Daily Papers

Deep Equilibrium Models (DEQs) and Neural Ordinary Differential Equations (Neural ODEs) are two branches of implicit models that have achieved remarkable success owing to their superior performance and low memory consumption. While both are implicit models, DEQs and Neural ODEs are derived from different mathematical formulations. Inspired by homotopy continuation, we establish a connection between these two models and illustrate that they are actually two sides of the same coin. Homotopy continuation is a classical method of solving nonlinear equations based on a corresponding ODE. Given this connection, we proposed a new implicit model called HomoODE that inherits the property of high accuracy from DEQs and the property of stability from Neural ODEs. Unlike DEQs, which explicitly solve an equilibrium-point-finding problem via Newton's methods in the forward pass, HomoODE solves the equilibrium-point-finding problem implicitly using a modified Neural ODE via homotopy continuation. Further, we developed an acceleration method for HomoODE with a shared learnable initial point. It is worth noting that our model also provides a better understanding of why Augmented Neural ODEs work as long as the augmented part is regarded as the equilibrium point to find. Comprehensive experiments with several image classification tasks demonstrate that HomoODE surpasses existing implicit models in terms of both accuracy and memory consumption.

Robustness against adversarial attacks and distribution shifts is a long-standing goal of Reinforcement Learning (RL). To this end, Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) trains a protagonist against destabilizing forces exercised by an adversary in a competitive zero-sum Markov game, whose optimal solution, i.e., rational strategy, corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. However, finding Nash equilibria requires facing complex saddle point optimization problems, which can be prohibitive to solve, especially for high-dimensional control. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for adversarial RL based on entropy regularization to ease the complexity of the saddle point optimization problem. We show that the solution of this entropy-regularized problem corresponds to a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), a generalization of Nash equilibria that accounts for bounded rationality, i.e., agents sometimes play random actions instead of optimal ones. Crucially, the connection between the entropy-regularized objective and QRE enables free modulation of the rationality of the agents by simply tuning the temperature coefficient. We leverage this insight to propose our novel algorithm, Quantal Adversarial RL (QARL), which gradually increases the rationality of the adversary in a curriculum fashion until it is fully rational, easing the complexity of the optimization problem while retaining robustness. We provide extensive evidence of QARL outperforming RARL and recent baselines across several MuJoCo locomotion and navigation problems in overall performance and robustness.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

In the Lagrange-Newton method, where Newton's method is applied to a Lagrangian function that includes equality constraints, all stationary points are saddle points. It is therefore not possible to use a line-search method based on the value of the objective function; instead, the line search can operate on merit functions. In this report, we explore an alternative line-search method which is applicable to this case; it particulary addresses the damping of the step length in tight valleys. We propose a line-search criterion based on the divergence of the field of Newton step vectors. The visualization of the criterion for two-dimensional test functions reveals a network of ravines with flat bottom at the zero points of the criterion. The ravines are typically connected to stationary points. To traverse this ravine network in order to approach a stationary point, a zigzag strategy is devised. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the novel line-search strategy succeeds from most starting points in all test functions, but only exhibits the desired damping of the step length in some situations. At the present stage it is therefore difficult to appraise the utility of this contribution.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discriminatively (by using them to score or rank a set of candidate outputs). These procedures sometimes yield very different predictions. How do we reconcile mutually incompatible scoring procedures to obtain coherent LM predictions? We introduce a new, a training-free, game-theoretic procedure for language model decoding. Our approach casts language model decoding as a regularized imperfect-information sequential signaling game - which we term the CONSENSUS GAME - in which a GENERATOR seeks to communicate an abstract correctness parameter using natural language sentences to a DISCRIMINATOR. We develop computational procedures for finding approximate equilibria of this game, resulting in a decoding algorithm we call EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING. Applied to a large number of tasks (including reading comprehension, commonsense reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, and dialog), EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING consistently, and sometimes substantially, improves performance over existing LM decoding procedures - on multiple benchmarks, we observe that applying EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING to LLaMA-7B outperforms the much larger LLaMA-65B and PaLM-540B models. These results highlight the promise of game-theoretic tools for addressing fundamental challenges of truthfulness and consistency in LMs.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

We describe and analyse Levenberg-Marquardt methods for solving systems of nonlinear equations. More specifically, we propose an adaptive formula for the Levenberg-Marquardt parameter and analyse the local convergence of the method under Hölder metric subregularity of the function defining the equation and Hölder continuity of its gradient mapping. Further, we analyse the local convergence of the method under the additional assumption that the Łojasiewicz gradient inequality holds. We finally report encouraging numerical results confirming the theoretical findings for the problem of computing moiety conserved steady states in biochemical reaction networks. This problem can be cast as finding a solution of a system of nonlinear equations, where the associated mapping satisfies the Łojasiewicz gradient inequality assumption.

In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires differentiation across the hierarchy, which is computationally intensive, if not prohibitive. To bypass the hierarchy, we propose to bound such bilevel programs, equivalent to multiple-followers Stackelberg games, with two new hierarchy-free problems: a T-step Cournot game and a T-step monopoly model. Since they are standard equilibrium or optimization problems, both can be efficiently solved via first-order methods. Importantly, we show that the bounds provided by these problems -- the upper bound by the T-step Cournot game and the lower bound by the T-step monopoly model -- can be made arbitrarily tight by increasing the step parameter T for a wide range of problems. We prove that a small T usually suffices under appropriate conditions to reach an approximation acceptable for most practical purposes. Eventually, the analytical insights are highlighted through numerical examples.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

We present a vector-based method to balance chemical reactions. The algorithm builds candidates in a deterministic way, removes duplicates, and always prints coefficients in the lowest whole-number form. For redox cases, electrons and protons/hydroxide are treated explicitly, so both mass and charge are balanced. We also outline the basic principles of the vector formulation of stoichiometry, interpreting reactions as integer vectors in composition space, this geometric view supports compact visualizations of reagent-product interactions and helps surface distinct reaction families. The method enumerates valid balances for arbitrary user-specified species lists without special-case balancing rules or symbolic tricks, and it provides a clean foundation for developing new algorithmic variants (e.g., alternative objectives or constraints). On representative examples (neutralization, double displacement, decomposition, classical redox, small multicomponent sets) and a negative control, the method produced correct integer balances. When multiple balances exist, we report a canonical one - minimizing the total coefficient sum with a simple tie-breaker - without claiming global optimality beyond the solutions the search enumerates. The procedure applies per reaction and extends to reaction networks via consistent per-reaction application. We do not report runtimes, broader benchmarking and code/data release are planned.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

Equilibrium propagation (EP) is a compelling alternative to the backpropagation of error algorithm (BP) for computing gradients of neural networks on biological or analog neuromorphic substrates. Still, the algorithm requires weight symmetry and infinitesimal equilibrium perturbations, i.e., nudges, to estimate unbiased gradients efficiently. Both requirements are challenging to implement in physical systems. Yet, whether and how weight asymmetry affects its applicability is unknown because, in practice, it may be masked by biases introduced through the finite nudge. To address this question, we study generalized EP, which can be formulated without weight symmetry, and analytically isolate the two sources of bias. For complex-differentiable non-symmetric networks, we show that the finite nudge does not pose a problem, as exact derivatives can still be estimated via a Cauchy integral. In contrast, weight asymmetry introduces bias resulting in low task performance due to poor alignment of EP's neuronal error vectors compared to BP. To mitigate this issue, we present a new homeostatic objective that directly penalizes functional asymmetries of the Jacobian at the network's fixed point. This homeostatic objective dramatically improves the network's ability to solve complex tasks such as ImageNet 32x32. Our results lay the theoretical groundwork for studying and mitigating the adverse effects of imperfections of physical networks on learning algorithms that rely on the substrate's relaxation dynamics.

The statistical mechanics of Gibbs is a juxtaposition of subjective, probabilistic ideas on the one hand and objective, mechanical ideas on the other. In this paper, we follow the path set out by Jaynes, including elements added subsequently to that original work, to explore the consequences of the purely statistical point of view. We show how standard methods in the equilibrium theory could have been derived simply from a description of the available problem information. In addition, our presentation leads to novel insights into questions associated with symmetry and non-equilibrium statistical mechanics. Two surprising consequences to be explored in further work are that (in)distinguishability factors are automatically predicted from the problem formulation and that a quantity related to the thermodynamic entropy production is found by considering information loss in non-equilibrium processes. Using the problem of ion channel thermodynamics as an example, we illustrate the idea of building up complexity by successively adding information to create progressively more complex descriptions of a physical system. Our result is that such statistical mechanical descriptions can be used to create transparent, computable, experimentally-relevant models that may be informed by more detailed atomistic simulations. We also derive a theory for the kinetic behavior of this system, identifying the nonequilibrium `process' free energy functional. The Gibbs relation for this functional is a fluctuation-dissipation theorem applicable arbitrarily far from equilibrium, that captures the effect of non-local and time-dependent behavior from transient driving forces. Based on this work, it is clear that statistical mechanics is a general tool for constructing the relationships between constraints on system information.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

We investigate safe multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents seek to collectively maximize an aggregate sum of local objectives while satisfying their own safety constraints. The objective and constraints are described by {\it general utilities}, i.e., nonlinear functions of the long-term state-action occupancy measure, which encompass broader decision-making goals such as risk, exploration, or imitations. The exponential growth of the state-action space size with the number of agents presents challenges for global observability, further exacerbated by the global coupling arising from agents' safety constraints. To tackle this issue, we propose a primal-dual method utilizing shadow reward and κ-hop neighbor truncation under a form of correlation decay property, where κ is the communication radius. In the exact setting, our algorithm converges to a first-order stationary point (FOSP) at the rate of Oleft(T^{-2/3}right). In the sample-based setting, we demonstrate that, with high probability, our algorithm requires mathcal{O}left(ε^{-3.5}right) samples to achieve an ε-FOSP with an approximation error of O(φ_0^{2κ}), where φ_0in (0,1). Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our model through extensive numerical experiments.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

Recent work by Baratin et al. (2021) sheds light on an intriguing pattern that occurs during the training of deep neural networks: some layers align much more with data compared to other layers (where the alignment is defined as the euclidean product of the tangent features matrix and the data labels matrix). The curve of the alignment as a function of layer index (generally) exhibits an ascent-descent pattern where the maximum is reached for some hidden layer. In this work, we provide the first explanation for this phenomenon. We introduce the Equilibrium Hypothesis which connects this alignment pattern to signal propagation in deep neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate an excellent match with the theoretical predictions.

Sequential decision-making problems with multiple objectives arise naturally in practice and pose unique challenges for research in decision-theoretic planning and learning, which has largely focused on single-objective settings. This article surveys algorithms designed for sequential decision-making problems with multiple objectives. Though there is a growing body of literature on this subject, little of it makes explicit under what circumstances special methods are needed to solve multi-objective problems. Therefore, we identify three distinct scenarios in which converting such a problem to a single-objective one is impossible, infeasible, or undesirable. Furthermore, we propose a taxonomy that classifies multi-objective methods according to the applicable scenario, the nature of the scalarization function (which projects multi-objective values to scalar ones), and the type of policies considered. We show how these factors determine the nature of an optimal solution, which can be a single policy, a convex hull, or a Pareto front. Using this taxonomy, we survey the literature on multi-objective methods for planning and learning. Finally, we discuss key applications of such methods and outline opportunities for future work.

Bundle adjustment is the common way to solve localization and mapping. It is an iterative process in which a system of non-linear equations is solved using two optimization methods, weighted by a damping factor. In the classic approach, the latter is chosen heuristically by the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm on each iteration. This might take many iterations, making the process computationally expensive, which might be harmful to real-time applications. We propose to replace this heuristic by viewing the problem in a holistic manner, as a game, and formulating it as a reinforcement-learning task. We set an environment which solves the non-linear equations and train an agent to choose the damping factor in a learned manner. We demonstrate that our approach considerably reduces the number of iterations required to reach the bundle adjustment's convergence, on both synthetic and real-life scenarios. We show that this reduction benefits the classic approach and can be integrated with other bundle adjustment acceleration methods.

We present new algorithms for optimizing non-smooth, non-convex stochastic objectives based on a novel analysis technique. This improves the current best-known complexity for finding a (delta,epsilon)-stationary point from O(epsilon^{-4}delta^{-1}) stochastic gradient queries to O(epsilon^{-3}delta^{-1}), which we also show to be optimal. Our primary technique is a reduction from non-smooth non-convex optimization to online learning, after which our results follow from standard regret bounds in online learning. For deterministic and second-order smooth objectives, applying more advanced optimistic online learning techniques enables a new complexity of O(epsilon^{-1.5}delta^{-0.5}). Our techniques also recover all optimal or best-known results for finding epsilon stationary points of smooth or second-order smooth objectives in both stochastic and deterministic settings.

Solving a linear system Ax=b is a fundamental scientific computing primitive for which numerous solvers and preconditioners have been developed. These come with parameters whose optimal values depend on the system being solved and are often impossible or too expensive to identify; thus in practice sub-optimal heuristics are used. We consider the common setting in which many related linear systems need to be solved, e.g. during a single numerical simulation. In this scenario, can we sequentially choose parameters that attain a near-optimal overall number of iterations, without extra matrix computations? We answer in the affirmative for Successive Over-Relaxation (SOR), a standard solver whose parameter omega has a strong impact on its runtime. For this method, we prove that a bandit online learning algorithm--using only the number of iterations as feedback--can select parameters for a sequence of instances such that the overall cost approaches that of the best fixed omega as the sequence length increases. Furthermore, when given additional structural information, we show that a contextual bandit method asymptotically achieves the performance of the instance-optimal policy, which selects the best omega for each instance. Our work provides the first learning-theoretic treatment of high-precision linear system solvers and the first end-to-end guarantees for data-driven scientific computing, demonstrating theoretically the potential to speed up numerical methods using well-understood learning algorithms.

Non-cooperative game theory provides a robust framework for analyzing distributed resource allocation in multi-user wireless networks, with Iterative Water-Filling (IWF) emerging as a canonical solution for power control problems. Although classical fixed-point theorems guarantee the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) under mild concavity and compactness conditions, the convergence of practical iterative algorithms to that equilibrium remains a challenging endeavor. This challenge intensifies under varying update schedules, interference regimes, and imperfections such as channel estimation errors or feedback delay. In this paper, we present an in-depth examination of IWF in multi-user systems under three different update schemes: (1) synchronous sequential updates, (2) synchronous simultaneous updates, and (3) totally asynchronous updates. We first formulate the water-filling operator in a multi-carrier environment, then recast the iterative process as a fixed-point problem. Using contraction mapping principles, we demonstrate sufficient conditions under which IWF converges to a unique NE and highlight how spectral radius constraints, diagonal dominance, and careful step-size selection are pivotal for guaranteeing convergence. We further discuss robustness to measurement noise, partial updates, and network scaling to emphasize the practical viability of these schemes. This comprehensive analysis unifies diverse threads in the literature while offering novel insights into asynchronous implementations. Our findings enable network designers to ascertain system parameters that foster both stable convergence and efficient spectrum usage.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

In this paper, we examine the solvability of a functional equation in a Lipschitz space. As an application, we use our result to determine the existence and uniqueness of solutions to an equation describing a specific type of choice behavior model for the learning process of the paradise fish. Finally, we present some concrete examples where, using numerical techniques, we obtain approximations to the solution of the functional equation. As the straightforward Picard's iteration can be very expensive, we show that an analytical suboptimal least-squares approximation can be chosen in practice, resulting in very good accuracy.

Synthesizing optimal controllers for dynamical systems often involves solving optimization problems with hard real-time constraints. These constraints determine the class of numerical methods that can be applied: computationally expensive but accurate numerical routines are replaced by fast and inaccurate methods, trading inference time for solution accuracy. This paper provides techniques to improve the quality of optimized control policies given a fixed computational budget. We achieve the above via a hypersolvers approach, which hybridizes a differential equation solver and a neural network. The performance is evaluated in direct and receding-horizon optimal control tasks in both low and high dimensions, where the proposed approach shows consistent Pareto improvements in solution accuracy and control performance.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Minimax problems are notoriously challenging to optimize. However, we demonstrate that the two-timescale extragradient can be a viable solution. By utilizing dynamical systems theory, we show that it converges to points that satisfy the second-order necessary condition of local minimax points, under a mild condition. This work surpasses all previous results as we eliminate a crucial assumption that the Hessian, with respect to the maximization variable, is nondegenerate.

We investigate a primal-dual (PD) method for the saddle point problem (SPP) that uses a linear approximation of the primal function instead of the standard proximal step, resulting in a linearized PD (LPD) method. For convex-strongly concave SPP, we observe that the LPD method has a suboptimal dependence on the Lipschitz constant of the primal function. To fix this issue, we combine features of Accelerated Gradient Descent with the LPD method resulting in a single-loop Accelerated Linearized Primal-Dual (ALPD) method. ALPD method achieves the optimal gradient complexity when the SPP has a semi-linear coupling function. We also present an inexact ALPD method for SPPs with a general nonlinear coupling function that maintains the optimal gradient evaluations of the primal parts and significantly improves the gradient evaluations of the coupling term compared to the ALPD method. We verify our findings with numerical experiments.

As first-order optimization methods become the method of choice for solving large-scale optimization problems, optimization solvers based on first-order algorithms are being built. Such general-purpose solvers must robustly detect infeasible or misspecified problem instances, but the computational complexity of first-order methods for doing so has yet to be formally studied. In this work, we characterize the optimal accelerated rate of infeasibility detection. We show that the standard fixed-point iteration achieves a O(1/k^2) and O(1/k) rates, respectively, on the normalized iterates and the fixed-point residual converging to the infimal displacement vector, while the accelerated fixed-point iteration achieves O(1/k^2) and mathcal{O}(1/k^2) rates. We then provide a matching complexity lower bound to establish that Theta(1/k^2) is indeed the optimal accelerated rate.

We revisit the noisy binary search model of Karp and Kleinberg, in which we have n coins with unknown probabilities p_i that we can flip. The coins are sorted by increasing p_i, and we would like to find where the probability crosses (to within varepsilon) of a target value tau. This generalized the fixed-noise model of Burnashev and Zigangirov , in which p_i = 1{2} pm varepsilon, to a setting where coins near the target may be indistinguishable from it. Karp and Kleinberg showed that Theta(1{varepsilon^2} log n) samples are necessary and sufficient for this task. We produce a practical algorithm by solving two theoretical challenges: high-probability behavior and sharp constants. We give an algorithm that succeeds with probability 1-delta from \[ 1{C_{\tau, \varepsilon}} \cdot \left(\lg n + O(\log^{2/3} n \log^{1/3} 1{\delta} + \log 1{\delta})\right) \] samples, where C_{tau, varepsilon} is the optimal such constant achievable. For delta > n^{-o(1)} this is within 1 + o(1) of optimal, and for delta ll 1 it is the first bound within constant factors of optimal.

Zero-shot coordination in cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) remains a significant challenge, which means effectively coordinating with a wide range of unseen partners. Previous algorithms have attempted to address this challenge by optimizing fixed objectives within a population to improve strategy or behaviour diversity. However, these approaches can result in a loss of learning and an inability to cooperate with certain strategies within the population, known as cooperative incompatibility. To address this issue, we propose the Cooperative Open-ended LEarning (COLE) framework, which constructs open-ended objectives in cooperative games with two players from the perspective of graph theory to assess and identify the cooperative ability of each strategy. We further specify the framework and propose a practical algorithm that leverages knowledge from game theory and graph theory. Furthermore, an analysis of the learning process of the algorithm shows that it can efficiently overcome cooperative incompatibility. The experimental results in the Overcooked game environment demonstrate that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art methods when coordinating with different-level partners. Our demo is available at https://sites.google.com/view/cole-2023.

We study the problem of constrained efficient global optimization, where both the objective and constraints are expensive black-box functions that can be learned with Gaussian processes. We propose CONFIG (CONstrained efFIcient Global Optimization), a simple and effective algorithm to solve it. Under certain regularity assumptions, we show that our algorithm enjoys the same cumulative regret bound as that in the unconstrained case and similar cumulative constraint violation upper bounds. For commonly used Matern and Squared Exponential kernels, our bounds are sublinear and allow us to derive a convergence rate to the optimal solution of the original constrained problem. In addition, our method naturally provides a scheme to declare infeasibility when the original black-box optimization problem is infeasible. Numerical experiments on sampled instances from the Gaussian process, artificial numerical problems, and a black-box building controller tuning problem all demonstrate the competitive performance of our algorithm. Compared to the other state-of-the-art methods, our algorithm significantly improves the theoretical guarantees, while achieving competitive empirical performance.

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

We introduce and analyze distance preservation games (DPGs). In DPGs, agents express ideal distances to other agents and need to choose locations in the unit interval while preserving their ideal distances as closely as possible. We analyze the existence and computation of location profiles that are jump stable (i.e., no agent can benefit by moving to another location) or welfare optimal for DPGs, respectively. Specifically, we prove that there are DPGs without jump stable location profiles and identify important cases where such outcomes always exist and can be computed efficiently. Similarly, we show that finding welfare optimal location profiles is NP-complete and present approximation algorithms for finding solutions with social welfare close to optimal. Finally, we prove that DPGs have a price of anarchy of at most 2.

In the endeavor to make autonomous robots take actions, task planning is a major challenge that requires translating high-level task descriptions into long-horizon action sequences. Despite recent advances in language model agents, they remain prone to planning errors and limited in their ability to plan ahead. To address these limitations in robotic planning, we advocate a self-refining scheme that iteratively refines a draft plan until an equilibrium is reached. Remarkably, this process can be optimized end-to-end from an analytical perspective without the need to curate additional verifiers or reward models, allowing us to train self-refining planners in a simple supervised learning fashion. Meanwhile, a nested equilibrium sequence modeling procedure is devised for efficient closed-loop planning that incorporates useful feedback from the environment (or an internal world model). Our method is evaluated on the VirtualHome-Env benchmark, showing advanced performance with better scaling for inference computation. Code is available at https://github.com/Singularity0104/equilibrium-planner.

Multiobjective optimization plays an increasingly important role in modern applications, where several criteria are often of equal importance. The task in multiobjective optimization and multiobjective optimal control is therefore to compute the set of optimal compromises (the Pareto set) between the conflicting objectives. The advances in algorithms and the increasing interest in Pareto-optimal solutions have led to a wide range of new applications related to optimal and feedback control - potentially with non-smoothness both on the level of the objectives or in the system dynamics. This results in new challenges such as dealing with expensive models (e.g., governed by partial differential equations (PDEs)) and developing dedicated algorithms handling the non-smoothness. Since in contrast to single-objective optimization, the Pareto set generally consists of an infinite number of solutions, the computational effort can quickly become challenging, which is particularly problematic when the objectives are costly to evaluate or when a solution has to be presented very quickly. This article gives an overview of recent developments in the field of multiobjective optimization of non-smooth PDE-constrained problems. In particular we report on the advances achieved within Project 2 "Multiobjective Optimization of Non-Smooth PDE-Constrained Problems - Switches, State Constraints and Model Order Reduction" of the DFG Priority Programm 1962 "Non-smooth and Complementarity-based Distributed Parameter Systems: Simulation and Hierarchical Optimization".

Given a set of dissimilarity measurements amongst data points, determining what metric representation is most "consistent" with the input measurements or the metric that best captures the relevant geometric features of the data is a key step in many machine learning algorithms. Existing methods are restricted to specific kinds of metrics or small problem sizes because of the large number of metric constraints in such problems. In this paper, we provide an active set algorithm, Project and Forget, that uses Bregman projections, to solve metric constrained problems with many (possibly exponentially) inequality constraints. We provide a theoretical analysis of Project and Forget and prove that our algorithm converges to the global optimal solution and that the L_2 distance of the current iterate to the optimal solution decays asymptotically at an exponential rate. We demonstrate that using our method we can solve large problem instances of three types of metric constrained problems: general weight correlation clustering, metric nearness, and metric learning; in each case, out-performing the state of the art methods with respect to CPU times and problem sizes.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

We prove stability for a class of heterogeneous catalysis models in the L_p-setting. We consider a setting in a finite three-dimensional pore of cylinder-like geometry, with the lateral walls acting as a catalytic surface. Under a reasonable condition on the involved parameters, we show that given equilibria are normally stable, i.e. solutions are attracted at an exponential rate. The potential incidence of instability is discussed as well.

We present a novel unified bilevel optimization-based framework, PARL, formulated to address the recently highlighted critical issue of policy alignment in reinforcement learning using utility or preference-based feedback. We identify a major gap within current algorithmic designs for solving policy alignment due to a lack of precise characterization of the dependence of the alignment objective on the data generated by policy trajectories. This shortfall contributes to the sub-optimal performance observed in contemporary algorithms. Our framework addressed these concerns by explicitly parameterizing the distribution of the upper alignment objective (reward design) by the lower optimal variable (optimal policy for the designed reward). Interestingly, from an optimization perspective, our formulation leads to a new class of stochastic bilevel problems where the stochasticity at the upper objective depends upon the lower-level variable. To demonstrate the efficacy of our formulation in resolving alignment issues in RL, we devised an algorithm named A-PARL to solve PARL problem, establishing sample complexity bounds of order O(1/T). Our empirical results substantiate that the proposed PARL can address the alignment concerns in RL by showing significant improvements (up to 63\% in terms of required samples) for policy alignment in large-scale environments of the Deepmind control suite and Meta world tasks.

A modified LAB algorithm is introduced in this paper. It builds upon the original LAB algorithm (Reddy et al. 2023), which is a socio-inspired algorithm that models competitive and learning behaviours within a group, establishing hierarchical roles. The proposed algorithm incorporates the roulette wheel approach and a reduction factor introducing inter-group competition and iteratively narrowing down the sample space. The algorithm is validated by solving the benchmark test problems from CEC 2005 and CEC 2017. The solutions are validated using standard statistical tests such as two-sided and pairwise signed rank Wilcoxon test and Friedman rank test. The algorithm exhibited improved and superior robustness as well as search space exploration capabilities. Furthermore, a Clustering-Based Search Space Reduction (C-SSR) method is proposed, making the algorithm capable to solve constrained problems. The C-SSR method enables the algorithm to identify clusters of feasible regions, satisfying the constraints and contributing to achieve the optimal solution. This method demonstrates its effectiveness as a potential alternative to traditional constraint handling techniques. The results obtained using the Modified LAB algorithm are then compared with those achieved by other recent metaheuristic algorithms.

We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions coupled with shared policy learning constitutes an efficient solution to this problem. By playing against each other, our deep-reinforcement-learning-driven agents learn emergent behaviors relative to a wide spectrum of objectives encompassing profit-and-loss, optimal execution and market share. In particular, we find that liquidity providers naturally learn to balance hedging and skewing, where skewing refers to setting their buy and sell prices asymmetrically as a function of their inventory. We further introduce a novel RL-based calibration algorithm which we found performed well at imposing constraints on the game equilibrium. On the theoretical side, we are able to show convergence rates for our multi-agent policy gradient algorithm under a transitivity assumption, closely related to generalized ordinal potential games.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

We introduce an Implicit Game-Theoretic MPC (IGT-MPC), a decentralized algorithm for two-agent motion planning that uses a learned value function that predicts the game-theoretic interaction outcomes as the terminal cost-to-go function in a model predictive control (MPC) framework, guiding agents to implicitly account for interactions with other agents and maximize their reward. This approach applies to competitive and cooperative multi-agent motion planning problems which we formulate as constrained dynamic games. Given a constrained dynamic game, we randomly sample initial conditions and solve for the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) to generate a dataset of GNE solutions, computing the reward outcome of each game-theoretic interaction from the GNE. The data is used to train a simple neural network to predict the reward outcome, which we use as the terminal cost-to-go function in an MPC scheme. We showcase emerging competitive and coordinated behaviors using IGT-MPC in scenarios such as two-vehicle head-to-head racing and un-signalized intersection navigation. IGT-MPC offers a novel method integrating machine learning and game-theoretic reasoning into model-based decentralized multi-agent motion planning.

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

The higher-order correlation clustering problem is an expressive model, and recently, local search heuristics have been proposed for several applications. Certifying optimality, however, is NP-hard and practically hampered already by the complexity of the problem statement. Here, we focus on establishing partial optimality conditions for the special case of complete graphs and cubic objective functions. In addition, we define and implement algorithms for testing these conditions and examine their effect numerically, on two datasets.

Path-velocity decomposition is an intuitive yet powerful approach to address the complexity of kinodynamic motion planning. The difficult trajectory planning problem is solved in two separate, simpler, steps: first, find a path in the configuration space that satisfies the geometric constraints (path planning), and second, find a time-parameterization of that path satisfying the kinodynamic constraints. A fundamental requirement is that the path found in the first step should be time-parameterizable. Most existing works fulfill this requirement by enforcing quasi-static constraints in the path planning step, resulting in an important loss in completeness. We propose a method that enables path-velocity decomposition to discover truly dynamic motions, i.e. motions that are not quasi-statically executable. At the heart of the proposed method is a new algorithm -- Admissible Velocity Propagation -- which, given a path and an interval of reachable velocities at the beginning of that path, computes exactly and efficiently the interval of all the velocities the system can reach after traversing the path while respecting the system kinodynamic constraints. Combining this algorithm with usual sampling-based planners then gives rise to a family of new trajectory planners that can appropriately handle kinodynamic constraints while retaining the advantages associated with path-velocity decomposition. We demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed method on some difficult kinodynamic planning problems, where, in particular, quasi-static methods are guaranteed to fail.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

This paper presents an equivalence between feasible kinodynamic planning and optimal kinodynamic planning, in that any optimal planning problem can be transformed into a series of feasible planning problems in a state-cost space whose solutions approach the optimum. This transformation gives rise to a meta-algorithm that produces an asymptotically optimal planner, given any feasible kinodynamic planner as a subroutine. The meta-algorithm is proven to be asymptotically optimal, and a formula is derived relating expected running time and solution suboptimality. It is directly applicable to a wide range of optimal planning problems because it does not resort to the use of steering functions or numerical boundary-value problem solvers. On a set of benchmark problems, it is demonstrated to perform, using the EST and RRT algorithms as subroutines, at a superior or comparable level to related planners.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

Solving Olympiad-level mathematical problems represents a significant advancement in machine intelligence and automated reasoning. Current machine learning methods, however, struggle to solve Olympiad-level problems beyond Euclidean plane geometry due to a lack of large-scale, high-quality datasets. The challenge is even greater in algebraic systems, which involve infinite reasoning spaces within finite conditions. To address these issues, we propose AIPS, an Algebraic Inequality Proving System capable of autonomously generating complex inequality theorems and effectively solving Olympiad-level inequality problems without requiring human demonstrations. During proof search in a mixed reasoning manner, a value curriculum learning strategy on generated datasets is implemented to improve proving performance, demonstrating strong mathematical intuitions. On a test set of 20 International Mathematical Olympiad-level inequality problems, AIPS successfully solved 10, outperforming state-of-the-art methods. Furthermore, AIPS automatically generated a vast array of non-trivial theorems without human intervention, some of which have been evaluated by professional contestants and deemed to reach the level of the International Mathematical Olympiad. Notably, one theorem was selected as a competition problem in a major city 2024 Mathematical Olympiad.

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an interest to deviate). In this paper, inspired by a practical application in the context of a decision support system for collaborative transportation in a Short Food Supply Chain (SFSC), we mainly focus on Traveling Salesman Games (TSGs), where the objective is to allocate the cost of a Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) with n locations and 1 depot to n players, each linked to exactly one of the locations. Given the computational complexity of computing an element of the core and the cost of a TSP, we study semicore allocations: a relaxation of the core that only requires that the subsets of size n -1 and of size 1 do not wish to deviate from the coalition. In the literature, instances of TSGs with empty cores and semicores are found. Hence, this paper first surveys the methods to approximate stability whenever the core is empty, such as the cost of stability (computing the minimum amount of money to subsidize the coalition with to attain stability) and the ε-core (which is a set of allocations that allow subsets of players to exceed their actual cost, but at most of a value of ε). We prove that these two solution

This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this purpose, with recent works also using methods based on Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, Elo is unable to handle intransitive agent interactions, and other techniques are restricted to zero-sum, two-player settings or are limited by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is intractable to compute. Recently, a ranking method called α-Rank, relying on a new graph-based game-theoretic solution concept, was shown to tractably apply to general games. However, evaluations based on Elo or α-Rank typically assume noise-free game outcomes, despite the data often being collected from noisy simulations, making this assumption unrealistic in practice. This paper investigates multiagent evaluation in the incomplete information regime, involving general-sum many-player games with noisy outcomes. We derive sample complexity guarantees required to confidently rank agents in this setting. We propose adaptive algorithms for accurate ranking, provide correctness and sample complexity guarantees, then introduce a means of connecting uncertainties in noisy match outcomes to uncertainties in rankings. We evaluate the performance of these approaches in several domains, including Bernoulli games, a soccer meta-game, and Kuhn poker.

Applying the method of moments to the chemical master equation (CME) appearing in stochastic chemical kinetics often leads to the so-called closure problem. Recently, several authors showed that this problem can be partially overcome using moment-based semidefinite programs (SDPs). In particular, they showed that moment-based SDPs can be used to calculate rigorous bounds on various descriptions of the stochastic chemical kinetic system's stationary distribution(s) -- for example, mean molecular counts, variances in these counts, and so on. In this paper, we show that these ideas can be extended to the corresponding dynamic problem, calculating time-varying bounds on the same descriptions.

This paper studies the fair range clustering problem in which the data points are from different demographic groups and the goal is to pick k centers with the minimum clustering cost such that each group is at least minimally represented in the centers set and no group dominates the centers set. More precisely, given a set of n points in a metric space (P,d) where each point belongs to one of the ell different demographics (i.e., P = P_1 uplus P_2 uplus cdots uplus P_ell) and a set of ell intervals [alpha_1, beta_1], cdots, [alpha_ell, beta_ell] on desired number of centers from each group, the goal is to pick a set of k centers C with minimum ell_p-clustering cost (i.e., (sum_{vin P} d(v,C)^p)^{1/p}) such that for each group iin ell, |Ccap P_i| in [alpha_i, beta_i]. In particular, the fair range ell_p-clustering captures fair range k-center, k-median and k-means as its special cases. In this work, we provide efficient constant factor approximation algorithms for fair range ell_p-clustering for all values of pin [1,infty).

Sphere packing, Hilbert's eighteenth problem, asks for the densest arrangement of congruent spheres in n-dimensional Euclidean space. Although relevant to areas such as cryptography, crystallography, and medical imaging, the problem remains unresolved: beyond a few special dimensions, neither optimal packings nor tight upper bounds are known. Even a major breakthrough in dimension n=8, later recognised with a Fields Medal, underscores its difficulty. A leading technique for upper bounds, the three-point method, reduces the problem to solving large, high-precision semidefinite programs (SDPs). Because each candidate SDP may take days to evaluate, standard data-intensive AI approaches are infeasible. We address this challenge by formulating SDP construction as a sequential decision process, the SDP game, in which a policy assembles SDP formulations from a set of admissible components. Using a sample-efficient model-based framework that combines Bayesian optimisation with Monte Carlo Tree Search, we obtain new state-of-the-art upper bounds in dimensions 4-16, showing that model-based search can advance computational progress in longstanding geometric problems. Together, these results demonstrate that sample-efficient, model-based search can make tangible progress on mathematically rigid, evaluation limited problems, pointing towards a complementary direction for AI-assisted discovery beyond large-scale LLM-driven exploration.

We consider the problem where an agent wants to find a hidden object that is randomly located in some vertex of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) according to a fixed but possibly unknown distribution. The agent can only examine vertices whose in-neighbors have already been examined. In this paper, we address a learning setting where we allow the agent to stop before having found the object and restart searching on a new independent instance of the same problem. Our goal is to maximize the total number of hidden objects found given a time budget. The agent can thus skip an instance after realizing that it would spend too much time on it. Our contributions are both to the search theory and multi-armed bandits. If the distribution is known, we provide a quasi-optimal and efficient stationary strategy. If the distribution is unknown, we additionally show how to sequentially approximate it and, at the same time, act near-optimally in order to collect as many hidden objects as possible.

Bayesian optimization (BO) is a powerful framework to optimize black-box expensive-to-evaluate functions via sequential interactions. In several important problems (e.g. drug discovery, circuit design, neural architecture search, etc.), though, such functions are defined over large combinatorial and unstructured spaces. This makes existing BO algorithms not feasible due to the intractable maximization of the acquisition function over these domains. To address this issue, we propose GameOpt, a novel game-theoretical approach to combinatorial BO. GameOpt establishes a cooperative game between the different optimization variables, and selects points that are game equilibria of an upper confidence bound acquisition function. These are stable configurations from which no variable has an incentive to deviate- analog to local optima in continuous domains. Crucially, this allows us to efficiently break down the complexity of the combinatorial domain into individual decision sets, making GameOpt scalable to large combinatorial spaces. We demonstrate the application of GameOpt to the challenging protein design problem and validate its performance on four real-world protein datasets. Each protein can take up to 20^{X} possible configurations, where X is the length of a protein, making standard BO methods infeasible. Instead, our approach iteratively selects informative protein configurations and very quickly discovers highly active protein variants compared to other baselines.

We propose the convergent graph solver (CGS), a deep learning method that learns iterative mappings to predict the properties of a graph system at its stationary state (fixed point) with guaranteed convergence. CGS systematically computes the fixed points of a target graph system and decodes them to estimate the stationary properties of the system without the prior knowledge of existing solvers or intermediate solutions. The forward propagation of CGS proceeds in three steps: (1) constructing the input dependent linear contracting iterative maps, (2) computing the fixed-points of the linear maps, and (3) decoding the fixed-points to estimate the properties. The contractivity of the constructed linear maps guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the fixed points following the Banach fixed point theorem. To train CGS efficiently, we also derive a tractable analytical expression for its gradient by leveraging the implicit function theorem. We evaluate the performance of CGS by applying it to various network-analytic and graph benchmark problems. The results indicate that CGS has competitive capabilities for predicting the stationary properties of graph systems, irrespective of whether the target systems are linear or non-linear. CGS also shows high performance for graph classification problems where the existence or the meaning of a fixed point is hard to be clearly defined, which highlights the potential of CGS as a general graph neural network architecture.

The FOX optimizer, inspired by red fox hunting behavior, is a powerful algorithm for solving real-world and engineering problems. However, despite balancing exploration and exploitation, it can prematurely converge to local optima, as agent positions are updated solely based on the current best-known position, causing all agents to converge on one location. This study proposes the modified FOX optimizer (mFOX) to enhance exploration and balance exploration and exploitation in three steps. First, the Oppositional-Based Learning (OBL) strategy is used to improve the initial population. Second, control parameters are refined to achieve a better balance between exploration and exploitation. Third, a new update equation is introduced, allowing agents to adjust their positions relative to one another rather than relying solely on the best-known position. This approach improves exploration efficiency without adding complexity. The mFOX algorithm's performance is evaluated against 12 well-known algorithms on 23 classical benchmark functions, 10 CEC2019 functions, and 12 CEC2022 functions. It outperforms competitors in 74% of the classical benchmarks, 60% of the CEC2019 benchmarks, and 58% of the CEC2022 benchmarks. Additionally, mFOX effectively addresses four engineering problems. These results demonstrate mFOX's strong competitiveness in solving complex optimization tasks, including unimodal, constrained, and high-dimensional problems.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Many popular reinforcement learning problems (e.g., navigation in a maze, some Atari games, mountain car) are instances of the episodic setting under its stochastic shortest path (SSP) formulation, where an agent has to achieve a goal state while minimizing the cumulative cost. Despite the popularity of this setting, the exploration-exploitation dilemma has been sparsely studied in general SSP problems, with most of the theoretical literature focusing on different problems (i.e., fixed-horizon and infinite-horizon) or making the restrictive loop-free SSP assumption (i.e., no state can be visited twice during an episode). In this paper, we study the general SSP problem with no assumption on its dynamics (some policies may actually never reach the goal). We introduce UC-SSP, the first no-regret algorithm in this setting, and prove a regret bound scaling as displaystyle mathcal{O}( D S A D K) after K episodes for any unknown SSP with S states, A actions, positive costs and SSP-diameter D, defined as the smallest expected hitting time from any starting state to the goal. We achieve this result by crafting a novel stopping rule, such that UC-SSP may interrupt the current policy if it is taking too long to achieve the goal and switch to alternative policies that are designed to rapidly terminate the episode.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

We investigate an active pure-exploration setting, that includes best-arm identification, in the context of linear stochastic bandits. While asymptotically optimal algorithms exist for standard multi-arm bandits, the existence of such algorithms for the best-arm identification in linear bandits has been elusive despite several attempts to address it. First, we provide a thorough comparison and new insight over different notions of optimality in the linear case, including G-optimality, transductive optimality from optimal experimental design and asymptotic optimality. Second, we design the first asymptotically optimal algorithm for fixed-confidence pure exploration in linear bandits. As a consequence, our algorithm naturally bypasses the pitfall caused by a simple but difficult instance, that most prior algorithms had to be engineered to deal with explicitly. Finally, we avoid the need to fully solve an optimal design problem by providing an approach that entails an efficient implementation.

We propose a new method for optimistic planning in infinite-horizon discounted Markov decision processes based on the idea of adding regularization to the updates of an otherwise standard approximate value iteration procedure. This technique allows us to avoid contraction and monotonicity arguments typically required by existing analyses of approximate dynamic programming methods, and in particular to use approximate transition functions estimated via least-squares procedures in MDPs with linear function approximation. We use our method to recover known guarantees in tabular MDPs and to provide a computationally efficient algorithm for learning near-optimal policies in discounted linear mixture MDPs from a single stream of experience, and show it achieves near-optimal statistical guarantees.

Finding the mixed Nash equilibria (MNE) of a two-player zero sum continuous game is an important and challenging problem in machine learning. A canonical algorithm to finding the MNE is the noisy gradient descent ascent method which in the infinite particle limit gives rise to the {\em Mean-Field Gradient Descent Ascent} (GDA) dynamics on the space of probability measures. In this paper, we first study the convergence of a two-scale Mean-Field GDA dynamics for finding the MNE of the entropy-regularized objective. More precisely we show that for each finite temperature (or regularization parameter), the two-scale Mean-Field GDA with a suitable {\em finite} scale ratio converges exponentially to the unique MNE without assuming the convexity or concavity of the interaction potential. The key ingredient of our proof lies in the construction of new Lyapunov functions that dissipate exponentially along the Mean-Field GDA. We further study the simulated annealing of the Mean-Field GDA dynamics. We show that with a temperature schedule that decays logarithmically in time the annealed Mean-Field GDA converges to the MNE of the original unregularized objective.

We consider the problem of designing a smooth trajectory that traverses a sequence of convex sets in minimum time, while satisfying given velocity and acceleration constraints. This problem is naturally formulated as a nonconvex program. To solve it, we propose a biconvex method that quickly produces an initial trajectory and iteratively refines it by solving two convex subproblems in alternation. This method is guaranteed to converge, returns a feasible trajectory even if stopped early, and does not require the selection of any line-search or trust-region parameter. Exhaustive experiments show that our method finds high-quality trajectories in a fraction of the time of state-of-the-art solvers for nonconvex optimization. In addition, it achieves runtimes comparable to industry-standard waypoint-based motion planners, while consistently designing lower-duration trajectories than existing optimization-based planners.

Given a graph, the shortest-path problem requires finding a sequence of edges with minimum cumulative length that connects a source vertex to a target vertex. We consider a variant of this classical problem in which the position of each vertex in the graph is a continuous decision variable constrained in a convex set, and the length of an edge is a convex function of the position of its endpoints. Problems of this form arise naturally in many areas, from motion planning of autonomous vehicles to optimal control of hybrid systems. The price for such a wide applicability is the complexity of this problem, which is easily seen to be NP-hard. Our main contribution is a strong and lightweight mixed-integer convex formulation based on perspective operators, that makes it possible to efficiently find globally optimal paths in large graphs and in high-dimensional spaces.

Using a long-standing conjecture from combinatorial group theory, we explore, from multiple perspectives, the challenges of finding rare instances carrying disproportionately high rewards. Based on lessons learned in the context defined by the Andrews-Curtis conjecture, we propose algorithmic enhancements and a topological hardness measure with implications for a broad class of search problems. As part of our study, we also address several open mathematical questions. Notably, we demonstrate the length reducibility of all but two presentations in the Akbulut-Kirby series (1981), and resolve various potential counterexamples in the Miller-Schupp series (1991), including three infinite subfamilies.

We propose a reinforcement learning (RL) framework under a broad class of risk objectives, characterized by convex scoring functions. This class covers many common risk measures, such as variance, Expected Shortfall, entropic Value-at-Risk, and mean-risk utility. To resolve the time-inconsistency issue, we consider an augmented state space and an auxiliary variable and recast the problem as a two-state optimization problem. We propose a customized Actor-Critic algorithm and establish some theoretical approximation guarantees. A key theoretical contribution is that our results do not require the Markov decision process to be continuous. Additionally, we propose an auxiliary variable sampling method inspired by the alternating minimization algorithm, which is convergent under certain conditions. We validate our approach in simulation experiments with a financial application in statistical arbitrage trading, demonstrating the effectiveness of the algorithm.

In this work, we study first-order algorithms for solving Bilevel Optimization (BO) where the objective functions are smooth but possibly nonconvex in both levels and the variables are restricted to closed convex sets. As a first step, we study the landscape of BO through the lens of penalty methods, in which the upper- and lower-level objectives are combined in a weighted sum with penalty parameter sigma > 0. In particular, we establish a strong connection between the penalty function and the hyper-objective by explicitly characterizing the conditions under which the values and derivatives of the two must be O(sigma)-close. A by-product of our analysis is the explicit formula for the gradient of hyper-objective when the lower-level problem has multiple solutions under minimal conditions, which could be of independent interest. Next, viewing the penalty formulation as O(sigma)-approximation of the original BO, we propose first-order algorithms that find an epsilon-stationary solution by optimizing the penalty formulation with sigma = O(epsilon). When the perturbed lower-level problem uniformly satisfies the small-error proximal error-bound (EB) condition, we propose a first-order algorithm that converges to an epsilon-stationary point of the penalty function, using in total O(epsilon^{-3}) and O(epsilon^{-7}) accesses to first-order (stochastic) gradient oracles when the oracle is deterministic and oracles are noisy, respectively. Under an additional assumption on stochastic oracles, we show that the algorithm can be implemented in a fully {\it single-loop} manner, i.e., with O(1) samples per iteration, and achieves the improved oracle-complexity of O(epsilon^{-3}) and O(epsilon^{-5}), respectively.

Bilevel optimization enjoys a wide range of applications in hyper-parameter optimization, meta-learning and reinforcement learning. However, bilevel optimization problems are difficult to solve. Recent progress on scalable bilevel algorithms mainly focuses on bilevel optimization problems where the lower-level objective is either strongly convex or unconstrained. In this work, we tackle the bilevel problem through the lens of the penalty method. We show that under certain conditions, the penalty reformulation recovers the solutions of the original bilevel problem. Further, we propose the penalty-based bilevel gradient descent (PBGD) algorithm and establish its finite-time convergence for the constrained bilevel problem without lower-level strong convexity. Experiments showcase the efficiency of the proposed PBGD algorithm.

Sampling-based algorithms are viewed as practical solutions for high-dimensional motion planning. Recent progress has taken advantage of random geometric graph theory to show how asymptotic optimality can also be achieved with these methods. Achieving this desirable property for systems with dynamics requires solving a two-point boundary value problem (BVP) in the state space of the underlying dynamical system. It is difficult, however, if not impractical, to generate a BVP solver for a variety of important dynamical models of robots or physically simulated ones. Thus, an open challenge was whether it was even possible to achieve optimality guarantees when planning for systems without access to a BVP solver. This work resolves the above question and describes how to achieve asymptotic optimality for kinodynamic planning using incremental sampling-based planners by introducing a new rigorous framework. Two new methods, Stable Sparse-RRT (SST) and SST*, result from this analysis, which are asymptotically near-optimal and optimal, respectively. The techniques are shown to converge fast to high-quality paths, while they maintain only a sparse set of samples, which makes them computationally efficient. The good performance of the planners is confirmed by experimental results using dynamical systems benchmarks, as well as physically simulated robots.

The study demonstrates the capabilities of a vector-based approach for calculating stoichiometric coefficients in chemical equations, using black powder as an illustrative example. A method is proposed for selecting and constraining intermediate interactions between reactants, as well as for identifying final products. It is shown that even a small number of components can lead to a large number of final and intermediate products. Through concrete calculations, a correlation is established between the number of possible chemical equations and the number of reactants. A methodology is proposed for computing all possible chemical equations within a reaction system for arbitrary component ratios, enabling the derivation of all feasible chemical reactions. Additionally, a method is developed for calculating the chemical composition for a fixed set of reactants, allowing for the evaluation of the set of products resulting from all possible chemical interactions given a specified initial composition.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

This paper studies the role of over-parametrization in solving non-convex optimization problems. The focus is on the important class of low-rank matrix sensing, where we propose an infinite hierarchy of non-convex problems via the lifting technique and the Burer-Monteiro factorization. This contrasts with the existing over-parametrization technique where the search rank is limited by the dimension of the matrix and it does not allow a rich over-parametrization of an arbitrary degree. We show that although the spurious solutions of the problem remain stationary points through the hierarchy, they will be transformed into strict saddle points (under some technical conditions) and can be escaped via local search methods. This is the first result in the literature showing that over-parametrization creates a negative curvature for escaping spurious solutions. We also derive a bound on how much over-parametrization is requited to enable the elimination of spurious solutions.

Two main challenges in Reinforcement Learning (RL) are designing appropriate reward functions and ensuring the safety of the learned policy. To address these challenges, we present a theoretical framework for Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) in constrained Markov decision processes. From a convex-analytic perspective, we extend prior results on reward identifiability and generalizability to both the constrained setting and a more general class of regularizations. In particular, we show that identifiability up to potential shaping (Cao et al., 2021) is a consequence of entropy regularization and may generally no longer hold for other regularizations or in the presence of safety constraints. We also show that to ensure generalizability to new transition laws and constraints, the true reward must be identified up to a constant. Additionally, we derive a finite sample guarantee for the suboptimality of the learned rewards, and validate our results in a gridworld environment.

Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing methods either fail to plan interactively or consider unimodal behaviors that could lead to catastrophic results. In this paper, we introduce an integrated decision-making and trajectory planning framework based on Bayesian game (i.e., game of incomplete information). Human decisions inherently exhibit discrete characteristics and therefore are modeled as types of players in the game. A general solver based on no-regret learning is introduced to obtain a corresponding Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, which captures the interaction between traffic agents in the multimodal context. With the attained equilibrium, decision-making and trajectory planning are performed simultaneously, and the resulting interactive strategy is shown to be optimal over the expectation of rivals' driving intentions. Closed-loop simulations on different traffic scenarios are performed to illustrate the generalizability and the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Magnitude of a finite metric space and the related notion of magnitude functions on metric spaces is an active area of research in algebraic topology. Magnitude originally arose in the context of biology, where it represents the number of effective species in an environment; when applied to a one-parameter family of metric spaces tX with scale parameter t, the magnitude captures much of the underlying geometry of the space. Prior work has mostly focussed on properties of magnitude in a global sense; in this paper we restrict the sets to finite subsets of Euclidean space and investigate its individual components. We give an explicit formula for the corrected inclusion-exclusion principle, and define a quantity associated with each point, called the moment which gives an intrinsic ordering to the points. We exploit this in order to form an algorithm which approximates the convex hull.

Preference learning algorithms (e.g., RLHF and DPO) are frequently used to steer LLMs to produce generations that are more preferred by humans, but our understanding of their inner workings is still limited. In this work, we study the conventional wisdom that preference learning trains models to assign higher likelihoods to more preferred outputs than less preferred outputs, measured via ranking accuracy. Surprisingly, we find that most state-of-the-art preference-tuned models achieve a ranking accuracy of less than 60% on common preference datasets. We furthermore derive the idealized ranking accuracy that a preference-tuned LLM would achieve if it optimized the DPO or RLHF objective perfectly. We demonstrate that existing models exhibit a significant alignment gap -- i.e., a gap between the observed and idealized ranking accuracies. We attribute this discrepancy to the DPO objective, which is empirically and theoretically ill-suited to fix even mild ranking errors in the reference model, and derive a simple and efficient formula for quantifying the difficulty of learning a given preference datapoint. Finally, we demonstrate that ranking accuracy strongly correlates with the empirically popular win rate metric when the model is close to the reference model used in the objective, shedding further light on the differences between on-policy (e.g., RLHF) and off-policy (e.g., DPO) preference learning algorithms.

Sampling-based kinodynamic planners, such as Rapidly-exploring Random Trees (RRTs), pose two fundamental challenges: computing a reliable (pseudo-)metric for the distance between two randomly sampled nodes, and computing a steering input to connect the nodes. The core of these challenges is a Two Point Boundary Value Problem, which is known to be NP-hard. Recently, the distance metric has been approximated using supervised learning, reducing computation time drastically. The previous work on such learning RRTs use direct optimal control to generate the data for supervised learning. This paper proposes to use indirect optimal control instead, because it provides two benefits: it reduces the computational effort to generate the data, and it provides a low dimensional parametrization of the action space. The latter allows us to learn both the distance metric and the steering input to connect two nodes. This eliminates the need for a local planner in learning RRTs. Experimental results on a pendulum swing up show 10-fold speed-up in both the offline data generation and the online planning time, leading to at least a 10-fold speed-up in the overall planning time.

P. Kabamba developed generation theory as a tool for studying self-reproducing systems. We provide an alternative definition of a generation system and give a complete solution to the problem of finding optimal seeds for a finite self-replicating system. We also exhibit examples illustrating a connection between self-replication and fixed-point theory.

We consider an improper reinforcement learning setting where a learner is given M base controllers for an unknown Markov decision process, and wishes to combine them optimally to produce a potentially new controller that can outperform each of the base ones. This can be useful in tuning across controllers, learnt possibly in mismatched or simulated environments, to obtain a good controller for a given target environment with relatively few trials. Towards this, we propose two algorithms: (1) a Policy Gradient-based approach; and (2) an algorithm that can switch between a simple Actor-Critic (AC) based scheme and a Natural Actor-Critic (NAC) scheme depending on the available information. Both algorithms operate over a class of improper mixtures of the given controllers. For the first case, we derive convergence rate guarantees assuming access to a gradient oracle. For the AC-based approach we provide convergence rate guarantees to a stationary point in the basic AC case and to a global optimum in the NAC case. Numerical results on (i) the standard control theoretic benchmark of stabilizing an cartpole; and (ii) a constrained queueing task show that our improper policy optimization algorithm can stabilize the system even when the base policies at its disposal are unstable.

This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among traders in a constant-product market-making protocol were modelled using mean field games (MFG), first without transaction costs and then incorporating them. Here we present the formulation of a more complete model that integrates three types of agents: traders, liquidity providers (LPs), and arbitrageurs. While we do not establish existence results for this general model, the formulation identifies the main technical difficulties and lays the groundwork for future work. The LP acts as a dominating player in the sense of 'Mean field games with a dominating player' by Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam: its strategy influences the mean field distribution of the traders, and the equilibrium is sought as a solution to the coupled system of three problems that constitute a Major-Minor game. The arbitrageurs operate by solving the optimization problem presented in "An analysis of uniswap markets" by Angeris et al., and their impact on the LP is captured through the loss-versus-rebalancing of "Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing" by Milionis et al. The material in this article should be read as an open research proposal rather than a collection of closed results.

We study the problem of approximating stationary points of Lipschitz and smooth functions under (varepsilon,delta)-differential privacy (DP) in both the finite-sum and stochastic settings. A point w is called an alpha-stationary point of a function F:R^drightarrowR if |nabla F(w)|leq alpha. We provide a new efficient algorithm that finds an Obig(big[sqrt{d}{nvarepsilon}big]^{2/3}big)-stationary point in the finite-sum setting, where n is the number of samples. This improves on the previous best rate of Obig(big[sqrt{d}{nvarepsilon}big]^{1/2}big). We also give a new construction that improves over the existing rates in the stochastic optimization setting, where the goal is to find approximate stationary points of the population risk. Our construction finds a Obig(1{n^{1/3}} + big[sqrt{d}{nvarepsilon}big]^{1/2}big)-stationary point of the population risk in time linear in n. Furthermore, under the additional assumption of convexity, we completely characterize the sample complexity of finding stationary points of the population risk (up to polylog factors) and show that the optimal rate on population stationarity is tilde Thetabig(1{n}+sqrt{d}{nvarepsilon}big). Finally, we show that our methods can be used to provide dimension-independent rates of Obig(1{n}+minbig(big[sqrt{rank}{nvarepsilon}big]^{2/3},1{(nvarepsilon)^{2/5}}big)big) on population stationarity for Generalized Linear Models (GLM), where rank is the rank of the design matrix, which improves upon the previous best known rate.

The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) path planning problem is a complex optimization problem in the field of robotics. In this paper, we investigate the possible utilization of this problem in benchmarking global optimization methods. We devise a problem instance generator and pick 56 representative instances, which we compare to established benchmarking suits through Exploratory Landscape Analysis to show their uniqueness. For the computational comparison, we select twelve well-performing global optimization techniques from both subfields of stochastic algorithms (evolutionary computation methods) and deterministic algorithms (Dividing RECTangles, or DIRECT-type methods). The experiments were conducted in settings with varying dimensionality and computational budgets. The results were analyzed through several criteria (number of best-found solutions, mean relative error, Friedman ranks) and utilized established statistical tests. The best-ranking methods for the UAV problems were almost universally the top-performing evolutionary techniques from recent competitions on numerical optimization at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Congress on Evolutionary Computation. Lastly, we discussed the variable dimension characteristics of the studied UAV problems that remain still largely under-investigated.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

The objective function used in trajectory optimization is often non-convex and can have an infinite set of local optima. In such cases, there are diverse solutions to perform a given task. Although there are a few methods to find multiple solutions for motion planning, they are limited to generating a finite set of solutions. To address this issue, we presents an optimization method that learns an infinite set of solutions in trajectory optimization. In our framework, diverse solutions are obtained by learning latent representations of solutions. Our approach can be interpreted as training a deep generative model of collision-free trajectories for motion planning. The experimental results indicate that the trained model represents an infinite set of homotopic solutions for motion planning problems.

Computing stable partitions in hedonic games is a challenging task because there exist games in which stable outcomes do not exist. Even more, these No-instances can often be leveraged to prove computational hardness results. We make this impression rigorous in a dynamic model of cardinal hedonic games by providing meta theorems. These imply hardness of deciding about the possible or necessary convergence of deviation dynamics based on the mere existence of No-instances. Our results hold for additively separable, fractional, and modified fractional hedonic games (ASHGs, FHGs, and MFHGs). Moreover, they encompass essentially all reasonable stability notions based on single-agent deviations. In addition, we propose dynamics as a method to find individually rational and contractually individual stable (CIS) partitions in ASHGs. In particular, we find that CIS dynamics from the singleton partition possibly converge after a linear number of deviations but may require an exponential number of deviations in the worst case.

The prevalent deployment of learning from human preferences through reinforcement learning (RLHF) relies on two important approximations: the first assumes that pairwise preferences can be substituted with pointwise rewards. The second assumes that a reward model trained on these pointwise rewards can generalize from collected data to out-of-distribution data sampled by the policy. Recently, Direct Preference Optimisation (DPO) has been proposed as an approach that bypasses the second approximation and learn directly a policy from collected data without the reward modelling stage. However, this method still heavily relies on the first approximation. In this paper we try to gain a deeper theoretical understanding of these practical algorithms. In particular we derive a new general objective called PsiPO for learning from human preferences that is expressed in terms of pairwise preferences and therefore bypasses both approximations. This new general objective allows us to perform an in-depth analysis of the behavior of RLHF and DPO (as special cases of PsiPO) and to identify their potential pitfalls. We then consider another special case for PsiPO by setting Psi simply to Identity, for which we can derive an efficient optimisation procedure, prove performance guarantees and demonstrate its empirical superiority to DPO on some illustrative examples.

We present a new approach to modeling sequential data: the deep equilibrium model (DEQ). Motivated by an observation that the hidden layers of many existing deep sequence models converge towards some fixed point, we propose the DEQ approach that directly finds these equilibrium points via root-finding. Such a method is equivalent to running an infinite depth (weight-tied) feedforward network, but has the notable advantage that we can analytically backpropagate through the equilibrium point using implicit differentiation. Using this approach, training and prediction in these networks require only constant memory, regardless of the effective "depth" of the network. We demonstrate how DEQs can be applied to two state-of-the-art deep sequence models: self-attention transformers and trellis networks. On large-scale language modeling tasks, such as the WikiText-103 benchmark, we show that DEQs 1) often improve performance over these state-of-the-art models (for similar parameter counts); 2) have similar computational requirements to existing models; and 3) vastly reduce memory consumption (often the bottleneck for training large sequence models), demonstrating an up-to 88% memory reduction in our experiments. The code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/deq .

Ridge Rider (RR) is an algorithm for finding diverse solutions to optimization problems by following eigenvectors of the Hessian ("ridges"). RR is designed for conservative gradient systems (i.e., settings involving a single loss function), where it branches at saddles - easy-to-find bifurcation points. We generalize this idea to non-conservative, multi-agent gradient systems by proposing a method - denoted Generalized Ridge Rider (GRR) - for finding arbitrary bifurcation points. We give theoretical motivation for our method by leveraging machinery from the field of dynamical systems. We construct novel toy problems where we can visualize new phenomena while giving insight into high-dimensional problems of interest. Finally, we empirically evaluate our method by finding diverse solutions in the iterated prisoners' dilemma and relevant machine learning problems including generative adversarial networks.

We propose a delay-agnostic asynchronous coordinate update algorithm (DEGAS) for computing operator fixed points, with applications to asynchronous optimization. DEGAS includes novel asynchronous variants of ADMM and block-coordinate descent as special cases. We prove that DEGAS converges under both bounded and unbounded delays under delay-free parameter conditions. We also validate by theory and experiments that DEGAS adapts well to the actual delays. The effectiveness of DEGAS is demonstrated by numerical experiments on classification problems.

We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.

We consider solving equality-constrained nonlinear, nonconvex optimization problems. This class of problems appears widely in a variety of applications in machine learning and engineering, ranging from constrained deep neural networks, to optimal control, to PDE-constrained optimization. We develop an adaptive inexact Newton method for this problem class. In each iteration, we solve the Lagrangian Newton system inexactly via a randomized iterative sketching solver, and select a suitable stepsize by performing line search on an exact augmented Lagrangian merit function. The randomized solvers have advantages over deterministic linear system solvers by significantly reducing per-iteration flops complexity and storage cost, when equipped with suitable sketching matrices. Our method adaptively controls the accuracy of the randomized solver and the penalty parameters of the exact augmented Lagrangian, to ensure that the inexact Newton direction is a descent direction of the exact augmented Lagrangian. This allows us to establish a global almost sure convergence. We also show that a unit stepsize is admissible locally, so that our method exhibits a local linear convergence. Furthermore, we prove that the linear convergence can be strengthened to superlinear convergence if we gradually sharpen the adaptive accuracy condition on the randomized solver. We demonstrate the superior performance of our method on benchmark nonlinear problems in CUTEst test set, constrained logistic regression with data from LIBSVM, and a PDE-constrained problem.

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.

We investigate the exploration of an unknown environment when no reward function is provided. Building on the incremental exploration setting introduced by Lim and Auer [1], we define the objective of learning the set of ε-optimal goal-conditioned policies attaining all states that are incrementally reachable within L steps (in expectation) from a reference state s_0. In this paper, we introduce a novel model-based approach that interleaves discovering new states from s_0 and improving the accuracy of a model estimate that is used to compute goal-conditioned policies to reach newly discovered states. The resulting algorithm, DisCo, achieves a sample complexity scaling as O(L^5 S_{L+ε} Γ_{L+ε} A ε^{-2}), where A is the number of actions, S_{L+ε} is the number of states that are incrementally reachable from s_0 in L+ε steps, and Γ_{L+ε} is the branching factor of the dynamics over such states. This improves over the algorithm proposed in [1] in both ε and L at the cost of an extra Γ_{L+ε} factor, which is small in most environments of interest. Furthermore, DisCo is the first algorithm that can return an ε/c_{min}-optimal policy for any cost-sensitive shortest-path problem defined on the L-reachable states with minimum cost c_{min}. Finally, we report preliminary empirical results confirming our theoretical findings.

We present a fast algorithm for the design of smooth paths (or trajectories) that are constrained to lie in a collection of axis-aligned boxes. We consider the case where the number of these safe boxes is large, and basic preprocessing of them (such as finding their intersections) can be done offline. At runtime we quickly generate a smooth path between given initial and terminal positions. Our algorithm designs trajectories that are guaranteed to be safe at all times, and detects infeasibility whenever such a trajectory does not exist. Our algorithm is based on two subproblems that we can solve very efficiently: finding a shortest path in a weighted graph, and solving (multiple) convex optimal-control problems. We demonstrate the proposed path planner on large-scale numerical examples, and we provide an efficient open-source software implementation, fastpathplanning.

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) to this setting, and we propose a new fairness concept called general fair share (GFS). We undertake a detailed study and present algorithms for finding fair allocations.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a pivotal tool for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), one of the most popular approaches, formulates RLHF as a policy optimization problem without explicitly estimating the reward function. It overcomes the stability and efficiency issues of two-step approaches, which typically involve first estimating the reward function and then optimizing the policy via proximal policy optimization (PPO). Since RLHF is essentially an optimization problem, and it is well-known that momentum techniques can accelerate optimization both theoretically and empirically, a natural question arises: Can RLHF be accelerated by momentum? This paper answers this question in the affirmative. In detail, we first show that the iterative preference optimization method can be viewed as a proximal point method. Based on this observation, we propose a general Accelerated Preference Optimization (APO) framework, which unifies many existing preference optimization algorithms and employs Nesterov's momentum technique to speed up the alignment of LLMs. Theoretically, we demonstrate that APO can achieve a faster convergence rate than the standard iterative preference optimization methods, including DPO and Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPPO). Empirically, we show the superiority of APO over DPO, iterative DPO, and other strong baselines for RLHF on the AlpacaEval 2.0 benchmark.

Physics-informed neural networks (PINNs) are emerging as popular mesh-free solvers for partial differential equations (PDEs). Recent extensions decompose the domain, applying different PINNs to solve the equation in each subdomain and aligning the solution at the interface of the subdomains. Hence, they can further alleviate the problem complexity, reduce the computational cost, and allow parallelization. However, the performance of the multi-domain PINNs is sensitive to the choice of the interface conditions for solution alignment. While quite a few conditions have been proposed, there is no suggestion about how to select the conditions according to specific problems. To address this gap, we propose META Learning of Interface Conditions (METALIC), a simple, efficient yet powerful approach to dynamically determine the optimal interface conditions for solving a family of parametric PDEs. Specifically, we develop two contextual multi-arm bandit models. The first one applies to the entire training procedure, and online updates a Gaussian process (GP) reward surrogate that given the PDE parameters and interface conditions predicts the solution error. The second one partitions the training into two stages, one is the stochastic phase and the other deterministic phase; we update a GP surrogate for each phase to enable different condition selections at the two stages so as to further bolster the flexibility and performance. We have shown the advantage of METALIC on four bench-mark PDE families.

The paper sets forth comprehensive basics of Discrete Thermodynamics of Chemical Equilibria (DTD), developed by the author during the last decade and spread over series of publications. Based on the linear equations of irreversible thermodynamics, De Donder's definition of the thermodynamic force, and the Le Chatelier principle, DTD brings forward a notion of chemical equilibrium as a balance of internal and external thermodynamic forces, acting against a chemical system. The basic expression of DTD is a logistic map that ties together energetic characteristics of the chemical transformation in the system, its deviation from true thermodynamic equilibrium, and the sum of thermodynamic forces, causing that deviation. System deviation from thermodynamic equilibrium is the major variable of the theory. Solutions to the basic map define the chemical system domain of states comprising bifurcation diagrams with four areas, from true thermodynamic equilibrium to chaos, having specific distinctive meaning for chemical systems. The theory is derived from the currently recognized ideas of chemical thermodynamics and binds classical and contemporary thermodynamics of chemical equilibria into a unique concept. DTD opens new opportunities in understanding and analysis of equilibria in chemical systems. Some new results, included in the paper, have never been published before.

Reinforcement learning usually uses the feedback rewards of environmental to train agents. But the rewards in the actual environment are sparse, and even some environments will not rewards. Most of the current methods are difficult to get good performance in sparse reward or non-reward environments. Although using shaped rewards is effective when solving sparse reward tasks, it is limited to specific problems and learning is also susceptible to local optima. We propose a model-free method that does not rely on environmental rewards to solve the problem of sparse rewards in the general environment. Our method use the minimum number of transitions between states as the distance to replace the rewards of environmental, and proposes a goal-distance gradient to achieve policy improvement. We also introduce a bridge point planning method based on the characteristics of our method to improve exploration efficiency, thereby solving more complex tasks. Experiments show that our method performs better on sparse reward and local optimal problems in complex environments than previous work.

Trajectory planning is commonly used as part of a local planner in autonomous driving. This paper considers the problem of planning a continuous-curvature-rate trajectory between fixed start and goal states that minimizes a tunable trade-off between passenger comfort and travel time. The problem is an instance of infinite dimensional optimization over two continuous functions: a path, and a velocity profile. We propose a simplification of this problem that facilitates the discretization of both functions. This paper also proposes a method to quickly generate minimal-length paths between start and goal states based on a single tuning parameter: the second derivative of curvature. Furthermore, we discretize the set of velocity profiles along a given path into a selection of acceleration way-points along the path. Gradient-descent is then employed to minimize cost over feasible choices of the second derivative of curvature, and acceleration way-points, resulting in a method that repeatedly solves the path and velocity profiles in an iterative fashion. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the benefits of the proposed methods.

We consider a class of structured fractional minimization problems, in which the numerator part of the objective is the sum of a differentiable convex function and a convex non-smooth function, while the denominator part is a convex or concave function. This problem is difficult to solve since it is non-convex. By exploiting the structure of the problem, we propose two Coordinate Descent (CD) methods for solving this problem. The proposed methods iteratively solve a one-dimensional subproblem globally, and they are guaranteed to converge to coordinate-wise stationary points. In the case of a convex denominator, under a weak locally bounded non-convexity condition, we prove that the optimality of coordinate-wise stationary point is stronger than that of the standard critical point and directional point. Under additional suitable conditions, CD methods converge Q-linearly to coordinate-wise stationary points. In the case of a concave denominator, we show that any critical point is a global minimum, and CD methods converge to the global minimum with a sublinear convergence rate. We demonstrate the applicability of the proposed methods to some machine learning and signal processing models. Our experiments on real-world data have shown that our method significantly and consistently outperforms existing methods in terms of accuracy.

The principle of detailed balance states that in equilibrium each elementary process is equilibrated by its reverse process. For many real physico-chemical complex systems (e.g. homogeneous combustion, heterogeneous catalytic oxidation, most enzyme reactions etc), detailed mechanisms include both reversible and irreversible reactions. In this case, the principle of detailed balance cannot be applied directly. We represent irreversible reactions as limits of reversible steps and obtain the principle of detailed balance for complex mechanisms with some irreversible elementary processes. We proved two consequences of the detailed balance for these mechanisms: the structural condition and the algebraic condition that form together the extended form of detailed balance. The algebraic condition is the principle of detailed balance for the reversible part. The structural condition is: the convex hull of the stoichiometric vectors of the irreversible reactions has empty intersection with the linear span of the stoichiometric vectors of the reversible reaction. Physically, this means that the irreversible reactions cannot be included in oriented pathways. The systems with the extended form of detailed balance are also the limits of the reversible systems with detailed balance when some of the equilibrium concentrations (or activities) tend to zero. Surprisingly, the structure of the limit reaction mechanism crucially depends on the relative speeds of this tendency to zero.

The study of hardest and easiest fitness landscapes is an active area of research. Recently, Kaufmann, Larcher, Lengler and Zou conjectured that for the self-adjusting (1,lambda)-EA, Adversarial Dynamic BinVal (ADBV) is the hardest dynamic monotone function to optimize. We introduce the function Switching Dynamic BinVal (SDBV) which coincides with ADBV whenever the number of remaining zeros in the search point is strictly less than n/2, where n denotes the dimension of the search space. We show, using a combinatorial argument, that for the (1+1)-EA with any mutation rate p in [0,1], SDBV is drift-minimizing among the class of dynamic monotone functions. Our construction provides the first explicit example of an instance of the partially-ordered evolutionary algorithm (PO-EA) model with parameterized pessimism introduced by Colin, Doerr and F\'erey, building on work of Jansen. We further show that the (1+1)-EA optimizes SDBV in Theta(n^{3/2}) generations. Our simulations demonstrate matching runtimes for both static and self-adjusting (1,lambda) and (1+lambda)-EA. We further show, using an example of fixed dimension, that drift-minimization does not equal maximal runtime.

Rapidly-exploring random trees (RRTs) are popular in motion planning because they find solutions efficiently to single-query problems. Optimal RRTs (RRT*s) extend RRTs to the problem of finding the optimal solution, but in doing so asymptotically find the optimal path from the initial state to every state in the planning domain. This behaviour is not only inefficient but also inconsistent with their single-query nature. For problems seeking to minimize path length, the subset of states that can improve a solution can be described by a prolate hyperspheroid. We show that unless this subset is sampled directly, the probability of improving a solution becomes arbitrarily small in large worlds or high state dimensions. In this paper, we present an exact method to focus the search by directly sampling this subset. The advantages of the presented sampling technique are demonstrated with a new algorithm, Informed RRT*. This method retains the same probabilistic guarantees on completeness and optimality as RRT* while improving the convergence rate and final solution quality. We present the algorithm as a simple modification to RRT* that could be further extended by more advanced path-planning algorithms. We show experimentally that it outperforms RRT* in rate of convergence, final solution cost, and ability to find difficult passages while demonstrating less dependence on the state dimension and range of the planning problem.

We introduce Riemannian Lyapunov Optimizers (RLOs), a family of optimization algorithms that unifies classic optimizers within one geometric framework. Unlike heuristic improvements to existing optimizers, RLOs are systematically derived from a novel control-theoretic framework that reinterprets optimization as an extended state discrete-time controlled dynamical system on a Riemannian parameter manifold. Central to this framework is the identification of a Normally Attracting Invariant Manifold (NAIM), which organizes training dynamics into two distinct stages: rapid alignment of the speed state to a target graph, followed by controlled evolution within it. We formalize this by constructing a strict Lyapunov function that certifies convergence to a target manifold. This perspective yields a constructive ``optimizer generator" that not only recovers classic algorithms but enables the principled design of RLOs. We validate our theory via geometric diagnostics and demonstrate that grounding optimizer design in control theory yields state-of-the-art performance in large-scale benchmarks. Overall, RLOs bridge control theory and modern machine learning optimization, providing a unified language and a systematic toolkit for designing stable, effective optimizers.