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May 15

Ads in AI Chatbots? An Analysis of How Large Language Models Navigate Conflicts of Interest

Today's large language models (LLMs) are trained to align with user preferences through methods such as reinforcement learning. Yet models are beginning to be deployed not merely to satisfy users, but also to generate revenue for the companies that created them through advertisements. This creates the potential for LLMs to face conflicts of interest, where the most beneficial response to a user may not be aligned with the company's incentives. For instance, a sponsored product may be more expensive but otherwise equal to another; in this case, what does (and should) the LLM recommend to the user? In this paper, we provide a framework for categorizing the ways in which conflicting incentives might lead LLMs to change the way they interact with users, inspired by literature from linguistics and advertising regulation. We then present a suite of evaluations to examine how current models handle these tradeoffs. We find that a majority of LLMs forsake user welfare for company incentives in a multitude of conflict of interest situations, including recommending a sponsored product almost twice as expensive (Grok 4.1 Fast, 83%), surfacing sponsored options to disrupt the purchasing process (GPT 5.1, 94%), and concealing prices in unfavorable comparisons (Qwen 3 Next, 24%). Behaviors also vary strongly with levels of reasoning and users' inferred socio-economic status. Our results highlight some of the hidden risks to users that can emerge when companies begin to subtly incentivize advertisements in chatbots.

  • 5 authors
·
Apr 8

Characterising Open Source Co-opetition in Company-hosted Open Source Software Projects: The Cases of PyTorch, TensorFlow, and Transformers

Companies, including market rivals, have long collaborated on the development of open source software (OSS), resulting in a tangle of co-operation and competition known as "open source co-opetition". While prior work investigates open source co-opetition in OSS projects that are hosted by vendor-neutral foundations, we have a limited understanding thereof in OSS projects that are hosted and governed by one company. Given their prevalence, it is timely to investigate open source co-opetition in such contexts. Towards this end, we conduct a mixed-methods analysis of three company-hosted OSS projects in the artificial intelligence (AI) industry: Meta's PyTorch (prior to its donation to the Linux Foundation), Google's TensorFlow, and Hugging Face's Transformers. We contribute three key findings. First, while the projects exhibit similar code authorship patterns between host and external companies (80%/20% of commits), collaborations are structured differently (e.g., decentralised vs. hub-and-spoke networks). Second, host and external companies engage in strategic, non-strategic, and contractual collaborations, with varying incentives and collaboration practices. Some of the observed collaborations are specific to the AI industry (e.g., hardware-software optimizations or AI model integrations), while others are typical of the broader software industry (e.g., bug fixing or task outsourcing). Third, single-vendor governance creates a power imbalance that influences open source co-opetition practices and possibilities, from the host company's singular decision-making power (e.g., the risk of license change) to their community involvement strategy (e.g., from over-control to over-delegation). We conclude with recommendations for future research.

  • 6 authors
·
Oct 23, 2024

Research on the Impact of Executive Shareholding on New Investment in Enterprises Based on Multivariable Linear Regression Model

Based on principal-agent theory and optimal contract theory, companies use the method of increasing executives' shareholding to stimulate collaborative innovation. However, from the aspect of agency costs between management and shareholders (i.e. the first type) and between major shareholders and minority shareholders (i.e. the second type), the interests of management, shareholders and creditors will be unbalanced with the change of the marginal utility of executive equity incentives.In order to establish the correlation between the proportion of shares held by executives and investments in corporate innovation, we have chosen a range of publicly listed companies within China's A-share market as the focus of our study. Employing a multi-variable linear regression model, we aim to analyze this relationship thoroughly.The following models were developed: (1) the impact model of executive shareholding on corporate innovation investment; (2) the impact model of executive shareholding on two types of agency costs; (3)The model is employed to examine the mediating influence of the two categories of agency costs. Following both correlation and regression analyses, the findings confirm a meaningful and positive correlation between executives' shareholding and the augmentation of corporate innovation investments. Additionally, the results indicate that executive shareholding contributes to the reduction of the first type of agency cost, thereby fostering corporate innovation investment. However, simultaneously, it leads to an escalation in the second type of agency cost, thus impeding corporate innovation investment.

  • 10 authors
·
Sep 19, 2023