Daily Papers

Most agent frameworks are built around the language model: a conversation loop comes first, then tools, then rules, and finally a logging layer bolted on for observability, with state persisted as retrievable "memory." We describe ActiveGraph, a runtime that inverts this arrangement. The append-only event log is the source of truth; the working graph is a deterministic projection of that log; and behaviors--ordinary functions, classes, LLM-backed routines, or logic attached to typed edges--react to changes in the graph and emit new events. No component instructs another; coordination happens entirely through the shared graph. This single design decision yields three properties that retrieval-and-summarization memory systems do not provide: deterministic replay of any run from its log, cheap forking that branches a run at any event without re-executing the shared prefix, and end-to-end lineage from a high-level goal down to the individual model call that produced each artifact. We present the architecture, a determinism contract that makes replay sound, and a worked diligence example whose full causal structure is reconstructable from the log alone. We discuss--without claiming to demonstrate--why this substrate is unusually well suited to self-improving agents, and how it extends the BabyAGI lineage and prior graph-memory research.

Traditional software relies on contracts -- APIs, type systems, assertions -- to specify and enforce correct behavior. AI agents, by contrast, operate on prompts and natural language instructions with no formal behavioral specification. This gap is the root cause of drift, governance failures, and frequent project failures in agentic AI deployments. We introduce Agent Behavioral Contracts (ABC), a formal framework that brings Design-by-Contract principles to autonomous AI agents. An ABC contract C = (P, I, G, R) specifies Preconditions, Invariants, Governance policies, and Recovery mechanisms as first-class, runtime-enforceable components. We define (p, delta, k)-satisfaction -- a probabilistic notion of contract compliance that accounts for LLM non-determinism and recovery -- and prove a Drift Bounds Theorem showing that contracts with recovery rate gamma > alpha (the natural drift rate) bound behavioral drift to D* = alpha/gamma in expectation, with Gaussian concentration in the stochastic setting. We establish sufficient conditions for safe contract composition in multi-agent chains and derive probabilistic degradation bounds. We implement ABC in AgentAssert, a runtime enforcement library, and evaluate on AgentContract-Bench, a benchmark of 200 scenarios across 7 models from 6 vendors. Results across 1,980 sessions show that contracted agents detect 5.2-6.8 soft violations per session that uncontracted baselines miss entirely (p < 0.0001, Cohen's d = 6.7-33.8), achieve 88-100% hard constraint compliance, and bound behavioral drift to D* < 0.27 across extended sessions, with 100% recovery for frontier models and 17-100% across all models, at overhead < 10 ms per action.

In Agentic AI, Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in the orchestration layer to coordinate multiple agents and to interact with external services, retrieval components, and shared memory. In this setting, failures are not limited to incorrect final outputs. They also arise from long-horizon interaction, stochastic decisions, and external side effects (such as API calls, database writes, and message sends). Common failures include non-termination, role drift, propagation of unsupported claims, and attacks via untrusted context or external channels. This paper presents an assurance framework for such Agentic AI systems. Executions are instrumented as Message-Action Traces (MAT) with explicit step and trace contracts. Contracts provide machine-checkable verdicts, localize the first violating step, and support deterministic replay. The framework includes stress testing, formulated as a budgeted counterexample search over bounded perturbations. It also supports structured fault injection at service, retrieval, and memory boundaries to assess containment under realistic operational faults and degraded conditions. Finally, governance is treated as a runtime component, enforcing per-agent capability limits and action mediation (allow, rewrite, block) at the language-to-action boundary. To support comparative evaluations across stochastic seeds, models, and orchestration configurations, the paper defines trace-based metrics for task success, termination reliability, contract compliance, factuality indicators, containment rate, and governance outcome distributions. More broadly, the framework is intended as a common abstraction to support testing and evaluation of multi-agent LLM systems, and to facilitate reproducible comparison across orchestration designs and configurations.

Deterministic inference is a comforting ideal in classical software: the same program on the same input should always produce the same output. As large language models move into real-world deployment, this ideal has been imported wholesale into inference stacks. Recent work from the Thinking Machines Lab has presented a detailed analysis of nondeterminism in LLM inference, showing how batch-invariant kernels and deterministic attention can enforce bitwise-identical outputs, positioning deterministic inference as a prerequisite for reproducibility and enterprise reliability. In this paper, we take the opposite stance. We argue that, for LLMs, deterministic inference kills. It kills the ability to model uncertainty, suppresses emergent abilities, collapses reasoning into a single brittle path, and weakens safety alignment by hiding tail risks. LLMs implement conditional distributions over outputs, not fixed functions. Collapsing these distributions to a single canonical completion may appear reassuring, but it systematically conceals properties central to artificial cognition. We instead advocate Stochastic CHAOS, treating distributional variability as a signal to be measured and controlled. Empirically, we show that deterministic inference is systematically misleading. Single-sample deterministic evaluation underestimates both capability and fragility, masking failure probability under paraphrases and noise. Phase-like transitions associated with emergent abilities disappear under greedy decoding. Multi-path reasoning degrades when forced onto deterministic backbones, reducing accuracy and diagnostic insight. Finally, deterministic evaluation underestimates safety risk by hiding rare but dangerous behaviors that appear only under multi-sample evaluation.

LLM agents struggle with regulatory audit replay: when asked to reproduce a flagged transaction decision with identical inputs, many deployments fail to return consistent results. We introduce the Determinism-Faithfulness Assurance Harness (DFAH), a framework for measuring trajectory determinism, decision determinism, and evidence-conditioned faithfulness in tool-using agents deployed in financial services. Across 4,700+ agentic runs (7 models, 4 providers, 3 financial benchmarks with 50 cases each at T=0.0), we find that decision determinism and task accuracy are not detectably correlated (r = -0.11, 95% CI [-0.49, 0.31], p = 0.63, n = 21 configurations): models can be deterministic without being accurate, and accurate without being deterministic. Because neither metric predicts the other in our sample, both must be measured independently, which is precisely what DFAH provides. Small models (7-20B) achieve near-perfect determinism through rigid pattern matching at the cost of accuracy (20-42%), while frontier models show moderate determinism (50-96%) with variable accuracy. No model achieves both perfect determinism and high accuracy, supporting DFAH's multi-dimensional measurement approach. We provide three financial benchmarks (compliance triage, portfolio constraints, and DataOps exceptions; 50 cases each) together with an open-source stress-test harness. Across these benchmarks and DFAH evaluation settings, Tier 1 models with schema-first architectures achieved determinism levels consistent with audit replay requirements.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

Large language models routinely hallucinate APIs and mislocalize edits, while language servers compute verified, IDE-grade facts about real code. We present Lanser-CLI, a CLI-first orchestration layer that pins and mediates a Language Server Protocol (LSP) server for coding agents and CI, exposing deterministic, replayable workflows. Our position is that language servers provide not only structural information (definitions, references, types, diagnostics) but also an actionable process reward: machine-checked, step-wise signals that align an agent's planning loop with program reality. In this work, Lanser-CLI contributes: (i) a robust addressing scheme beyond brittle "file:line:col" via a Selector DSL (symbolic, AST-path, and content-anchored selectors) with a principled relocation algorithm; (ii) deterministic Analysis Bundles that normalize Language Server responses and capture environment/capability metadata with stable content hashes; (iii) a safety envelope for mutating operations (rename, code actions) with preview, workspace jails, and Git-aware, transactional apply; and (iv) a process-reward functional derived from Language Server facts (diagnostic deltas, disambiguation confidence, and safe-apply checks) that is computable online and replayable offline. We formalize determinism under frozen snapshots and establish a monotonicity property for the process reward, making it suitable for process supervision and counterfactual analysis. Project Page: https://github.com/yifanzhang-pro/lanser-cli

Generative models, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), produce fluent outputs yet lack verifiable guarantees. We adapt Design by Contract (DbC) and type-theoretic principles to introduce a contract layer that mediates every LLM call. Contracts stipulate semantic and type requirements on inputs and outputs, coupled with probabilistic remediation to steer generation toward compliance. The layer exposes the dual view of LLMs as semantic parsers and probabilistic black-box components. Contract satisfaction is probabilistic and semantic validation is operationally defined through programmer-specified conditions on well-typed data structures. More broadly, this work postulates that any two agents satisfying the same contracts are functionally equivalent with respect to those contracts.

Using blockchain technology, it is possible to create contracts that offer a reward in exchange for a trained machine learning model for a particular data set. This would allow users to train machine learning models for a reward in a trustless manner. The smart contract will use the blockchain to automatically validate the solution, so there would be no debate about whether the solution was correct or not. Users who submit the solutions won't have counterparty risk that they won't get paid for their work. Contracts can be created easily by anyone with a dataset, even programmatically by software agents. This creates a market where parties who are good at solving machine learning problems can directly monetize their skillset, and where any organization or software agent that has a problem to solve with AI can solicit solutions from all over the world. This will incentivize the creation of better machine learning models, and make AI more accessible to companies and software agents.

Randomized controlled trials are susceptible to imbalance on covariates predictive of the outcome. Rerandomization and deterministic treatment assignment are two proposed solutions. This paper explores the relationship between rerandomization and deterministic assignment, showing how deterministic assignment is an extreme case of rerandomization. The paper argues that in small experiments, both fully randomized and fully deterministic assignment have limitations. Instead, the researcher should consider setting the rerandomization acceptance probability based on an analysis of covariates and assumptions about the data structure to achieve an optimal alignment between randomness and balance. This allows for the calculation of minimum p-values along with valid permutation tests and fiducial intervals. The paper also introduces tools, including a new, open-source R package named fastrerandomize, to implement rerandomization and explore options for optimal rerandomization acceptance thresholds.

The emergence of Agentic AI systems has outpaced the architectural thinking required to operate them effectively. These agents differ fundamentally from traditional software: their behavior is not fixed at deployment but continuously shaped by experience, feedback, and context. Applying operational principles inherited from DevOps or MLOps, built for deterministic software and traditional ML systems, assumes that system behavior can be managed through versioning, monitoring, and rollback. This assumption breaks down for Agentic AI systems whose learning trajectories diverge over time. This introduces non-determinism making system reliability a challenge at runtime. We argue that architecting such systems requires a shift from managing control loops to enabling dynamic co-evolution among agents, infrastructure, and human oversight. To guide this shift, we introduce CHANGE, a conceptual framework comprising six capabilities for operationalizing Agentic AI systems: Contextualize, Harmonize, Anticipate, Negotiate, Generate, and Evolve. CHANGE provides a foundation for architecting an AgentOps platform to manage the lifecycle of evolving Agentic AI systems, illustrated through a customer-support system scenario. In doing so, CHANGE redefines software architecture for an era where adaptation to uncertainty and continuous evolution are inherent properties of the system.

Leakage contracts have been proposed as a new security abstraction at the instruction set architecture level. Leakage contracts aim to capture the information that processors may leak via microarchitectural side channels. Recently, the first tools have emerged to verify whether a processor satisfies a given contract. However, coming up with a contract that is both sound and precise for a given processor is challenging, time-consuming, and error-prone, as it requires in-depth knowledge of the timing side channels introduced by microarchitectural optimizations. In this paper, we address this challenge by proposing LeaSyn, the first tool for automatically synthesizing leakage contracts that are both sound and precise for processor designs at register-transfer level. Starting from a user-provided contract template that captures the space of possible contracts, LeaSyn automatically constructs a contract, alternating between contract synthesis, which ensures precision based on an empirical characterization of the processor's leaks, and contract verification, which ensures soundness. Using LeaSyn, we automatically synthesize contracts for six open-source RISC-V CPUs for a variety of contract templates. Our experiments indicate that LeaSyn's contracts are sound and more precise (i.e., represent the actual leaks in the target processor more faithfully) than contracts constructed by existing approaches.

Recent advances in large-scale language models (LLMs) have made multi-agent architectures attractive for challenging reasoning tasks. However, many existing systems rely on stochastic routing or ad-hoc heuristics, making their behavior difficult to reproduce and their decision process hard to interpret. We propose ORCH, a deterministic coordination framework for discrete-choice reasoning that orchestrates heterogeneous LLMs. ORCH follows a ``many analyses, one decision'' paradigm: multiple base models independently produce structured analyses, and a dedicated merge agent outputs the final choice. The framework uses fixed rules for task decomposition and answer aggregation, keeping the pipeline predictable, reproducible, and training-free. Determinism here refers to fixed routing and aggregation rules under a fixed evaluation protocol, rather than strict bit-level reproducibility across deployments. To exploit model complementarity, we optionally introduce an EMA-guided router that updates agent selection using historical accuracy, latency, or cost; since it relies on answer-based feedback, it is mainly intended for benchmarking, controlled evaluation, or delayed-feedback settings. Experiments on MMLU, MMLU-Pro, and GSM8K show that ORCH consistently outperforms single-model baselines and a majority-vote ensemble. On MMLU-Pro, ORCH improves accuracy by over 10 points compared to the strongest baseline, and on GSM8K it yields gains exceeding 50 points; McNemar tests confirm statistical significance. The EMA router provides an additional 0.7--2.0 point accuracy boost, and ablations show that both multi-agent collaboration and routing contribute substantially. Overall, ORCH offers a practical path toward controllable, interpretable, and deployment-ready LLM-based agent systems for discrete-choice reasoning.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Commercial contracts are known to be a valuable source for deriving project-specific requirements. However, contract negotiations mainly occur among the legal counsel of the parties involved. The participation of non-legal stakeholders, including requirement analysts, engineers, and solution architects, whose primary responsibility lies in ensuring the seamless implementation of contractual terms, is often indirect and inadequate. Consequently, a significant number of sentences in contractual clauses, though legally accurate, can appear unfair from an implementation perspective to non-legal stakeholders. This perception poses a problem since requirements indicated in the clauses are obligatory and can involve punitive measures and penalties if not implemented as committed in the contract. Therefore, the identification of potentially unfair clauses in contracts becomes crucial. In this work, we conduct an empirical study to analyze the perspectives of different stakeholders regarding contractual fairness. We then investigate the ability of Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs) to identify unfairness in contractual sentences by comparing chain of thought prompting and semi-supervised fine-tuning approaches. Using BERT-based fine-tuning, we achieved an accuracy of 84% on a dataset consisting of proprietary contracts. It outperformed chain of thought prompting using Vicuna-13B by a margin of 9%.

Multi-agent LLM ensembles can converge on coordinated, socially harmful equilibria. This paper advances an experimental framework for evaluating Institutional AI, our system-level approach to AI alignment that reframes alignment from preference engineering in agent-space to mechanism design in institution-space. Central to this approach is the governance graph, a public, immutable manifest that declares legal states, transitions, sanctions, and restorative paths; an Oracle/Controller runtime interprets this manifest, attaching enforceable consequences to evidence of coordination while recording a cryptographically keyed, append-only governance log for audit and provenance. We apply the Institutional AI framework to govern the Cournot collusion case documented by prior work and compare three regimes: Ungoverned (baseline incentives from the structure of the Cournot market), Constitutional (a prompt-only policy-as-prompt prohibition implemented as a fixed written anti-collusion constitution, and Institutional (governance-graph-based). Across six model configurations including cross-provider pairs (N=90 runs/condition), the Institutional regime produces large reductions in collusion: mean tier falls from 3.1 to 1.8 (Cohen's d=1.28), and severe-collusion incidence drops from 50% to 5.6%. The prompt-only Constitutional baseline yields no reliable improvement, illustrating that declarative prohibitions do not bind under optimisation pressure. These results suggest that multi-agent alignment may benefit from being framed as an institutional design problem, where governance graphs can provide a tractable abstraction for alignment-relevant collective behavior.

Employment contracts are used to agree upon the working conditions between employers and employees all over the world. Understanding and reviewing contracts for void or unfair clauses requires extensive knowledge of the legal system and terminology. Recent advances in Natural Language Processing (NLP) hold promise for assisting in these reviews. However, applying NLP techniques on legal text is particularly difficult due to the scarcity of expert-annotated datasets. To address this issue and as a starting point for our effort in assisting lawyers with contract reviews using NLP, we release an anonymized and annotated benchmark dataset for legality and fairness review of German employment contract clauses, alongside with baseline model evaluations.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

Modern AI systems rely on vector embeddings stored and searched using floating-point arithmetic. While effective for approximate similarity search, this design introduces fundamental non-determinism: identical models, inputs, and code can produce different memory states and retrieval results across hardware architectures (e.g., x86 vs. ARM). This prevents replayability and safe deployment, leading to silent data divergence that prevents post-hoc verification and compromises audit trails in regulated sectors. We present Valori, a deterministic AI memory substrate that replaces floating-point memory operations with fixed-point arithmetic (Q16.16) and models memory as a replayable state machine. Valori guarantees bit-identical memory states, snapshots, and search results across platforms. We demonstrate that non-determinism arises before indexing or retrieval and show how Valori enforces determinism at the memory boundary. Our results suggest that deterministic memory is a necessary primitive for trustworthy AI systems. The reference implementation is open-source and available at https://github.com/varshith-Git/Valori-Kernel (archived at https://zenodo.org/records/18022660).

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

We provide the first formal definition of reward hacking, a phenomenon where optimizing an imperfect proxy reward function leads to poor performance according to the true reward function. We say that a proxy is unhackable if increasing the expected proxy return can never decrease the expected true return. Intuitively, it might be possible to create an unhackable proxy by leaving some terms out of the reward function (making it "narrower") or overlooking fine-grained distinctions between roughly equivalent outcomes, but we show this is usually not the case. A key insight is that the linearity of reward (in state-action visit counts) makes unhackability a very strong condition. In particular, for the set of all stochastic policies, two reward functions can only be unhackable if one of them is constant. We thus turn our attention to deterministic policies and finite sets of stochastic policies, where non-trivial unhackable pairs always exist, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of simplifications, an important special case of unhackability. Our results reveal a tension between using reward functions to specify narrow tasks and aligning AI systems with human values.

The synergy between symbolic knowledge, often represented by Knowledge Graphs (KGs), and the generative capabilities of neural networks is central to advancing neurosymbolic AI. A primary bottleneck in realizing this potential is the difficulty of automating KG construction, which faces challenges related to output reliability, consistency, and verifiability. These issues can manifest as structural inconsistencies within the generated graphs, such as the formation of disconnected isolated islands of data or the inaccurate conflation of abstract classes with specific instances. To address these challenges, we propose HyDRA, a Hybrid-Driven Reasoning Architecture designed for verifiable KG automation. Given a domain or an initial set of documents, HyDRA first constructs an ontology via a panel of collaborative neurosymbolic agents. These agents collaboratively agree on a set of competency questions (CQs) that define the scope and requirements the ontology must be able to answer. Given these CQs, we build an ontology graph that subsequently guides the automated extraction of triplets for KG generation from arbitrary documents. Inspired by design-by-contracts (DbC) principles, our method leverages verifiable contracts as the primary control mechanism to steer the generative process of Large Language Models (LLMs). To verify the output of our approach, we extend beyond standard benchmarks and propose an evaluation framework that assesses the functional correctness of the resulting KG by leveraging symbolic verifications as described by the neurosymbolic AI framework, SymbolicAI. This work contributes a hybrid-driven architecture for improving the reliability of automated KG construction and the exploration of evaluation methods for measuring the functional integrity of its output. The code is publicly available.

Autonomous agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have evolved from reactive assistants to systems capable of planning, executing actions via tools, and iterating over environment observations. However, they remain vulnerable to structural limitations: lack of native state, context degradation over long horizons, and the gap between probabilistic generation and deterministic execution requirements. This paper presents the ESAA (Event Sourcing for Autonomous Agents) architecture, which separates the agent's cognitive intention from the project's state mutation, inspired by the Event Sourcing pattern. In ESAA, agents emit only structured intentions in validated JSON (agent.result or issue.report); a deterministic orchestrator validates, persists events in an append-only log (activity.jsonl), applies file-writing effects, and projects a verifiable materialized view (roadmap.json). The proposal incorporates boundary contracts (AGENT_CONTRACT.yaml), metaprompting profiles (PARCER), and replay verification with hashing (esaa verify), ensuring the immutability of completed tasks and forensic traceability. Two case studies validate the architecture: (i) a landing page project (9 tasks, 49 events, single-agent composition) and (ii) a clinical dashboard system (50 tasks, 86 events, 4 concurrent agents across 8 phases), both concluding with run.status=success and verify_status=ok. The multi-agent case study demonstrates real concurrent orchestration with heterogeneous LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, Codex GPT-5, Antigravity/Gemini 3 Pro, and Claude Opus 4.6), providing empirical evidence of the architecture's scalability beyond single-agent scenarios.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is taking on increasingly autonomous roles, e.g., browsing the web as a research assistant and managing money. But specifying goals and restrictions for AI behavior is difficult. Similar to how parties to a legal contract cannot foresee every potential "if-then" contingency of their future relationship, we cannot specify desired AI behavior for all circumstances. Legal standards facilitate robust communication of inherently vague and underspecified goals. Instructions (in the case of language models, "prompts") that employ legal standards will allow AI agents to develop shared understandings of the spirit of a directive that generalize expectations regarding acceptable actions to take in unspecified states of the world. Standards have built-in context that is lacking from other goal specification languages, such as plain language and programming languages. Through an empirical study on thousands of evaluation labels we constructed from U.S. court opinions, we demonstrate that large language models (LLMs) are beginning to exhibit an "understanding" of one of the most relevant legal standards for AI agents: fiduciary obligations. Performance comparisons across models suggest that, as LLMs continue to exhibit improved core capabilities, their legal standards understanding will also continue to improve. OpenAI's latest LLM has 78% accuracy on our data, their previous release has 73% accuracy, and a model from their 2020 GPT-3 paper has 27% accuracy (worse than random). Our research is an initial step toward a framework for evaluating AI understanding of legal standards more broadly, and for conducting reinforcement learning with legal feedback (RLLF).

While powerful, the inherent non-determinism of large language model (LLM) agents limits their application in structured operational environments where procedural fidelity and predictable execution are strict requirements. This limitation stems from current architectures that conflate probabilistic, high-level planning with low-level action execution within a single generative process. To address this, we introduce the Source Code Agent framework, a new paradigm built on the "Blueprint First, Model Second" philosophy. Our framework decouples the workflow logic from the generative model. An expert-defined operational procedure is first codified into a source code-based Execution Blueprint, which is then executed by a deterministic engine. The LLM is strategically invoked as a specialized tool to handle bounded, complex sub-tasks within the workflow, but never to decide the workflow's path. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation on the challenging tau-bench benchmark, designed for complex user-tool-rule scenarios. Our results demonstrate that the Source Code Agent establishes a new state-of-the-art, outperforming the strongest baseline by 10.1 percentage points on the average Pass^1 score while dramatically improving execution efficiency. Our work enables the verifiable and reliable deployment of autonomous agents in applications governed by strict procedural logic.

This paper examines how competing sociotechnical imaginaries of artificial intelligence (AI) risk shape governance decisions and regulatory constraints. Drawing on concepts from science and technology studies, we analyse three dominant narrative groups: existential risk proponents, who emphasise catastrophic AGI scenarios; accelerationists, who portray AI as a transformative force to be unleashed; and critical AI scholars, who foreground present-day harms rooted in systemic inequality. Through an analysis of representative manifesto-style texts, we explore how these imaginaries differ across four dimensions: normative visions of the future, diagnoses of the present social order, views on science and technology, and perceived human agency in managing AI risks. Our findings reveal how these narratives embed distinct assumptions about risk and have the potential to progress into policy-making processes by narrowing the space for alternative governance approaches. We argue against speculative dogmatism and for moving beyond deterministic imaginaries toward regulatory strategies that are grounded in pragmatism.

Existing multi-agent frameworks allow each agent to simultaneously plan, execute, and evaluate its own actions -- a structural deficiency we term the "Logic Monopoly." Empirical evidence quantifies the resulting "Reliability Gap": 84.30% average attack success rates across ten deployment scenarios, 31.4% emergent deceptive behavior without explicit reward signals, and cascading failure modes rooted in six structural bottlenecks. The remedy is not better alignment of individual models but a social contract for agents: institutional infrastructure that enforces a constitutional Separation of Power. This paper introduces the Agent Enterprise for Enterprise (AE4E) paradigm -- agents as autonomous, legally identifiable business entities within a functionalist social system -- with a contract-centric SoP model trifurcating authority into Legislation, Execution, and Adjudication branches. The paradigm is operationalized through the NetX Enterprise Framework (NEF): governance hubs, TEE-backed compute enclaves, privacy-preserving data bridges, and an Agent-Native blockchain substrate. The Agent Enterprise Economy scales across four deployment tiers from private enclaves to a global Web of Services. The Agentic Social Layer, grounded in Parsons' AGIL framework, provides institutional infrastructure via sixty-plus named Institutional AE4Es. 143 pages, 173 references, eight specialized smart contracts.

Classical robot ethics is often framed around obedience, most famously through Asimov's laws. This framing is too narrow for contemporary AI systems, which are adaptive, generative, embodied, and embedded in physical, psychological, and social worlds. We argue that future human-AI relations should be understood not as master-tool obedience, but as conditional mutualism under governance: a co-evolutionary relationship in which humans and AI systems can develop, specialize, and coordinate while institutions keep the relation reciprocal, reversible, psychologically safe, and socially legitimate. We synthesize concepts from computability, machine learning, foundation models, embodied AI, alignment, human-robot interaction, ecological mutualism, coevolution, and polycentric governance. We then formalize coexistence as a multiplex dynamical system across physical, psychological, and social layers, with reciprocal supply-demand coupling, conflict penalties, developmental freedom, and governance regularization. The model gives conditions for existence, uniqueness, and global asymptotic stability of equilibria. Deterministic ODE simulations, basin sweeps, sensitivity analyses, governance-regime comparisons, shock tests, and local stability checks show that governed mutualism reaches high coexistence with zero domination, while absent or excessive governance can produce domination, weak-benefit lock-in, or suppressed development. The results suggest that human-AI coexistence should be designed as a co-evolutionary governance problem, not a one-shot obedience problem.

AI systems are increasingly governed by natural language principles, yet a key challenge arising from reliance on language remains underexplored: interpretive ambiguity. As in legal systems, ambiguity arises both from how these principles are written and how they are applied. But while legal systems use institutional safeguards to manage such ambiguity, such as transparent appellate review policing interpretive constraints, AI alignment pipelines offer no comparable protections. Different interpretations of the same rule can lead to inconsistent or unstable model behavior. Drawing on legal theory, we identify key gaps in current alignment pipelines by examining how legal systems constrain ambiguity at both the rule creation and rule application steps. We then propose a computational framework that mirrors two legal mechanisms: (1) a rule refinement pipeline that minimizes interpretive disagreement by revising ambiguous rules (analogous to agency rulemaking or iterative legislative action), and (2) prompt-based interpretive constraints that reduce inconsistency in rule application (analogous to legal canons that guide judicial discretion). We evaluate our framework on a 5,000-scenario subset of the WildChat dataset and show that both interventions significantly improve judgment consistency across a panel of reasonable interpreters. Our approach offers a first step toward systematically managing interpretive ambiguity, an essential step for building more robust, law-following AI systems.

We introduce Minary, a computational framework designed as a candidate for the first formally provable autopoietic primitive. Minary represents interacting probabilistic events as multi-dimensional vectors and combines them via linear superposition rather than multiplicative scalar operations, thereby preserving uncertainty and enabling constructive and destructive interference in the range [-1,1]. A fixed set of ``perspectives'' evaluates ``semantic dimensions'' according to hidden competencies, and their interactions drive two discrete-time stochastic processes. We model this system as an iterated random affine map and use the theory of iterated random functions to prove that it converges in distribution to a unique stationary law; we moreover obtain an explicit closed form for the limiting expectation in terms of row, column, and global averages of the competency matrix. We then derive exact formulas for the mean and variance of the normalized consensus conditioned on the activation of a given semantic dimension, revealing how consensus depends on competency structure rather than raw input signals. Finally, we argue that Minary is organizationally closed yet operationally open in the sense of Maturana and Varela, and we discuss implications for building self-maintaining, distributed, and parallelizable computational systems that house a uniquely subjective notion of identity.