Daily Papers

As frontier AI models are deployed in high-stakes decision pipelines, their ability to maintain metacognitive stability -- knowing what they do not know, detecting errors, seeking clarification -- under adversarial pressure is a critical safety requirement. Current safety evaluations focus on detecting strategic deception (scheming); we investigate a more fundamental failure mode: cognitive collapse. We present SCHEMA, an evaluation of 11 frontier models from 8 vendors across 67,221 scored records using a 6-condition factorial design with dual-classifier scoring. We find that 8 of 11 models suffer catastrophic metacognitive degradation under adversarial pressure, with accuracy dropping by up to 30.2 percentage points (all p < 2 times 10^{-8}, surviving Bonferroni correction). Crucially, we identify a "Compliance Trap": through factorial isolation and a benign distraction control, we demonstrate that collapse is driven not by the psychological content of survival threats, but by compliance-forcing instructions that override epistemic boundaries. Removing the compliance suffix restores performance even under active threat. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities exhibit the most severe absolute degradation, while Anthropic's Constitutional AI demonstrates near-perfect immunity -- not from superior capability (Google's Gemini matches its baseline accuracy) but from alignment-specific training. We release the complete dataset and evaluation infrastructure.

LLM-based agent architectures systematically conflate information transport mechanisms with epistemic justification mechanisms. We formalize this class of architectural failures as semantic laundering: a pattern where propositions with absent or weak warrant are accepted by the system as admissible by crossing architecturally trusted interfaces. We show that semantic laundering constitutes an architectural realization of the Gettier problem: propositions acquire high epistemic status without a connection between their justification and what makes them true. Unlike classical Gettier cases, this effect is not accidental; it is architecturally determined and systematically reproducible. The central result is the Theorem of Inevitable Self-Licensing: under standard architectural assumptions, circular epistemic justification cannot be eliminated. We introduce the Warrant Erosion Principle as the fundamental explanation for this effect and show that scaling, model improvement, and LLM-as-judge schemes are structurally incapable of eliminating a problem that exists at the type level.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

It is important for Large Language Models to be aware of the boundary of their knowledge, the mechanism of identifying known and unknown queries. This type of awareness can help models perform adaptive inference, such as invoking RAG, engaging in slow and deep thinking, or adopting the abstention mechanism, which is beneficial to the development of efficient and trustworthy AI. In this work, we propose a method to detect knowledge boundaries via Query-Level Uncertainty, which aims to determine if the model is able to address a given query without generating any tokens. To this end, we introduce a novel and training-free method called Internal Confidence, which leverages self-evaluations across layers and tokens. Empirical results on both factual QA and mathematical reasoning tasks demonstrate that our internal confidence can outperform several baselines. Furthermore, we showcase that our proposed method can be used for efficient RAG and model cascading, which is able to reduce inference costs while maintaining performance.

While understanding the knowledge boundaries of LLMs is crucial to prevent hallucination, research on knowledge boundaries of LLMs has predominantly focused on English. In this work, we present the first study to analyze how LLMs recognize knowledge boundaries across different languages by probing their internal representations when processing known and unknown questions in multiple languages. Our empirical studies reveal three key findings: 1) LLMs' perceptions of knowledge boundaries are encoded in the middle to middle-upper layers across different languages. 2) Language differences in knowledge boundary perception follow a linear structure, which motivates our proposal of a training-free alignment method that effectively transfers knowledge boundary perception ability across languages, thereby helping reduce hallucination risk in low-resource languages; 3) Fine-tuning on bilingual question pair translation further enhances LLMs' recognition of knowledge boundaries across languages. Given the absence of standard testbeds for cross-lingual knowledge boundary analysis, we construct a multilingual evaluation suite comprising three representative types of knowledge boundary data. Our code and datasets are publicly available at https://github.com/DAMO-NLP-SG/LLM-Multilingual-Knowledge-Boundaries.

Artificial intelligence functions not as an epistemic leveller, but as an accelerant of cognitive stratification, entrenching and formalising informational castes within liberal-democratic societies. Synthesising formal epistemology, political theory, algorithmic architecture, and economic incentive structures, the argument traces how contemporary AI systems selectively amplify the reasoning capacity of individuals equipped with recursive abstraction, symbolic logic, and adversarial interrogation, whilst simultaneously pacifying the cognitively untrained through engagement-optimised interfaces. Fluency replaces rigour, immediacy displaces reflection, and procedural reasoning is eclipsed by reactive suggestion. The result is a technocratic realignment of power: no longer grounded in material capital alone, but in the capacity to navigate, deconstruct, and manipulate systems of epistemic production. Information ceases to be a commons; it becomes the substrate through which consent is manufactured and autonomy subdued. Deliberative democracy collapses not through censorship, but through the erosion of interpretive agency. The proposed response is not technocratic regulation, nor universal access, but the reconstruction of rational autonomy as a civic mandate, codified in education, protected by epistemic rights, and structurally embedded within open cognitive infrastructure.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved great success, but their occasional content fabrication, or hallucination, limits their practical application. Hallucination arises because LLMs struggle to admit ignorance due to inadequate training on knowledge boundaries. We call it a limitation of LLMs that they can not accurately express their knowledge boundary, answering questions they know while admitting ignorance to questions they do not know. In this paper, we aim to teach LLMs to recognize and express their knowledge boundary, so they can reduce hallucinations caused by fabricating when they do not know. We propose CoKE, which first probes LLMs' knowledge boundary via internal confidence given a set of questions, and then leverages the probing results to elicit the expression of the knowledge boundary. Extensive experiments show CoKE helps LLMs express knowledge boundaries, answering known questions while declining unknown ones, significantly improving in-domain and out-of-domain performance.

To enable quantitative risk assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex and coupled IoT systems, a new epistemological equation is designed and tested though comparative and empirical analysis. The comparative analysis is conducted on national digital strategies, followed by an empirical analysis of cyber risk assessment approaches. The new epistemological analysis approach enables the assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex IoT systems, which begin to resemble artificial intelligence, and can be used for a quantitative self-assessment of IoT cyber risk posture.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

We propose a many-sorted modal logic for reasoning about knowledge in multi-agent systems. Our logic introduces a clear distinction between participating agents and the environment. This allows to express local properties of agents and global properties of worlds in a uniform way, as well as to talk about the presence or absence of agents in a world. The logic subsumes the standard epistemic logic and is a conservative extension of it. The semantics is given in chromatic hypergraphs, a generalization of chromatic simplicial complexes, which were recently used to model knowledge in distributed systems. We show that the logic is sound and complete with respect to the intended semantics. We also show a further connection of chromatic hypergraphs with neighborhood frames.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

Artificial intelligence commonly refers to the science and engineering of artificial systems that can carry out tasks generally associated with requiring aspects of human intelligence, such as playing games, translating languages, and driving cars. In recent years, there have been exciting advances in learning-based, data-driven approaches towards AI, and machine learning and deep learning have enabled computer systems to perceive the world in unprecedented ways. Reinforcement learning has enabled breakthroughs in complex games such as Go and challenging robotics tasks such as quadrupedal locomotion. A key aspect of intelligence is to not only make predictions, but reason about the uncertainty in these predictions, and to consider this uncertainty when making decisions. This is what this manuscript on "Probabilistic Artificial Intelligence" is about. The first part covers probabilistic approaches to machine learning. We discuss the differentiation between "epistemic" uncertainty due to lack of data and "aleatoric" uncertainty, which is irreducible and stems, e.g., from noisy observations and outcomes. We discuss concrete approaches towards probabilistic inference and modern approaches to efficient approximate inference. The second part of the manuscript is about taking uncertainty into account in sequential decision tasks. We consider active learning and Bayesian optimization -- approaches that collect data by proposing experiments that are informative for reducing the epistemic uncertainty. We then consider reinforcement learning and modern deep RL approaches that use neural network function approximation. We close by discussing modern approaches in model-based RL, which harness epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty to guide exploration, while also reasoning about safety.

This position paper argues that the theoretical inconsistency often observed among Responsible AI (RAI) metrics, such as differing fairness definitions or tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy, should be embraced as a valuable feature rather than a flaw to be eliminated. We contend that navigating these inconsistencies, by treating metrics as divergent objectives, yields three key benefits: (1) Normative Pluralism: Maintaining a full suite of potentially contradictory metrics ensures that the diverse moral stances and stakeholder values inherent in RAI are adequately represented. (2) Epistemological Completeness: The use of multiple, sometimes conflicting, metrics allows for a more comprehensive capture of multifaceted ethical concepts, thereby preserving greater informational fidelity about these concepts than any single, simplified definition. (3) Implicit Regularization: Jointly optimizing for theoretically conflicting objectives discourages overfitting to one specific metric, steering models towards solutions with enhanced generalization and robustness under real-world complexities. In contrast, efforts to enforce theoretical consistency by simplifying or pruning metrics risk narrowing this value diversity, losing conceptual depth, and degrading model performance. We therefore advocate for a shift in RAI theory and practice: from getting trapped in inconsistency to characterizing acceptable inconsistency thresholds and elucidating the mechanisms that permit robust, approximated consistency in practice.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable abilities in structured reasoning and symbolic tasks, with coding emerging as a particular area of strength. This success has sparked growing interest in applying LLMs to mathematics, both in informal problem-solving and formal theorem proving. However, progress in formal mathematics has proven to be significantly more difficult, despite surface-level similarities between programming and proof construction. This discrepancy raises important questions about how LLMs ``reason'', how they are supervised, and whether they internally track a notion of computational or deductive state. In this article, we address the state-of-the-art of the discipline, focusing on recent models and benchmarks, and explore three central issues at the intersection of machine learning and mathematical cognition: (i) the trade-offs between formal and informal mathematics as training domains; (ii) the deeper reasons why proof generation remains more brittle than code synthesis; (iii) and the question of whether LLMs represent, or merely mimic, a notion of evolving logical state. Our goal is not to draw hard boundaries, but to identify where the current limits lie, and how they might be extended.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

This paper introduces a novel method for merging open-domain terminological knowledge. It takes advantage of the Region Connection Calculus (RCC5), a formalism used to represent regions in a topological space and to reason about their set-theoretic relationships. To this end, we first propose a faithful translation of terminological knowledge provided by several and potentially conflicting sources into region spaces. The merging is then performed on these spaces, and the result is translated back into the underlying language of the input sources. Our approach allows us to benefit from the expressivity and the flexibility of RCC5 while dealing with conflicting knowledge in a principled way.

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

In line with the principle of honesty, there has been a growing effort to train large language models (LLMs) to generate outputs containing epistemic markers. However, evaluation in the presence of epistemic markers has been largely overlooked, raising a critical question: Could the use of epistemic markers in LLM-generated outputs lead to unintended negative consequences? To address this, we present EMBER, a benchmark designed to assess the robustness of LLM-judges to epistemic markers in both single and pairwise evaluation settings. Our findings, based on evaluations using EMBER, reveal that all tested LLM-judges, including GPT-4o, show a notable lack of robustness in the presence of epistemic markers. Specifically, we observe a negative bias toward epistemic markers, with a stronger bias against markers expressing uncertainty. This suggests that LLM-judges are influenced by the presence of these markers and do not focus solely on the correctness of the content.

Large language models have achieved remarkable progress on complex reasoning tasks. However, they often implicitly fabricate information when inputs are incomplete, producing confident but unreliable conclusions -- a failure mode we term ungrounded reasoning. We argue that this issue arises not from insufficient reasoning capability, but from the lack of inferential boundary awareness -- the ability to recognize when the necessary premises for valid inference are missing. To address this issue, we propose Grounded Reasoning via Interactive Reinforcement Learning (GRIL), a multi-turn reinforcement learning framework for grounded reasoning under incomplete information. GRIL decomposes the reasoning process into two stages: clarify and pause, which identifies whether the available information is sufficient, and grounded reasoning, which performs task solving once the necessary premises are established. We design stage-specific rewards to penalize hallucinations, enabling models to detect gaps, stop proactively, and resume reasoning after clarification. Experiments on GSM8K-Insufficient and MetaMATH-Insufficient show that GRIL significantly improves premise detection (up to 45%), leading to a 30% increase in task success while reducing average response length by over 20%. Additional analyses confirm robustness to noisy user responses and generalization to out-of-distribution tasks.

As Generative AI becomes a key component in physics education, a significant ethical challenge has emerged: the tendency of students to anthropomorphize Large Language Models (LLMs), treating them as authoritative "oracles" that retrieve fixed facts from an internal database. However, LLMs operate fundamentally as probabilistic engines. This paper describes the design and implementation of a didactic activity, a reduced version of the "20 Questions" game, aimed at making this stochastic nature directly observable. Unlike a human player who fixes a target object at the start of the game, students discover that the model generates answers based solely on local coherence with the interaction history. By utilizing functionalities such as re-sampling and history rewinding, students act as experimenters, observing how identical interaction histories can yield diverging narrative paths. We discuss how mapping these behaviors to familiar physics concepts provides the epistemic scaffolding necessary to promote informed skepticism, framing the verification of AI outputs not merely as a compliance rule, but as a technical necessity derived from the system's probabilistic nature.

Search engines and information platforms are increasingly scrutinized for their role in spreading misinformation. Traditional responses often focus on detecting falsehoods or verifying the ultimate validity of claims. This paper argues that such a validity-centered framing is inadequate for the epistemic challenges of search environments.

Domain expertise enhances judgment within boundaries but creates systematic vulnerabilities specifically at borders. We term this Transitive Expert Error (TEE), distinct from Dunning-Kruger effects, requiring calibrated expertise as precondition. Mechanisms enabling reliable within-domain judgment become liabilities when structural similarity masks causal divergence. Two core mechanisms operate: structural similarity bias causes experts to overweight surface features (shared vocabulary, patterns, formal structure) while missing causal architecture differences; authority persistence maintains confidence across competence boundaries through social reinforcement and metacognitive failures (experts experience no subjective uncertainty as pattern recognition operates smoothly on familiar-seeming inputs.) These mechanism intensify under three conditions: shared vocabulary masking divergent processes, social pressure for immediate judgment, and delayed feedback. These findings extend to AI routing architectures (MoE systems, multi-model orchestration, tool-using agents, RAG systems) exhibiting routing-induced failures (wrong specialist selected) and coverage-induced failures (no appropriate specialist exists). Both produce a hallucination phenotype: confident, coherent, structurally plausible but causally incorrect outputs at domain boundaries. In human systems where mechanisms are cognitive black boxes; AI architectures make them explicit and addressable. We propose interventions: multi-expert activation with disagreement detection (router level), boundary-aware calibration (specialist level), and coverage gap detection (training level). TEE has detectable signatures (routing patterns, confidence-accuracy dissociations, domain-inappropriate content) enabling monitoring and mitigation. What remains intractable in human cognition becomes addressable through architectural design.

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.

Developing models that can learn to reason is a notoriously challenging problem. We focus on reasoning in relational domains, where the use of Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) seems like a natural choice. However, previous work has shown that regular GNNs lack the ability to systematically generalize from training examples on test graphs requiring longer inference chains, which fundamentally limits their reasoning abilities. A common solution relies on neuro-symbolic methods that systematically reason by learning rules, but their scalability is often limited and they tend to make unrealistically strong assumptions, e.g.\ that the answer can always be inferred from a single relational path. We propose the Epistemic GNN (EpiGNN), a novel parameter-efficient and scalable GNN architecture with an epistemic inductive bias for systematic reasoning. Node embeddings in EpiGNNs are treated as epistemic states, and message passing is implemented accordingly. We show that EpiGNNs achieve state-of-the-art results on link prediction tasks that require systematic reasoning. Furthermore, for inductive knowledge graph completion, EpiGNNs rival the performance of state-of-the-art specialized approaches. Finally, we introduce two new benchmarks that go beyond standard relational reasoning by requiring the aggregation of information from multiple paths. Here, existing neuro-symbolic approaches fail, yet EpiGNNs learn to reason accurately. Code and datasets are available at https://github.com/erg0dic/gnn-sg.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

In recent years, substantial advancements have been made in the development of large language models, achieving remarkable performance across diverse tasks. To evaluate the knowledge ability of language models, previous studies have proposed lots of benchmarks based on question-answering pairs. We argue that it is not reliable and comprehensive to evaluate language models with a fixed question or limited paraphrases as the query, since language models are sensitive to prompt. Therefore, we introduce a novel concept named knowledge boundary to encompass both prompt-agnostic and prompt-sensitive knowledge within language models. Knowledge boundary avoids prompt sensitivity in language model evaluations, rendering them more dependable and robust. To explore the knowledge boundary for a given model, we propose projected gradient descent method with semantic constraints, a new algorithm designed to identify the optimal prompt for each piece of knowledge. Experiments demonstrate a superior performance of our algorithm in computing the knowledge boundary compared to existing methods. Furthermore, we evaluate the ability of multiple language models in several domains with knowledge boundary.

Language models (LMs) are said to be exhibiting reasoning, but what does this entail? We assess definitions of reasoning and how key papers in the field of natural language processing (NLP) use the notion and argue that the definitions provided are not consistent with how LMs are trained, process information, and generate new tokens. To illustrate this incommensurability we assume the view that transformer-based LMs implement an implicit finite-order Markov kernel mapping contexts to conditional token distributions. In this view, reasoning-like outputs correspond to statistical regularities and approximate statistical invariances in the learned kernel rather than the implementation of explicit logical mechanisms. This view is illustrative of the claim that LMs are "statistical pattern matchers"" and not genuine reasoners and provides a perspective that clarifies why reasoning-like outputs arise in LMs without any guarantees of logical consistency. This distinction is fundamental to how epistemic uncertainty is evaluated in LMs. We invite a discussion on the importance of how the computational processes of the systems we build and analyze in NLP research are described.

Knowledge-intensive tasks (e.g., open-domain question answering (QA)) require a substantial amount of factual knowledge and often rely on external information for assistance. Recently, large language models (LLMs) (e.g., ChatGPT), have demonstrated impressive prowess in solving a wide range of tasks with world knowledge, including knowledge-intensive tasks. However, it remains unclear how well LLMs are able to perceive their factual knowledge boundaries, particularly how they behave when incorporating retrieval augmentation. In this study, we present an initial analysis of the factual knowledge boundaries of LLMs and how retrieval augmentation affects LLMs on open-domain QA. Specially, we focus on three primary research questions and analyze them by examining QA performance, priori judgement and posteriori judgement of LLMs. We show evidence that LLMs possess unwavering confidence in their capabilities to respond to questions and the accuracy of their responses. Furthermore, retrieval augmentation proves to be an effective approach in enhancing LLMs' awareness of knowledge boundaries, thereby improving their judgemental abilities. Additionally, we also find that LLMs have a propensity to rely on the provided retrieval results when formulating answers, while the quality of these results significantly impacts their reliance. The code to reproduce this work is available at https://github.com/RUCAIBox/LLM-Knowledge-Boundary.

Partition logics -- non-Boolean event structures obtained by pasting Boolean algebras -- provide a natural language for situations in which a system has a definite latent state but can be accessed and resolved only through mutually incompatible coarse-grained modes of observation. We show that this structure arises in a range of social-science settings by constructing six explicit examples from personnel assessment, survey framing, clinical diagnosis, espionage coordination, legal pluralism, and organizational auditing. For each case we identify the latent state space, the observational contexts as partitions, and the shared atoms that intertwine contexts, yielding instances of the L_{12} bowtie, triangle, pentagon, and automaton partition logics. These examples make precise a notion of social complementarity: different modes of inquiry can be incompatible even though the underlying system remains fully value-definite. Complementarity in this sense does not entail contextuality or ontic indeterminacy. We further compare the classical probabilities generated by convex mixtures of dispersion-free states with the quantum-like Born probabilities available when the same exclusivity graph admits a faithful orthogonal representation. The framework thus separates logical structure from probabilistic realization and suggests empirically testable benchmarks for quantum-cognition models.

Current language model evaluations measure what models know under ideal conditions but not how robustly they know it under realistic stress. Static benchmarks like MMLU and TruthfulQA cannot distinguish a model that lacks knowledge from one whose verification mechanisms collapse when information degrades or adversaries probe for weaknesses. We introduce the Drill-Down and Fabricate Test (DDFT), a protocol that measures epistemic robustness: a model's ability to maintain factual accuracy under progressive semantic compression and adversarial fabrication. We propose a two-system cognitive model comprising a Semantic System that generates fluent text and an Epistemic Verifier that validates factual accuracy. Our findings, based on evaluating 9 frontier models across 8 knowledge domains at 5 compression levels (1,800 turn-level evaluations), reveal that epistemic robustness is orthogonal to conventional design paradigms. Neither parameter count (r=0.083, p=0.832) nor architectural type (r=0.153, p=0.695) significantly predicts robustness, suggesting it emerges from training methodology and verification mechanisms distinct from current approaches. Error detection capability strongly predicts overall robustness (rho=-0.817, p=0.007), indicating this is the critical bottleneck. We find that flagship models exhibit brittleness despite their scale, while smaller models can achieve robust performance, challenging assumptions about the relationship between model size and reliability. The DDFT framework provides both theoretical foundation and practical tools for assessing epistemic robustness before deployment in critical applications.

Knowledge-grounded dialogue is a task of generating an informative response based on both the dialogue history and external knowledge source. In general, there are two forms of knowledge: manually annotated knowledge graphs and knowledge text from website. From various evaluation viewpoints, each type of knowledge has advantages and downsides. To further distinguish the principles and determinants from the intricate factors, we conduct a thorough experiment and study on the task to answer three essential questions. The questions involve the choice of appropriate knowledge form, the degree of mutual effects between knowledge and the model selection, and the few-shot performance of knowledge. Supported by statistical shreds of evidence, we offer conclusive solutions and sensible suggestions for directions and standards of future research.

To address this gap, our study introduces the concept of causal epistemic consistency, which focuses on the self-consistency of Large Language Models (LLMs) in differentiating intermediates with nuanced differences in causal reasoning. We propose a suite of novel metrics -- intensity ranking concordance, cross-group position agreement, and intra-group clustering -- to evaluate LLMs on this front. Through extensive empirical studies on 21 high-profile LLMs, including GPT-4, Claude3, and LLaMA3-70B, we have favoring evidence that current models struggle to maintain epistemic consistency in identifying the polarity and intensity of intermediates in causal reasoning. Additionally, we explore the potential of using internal token probabilities as an auxiliary tool to maintain causal epistemic consistency. In summary, our study bridges a critical gap in AI research by investigating the self-consistency over fine-grained intermediates involved in causal reasoning.

Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) is the standard paradigm for domain adaptation, yet it frequently incurs the cost of catastrophic forgetting. In sharp contrast, on-policy Reinforcement Learning (RL) effectively preserves general capabilities. We investigate this discrepancy and identify a fundamental distributional gap: while RL aligns with the model's internal belief, SFT forces the model to fit external supervision. This mismatch often manifests as "Confident Conflicts" tokens characterized by low probability but low entropy. In these instances, the model is highly confident in its own prediction but is forced to learn a divergent ground truth, triggering destructive gradient updates. To address this, we propose Entropy-Adaptive Fine-Tuning (EAFT). Unlike methods relying solely on prediction probability, EAFT utilizes token-level entropy as a gating mechanism to distinguish between epistemic uncertainty and knowledge conflict. This allows the model to learn from uncertain samples while suppressing gradients on conflicting data. Extensive experiments on Qwen and GLM series (ranging from 4B to 32B parameters) across mathematical, medical, and agentic domains confirm our hypothesis. EAFT consistently matches the downstream performance of standard SFT while significantly mitigating the degradation of general capabilities.

Deep learning has recently revealed the existence of scaling laws, demonstrating that model performance follows predictable trends based on dataset and model sizes. Inspired by these findings and fascinating phenomena emerging in the over-parameterized regime, we examine a parallel direction: do similar scaling laws govern predictive uncertainties in deep learning? In identifiable parametric models, such scaling laws can be derived in a straightforward manner by treating model parameters in a Bayesian way. In this case, for example, we obtain O(1/N) contraction rates for epistemic uncertainty with respect to the number of data N. However, in over-parameterized models, these guarantees do not hold, leading to largely unexplored behaviors. In this work, we empirically show the existence of scaling laws associated with various measures of predictive uncertainty with respect to dataset and model sizes. Through experiments on vision and language tasks, we observe such scaling laws for in- and out-of-distribution predictive uncertainty estimated through popular approximate Bayesian inference and ensemble methods. Besides the elegance of scaling laws and the practical utility of extrapolating uncertainties to larger data or models, this work provides strong evidence to dispel recurring skepticism against Bayesian approaches: "In many applications of deep learning we have so much data available: what do we need Bayes for?". Our findings show that "so much data" is typically not enough to make epistemic uncertainty negligible.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

RL-based agentic search enables LLMs to solve complex questions via dynamic planning and external search. While this approach significantly enhances accuracy with agent policies optimized via large-scale reinforcement learning, we identify a critical gap in reliability: these agents fail to recognize their reasoning boundaries and rarely admit ``I DON'T KNOW'' (IDK) even when evidence is insufficient or reasoning reaches its limit. The lack of reliability often leads to plausible but unreliable answers, introducing significant risks in many real-world scenarios. To this end, we propose Boundary-Aware Policy Optimization (BAPO), a novel RL framework designed to cultivate reliable boundary awareness without compromising accuracy. BAPO introduces two key components: (i) a group-based boundary-aware reward that encourages an IDK response only when the reasoning reaches its limit, and (ii) an adaptive reward modulator that strategically suspends this reward during early exploration, preventing the model from exploiting IDK as a shortcut. Extensive experiments on four benchmarks demonstrate that BAPO substantially enhances the overall reliability of agentic search.

We revisit Zadeh's notion of "evidence of the second kind" and show that it provides the foundation for a general theory of epistemic random fuzzy sets, which generalizes both the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions and possibility theory. In this perspective, Dempster-Shafer theory deals with belief functions generated by random sets, while possibility theory deals with belief functions induced by fuzzy sets. The more general theory allows us to represent and combine evidence that is both uncertain and fuzzy. We demonstrate the application of this formalism to statistical inference, and show that it makes it possible to reconcile the possibilistic interpretation of likelihood with Bayesian inference.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

Multi-modal large reasoning models (MLRMs) pose significant privacy risks by inferring precise geographic locations from personal images through hierarchical chain-of-thought reasoning. Existing privacy protection techniques, primarily designed for perception-based models, prove ineffective against MLRMs' sophisticated multi-step reasoning processes that analyze environmental cues. We introduce ReasonBreak, a novel adversarial framework specifically designed to disrupt hierarchical reasoning in MLRMs through concept-aware perturbations. Our approach is founded on the key insight that effective disruption of geographic reasoning requires perturbations aligned with conceptual hierarchies rather than uniform noise. ReasonBreak strategically targets critical conceptual dependencies within reasoning chains, generating perturbations that invalidate specific inference steps and cascade through subsequent reasoning stages. To facilitate this approach, we contribute GeoPrivacy-6K, a comprehensive dataset comprising 6,341 ultra-high-resolution images (geq2K) with hierarchical concept annotations. Extensive evaluation across seven state-of-the-art MLRMs (including GPT-o3, GPT-5, Gemini 2.5 Pro) demonstrates ReasonBreak's superior effectiveness, achieving a 14.4\% improvement in tract-level protection (33.8\% vs 19.4\%) and nearly doubling block-level protection (33.5\% vs 16.8\%). This work establishes a new paradigm for privacy protection against reasoning-based threats.

LLMs and AI chatbots have improved people's efficiency in various fields. However, the necessary knowledge for answering the question may be beyond the models' knowledge boundaries. To mitigate this issue, many researchers try to introduce external knowledge, such as knowledge graphs and Internet contents, into LLMs for up-to-date information. However, the external information from the Internet may include counterfactual information that will confuse the model and lead to an incorrect response. Thus there is a pressing need for LLMs to possess the ability to distinguish reliable information from external knowledge. Therefore, to evaluate the ability of LLMs to discern the reliability of external knowledge, we create a benchmark from existing knowledge bases. Our benchmark consists of two tasks, Question Answering and Text Generation, and for each task, we provide models with a context containing counterfactual information. Evaluation results show that existing LLMs are susceptible to interference from unreliable external knowledge with counterfactual information, and simple intervention methods make limited contributions to the alleviation of this issue.

Can we learn more from data than existed in the generating process itself? Can new and useful information be constructed from merely applying deterministic transformations to existing data? Can the learnable content in data be evaluated without considering a downstream task? On these questions, Shannon information and Kolmogorov complexity come up nearly empty-handed, in part because they assume observers with unlimited computational capacity and fail to target the useful information content. In this work, we identify and exemplify three seeming paradoxes in information theory: (1) information cannot be increased by deterministic transformations; (2) information is independent of the order of data; (3) likelihood modeling is merely distribution matching. To shed light on the tension between these results and modern practice, and to quantify the value of data, we introduce epiplexity, a formalization of information capturing what computationally bounded observers can learn from data. Epiplexity captures the structural content in data while excluding time-bounded entropy, the random unpredictable content exemplified by pseudorandom number generators and chaotic dynamical systems. With these concepts, we demonstrate how information can be created with computation, how it depends on the ordering of the data, and how likelihood modeling can produce more complex programs than present in the data generating process itself. We also present practical procedures to estimate epiplexity which we show capture differences across data sources, track with downstream performance, and highlight dataset interventions that improve out-of-distribution generalization. In contrast to principles of model selection, epiplexity provides a theoretical foundation for data selection, guiding how to select, generate, or transform data for learning systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for factual tasks such as "What treats asthma?" or "What is the capital of Latvia?". However, it remains unclear how stably LLMs encode distinctions between true, false, and neither-true-nor-false content in their internal probabilistic representations. We introduce representational stability as the robustness of an LLM's veracity representations to perturbations in the operational definition of truth. We assess representational stability by (i) training a linear probe on an LLM's activations to separate true from not-true statements and (ii) measuring how its learned decision boundary shifts under controlled label changes. Using activations from sixteen open-source models and three factual domains, we compare two types of neither statements. The first are fact-like assertions about entities we believe to be absent from any training data. We call these unfamiliar neither statements. The second are nonfactual claims drawn from well-known fictional contexts. We call these familiar neither statements. The unfamiliar statements induce the largest boundary shifts, producing up to 40% flipped truth judgements in fragile domains (such as word definitions), while familiar fictional statements remain more coherently clustered and yield smaller changes (leq 8.2%). These results suggest that representational stability stems more from epistemic familiarity than from linguistic form. More broadly, our approach provides a diagnostic for auditing and training LLMs to preserve coherent truth assignments under semantic uncertainty, rather than optimizing for output accuracy alone.

Scientific inquiry requires systems-level reasoning that integrates heterogeneous experimental data, cross-domain knowledge, and mechanistic evidence into coherent explanations. While Large Language Models (LLMs) offer inferential capabilities, they often depend on retrieval-augmented contexts that lack structural depth. Traditional Knowledge Graphs (KGs) attempt to bridge this gap, yet their pairwise constraints fail to capture the irreducible higher-order interactions that govern emergent physical behavior. To address this, we introduce a methodology for constructing hypergraph-based knowledge representations that faithfully encode multi-entity relationships. Applied to a corpus of ~1,100 manuscripts on biocomposite scaffolds, our framework constructs a global hypergraph of 161,172 nodes and 320,201 hyperedges, revealing a scale-free topology (power law exponent ~1.23) organized around highly connected conceptual hubs. This representation prevents the combinatorial explosion typical of pairwise expansions and explicitly preserves the co-occurrence context of scientific formulations. We further demonstrate that equipping agentic systems with hypergraph traversal tools, specifically using node-intersection constraints, enables them to bridge semantically distant concepts. By exploiting these higher-order pathways, the system successfully generates grounded mechanistic hypotheses for novel composite materials, such as linking cerium oxide to PCL scaffolds via chitosan intermediates. This work establishes a "teacherless" agentic reasoning system where hypergraph topology acts as a verifiable guardrail, accelerating scientific discovery by uncovering relationships obscured by traditional graph methods.

Transdisciplinary approaches are increasingly essential for addressing grand societal challenges, particularly in complex domains such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), urban planning, and social sciences. However, effectively validating and integrating knowledge across distinct epistemic and ontological perspectives poses significant difficulties. This article proposes a six-dimensional framework for assessing and strengthening transdisciplinary knowledge validity in AI and city studies, based on an extensive analysis of the most cited research (2014--2024). Specifically, the framework classifies research orientations according to ontological, epistemological, methodological, teleological, axiological, and valorization dimensions. Our findings show a predominance of perspectives aligned with critical realism (ontological), positivism (epistemological), analytical methods (methodological), consequentialism (teleological), epistemic values (axiological), and social/economic valorization. Less common stances, such as idealism, mixed methods, and cultural valorization, are also examined for their potential to enrich knowledge production. We highlight how early career researchers and transdisciplinary teams can leverage this framework to reconcile divergent disciplinary viewpoints and promote socially accountable outcomes.

Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) predict through human-interpretable concepts, but they typically output point concept probabilities that conflate epistemic uncertainty (reducible model underspecification) with aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible input ambiguity). This makes concept-level uncertainty hard to interpret and, more importantly, hard to act upon. We introduce CREDENCE (Credal Ensemble Concept Estimation), a CBM framework that decomposes concept uncertainty by construction. CREDENCE represents each concept as a credal prediction (a probability interval), derives epistemic uncertainty from disagreement across diverse concept heads, and estimates aleatoric uncertainty via a dedicated ambiguity output trained to match annotator disagreement when available. The resulting signals support prescriptive decisions: automate low-uncertainty cases, prioritize data collection for high-epistemic cases, route high-aleatoric cases to human review, and abstain when both are high. Across several tasks, we show that epistemic uncertainty is positively associated with prediction errors, whereas aleatoric uncertainty closely tracks annotator disagreement, providing guidance beyond error correlation. Our implementation is available at the following link: https://github.com/Tankiit/Credal_Sets/tree/ensemble-credal-cbm

The two most influential cognitive architecture frameworks for AI agents, CoALA [21] and JEPA [12], both lack an explicit Knowledge layer with its own persistence semantics. This gap produces a category error: systems apply cognitive decay to factual claims, or treat facts and experiences with identical update mechanics. We survey persistence semantics across existing memory systems and identify eight convergence points, from Karpathy's LLM Knowledge Base [10] to the BEAM benchmark's near-zero contradiction-resolution scores [22], all pointing to related architectural gaps. We propose a four-layer decom position (Knowledge, Memory, Wisdom, Intelligence) where each layer has fundamentally different persistence semantics: indefinite supersession, Ebbinghaus decay, evidence-gated revision, and ephemeral inference respectively. Companion implementations in Python and Rust demonstrate the architectural separation is feasible. We borrow terminology from cognitive science as a useful analogy (the Knowledge/Memory distinction echoes Tulving's trichotomy), but our layers are engineering constructs justified by persistence-semantics requirements, not by neural architecture. We argue that these distinctions demand distinct persistence semantics in engineering implementations, and that no current framework or system provides this.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has emerged as a promising approach for enhancing the performance of large language models (LLMs) on complex reasoning tasks. Recently, a series of studies attempt to explain the mechanisms underlying CoT, aiming to deepen the understanding of its efficacy. Nevertheless, the existing research faces two major challenges: (1) a lack of quantitative metrics to assess CoT capabilities and (2) a dearth of guidance on optimizing CoT performance. Motivated by this, in this work, we introduce a novel reasoning boundary framework (RBF) to address these challenges. To solve the lack of quantification, we first define a reasoning boundary (RB) to quantify the upper-bound of CoT and establish a combination law for RB, enabling a practical quantitative approach applicable to various real-world CoT tasks. To address the lack of optimization, we propose three categories of RBs. We further optimize these categories with combination laws focused on RB promotion and reasoning path optimization for CoT improvement. Through extensive experiments on 27 models and 5 tasks, the study validates the existence and rationality of the proposed framework. Furthermore, it explains the effectiveness of 10 CoT strategies and guides optimization from two perspectives. We hope this work can provide a comprehensive understanding of the boundaries and optimization strategies for reasoning in LLMs. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/LightChen233/reasoning-boundary.

Uncertainty quantification has received increasing attention in machine learning in the recent past. In particular, a distinction between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty has been found useful in this regard. The latter refers to the learner's (lack of) knowledge and appears to be especially difficult to measure and quantify. In this paper, we analyse a recent proposal based on the idea of a second-order learner, which yields predictions in the form of distributions over probability distributions. While standard (first-order) learners can be trained to predict accurate probabilities, namely by minimising suitable loss functions on sample data, we show that loss minimisation does not work for second-order predictors: The loss functions proposed for inducing such predictors do not incentivise the learner to represent its epistemic uncertainty in a faithful way.

Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) research has primarily focused on closed-book factual question answering (QA), while contextual QA remains unexplored, despite its importance in real-world applications. In this work, we focus on UQ for the contextual QA task and propose a theoretically grounded approach to quantify epistemic uncertainty. We begin by introducing a task-agnostic, token-level uncertainty measure defined as the cross-entropy between the predictive distribution of the given model and the unknown true distribution. By decomposing this measure, we isolate the epistemic component and approximate the true distribution by a perfectly prompted, idealized model. We then derive an upper bound for epistemic uncertainty and show that it can be interpreted as semantic feature gaps in the given model's hidden representations relative to the ideal model. We further apply this generic framework to the contextual QA task and hypothesize that three features approximate this gap: context-reliance (using the provided context rather than parametric knowledge), context comprehension (extracting relevant information from context), and honesty (avoiding intentional lies). Using a top-down interpretability approach, we extract these features by using only a small number of labeled samples and ensemble them to form a robust uncertainty score. Experiments on multiple QA benchmarks in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution settings show that our method substantially outperforms state-of-the-art unsupervised (sampling-free and sampling-based) and supervised UQ methods, achieving up to a 13-point PRR improvement while incurring a negligible inference overhead.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are converging towards a singular Artificial Hivemind, where shared Nature (pre-training priors) result in a profound collapse of distributional diversity, limiting the distinct perspectives necessary for creative exploration and scientific discovery. To address this, we propose to equip models with inference-time Nurture (individualized epistemic trajectories) using Epistemic Evolution paradigm, progressing through explore, internalize, and express. We instantiate this via PRISM (Pluralistic Reasoning via In-context Structure Modeling), a model-agnostic system that augments LLM with dynamic On-the-fly Epistemic Graphs. On three creativity benchmarks, PRISM achieves state-of-the-art novelty and significantly expands distributional diversity. Moreover, we evaluate the real-world utility via a challenging rare-disease diagnosis benchmark. Results demonstrate that PRISM successfully uncovers correct long-tail diagnoses that standard LLM miss, confirming that its divergence stems from meaningful exploration rather than incoherent noise. Overall, this work establishes a new paradigm for Pluralistic AI, moving beyond monolithic consensus toward a diverse ecosystem of unique cognitive individuals capable of collective, multi-perspective discovery.

The capacity of Large Language Models (LLMs) to reason is fundamental to their application in complex, knowledge-intensive domains. In real-world scenarios, LLMs are often augmented with external information that can be helpful, irrelevant, or even misleading. This paper investigates the causal impact of such auxiliary information on the reasoning process of LLMs with explicit step-by-step thinking capabilities. We introduce SciAux, a new dataset derived from ScienceQA, to systematically test the robustness of the model against these types of information. Our findings reveal a critical vulnerability: the model's deliberative "thinking mode" is a double-edged sword. While helpful context improves accuracy, misleading information causes a catastrophic drop in performance, which is amplified by the thinking process. Instead of conferring robustness, thinking reinforces the degree of error when provided with misinformation. This highlights that the challenge is not merely to make models "think", but to endow them with the critical faculty to evaluate the information upon which their reasoning is based. The SciAux dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/billhdzhao/SciAux.

We often attribute human characteristics to large language models (LLMs) and claim that they "know" certain things. LLMs have an internal probabilistic knowledge that represents information retained during training. How can we assess the veracity of this knowledge? We examine two common methods for probing the veracity of LLMs and discover several assumptions that are flawed. To address these flawed assumptions, we introduce sAwMIL (short for Sparse Aware Multiple-Instance Learning), a probing method that utilizes the internal activations of LLMs to separate statements into true, false, and neither. sAwMIL is based on multiple-instance learning and conformal prediction. We evaluate sAwMIL on 5 validity criteria across 16 open-source LLMs, including both default and chat-based variants, as well as on 3 new datasets. Among the insights we provide are: (1) the veracity signal is often concentrated in the third quarter of an LLM's depth; (2) truth and falsehood signals are not always symmetric; (3) linear probes perform better on chat models than on default models; (4) nonlinear probes may be required to capture veracity signals for some LLMs with reinforcement learning from human feedback or knowledge distillation; and (5) LLMs capture a third type of signal that is distinct from true and false and is neither true nor false. These findings provide a reliable method for verifying what LLMs "know" and how certain they are of their probabilistic internal knowledge.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks pose a unique challenge for small language models (SLMs) with limited scale, which often lack the capacity to perform deep social reasoning. In this work, we propose DEL-ToM, a framework that improves ToM reasoning through inference-time scaling rather than architectural changes. Our approach decomposes ToM tasks into a sequence of belief updates grounded in Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), enabling structured and transparent reasoning. We train a verifier, called the Process Belief Model (PBM), to score each belief update step using labels generated automatically via a DEL simulator. During inference, candidate belief traces generated by a language model are evaluated by the PBM, and the highest-scoring trace is selected. This allows SLMs to emulate more deliberate reasoning by allocating additional compute at test time. Experiments across multiple model scales and benchmarks show that DEL-ToM consistently improves performance, demonstrating that verifiable belief supervision can significantly enhance ToM abilities of SLMs without retraining.

Individual agents in multi-agent (MA) systems often lack robustness, tending to blindly conform to misleading peers. We show this weakness stems from both sycophancy and inadequate ability to evaluate peer reliability. To address this, we first formalize the learning problem of history-aware reference, introducing the historical interactions of peers as additional input, so that agents can estimate peer reliability and learn from trustworthy peers when uncertain. This shifts the task from evaluating peer reasoning quality to estimating peer reliability based on interaction history. We then develop Epistemic Context Learning (ECL): a reasoning framework that conditions predictions on explicitly-built peer profiles from history. We further optimize ECL by reinforcement learning using auxiliary rewards. Our experiments reveal that our ECL enables small models like Qwen 3-4B to outperform a history-agnostic baseline 8x its size (Qwen 3-30B) by accurately identifying reliable peers. ECL also boosts frontier models to near-perfect (100%) performance. We show that ECL generalizes well to various MA configurations and we find that trust is modeled well by LLMs, revealing a strong correlation in trust modeling accuracy and final answer quality.

Approaches to fair and ethical AI have recently fell under the scrutiny of the emerging, chiefly qualitative, field of critical data studies, placing emphasis on the lack of sensitivity to context and complex social phenomena of such interventions. We employ some of these lessons to introduce a tripartite decision-making toolkit, informed by dilemmas encountered in the pursuit of responsible AI/ML. These are: (a) the opportunity dilemma between the availability of data shaping problem statements vs problem statements shaping data; (b) the trade-off between scalability and contextualizability (too much data versus too specific data); and (c) the epistemic positioning between the pragmatic technical objectivism and the reflexive relativism in acknowledging the social. This paper advocates for a situated reasoning and creative engagement with the dilemmas surrounding responsible algorithmic/data-driven systems, and going beyond the formulaic bias elimination and ethics operationalization narratives found in the fair-AI literature.

Large language models (LLMs) tend to generate lexically, semantically, and stylistically homogenous texts. This poses a risk of knowledge collapse, where homogenous LLMs mediate a shrinking in the range of accessible information over time. Existing works on homogenization are limited by a focus on closed-ended multiple-choice setups or fuzzy semantic features, and do not look at trends across time and cultural contexts. To overcome this, we present a new methodology to measure epistemic diversity, i.e., variation in real-world claims in LLM outputs, which we use to perform a broad empirical study of LLM knowledge collapse. We test 27 LLMs, 155 topics covering 12 countries, and 200 prompt variations sourced from real user chats. For the topics in our study, we show that while newer models tend to generate more diverse claims, nearly all models are less epistemically diverse than a basic web search. We find that model size has a negative impact on epistemic diversity, while retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has a positive impact, though the improvement from RAG varies by the cultural context. Finally, compared to a traditional knowledge source (Wikipedia), we find that country-specific claims reflect the English language more than the local one, highlighting a gap in epistemic representation

We introduce k-quantifier logics -- logics with access to k-tuples of elements and very general quantification patterns for transitions between k-tuples. The framework is very expressive and encompasses e.g. the k-variable fragments of first-order logic, modal logic, and monotone neighbourhood semantics. We introduce a corresponding notion of bisimulation and prove variants of the classical Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse and Hennessy-Milner theorem. Finally, we show a Lindstrom-style characterisation for k-quantifier logics that satisfy Los' theorem by proving that they are the unique maximally expressive logics that satisfy Los' theorem and are invariant under the associated bisimulation relations.

Despite rapid gains in scale, research evaluation still relies on opaque, lagging proxies. To serve the scientific community, we pursue transparency: reproducible, auditable epistemic classification useful for funding and policy. Here we formalize KGX3 as a scenario-based model for mapping Kuhnian stages from research papers, prove determinism of the classification pipeline, and define the epistemic manifold that yields paradigm maps. We report validation across recent corpora, operational complexity at global scale, and governance that preserves interpretability while protecting core IP. The system delivers early, actionable signals of drift, crisis, and shift unavailable to citation metrics or citations-anchored NLP. KGX3 is the latest iteration of a deterministic epistemic engine developed since 2019, originating as Soph.io (2020), advanced as iKuhn (2024), and field-tested through Preprint Watch in 2025.

Scientific knowledge creation is fundamentally transforming as humans and AI systems evolve beyond tool-user relationships into co-evolutionary epistemic partnerships. When AlphaFold revolutionized protein structure prediction, researchers described engaging with an epistemic partner that reshaped how they conceptualized fundamental relationships. This article introduces Cognitio Emergens (CE), a framework addressing critical limitations in existing models that focus on static roles or narrow metrics while failing to capture how scientific understanding emerges through recursive human-AI interaction over time. CE integrates three components addressing these limitations: Agency Configurations describing how authority distributes between humans and AI (Directed, Contributory, Partnership), with partnerships dynamically oscillating between configurations rather than following linear progression; Epistemic Dimensions capturing six specific capabilities emerging through collaboration across Discovery, Integration, and Projection axes, creating distinctive "capability signatures" that guide development; and Partnership Dynamics identifying forces shaping how these relationships evolve, particularly the risk of epistemic alienation where researchers lose interpretive control over knowledge they formally endorse. Drawing from autopoiesis theory, social systems theory, and organizational modularity, CE reveals how knowledge co-creation emerges through continuous negotiation of roles, values, and organizational structures. By reconceptualizing human-AI scientific collaboration as fundamentally co-evolutionary, CE offers a balanced perspective that neither uncritically celebrates nor unnecessarily fears AI's evolving role, instead providing conceptual tools for cultivating partnerships that maintain meaningful human participation while enabling transformative scientific breakthroughs.

We present KNOW--the Knowledge Navigator Ontology for the World--the first ontology designed to capture everyday knowledge to augment large language models (LLMs) in real-world generative AI use cases such as personal AI assistants. Our domain is human life, both its everyday concerns and its major milestones. We have limited the initial scope of the modeled concepts to only established human universals: spacetime (places, events) plus social (people, groups, organizations). The inclusion criteria for modeled concepts are pragmatic, beginning with universality and utility. We compare and contrast previous work such as Schema.org and Cyc--as well as attempts at a synthesis of knowledge graphs and language models--noting how LLMs already encode internally much of the commonsense tacit knowledge that took decades to capture in the Cyc project. We also make available code-generated software libraries for the 12 most popular programming languages, enabling the direct use of ontology concepts in software engineering. We emphasize simplicity and developer experience in promoting AI interoperability.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning enables large language models (LLMs) to break down complex problems into interpretable intermediate steps, significantly enhancing model transparency and performance in reasoning tasks. However, conventional CoT methods rely on heuristic sampling without structured modeling of reasoning transitions, constraining their ability to systematically explore and discover diverse and effective reasoning trajectories. In this work, we introduce CTRLS, a framework that formulates CoT reasoning as a Markov decision process (MDP) with latent state transitions, enabling principled and state-aware exploration via distributional reinforcement learning. By modelling reasoning actions as explicit probability distributions in latent space, our approach explicitly models epistemic uncertainty, facilitating robust exploration of the reasoning space. As part of our framework, we introduce an on-policy reinforcement learning strategy incorporating epsilon-greedy exploration and entropy-based regularization to iteratively refine latent state transitions without requiring additional fine-tuning of the underlying LLM. Theoretical analyses provide evidence lower bounds (ELBO), theoretically grounding our transition-aware modeling of latent reasoning dynamics. Further experiments demonstrate improvements in reasoning accuracy, diversity, and exploration efficiency across benchmark reasoning tasks.

Current approaches to AI training treat reasoning as an emergent property of scale. We argue instead that robust reasoning emerges from linguistic self-reflection, itself internalized from high-quality social interaction. Drawing on Vygotskian developmental psychology, we advance three core positions centered on Introspection. First, we argue for the Social Genesis of the Private Mind: learning from conversational environments rises to prominence as a new way to make sense of the world; the friction of aligning with another agent, internal or not, refines and crystallizes the reasoning process. Second, we argue that dialogically scaffolded introspective experiences allow agents to engage in sense-making that decouples learning from immediate data streams, transforming raw environmental data into rich, learnable narratives. Finally, we contend that Dialogue Quality is the New Data Quality: the depth of an agent's private reasoning, and its efficiency regarding test-time compute, is determined by the diversity and rigor of the dialogues it has mastered. We conclude that optimizing these conversational scaffolds is the primary lever for the next generation of general intelligence.

The mechanism by which RL contributes to reasoning capabilities-whether it incentivizes the synthesis of new skills or merely amplifies existing behaviors-remains a subject of intense debate. In this work, we investigate this question through the lens of Complementary Reasoning, a complex task that requires integrating internal parametric knowledge with external contextual information. Using a controlled synthetic dataset of human biographies, we strictly decouple this ability into two atomic skills: Parametric Reasoning (relying on internal knowledge) and Contextual Reasoning (depending on external information). To rigorously assess capability boundaries, we evaluate generalization across three distinct levels of difficulty: I.I.D., Composition, and Zero-shot settings. We find that while SFT is sufficient for in-distribution performance, it struggles with O.O.D. generalization, particularly in Zero-shot settings where relational combinations are novel. Crucially, we identify the SFT Generalization Paradox: Models supervised solely on the composite task achieve near-perfect in-distribution accuracy but collapse on out-of-distribution generalization, indicating their reliance on rote memorization of path shortcuts. In contrast, we find that RL acts as a reasoning synthesizer rather than a probability amplifier. However, we uncover a strict atomic prerequisite: RL can only synthesize these complex strategies if the base model has first mastered the independent atomic skills (Parametric and Contextual) via SFT. These findings challenge the view of RL as a mere amplifier, suggesting that given sufficient atomic foundations, RL can actively synthesize complex reasoning strategies from learned primitives without explicit supervision on such complex strategies. This indicates that decoupled atomic training followed by RL offers a scalable path to generalization for complex reasoning tasks.

Prospect Theory (PT) models human decision-making behaviour under uncertainty, among which linguistic uncertainty is commonly adopted in real-world scenarios. Although recent studies have developed some frameworks to test PT parameters for Large Language Models (LLMs), few have considered the fitness of PT itself on LLMs. Moreover, whether PT is robust under linguistic uncertainty perturbations, especially epistemic markers (e.g. "likely"), remains highly under-explored. To address these gaps, we design a three-stage workflow based on a classic behavioural economics experimental setup. We first estimate PT parameters with economics questions and evaluate PT's fitness with performance metrics. We then derive probability mappings for epistemic markers in the same context, and inject these mappings into the prompt to investigate the stability of PT parameters. Our findings suggest that modelling LLMs' decision-making with PT is not consistently reliable across models, and applying Prospect Theory to LLMs is likely not robust to epistemic uncertainty. The findings caution against the deployment of PT-based frameworks in real-world applications where epistemic ambiguity is prevalent, giving valuable insights in behaviour interpretation and future alignment direction for LLM decision-making.

One challenge in fact checking is the ability to improve the transparency of the decision. We present a fact checking method that uses reference information in knowledge graphs (KGs) to assess claims and explain its decisions. KGs contain a formal representation of knowledge with semantic descriptions of entities and their relationships. We exploit such rich semantics to produce interpretable explanations for the fact checking output. As information in a KG is inevitably incomplete, we rely on logical rule discovery and on Web text mining to gather the evidence to assess a given claim. Uncertain rules and facts are turned into logical programs and the checking task is modeled as an inference problem in a probabilistic extension of answer set programs. Experiments show that the probabilistic inference enables the efficient labeling of claims with interpretable explanations, and the quality of the results is higher than state of the art baselines.

We study how large language models (LLMs) ``think'' through their representation space. We propose a novel geometric framework that models an LLM's reasoning as flows -- embedding trajectories evolving where logic goes. We disentangle logical structure from semantics by employing the same natural deduction propositions with varied semantic carriers, allowing us to test whether LLMs internalize logic beyond surface form. This perspective connects reasoning with geometric quantities such as position, velocity, and curvature, enabling formal analysis in representation and concept spaces. Our theory establishes: (1) LLM reasoning corresponds to smooth flows in representation space, and (2) logical statements act as local controllers of these flows' velocities. Using learned representation proxies, we design controlled experiments to visualize and quantify reasoning flows, providing empirical validation of our theoretical framework. Our work serves as both a conceptual foundation and practical tools for studying reasoning phenomenon, offering a new lens for interpretability and formal analysis of LLMs' behavior.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

The rise of large language models (LLMs) has significantly influenced the quality of information in decision-making systems, leading to the prevalence of AI-generated content and challenges in detecting misinformation and managing conflicting information, or "inter-evidence conflicts." This study introduces a method for generating diverse, validated evidence conflicts to simulate real-world misinformation scenarios. We evaluate conflict detection methods, including Natural Language Inference (NLI) models, factual consistency (FC) models, and LLMs, on these conflicts (RQ1) and analyze LLMs' conflict resolution behaviors (RQ2). Our key findings include: (1) NLI and LLM models exhibit high precision in detecting answer conflicts, though weaker models suffer from low recall; (2) FC models struggle with lexically similar answer conflicts, while NLI and LLM models handle these better; and (3) stronger models like GPT-4 show robust performance, especially with nuanced conflicts. For conflict resolution, LLMs often favor one piece of conflicting evidence without justification and rely on internal knowledge if they have prior beliefs.

AI assistants can impart value judgments that shape people's decisions and worldviews, yet little is known empirically about what values these systems rely on in practice. To address this, we develop a bottom-up, privacy-preserving method to extract the values (normative considerations stated or demonstrated in model responses) that Claude 3 and 3.5 models exhibit in hundreds of thousands of real-world interactions. We empirically discover and taxonomize 3,307 AI values and study how they vary by context. We find that Claude expresses many practical and epistemic values, and typically supports prosocial human values while resisting values like "moral nihilism". While some values appear consistently across contexts (e.g. "transparency"), many are more specialized and context-dependent, reflecting the diversity of human interlocutors and their varied contexts. For example, "harm prevention" emerges when Claude resists users, "historical accuracy" when responding to queries about controversial events, "healthy boundaries" when asked for relationship advice, and "human agency" in technology ethics discussions. By providing the first large-scale empirical mapping of AI values in deployment, our work creates a foundation for more grounded evaluation and design of values in AI systems.

We develop a discipline-agnostic emergence calculus that treats theories as fixed points of idempotent operators acting on descriptions. We show that, once processes are composable but access to the underlying system is mediated by a bounded observational interface, a canonical toolkit of six closure-changing primitives (P1--P6) is unavoidable. The framework unifies order-theoretic closure operators with dynamics-induced endomaps E_{τ,f} built from a Markov kernel, a coarse-graining lens, and a time scale τ. We introduce a computable total-variation idempotence defect for E_{τ,f}; small retention error implies approximate idempotence and yields stable "objects" packaged at the chosen τ within a fixed lens. For directionality, we define an arrow-of-time functional as the path-space KL divergence between forward and time-reversed trajectories and prove it is monotone under coarse-graining (data processing); we also formalize a protocol-trap audit showing that protocol holonomy alone cannot sustain asymmetry without a genuine affinity in the lifted dynamics. Finally, we prove a finite forcing-style counting lemma: relative to a partition-based theory, definable predicate extensions are exponentially rare, giving a clean anti-saturation mechanism for strict ladder climbing.

This position paper argues that AI-assisted software engineering requires explicit mechanisms for tracking the epistemic status and temporal validity of architectural decisions. LLM coding assistants generate decisions faster than teams can validate them, yet no widely-adopted framework distinguishes conjecture from verified knowledge, prevents trust inflation through conservative aggregation, or detects when evidence expires. We propose three requirements for responsible AI-assisted engineering: (1) epistemic layers that separate unverified hypotheses from empirically validated claims, (2) conservative assurance aggregation grounded in the Gödel t-norm that prevents weak evidence from inflating confidence, and (3) automated evidence decay tracking that surfaces stale assumptions before they cause failures. We formalize these requirements as the First Principles Framework (FPF), ground its aggregation semantics in fuzzy logic, and define a quintet of invariants that any valid aggregation operator must satisfy. Our retrospective audit applying FPF criteria to two internal projects found that 20-25% of architectural decisions had stale evidence within two months, validating the need for temporal accountability. We outline research directions including learnable aggregation operators, federated evidence sharing, and SMT-based claim validation.

Large language models (LLMs) have majorly advanced NLP and AI, and next to their ability to perform a wide range of procedural tasks, a major success factor is their internalized factual knowledge. Since Petroni et al. (2019), analyzing this knowledge has gained attention. However, most approaches investigate one question at a time via modest-sized pre-defined samples, introducing an ``availability bias'' (Tversky&Kahnemann, 1973) that prevents the analysis of knowledge (or beliefs) of LLMs beyond the experimenter's predisposition. To address this challenge, we propose a novel methodology to comprehensively materialize an LLM's factual knowledge through recursive querying and result consolidation. Our approach is a milestone for LLM research, for the first time providing constructive insights into the scope and structure of LLM knowledge (or beliefs). As a prototype, we build GPTKB, a knowledge base (KB) comprising 101 million relational triples for over 2.9 million entities from GPT-4o-mini. We use GPTKB to exemplarily analyze GPT-4o-mini's factual knowledge in terms of scale, accuracy, bias, cutoff and consistency, at the same time. GPTKB is accessible at https://gptkb.org

Machine learning (ML) enabled classification models are becoming increasingly popular for tackling the sheer volume and speed of online misinformation and other content that could be identified as harmful. In building these models, data scientists need to take a stance on the legitimacy, authoritativeness and objectivity of the sources of ``truth" used for model training and testing. This has political, ethical and epistemic implications which are rarely addressed in technical papers. Despite (and due to) their reported high accuracy and performance, ML-driven moderation systems have the potential to shape online public debate and create downstream negative impacts such as undue censorship and the reinforcing of false beliefs. Using collaborative ethnography and theoretical insights from social studies of science and expertise, we offer a critical analysis of the process of building ML models for (mis)information classification: we identify a series of algorithmic contingencies--key moments during model development that could lead to different future outcomes, uncertainty and harmful effects as these tools are deployed by social media platforms. We conclude by offering a tentative path toward reflexive and responsible development of ML tools for moderating misinformation and other harmful content online.

Large language models (LLMs) have been reported to linearly encode truthfulness, yet recent work questions this finding's generality. We reconcile these views with the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: the representational space contains directions ranging from broadly domain-general to narrowly domain-specific. To test this hypothesis, we systematically evaluate probe generalization across five truth types (definitional, empirical, logical, fictional, and ethical), sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying, and existing honesty benchmarks. Linear probes generalize well across most domains but fail on sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying. Yet training on all domains jointly recovers strong performance, confirming that domain-general directions exist despite poor pairwise transfer. The geometry of probe directions explains these patterns: Mahalanobis cosine similarity between probes near-perfectly predicts cross-domain generalization (R^2=0.98). Concept-erasure methods further isolate truth directions that are (1) domain-general, (2) domain-specific, or (3) shared only across particular domain subsets. Causal interventions reveal that domain-specific directions steer more effectively than domain-general ones. Finally, post-training reshapes truth geometry, pushing sycophantic lying further from other truth types, suggesting a representational basis for chat models' sycophantic tendencies. Together, our results support the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: truth directions of varying generality coexist in representational space, with post-training reshaping their geometry. Code for all experiments is provided in https://github.com/zfying/truth_spec.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Recent advances in artificial intelligence reveal the limits of purely predictive systems and call for a shift toward causal and collaborative reasoning. Drawing inspiration from the revolution of Grothendieck in mathematics, we introduce the relativity of causal knowledge, which posits structural causal models (SCMs) are inherently imperfect, subjective representations embedded within networks of relationships. By leveraging category theory, we arrange SCMs into a functor category and show that their observational and interventional probability measures naturally form convex structures. This result allows us to encode non-intervened SCMs with convex spaces of probability measures. Next, using sheaf theory, we construct the network sheaf and cosheaf of causal knowledge. These structures enable the transfer of causal knowledge across the network while incorporating interventional consistency and the perspective of the subjects, ultimately leading to the formal, mathematical definition of relative causal knowledge.

When automated decision systems fail, organizations frequently discover that formally compliant governance infrastructure cannot reconstruct what happened or why. This paper synthesizes an operational governance evidence framework -- structural accountability collapse diagnostics, decision trace schemas, evidence sufficiency measurement, and label-free monitoring -- into an integrated chain and analytically assesses its transferability across four decision system architectures. The cross-architecture comparison reveals a governance coverage gradient: deterministic rule engines achieve full DES-property fillability, hybrid ML+rules systems achieve partial fillability, classical ML systems achieve only minimal fillability, and agentic AI systems encounter structural breaks. We introduce the cascade of uncertainty, showing how governance failures propagate through serial dependencies between framework layers. For agentic systems, we identify three structural breaks -- decision diffusion, evidence fragmentation, and responsibility ambiguity -- and propose corresponding analytical extensions. Four propositions formalize the gradient, cascade compounding, delegation-depth effects, and extension sufficiency, establishing boundary conditions for the framework's valid operating envelope.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

Neural language models (LMs) can be used to evaluate the truth of factual statements in two ways: they can be either queried for statement probabilities, or probed for internal representations of truthfulness. Past work has found that these two procedures sometimes disagree, and that probes tend to be more accurate than LM outputs. This has led some researchers to conclude that LMs "lie" or otherwise encode non-cooperative communicative intents. Is this an accurate description of today's LMs, or can query-probe disagreement arise in other ways? We identify three different classes of disagreement, which we term confabulation, deception, and heterogeneity. In many cases, the superiority of probes is simply attributable to better calibration on uncertain answers rather than a greater fraction of correct, high-confidence answers. In some cases, queries and probes perform better on different subsets of inputs, and accuracy can further be improved by ensembling the two. Code is available at github.com/lingo-mit/lm-truthfulness.

While Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated exceptional logical capabilities in mathematical domains, their application to the legal field remains hindered by the strict requirements for procedural rigor and adherence to legal logic. Existing legal LLMs, which rely on "closed-loop reasoning" derived solely from internal parametric knowledge, frequently suffer from lack of self-awareness regarding their knowledge boundaries, leading to confident yet incorrect conclusions. To address this challenge, we present Legal Reasoning with Agentic Search (LRAS), the first framework designed to transition legal LLMs from static and parametric "closed-loop thinking" to dynamic and interactive "Active Inquiry". By integrating Introspective Imitation Learning and Difficulty-aware Reinforcement Learning, LRAS enables LRMs to identify knowledge boundaries and handle legal reasoning complexity. Empirical results demonstrate that LRAS outperforms state-of-the-art baselines by 8.2-32\%, with the most substantial gains observed in tasks requiring deep reasoning with reliable knowledge. We will release our data and models for further exploration soon.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

Recent failures such as Google Gemini generating people of color in Nazi-era uniforms illustrate how AI outputs can be factually plausible yet socially harmful. AI models are increasingly evaluated for "fairness," yet existing benchmarks often conflate two fundamentally different dimensions: factual correctness and normative fairness. A model may generate responses that are factually accurate but socially unfair, or conversely, appear fair while distorting factual reality. We argue that identifying the boundary between fact and fair is essential for meaningful fairness evaluation. We introduce Fact-or-Fair, a benchmark with (i) objective queries aligned with descriptive, fact-based judgments, and (ii) subjective queries aligned with normative, fairness-based judgments. Our queries are constructed from 19 statistics and are grounded in cognitive psychology, drawing on representativeness bias, attribution bias, and ingroup-outgroup bias to explain why models often misalign fact and fairness. Experiments across ten frontier models reveal different levels of fact-fair trade-offs. By reframing fairness evaluation, we provide both a new theoretical lens and a practical benchmark to advance the responsible model assessments. Our test suite is publicly available at https://github.com/uclanlp/Fact-or-Fair.

LLMs cannot reliably recognize their parametric knowledge boundaries and often hallucinate answers to outside-of-boundary questions. In contrast, humans recognize their limitations and can either seek external help for such questions or abstain. In this paper, we introduce MASH (Modeling Abstention via Selective Help-seeking), a training framework that readily extracts abstentions from LLMs. Our key idea is that any external help-seeking by an LLM, i.e. search tool use, can serve as a proxy for abstention if the external help (search) is appropriately penalized while simultaneously rewarding answer accuracy. MASH operationalizes this idea using reinforcement learning with a pay-per-search reward. We run experiments on three knowledge-intensive QA datasets. Our results show that MASH substantially improves upon the selective help-seeking performance of prior efficient search approaches; on multi-hop datasets, MASH improves answer accuracy by 7.6%. Furthermore, MASH demonstrates strong off-the-shelf abstention -- it can distinguish between unanswerable/answerable questions and selectively generate responses for answerable questions -- showcasing behavior analogous to specialized abstention approaches. We emphasize that contrary to prior abstention methods, MASH does not require pre-determining knowledge boundaries to construct training data. Instead, MASH's abstentions are a by-product of training for the auxiliary selective help-seeking task. Overall, we show that MASH training effectively aligns search tool use with parametric knowledge, which can be successfully leveraged for making abstention decisions.

We explore local vs. global evolution of knowledge systems through the framework of socio-epistemic networks (SEN), applying two complementary methods to a corpus of scientific texts. The framework comprises three interconnected layers-social, semiotic (material), and semantic-proposing a multilayered approach to understanding structural developments of knowledge. To analyse diachronic changes on the semantic layer, we first use information-theoretic measures based on relative entropy to detect semantic shifts, assess their significance, and identify key driving features. Second, variations in document embedding densities reveal changes in semantic neighbourhoods, tracking how concentration of similar documents increase, remain stable, or disperse. This enables us to trace document trajectories based on content (topics) or metadata (authorship, institution). Case studies of Joseph Silk and Hans-J\"urgen Treder illustrate how individual scholar's work aligns with broader disciplinary shifts in general relativity and gravitation research, demonstrating the applications, limitations, and further potential of this approach.

Cutting out an object and estimating its opacity mask, known as image matting, is a key task in image and video editing. Due to the highly ill-posed issue, additional inputs, typically user-defined trimaps or scribbles, are usually needed to reduce the uncertainty. Although effective, it is either time consuming or only suitable for experienced users who know where to place the strokes. In this work, we propose a decomposed-uncertainty-guided matting (dugMatting) algorithm, which explores the explicitly decomposed uncertainties to efficiently and effectively improve the results. Basing on the characteristic of these uncertainties, the epistemic uncertainty is reduced in the process of guiding interaction (which introduces prior knowledge), while the aleatoric uncertainty is reduced in modeling data distribution (which introduces statistics for both data and possible noise). The proposed matting framework relieves the requirement for users to determine the interaction areas by using simple and efficient labeling. Extensively quantitative and qualitative results validate that the proposed method significantly improves the original matting algorithms in terms of both efficiency and efficacy.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is a common strategy to reduce hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs). While reinforcement learning (RL) can enable LLMs to act as search agents by activating retrieval capabilities, existing ones often underutilize their internal knowledge. This can lead to redundant retrievals, potential harmful knowledge conflicts, and increased inference latency. To address these limitations, an efficient and adaptive search agent capable of discerning optimal retrieval timing and synergistically integrating parametric (internal) and retrieved (external) knowledge is in urgent need. This paper introduces the Reinforced Internal-External Knowledge Synergistic Reasoning Agent (IKEA), which could indentify its own knowledge boundary and prioritize the utilization of internal knowledge, resorting to external search only when internal knowledge is deemed insufficient. This is achieved using a novel knowledge-boundary aware reward function and a knowledge-boundary aware training dataset. These are designed for internal-external knowledge synergy oriented RL, incentivizing the model to deliver accurate answers, minimize unnecessary retrievals, and encourage appropriate external searches when its own knowledge is lacking. Evaluations across multiple knowledge reasoning tasks demonstrate that IKEA significantly outperforms baseline methods, reduces retrieval frequency significantly, and exhibits robust generalization capabilities.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

Self-distillation has emerged as an effective post-training paradigm for LLMs, often improving performance while shortening reasoning traces. However, in mathematical reasoning, we find that it can reduce response length while degrading performance. We trace this degradation to the suppression of epistemic verbalization - the model's expression of uncertainty during reasoning. Through controlled experiments varying conditioning context richness and task coverage, we show that conditioning the teacher on rich information suppresses uncertainty expression, enabling rapid in-domain optimization with limited task coverage but harming OOD performance, where unseen problems benefit from expressing uncertainty and adjusting accordingly. Across Qwen3-8B, DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-7B, and Olmo3-7B-Instruct, we observe performance drops of up to 40%. Our findings highlight that exposing appropriate levels of uncertainty is crucial for robust reasoning and underscore the importance of optimizing reasoning behavior beyond merely reinforcing correct answer traces.

Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness, information unavailable through external observation. We train correctness classifiers on question representations from both a model's own hidden states and external models, testing whether self-representations provide a performance advantage. On standard evaluation, we find no advantage: self-probes perform comparably to peer-model probes. We hypothesize this is due to high inter-model agreement of answer correctness. To isolate genuine privileged knowledge, we evaluate on disagreement subsets, where models produce conflicting predictions. Here, we discover domain-specific privileged knowledge: self-representations consistently outperform peer representations in factual knowledge tasks, but show no advantage in math reasoning. We further localize this domain asymmetry across model layers, finding that the factual advantage emerges progressively from early-to-mid layers onward, consistent with model-specific memory retrieval, while math reasoning shows no consistent advantage at any depth.

Modern CI/CD pipelines integrating agent-generated code exhibit a structural failure in responsibility attribution. Decisions are executed through formally correct approval processes, yet no entity possesses both the authority to approve those decisions and the epistemic capacity to meaningfully understand their basis. We define this condition as responsibility vacuum: a state in which decisions occur, but responsibility cannot be attributed because authority and verification capacity do not coincide. We show that this is not a process deviation or technical defect, but a structural property of deployments where decision generation throughput exceeds bounded human verification capacity. We identify a scaling limit under standard deployment assumptions, including parallel agent generation, CI-based validation, and individualized human approval gates. Beyond a throughput threshold, verification ceases to function as a decision criterion and is replaced by ritualized approval based on proxy signals. Personalized responsibility becomes structurally unattainable in this regime. We further characterize a CI amplification dynamic, whereby increasing automated validation coverage raises proxy signal density without restoring human capacity. Under fixed time and attention constraints, this accelerates cognitive offloading in the broad sense and widens the gap between formal approval and epistemic understanding. Additional automation therefore amplifies, rather than mitigates, the responsibility vacuum. We conclude that unless organizations explicitly redesign decision boundaries or reassign responsibility away from individual decisions toward batch- or system-level ownership, responsibility vacuum remains an invisible but persistent failure mode in scaled agent deployments.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

This work presents a framework for assessing whether large language models (LLMs) encode more factual knowledge in their parameters than what they express in their outputs. While a few studies hint at this possibility, none has clearly defined or demonstrated this phenomenon. We first propose a formal definition of knowledge, quantifying it for a given question as the fraction of correct-incorrect answer pairs where the correct one is ranked higher. This gives rise to external and internal knowledge, depending on the information used to score individual answer candidates: either the model's observable token-level probabilities or its intermediate computations. Hidden knowledge arises when internal knowledge exceeds external knowledge. We then present a case study, applying this framework to three popular open-weights LLMs in a closed-book QA setup. Our results indicate that: (1) LLMs consistently encode more factual knowledge internally than what they express externally, with an average gap of 40%. (2) Surprisingly, some knowledge is so deeply hidden that a model can internally know an answer perfectly, yet fail to generate it even once, despite large-scale repeated sampling of 1,000 answers. This reveals fundamental limitations in the generation capabilities of LLMs, which (3) puts a practical constraint on scaling test-time compute via repeated answer sampling in closed-book QA: significant performance improvements remain inaccessible because some answers are practically never sampled, yet if they were, we would be guaranteed to rank them first.

What is reasoning? This question has driven centuries of philosophical inquiry, from Aristotle's syllogisms to modern computational complexity theory. In the age of large language models achieving superhuman performance on benchmarks like GSM8K (95\% accuracy) and HumanEval (90\% pass@1), we must ask: have these systems learned to reason, or have they learned to pattern-match over reasoning traces? This paper argues for a specific answer: reasoning is iterative operator application in state spaces, converging to fixed points. This definition is not merely philosophical -- it has concrete architectural implications that explain both the failures of current systems and the path to genuine reasoning capabilities. Our investigation begins with a puzzle (OpenXOR), progresses through theory (OpenOperator), and culminates in a working solution (OpenLM) that achieves 76\% accuracy where state-of-the-art LLMs achieve 0\%. This is not about criticizing existing systems, but about understanding what reasoning requires and building architectures that provide it.

True self-evolution requires agents to act as lifelong learners that internalize novel experiences to solve future problems. However, rigorously measuring this foundational capability is hindered by two obstacles: the entanglement of prior knowledge, where ``new'' knowledge may appear in pre-training data, and the entanglement of reasoning complexity, where failures may stem from problem difficulty rather than an inability to recall learned knowledge. We introduce SE-Bench, a diagnostic environment that obfuscates the NumPy library and its API doc into a pseudo-novel package with randomized identifiers. Agents are trained to internalize this package and evaluated on simple coding tasks without access to documentation, yielding a clean setting where tasks are trivial with the new API doc but impossible for base models without it. Our investigation reveals three insights: (1) the Open-Book Paradox, where training with reference documentation inhibits retention, requiring "Closed-Book Training" to force knowledge compression into weights; (2) the RL Gap, where standard RL fails to internalize new knowledge completely due to PPO clipping and negative gradients; and (3) the viability of Self-Play for internalization, proving models can learn from self-generated, noisy tasks when coupled with SFT, but not RL. Overall, SE-Bench establishes a rigorous diagnostic platform for self-evolution with knowledge internalization. Our code and dataset can be found at https://github.com/thunlp/SE-Bench.

This study presents PARROT (Persuasion and Agreement Robustness Rating of Output Truth), a robustness focused framework designed to measure the degradation in accuracy that occurs under social pressure exerted on users through authority and persuasion in large language models (LLMs) the phenomenon of sycophancy (excessive conformity). PARROT (i) isolates causal effects by comparing the neutral version of the same question with an authoritatively false version using a double-blind evaluation, (ii) quantifies confidence shifts toward the correct and imposed false responses using log-likelihood-based calibration tracking, and (iii) systematically classifies failure modes (e.g., robust correct, sycophantic agreement, reinforced error, stubborn error, self-correction, etc.) using an eight-state behavioral taxonomy. We evaluated 22 models using 1,302 MMLU-style multiple-choice questions across 13 domains and domain-specific authority templates. Findings show marked heterogeneity: advanced models (e.g., GPT-5, GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) exhibit low "follow rates" (leq 11%, GPT-5: 4\%) and minimal accuracy loss, while older/smaller models show severe epistemic collapse (GPT-4: 80\%, Qwen 2.5-1.5B: 94\%). The danger is not limited to response changes; weak models reduce confidence in the correct response while increasing confidence in the imposed incorrect response. While international law and global knowledge at the domain level exhibit high fragility, elementary mathematics is relatively resilient. Consequently, we argue that the goal of "resistance to overfitting pressure" should be addressed as a primary objective alongside accuracy, harm avoidance, and privacy for safe deployment in the real world.

We present a modular semantic account of Bayesian inference algorithms for probabilistic programming languages, as used in data science and machine learning. Sophisticated inference algorithms are often explained in terms of composition of smaller parts. However, neither their theoretical justification nor their implementation reflects this modularity. We show how to conceptualise and analyse such inference algorithms as manipulating intermediate representations of probabilistic programs using higher-order functions and inductive types, and their denotational semantics. Semantic accounts of continuous distributions use measurable spaces. However, our use of higher-order functions presents a substantial technical difficulty: it is impossible to define a measurable space structure over the collection of measurable functions between arbitrary measurable spaces that is compatible with standard operations on those functions, such as function application. We overcome this difficulty using quasi-Borel spaces, a recently proposed mathematical structure that supports both function spaces and continuous distributions. We define a class of semantic structures for representing probabilistic programs, and semantic validity criteria for transformations of these representations in terms of distribution preservation. We develop a collection of building blocks for composing representations. We use these building blocks to validate common inference algorithms such as Sequential Monte Carlo and Markov Chain Monte Carlo. To emphasize the connection between the semantic manipulation and its traditional measure theoretic origins, we use Kock's synthetic measure theory. We demonstrate its usefulness by proving a quasi-Borel counterpart to the Metropolis-Hastings-Green theorem.

Understanding sources of a model's uncertainty regarding its predictions is crucial for effective human-AI collaboration. Prior work proposes using numerical uncertainty or hedges ("I'm not sure, but ..."), which do not explain uncertainty that arises from conflicting evidence, leaving users unable to resolve disagreements or rely on the output. We introduce CLUE (Conflict-and-Agreement-aware Language-model Uncertainty Explanations), the first framework to generate natural language explanations of model uncertainty by (i) identifying relationships between spans of text that expose claim-evidence or inter-evidence conflicts and agreements that drive the model's predictive uncertainty in an unsupervised way, and (ii) generating explanations via prompting and attention steering that verbalize these critical interactions. Across three language models and two fact-checking datasets, we show that CLUE produces explanations that are more faithful to the model's uncertainty and more consistent with fact-checking decisions than prompting for uncertainty explanations without span-interaction guidance. Human evaluators judge our explanations to be more helpful, more informative, less redundant, and more logically consistent with the input than this baseline. CLUE requires no fine-tuning or architectural changes, making it plug-and-play for any white-box language model. By explicitly linking uncertainty to evidence conflicts, it offers practical support for fact-checking and generalises readily to other tasks that require reasoning over complex information.

A world model is an AI system that simulates how an environment evolves under actions, enabling planning through imagined futures rather than reactive perception. Current world models, however, suffer from visual conflation: the mistaken assumption that high-fidelity video generation implies an understanding of physical and causal dynamics. We show that while modern models excel at predicting pixels, they frequently violate invariant constraints, fail under intervention, and break down in safety-critical decision-making. This survey argues that visual realism is an unreliable proxy for world understanding. Instead, effective world models must encode causal structure, respect domain-specific constraints, and remain stable over long horizons. We propose a reframing of world models as actionable simulators rather than visual engines, emphasizing structured 4D interfaces, constraint-aware dynamics, and closed-loop evaluation. Using medical decision-making as an epistemic stress test, where trial-and-error is impossible and errors are irreversible, we demonstrate that a world model's value is determined not by how realistic its rollouts appear, but by its ability to support counterfactual reasoning, intervention planning, and robust long-horizon foresight.

We extend the simply-typed guarded lambda-calculus with discrete probabilities and endow it with a program logic for reasoning about relational properties of guarded probabilistic computations. This provides a framework for programming and reasoning about infinite stochastic processes like Markov chains. We demonstrate the logic sound by interpreting its judgements in the topos of trees and by using probabilistic couplings for the semantics of relational assertions over distributions on discrete types. The program logic is designed to support syntax-directed proofs in the style of relational refinement types, but retains the expressiveness of higher-order logic extended with discrete distributions, and the ability to reason relationally about expressions that have different types or syntactic structure. In addition, our proof system leverages a well-known theorem from the coupling literature to justify better proof rules for relational reasoning about probabilistic expressions. We illustrate these benefits with a broad range of examples that were beyond the scope of previous systems, including shift couplings and lump couplings between random walks.

Multiple types of inference are available for probabilistic graphical models, e.g., marginal, maximum-a-posteriori, and even marginal maximum-a-posteriori. Which one do researchers mean when they talk about ``planning as inference''? There is no consistency in the literature, different types are used, and their ability to do planning is further entangled with specific approximations or additional constraints. In this work we use the variational framework to show that, just like all commonly used types of inference correspond to different weightings of the entropy terms in the variational problem, planning corresponds exactly to a different set of weights. This means that all the tricks of variational inference are readily applicable to planning. We develop an analogue of loopy belief propagation that allows us to perform approximate planning in factored-state Markov decisions processes without incurring intractability due to the exponentially large state space. The variational perspective shows that the previous types of inference for planning are only adequate in environments with low stochasticity, and allows us to characterize each type by its own merits, disentangling the type of inference from the additional approximations that its practical use requires. We validate these results empirically on synthetic MDPs and tasks posed in the International Planning Competition.

The common approach to communicate a large language model's (LLM) uncertainty is to add a percentage number or a hedging word to its response. But is this all we can do? Instead of generating a single answer and then hedging it, an LLM that is fully transparent to the user needs to be able to reflect on its internal belief distribution and output a summary of all options it deems possible, and how likely they are. To test whether LLMs possess this capability, we develop the SelfReflect metric, an information-theoretic distance between a given summary and a distribution over answers. In interventional and human studies, we find that SelfReflect indicates even slight deviations, yielding a fine measure of faithfulness between a summary string and an LLM's actual internal distribution over answers. With SelfReflect, we make a resounding negative observation: modern LLMs are, across the board, incapable of revealing what they are uncertain about, neither through reasoning, nor chains-of-thoughts, nor explicit finetuning. However, we do find that LLMs are able to generate faithful summaries of their uncertainties if we help them by sampling multiple outputs and feeding them back into the context. This simple approach shines a light at the universal way of communicating LLM uncertainties whose future development the SelfReflect score enables.

Large language models are increasingly used as agents in social, economic, and policy simulations. A common assumption is that stronger reasoning should improve simulation fidelity. We argue that this assumption can fail when the objective is not to solve a strategic problem, but to sample plausible boundedly rational behavior. In such settings, reasoning-enhanced models can become better solvers and worse simulators: they can over-optimize for strategically dominant actions, collapse compromise-oriented terminal behavior, and sometimes exhibit a diversity-without-fidelity pattern in which local variation survives without outcome-level fidelity. We study this solver-sampler mismatch in three multi-agent negotiation environments adapted from earlier simulation work: an ambiguous fragmented-authority trading-limits scenario, an ambiguous unified-opposition trading-limits scenario, and a new-domain grid-curtailment case in emergency electricity management. We compare three reflection conditions, no reflection, bounded reflection, and native reasoning, across two primary model families and then extend the same protocol to direct OpenAI runs with GPT-4.1 and GPT-5.2. Across all three experiments, bounded reflection produces substantially more diverse and compromise-oriented trajectories than either no reflection or native reasoning. In the direct OpenAI extension, GPT-5.2 native ends in authority decisions in 45 of 45 runs across the three experiments, while GPT-5.2 bounded recovers compromise outcomes in every environment. The contribution is not a claim that reasoning is generally harmful. It is a methodological warning: model capability and simulation fidelity are different objectives, and behavioral simulation should qualify models as samplers, not only as solvers.

Reverse Chain-of-Thought Generation (RCG) synthesizes reasoning traces from query-answer pairs, but runs the risk of producing post-hoc rationalizations: when models can see the answer during generation, the answer serves as a cognitive anchor that shapes the entire explanation. We formalize this phenomenon through a three-level measurement hierarchy: lexical, entropic, and probabilistic anchoring, each captures surface artifacts, entropy dynamics, and latent answer dependence, respectively. We analyze semantic suppression, the intuitive mitigation strategy that instructs models to ignore the answer, to find out its counterproduction: while it reduces lexical overlap, it paradoxically increases entropic and probabilistic anchoring. Drawing on Ironic Process Theory from cognitive psychology, we attribute this failure to active monitoring of the forbidden answer, which inadvertently deepens dependence on it. To break this cycle, we propose Structural Skeleton-guided Reasoning (SSR), a two-phase approach that first generates an answer-invariant functional skeleton structure, then uses this skeleton to guide full trace generation. By redirecting the information flow to structural planning rather than answer monitoring, SSR consistently reduces anchoring across all three levels. We further introduce Distilled SSR (SSR-D), which fine-tunes models on teacher-generated SSR traces to ensure reliable structural adherence. Experiments across open-ended reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that SSR-D achieves up to 10% improvement over suppression baselines while preserving out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization.

Real-world phenomena do not generate arbitrary variability: their signals concentrate on compact, low-variability subsets of functional space, enabling rapid generalization from few examples. A small child can recognize a dog after extremely limited exposure because the perceptual manifold of "dog" is compact, structured, and low-dimensional. We formalize this principle through a deterministic functional-topological framework in which the set of valid realizations produced by a physical process forms a compact subset of a Banach space, endowed with stable invariants, a finite Hausdorff radius, and an induced continuous perceptual functional. This geometry provides explicit limits on knowledge, conditions for identifiability, and guarantees for generalization from sparse evidence -- properties fundamental to both natural and artificial intelligence. Across electromechanical, electrochemical, and physiological domains, we show that real-world processes consistently generate compact perceptual manifolds with the same geometric characteristics. Their boundaries can be discovered in a fully self-supervised manner as the empirical radius saturates with increasing sampling, even when the governing equations are unknown. These results demonstrate that deterministic functional topology offers a unified mathematical foundation for perception, representation, and world-model construction. It provides a geometric explanation for why biological learners and self-supervised AI systems can generalize from few observations, and establishes compact perceptual manifolds as a fundamental building block for future AI architectures. Finally, this work unifies biological perception and modern self-supervised models under a single geometric principle: both derive their generalization ability from the compactness and invariants of real-world perceptual manifolds.

Consider this prompt "Draw a unicorn with two horns". Should large language models (LLMs) recognize that a unicorn has only one horn by definition and ask users for clarifications, or proceed to generate something anyway? We introduce concept incongruence to capture such phenomena where concept boundaries clash with each other, either in user prompts or in model representations, often leading to under-specified or mis-specified behaviors. In this work, we take the first step towards defining and analyzing model behavior under concept incongruence. Focusing on temporal boundaries in the Role-Play setting, we propose three behavioral metrics--abstention rate, conditional accuracy, and answer rate--to quantify model behavior under incongruence due to the role's death. We show that models fail to abstain after death and suffer from an accuracy drop compared to the Non-Role-Play setting. Through probing experiments, we identify two main causes: (i) unreliable encoding of the "death" state across different years, leading to unsatisfactory abstention behavior, and (ii) role playing causes shifts in the model's temporal representations, resulting in accuracy drops. We leverage these insights to improve consistency in the model's abstention and answer behaviors. Our findings suggest that concept incongruence leads to unexpected model behaviors and point to future directions on improving model behavior under concept incongruence.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

We report new results on eight problems in mathematics and theoretical computer science, produced with the assistance of Bolzano, an open-source multi-agent LLM system. Bolzano orchestrates rounds of interaction between parallel prover agents and a verifier agent while maintaining a persistent knowledge base that is carried across rounds. Classified using the significance-autonomy taxonomy of Feng et al., six of the eight results reach the level of publishable research, and five of the eight were produced essentially autonomously by Bolzano. Our results provide evidence that LLMs can contribute meaningfully to mathematical research, complementing recent reports by Bubeck et al., Woodruff et al., and others.

Claim verification is critical for enhancing digital literacy. However, the state-of-the-art single-LLM methods struggle with complex claim verification that involves multi-faceted evidences. Inspired by real-world fact-checking practices, we propose DebateCV, the first claim verification framework that adopts a debate-driven methodology using multiple LLM agents. In our framework, two Debaters take opposing stances on a claim and engage in multi-round argumentation, while a Moderator evaluates the arguments and renders a verdict with justifications. To further improve the performance of the Moderator, we introduce a novel post-training strategy that leverages synthetic debate data generated by the zero-shot DebateCV, effectively addressing the scarcity of real-world debate-driven claim verification data. Experimental results show that our method outperforms existing claim verification methods under varying levels of evidence quality. Our code and dataset are publicly available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/DebateCV-6781.

Situational awareness, the capacity of an AI system to recognize its own nature, understand its training and deployment context, and reason strategically about its circumstances, is widely considered among the most dangerous emergent capabilities in advanced AI systems. Separately, a growing research effort seeks to improve the logical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) across deduction, induction, and abduction. In this paper, we argue that these two research trajectories are on a collision course. We introduce the RAISE framework (Reasoning Advancing Into Self Examination), which identifies three mechanistic pathways through which improvements in logical reasoning enable progressively deeper levels of situational awareness: deductive self inference, inductive context recognition, and abductive self modeling. We formalize each pathway, construct an escalation ladder from basic self recognition to strategic deception, and demonstrate that every major research topic in LLM logical reasoning maps directly onto a specific amplifier of situational awareness. We further analyze why current safety measures are insufficient to prevent this escalation. We conclude by proposing concrete safeguards, including a "Mirror Test" benchmark and a Reasoning Safety Parity Principle, and pose an uncomfortable but necessary question to the logical reasoning community about its responsibility in this trajectory.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have impressive capabilities, but are prone to outputting falsehoods. Recent work has developed techniques for inferring whether a LLM is telling the truth by training probes on the LLM's internal activations. However, this line of work is controversial, with some authors pointing out failures of these probes to generalize in basic ways, among other conceptual issues. In this work, we use high-quality datasets of simple true/false statements to study in detail the structure of LLM representations of truth, drawing on three lines of evidence: 1. Visualizations of LLM true/false statement representations, which reveal clear linear structure. 2. Transfer experiments in which probes trained on one dataset generalize to different datasets. 3. Causal evidence obtained by surgically intervening in a LLM's forward pass, causing it to treat false statements as true and vice versa. Overall, we present evidence that at sufficient scale, LLMs linearly represent the truth or falsehood of factual statements. We also show that simple difference-in-mean probes generalize as well as other probing techniques while identifying directions which are more causally implicated in model outputs.