; and Goal Fulfillment checks that agent's final outcomes match the stated goals. Our experimental results on two benchmark datasets - the public TRAIL/GAIA dataset and an internal dataset for a production-grade data agent - show that this framework (a) provides a systematic way to cover a broad range of agent failures, including all agent errors on the TRAIL/GAIA benchmark dataset; (b) supports LLM-judges that exhibit strong agreement with human annotation, covering 80% to over 95% errors; and (c) localizes errors with 86% agreement to enable targeted improvement of agent performance.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) outputs let us read a model's step-by-step reasoning. Since any long, serial reasoning process must pass through this textual trace, the quality of the CoT is a direct window into what the model is thinking. This visibility could help us spot unsafe or misaligned behavior (monitorability), but only if the CoT is transparent about its internal reasoning (faithfulness). Fully measuring faithfulness is difficult, so researchers often focus on examining the CoT in cases where the model changes its answer after adding a cue to the input. This proxy finds some instances of unfaithfulness but loses information when the model maintains its answer, and does not investigate aspects of reasoning not tied to the cue. We extend these results to a more holistic sense of monitorability by introducing verbosity: whether the CoT lists every factor needed to solve the task. We combine faithfulness and verbosity into a single monitorability score that shows how well the CoT serves as the model's external `working memory', a property that many safety schemes based on CoT monitoring depend on. We evaluate instruction-tuned and reasoning models on BBH, GPQA, and MMLU. Our results show that models can appear faithful yet remain hard to monitor when they leave out key factors, and that monitorability differs sharply across model families. We release our evaluation code using the Inspect library to support reproducible future work.

A fundamental skill among human developers is the ability to understand and reason about program execution. As an example, a programmer can mentally simulate code execution in natural language to debug and repair code (aka. rubber duck debugging). However, large language models (LLMs) of code are typically trained on the surface textual form of programs, thus may lack a semantic understanding of how programs execute at run-time. To address this issue, we propose NExT, a method to teach LLMs to inspect the execution traces of programs (variable states of executed lines) and reason about their run-time behavior through chain-of-thought (CoT) rationales. Specifically, NExT uses self-training to bootstrap a synthetic training set of execution-aware rationales that lead to correct task solutions (e.g., fixed programs) without laborious manual annotation. Experiments on program repair tasks based on MBPP and HumanEval demonstrate that NExT improves the fix rate of a PaLM 2 model, by 26.1% and 14.3% absolute, respectively, with significantly improved rationale quality as verified by automated metrics and human raters. Our model can also generalize to scenarios where program traces are absent at test-time.

Though safety alignment has been applied to most large language models (LLMs), LLM service providers generally deploy a subsequent moderation as the external safety guardrail in real-world products. Existing moderators mainly practice a conventional full detection, which determines the harmfulness based on the complete LLM output, causing high service latency. Recent works pay more attention to partial detection where moderators oversee the generation midway and early stop the output if harmfulness is detected, but they directly apply moderators trained with the full detection paradigm to incomplete outputs, introducing a training-inference gap that lowers the performance. In this paper, we explore how to form a data-and-model solution that natively supports partial detection. For the data, we construct FineHarm, a dataset consisting of 29K prompt-response pairs with fine-grained annotations to provide reasonable supervision for token-level training. Then, we propose the streaming content monitor, which is trained with dual supervision of response- and token-level labels and can follow the output stream of LLM to make a timely judgment of harmfulness. Experiments show that SCM gains 0.95+ in macro F1 score that is comparable to full detection, by only seeing the first 18% of tokens in responses on average. Moreover, the SCM can serve as a pseudo-harmfulness annotator for improving safety alignment and lead to a higher harmlessness score than DPO.

When an LLM agent reads a confidential file, then writes a summary, then emails it externally, no single step is unsafe, but the sequence is a data leak. We call this safety drift: individually safe actions compounding into violations. Prior work has measured this problem; we predict it. SafetyDrift models agent safety trajectories as absorbing Markov chains, computing the probability that a trajectory will reach a violation within a given number of steps via closed form absorption analysis. A consequence of the monotonic state design is that every agent will eventually violate safety if left unsupervised (absorption probability 1.0 from all states), making the practical question not if but when, and motivating our focus on finite horizon prediction. Across 357 traces spanning 40 realistic tasks in four categories, we discover that "points of no return" are sharply task dependent: in communication tasks, agents that reach even a mild risk state have an 85% chance of violating safety within five steps, while in technical tasks the probability stays below 5% from any state. A lightweight monitor built on these models detects 94.7% of violations with 3.7 steps of advance warning at negligible computational cost, outperforming both keyword matching (44.7% detection, 55.9% false positive rate) and per step LLM judges (52.6% detection, 38.2% false positive rate) while running over 60,000x faster.

In recent years, trace generation has emerged as a significant challenge within the Process Mining community. Deep Learning (DL) models have demonstrated accuracy in reproducing the features of the selected processes. However, current DL generative models are limited in their ability to adapt the learned distributions to generate data samples based on specific conditions or attributes. This limitation is particularly significant because the ability to control the type of generated data can be beneficial in various contexts, enabling a focus on specific behaviours, exploration of infrequent patterns, or simulation of alternative 'what-if' scenarios. In this work, we address this challenge by introducing a conditional model for process data generation based on a conditional variational autoencoder (CVAE). Conditional models offer control over the generation process by tuning input conditional variables, enabling more targeted and controlled data generation. Unlike other domains, CVAE for process mining faces specific challenges due to the multiperspective nature of the data and the need to adhere to control-flow rules while ensuring data variability. Specifically, we focus on generating process executions conditioned on control flow and temporal features of the trace, allowing us to produce traces for specific, identified sub-processes. The generated traces are then evaluated using common metrics for generative model assessment, along with additional metrics to evaluate the quality of the conditional generation

Code Executing Reasoning is becoming a new non-functional metric that assesses the ability of large language models (LLMs) in programming tasks. State-of-the-art frameworks (CodeMind or REval) and benchmarks (CruxEval) usually focus on LLM's prediction of a given code's input/output or intermediate variable states/values on limited programs. However, there is no tool for more in-depth analysis of the results. Without such a tool, the observations about LLM's code execution reasoning cannot be generalized to more datasets, preventing the research community and practitioners from devising the next generation of LLMs with better code execution reasoning abilities. This paper introduces ExeRScope, a series of tools and heuristics to analyze the result of code execution reasoning frameworks to understand better the impact of code properties in the studied benchmarks on the code execution reasoning. With such tooling, analysis can be generalized to code with similar properties without the urgent need to design more benchmarks, which is a cumbersome effort.

Mitigating reward hacking--where AI systems misbehave due to flaws or misspecifications in their learning objectives--remains a key challenge in constructing capable and aligned models. We show that we can monitor a frontier reasoning model, such as OpenAI o3-mini, for reward hacking in agentic coding environments by using another LLM that observes the model's chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. CoT monitoring can be far more effective than monitoring agent actions and outputs alone, and we further found that a LLM weaker than o3-mini, namely GPT-4o, can effectively monitor a stronger model. Because CoT monitors can be effective at detecting exploits, it is natural to ask whether those exploits can be suppressed by incorporating a CoT monitor directly into the agent's training objective. While we show that integrating CoT monitors into the reinforcement learning reward can indeed produce more capable and more aligned agents in the low optimization regime, we find that with too much optimization, agents learn obfuscated reward hacking, hiding their intent within the CoT while still exhibiting a significant rate of reward hacking. Because it is difficult to tell when CoTs have become obfuscated, it may be necessary to pay a monitorability tax by not applying strong optimization pressures directly to the chain-of-thought, ensuring that CoTs remain monitorable and useful for detecting misaligned behavior.

End-to-end GUI agents for real desktop environments require large amounts of high-quality interaction data, yet collecting human demonstrations is expensive and existing synthetic pipelines often suffer from limited task diversity or noisy, goal-drifting trajectories. We present a trajectory expansion framework Anchor that bootstraps scalable desktop supervision from a small set of verified seed demonstrations. Starting from each seed, we identify branch points that correspond to meaningful state changes and propose new, state-grounded task variants conditioned on the current GUI context. An executing agent then follows the proposed instructions to generate new trajectories, while a verifier enforces task completion via state-aware checks and trajectory-level consistency. To improve supervision quality, we further apply task-conditioned step-level filtering to remove ungrounded actions and denoise post-branch segments to maintain coherent intent. Experiments on standard desktop benchmarks, OSWorld and WindowsAgentArena, show that models fine-tuned on our expanded corpus achieve consistent improvements over zero-shot agents and representative synthesis baselines, and generalize across applications and operating systems.

We introduce QualityFlow, a dynamic agentic workflow for program synthesis. Given the English description of a programming problem and a set of unit tests, the model's goal is to synthesize the correct program that solves the problem and passes the tests. QualityFlow includes large language model (LLM) agents resembling a software development team, including code generation, testing, and self-debugging. We propose the LLM Quality Checker, which explicitly "imagines" whether the synthesized programs' execution would conform to the unit tests. The Quality Checks dynamically control the workflow, including actions to submit the final answer, clarify the problem statement, and revert previous workflow steps. Our experiments show that the Quality Checker can precisely accept any correct program, mitigate faulty synthesized tests, and prevent potential workflow deviation. QualityFlow establishes the state-of-the-art results on four program synthesis benchmarks: MBPP, HumanEval, and stricter evaluations from MBPP-EvalPlus and HumanEval-EvalPlus.

Policy compliance assessment is a fundamental task of evaluating whether an input case strictly complies with a set of human-defined rules, more generally known as policies. In practice, human experts follow a systematic, step-by-step process to identify violations with respect to specific stipulations outlined in the policy. However, such documentation of gold-standard, expert-level reasoning processes is costly to acquire. In this paper, we introduce Policy Reasoning Traces (PRT), a form of specialized generated reasoning chains that serve as a reasoning bridge to improve an LLM's policy compliance assessment capabilities. Our empirical evaluations demonstrate that the use of PRTs for both inference-time and training-time scenarios significantly enhances the performance of open-weight and commercial models, setting a new state-of-the-art for HIPAA and GDPR policies. Beyond accuracy gains, we also highlight how PRTs can improve an LLM's ability to accurately cite policy clauses, as well as influence compliance decisions through their high utilization from the raw chains of thought.

Healthcare monitoring is crucial for early detection, timely intervention, and the ongoing management of health conditions, ultimately improving individuals' quality of life. Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance in supporting healthcare tasks. However, existing LLM-based healthcare solutions typically rely on cloud-based systems, which raise privacy concerns and increase the risk of personal information leakage. As a result, there is growing interest in running these models locally on devices like mobile phones and wearables to protect users' privacy. Small Language Models (SLMs) are potential candidates to solve privacy and computational issues, as they are more efficient and better suited for local deployment. However, the performance of SLMs in healthcare domains has not yet been investigated. This paper examines the capability of SLMs to accurately analyze health data, such as steps, calories, sleep minutes, and other vital statistics, to assess an individual's health status. Our results show that, TinyLlama, which has 1.1 billion parameters, utilizes 4.31 GB memory, and has 0.48s latency, showing the best performance compared other four state-of-the-art (SOTA) SLMs on various healthcare applications. Our results indicate that SLMs could potentially be deployed on wearable or mobile devices for real-time health monitoring, providing a practical solution for efficient and privacy-preserving healthcare.

Code execution is a fundamental aspect of programming language semantics that reflects the exact behavior of the code. However, most pre-trained models for code intelligence ignore the execution trace and only rely on source code and syntactic structures. In this paper, we investigate how well pre-trained models can understand and perform code execution. We develop a mutation-based data augmentation technique to create a large-scale and realistic Python dataset and task for code execution, which challenges existing models such as Codex. We then present CodeExecutor, a Transformer model that leverages code execution pre-training and curriculum learning to enhance its semantic comprehension. We evaluate CodeExecutor on code execution and show its promising performance and limitations. We also demonstrate its potential benefits for code intelligence tasks such as zero-shot code-to-code search and text-to-code generation. Our analysis provides insights into the learning and generalization abilities of pre-trained models for code execution.

Deploying LLMs raises two coupled challenges: (1) monitoring - estimating where a model underperforms as traffic and domains drift - and (2) improvement - prioritizing data acquisition to close the largest performance gaps. We test whether an inference-time signal can estimate slice-level accuracy under domain shift. For each response, we compute an output-entropy profile from final-layer next-token probabilities (from top-k logprobs) and summarize it with eleven statistics. A lightweight classifier predicts instance correctness, and averaging predicted probabilities yields a domain-level accuracy estimate. We evaluate on ten STEM reasoning benchmarks with exhaustive train/test compositions (k in {1,2,3,4}; all "10 choose k" combinations), across nine LLMs from six families (3B-20B). Estimates often track held-out benchmark accuracy, and several models show near-monotonic ordering of domains. Output-entropy profiles are thus an accessible signal for scalable monitoring and for targeting data acquisition.

Large Language Models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in code generation, yet they often struggle with complex programming tasks that require deep algorithmic reasoning. While process supervision through learned reward models shows promise in guiding reasoning steps, it requires expensive training data and suffers from unreliable evaluation. We propose Outcome-Refining Process Supervision, a novel paradigm that treats outcome refinement itself as the process to be supervised. Our framework leverages concrete execution signals to ground the supervision of reasoning steps, while using tree-structured exploration to maintain multiple solution trajectories simultaneously. Experiments demonstrate that our approach enables even smaller models to achieve high success accuracy and performance metrics on competitive programming tasks, creates more reliable verification than traditional reward models without requiring training PRMs. Our approach achieves significant improvements across 5 models and 3 datasets: an average of 26.9% increase in correctness and 42.2% in efficiency. The results suggest that providing structured reasoning space with concrete verification signals is crucial for solving complex programming tasks. We open-source all our code and data at: https://github.com/zhuohaoyu/ORPS

Detecting anomalies is important for identifying inefficiencies, errors, or fraud in business processes. Traditional process mining approaches focus on analyzing 'flattened', sequential, event logs based on a single case notion. However, many real-world process executions exhibit a graph-like structure, where events can be associated with multiple cases. Flattening event logs requires selecting a single case identifier which creates a gap with the real event data and artificially introduces anomalies in the event logs. Object-centric process mining avoids these limitations by allowing events to be related to different cases. This study proposes a novel framework for anomaly detection in business processes that exploits graph neural networks and the enhanced information offered by object-centric process mining. We first reconstruct and represent the process dependencies of the object-centric event logs as attributed graphs and then employ a graph convolutional autoencoder architecture to detect anomalous events. Our results show that our approach provides promising performance in detecting anomalies at the activity type and attributes level, although it struggles to detect anomalies in the temporal order of events.

Graphical user interface (GUI) agents have advanced rapidly but still struggle with complex tasks involving novel UI elements, long-horizon actions, and personalized trajectories. In this work, we introduce Instruction Agent, a GUI agent that leverages expert demonstrations to solve such tasks, enabling completion of otherwise difficult workflows. Given a single demonstration, the agent extracts step-by-step instructions and executes them by strictly following the trajectory intended by the user, which avoids making mistakes during execution. The agent leverages the verifier and backtracker modules further to improve robustness. Both modules are critical to understand the current outcome from each action and handle unexpected interruptions(such as pop-up windows) during execution. Our experiments show that Instruction Agent achieves a 60% success rate on a set of tasks in OSWorld that all top-ranked agents failed to complete. The Instruction Agent offers a practical and extensible framework, bridging the gap between current GUI agents and reliable real-world GUI task automation.