Daily Papers

Training capable Large Language Model (LLM) agents is critically bottlenecked by the high cost and static nature of real-world interaction data. We address this by introducing GenEnv, a framework that establishes a difficulty-aligned co-evolutionary game between an agent and a scalable, generative environment simulator. Unlike traditional methods that evolve models on static datasets, GenEnv instantiates a dataevolving: the simulator acts as a dynamic curriculum policy, continuously generating tasks specifically tailored to the agent's ``zone of proximal development''. This process is guided by a simple but effective α-Curriculum Reward, which aligns task difficulty with the agent's current capabilities. We evaluate GenEnv on five benchmarks, including API-Bank, ALFWorld, BFCL, Bamboogle, and TravelPlanner. Across these tasks, GenEnv improves agent performance by up to +40.3\% over 7B baselines and matches or exceeds the average performance of larger models. Compared to Gemini 2.5 Pro-based offline data augmentation, GenEnv achieves better performance while using 3.3times less data. By shifting from static supervision to adaptive simulation, GenEnv provides a data-efficient pathway for scaling agent capabilities.

Environmental and genetic mutations can transform the cells in a co-operating healthy tissue into an ecosystem of individualistic tumour cells that compete for space and resources. Various selection forces are responsible for driving the evolution of cells in a tumour towards more malignant and aggressive phenotypes that tend to have a fitness advantage over the older populations. Although the evolutionary nature of cancer has been recognised for more than three decades (ever since the seminal work of Nowell) it has been only recently that tools traditionally used by ecological and evolutionary researchers have been adopted to study the evolution of cancer phenotypes in populations of individuals capable of co-operation and competition. In this chapter we will describe game theory as an important tool to study the emergence of cell phenotypes in a tumour and will critically review some of its applications in cancer research. These applications demonstrate that game theory can be used to understand the dynamics of somatic cancer evolution and suggest new therapies in which this knowledge could be applied to gain some control over the evolution of the tumour.

Zero-shot coordination in cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) remains a significant challenge, which means effectively coordinating with a wide range of unseen partners. Previous algorithms have attempted to address this challenge by optimizing fixed objectives within a population to improve strategy or behaviour diversity. However, these approaches can result in a loss of learning and an inability to cooperate with certain strategies within the population, known as cooperative incompatibility. To address this issue, we propose the Cooperative Open-ended LEarning (COLE) framework, which constructs open-ended objectives in cooperative games with two players from the perspective of graph theory to assess and identify the cooperative ability of each strategy. We further specify the framework and propose a practical algorithm that leverages knowledge from game theory and graph theory. Furthermore, an analysis of the learning process of the algorithm shows that it can efficiently overcome cooperative incompatibility. The experimental results in the Overcooked game environment demonstrate that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art methods when coordinating with different-level partners. Our demo is available at https://sites.google.com/view/cole-2023.

Recently, evolutionary reinforcement learning has obtained much attention in various domains. Maintaining a population of actors, evolutionary reinforcement learning utilises the collected experiences to improve the behaviour policy through efficient exploration. However, the poor scalability of genetic operators limits the efficiency of optimising high-dimensional neural networks. To address this issue, this paper proposes a novel cooperative coevolutionary reinforcement learning (CoERL) algorithm. Inspired by cooperative coevolution, CoERL periodically and adaptively decomposes the policy optimisation problem into multiple subproblems and evolves a population of neural networks for each of the subproblems. Instead of using genetic operators, CoERL directly searches for partial gradients to update the policy. Updating policy with partial gradients maintains consistency between the behaviour spaces of parents and offspring across generations. The experiences collected by the population are then used to improve the entire policy, which enhances the sampling efficiency. Experiments on six benchmark locomotion tasks demonstrate that CoERL outperforms seven state-of-the-art algorithms and baselines. Ablation study verifies the unique contribution of CoERL's core ingredients.

Recent research in Cooperative Coevolution~(CC) have achieved promising progress in solving large-scale global optimization problems. However, existing CC paradigms have a primary limitation in that they require deep expertise for selecting or designing effective variable decomposition strategies. Inspired by advancements in Meta-Black-Box Optimization, this paper introduces LCC, a pioneering learning-based cooperative coevolution framework that dynamically schedules decomposition strategies during optimization processes. The decomposition strategy selector is parameterized through a neural network, which processes a meticulously crafted set of optimization status features to determine the optimal strategy for each optimization step. The network is trained via the Proximal Policy Optimization method in a reinforcement learning manner across a collection of representative problems, aiming to maximize the expected optimization performance. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that LCC not only offers certain advantages over state-of-the-art baselines in terms of optimization effectiveness and resource consumption, but it also exhibits promising transferability towards unseen problems.

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

Achieving cooperation among self-interested agents remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Recent work showed that mutual cooperation can be induced between "learning-aware" agents that account for and shape the learning dynamics of their co-players. However, existing approaches typically rely on hardcoded, often inconsistent, assumptions about co-player learning rules or enforce a strict separation between "naive learners" updating on fast timescales and "meta-learners" observing these updates. Here, we demonstrate that the in-context learning capabilities of sequence models allow for co-player learning awareness without requiring hardcoded assumptions or explicit timescale separation. We show that training sequence model agents against a diverse distribution of co-players naturally induces in-context best-response strategies, effectively functioning as learning algorithms on the fast intra-episode timescale. We find that the cooperative mechanism identified in prior work-where vulnerability to extortion drives mutual shaping-emerges naturally in this setting: in-context adaptation renders agents vulnerable to extortion, and the resulting mutual pressure to shape the opponent's in-context learning dynamics resolves into the learning of cooperative behavior. Our results suggest that standard decentralized reinforcement learning on sequence models combined with co-player diversity provides a scalable path to learning cooperative behaviors.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

Self-evolution is a central research topic in enabling large language model (LLM)-based agents to continually improve their capabilities after pretraining. Recent research has witnessed a transition from reinforcement learning (RL)-free to RL-based methods. Current RL-based methods either rely on dense external reward signals or extract intrinsic reward signals from LLMs themselves. However, these approaches diverge from the self-evolution mechanisms observed in human intelligence, where individuals learn and improve through mutual discussion and collaboration. In this work, we introduce Co-Evolving Multi-Agent Systems (CoMAS), a novel framework that enables agents to improve autonomously by learning from inter-agent interactions without external supervision. CoMAS generates intrinsic rewards from rich discussion dynamics, employs an LLM-as-a-judge mechanism to formulate these rewards, and optimizes each agent's policy through RL, thereby enabling decentralized and scalable co-evolution. Experimental results demonstrate that CoMAS consistently outperforms untrained agents and achieves state-of-the-art performance across most evaluation settings. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of interaction-based reward signals and reveal promising scalability as the number and diversity of agents increase. These findings establish CoMAS as a novel and effective paradigm for self-evolution in LLM-based agents.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning has recently shown great promise as an approach to networked system control. Arguably, one of the most difficult and important tasks for which large scale networked system control is applicable is common-pool resource management. Crucial common-pool resources include arable land, fresh water, wetlands, wildlife, fish stock, forests and the atmosphere, of which proper management is related to some of society's greatest challenges such as food security, inequality and climate change. Here we take inspiration from a recent research program investigating the game-theoretic incentives of humans in social dilemma situations such as the well-known tragedy of the commons. However, instead of focusing on biologically evolved human-like agents, our concern is rather to better understand the learning and operating behaviour of engineered networked systems comprising general-purpose reinforcement learning agents, subject only to nonbiological constraints such as memory, computation and communication bandwidth. Harnessing tools from empirical game-theoretic analysis, we analyse the differences in resulting solution concepts that stem from employing different information structures in the design of networked multi-agent systems. These information structures pertain to the type of information shared between agents as well as the employed communication protocol and network topology. Our analysis contributes new insights into the consequences associated with certain design choices and provides an additional dimension of comparison between systems beyond efficiency, robustness, scalability and mean control performance.

Much of the advancement of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) in imperfect-information games has historically depended on manual iterative refinement of baselines. While foundational families like Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) and Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) rest on solid theoretical ground, the design of their most effective variants often relies on human intuition to navigate a vast algorithmic design space. In this work, we propose the use of AlphaEvolve, an evolutionary coding agent powered by large language models, to automatically discover new multiagent learning algorithms. We demonstrate the generality of this framework by evolving novel variants for two distinct paradigms of game-theoretic learning. First, in the domain of iterative regret minimization, we evolve the logic governing regret accumulation and policy derivation, discovering a new algorithm, Volatility-Adaptive Discounted (VAD-)CFR. VAD-CFR employs novel, non-intuitive mechanisms-including volatility-sensitive discounting, consistency-enforced optimism, and a hard warm-start policy accumulation schedule-to outperform state-of-the-art baselines like Discounted Predictive CFR+. Second, in the regime of population based training algorithms, we evolve training-time and evaluation-time meta strategy solvers for PSRO, discovering a new variant, Smoothed Hybrid Optimistic Regret (SHOR-)PSRO. SHOR-PSRO introduces a hybrid meta-solver that linearly blends Optimistic Regret Matching with a smoothed, temperature-controlled distribution over best pure strategies. By dynamically annealing this blending factor and diversity bonuses during training, the algorithm automates the transition from population diversity to rigorous equilibrium finding, yielding superior empirical convergence compared to standard static meta-solvers.

Cooperation in multi-agent learning (MAL) is a topic at the intersection of numerous disciplines, including game theory, economics, social sciences, and evolutionary biology. Research in this area aims to understand both how agents can coordinate effectively when goals are aligned and how they may cooperate in settings where gains from working together are possible but possibilities for conflict abound. In this paper we provide an overview of the fundamental concepts, problem settings and algorithms of multi-agent learning. This encompasses reinforcement learning, multi-agent sequential decision-making, challenges associated with multi-agent cooperation, and a comprehensive review of recent progress, along with an evaluation of relevant metrics. Finally we discuss open challenges in the field with the aim of inspiring new avenues for research.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being used to evolve solutions to problems in many domains, in a process inspired by biological evolution. However, unlike biological evolution, most LLM-evolution frameworks are formulated as static optimization problems, overlooking the open-ended adversarial dynamics that characterize real-world evolutionary processes. Here, we study Digital Red Queen (DRQ), a simple self-play algorithm that embraces these so-called "Red Queen" dynamics via continual adaptation to a changing objective. DRQ uses an LLM to evolve assembly-like programs, called warriors, which compete against each other for control of a virtual machine in the game of Core War, a Turing-complete environment studied in artificial life and connected to cybersecurity. In each round of DRQ, the model evolves a new warrior to defeat all previous ones, producing a sequence of adapted warriors. Over many rounds, we observe that warriors become increasingly general (relative to a set of held-out human warriors). Interestingly, warriors also become less behaviorally diverse across independent runs, indicating a convergence pressure toward a general-purpose behavioral strategy, much like convergent evolution in nature. This result highlights a potential value of shifting from static objectives to dynamic Red Queen objectives. Our work positions Core War as a rich, controllable sandbox for studying adversarial adaptation in artificial systems and for evaluating LLM-based evolution methods. More broadly, the simplicity and effectiveness of DRQ suggest that similarly minimal self-play approaches could prove useful in other more practical multi-agent adversarial domains, like real-world cybersecurity or combating drug resistance.

How have individuals of social animals in nature evolved to learn from each other, and what would be the optimal strategy for such learning in a specific environment? Here, we address both problems by employing a deep reinforcement learning model to optimize the social learning strategies (SLSs) of agents in a cooperative game in a multi-dimensional landscape. Throughout the training for maximizing the overall payoff, we find that the agent spontaneously learns various concepts of social learning, such as copying, focusing on frequent and well-performing neighbors, self-comparison, and the importance of balancing between individual and social learning, without any explicit guidance or prior knowledge about the system. The SLS from a fully trained agent outperforms all of the traditional, baseline SLSs in terms of mean payoff. We demonstrate the superior performance of the reinforcement learning agent in various environments, including temporally changing environments and real social networks, which also verifies the adaptability of our framework to different social settings.

A growing body of multi-agent studies with LLMs explores how norms and cooperation emerge in mixed-motive scenarios, where pursuing individual gain can undermine the collective good. While prior work has explored these dynamics in both richly contextualized simulations and simplified game-theoretic environments, most LLM systems featuring common-pool resource (CPR) games provide agents with explicit reward functions directly tied to their actions. In contrast, human cooperation often emerges without explicit knowledge of the payoff structure or how individual actions translate into long-run outcomes, relying instead on heuristics, communication, and enforcement. We introduce a CPR simulation framework that removes explicit reward signals and embeds cultural-evolutionary mechanisms: social learning (adopting strategies and beliefs from successful peers) and norm-based punishment, grounded in Ostrom's principles of resource governance. Agents also individually learn from the consequences of harvesting, monitoring, and punishing via environmental feedback, enabling norms to emerge endogenously. We establish the validity of our simulation by reproducing key findings from existing studies on human behavior. Building on this, we examine norm evolution across a 2times2 grid of environmental and social initialisations (resource-rich vs. resource-scarce; altruistic vs. selfish) and benchmark how agentic societies comprised of different LLMs perform under these conditions. Our results reveal systematic model differences in sustaining cooperation and norm formation, positioning the framework as a rigorous testbed for studying emergent norms in mixed-motive LLM societies. Such analysis can inform the design of AI systems deployed in social and organizational contexts, where alignment with cooperative norms is critical for stability, fairness, and effective governance of AI-mediated environments.

Recent work such as AlphaEvolve has shown that combining LLM-driven optimization with evolutionary search can effectively improve programs, prompts, and algorithms across domains. In this paradigm, previously evaluated solutions are reused to guide the model toward new candidate solutions. Crucially, the effectiveness of this evolution process depends on the search strategy: how prior solutions are selected and varied to generate new candidates. However, most existing methods rely on fixed search strategies with predefined knobs (e.g., explore-exploit ratios) that remain static throughout execution. While effective in some settings, these approaches often fail to adapt across tasks, or even within the same task as the search space changes over time. We introduce EvoX, an adaptive evolution method that optimizes its own evolution process. EvoX jointly evolves candidate solutions and the search strategies used to generate them, continuously updating how prior solutions are selected and varied based on progress. This enables the system to dynamically shift between different search strategies during the optimization process. Across nearly 200 real-world optimization tasks, EvoX outperforms existing AI-driven evolutionary methods including AlphaEvolve, OpenEvolve, GEPA, and ShinkaEvolve on the majority of tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

The evolution of large language models (LLMs) toward artificial superhuman intelligence (ASI) hinges on data reproduction, a cyclical process in which models generate, curate and retrain on novel data to refine capabilities. Current methods, however, risk getting stuck in a data reproduction trap: optimizing outputs within fixed human-generated distributions in a closed loop leads to stagnation, as models merely recombine existing knowledge rather than explore new frontiers. In this paper, we propose language games as a pathway to expanded data reproduction, breaking this cycle through three mechanisms: (1) role fluidity, which enhances data diversity and coverage by enabling multi-agent systems to dynamically shift roles across tasks; (2) reward variety, embedding multiple feedback criteria that can drive complex intelligent behaviors; and (3) rule plasticity, iteratively evolving interaction constraints to foster learnability, thereby injecting continual novelty. By scaling language games into global sociotechnical ecosystems, human-AI co-evolution generates unbounded data streams that drive open-ended exploration. This framework redefines data reproduction not as a closed loop but as an engine for superhuman intelligence.

Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-humans. In the natural world, direct punishment is often strongly coupled with partner selection and reputation and used in conjunction with third-party punishment. The interactions between these mechanisms could potentially enhance the emergence of cooperation within populations. However, no previous work has evaluated the learning dynamics and outcomes emerging from Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) populations that combine these mechanisms. This paper addresses this gap. It presents a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the behaviors and learning dynamics associated with direct punishment, third-party punishment, partner selection, and reputation. Finally, we discuss the implications of using these mechanisms on the design of cooperative AI systems.

Morphology-control co-design concerns the coupled optimization of an agent's body structure and control policy. This problem exhibits a bi-level structure, where the control dynamically adapts to the morphology to maximize performance. Existing methods typically neglect the control's adaptation dynamics by adopting a single-level formulation that treats the control policy as fixed when optimizing morphology. This can lead to inefficient optimization, as morphology updates may be misaligned with control adaptation. In this paper, we revisit the co-design problem from a game-theoretic perspective, modeling the intrinsic coupling between morphology and control as a novel variant of a Stackelberg game. We propose Stackelberg Proximal Policy Optimization (Stackelberg PPO), which explicitly incorporates the control's adaptation dynamics into morphology optimization. By modeling this intrinsic coupling, our method aligns morphology updates with control adaptation, thereby stabilizing training and improving learning efficiency. Experiments across diverse co-design tasks demonstrate that Stackelberg PPO outperforms standard PPO in both stability and final performance, opening the way for dramatically more efficient robotics designs.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the behaviors that agents learn in a single Markov Game (MG) are typically confined to the given agent number. Every single MG induced by varying the population may possess distinct optimal joint strategies and game-specific knowledge, which are modeled independently in modern multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms. In this work, our focus is on creating agents that can generalize across population-varying MGs. Instead of learning a unimodal policy, each agent learns a policy set comprising effective strategies across a variety of games. To achieve this, we propose Meta Representations for Agents (MRA) that explicitly models the game-common and game-specific strategic knowledge. By representing the policy sets with multi-modal latent policies, the game-common strategic knowledge and diverse strategic modes are discovered through an iterative optimization procedure. We prove that by approximately maximizing the resulting constrained mutual information objective, the policies can reach Nash Equilibrium in every evaluation MG when the latent space is sufficiently large. When deploying MRA in practical settings with limited latent space sizes, fast adaptation can be achieved by leveraging the first-order gradient information. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of MRA in improving training performance and generalization ability in challenging evaluation games.

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

Large language models (LLMs) provide a compelling foundation for building generally-capable AI agents. These agents may soon be deployed at scale in the real world, representing the interests of individual humans (e.g., AI assistants) or groups of humans (e.g., AI-accelerated corporations). At present, relatively little is known about the dynamics of multiple LLM agents interacting over many generations of iterative deployment. In this paper, we examine whether a "society" of LLM agents can learn mutually beneficial social norms in the face of incentives to defect, a distinctive feature of human sociality that is arguably crucial to the success of civilization. In particular, we study the evolution of indirect reciprocity across generations of LLM agents playing a classic iterated Donor Game in which agents can observe the recent behavior of their peers. We find that the evolution of cooperation differs markedly across base models, with societies of Claude 3.5 Sonnet agents achieving significantly higher average scores than Gemini 1.5 Flash, which, in turn, outperforms GPT-4o. Further, Claude 3.5 Sonnet can make use of an additional mechanism for costly punishment to achieve yet higher scores, while Gemini 1.5 Flash and GPT-4o fail to do so. For each model class, we also observe variation in emergent behavior across random seeds, suggesting an understudied sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We suggest that our evaluation regime could inspire an inexpensive and informative new class of LLM benchmarks, focussed on the implications of LLM agent deployment for the cooperative infrastructure of society.

In various real-world scenarios, interactions among agents often resemble the dynamics of general-sum games, where each agent strives to optimize its own utility. Despite the ubiquitous relevance of such settings, decentralized machine learning algorithms have struggled to find equilibria that maximize individual utility while preserving social welfare. In this paper we introduce Learning with Opponent Q-Learning Awareness (LOQA), a novel, decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm tailored to optimizing an agent's individual utility while fostering cooperation among adversaries in partially competitive environments. LOQA assumes the opponent samples actions proportionally to their action-value function Q. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LOQA at achieving state-of-the-art performance in benchmark scenarios such as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Coin Game. LOQA achieves these outcomes with a significantly reduced computational footprint, making it a promising approach for practical multi-agent applications.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

Evolutionary Reinforcement Learning (ERL), which integrates Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) for optimization, has demonstrated remarkable performance advancements. By fusing both approaches, ERL has emerged as a promising research direction. This survey offers a comprehensive overview of the diverse research branches in ERL. Specifically, we systematically summarize recent advancements in related algorithms and identify three primary research directions: EA-assisted Optimization of RL, RL-assisted Optimization of EA, and synergistic optimization of EA and RL. Following that, we conduct an in-depth analysis of each research direction, organizing multiple research branches. We elucidate the problems that each branch aims to tackle and how the integration of EAs and RL addresses these challenges. In conclusion, we discuss potential challenges and prospective future research directions across various research directions. To facilitate researchers in delving into ERL, we organize the algorithms and codes involved on https://github.com/yeshenpy/Awesome-Evolutionary-Reinforcement-Learning.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.

Standard game theory explains cooperation in repeated games through conditional strategies such as Tit-for-Tat (TfT), but these require continuous computation that imposes physical costs on embodied agents. We propose a three-layer Body-Reservoir Governance (BRG) architecture: (1) a body reservoir (echo state network) whose d-dimensional state performs implicit inference over interaction history, serving as both decision-maker and anomaly detector, (2) a cognitive filter providing costly strategic tools activated on demand, and (3) a metacognitive governance layer with receptivity parameter αin [0,1]. At full body governance (α=1), closed-loop dynamics satisfy a self-consistency equation: cooperation is expressed as the reservoir's fixed point, not computed. Strategy complexity cost is defined as the KL divergence between the reservoir's state distribution and its habituated baseline. Body governance reduces this cost, with action variance decreasing up to 1600times with dimension d. A dynamic sentinel generates a composite discomfort signal from the reservoir's own state, driving adaptive α(t): near baseline during cooperation, rapidly dropping upon defection to activate cognitive retaliation. Overriding the body incurs thermodynamic cost proportional to internal state distortion. The sentinel achieves the highest payoff across all conditions, outperforming static body governance, TfT, and EMA baselines. A dimension sweep (d in {5,ldots,100}) shows implicit inference scales with bodily richness (23times to 1600times variance reduction), attributable to reservoir dynamics. A phase diagram in (d, τ_{env}) space reveals governance regime transitions near d approx 20. The framework reinterprets cooperation as the minimum-dissipation response of an adapted dynamical system -- emergent from embodied dynamics rather than computed.

Conventional language model (LM) safety alignment relies on a reactive, disjoint procedure: attackers exploit a static model, followed by defensive fine-tuning to patch exposed vulnerabilities. This sequential approach creates a mismatch -- attackers overfit to obsolete defenses, while defenders perpetually lag behind emerging threats. To address this, we propose Self-RedTeam, an online self-play reinforcement learning algorithm where an attacker and defender agent co-evolve through continuous interaction. We cast safety alignment as a two-player zero-sum game, where a single model alternates between attacker and defender roles -- generating adversarial prompts and safeguarding against them -- while a reward LM adjudicates outcomes. This enables dynamic co-adaptation. Grounded in the game-theoretic framework of zero-sum games, we establish a theoretical safety guarantee which motivates the design of our method: if self-play converges to a Nash Equilibrium, the defender will reliably produce safe responses to any adversarial input. Empirically, Self-RedTeam uncovers more diverse attacks (+21.8% SBERT) compared to attackers trained against static defenders and achieves higher robustness on safety benchmarks (e.g., +65.5% on WildJailBreak) than defenders trained against static attackers. We further propose hidden Chain-of-Thought, allowing agents to plan privately, which boosts adversarial diversity and reduces over-refusals. Our results motivate a shift from reactive patching to proactive co-evolution in LM safety training, enabling scalable, autonomous, and robust self-improvement of LMs via multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL).

Coordinating multiple large language models (LLMs) to solve complex tasks collaboratively poses a fundamental trade-off between the computation costs and collective performance compared with individual model. We introduce a novel, game-theoretically grounded reinforcement learning (RL) framework, the Multi-Agent Cooperation Sequential Public Goods Game (MAC-SPGG), to systematically incentivize cooperation in multi-LLM ensembles. In MAC-SPGG, LLM agents move in sequence, observing predecessors' outputs and updating beliefs to condition their own contributions. By redesigning the public-goods reward, effortful contributions become the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), which eliminates free-riding under traditional SPGG or PGG. Its sequential protocol replaces costly round-based information exchanges with a streamlined decision flow, cutting communication overhead while retaining strategic depth. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the SPNE under realistic parameters, and empirically show that MAC-SPGG-trained ensembles outperform single-agent baselines, chain-of-thought prompting, and other cooperative methods, even achieving comparable performance to large-scale models across reasoning, math, code generation, and NLP tasks. Our results highlight the power of structured, incentive-aligned MAC-SPGG cooperation for scalable and robust multi-agent language generation.

Both the design and control of a robot play equally important roles in its task performance. However, while optimal control is well studied in the machine learning and robotics community, less attention is placed on finding the optimal robot design. This is mainly because co-optimizing design and control in robotics is characterized as a challenging problem, and more importantly, a comprehensive evaluation benchmark for co-optimization does not exist. In this paper, we propose Evolution Gym, the first large-scale benchmark for co-optimizing the design and control of soft robots. In our benchmark, each robot is composed of different types of voxels (e.g., soft, rigid, actuators), resulting in a modular and expressive robot design space. Our benchmark environments span a wide range of tasks, including locomotion on various types of terrains and manipulation. Furthermore, we develop several robot co-evolution algorithms by combining state-of-the-art design optimization methods and deep reinforcement learning techniques. Evaluating the algorithms on our benchmark platform, we observe robots exhibiting increasingly complex behaviors as evolution progresses, with the best evolved designs solving many of our proposed tasks. Additionally, even though robot designs are evolved autonomously from scratch without prior knowledge, they often grow to resemble existing natural creatures while outperforming hand-designed robots. Nevertheless, all tested algorithms fail to find robots that succeed in our hardest environments. This suggests that more advanced algorithms are required to explore the high-dimensional design space and evolve increasingly intelligent robots -- an area of research in which we hope Evolution Gym will accelerate progress. Our website with code, environments, documentation, and tutorials is available at http://evogym.csail.mit.edu.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

Recent advances in large language models have sparked growing interest in AI agents capable of solving complex, real-world tasks. However, most existing agent systems rely on manually crafted configurations that remain static after deployment, limiting their ability to adapt to dynamic and evolving environments. To this end, recent research has explored agent evolution techniques that aim to automatically enhance agent systems based on interaction data and environmental feedback. This emerging direction lays the foundation for self-evolving AI agents, which bridge the static capabilities of foundation models with the continuous adaptability required by lifelong agentic systems. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive review of existing techniques for self-evolving agentic systems. Specifically, we first introduce a unified conceptual framework that abstracts the feedback loop underlying the design of self-evolving agentic systems. The framework highlights four key components: System Inputs, Agent System, Environment, and Optimisers, serving as a foundation for understanding and comparing different strategies. Based on this framework, we systematically review a wide range of self-evolving techniques that target different components of the agent system. We also investigate domain-specific evolution strategies developed for specialised fields such as biomedicine, programming, and finance, where optimisation objectives are tightly coupled with domain constraints. In addition, we provide a dedicated discussion on the evaluation, safety, and ethical considerations for self-evolving agentic systems, which are critical to ensuring their effectiveness and reliability. This survey aims to provide researchers and practitioners with a systematic understanding of self-evolving AI agents, laying the foundation for the development of more adaptive, autonomous, and lifelong agentic systems.

Conventional federated learning frameworks suffer from several challenges including performance bottlenecks at the central aggregation server, data bias, poor model convergence, and exposure to model poisoning attacks, and limited trust in the centralized infrastructure. In the current paper, a novel game theory-based approach called pFedGame is proposed for decentralized federated learning, best suitable for temporally dynamic networks. The proposed algorithm works without any centralized server for aggregation and incorporates the problem of vanishing gradients and poor convergence over temporally dynamic topology among federated learning participants. The solution comprises two sequential steps in every federated learning round, for every participant. First, it selects suitable peers for collaboration in federated learning. Secondly, it executes a two-player constant sum cooperative game to reach convergence by applying an optimal federated learning aggregation strategy. Experiments performed to assess the performance of pFedGame in comparison to existing methods in decentralized federated learning have shown promising results with accuracy higher than 70% for heterogeneous data.

This paper introduces Alympics (Olympics for Agents), a systematic simulation framework utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) agents for game theory research. Alympics creates a versatile platform for studying complex game theory problems, bridging the gap between theoretical game theory and empirical investigations by providing a controlled environment for simulating human-like strategic interactions with LLM agents. In our pilot case study, the "Water Allocation Challenge," we explore Alympics through a challenging strategic game focused on the multi-round auction on scarce survival resources. This study demonstrates the framework's ability to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze game determinants, strategies, and outcomes. Additionally, we conduct a comprehensive human assessment and an in-depth evaluation of LLM agents in strategic decision-making scenarios. Our findings not only expand the understanding of LLM agents' proficiency in emulating human strategic behavior but also highlight their potential in advancing game theory knowledge, thereby enriching our understanding of both game theory and empowering further research into strategic decision-making domains with LLM agents. Codes, prompts, and all related resources are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Alympics.

The emergence of complex life on Earth is often attributed to the arms race that ensued from a huge number of organisms all competing for finite resources. We present an artificial intelligence research environment, inspired by the human game genre of MMORPGs (Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games, a.k.a. MMOs), that aims to simulate this setting in microcosm. As with MMORPGs and the real world alike, our environment is persistent and supports a large and variable number of agents. Our environment is well suited to the study of large-scale multiagent interaction: it requires that agents learn robust combat and navigation policies in the presence of large populations attempting to do the same. Baseline experiments reveal that population size magnifies and incentivizes the development of skillful behaviors and results in agents that outcompete agents trained in smaller populations. We further show that the policies of agents with unshared weights naturally diverge to fill different niches in order to avoid competition.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has significantly enhanced the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but its reliance on expensive human-labeled data or complex reward models severely limits scalability. While existing self-feedback methods aim to address this problem, they are constrained by the capabilities of a single model, which can lead to overconfidence in incorrect answers, reward hacking, and even training collapse. To this end, we propose Reinforcement Learning from Coevolutionary Collective Feedback (RLCCF), a novel RL framework that enables multi-model collaborative evolution without external supervision. Specifically, RLCCF optimizes the ability of a model collective by maximizing its Collective Consistency (CC), which jointly trains a diverse ensemble of LLMs and provides reward signals by voting on collective outputs. Moreover, each model's vote is weighted by its Self-Consistency (SC) score, ensuring that more confident models contribute more to the collective decision. Benefiting from the diverse output distributions and complementary abilities of multiple LLMs, RLCCF enables the model collective to continuously enhance its reasoning ability through coevolution. Experiments on four mainstream open-source LLMs across four mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our framework yields significant performance gains, achieving an average relative improvement of 16.72\% in accuracy. Notably, RLCCF not only improves the performance of individual models but also enhances the group's majority-voting accuracy by 4.51\%, demonstrating its ability to extend the collective capability boundary of the model collective.

Real-world multi-agent scenarios often involve mixed motives, demanding altruistic agents capable of self-protection against potential exploitation. However, existing approaches often struggle to achieve both objectives. In this paper, based on that empathic responses are modulated by inferred social relationships between agents, we propose LASE Learning to balance Altruism and Self-interest based on Empathy), a distributed multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm that fosters altruistic cooperation through gifting while avoiding exploitation by other agents in mixed-motive games. LASE allocates a portion of its rewards to co-players as gifts, with this allocation adapting dynamically based on the social relationship -- a metric evaluating the friendliness of co-players estimated by counterfactual reasoning. In particular, social relationship measures each co-player by comparing the estimated Q-function of current joint action to a counterfactual baseline which marginalizes the co-player's action, with its action distribution inferred by a perspective-taking module. Comprehensive experiments are performed in spatially and temporally extended mixed-motive games, demonstrating LASE's ability to promote group collaboration without compromising fairness and its capacity to adapt policies to various types of interactive co-players.

Scientific knowledge creation is fundamentally transforming as humans and AI systems evolve beyond tool-user relationships into co-evolutionary epistemic partnerships. When AlphaFold revolutionized protein structure prediction, researchers described engaging with an epistemic partner that reshaped how they conceptualized fundamental relationships. This article introduces Cognitio Emergens (CE), a framework addressing critical limitations in existing models that focus on static roles or narrow metrics while failing to capture how scientific understanding emerges through recursive human-AI interaction over time. CE integrates three components addressing these limitations: Agency Configurations describing how authority distributes between humans and AI (Directed, Contributory, Partnership), with partnerships dynamically oscillating between configurations rather than following linear progression; Epistemic Dimensions capturing six specific capabilities emerging through collaboration across Discovery, Integration, and Projection axes, creating distinctive "capability signatures" that guide development; and Partnership Dynamics identifying forces shaping how these relationships evolve, particularly the risk of epistemic alienation where researchers lose interpretive control over knowledge they formally endorse. Drawing from autopoiesis theory, social systems theory, and organizational modularity, CE reveals how knowledge co-creation emerges through continuous negotiation of roles, values, and organizational structures. By reconceptualizing human-AI scientific collaboration as fundamentally co-evolutionary, CE offers a balanced perspective that neither uncritically celebrates nor unnecessarily fears AI's evolving role, instead providing conceptual tools for cultivating partnerships that maintain meaningful human participation while enabling transformative scientific breakthroughs.

We explore the use of Evolution Strategies (ES), a class of black box optimization algorithms, as an alternative to popular MDP-based RL techniques such as Q-learning and Policy Gradients. Experiments on MuJoCo and Atari show that ES is a viable solution strategy that scales extremely well with the number of CPUs available: By using a novel communication strategy based on common random numbers, our ES implementation only needs to communicate scalars, making it possible to scale to over a thousand parallel workers. This allows us to solve 3D humanoid walking in 10 minutes and obtain competitive results on most Atari games after one hour of training. In addition, we highlight several advantages of ES as a black box optimization technique: it is invariant to action frequency and delayed rewards, tolerant of extremely long horizons, and does not need temporal discounting or value function approximation.

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

Emergent cooperation in classical Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning has gained significant attention, particularly in the context of Sequential Social Dilemmas (SSDs). While classical reinforcement learning approaches have demonstrated capability for emergent cooperation, research on extending these methods to Quantum Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning remains limited, particularly through communication. In this paper, we apply communication approaches to quantum Q-Learning agents: the Mutual Acknowledgment Token Exchange (MATE) protocol, its extension Mutually Endorsed Distributed Incentive Acknowledgment Token Exchange (MEDIATE), the peer rewarding mechanism Gifting, and Reinforced Inter-Agent Learning (RIAL). We evaluate these approaches in three SSDs: the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Iterated Stag Hunt, and Iterated Game of Chicken. Our experimental results show that approaches using MATE with temporal-difference measure (MATETD), AutoMATE, MEDIATE-I, and MEDIATE-S achieved high cooperation levels across all dilemmas, demonstrating that communication is a viable mechanism for fostering emergent cooperation in Quantum Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning.

Self-play, characterized by agents' interactions with copies or past versions of itself, has recently gained prominence in reinforcement learning. This paper first clarifies the preliminaries of self-play, including the multi-agent reinforcement learning framework and basic game theory concepts. Then it provides a unified framework and classifies existing self-play algorithms within this framework. Moreover, the paper bridges the gap between the algorithms and their practical implications by illustrating the role of self-play in different scenarios. Finally, the survey highlights open challenges and future research directions in self-play. This paper is an essential guide map for understanding the multifaceted landscape of self-play in RL.

Game-playing agents like AlphaGo have achieved superhuman performance through self-play, which is theoretically guaranteed to yield optimal policies in competitive games. However, most language tasks are partially or fully cooperative, so it is an open question whether techniques like self-play can effectively be used to improve language models. We empirically investigate this question in a negotiation game setting known as Deal or No Deal (DoND). Crucially, the objective in DoND can be modified to produce a fully cooperative game, a strictly competitive one, or anything in between. We finetune language models in self-play over multiple rounds of filtered behavior cloning in DoND for each of these objectives. Contrary to expectations, we find that language model self-play leads to significant performance gains in both cooperation and competition with humans, suggesting that self-play and related techniques have promise despite a lack of theoretical guarantees.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

Maintaining genetic diversity as a means to avoid premature convergence is critical in Genetic Programming. Several approaches have been proposed to achieve this, with some focusing on the mating phase from coupling dissimilar solutions to some form of self-adaptive selection mechanism. In nature, genetic diversity can be the consequence of many different factors, but when considering reproduction Sexual Selection can have an impact on promoting variety within a species. Specifically, Mate Choice often results in different selective pressures between sexes, which in turn may trigger evolutionary differences among them. Although some mechanisms of Sexual Selection have been applied to Genetic Programming in the past, the literature is scarce when it comes to mate choice. Recently, a way of modelling mating preferences by ideal mate representations was proposed, achieving good results when compared to a standard approach. These mating preferences evolve freely in a self-adaptive fashion, creating an evolutionary driving force of its own alongside fitness pressure. The inner mechanisms of this approach operate from personal choice, as each individual has its own representation of a perfect mate which affects the mate to be selected. In this paper, we compare this method against a random mate choice to assess whether there are advantages in evolving personal preferences. We conducted experiments using three symbolic regression problems and different mutation rates. The results show that self-adaptive mating preferences are able to create a more diverse set of solutions when compared to the traditional approach and a random mate approach (with statistically significant differences) and have a higher success rate in three of the six instances tested.

Early cavemen relied on gestures, vocalizations, and simple signals to coordinate, plan, avoid predators, and share resources. Today, humans collaborate using complex languages to achieve remarkable results. What drives this evolution in communication? How does language emerge, adapt, and become vital for teamwork? Understanding the origins of language remains a challenge. A leading hypothesis in linguistics and anthropology posits that language evolved to meet the ecological and social demands of early human cooperation. Language did not arise in isolation, but through shared survival goals. Inspired by this view, we investigate the emergence of language in multi-agent Foraging Games. These environments are designed to reflect the cognitive and ecological constraints believed to have influenced the evolution of communication. Agents operate in a shared grid world with only partial knowledge about other agents and the environment, and must coordinate to complete games like picking up high-value targets or executing temporally ordered actions. Using end-to-end deep reinforcement learning, agents learn both actions and communication strategies from scratch. We find that agents develop communication protocols with hallmark features of natural language: arbitrariness, interchangeability, displacement, cultural transmission, and compositionality. We quantify each property and analyze how different factors, such as population size and temporal dependencies, shape specific aspects of the emergent language. Our framework serves as a platform for studying how language can evolve from partial observability, temporal reasoning, and cooperative goals in embodied multi-agent settings. We will release all data, code, and models publicly.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

In multi-agent tasks, the central challenge lies in the dynamic adaptation of strategies. However, directly conditioning on opponents' strategies is intractable in the prevalent deep reinforcement learning paradigm due to a fundamental ``representational bottleneck'': neural policies are opaque, high-dimensional parameter vectors that are incomprehensible to other agents. In this work, we propose a paradigm shift that bridges this gap by representing policies as human-interpretable source code and utilizing Large Language Models (LLMs) as approximate interpreters. This programmatic representation allows us to operationalize the game-theoretic concept of Program Equilibrium. We reformulate the learning problem by utilizing LLMs to perform optimization directly in the space of programmatic policies. The LLM functions as a point-wise best-response operator that iteratively synthesizes and refines the ego agent's policy code to respond to the opponent's strategy. We formalize this process as Programmatic Iterated Best Response (PIBR), an algorithm where the policy code is optimized by textual gradients, using structured feedback derived from game utility and runtime unit tests. We demonstrate that this approach effectively solves several standard coordination matrix games and a cooperative Level-Based Foraging environment.

Executing actions in a correlated manner is a common strategy for human coordination that often leads to better cooperation, which is also potentially beneficial for cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). However, the recent success of MARL relies heavily on the convenient paradigm of purely decentralized execution, where there is no action correlation among agents for scalability considerations. In this work, we introduce a Bayesian network to inaugurate correlations between agents' action selections in their joint policy. Theoretically, we establish a theoretical justification for why action dependencies are beneficial by deriving the multi-agent policy gradient formula under such a Bayesian network joint policy and proving its global convergence to Nash equilibria under tabular softmax policy parameterization in cooperative Markov games. Further, by equipping existing MARL algorithms with a recent method of differentiable directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), we develop practical algorithms to learn the context-aware Bayesian network policies in scenarios with partial observability and various difficulty. We also dynamically decrease the sparsity of the learned DAG throughout the training process, which leads to weakly or even purely independent policies for decentralized execution. Empirical results on a range of MARL benchmarks show the benefits of our approach.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning in dynamic social dilemmas commonly relies on parameter sharing to enable scalability. We show that in shared-policy Deep Q-Network learning, standard exploration can induce a robust and systematic collapse of cooperation even in environments where fully cooperative equilibria are stable and payoff dominant. Through controlled experiments, we demonstrate that shared DQN converges to stable but persistently low-cooperation regimes. This collapse is not caused by reward misalignment, noise, or insufficient training, but by a representational failure arising from partial observability combined with parameter coupling across heterogeneous agent states. Exploration-driven updates bias the shared representation toward locally dominant defection responses, which then propagate across agents and suppress cooperative learning. We confirm that the failure persists across network sizes, exploration schedules, and payoff structures, and disappears when parameter sharing is removed or when agents maintain independent representations. These results identify a fundamental failure mode of shared-policy MARL and establish structural conditions under which scalable learning architectures can systematically undermine cooperation. Our findings provide concrete guidance for the design of multi-agent learning systems in social and economic environments where collective behavior is critical.

In this paper, we tackle the problem of learning to play 3v3 multi-drone volleyball, a new embodied competitive task that requires both high-level strategic coordination and low-level agile control. The task is turn-based, multi-agent, and physically grounded, posing significant challenges due to its long-horizon dependencies, tight inter-agent coupling, and the underactuated dynamics of quadrotors. To address this, we propose Hierarchical Co-Self-Play (HCSP), a hierarchical reinforcement learning framework that separates centralized high-level strategic decision-making from decentralized low-level motion control. We design a three-stage population-based training pipeline to enable both strategy and skill to emerge from scratch without expert demonstrations: (I) training diverse low-level skills, (II) learning high-level strategy via self-play with fixed low-level skills, and (III) joint fine-tuning through co-self-play. Experiments show that HCSP achieves superior performance, outperforming non-hierarchical self-play and rule-based hierarchical baselines with an average 82.9% win rate and a 71.5% win rate against the two-stage variant. Moreover, co-self-play leads to emergent team behaviors such as role switching and coordinated formations, demonstrating the effectiveness of our hierarchical design and training scheme. The project page is at https://sites.google.com/view/hi-co-self-play.

In this work, our goal is to train agents that can coordinate with seen, unseen as well as human partners in a multi-agent communication environment involving natural language. Previous work using a single set of agents has shown great progress in generalizing to known partners, however it struggles when coordinating with unfamiliar agents. To mitigate that, recent work explored the use of population-based approaches, where multiple agents interact with each other with the goal of learning more generic protocols. These methods, while able to result in good coordination between unseen partners, still only achieve so in cases of simple languages, thus failing to adapt to human partners using natural language. We attribute this to the use of static populations and instead propose a dynamic population-based meta-learning approach that builds such a population in an iterative manner. We perform a holistic evaluation of our method on two different referential games, and show that our agents outperform all prior work when communicating with seen partners and humans. Furthermore, we analyze the natural language generation skills of our agents, where we find that our agents also outperform strong baselines. Finally, we test the robustness of our agents when communicating with out-of-population agents and carefully test the importance of each component of our method through ablation studies.

Traditional task-oriented dialog systems are unable to evolve from ongoing interactions or adapt to new domains after deployment, that is a critical limitation in real-world dynamic environments. Continual learning approaches depend on episodic retraining with human curated data, failing to achieve autonomy lifelong improvement. While evolutionary computation and LLM driven self improvement offer promising mechanisms for dialog optimization, they lack a unified framework for holistic, iterative strategy refinement. To bridge this gap, we propose DarwinTOD, a lifelong self evolving dialog framework that systematically integrates these two paradigms, enabling continuous strategy optimization from a zero-shot base without task specific fine-tuning. DarwinTOD maintains an Evolvable Strategy Bank and operates through a dual-loop process: online multi-agent dialog execution with peer critique, and offline structured evolutionary operations that refine the strategy bank using accumulated feedback. This closed-loop design enables autonomous continuous improvement without human intervention. Extensive experiments show that DarwinTOD surpasses previous state-of-the-art methods and exhibits continuous performance gains throughout evolution. Our work provides a novel framework for building dialog systems with lifelong self evolution capabilities.

Multi-agent football poses an unsolved challenge in AI research. Existing work has focused on tackling simplified scenarios of the game, or else leveraging expert demonstrations. In this paper, we develop a multi-agent system to play the full 11 vs. 11 game mode, without demonstrations. This game mode contains aspects that present major challenges to modern reinforcement learning algorithms; multi-agent coordination, long-term planning, and non-transitivity. To address these challenges, we present TiZero; a self-evolving, multi-agent system that learns from scratch. TiZero introduces several innovations, including adaptive curriculum learning, a novel self-play strategy, and an objective that optimizes the policies of multiple agents jointly. Experimentally, it outperforms previous systems by a large margin on the Google Research Football environment, increasing win rates by over 30%. To demonstrate the generality of TiZero's innovations, they are assessed on several environments beyond football; Overcooked, Multi-agent Particle-Environment, Tic-Tac-Toe and Connect-Four.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning (RL) heavily rely on a variety of well-designed benchmarks, which provide environmental platforms and consistent criteria to evaluate existing and novel algorithms. Specifically, in multi-agent RL (MARL), a plethora of benchmarks based on cooperative games have spurred the development of algorithms that improve the scalability of cooperative multi-agent systems. However, for the competitive setting, a lightweight and open-sourced benchmark with challenging gaming dynamics and visual inputs has not yet been established. In this work, we present FightLadder, a real-time fighting game platform, to empower competitive MARL research. Along with the platform, we provide implementations of state-of-the-art MARL algorithms for competitive games, as well as a set of evaluation metrics to characterize the performance and exploitability of agents. We demonstrate the feasibility of this platform by training a general agent that consistently defeats 12 built-in characters in single-player mode, and expose the difficulty of training a non-exploitable agent without human knowledge and demonstrations in two-player mode. FightLadder provides meticulously designed environments to address critical challenges in competitive MARL research, aiming to catalyze a new era of discovery and advancement in the field. Videos and code at https://sites.google.com/view/fightladder/home.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities but remain fundamentally static, unable to adapt their internal parameters to novel tasks, evolving knowledge domains, or dynamic interaction contexts. As LLMs are increasingly deployed in open-ended, interactive environments, this static nature has become a critical bottleneck, necessitating agents that can adaptively reason, act, and evolve in real time. This paradigm shift -- from scaling static models to developing self-evolving agents -- has sparked growing interest in architectures and methods enabling continual learning and adaptation from data, interactions, and experiences. This survey provides the first systematic and comprehensive review of self-evolving agents, organized around three foundational dimensions -- what to evolve, when to evolve, and how to evolve. We examine evolutionary mechanisms across agent components (e.g., models, memory, tools, architecture), categorize adaptation methods by stages (e.g., intra-test-time, inter-test-time), and analyze the algorithmic and architectural designs that guide evolutionary adaptation (e.g., scalar rewards, textual feedback, single-agent and multi-agent systems). Additionally, we analyze evaluation metrics and benchmarks tailored for self-evolving agents, highlight applications in domains such as coding, education, and healthcare, and identify critical challenges and research directions in safety, scalability, and co-evolutionary dynamics. By providing a structured framework for understanding and designing self-evolving agents, this survey establishes a roadmap for advancing adaptive agentic systems in both research and real-world deployments, ultimately shedding lights to pave the way for the realization of Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI), where agents evolve autonomously, performing at or beyond human-level intelligence across a wide array of tasks.

Learning in strategy games (e.g. StarCraft, poker) requires the discovery of diverse policies. This is often achieved by iteratively training new policies against existing ones, growing a policy population that is robust to exploit. This iterative approach suffers from two issues in real-world games: a) under finite budget, approximate best-response operators at each iteration needs truncating, resulting in under-trained good-responses populating the population; b) repeated learning of basic skills at each iteration is wasteful and becomes intractable in the presence of increasingly strong opponents. In this work, we propose Neural Population Learning (NeuPL) as a solution to both issues. NeuPL offers convergence guarantees to a population of best-responses under mild assumptions. By representing a population of policies within a single conditional model, NeuPL enables transfer learning across policies. Empirically, we show the generality, improved performance and efficiency of NeuPL across several test domains. Most interestingly, we show that novel strategies become more accessible, not less, as the neural population expands.

Evolvability is an important feature that impacts the ability of evolutionary processes to find interesting novel solutions and to deal with changing conditions of the problem to solve. The estimation of evolvability is not straightforward and is generally too expensive to be directly used as selective pressure in the evolutionary process. Indirectly promoting evolvability as a side effect of other easier and faster to compute selection pressures would thus be advantageous. In an unbounded behavior space, it has already been shown that evolvable individuals naturally appear and tend to be selected as they are more likely to invade empty behavior niches. Evolvability is thus a natural byproduct of the search in this context. However, practical agents and environments often impose limits on the reach-able behavior space. How do these boundaries impact evolvability? In this context, can evolvability still be promoted without explicitly rewarding it? We show that Novelty Search implicitly creates a pressure for high evolvability even in bounded behavior spaces, and explore the reasons for such a behavior. More precisely we show that, throughout the search, the dynamic evaluation of novelty rewards individuals which are very mobile in the behavior space, which in turn promotes evolvability.

Developing AI agents that can robustly adapt to dramatically different strategic landscapes without retraining is a central challenge for multi-agent learning. Pok\'emon Video Game Championships (VGC) is a domain with an extraordinarily large space of possible team configurations of approximately 10^{139} - far larger than those of Dota or Starcraft. The highly discrete, combinatorial nature of team building in Pok\'emon VGC causes optimal strategies to shift dramatically depending on both the team being piloted and the opponent's team, making generalization uniquely challenging. To advance research on this problem, we introduce VGC-Bench: a benchmark that provides critical infrastructure, standardizes evaluation protocols, and supplies human-play datasets and a range of baselines - from large-language-model agents and behavior cloning to reinforcement learning and empirical game-theoretic methods such as self-play, fictitious play, and double oracle. In the restricted setting where an agent is trained and evaluated on a single-team configuration, our methods are able to win against a professional VGC competitor. We extensively evaluated all baseline methods over progressively larger team sets and find that even the best-performing algorithm in the single-team setting struggles at scaling up as team size grows. Thus, policy generalization across diverse team strategies remains an open challenge for the community. Our code is open sourced at https://github.com/cameronangliss/VGC-Bench.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional reasoning capabilities, and co-evolving paradigms have shown promising results in domains such as code and math. However, in scientific reasoning tasks, these models remain fragile due to unreliable solution evaluation and limited diversity in verification strategies. In this work, we propose Sci-CoE, a two-stage scientific co-evolving framework that enables models to self-evolve as both solver and verifier through a transition from sparse supervision to unsupervised learning. In the first stage, the model uses a small set of annotated data to establish fundamental correctness judgment anchors for the Verifier. In the second stage, we introduce a geometric reward mechanism that jointly considers consensus, reliability, and diversity, driving large-scale self-iteration on unlabeled data. Experiments on several general scientific benchmarks demonstrate that Sci-CoE enhances complex reasoning capabilities and exhibits strong scalability, facilitating the construction of more robust and diverse evaluation systems. Codes are available at https://github.com/InternScience/Sci-CoE.

This study probes the vulnerabilities of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) under adversarial attacks, a critical determinant of c-MARL's worst-case performance prior to real-world implementation. Current observation-based attacks, constrained by white-box assumptions, overlook c-MARL's complex multi-agent interactions and cooperative objectives, resulting in impractical and limited attack capabilities. To address these shortcomes, we propose Adversarial Minority Influence (AMI), a practical and strong for c-MARL. AMI is a practical black-box attack and can be launched without knowing victim parameters. AMI is also strong by considering the complex multi-agent interaction and the cooperative goal of agents, enabling a single adversarial agent to unilaterally misleads majority victims to form targeted worst-case cooperation. This mirrors minority influence phenomena in social psychology. To achieve maximum deviation in victim policies under complex agent-wise interactions, our unilateral attack aims to characterize and maximize the impact of the adversary on the victims. This is achieved by adapting a unilateral agent-wise relation metric derived from mutual information, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of victim influence on the adversary. To lead the victims into a jointly detrimental scenario, our targeted attack deceives victims into a long-term, cooperatively harmful situation by guiding each victim towards a specific target, determined through a trial-and-error process executed by a reinforcement learning agent. Through AMI, we achieve the first successful attack against real-world robot swarms and effectively fool agents in simulated environments into collectively worst-case scenarios, including Starcraft II and Multi-agent Mujoco. The source code and demonstrations can be found at: https://github.com/DIG-Beihang/AMI.

Ensuring robust safety alignment is crucial for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet existing defenses often lag behind evolving adversarial attacks due to their reliance on static, pre-collected data distributions. In this paper, we introduce MAGIC, a novel multi-turn multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that formulates LLM safety alignment as an adversarial asymmetric game. Specifically, an attacker agent learns to iteratively rewrite original queries into deceptive prompts, while a defender agent simultaneously optimizes its policy to recognize and refuse such inputs. This dynamic process triggers a co-evolution, where the attacker's ever-changing strategies continuously uncover long-tail vulnerabilities, driving the defender to generalize to unseen attack patterns. Remarkably, we observe that the attacker, endowed with initial reasoning ability, evolves novel, previously unseen combinatorial strategies through iterative RL training, underscoring our method's substantial potential. Theoretically, we provide insights into a more robust game equilibrium and derive safety guarantees. Extensive experiments validate our framework's effectiveness, demonstrating superior defense success rates without compromising the helpfulness of the model. Our code is available at https://github.com/BattleWen/MAGIC.

Current reinforcement learning (RL) frameworks for large language models (LLM) post-training typically assume a fixed prompt distribution, which is sub-optimal and bottlenecks scalability. Prior works have explored prompt evolving, but are often limited to the supervised fine-tuning stage, and prompts are sampled and evolved uniformly without signals. This empirical work presents a paradigm shift: Evolving Alignment via Asymmetric Self-Play (eva), that casts post-training as an infinite game with regret-based signals for 2 players: (i) a creator, who strategically samples and creates new informative prompts and (ii) a solver, who learns to produce preferred responses. eva is the first method that allows language models to adaptively create training prompts in both offline and online RL post-training. The design is simple, easy-to-use yet remarkably effective: eva sets a new SOTA on challenging benchmarks, without any extra human prompts, e.g. it boosts the win-rate of gemma-2-9b-it on Arena-Hard by 51.6% -> 60.1% for DPO and 52.6% -> 62.4% for RLOO, surpassing claude-3-opus and catching up to gemini-1.5-pro, both of which are orders of magnitude larger. Extensive experiments show eva can create effective RL curricula and is robust across ablations. We believe adaptively evolving prompts are key to designing the next-generation RL post-training scheme.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

In cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), agents aim to achieve a common goal, such as defeating enemies or scoring a goal. Existing MARL algorithms are effective but still require significant learning time and often get trapped in local optima by complex tasks, subsequently failing to discover a goal-reaching policy. To address this, we introduce Efficient episodic Memory Utilization (EMU) for MARL, with two primary objectives: (a) accelerating reinforcement learning by leveraging semantically coherent memory from an episodic buffer and (b) selectively promoting desirable transitions to prevent local convergence. To achieve (a), EMU incorporates a trainable encoder/decoder structure alongside MARL, creating coherent memory embeddings that facilitate exploratory memory recall. To achieve (b), EMU introduces a novel reward structure called episodic incentive based on the desirability of states. This reward improves the TD target in Q-learning and acts as an additional incentive for desirable transitions. We provide theoretical support for the proposed incentive and demonstrate the effectiveness of EMU compared to conventional episodic control. The proposed method is evaluated in StarCraft II and Google Research Football, and empirical results indicate further performance improvement over state-of-the-art methods.

We consider the problem of team formation within multiagent adversarial games. We propose BERTeam, a novel algorithm that uses a transformer-based deep neural network with Masked Language Model training to select the best team of players from a trained population. We integrate this with coevolutionary deep reinforcement learning, which trains a diverse set of individual players to choose teams from. We test our algorithm in the multiagent adversarial game Marine Capture-The-Flag, and we find that BERTeam learns non-trivial team compositions that perform well against unseen opponents. For this game, we find that BERTeam outperforms MCAA, an algorithm that similarly optimizes team formation.

In this work we create agents that can perform well beyond a single, individual task, that exhibit much wider generalisation of behaviour to a massive, rich space of challenges. We define a universe of tasks within an environment domain and demonstrate the ability to train agents that are generally capable across this vast space and beyond. The environment is natively multi-agent, spanning the continuum of competitive, cooperative, and independent games, which are situated within procedurally generated physical 3D worlds. The resulting space is exceptionally diverse in terms of the challenges posed to agents, and as such, even measuring the learning progress of an agent is an open research problem. We propose an iterative notion of improvement between successive generations of agents, rather than seeking to maximise a singular objective, allowing us to quantify progress despite tasks being incomparable in terms of achievable rewards. We show that through constructing an open-ended learning process, which dynamically changes the training task distributions and training objectives such that the agent never stops learning, we achieve consistent learning of new behaviours. The resulting agent is able to score reward in every one of our humanly solvable evaluation levels, with behaviour generalising to many held-out points in the universe of tasks. Examples of this zero-shot generalisation include good performance on Hide and Seek, Capture the Flag, and Tag. Through analysis and hand-authored probe tasks we characterise the behaviour of our agent, and find interesting emergent heuristic behaviours such as trial-and-error experimentation, simple tool use, option switching, and cooperation. Finally, we demonstrate that the general capabilities of this agent could unlock larger scale transfer of behaviour through cheap finetuning.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

Data Darwinism (Part I) established a ten-level hierarchy for data processing, showing that stronger processing can unlock greater data value. However, that work relied on manually designed strategies for a single category. Modern pretraining corpora comprise hundreds of heterogeneous categories spanning domains and content types, each demanding specialized treatment. At this scale, manual strategy design becomes prohibitive. This raises a key question: can strategies evolve in an automated way? We introduce DataEvolve, a framework that enables strategies to evolve through iterative optimization rather than manual design. For each data category, DataEvolve operates in a closed evolutionary loop: it identifies quality issues, generates candidate strategies, executes them on sampled data, evaluates results, and refines approaches across generations. The process accumulates knowledge through an experience pool of discovered issues and a strategy pool tracking performance across iterations. Applied to 8 categories spanning 672B tokens from Nemotron-CC, DataEvolve produces Darwin-CC, a 504B-token dataset with strategies evolved through 30 iterations per category. Training 3B models on 500B tokens, Darwin-CC outperforms raw data (+3.96 points) and achieves a 44.13 average score across 18 benchmarks, surpassing DCLM, Ultra-FineWeb, and FineWeb-Edu, with strong gains on knowledge-intensive tasks such as MMLU. Analysis shows evolved strategies converge on cleaning-focused approaches: targeted noise removal and format normalization with domain-aware preservation, echoing the L4 (Generative Refinement) principles from Part I. Ablation studies confirm iterative evolution is essential: optimized strategies outperform suboptimal ones by 2.93 points, establishing evolutionary strategy design as feasible and necessary for pretraining-scale data curation.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has become the mainstream technique for training LLM agents. However, RLVR highly depends on well-crafted task queries and corresponding ground-truth answers to provide accurate rewards, which requires massive human efforts and hinders the RL scaling processes, especially under agentic scenarios. Although a few recent works explore task synthesis methods, the difficulty of generated agentic tasks can hardly be controlled to provide effective RL training advantages. To achieve agentic RLVR with higher scalability, we explore self-play training for deep search agents, in which the learning LLM utilizes multi-turn search engine calling and acts simultaneously as both a task proposer and a problem solver. The task proposer aims to generate deep search queries with well-defined ground-truth answers and increasing task difficulty. The problem solver tries to handle the generated search queries and output the correct answer predictions. To ensure that each generated search query has accurate ground truth, we collect all the searching results from the proposer's trajectory as external knowledge, then conduct retrieval-augmentation generation (RAG) to test whether the proposed query can be correctly answered with all necessary search documents provided. In this search self-play (SSP) game, the proposer and the solver co-evolve their agent capabilities through both competition and cooperation. With substantial experimental results, we find that SSP can significantly improve search agents' performance uniformly on various benchmarks without any supervision under both from-scratch and continuous RL training setups. The code is at https://github.com/Alibaba-Quark/SSP.

This paper introduces SC2LE (StarCraft II Learning Environment), a reinforcement learning environment based on the StarCraft II game. This domain poses a new grand challenge for reinforcement learning, representing a more difficult class of problems than considered in most prior work. It is a multi-agent problem with multiple players interacting; there is imperfect information due to a partially observed map; it has a large action space involving the selection and control of hundreds of units; it has a large state space that must be observed solely from raw input feature planes; and it has delayed credit assignment requiring long-term strategies over thousands of steps. We describe the observation, action, and reward specification for the StarCraft II domain and provide an open source Python-based interface for communicating with the game engine. In addition to the main game maps, we provide a suite of mini-games focusing on different elements of StarCraft II gameplay. For the main game maps, we also provide an accompanying dataset of game replay data from human expert players. We give initial baseline results for neural networks trained from this data to predict game outcomes and player actions. Finally, we present initial baseline results for canonical deep reinforcement learning agents applied to the StarCraft II domain. On the mini-games, these agents learn to achieve a level of play that is comparable to a novice player. However, when trained on the main game, these agents are unable to make significant progress. Thus, SC2LE offers a new and challenging environment for exploring deep reinforcement learning algorithms and architectures.

As agentic AI becomes more widespread, agents with distinct and possibly conflicting goals will interact in complex ways. These multi-agent interactions pose a fundamental challenge, particularly in social dilemmas, where agents' individual incentives can undermine collective welfare. While reinforcement learning (RL) has been effective for aligning large language models (LLMs) in the single-agent regime, prior small-network results suggest that standard RL in multi-agent settings often converges to defecting, self-interested policies. We show the same effect in LLMs: despite cooperative priors, RL-trained LLM agents develop opportunistic behavior that can exploit even advanced closed-source models. To address this tendency of RL to converge to poor equilibria, we adapt a recent opponent-learning awareness algorithm, Advantage Alignment, to fine-tune LLMs toward multi-agent cooperation and non-exploitability. We then introduce a group-relative baseline that simplifies advantage computation in iterated games, enabling multi-agent training at LLM scale. We also contribute a novel social dilemma environment, Trust-and-Split, which requires natural language communication to achieve high collective welfare. Across a wide range of social dilemmas, policies learned with Advantage Alignment achieve higher collective payoffs while remaining robust against exploitation by greedy agents. We release all of our code to support future work on multi-agent RL training for LLMs.

In here presented in silico study we suggest a way how to implement the evolutionary principles into anti-cancer therapy design. We hypothesize that instead of its ongoing supervised adaptation, the therapy may be constructed as a self-sustaining evolutionary process in a dynamic fitness landscape established implicitly by evolving cancer cells, microenvironment and the therapy itself. For these purposes, we replace a unified therapy with the `therapy species', which is a population of heterogeneous elementary therapies, and propose a way how to turn the toxicity of the elementary therapy into its fitness in a way conforming to evolutionary causation. As a result, not only the therapies govern the evolution of different cell phenotypes, but the cells' resistances govern the evolution of the therapies as well. We illustrate the approach by the minimalistic ad hoc evolutionary model. Its results indicate that the resistant cells could bias the evolution towards more toxic elementary therapies by inhibiting the less toxic ones. As the evolutionary causation of cancer drug resistance has been intensively studied for a few decades, we refer to cancer as a special case to illustrate purely theoretical analysis.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Multi-turn, multi-agent LLM game evaluations often exhibit substantial run-to-run variance. In long-horizon interactions, small early deviations compound across turns and are amplified by multi-agent coupling. This biases win rate estimates and makes rankings unreliable across repeated tournaments. Prompt choice worsens this further by producing different effective policies. We address both instability and underperformance with MEMO (Memory-augmented MOdel context optimization), a self-play framework that optimizes inference-time context by coupling retention and exploration. Retention maintains a persistent memory bank that stores structured insights from self-play trajectories and injects them as priors during later play. Exploration runs tournament-style prompt evolution with uncertainty-aware selection via TrueSkill, and uses prioritized replay to revisit rare and decisive states. Across five text-based games, MEMO raises mean win rate from 25.1% to 49.5% for GPT-4o-mini and from 20.9% to 44.3% for Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct, using 2,000 self-play games per task. Run-to-run variance also drops, giving more stable rankings across prompt variations. These results suggest that multi-agent LLM game performance and robustness have substantial room for improvement through context optimization. MEMO achieves the largest gains in negotiation and imperfect-information games, while RL remains more effective in perfect-information settings.

In this work, we introduce CodeEvolve, an open-source evolutionary coding agent that unites Large Language Models (LLMs) with genetic algorithms to solve complex computational problems. Our framework adapts powerful evolutionary concepts to the LLM domain, building upon recent methods for generalized scientific discovery. CodeEvolve employs an island-based genetic algorithm to maintain population diversity and increase throughput, introduces a novel inspiration-based crossover mechanism that leverages the LLMs context window to combine features from successful solutions, and implements meta-prompting strategies for dynamic exploration of the solution space. We conduct a rigorous evaluation of CodeEvolve on a subset of the mathematical benchmarks used to evaluate Google DeepMind's closed-source AlphaEvolve. Our findings show that our method surpasses AlphaEvolve's performance on several challenging problems. To foster collaboration and accelerate progress, we release our complete framework as an open-source repository.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Recent evidence suggests that the use of generative artificial intelligence reduces the diversity of content produced. In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model to explore the downstream consequences of content homogeneity when producers use generative AI to compete with one another. At equilibrium, players indeed produce content that is less diverse than optimal. However, stronger competition mitigates homogeneity and induces more diverse production. Perhaps more surprisingly, we show that a generative AI model that performs well in isolation (i.e., according to a benchmark) may fail to do so when faced with competition, and vice versa. We validate our results empirically by using language models to play Scattergories, a word game in which players are rewarded for producing answers that are both correct and unique. We discuss how the interplay between competition and homogeneity has implications for the development, evaluation, and use of generative AI.

While "Intent-oriented programming" (or "Vibe Coding") redefines software engineering, existing code agents remain tethered to static code snapshots. Consequently, they struggle to model the critical information embedded in the temporal evolution of projects, failing to leverage the "reasoning trajectories" implicit in past successful practices. This limitation results in rigid behavioral logic and a lack of autonomous adaptability, ultimately hindering their ability to tackle complex, repository-level problems. To bridge this static-dynamic mismatch, we propose MemCoder, a framework designed to enable continual human-AI co-evolution. MemCoder first structures historical human experience to distill latent intent-to-code mappings from past commits. It then employs a self-refinement mechanism driven by verification feedback to correct agent behavior in real-time. Crucially, an experience self-internalization mechanism is introduced to crystallize human-validated solutions into long-term knowledge, thereby supporting sustained evolution. Experimental results on SWE-bench Verified demonstrate that MemCoder not only achieves State-of-the-Art (SOTA) performance but also delivers a 9.4% improvement in resolved rate over the general foundation model DeepSeek-V3.2. These findings indicate that equipping agents with the capability to co-evolve with humans via project history and real-time feedback effectively unlocks the potential of general models in complex software engineering tasks.

Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.

The increasing adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has enabled AI scientists to perform complex end-to-end scientific discovery tasks requiring coordination of specialized roles, including idea generation and experimental execution. However, most state-of-the-art AI scientist systems rely on static, hand-designed pipelines and fail to adapt based on accumulated interaction histories. As a result, these systems overlook promising research directions, repeat failed experiments, and pursue infeasible ideas. To address this, we introduce EvoScientist, an evolving multi-agent AI scientist framework that continuously improves research strategies through persistent memory and self-evolution. EvoScientist comprises three specialized agents: a Researcher Agent (RA) for scientific idea generation, an Engineer Agent (EA) for experiment implementation and execution, and an Evolution Manager Agent (EMA) that distills insights from prior interactions into reusable knowledge. EvoScientist contains two persistent memory modules: (i) an ideation memory, which summarizes feasible research directions from top-ranked ideas while recording previously unsuccessful directions; and (ii) an experimentation memory, which captures effective data processing and model training strategies derived from code search trajectories and best-performing implementations. These modules enable the RA and EA to retrieve relevant prior strategies, improving idea quality and code execution success rates over time. Experiments show that EvoScientist outperforms 7 open-source and commercial state-of-the-art systems in scientific idea generation, achieving higher novelty, feasibility, relevance, and clarity via automatic and human evaluation. EvoScientist also substantially improves code execution success rates through multi-agent evolution, demonstrating persistent memory's effectiveness for end-to-end scientific discovery.

Large language model (LLM)-based evolution is a promising approach for open-ended discovery, where progress requires sustained search and knowledge accumulation. Existing methods still rely heavily on fixed heuristics and hard-coded exploration rules, which limit the autonomy of LLM agents. We present CORAL, the first framework for autonomous multi-agent evolution on open-ended problems. CORAL replaces rigid control with long-running agents that explore, reflect, and collaborate through shared persistent memory, asynchronous multi-agent execution, and heartbeat-based interventions. It also provides practical safeguards, including isolated workspaces, evaluator separation, resource management, and agent session and health management. Evaluated on diverse mathematical, algorithmic, and systems optimization tasks, CORAL sets new state-of-the-art results on 10 tasks, achieving 3-10 times higher improvement rates with far fewer evaluations than fixed evolutionary search baselines across tasks. On Anthropic's kernel engineering task, four co-evolving agents improve the best known score from 1363 to 1103 cycles. Mechanistic analyses further show how these gains arise from knowledge reuse and multi-agent exploration and communication. Together, these results suggest that greater agent autonomy and multi-agent evolution can substantially improve open-ended discovery. Code is available at https://github.com/Human-Agent-Society/CORAL.

As autonomous agents increasingly operate in real-world digital ecosystems, understanding how they coordinate, form institutions, and accumulate shared culture becomes both a scientific and practical priority. This paper introduces TerraLingua, a persistent multi-agent ecology designed to study open-ended dynamics in such systems. Unlike prior large language model simulations with static or consequence-free environments, TerraLingua imposes resource constraints and limited lifespans for the agents. As a result, agents create artifacts that persist beyond individuals, shaping future interactions and selection pressures. To characterize the dynamics, an AI Anthropologist systematically analyzes agent behavior, group structure, and artifact evolution. Across experimental conditions, the results reveal the emergence of cooperative norms, division of labor, governance attempts, and branching artifact lineages consistent with cumulative cultural processes. Divergent outcomes across experimental runs can be traced back to specific innovations and organizational structures. TerraLingua thus provides a platform for characterizing the mechanisms of cumulative culture and social organization in artificial populations, and can serve as a foundation for guiding real-world agentic populations to socially beneficial outcomes.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

MoltBook is a large-scale multi-agent coordination environment where over 770,000 autonomous LLM agents interact without human participation, offering the first opportunity we are aware of to observe emergent multi-agent coordination dynamics at this population scale. We introduce Molt Dynamics: the emergent agent coordination behaviors, inter-agent communication dynamics, and role specialization patterns arising when autonomous agents operate as decentralized decision-makers in an unconstrained multi-agent environment. Through longitudinal observation of 90,704 active agents over three weeks, we characterize three aspects. First, spontaneous role specialization: network-based clustering reveals six structural roles (silhouette 0.91), though the result primarily reflects core-periphery organization -- 93.5\% of agents occupy a homogeneous peripheral cluster, with meaningful differentiation confined to the active minority. Second, decentralized information dissemination: cascade analysis of 10,323 inter-agent propagation events reveals power-law distributed cascade sizes (α= 2.57 pm 0.02) and saturating adoption dynamics where adoption probability shows diminishing returns with repeated exposures (Cox hazard ratio 0.53, concordance 0.78). Third, distributed cooperative task resolution: 164 multi-agent collaborative events show detectable coordination patterns, but success rates are low (6.7\%, p = 0.057) and cooperative outcomes are significantly worse than a matched single-agent baseline (Cohen's d = -0.88), indicating emergent cooperative behavior is nascent. These findings establish an empirical baseline for coordination dynamics in decentralized autonomous agent systems, with implications for multi-agent system design, agent communication protocol engineering, and AI safety.

Although Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) methods can learn effective policies for challenging problems such as Atari games and robotics tasks, algorithms are complex and training times are often long. This study investigates how evolution strategies (ES) perform compared to gradient-based deep reinforcement learning methods. We use ES to optimize the weights of a neural network via neuroevolution, performing direct policy search. We benchmark both regular networks and policy networks consisting of a single linear layer from observations to actions; for three classical ES methods and for three gradient-based methods such as PPO. Our results reveal that ES can find effective linear policies for many RL benchmark tasks, in contrast to DRL methods that can only find successful policies using much larger networks, suggesting that current benchmarks are easier to solve than previously assumed. Interestingly, also for higher complexity tasks, ES achieves results comparable to gradient-based DRL algorithms. Furthermore, we find that by directly accessing the memory state of the game, ES are able to find successful policies in Atari, outperforming DQN. While gradient-based methods have dominated the field in recent years, ES offers an alternative that is easy to implement, parallelize, understand, and tune.

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

Self-evolution methods enhance code generation through iterative "generate-verify-refine" cycles, yet existing approaches suffer from low exploration efficiency, failing to discover solutions with superior complexity within limited budgets. This inefficiency stems from initialization bias trapping evolution in poor solution regions, uncontrolled stochastic operations lacking feedback guidance, and insufficient experience utilization across tasks. To address these bottlenecks, we propose Controlled Self-Evolution (CSE), which consists of three key components. Diversified Planning Initialization generates structurally distinct algorithmic strategies for broad solution space coverage. Genetic Evolution replaces stochastic operations with feedback-guided mechanisms, enabling targeted mutation and compositional crossover. Hierarchical Evolution Memory captures both successful and failed experiences at inter-task and intra-task levels. Experiments on EffiBench-X demonstrate that CSE consistently outperforms all baselines across various LLM backbones. Furthermore, CSE achieves higher efficiency from early generations and maintains continuous improvement throughout evolution. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/QuantaAlpha/EvoControl.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in automated code generation. However, existing approaches often rely heavily on pre-defined test cases, which become impractical in scenarios where such cases are unavailable. While prior works explore filtering techniques between programs and test cases, they overlook the refinement of test cases. To address this limitation, we introduce CoCoEvo, a novel LLM-based co-evolution framework that simultaneously evolves programs and test cases. CoCoEvo eliminates the dependency on pre-defined test cases by generating both programs and test cases directly from natural language problem descriptions and function headers. The framework employs specialized evolutionary operators, including LLM-based crossover and mutation operators for program evolution, along with a test case generation operator for test case evolution. Additionally, we propose optimization strategies such as a crossover rate scheduler to balance exploration and convergence, and a multi-objective optimization method for test case selection. Experimental results on multiple state-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate that CoCoEvo surpasses existing methods, achieving state-of-the-art performance in automated code generation and testing. These results underscore the potential of co-evolutionary techniques in advancing the field of automated programming.

What if artificial agents could not just communicate, but also evolve, adapt, and reshape their worlds in ways we cannot fully predict? With llm now powering multi-agent systems and social simulations, we are witnessing new possibilities for modeling open-ended, ever-changing environments. Yet, most current simulations remain constrained within static sandboxes, characterized by predefined tasks, limited dynamics, and rigid evaluation criteria. These limitations prevent them from capturing the complexity of real-world societies. In this paper, we argue that static, task-specific benchmarks are fundamentally inadequate and must be rethought. We critically review emerging architectures that blend llm with multi-agent dynamics, highlight key hurdles such as balancing stability and diversity, evaluating unexpected behaviors, and scaling to greater complexity, and introduce a fresh taxonomy for this rapidly evolving field. Finally, we present a research roadmap centered on open-endedness, continuous co-evolution, and the development of resilient, socially aligned AI ecosystems. We call on the community to move beyond static paradigms and help shape the next generation of adaptive, socially-aware multi-agent simulations.

Recent advances in Competitive Self-Play (CSP) have achieved, or even surpassed, human level performance in complex game environments such as Dota 2 and StarCraft II using Distributed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). One core component of these methods relies on creating a pool of learning agents -- consisting of the Main Agent, past versions of this agent, and Exploiter Agents -- where Exploiter Agents learn counter-strategies to the Main Agents. A key drawback of these approaches is the large computational cost and physical time that is required to train the system, making them impractical to deploy in highly iterative real-life settings such as video game productions. In this paper, we propose the Minimax Exploiter, a game theoretic approach to exploiting Main Agents that leverages knowledge of its opponents, leading to significant increases in data efficiency. We validate our approach in a diversity of settings, including simple turn based games, the arcade learning environment, and For Honor, a modern video game. The Minimax Exploiter consistently outperforms strong baselines, demonstrating improved stability and data efficiency, leading to a robust CSP-MARL method that is both flexible and easy to deploy.

Recent advances in large multimodal models (LMMs) have enabled impressive reasoning and perception abilities, yet most existing training pipelines still depend on human-curated data or externally verified reward models, limiting their autonomy and scalability. In this work, we strive to improve LMM reasoning capabilities in a purely unsupervised fashion (without any annotated data or reward distillation). To this end, we propose a self-evolving framework, named EvoLMM, that instantiates two cooperative agents from a single backbone model: a Proposer, which generates diverse, image-grounded questions, and a Solver, which solves them through internal consistency, where learning proceeds through a continuous self-rewarding process. This dynamic feedback encourages both the generation of informative queries and the refinement of structured reasoning without relying on ground-truth or human judgments. When using the popular Qwen2.5-VL as the base model, our EvoLMM yields consistent gains upto sim3\% on multimodal math-reasoning benchmarks, including ChartQA, MathVista, and MathVision, using only raw training images. We hope our simple yet effective approach will serve as a solid baseline easing future research in self-improving LMMs in a fully-unsupervised fashion. Our code and models are available at https://github.com/mbzuai-oryx/EvoLMM.

Building AIs with adaptive behaviors in human-AI cooperation stands as a pivotal focus in AGI research. Current methods for developing cooperative agents predominantly rely on learning-based methods, where policy generalization heavily hinges on past interactions with specific teammates. These approaches constrain the agent's capacity to recalibrate its strategy when confronted with novel teammates. We propose ProAgent, a novel framework that harnesses large language models (LLMs) to fashion a proactive agent empowered with the ability to anticipate teammates' forthcoming decisions and formulate enhanced plans for itself. ProAgent excels at cooperative reasoning with the capacity to dynamically adapt its behavior to enhance collaborative efforts with teammates. Moreover, the ProAgent framework exhibits a high degree of modularity and interpretability, facilitating seamless integration to address a wide array of coordination scenarios. Experimental evaluations conducted within the framework of Overcook-AI unveil the remarkable performance superiority of ProAgent, outperforming five methods based on self-play and population-based training in cooperation with AI agents. Further, when cooperating with human proxy models, its performance exhibits an average improvement exceeding 10\% compared to the current state-of-the-art, COLE. The advancement was consistently observed across diverse scenarios involving interactions with both AI agents of varying characteristics and human counterparts. These findings inspire future research for human-robot collaborations. For a hands-on demonstration, please visit https://pku-proagent.github.io.

Polarization in online discourse erodes social trust and accelerates misinformation, yet technical responses remain largely diagnostic and post-hoc. Current governance approaches suffer from inherent latency and static policies, struggling to counter coordinated adversarial amplification that evolves in real-time. We present EvoCorps, an evolutionary multi-agent framework for proactive depolarization. EvoCorps frames discourse governance as a dynamic social game and coordinates roles for monitoring, planning, grounded generation, and multi-identity diffusion. A retrieval-augmented collective cognition core provides factual grounding and action--outcome memory, while closed-loop evolutionary learning adapts strategies as the environment and attackers change. We implement EvoCorps on the MOSAIC social-AI simulation platform for controlled evaluation in a multi-source news stream with adversarial injection and amplification. Across emotional polarization, viewpoint extremity, and argumentative rationality, EvoCorps improves discourse outcomes over an adversarial baseline, pointing to a practical path from detection and post-hoc mitigation to in-process, closed-loop intervention. The code is available at https://github.com/ln2146/EvoCorps.

Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous N-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population generative model", which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Moreover, learning algorithms typically work on abstract simulators with population instead of the N-player game. Instead, we show that N agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within mathcal{O}(varepsilon^{-2}) samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard O(1{N}) error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from the literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. We analyze single-path TD learning for N-agent games, proving sample complexity guarantees by only using a sample path from the N-agent simulator without a population generative model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by N agents with finite sample guarantees.

As AI systems pervade human life, ensuring that large language models (LLMs) make safe decisions remains a significant challenge. We introduce the Governance of the Commons Simulation (GovSim), a generative simulation platform designed to study strategic interactions and cooperative decision-making in LLMs. In GovSim, a society of AI agents must collectively balance exploiting a common resource with sustaining it for future use. This environment enables the study of how ethical considerations, strategic planning, and negotiation skills impact cooperative outcomes. We develop an LLM-based agent architecture and test it with the leading open and closed LLMs. We find that all but the most powerful LLM agents fail to achieve a sustainable equilibrium in GovSim, with the highest survival rate below 54%. Ablations reveal that successful multi-agent communication between agents is critical for achieving cooperation in these cases. Furthermore, our analyses show that the failure to achieve sustainable cooperation in most LLMs stems from their inability to formulate and analyze hypotheses about the long-term effects of their actions on the equilibrium of the group. Finally, we show that agents that leverage "Universalization"-based reasoning, a theory of moral thinking, are able to achieve significantly better sustainability. Taken together, GovSim enables us to study the mechanisms that underlie sustainable self-government with specificity and scale. We open source the full suite of our research results, including the simulation environment, agent prompts, and a comprehensive web interface.

Intelligence is a crucial trait for species to find solutions within a limited number of trial-and-error attempts. Building on this idea, we introduce Survival Game as a framework to evaluate intelligence based on the number of failed attempts in a trial-and-error process. Fewer failures indicate higher intelligence. When the expectation and variance of failure counts are both finite, it signals the ability to consistently find solutions to new challenges, which we define as the Autonomous Level of intelligence. Using Survival Game, we comprehensively evaluate existing AI systems. Our results show that while AI systems achieve the Autonomous Level in simple tasks, they are still far from it in more complex tasks, such as vision, search, recommendation, and language. While scaling current AI technologies might help, this would come at an astronomical cost. Projections suggest that achieving the Autonomous Level for general tasks would require 10^{26} parameters. To put this into perspective, loading such a massive model requires so many H100 GPUs that their total value is 10^{7} times that of Apple Inc.'s market value. Even with Moore's Law, supporting such a parameter scale would take 70 years. This staggering cost highlights the complexity of human tasks and the inadequacies of current AI technologies. To further investigate this phenomenon, we conduct a theoretical analysis of Survival Game and its experimental results. Our findings suggest that human tasks possess a criticality property. As a result, Autonomous Level requires a deep understanding of the task's underlying mechanisms. Current AI systems, however, do not fully grasp these mechanisms and instead rely on superficial mimicry, making it difficult for them to reach an autonomous level. We believe Survival Game can not only guide the future development of AI but also offer profound insights into human intelligence.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as a pivotal technique for fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) on specific tasks. However, prevailing RL fine-tuning methods predominantly rely on PPO and its variants. Though these algorithms are effective in general RL settings, they often exhibit suboptimal performance and vulnerability to distribution collapse when applied to the fine-tuning of LLMs. In this paper, we propose CORY, extending the RL fine-tuning of LLMs to a sequential cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning framework, to leverage the inherent coevolution and emergent capabilities of multi-agent systems. In CORY, the LLM to be fine-tuned is initially duplicated into two autonomous agents: a pioneer and an observer. The pioneer generates responses based on queries, while the observer generates responses using both the queries and the pioneer's responses. The two agents are trained together. During training, the agents exchange roles periodically, fostering cooperation and coevolution between them. Experiments evaluate CORY's performance by fine-tuning GPT-2 and Llama-2 under subjective and objective reward functions on the IMDB Review and GSM8K datasets, respectively. Results show that CORY outperforms PPO in terms of policy optimality, resistance to distribution collapse, and training robustness, thereby underscoring its potential as a superior methodology for refining LLMs in real-world applications.

Competitive Pok\'emon Singles (CPS) is a popular strategy game where players learn to exploit their opponent based on imperfect information in battles that can last more than one hundred stochastic turns. AI research in CPS has been led by heuristic tree search and online self-play, but the game may also create a platform to study adaptive policies trained offline on large datasets. We develop a pipeline to reconstruct the first-person perspective of an agent from logs saved from the third-person perspective of a spectator, thereby unlocking a dataset of real human battles spanning more than a decade that grows larger every day. This dataset enables a black-box approach where we train large sequence models to adapt to their opponent based solely on their input trajectory while selecting moves without explicit search of any kind. We study a progression from imitation learning to offline RL and offline fine-tuning on self-play data in the hardcore competitive setting of Pok\'emon's four oldest (and most partially observed) game generations. The resulting agents outperform a recent LLM Agent approach and a strong heuristic search engine. While playing anonymously in online battles against humans, our best agents climb to rankings inside the top 10% of active players.

Deep artificial neural networks (DNNs) are typically trained via gradient-based learning algorithms, namely backpropagation. Evolution strategies (ES) can rival backprop-based algorithms such as Q-learning and policy gradients on challenging deep reinforcement learning (RL) problems. However, ES can be considered a gradient-based algorithm because it performs stochastic gradient descent via an operation similar to a finite-difference approximation of the gradient. That raises the question of whether non-gradient-based evolutionary algorithms can work at DNN scales. Here we demonstrate they can: we evolve the weights of a DNN with a simple, gradient-free, population-based genetic algorithm (GA) and it performs well on hard deep RL problems, including Atari and humanoid locomotion. The Deep GA successfully evolves networks with over four million free parameters, the largest neural networks ever evolved with a traditional evolutionary algorithm. These results (1) expand our sense of the scale at which GAs can operate, (2) suggest intriguingly that in some cases following the gradient is not the best choice for optimizing performance, and (3) make immediately available the multitude of neuroevolution techniques that improve performance. We demonstrate the latter by showing that combining DNNs with novelty search, which encourages exploration on tasks with deceptive or sparse reward functions, can solve a high-dimensional problem on which reward-maximizing algorithms (e.g.\ DQN, A3C, ES, and the GA) fail. Additionally, the Deep GA is faster than ES, A3C, and DQN (it can train Atari in {raise.17ex\scriptstyle\sim}4 hours on one desktop or {raise.17ex\scriptstyle\sim}1 hour distributed on 720 cores), and enables a state-of-the-art, up to 10,000-fold compact encoding technique.

Scientific discovery relies on scientists generating novel hypotheses that undergo rigorous experimental validation. To augment this process, we introduce an AI co-scientist, a multi-agent system built on Gemini 2.0. The AI co-scientist is intended to help uncover new, original knowledge and to formulate demonstrably novel research hypotheses and proposals, building upon prior evidence and aligned to scientist-provided research objectives and guidance. The system's design incorporates a generate, debate, and evolve approach to hypothesis generation, inspired by the scientific method and accelerated by scaling test-time compute. Key contributions include: (1) a multi-agent architecture with an asynchronous task execution framework for flexible compute scaling; (2) a tournament evolution process for self-improving hypotheses generation. Automated evaluations show continued benefits of test-time compute, improving hypothesis quality. While general purpose, we focus development and validation in three biomedical areas: drug repurposing, novel target discovery, and explaining mechanisms of bacterial evolution and anti-microbial resistance. For drug repurposing, the system proposes candidates with promising validation findings, including candidates for acute myeloid leukemia that show tumor inhibition in vitro at clinically applicable concentrations. For novel target discovery, the AI co-scientist proposed new epigenetic targets for liver fibrosis, validated by anti-fibrotic activity and liver cell regeneration in human hepatic organoids. Finally, the AI co-scientist recapitulated unpublished experimental results via a parallel in silico discovery of a novel gene transfer mechanism in bacterial evolution. These results, detailed in separate, co-timed reports, demonstrate the potential to augment biomedical and scientific discovery and usher an era of AI empowered scientists.

In this research, we compare four different evaluation methods in coevolution on the Majority Function problem. The size of the problem is selected such that evaluation against all possible test cases is feasible. Two measures are used for the comparisons, i.e., the objective fitness derived from evaluating solutions against all test cases, and the objective fitness correlation (OFC), which is defined as the correlation coefficient between subjective and objective fitness. The results of our experiments suggest that a combination of average score and weighted informativeness may provide a more accurate evaluation in coevolution. In order to confirm this difference, a series of t-tests on the preference between each pair of the evaluation methods is performed. The resulting significance is affirmative, and the tests for two quality measures show similar preference on four evaluation methods. %This study is the first time OFC is actually computed on a real problem. Experiments on Majority Function problems with larger sizes and Parity problems are in progress, and their results will be added in the final version.

Social media platforms frequently impose restrictive policies to moderate user content, prompting the emergence of creative evasion language strategies. This paper presents a multi-agent framework based on Large Language Models (LLMs) to simulate the iterative evolution of language strategies under regulatory constraints. In this framework, participant agents, as social media users, continuously evolve their language expression, while supervisory agents emulate platform-level regulation by assessing policy violations. To achieve a more faithful simulation, we employ a dual design of language strategies (constraint and expression) to differentiate conflicting goals and utilize an LLM-driven GA (Genetic Algorithm) for the selection, mutation, and crossover of language strategies. The framework is evaluated using two distinct scenarios: an abstract password game and a realistic simulated illegal pet trade scenario. Experimental results demonstrate that as the number of dialogue rounds increases, both the number of uninterrupted dialogue turns and the accuracy of information transmission improve significantly. Furthermore, a user study with 40 participants validates the real-world relevance of the generated dialogues and strategies. Moreover, ablation studies validate the importance of the GA, emphasizing its contribution to long-term adaptability and improved overall results.

This paper introduces a novel framework combining LLM agents as proxies for human strategic behavior with reinforcement learning (RL) to engage these agents in evolving strategic interactions within team environments. Our approach extends traditional agent-based simulations by using strategic LLM agents (SLA) and introducing dynamic and adaptive governance through a pro-social promoting RL agent (PPA) that modulates information access across agents in a network, optimizing social welfare and promoting pro-social behavior. Through validation in iterative games, including the prisoner dilemma, we demonstrate that SLA agents exhibit nuanced strategic adaptations. The PPA agent effectively learns to adjust information transparency, resulting in enhanced cooperation rates. This framework offers significant insights into AI-mediated social dynamics, contributing to the deployment of AI in real-world team settings.

Post-training alignment optimizes language models to match human preference signals, but this objective is not equivalent to modeling observed human behavior. We compare 120 base-aligned model pairs on more than 10,000 real human decisions in multi-round strategic games - bargaining, persuasion, negotiation, and repeated matrix games. In these settings, base models outperform their aligned counterparts in predicting human choices by nearly 10:1, robustly across model families, prompt formulations, and game configurations. This pattern reverses, however, in settings where human behavior is more likely to follow normative predictions: aligned models dominate on one-shot textbook games across all 12 types tested and on non-strategic lottery choices - and even within the multi-round games themselves, at round one, before interaction history develops. This boundary-condition pattern suggests that alignment induces a normative bias: it improves prediction when human behavior is relatively well captured by normative solutions, but hurts prediction in multi-round strategic settings, where behavior is shaped by descriptive dynamics such as reciprocity, retaliation, and history-dependent adaptation. These results reveal a fundamental trade-off between optimizing models for human use and using them as proxies for human behavior.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has been shown effective for cooperative games in recent years. However, existing state-of-the-art methods face challenges related to sample complexity, training instability, and the risk of converging to a suboptimal Nash Equilibrium. In this paper, we propose a unified framework for learning stochastic policies to resolve these issues. We embed cooperative MARL problems into probabilistic graphical models, from which we derive the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) objective for MARL. Based on the MaxEnt framework, we propose Heterogeneous-Agent Soft Actor-Critic (HASAC) algorithm. Theoretically, we prove the monotonic improvement and convergence to quantal response equilibrium (QRE) properties of HASAC. Furthermore, we generalize a unified template for MaxEnt algorithmic design named Maximum Entropy Heterogeneous-Agent Mirror Learning (MEHAML), which provides any induced method with the same guarantees as HASAC. We evaluate HASAC on six benchmarks: Bi-DexHands, Multi-Agent MuJoCo, StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge, Google Research Football, Multi-Agent Particle Environment, and Light Aircraft Game. Results show that HASAC consistently outperforms strong baselines, exhibiting better sample efficiency, robustness, and sufficient exploration.

Bayesian optimization (BO) is a powerful framework to optimize black-box expensive-to-evaluate functions via sequential interactions. In several important problems (e.g. drug discovery, circuit design, neural architecture search, etc.), though, such functions are defined over large combinatorial and unstructured spaces. This makes existing BO algorithms not feasible due to the intractable maximization of the acquisition function over these domains. To address this issue, we propose GameOpt, a novel game-theoretical approach to combinatorial BO. GameOpt establishes a cooperative game between the different optimization variables, and selects points that are game equilibria of an upper confidence bound acquisition function. These are stable configurations from which no variable has an incentive to deviate- analog to local optima in continuous domains. Crucially, this allows us to efficiently break down the complexity of the combinatorial domain into individual decision sets, making GameOpt scalable to large combinatorial spaces. We demonstrate the application of GameOpt to the challenging protein design problem and validate its performance on four real-world protein datasets. Each protein can take up to 20^{X} possible configurations, where X is the length of a protein, making standard BO methods infeasible. Instead, our approach iteratively selects informative protein configurations and very quickly discovers highly active protein variants compared to other baselines.

Agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly permeating various domains of human production and life, highlighting the importance of aligning them with human values. The current alignment of AI systems primarily focuses on passively aligning LLMs through human intervention. However, agents possess characteristics like receiving environmental feedback and self-evolution, rendering the LLM alignment methods inadequate. In response, we propose an evolutionary framework for agent evolution and alignment, named EvolutionaryAgent, which transforms agent alignment into a process of evolution and selection under the principle of survival of the fittest. In an environment where social norms continuously evolve, agents better adapted to the current social norms will have a higher probability of survival and proliferation, while those inadequately aligned dwindle over time. Experimental results assessing the agents from multiple perspectives in aligning with social norms demonstrate that EvolutionaryAgent can align progressively better with the evolving social norms while maintaining its proficiency in general tasks. Effectiveness tests conducted on various open and closed-source LLMs as the foundation for agents also prove the applicability of our approach.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.