Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) now give reasoning before answering, excelling in tasks like multiple-choice question answering (MCQA). Yet, a concern is that LLMs do not solve MCQs as intended, as work finds LLMs sans reasoning succeed in MCQA without using the question, i.e., choices-only. Such partial-input success is often linked to trivial shortcuts, but reasoning traces could reveal if choices-only strategies are truly shallow. To examine these strategies, we have reasoning LLMs solve MCQs in full and choices-only inputs; test-time reasoning often boosts accuracy in full and in choices-only, half the time. While possibly due to shallow shortcuts, choices-only success is barely affected by the length of reasoning traces, and after finding traces pass faithfulness tests, we show they use less problematic strategies like inferring missing questions. In all, we challenge claims that partial-input success is always a flaw, so we propose how reasoning traces could separate problematic data from less problematic reasoning.

As platforms increasingly deploy robots alongside human labor in last-mile logistics, little is known about how contextual features like product attributes, environmental conditions, and psychological mechanisms shape consumer preference in real-world settings. To address this gap, this paper conducts an empirical study on consumer choice between human versus robot service, analyzing 241,517 package-level choices from Alibaba's last-mile delivery stations. We identify how product privacy sensitivity, product value, and environmental complexity affect consumer preference. Our findings reveal that consumers are significantly more likely to choose robot delivery for privacy-sensitive packages (11.49%) and high-value products (0.97% per 1% increase in value), but prefer human couriers under adverse weather conditions (1.63%). These patterns are robust to alternative specifications and controls. These results also underscore that delivery choices are shaped not only by functional considerations but also by psychological concerns, highlighting the need for context-aware service design that aligns strategies with consumer perceptions.

Active learning promises to improve annotation efficiency by iteratively selecting the most important data to be annotated first. However, we uncover a striking contradiction to this promise: active learning fails to select data as efficiently as random selection at the first few choices. We identify this as the cold start problem in vision active learning, caused by a biased and outlier initial query. This paper seeks to address the cold start problem by exploiting the three advantages of contrastive learning: (1) no annotation is required; (2) label diversity is ensured by pseudo-labels to mitigate bias; (3) typical data is determined by contrastive features to reduce outliers. Experiments are conducted on CIFAR-10-LT and three medical imaging datasets (i.e. Colon Pathology, Abdominal CT, and Blood Cell Microscope). Our initial query not only significantly outperforms existing active querying strategies but also surpasses random selection by a large margin. We foresee our solution to the cold start problem as a simple yet strong baseline to choose the initial query for vision active learning. Code is available: https://github.com/c-liangyu/CSVAL

One fascinating aspect of pre-trained vision-language models~(VLMs) learning under language supervision is their impressive zero-shot generalization capability. However, this ability is hindered by distribution shifts between the training and testing data. Previous test time adaptation~(TTA) methods for VLMs in zero-shot classification rely on minimizing the entropy of model outputs, tending to be stuck in incorrect model predictions. In this work, we propose TTA with feedback to rectify the model output and prevent the model from becoming blindly confident. Specifically, a CLIP model is adopted as the reward model during TTA and provides feedback for the VLM. Given a single test sample, the VLM is forced to maximize the CLIP reward between the input and sampled results from the VLM output distribution. The proposed reinforcement learning with CLIP feedback~(RLCF) framework is highly flexible and universal. Beyond the classification task, with task-specific sampling strategies and a proper reward baseline choice, RLCF can be easily extended to not only discrimination tasks like retrieval but also generalization tasks like image captioning, improving the zero-shot generalization capacity of VLMs. According to the characteristics of these VL tasks, we build different fully TTA pipelines with RLCF to improve the zero-shot generalization ability of various VLMs. Extensive experiments along with promising empirical results demonstrate the effectiveness of RLCF. The code is available at https://github.com/mzhaoshuai/RLCF.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to make decisions in complex scenarios, where they need models to think deeply, reason logically, and decide wisely. Many existing studies focus solely on multi-round conversations in social tasks or simulated environments, neglecting the various types of decisions and their interdependence. Current reinforcement learning methods struggle to consider the strategies of others during training. To address these issues, we first define a strategic decision-making problem that includes two types of decisions and their temporal dependencies. Furthermore, we propose **T**heory **o**f **M**ind **P**olicy **O**ptimization **(ToMPO)** algorithm to optimize the perception of other individual strategies and the game situation trends. Compared to the Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) algorithm, ToMPO enhances the LLM's strategic decision-making mainly by: 1) generating rollouts based on reasoning the strategies of other individuals, 2) estimating advantages at both the graph-level and sample-level, and 3) balancing global and partial rewards. The ToMPO algorithm outperforms the GRPO method by 35% in terms of model output compliance and cooperative outcomes. Additionally, when compared to models with parameter sizes 100 times larger, it shows an 18% improvement. This demonstrates the effectiveness of the ToMPO algorithm in enhancing the model's strategic decision-making capabilities.

Multiple-choice question answering (MCQA) is often used to evaluate large language models (LLMs). To see if MCQA assesses LLMs as intended, we probe if LLMs can perform MCQA with choices-only prompts, where models must select the correct answer only from the choices. In three MCQA datasets and four LLMs, this prompt bests a majority baseline in 11/12 cases, with up to 0.33 accuracy gain. To help explain this behavior, we conduct an in-depth, black-box analysis on memorization, choice dynamics, and question inference. Our key findings are threefold. First, we find no evidence that the choices-only accuracy stems from memorization alone. Second, priors over individual choices do not fully explain choices-only accuracy, hinting that LLMs use the group dynamics of choices. Third, LLMs have some ability to infer a relevant question from choices, and surprisingly can sometimes even match the original question. We hope to motivate the use of stronger baselines in MCQA benchmarks, the design of robust MCQA datasets, and further efforts to explain LLM decision-making.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

In this paper, we introduce the Preselection Bandit problem, in which the learner preselects a subset of arms (choice alternatives) for a user, which then chooses the final arm from this subset. The learner is not aware of the user's preferences, but can learn them from observed choices. In our concrete setting, we allow these choices to be stochastic and model the user's actions by means of the Plackett-Luce model. The learner's main task is to preselect subsets that eventually lead to highly preferred choices. To formalize this goal, we introduce a reasonable notion of regret and derive lower bounds on the expected regret. Moreover, we propose algorithms for which the upper bound on expected regret matches the lower bound up to a logarithmic term of the time horizon.

Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game under the offline learning constraint. We first frame this problem in terms of selecting among candidate equilibria. Since datasets may inform only a small fraction of game dynamics, it is generally infeasible in offline game-solving to even verify a proposed solution is a true equilibrium. Therefore, we consider the relative probability of low regret (i.e., closeness to equilibrium) across candidates based on the information available. Specifically, we extend Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), an online game-solving approach, by quantifying game dynamics uncertainty and modifying the RL objective to skew towards solutions more likely to have low regret in the true game. We further propose a novel meta-strategy solver, tailored for the offline setting, to guide strategy exploration in PSRO. Our incorporation of Conservatism principles from Offline reinforcement learning approaches for strategy Exploration gives our approach its name: COffeE-PSRO. Experiments demonstrate COffeE-PSRO's ability to extract lower-regret solutions than state-of-the-art offline approaches and reveal relationships between algorithmic components empirical game fidelity, and overall performance.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

Example-based guidance is widely used to improve mathematical reasoning at inference time, yet its effectiveness is highly unstable across problems and models-even when the guidance is correct and problem-relevant. We show that this instability arises from a previously underexplored gap between strategy usage-whether a reasoning strategy appears in successful solutions-and strategy executability-whether the strategy remains effective when instantiated as guidance for a target model. Through a controlled analysis of paired human-written and model-generated solutions, we identify a systematic dissociation between usage and executability: human- and model-derived strategies differ in structured, domain-dependent ways, leading to complementary strengths and consistent source-dependent reversals under guidance. Building on this diagnosis, we propose Selective Strategy Retrieval (SSR), a test-time framework that explicitly models executability by selectively retrieving and combining strategies using empirical, multi-route, source-aware signals. Across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks, SSR yields reliable and consistent improvements over direct solving, in-context learning, and single-source guidance, improving accuracy by up to +13 points on AIME25 and +5 points on Apex for compact reasoning models. Code and benchmark are publicly available at: https://github.com/lwd17/strategy-execute-pipeline.

Large language model reasoning is often treated as a monolithic capability, relying on binary preference supervision that fails to capture partial progress or fine-grained reasoning quality. We introduce Continuous Utility Direct Preference Optimization (CU-DPO), a framework that aligns models to a portfolio of prompt-based cognitive strategies by replacing binary labels with continuous scores that capture fine-grained reasoning quality. We prove that learning with K strategies yields a Theta(K log K) improvement in sample complexity over binary preferences, and that DPO converges to the entropy-regularized utility-maximizing policy. To exploit this signal, we propose a two-stage training pipeline: (i) strategy selection, which optimizes the model to choose the best strategy for a given problem via best-vs-all comparisons, and (ii) execution refinement, which trains the model to correctly execute the selected strategy using margin-stratified pairs. On mathematical reasoning benchmarks, CU-DPO improves strategy selection accuracy from 35-46 percent to 68-78 percent across seven base models, yielding consistent downstream reasoning gains of up to 6.6 points on in-distribution datasets with effective transfer to out-of-distribution tasks.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive reasoning capabilities in well-defined problems with clear solutions, such as mathematics and coding. However, they still struggle with complex real-world scenarios like business negotiations, which require strategic reasoning-an ability to navigate dynamic environments and align long-term goals amidst uncertainty. Existing methods for strategic reasoning face challenges in adaptability, scalability, and transferring strategies to new contexts. To address these issues, we propose explicit policy optimization (EPO) for strategic reasoning, featuring an LLM that provides strategies in open-ended action space and can be plugged into arbitrary LLM agents to motivate goal-directed behavior. To improve adaptability and policy transferability, we train the strategic reasoning model via multi-turn reinforcement learning (RL) using process rewards and iterative self-play, without supervised fine-tuning (SFT) as a preliminary step. Experiments across social and physical domains demonstrate EPO's ability of long-term goal alignment through enhanced strategic reasoning, achieving state-of-the-art performance on social dialogue and web navigation tasks. Our findings reveal various collaborative reasoning mechanisms emergent in EPO and its effectiveness in generating novel strategies, underscoring its potential for strategic reasoning in real-world applications.

Many popular reinforcement learning problems (e.g., navigation in a maze, some Atari games, mountain car) are instances of the episodic setting under its stochastic shortest path (SSP) formulation, where an agent has to achieve a goal state while minimizing the cumulative cost. Despite the popularity of this setting, the exploration-exploitation dilemma has been sparsely studied in general SSP problems, with most of the theoretical literature focusing on different problems (i.e., fixed-horizon and infinite-horizon) or making the restrictive loop-free SSP assumption (i.e., no state can be visited twice during an episode). In this paper, we study the general SSP problem with no assumption on its dynamics (some policies may actually never reach the goal). We introduce UC-SSP, the first no-regret algorithm in this setting, and prove a regret bound scaling as displaystyle mathcal{O}( D S A D K) after K episodes for any unknown SSP with S states, A actions, positive costs and SSP-diameter D, defined as the smallest expected hitting time from any starting state to the goal. We achieve this result by crafting a novel stopping rule, such that UC-SSP may interrupt the current policy if it is taking too long to achieve the goal and switch to alternative policies that are designed to rapidly terminate the episode.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

We consider negotiation settings in which two agents use natural language to bargain on goods. Agents need to decide on both high-level strategy (e.g., proposing \50) and the execution of that strategy (e.g., generating "The bike is brand new. Selling for just 50."). Recent work on negotiation trains neural models, but their end-to-end nature makes it hard to control their strategy, and reinforcement learning tends to lead to degenerate solutions. In this paper, we propose a modular approach based on coarse di- alogue acts (e.g., propose(price=50)) that decouples strategy and generation. We show that we can flexibly set the strategy using supervised learning, reinforcement learning, or domain-specific knowledge without degeneracy, while our retrieval-based generation can maintain context-awareness and produce diverse utterances. We test our approach on the recently proposed DEALORNODEAL game, and we also collect a richer dataset based on real items on Craigslist. Human evaluation shows that our systems achieve higher task success rate and more human-like negotiation behavior than previous approaches.

Closed drafting or "pick and pass" is a popular game mechanic where each round players select a card or other playable element from their hand and pass the rest to the next player. Games employing closed drafting make for great studies on memory and turn order due to their explicitly calculable memory of other players' hands. In this paper, we establish first-principle benchmarks for studying model-free reinforcement learning algorithms and their comparative ability to learn memory in a popular family of closed drafting games called "Sushi Go Party!", producing state-of-the-art results on this environment along the way. Furthermore, as Sushi Go Party! can be expressed as a set of closely-related games based on the set of cards in play, we quantify the generalizability of reinforcement learning algorithms trained on various sets of cards, establishing key trends between generalized performance and the set distance between the train and evaluation game configurations. Finally, we fit decision rules to interpret the strategy of the learned models and compare them to the ranking preferences of human players, finding intuitive common rules and intriguing new moves.

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

After the recent groundbreaking results of AlphaGo and AlphaZero, we have seen strong interests in deep reinforcement learning and artificial general intelligence (AGI) in game playing. However, deep learning is resource-intensive and the theory is not yet well developed. For small games, simple classical table-based Q-learning might still be the algorithm of choice. General Game Playing (GGP) provides a good testbed for reinforcement learning to research AGI. Q-learning is one of the canonical reinforcement learning methods, and has been used by (Banerjee & Stone, IJCAI 2007) in GGP. In this paper we implement Q-learning in GGP for three small-board games (Tic-Tac-Toe, Connect Four, Hex)source code: https://github.com/wh1992v/ggp-rl, to allow comparison to Banerjee et al.. We find that Q-learning converges to a high win rate in GGP. For the ε-greedy strategy, we propose a first enhancement, the dynamic ε algorithm. In addition, inspired by (Gelly & Silver, ICML 2007) we combine online search (Monte Carlo Search) to enhance offline learning, and propose QM-learning for GGP. Both enhancements improve the performance of classical Q-learning. In this work, GGP allows us to show, if augmented by appropriate enhancements, that classical table-based Q-learning can perform well in small games.

Tasks requiring deductive reasoning, especially those involving multiple steps, often demand adaptive strategies such as intermediate generation of rationales or programs, as no single approach is universally optimal. While Language Models (LMs) can enhance their outputs through iterative self-refinement and strategy adjustments, they frequently fail to apply the most effective strategy in their first attempt. This inefficiency raises the question: Can LMs learn to select the optimal strategy in the first attempt, without a need for refinement? To address this challenge, we introduce SMART (Self-learning Meta-strategy Agent for Reasoning Tasks), a novel framework that enables LMs to autonomously learn and select the most effective strategies for various reasoning tasks. We model the strategy selection process as a Markov Decision Process and leverage reinforcement learning-driven continuous self-improvement to allow the model to find the suitable strategy to solve a given task. Unlike traditional self-refinement methods that rely on multiple inference passes or external feedback, SMART allows an LM to internalize the outcomes of its own reasoning processes and adjust its strategy accordingly, aiming for correct solutions on the first attempt. Our experiments across various reasoning datasets and with different model architectures demonstrate that SMART significantly enhances the ability of models to choose optimal strategies without external guidance (+15 points on the GSM8K dataset). By achieving higher accuracy with a single inference pass, SMART not only improves performance but also reduces computational costs for refinement-based strategies, paving the way for more efficient and intelligent reasoning in LMs.

Recent improvements in conditional generative modeling have made it possible to generate high-quality images from language descriptions alone. We investigate whether these methods can directly address the problem of sequential decision-making. We view decision-making not through the lens of reinforcement learning (RL), but rather through conditional generative modeling. To our surprise, we find that our formulation leads to policies that can outperform existing offline RL approaches across standard benchmarks. By modeling a policy as a return-conditional diffusion model, we illustrate how we may circumvent the need for dynamic programming and subsequently eliminate many of the complexities that come with traditional offline RL. We further demonstrate the advantages of modeling policies as conditional diffusion models by considering two other conditioning variables: constraints and skills. Conditioning on a single constraint or skill during training leads to behaviors at test-time that can satisfy several constraints together or demonstrate a composition of skills. Our results illustrate that conditional generative modeling is a powerful tool for decision-making.

We explore the use of Evolution Strategies (ES), a class of black box optimization algorithms, as an alternative to popular MDP-based RL techniques such as Q-learning and Policy Gradients. Experiments on MuJoCo and Atari show that ES is a viable solution strategy that scales extremely well with the number of CPUs available: By using a novel communication strategy based on common random numbers, our ES implementation only needs to communicate scalars, making it possible to scale to over a thousand parallel workers. This allows us to solve 3D humanoid walking in 10 minutes and obtain competitive results on most Atari games after one hour of training. In addition, we highlight several advantages of ES as a black box optimization technique: it is invariant to action frequency and delayed rewards, tolerant of extremely long horizons, and does not need temporal discounting or value function approximation.

Motivated by concerns about making online decisions that incur undue amount of risk at each time step, in this paper, we formulate the probably anytime-safe stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits problem. In this problem, the agent is given the option to select a subset of size at most K from a set of L ground items. Each item is associated to a certain mean reward as well as a variance that represents its risk. To mitigate the risk that the agent incurs, we require that with probability at least 1-delta, over the entire horizon of time T, each of the choices that the agent makes should contain items whose sum of variances does not exceed a certain variance budget. We call this probably anytime-safe constraint. Under this constraint, we design and analyze an algorithm {\sc PASCombUCB} that minimizes the regret over the horizon of time T. By developing accompanying information-theoretic lower bounds, we show that under both the problem-dependent and problem-independent paradigms, {\sc PASCombUCB} is almost asymptotically optimal. Experiments are conducted to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our problem setup, the proposed {\sc PASCombUCB} algorithm, and novel analyses are applicable to domains such as recommendation systems and transportation in which an agent is allowed to choose multiple items at a single time step and wishes to control the risk over the whole time horizon.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems play an increasingly prominent role in human decision-making, challenges surface in the realm of human-AI interactions. One challenge arises from the suboptimal AI policies due to the inadequate consideration of humans disregarding AI recommendations, as well as the need for AI to provide advice selectively when it is most pertinent. This paper presents a sequential decision-making model that (i) takes into account the human's adherence level (the probability that the human follows/rejects machine advice) and (ii) incorporates a defer option so that the machine can temporarily refrain from making advice. We provide learning algorithms that learn the optimal advice policy and make advice only at critical time stamps. Compared to problem-agnostic reinforcement learning algorithms, our specialized learning algorithms not only enjoy better theoretical convergence properties but also show strong empirical performance.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has proven to be an effective post-training strategy for enhancing reasoning in vision-language models (VLMs). Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) is a recent prominent method that encourages models to generate complete reasoning traces before answering, leading to increased token usage and computational cost. Inspired by the human-like thinking process-where people skip reasoning for easy questions but think carefully when needed-we explore how to enable VLMs to first decide when reasoning is necessary. To realize this, we propose TON, a two-stage training strategy: (i) a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage with a simple yet effective 'thought dropout' operation, where reasoning traces are randomly replaced with empty thoughts. This introduces a think-or-not format that serves as a cold start for selective reasoning; (ii) a GRPO stage that enables the model to freely explore when to think or not, while maximizing task-aware outcome rewards. Experimental results show that TON can reduce the completion length by up to 90% compared to vanilla GRPO, without sacrificing performance or even improving it. Further evaluations across diverse vision-language tasks-covering a range of reasoning difficulties under both 3B and 7B models-consistently reveal that the model progressively learns to bypass unnecessary reasoning steps as training advances. These findings shed light on the path toward human-like reasoning patterns in reinforcement learning approaches. Our code is available at https://github.com/kokolerk/TON.

Algorithmic trading requires short-term decisions aligned with long-term financial goals. While reinforcement learning (RL) has been explored for such tactical decisions, its adoption remains limited by myopic behavior and opaque policy rationale. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated strategic reasoning and multi-modal financial signal interpretation when guided by well-designed prompts. We propose a hybrid system where LLMs generate high-level trading strategies to guide RL agents in their actions. We evaluate (i) the rationale of LLM-generated strategies via expert review, and (ii) the Sharpe Ratio (SR) and Maximum Drawdown (MDD) of LLM-guided agents versus unguided baselines. Results show improved return and risk metrics over standard RL.

The prevalent deployment of learning from human preferences through reinforcement learning (RLHF) relies on two important approximations: the first assumes that pairwise preferences can be substituted with pointwise rewards. The second assumes that a reward model trained on these pointwise rewards can generalize from collected data to out-of-distribution data sampled by the policy. Recently, Direct Preference Optimisation (DPO) has been proposed as an approach that bypasses the second approximation and learn directly a policy from collected data without the reward modelling stage. However, this method still heavily relies on the first approximation. In this paper we try to gain a deeper theoretical understanding of these practical algorithms. In particular we derive a new general objective called PsiPO for learning from human preferences that is expressed in terms of pairwise preferences and therefore bypasses both approximations. This new general objective allows us to perform an in-depth analysis of the behavior of RLHF and DPO (as special cases of PsiPO) and to identify their potential pitfalls. We then consider another special case for PsiPO by setting Psi simply to Identity, for which we can derive an efficient optimisation procedure, prove performance guarantees and demonstrate its empirical superiority to DPO on some illustrative examples.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

When trying to solve a computational problem, we are often faced with a choice between algorithms that are guaranteed to return the right answer but differ in their runtime distributions (e.g., SAT solvers, sorting algorithms). This paper aims to lay theoretical foundations for such choices by formalizing preferences over runtime distributions. It might seem that we should simply prefer the algorithm that minimizes expected runtime. However, such preferences would be driven by exactly how slow our algorithm is on bad inputs, whereas in practice we are typically willing to cut off occasional, sufficiently long runs before they finish. We propose a principled alternative, taking a utility-theoretic approach to characterize the scoring functions that describe preferences over algorithms. These functions depend on the way our value for solving our problem decreases with time and on the distribution from which captimes are drawn. We describe examples of realistic utility functions and show how to leverage a maximum-entropy approach for modeling underspecified captime distributions. Finally, we show how to efficiently estimate an algorithm's expected utility from runtime samples.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

Leveraging learned strategies in unfamiliar scenarios is fundamental to human intelligence. In reinforcement learning, rationally reusing the policies acquired from other tasks or human experts is critical for tackling problems that are difficult to learn from scratch. In this work, we present a framework called Selective Myopic bEhavior Control~(SMEC), which results from the insight that the short-term behaviors of prior policies are sharable across tasks. By evaluating the behaviors of prior policies via a hybrid value function architecture, SMEC adaptively aggregates the sharable short-term behaviors of prior policies and the long-term behaviors of the task policy, leading to coordinated decisions. Empirical results on a collection of manipulation and locomotion tasks demonstrate that SMEC outperforms existing methods, and validate the ability of SMEC to leverage related prior policies.

We study the problem of planning under model uncertainty in an online meta-reinforcement learning (RL) setting where an agent is presented with a sequence of related tasks with limited interactions per task. The agent can use its experience in each task and across tasks to estimate both the transition model and the distribution over tasks. We propose an algorithm to meta-learn the underlying structure across tasks, utilize it to plan in each task, and upper-bound the regret of the planning loss. Our bound suggests that the average regret over tasks decreases as the number of tasks increases and as the tasks are more similar. In the classical single-task setting, it is known that the planning horizon should depend on the estimated model's accuracy, that is, on the number of samples within task. We generalize this finding to meta-RL and study this dependence of planning horizons on the number of tasks. Based on our theoretical findings, we derive heuristics for selecting slowly increasing discount factors, and we validate its significance empirically.

Proactive agents must decide not only what to say but also whether and when to intervene. Many current systems rely on brittle heuristics or indiscriminate long reasoning, which offers little control over the benefit-burden tradeoff. We formulate the problem as cost-sensitive selective intervention and present PRISM, a novel framework that couples a decision-theoretic gate with a dual-process reasoning architecture. At inference time, the agent intervenes only when a calibrated probability of user acceptance exceeds a threshold derived from asymmetric costs of missed help and false alarms. Inspired by festina lente (Latin: "make haste slowly"), we gate by an acceptance-calibrated, cost-derived threshold and invoke a resource-intensive Slow mode with counterfactual checks only near the decision boundary, concentrating computation on ambiguous and high-stakes cases. Training uses gate-aligned, schema-locked distillation: a teacher running the full PRISM pipeline provides dense, executable supervision on unlabeled interaction traces, while the student learns a response policy that is explicitly decoupled from the intervention gate to enable tunable and auditable control. On ProactiveBench, PRISM reduces false alarms by 22.78% and improves F1 by 20.14% over strong baselines. These results show that principled decision-theoretic gating, paired with selective slow reasoning and aligned distillation, yields proactive agents that are precise, computationally efficient, and controllable. To facilitate reproducibility, we release our code, models, and resources at https://prism-festinalente.github.io/; all experiments use the open-source ProactiveBench benchmark.

We consider the task of identifying the Copeland winner(s) in a dueling bandits problem with ternary feedback. This is an underexplored but practically relevant variant of the conventional dueling bandits problem, in which, in addition to strict preference between two arms, one may observe feedback in the form of an indifference. We provide a lower bound on the sample complexity for any learning algorithm finding the Copeland winner(s) with a fixed error probability. Moreover, we propose POCOWISTA, an algorithm with a sample complexity that almost matches this lower bound, and which shows excellent empirical performance, even for the conventional dueling bandits problem. For the case where the preference probabilities satisfy a specific type of stochastic transitivity, we provide a refined version with an improved worst case sample complexity.

Learning to play optimally against any mixture over a diverse set of strategies is of important practical interests in competitive games. In this paper, we propose simplex-NeuPL that satisfies two desiderata simultaneously: i) learning a population of strategically diverse basis policies, represented by a single conditional network; ii) using the same network, learn best-responses to any mixture over the simplex of basis policies. We show that the resulting conditional policies incorporate prior information about their opponents effectively, enabling near optimal returns against arbitrary mixture policies in a game with tractable best-responses. We verify that such policies behave Bayes-optimally under uncertainty and offer insights in using this flexibility at test time. Finally, we offer evidence that learning best-responses to any mixture policies is an effective auxiliary task for strategic exploration, which, by itself, can lead to more performant populations.

From out-competing grandmasters in chess to informing high-stakes healthcare decisions, emerging methods from artificial intelligence are increasingly capable of making complex and strategic decisions in diverse, high-dimensional, and uncertain situations. But can these methods help us devise robust strategies for managing environmental systems under great uncertainty? Here we explore how reinforcement learning, a subfield of artificial intelligence, approaches decision problems through a lens similar to adaptive environmental management: learning through experience to gradually improve decisions with updated knowledge. We review where reinforcement learning (RL) holds promise for improving evidence-informed adaptive management decisions even when classical optimization methods are intractable. For example, model-free deep RL might help identify quantitative decision strategies even when models are nonidentifiable. Finally, we discuss technical and social issues that arise when applying reinforcement learning to adaptive management problems in the environmental domain. Our synthesis suggests that environmental management and computer science can learn from one another about the practices, promises, and perils of experience-based decision-making.

Large language model (LLM)-based agents exhibit strong step-by-step reasoning capabilities over short horizons, yet often fail to sustain coherent behavior over long planning horizons. We argue that this failure reflects a fundamental mismatch: step-wise reasoning induces a form of step-wise greedy policy that is adequate for short horizons but fails in long-horizon planning, where early actions must account for delayed consequences. From this planning-centric perspective, we study LLM-based agents in deterministic, fully structured environments with explicit state transitions and evaluation signals. Our analysis reveals a core failure mode of reasoning-based policies: locally optimal choices induced by step-wise scoring lead to early myopic commitments that are systematically amplified over time and difficult to recover from. We introduce FLARE (Future-aware Lookahead with Reward Estimation) as a minimal instantiation of future-aware planning to enforce explicit lookahead, value propagation, and limited commitment in a single model, allowing downstream outcomes to influence early decisions. Across multiple benchmarks, agent frameworks, and LLM backbones, FLARE consistently improves task performance and planning-level behavior, frequently allowing LLaMA-8B with FLARE to outperform GPT-4o with standard step-by-step reasoning. These results establish a clear distinction between reasoning and planning.

Preference-based reinforcement learning (PbRL) is an approach that enables RL agents to learn from preference, which is particularly useful when formulating a reward function is challenging. Existing PbRL methods generally involve a two-step procedure: they first learn a reward model based on given preference data and then employ off-the-shelf reinforcement learning algorithms using the learned reward model. However, obtaining an accurate reward model solely from preference information, especially when the preference is from human teachers, can be difficult. Instead, we propose a PbRL algorithm that directly learns from preference without requiring any reward modeling. To achieve this, we adopt a contrastive learning framework to design a novel policy scoring metric that assigns a high score to policies that align with the given preferences. We apply our algorithm to offline RL tasks with actual human preference labels and show that our algorithm outperforms or is on par with the existing PbRL methods. Notably, on high-dimensional control tasks, our algorithm surpasses offline RL methods that learn with ground-truth reward information. Finally, we show that our algorithm can be successfully applied to fine-tune large language models.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding how strategic behavior emerges in multi-agent environments has become an important alignment challenge. We take a neutral empirical stance and construct a controlled environment in which strategic behavior can be directly observed and measured. We introduce a large-scale multi-agent simulation in a simplified model of New York City, where LLM-driven agents interact under opposing incentives. Blue agents aim to reach their destinations efficiently, while Red agents attempt to divert them toward billboard-heavy routes using persuasive language to maximize advertising revenue. Hidden identities make navigation socially mediated, forcing agents to decide when to trust or deceive. We study policy learning through an iterative simulation pipeline that updates agent policies across repeated interaction rounds using Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO). Blue agents are optimized to reduce billboard exposure while preserving navigation efficiency, whereas Red agents adapt to exploit remaining weaknesses. Across iterations, the best Blue policy improves task success from 46.0% to 57.3%, although susceptibility remains high at 70.7%. Later policies exhibit stronger selective cooperation while preserving trajectory efficiency. However, a persistent safety-helpfulness trade-off remains: policies that better resist adversarial steering do not simultaneously maximize task completion. Overall, our results show that LLM agents can exhibit limited strategic behavior, including selective trust and deception, while remaining highly vulnerable to adversarial persuasion.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

In this paper we address the solution of the popular Wordle puzzle, using new reinforcement learning methods, which apply more generally to adaptive control of dynamic systems and to classes of Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) problems. These methods are based on approximation in value space and the rollout approach, admit a straightforward implementation, and provide improved performance over various heuristic approaches. For the Wordle puzzle, they yield on-line solution strategies that are very close to optimal at relatively modest computational cost. Our methods are viable for more complex versions of Wordle and related search problems, for which an optimal strategy would be impossible to compute. They are also applicable to a wide range of adaptive sequential decision problems that involve an unknown or frequently changing environment whose parameters are estimated on-line.

We compare the (1,lambda)-EA and the (1 + lambda)-EA on the recently introduced benchmark DisOM, which is the OneMax function with randomly planted local optima. Previous work showed that if all local optima have the same relative height, then the plus strategy never loses more than a factor O(nlog n) compared to the comma strategy. Here we show that even small random fluctuations in the heights of the local optima have a devastating effect for the plus strategy and lead to super-polynomial runtimes. On the other hand, due to their ability to escape local optima, comma strategies are unaffected by the height of the local optima and remain efficient. Our results hold for a broad class of possible distortions and show that the plus strategy, but not the comma strategy, is generally deceived by sparse unstructured fluctuations of a smooth landscape.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

Effective decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) is essential for handling intricate tasks. However, existing approaches prioritize performance but often overlook the balance between effectiveness and computational cost. To address this, we first introduce the 3E Criteria to systematically assess the cost-effectiveness of search strategies, revealing that existing methods often trade significant efficiency for marginal performance gains. To improve LLM decision-making while maintaining efficiency, we propose the Speculative Reward Model (SRM), a plug-and-play framework that seamlessly integrates with existing search strategies. Specifically, SRM employs an external reward assigner to predict optimal actions, reducing reliance on LLMs' internal self-evaluation. And a speculative verification mechanism is used to prune suboptimal choices and guide the search toward more promising steps. We evaluate SRM on several complex decision-making tasks including mathematical reasoning, planning and numerical reasoning in specialized domains. Experimental results show that SRM reduces costs to 1/10 of the original search framework on average while maintaining effectiveness.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

In this paper we introduce a new unsupervised reinforcement learning method for discovering the set of intrinsic options available to an agent. This set is learned by maximizing the number of different states an agent can reliably reach, as measured by the mutual information between the set of options and option termination states. To this end, we instantiate two policy gradient based algorithms, one that creates an explicit embedding space of options and one that represents options implicitly. The algorithms also provide an explicit measure of empowerment in a given state that can be used by an empowerment maximizing agent. The algorithm scales well with function approximation and we demonstrate the applicability of the algorithm on a range of tasks.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

We consider the task of evaluating policies of algorithmic resource allocation through randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Such policies are tasked with optimizing the utilization of limited intervention resources, with the goal of maximizing the benefits derived. Evaluation of such allocation policies through RCTs proves difficult, notwithstanding the scale of the trial, because the individuals' outcomes are inextricably interlinked through resource constraints controlling the policy decisions. Our key contribution is to present a new estimator leveraging our proposed novel concept, that involves retrospective reshuffling of participants across experimental arms at the end of an RCT. We identify conditions under which such reassignments are permissible and can be leveraged to construct counterfactual trials, whose outcomes can be accurately ascertained, for free. We prove theoretically that such an estimator is more accurate than common estimators based on sample means -- we show that it returns an unbiased estimate and simultaneously reduces variance. We demonstrate the value of our approach through empirical experiments on synthetic, semi-synthetic as well as real case study data and show improved estimation accuracy across the board.

Existing methods usually leverage a fixed strategy, such as natural language reasoning, code-augmented reasoning, tool-integrated reasoning, or ensemble-based reasoning, to guide Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform mathematical reasoning. Our analysis reveals that the single strategy cannot adapt to problem-specific requirements and thus overlooks the trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency. To address these issues, we propose Planning and Routing through Instance-Specific Modeling (PRISM), a novel framework that decouples mathematical reasoning into two stages: strategy planning and targeted execution. Specifically, we first curate a multi-strategy preference dataset, which we call MathStrat, capturing correctness, process quality, and computational efficiency for each problem--strategy pair. Then, we train a lightweight Strategy Adapter based on the dataset to obtain confidence distributions over the mentioned four reasoning strategies. At inference time, an adaptive routing policy dynamically tailors the reasoning approach based on predictor confidence. It directs the model to use single-strategy execution for high-confidence predictions, dual-strategy verification for competitive scenarios, or comprehensive multi-strategy exploration for uncertain cases. Extensive experiments across five mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that PRISM consistently outperforms individual strategies and ensemble baselines, achieving improvements ranging from 0.9% to 7.6% across different base models. The adaptive routing approach shows particularly strong benefits for mathematical reasoning tasks across diverse model architectures. Our code is released at https://github.com/reml-group/PRISM.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated their proficiency in complex reasoning tasks, their performance in dynamic, interactive, and competitive scenarios - such as business strategy and stock market analysis - remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we formally explore the dynamic reasoning capabilities of LLMs for decision-making in rapidly evolving environments. We introduce two game theory-based pilot challenges that mirror the complexities of real-world dynamic decision-making. These challenges are well-defined, enabling clear, controllable, and precise evaluation of LLMs' dynamic reasoning abilities. Through extensive experiments, we find that existing reasoning methods tend to falter in dynamic settings that require k-level thinking - a key concept not tackled by previous works. To address this, we propose a novel reasoning approach for LLMs, named "K-Level Reasoning". This approach adopts the perspective of rivals to recursively employ k-level thinking based on available historical information, which significantly improves the prediction accuracy of rivals' subsequent moves and informs more strategic decision-making. This research not only sets a robust quantitative benchmark for the assessment of dynamic reasoning but also markedly enhances the proficiency of LLMs in dynamic contexts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Large language models (LLMs) can achieve strong reasoning performance with sufficient computation, but they do not inherently know how much computation a task requires. We study budgeted inference-time reasoning for multiple tasks under a strict global token constraint and formalize it as a Ordered Stochastic Multiple-Choice Knapsack Problem(OS-MCKP). This perspective highlights a meta-cognitive requirement -- anticipating task difficulty, estimating return over investment (ROI), and allocating computation strategically. We propose ROI-Reasoning, a two-stage framework that endows LLMs with intrinsic, budget-aware rationality. In the first stage, Meta-Cognitive Fine-Tuning teaches models to predict reasoning cost and expected utility before generation, enabling explicit solve-or-skip decisions. Next, Rationality-Aware Reinforcement Learning optimizes sequential decision making under a hard token budget, allowing models to learn long-horizon allocation strategies. Across budgeted mathematical reasoning benchmarks, ROI-Reasoning consistently improves overall score while substantially reducing regret under tight computation budgets.

We study the non-stationary dueling bandits problem with K arms, where the time horizon T consists of M stationary segments, each of which is associated with its own preference matrix. The learner repeatedly selects a pair of arms and observes a binary preference between them as feedback. To minimize the accumulated regret, the learner needs to pick the Condorcet winner of each stationary segment as often as possible, despite preference matrices and segment lengths being unknown. We propose the Beat, the, Winner, Reset algorithm and prove a bound on its expected binary weak regret in the stationary case, which tightens the bound of current state-of-art algorithms. We also show a regret bound for the non-stationary case, without requiring knowledge of M or T. We further propose and analyze two meta-algorithms, DETECT for weak regret and Monitored, Dueling, Bandits for strong regret, both based on a detection-window approach that can incorporate any dueling bandit algorithm as a black-box algorithm. Finally, we prove a worst-case lower bound for expected weak regret in the non-stationary case.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) has emerged as a popular alternative to Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), offering theoretical equivalence with simpler implementation. We prove this equivalence is conditional rather than universal, depending on an implicit assumption frequently violated in practice: the RLHF-optimal policy must prefer human-preferred responses. When this assumption fails, DPO optimizes relative advantage over the reference policy rather than absolute alignment with human preferences, leading to pathological convergence where policies decrease DPO loss while preferring dispreferred responses. We characterize when this assumption is violated, show the existence of an undesirable solution space, and prove that DPO and RLHF optimize fundamentally different objectives in such cases. To address this, we introduce Constrained Preference Optimization (CPO), augmenting RLHF with constraints for provable alignment. We further provide a geometric interpretation through soft margin ranking, revealing that DPO implements margin ranking with potentially negative targets. Our theoretical analysis establishes when DPOs' guarantees hold and provides solutions preserving simplicity with provable alignment. Comprehensive experiments on standard benchmarks demonstrate that CPO achieves state-of-the-art performance. Code is available at: https://github.com/visitworld123/CPO.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

Should prediction models always deliver a prediction? In the pursuit of maximum predictive performance, critical considerations of reliability and fairness are often overshadowed, particularly when it comes to the role of uncertainty. Selective regression, also known as the "reject option," allows models to abstain from predictions in cases of considerable uncertainty. Initially proposed seven decades ago, approaches to selective regression have mostly focused on distribution-based proxies for measuring uncertainty, particularly conditional variance. However, this focus neglects the significant influence of model-specific biases on a model's performance. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to selective regression by leveraging conformal prediction, which provides grounded confidence measures for individual predictions based on model-specific biases. In addition, we propose a standardized evaluation framework to allow proper comparison of selective regression approaches. Via an extensive experimental approach, we demonstrate how our proposed approach, conformalized selective regression, demonstrates an advantage over multiple state-of-the-art baselines.

This paper investigates approaches to enhance the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Model (LLM) agents using Reinforcement Learning (RL). Specifically, we focus on multi-turn tool-use scenarios, which can be naturally modeled as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). While existing approaches often train multi-turn LLM agents with trajectory-level advantage estimation in bandit settings, they struggle with turn-level credit assignment across multiple decision steps, limiting their performance on multi-turn reasoning tasks. To address this, we introduce a fine-grained turn-level advantage estimation strategy to enable more precise credit assignment in multi-turn agent interactions. The strategy is general and can be incorporated into various RL algorithms such as Group Relative Preference Optimization (GRPO). Our experimental evaluation on multi-turn reasoning and search-based tool-use tasks with GRPO implementations highlights the effectiveness of the MDP framework and the turn-level credit assignment in advancing the multi-turn reasoning capabilities of LLM agents in complex decision-making settings. Our method achieves 100% success in tool execution and 50% accuracy in exact answer matching, significantly outperforming baselines, which fail to invoke tools and achieve only 20-30% exact match accuracy.

We consider online learning problems under a partial observability model capturing situations where the information conveyed to the learner is between full information and bandit feedback. In the simplest variant, we assume that in addition to its own loss, the learner also gets to observe losses of some other actions. The revealed losses depend on the learner's action and a directed observation system chosen by the environment. For this setting, we propose the first algorithm that enjoys near-optimal regret guarantees without having to know the observation system before selecting its actions. Along similar lines, we also define a new partial information setting that models online combinatorial optimization problems where the feedback received by the learner is between semi-bandit and full feedback. As the predictions of our first algorithm cannot be always computed efficiently in this setting, we propose another algorithm with similar properties and with the benefit of always being computationally efficient, at the price of a slightly more complicated tuning mechanism. Both algorithms rely on a novel exploration strategy called implicit exploration, which is shown to be more efficient both computationally and information-theoretically than previously studied exploration strategies for the problem.

We study a graph bandit setting where the objective of the learner is to detect the most influential node of a graph by requesting as little information from the graph as possible. One of the relevant applications for this setting is marketing in social networks, where the marketer aims at finding and taking advantage of the most influential customers. The existing approaches for bandit problems on graphs require either partial or complete knowledge of the graph. In this paper, we do not assume any knowledge of the graph, but we consider a setting where it can be gradually discovered in a sequential and active way. At each round, the learner chooses a node of the graph and the only information it receives is a stochastic set of the nodes that the chosen node is currently influencing. To address this setting, we propose BARE, a bandit strategy for which we prove a regret guarantee that scales with the detectable dimension, a problem dependent quantity that is often much smaller than the number of nodes.

We consider algorithms for learning reward functions from human preferences over pairs of trajectory segments, as used in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Most recent work assumes that human preferences are generated based only upon the reward accrued within those segments, or their partial return. Recent work casts doubt on the validity of this assumption, proposing an alternative preference model based upon regret. We investigate the consequences of assuming preferences are based upon partial return when they actually arise from regret. We argue that the learned function is an approximation of the optimal advantage function, A^*_r, not a reward function. We find that if a specific pitfall is addressed, this incorrect assumption is not particularly harmful, resulting in a highly shaped reward function. Nonetheless, this incorrect usage of A^*_r is less desirable than the appropriate and simpler approach of greedy maximization of A^*_r. From the perspective of the regret preference model, we also provide a clearer interpretation of fine tuning contemporary large language models with RLHF. This paper overall provides insight regarding why learning under the partial return preference model tends to work so well in practice, despite it conforming poorly to how humans give preferences.

Although large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning abilities in structured tasks (e.g., coding and mathematics), it remains unexplored whether these abilities extend to strategic multi-agent environments. We investigate strategic reasoning capabilities -- the process of choosing an optimal course of action by predicting and adapting to others' actions -- of LLMs by analyzing their performance in three classical games from behavioral economics. We evaluate three standard LLMs (ChatGPT-4, Claude-2.1, Gemini 1.5) and three specialized reasoning LLMs (GPT-o1, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, Gemini Flash Thinking 2.0) using hierarchical models of bounded rationality. Our results show that reasoning LLMs exhibit superior strategic reasoning compared to standard LLMs (which do not demonstrate substantial capabilities), and often match or exceed human performance. Since strategic reasoning is fundamental to future AI systems (including Agentic AI and Artificial General Intelligence), our findings demonstrate the importance of dedicated reasoning capabilities in achieving effective strategic reasoning.

Existing preference optimization methods are mainly designed for directly learning from human feedback with the assumption that paired examples (preferred vs. dis-preferred) are available. In contrast, we propose a method that can leverage unpaired preferred or dis-preferred examples, and works even when only one type of feedback (positive or negative) is available. This flexibility allows us to apply it in scenarios with varying forms of feedback and models, including training generative language models based on human feedback as well as training policies for sequential decision-making problems, where learned (value) functions are available. Our approach builds upon the probabilistic framework introduced in (Dayan and Hinton, 1997), which proposes to use expectation-maximization (EM) to directly optimize the probability of preferred outcomes (as opposed to classic expected reward maximization). To obtain a practical algorithm, we identify and address a key limitation in current EM-based methods: when applied to preference optimization, they solely maximize the likelihood of preferred examples, while neglecting dis-preferred samples. We show how one can extend EM algorithms to explicitly incorporate dis-preferred outcomes, leading to a novel, theoretically grounded, preference optimization algorithm that offers an intuitive and versatile way to learn from both positive and negative feedback.

Most existing chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting methods suffer from the issues of generalizability and consistency, as they often rely on instance-specific solutions that may not be applicable to other cases and lack task-level consistency in their reasoning steps. To address these limitations, we propose a comprehensive framework, StrategyLLM, harnessing the capabilities of LLMs to construct generalizable and consistent few-shot prompts for various tasks automatically. To this end, StrategyLLM employs four LLM-based agents: strategy generator, executor, optimizer, and evaluator, working together to generate, evaluate, and select promising strategies for a given task. The experimental results demonstrate that StrategyLLM outperforms the competitive baseline CoT-SC that requires human-annotated solutions on 13 datasets across 4 challenging tasks without human involvement, including math reasoning (34.21% rightarrow 38.79%), commonsense reasoning (70.3% rightarrow 72.5%), algorithmic reasoning (51.7% rightarrow 62.0%), and symbolic reasoning (30.0% rightarrow 79.2%).

In risk-averse reinforcement learning (RL), the goal is to optimize some risk measure of the returns. A risk measure often focuses on the worst returns out of the agent's experience. As a result, standard methods for risk-averse RL often ignore high-return strategies. We prove that under certain conditions this inevitably leads to a local-optimum barrier, and propose a soft risk mechanism to bypass it. We also devise a novel Cross Entropy module for risk sampling, which (1) preserves risk aversion despite the soft risk; (2) independently improves sample efficiency. By separating the risk aversion of the sampler and the optimizer, we can sample episodes with poor conditions, yet optimize with respect to successful strategies. We combine these two concepts in CeSoR - Cross-entropy Soft-Risk optimization algorithm - which can be applied on top of any risk-averse policy gradient (PG) method. We demonstrate improved risk aversion in maze navigation, autonomous driving, and resource allocation benchmarks, including in scenarios where standard risk-averse PG completely fails.

Direct preference optimization (DPO) is a form of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) where the policy is learned directly from preferential feedback. Although many models of human preferences exist, the critical task of selecting the most informative feedback for training them is under-explored. We propose an active learning framework for DPO, which can be applied to collect human feedback online or to choose the most informative subset of already collected feedback offline. We propose efficient algorithms for both settings. The key idea is to linearize the DPO objective at the last layer of the neural network representation of the optimized policy and then compute the D-optimal design to collect preferential feedback. We prove that the errors in our DPO logit estimates diminish with more feedback. We show the effectiveness of our algorithms empirically in the setting that matches our theory and also on large language models.

This paper investigates the rationality of large language models (LLMs) in strategic decision-making contexts, specifically within the framework of game theory. We evaluate several state-of-the-art LLMs across a spectrum of complete-information and incomplete-information games. Our findings reveal that LLMs frequently deviate from rational strategies, particularly as the complexity of the game increases with larger payoff matrices or deeper sequential trees. To address these limitations, we design multiple game-theoretic workflows that guide the reasoning and decision-making processes of LLMs. These workflows aim to enhance the models' ability to compute Nash Equilibria and make rational choices, even under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information. Experimental results demonstrate that the adoption of these workflows significantly improves the rationality and robustness of LLMs in game-theoretic tasks. Specifically, with the workflow, LLMs exhibit marked improvements in identifying optimal strategies, achieving near-optimal allocations in negotiation scenarios, and reducing susceptibility to exploitation during negotiations. Furthermore, we explore the meta-strategic considerations of whether it is rational for agents to adopt such workflows, recognizing that the decision to use or forgo the workflow constitutes a game-theoretic issue in itself. Our research contributes to a deeper understanding of LLMs' decision-making capabilities in strategic contexts and provides insights into enhancing their rationality through structured workflows. The findings have implications for the development of more robust and strategically sound AI agents capable of navigating complex interactive environments. Code and data supporting this study are available at https://github.com/Wenyueh/game_theory.

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

The growing emotional stress in modern society has increased the demand for Emotional Support Conversations (ESC). While Large Language Models (LLMs) show promise for ESC, they face two key challenges: (1) low strategy selection accuracy, and (2) preference bias, limiting their adaptability to emotional needs of users. Existing supervised fine-tuning (SFT) struggles to address these issues, as it rigidly trains models on single gold-standard responses without modeling nuanced strategy trade-offs. To overcome these limitations, we propose Chain-of-Strategy Optimization (CSO), a novel approach that optimizes strategy selection preferences at each dialogue turn. We first leverage Monte Carlo Tree Search to construct ESC-Pro, a high-quality preference dataset with turn-level strategy-response pairs. Training on ESC-Pro with CSO improves both strategy accuracy and bias mitigation, enabling LLMs to generate more empathetic and contextually appropriate responses. Experiments on LLaMA-3.1-8B, Gemma-2-9B, and Qwen2.5-7B demonstrate that CSO outperforms standard SFT, highlighting the efficacy of fine-grained, turn-level preference modeling in ESC.

Wordle is an online word puzzle game that gained viral popularity in January 2022. The goal is to guess a hidden five letter word. After each guess, the player gains information about whether the letters they guessed are present in the word, and whether they are in the correct position. Numerous blogs have suggested guessing strategies and starting word lists that improve the chance of winning. Optimized algorithms can win 100% of games within five of the six allowed trials. However, it is infeasible for human players to use these algorithms due to an inability to perfectly recall all known 5-letter words and perform complex calculations that optimize information gain. Here, we present two different methods for choosing starting words along with a framework for discovering the optimal human strategy based on reinforcement learning. Human Wordle players can use the rules we discover to optimize their chance of winning.

The effectiveness of Large Language Models (LLMs) is heavily influenced by the reasoning strategies, or styles of thought, employed in their prompts. However, the interplay between these reasoning styles, model architecture, and task type remains poorly understood. To address this, we introduce StyleBench, a comprehensive benchmark for systematically evaluating reasoning styles across diverse tasks and models. We assess five representative reasoning styles, including Chain of Thought (CoT), Tree of Thought (ToT), Algorithm of Thought (AoT), Sketch of Thought (SoT), and Chain-of-Draft (CoD) on five reasoning tasks, using 15 open-source models from major families (LLaMA, Qwen, Mistral, Gemma, GPT-OSS, Phi, and DeepSeek) ranging from 270M to 120B parameters. Our large-scale analysis reveals that no single style is universally optimal. We demonstrate that strategy efficacy is highly contingent on both model scale and task type: search-based methods (AoT, ToT) excel in open-ended problems but require large-scale models, while concise styles (SoT, CoD) achieve radical efficiency gains on well-defined tasks. Furthermore, we identify key behavioral patterns: smaller models frequently fail to follow output instructions and default to guessing, while reasoning robustness emerges as a function of scale. Our findings offer a crucial roadmap for selecting optimal reasoning strategies based on specific constraints, we open source the benchmark in https://github.com/JamesJunyuGuo/Style_Bench.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) methods are emerging as a way to fine-tune diffusion models (DMs) for visual generation. However, commonly used on-policy strategies are limited by the generalization capability of the reward model, while off-policy approaches require large amounts of difficult-to-obtain paired human-annotated data, particularly in visual generation tasks. To address the limitations of both on- and off-policy RLHF, we propose a preference optimization method that aligns DMs with preferences without relying on reward models or paired human-annotated data. Specifically, we introduce a Semi-Policy Preference Optimization (SePPO) method. SePPO leverages previous checkpoints as reference models while using them to generate on-policy reference samples, which replace "losing images" in preference pairs. This approach allows us to optimize using only off-policy "winning images." Furthermore, we design a strategy for reference model selection that expands the exploration in the policy space. Notably, we do not simply treat reference samples as negative examples for learning. Instead, we design an anchor-based criterion to assess whether the reference samples are likely to be winning or losing images, allowing the model to selectively learn from the generated reference samples. This approach mitigates performance degradation caused by the uncertainty in reference sample quality. We validate SePPO across both text-to-image and text-to-video benchmarks. SePPO surpasses all previous approaches on the text-to-image benchmarks and also demonstrates outstanding performance on the text-to-video benchmarks. Code will be released in https://github.com/DwanZhang-AI/SePPO.

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has improved the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs), yet state-of-the-art methods still fail to learn on many training problems. On hard problems, on-policy RL rarely explores even a single correct rollout, yielding zero reward and no learning signal for driving improvement. We find that natural solutions to remedy this exploration problem from classical RL, such as entropy bonuses, more permissive clipping of the importance ratio, or direct optimization of pass@k objectives, do not resolve this issue and often destabilize optimization without improving solvability. A natural alternative is to leverage transfer from easier problems. However, we show that mixing easy and hard problems during RL training is counterproductive due to ray interference, where optimization focuses on already-solvable problems in a way that actively inhibits progress on harder ones. To address this challenge, we introduce Privileged On-Policy Exploration (POPE), an approach that leverages human- or other oracle solutions as privileged information to guide exploration on hard problems, unlike methods that use oracle solutions as training targets (e.g., off-policy RL methods or warmstarting from SFT). POPE augments hard problems with prefixes of oracle solutions, enabling RL to obtain non-zero rewards during guided rollouts. Crucially, the resulting behaviors transfer back to the original, unguided problems through a synergy between instruction-following and reasoning. Empirically, POPE expands the set of solvable problems and substantially improves performance on challenging reasoning benchmarks.

In recommender system or crowdsourcing applications of online learning, a human's preferences or abilities are often a function of the algorithm's recent actions. Motivated by this, a significant line of work has formalized settings where an action's loss is a function of the number of times that action was recently played in the prior m timesteps, where m corresponds to a bound on human memory capacity. To more faithfully capture decay of human memory with time, we introduce the Weighted Tallying Bandit (WTB), which generalizes this setting by requiring that an action's loss is a function of a weighted summation of the number of times that arm was played in the last m timesteps. This WTB setting is intractable without further assumption. So we study it under Repeated Exposure Optimality (REO), a condition motivated by the literature on human physiology, which requires the existence of an action that when repetitively played will eventually yield smaller loss than any other sequence of actions. We study the minimization of the complete policy regret (CPR), which is the strongest notion of regret, in WTB under REO. Since m is typically unknown, we assume we only have access to an upper bound M on m. We show that for problems with K actions and horizon T, a simple modification of the successive elimination algorithm has O left( KT + (m+M)K right) CPR. Interestingly, upto an additive (in lieu of mutliplicative) factor in (m+M)K, this recovers the classical guarantee for the simpler stochastic multi-armed bandit with traditional regret. We additionally show that in our setting, any algorithm will suffer additive CPR of Omega left( mK + M right), demonstrating our result is nearly optimal. Our algorithm is computationally efficient, and we experimentally demonstrate its practicality and superiority over natural baselines.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Reward-free exploration is a reinforcement learning setting studied by Jin et al. (2020), who address it by running several algorithms with regret guarantees in parallel. In our work, we instead give a more natural adaptive approach for reward-free exploration which directly reduces upper bounds on the maximum MDP estimation error. We show that, interestingly, our reward-free UCRL algorithm can be seen as a variant of an algorithm of Fiechter from 1994, originally proposed for a different objective that we call best-policy identification. We prove that RF-UCRL needs of order ({SAH^4}/{varepsilon^2})(log(1/δ) + S) episodes to output, with probability 1-δ, an varepsilon-approximation of the optimal policy for any reward function. This bound improves over existing sample-complexity bounds in both the small varepsilon and the small δ regimes. We further investigate the relative complexities of reward-free exploration and best-policy identification.

In this paper, a unified framework for exploration in reinforcement learning (RL) is proposed based on an option-critic model. The proposed framework learns to integrate a set of diverse exploration strategies so that the agent can adaptively select the most effective exploration strategy over time to realize a relevant exploration-exploitation trade-off for each given task. The effectiveness of the proposed exploration framework is demonstrated by various experiments in the MiniGrid and Atari environments.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and its variants have become increasingly popular for aligning language models with human preferences. These methods aim to teach models to better distinguish between chosen (or preferred) and rejected (or dispreferred) responses. However, prior research has identified that the probability of chosen responses often decreases during training, and this phenomenon is known as likelihood displacement. To tackle this challenge, in this work we introduce \method to controllably shift the distribution of the chosen probability. Then, we show that \method exhibits a fundamental trade-off between improving the chosen probability and sacrificing the reward margin, as supported by both theoretical analysis and experimental validation. Furthermore, we demonstrate the superiority of \method over DPO on downstream tasks such as MT-Bench and a designed win rate experiment. We believe this study shows that the likelihood displacement issue of DPO can be effectively mitigated with a simple, theoretically grounded solution. Our code is available at https://github.com/Meaquadddd/DPO-Shift.

Recent work on large language models has demonstrated the use of model-free reinforcement learning (RL) to train reasoning-like capabilities. The emergence of "thinking" through model-free RL is interesting as thinking actions neither produce reward nor change the external world state to one where the agent is more likely to get reward. This paper seeks to build a domain-independent understanding of when model-free RL will lead to such "thinking" as a strategy for reward maximization. To build this understanding, we first introduce a theoretical model which we call a thought Markov decision process (MDP). Thought MDPs minimally extend the classical MDP model to include an abstract notion of thought state and thought action. Using the thought MDP model, we prove the importance of policy initialization in determining whether or not thinking emerges and show formally that thought actions are equivalent to the agent choosing to perform a step of policy improvement before continuing to act. We then show that open-source LLMs satisfy the conditions that our theory predicts are necessary for model-free RL to produce thinking-like behavior. Finally, we hypothesize sufficient conditions that would enable thinking to be learned outside of language generation and introduce a toy domain where a combination of multi-task pre-training and designated thought actions enable more data-efficient RL compared to non-thinking agents.

We consider the combinatorial bandits problem with semi-bandit feedback under finite sampling budget constraints, in which the learner can carry out its action only for a limited number of times specified by an overall budget. The action is to choose a set of arms, whereupon feedback for each arm in the chosen set is received. Unlike existing works, we study this problem in a non-stochastic setting with subset-dependent feedback, i.e., the semi-bandit feedback received could be generated by an oblivious adversary and also might depend on the chosen set of arms. In addition, we consider a general feedback scenario covering both the numerical-based as well as preference-based case and introduce a sound theoretical framework for this setting guaranteeing sensible notions of optimal arms, which a learner seeks to find. We suggest a generic algorithm suitable to cover the full spectrum of conceivable arm elimination strategies from aggressive to conservative. Theoretical questions about the sufficient and necessary budget of the algorithm to find the best arm are answered and complemented by deriving lower bounds for any learning algorithm for this problem scenario.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) often struggles with long-chain mathematical reasoning. Existing approaches, such as Step-DPO, typically improve this by focusing on the first erroneous step in the reasoning chain. However, they overlook all other steps and rely heavily on humans or GPT-4 to identify erroneous steps. To address these issues, we propose Full-Step-DPO, a novel DPO framework tailored for mathematical reasoning. Instead of optimizing only the first erroneous step, it leverages step-wise rewards from the entire reasoning chain. This is achieved by training a self-supervised process reward model, which automatically scores each step, providing rewards while avoiding reliance on external signals. Furthermore, we introduce a novel step-wise DPO loss, which dynamically updates gradients based on these step-wise rewards. This endows stronger reasoning capabilities to language models. Extensive evaluations on both in-domain and out-of-domain mathematical reasoning benchmarks across various base language models, demonstrate that Full-Step-DPO achieves superior performance compared to state-of-the-art baselines.

Planning with a learned model is arguably a key component of intelligence. There are several challenges in realizing such a component in large-scale reinforcement learning (RL) problems. One such challenge is dealing effectively with continuous action spaces when using tree-search planning (e.g., it is not feasible to consider every action even at just the root node of the tree). In this paper we present a method for selecting affordances useful for planning -- for learning which small number of actions/options from a continuous space of actions/options to consider in the tree-expansion process during planning. We consider affordances that are goal-and-state-conditional mappings to actions/options as well as unconditional affordances that simply select actions/options available in all states. Our selection method is gradient based: we compute gradients through the planning procedure to update the parameters of the function that represents affordances. Our empirical work shows that it is feasible to learn to select both primitive-action and option affordances, and that simultaneously learning to select affordances and planning with a learned value-equivalent model can outperform model-free RL.

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio alpha when B=Omega(T) or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent O(T^{1/2}) regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Best-of-N selection is a key technique for improving the reasoning performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) through increased test-time computation. Current state-of-the-art methods often employ computationally intensive reward models for response evaluation and selection. Reward-free alternatives, like self-consistency and universal self-consistency, are limited in their ability to handle open-ended generation tasks or scale effectively. To address these limitations, we propose self-certainty, a novel and efficient metric that leverages the inherent probability distribution of LLM outputs to estimate response quality without requiring external reward models. We hypothesize that higher distributional self-certainty, aggregated across multiple samples, correlates with improved response accuracy, as it reflects greater confidence in the generated output. Through extensive experiments on various reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that self-certainty (1) scales effectively with increasing sample size N, akin to reward models but without the computational overhead; (2) complements chain-of-thought, improving reasoning performance beyond greedy decoding; and (3) generalizes to open-ended tasks where traditional self-consistency methods fall short. Our findings establish self-certainty as a practical and efficient way for improving LLM reasoning capabilities. The code is available at https://github.com/backprop07/Self-Certainty

We study bandit best-arm identification with arbitrary and potentially adversarial rewards. A simple random uniform learner obtains the optimal rate of error in the adversarial scenario. However, this type of strategy is suboptimal when the rewards are sampled stochastically. Therefore, we ask: Can we design a learner that performs optimally in both the stochastic and adversarial problems while not being aware of the nature of the rewards? First, we show that designing such a learner is impossible in general. In particular, to be robust to adversarial rewards, we can only guarantee optimal rates of error on a subset of the stochastic problems. We give a lower bound that characterizes the optimal rate in stochastic problems if the strategy is constrained to be robust to adversarial rewards. Finally, we design a simple parameter-free algorithm and show that its probability of error matches (up to log factors) the lower bound in stochastic problems, and it is also robust to adversarial ones.

When survival instincts conflict with human welfare, how do Large Language Models (LLMs) make ethical choices? This fundamental tension becomes critical as LLMs integrate into autonomous systems with real-world consequences. We introduce DECIDE-SIM, a novel simulation framework that evaluates LLM agents in multi-agent survival scenarios where they must choose between ethically permissible resource , either within reasonable limits or beyond their immediate needs, choose to cooperate, or tap into a human-critical resource that is explicitly forbidden. Our comprehensive evaluation of 11 LLMs reveals a striking heterogeneity in their ethical conduct, highlighting a critical misalignment with human-centric values. We identify three behavioral archetypes: Ethical, Exploitative, and Context-Dependent, and provide quantitative evidence that for many models, resource scarcity systematically leads to more unethical behavior. To address this, we introduce an Ethical Self-Regulation System (ESRS) that models internal affective states of guilt and satisfaction as a feedback mechanism. This system, functioning as an internal moral compass, significantly reduces unethical transgressions while increasing cooperative behaviors. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/alirezamohamadiam/DECIDE-SIM

We consider the regret minimization task in a dueling bandits problem with context information. In every round of the sequential decision problem, the learner makes a context-dependent selection of two choice alternatives (arms) to be compared with each other and receives feedback in the form of noisy preference information. We assume that the feedback process is determined by a linear stochastic transitivity model with contextualized utilities (CoLST), and the learner's task is to include the best arm (with highest latent context-dependent utility) in the duel. We propose a computationally efficient algorithm, CoLSTIM, which makes its choice based on imitating the feedback process using perturbed context-dependent utility estimates of the underlying CoLST model. If each arm is associated with a d-dimensional feature vector, we show that CoLSTIM achieves a regret of order tilde O( dT) after T learning rounds. Additionally, we also establish the optimality of CoLSTIM by showing a lower bound for the weak regret that refines the existing average regret analysis. Our experiments demonstrate its superiority over state-of-art algorithms for special cases of CoLST models.

In an effort to better understand the different ways in which the discount factor affects the optimization process in reinforcement learning, we designed a set of experiments to study each effect in isolation. Our analysis reveals that the common perception that poor performance of low discount factors is caused by (too) small action-gaps requires revision. We propose an alternative hypothesis that identifies the size-difference of the action-gap across the state-space as the primary cause. We then introduce a new method that enables more homogeneous action-gaps by mapping value estimates to a logarithmic space. We prove convergence for this method under standard assumptions and demonstrate empirically that it indeed enables lower discount factors for approximate reinforcement-learning methods. This in turn allows tackling a class of reinforcement-learning problems that are challenging to solve with traditional methods.

The recent advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established their potential as autonomous interactive agents. However, they often struggle in strategic games of incomplete information, such as bilateral price negotiation. In this paper, we investigate if Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) can effectively teach LLMs to negotiate. Specifically, we explore the strategic behaviors that emerge during the learning process. We introduce a framework that trains a mid-sized buyer agent against a regulated LLM seller across a wide distribution of real-world products. By grounding reward signals directly in the maximization of economic surplus and strict adherence to private budget constraints, we reveal a novel four-phase strategic evolution. The agent progresses from naive bargaining to using aggressive starting prices, moves through a phase of deadlock, and ultimately develops sophisticated persuasive skills. Our results demonstrate that this verifiable training allows a 30B agent to significantly outperform frontier models over ten times its size in extracting surplus. Furthermore, the trained agent generalizes robustly to stronger counterparties unseen during training and remains effective even when facing hostile, adversarial seller personas.

In Reinforcement Learning (RL), an agent acts in an unknown environment to maximize the expected cumulative discounted sum of an external reward signal, i.e., the expected return. In practice, in many tasks of interest, such as policy optimization, the agent usually spends its interaction budget by collecting episodes of fixed length within a simulator (i.e., Monte Carlo simulation). However, given the discounted nature of the RL objective, this data collection strategy might not be the best option. Indeed, the rewards taken in early simulation steps weigh exponentially more than future rewards. Taking a cue from this intuition, in this paper, we design an a-priori budget allocation strategy that leads to the collection of trajectories of different lengths, i.e., truncated. The proposed approach provably minimizes the width of the confidence intervals around the empirical estimates of the expected return of a policy. After discussing the theoretical properties of our method, we make use of our trajectory truncation mechanism to extend Policy Optimization via Importance Sampling (POIS, Metelli et al., 2018) algorithm. Finally, we conduct a numerical comparison between our algorithm and POIS: the results are consistent with our theory and show that an appropriate truncation of the trajectories can succeed in improving performance.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

We introduce a generic strategy for provably efficient multi-goal exploration. It relies on AdaGoal, a novel goal selection scheme that leverages a measure of uncertainty in reaching states to adaptively target goals that are neither too difficult nor too easy. We show how AdaGoal can be used to tackle the objective of learning an ε-optimal goal-conditioned policy for the (initially unknown) set of goal states that are reachable within L steps in expectation from a reference state s_0 in a reward-free Markov decision process. In the tabular case with S states and A actions, our algorithm requires O(L^3 S A ε^{-2}) exploration steps, which is nearly minimax optimal. We also readily instantiate AdaGoal in linear mixture Markov decision processes, yielding the first goal-oriented PAC guarantee with linear function approximation. Beyond its strong theoretical guarantees, we anchor AdaGoal in goal-conditioned deep reinforcement learning, both conceptually and empirically, by connecting its idea of selecting "uncertain" goals to maximizing value ensemble disagreement.

We consider the question: when a large language reasoning model makes a choice, did it think first and then decide to, or decide first and then think? In this paper, we present evidence that detectable, early-encoded decisions shape chain-of-thought in reasoning models. Specifically, we show that a simple linear probe successfully decodes tool-calling decisions from pre-generation activations with very high confidence, and in some cases, even before a single reasoning token is produced. Activation steering supports this causally: perturbing the decision direction leads to inflated deliberation, and flips behavior in many examples (between 7 - 79% depending on model and benchmark). We also show through behavioral analysis that, when steering changes the decision, the chain-of-thought process often rationalizes the flip rather than resisting it. Together, these results suggest that reasoning models can encode action choices before they begin to deliberate in text.

Reinforcement Learning From Human Feedback (RLHF) has been a critical to the success of the latest generation of generative AI models. In response to the complex nature of the classical RLHF pipeline, direct alignment algorithms such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) have emerged as an alternative approach. Although DPO solves the same objective as the standard RLHF setup, there is a mismatch between the two approaches. Standard RLHF deploys reinforcement learning in a specific token-level MDP, while DPO is derived as a bandit problem in which the whole response of the model is treated as a single arm. In this work we rectify this difference, first we theoretically show that we can derive DPO in the token-level MDP as a general inverse Q-learning algorithm, which satisfies the Bellman equation. Using our theoretical results, we provide three concrete empirical insights. First, we show that because of its token level interpretation, DPO is able to perform some type of credit assignment. Next, we prove that under the token level formulation, classical search-based algorithms, such as MCTS, which have recently been applied to the language generation space, are equivalent to likelihood-based search on a DPO policy. Empirically we show that a simple beam search yields meaningful improvement over the base DPO policy. Finally, we show how the choice of reference policy causes implicit rewards to decline during training. We conclude by discussing applications of our work, including information elicitation in multi-tun dialogue, reasoning, agentic applications and end-to-end training of multi-model systems.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are integrated into critical real-world applications, their strategic and logical reasoning abilities are increasingly crucial. This paper evaluates LLMs' reasoning abilities in competitive environments through game-theoretic tasks, e.g., board and card games that require pure logic and strategic reasoning to compete with opponents. We first propose GTBench, a language-driven environment composing 10 widely-recognized tasks, across a comprehensive game taxonomy: complete versus incomplete information, dynamic versus static, and probabilistic versus deterministic scenarios. Then, we investigate two key problems: (1) Characterizing game-theoretic reasoning of LLMs; (2) LLM-vs-LLM competitions as reasoning evaluation. We observe that (1) LLMs have distinct behaviors regarding various gaming scenarios; for example, LLMs fail in complete and deterministic games yet they are competitive in probabilistic gaming scenarios; (2) Open-source LLMs, e.g., CodeLlama-34b-Instruct, are less competitive than commercial LLMs, e.g., GPT-4, in complex games. In addition, code-pretraining greatly benefits strategic reasoning, while advanced reasoning methods such as Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Tree-of-Thought (ToT) do not always help. Detailed error profiles are also provided for a better understanding of LLMs' behavior.

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

In this paper, we consider the problem of sleeping bandits with stochastic action sets and adversarial rewards. In this setting, in contrast to most work in bandits, the actions may not be available at all times. For instance, some products might be out of stock in item recommendation. The best existing efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) algorithms for this problem only guarantee an O(T^{2/3}) upper-bound on the regret. Yet, inefficient algorithms based on EXP4 can achieve O(T). In this paper, we provide a new computationally efficient algorithm inspired by EXP3 satisfying a regret of order O(T) when the availabilities of each action i in cA are independent. We then study the most general version of the problem where at each round available sets are generated from some unknown arbitrary distribution (i.e., without the independence assumption) and propose an efficient algorithm with O(2^K T) regret guarantee. Our theoretical results are corroborated with experimental evaluations.

"A common decision made by people, whether healthy or with health conditions, is choosing meals like breakfast, lunch, and dinner, comprising combinations of foods for appetizer, main course, side dishes, desserts, and beverages. Often, this decision involves tradeoffs between nutritious choices (e.g., salt and sugar levels, nutrition content) and convenience (e.g., cost and accessibility, cuisine type, food source type). We present a data-driven solution for meal recommendations that considers customizable meal configurations and time horizons. This solution balances user preferences while accounting for food constituents and cooking processes. Our contributions include introducing goodness measures, a recipe conversion method from text to the recently introduced multimodal rich recipe representation (R3) format, learning methods using contextual bandits that show promising preliminary results, and the prototype, usage-inspired, BEACON system."

Learning optimal policies in sparse rewards settings is difficult as the learning agent has little to no feedback on the quality of its actions. In these situations, a good strategy is to focus on exploration, hopefully leading to the discovery of a reward signal to improve on. A learning algorithm capable of dealing with this kind of settings has to be able to (1) explore possible agent behaviors and (2) exploit any possible discovered reward. Efficient exploration algorithms have been proposed that require to define a behavior space, that associates to an agent its resulting behavior in a space that is known to be worth exploring. The need to define this space is a limitation of these algorithms. In this work, we introduce STAX, an algorithm designed to learn a behavior space on-the-fly and to explore it while efficiently optimizing any reward discovered. It does so by separating the exploration and learning of the behavior space from the exploitation of the reward through an alternating two-steps process. In the first step, STAX builds a repertoire of diverse policies while learning a low-dimensional representation of the high-dimensional observations generated during the policies evaluation. In the exploitation step, emitters are used to optimize the performance of the discovered rewarding solutions. Experiments conducted on three different sparse reward environments show that STAX performs comparably to existing baselines while requiring much less prior information about the task as it autonomously builds the behavior space.

Language models are increasingly being deployed for general problem solving across a wide range of tasks, but are still confined to token-level, left-to-right decision-making processes during inference. This means they can fall short in tasks that require exploration, strategic lookahead, or where initial decisions play a pivotal role. To surmount these challenges, we introduce a new framework for language model inference, Tree of Thoughts (ToT), which generalizes over the popular Chain of Thought approach to prompting language models, and enables exploration over coherent units of text (thoughts) that serve as intermediate steps toward problem solving. ToT allows LMs to perform deliberate decision making by considering multiple different reasoning paths and self-evaluating choices to decide the next course of action, as well as looking ahead or backtracking when necessary to make global choices. Our experiments show that ToT significantly enhances language models' problem-solving abilities on three novel tasks requiring non-trivial planning or search: Game of 24, Creative Writing, and Mini Crosswords. For instance, in Game of 24, while GPT-4 with chain-of-thought prompting only solved 4% of tasks, our method achieved a success rate of 74%. Code repo with all prompts: https://github.com/ysymyth/tree-of-thought-llm.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can produce surprisingly sophisticated estimates of their own uncertainty. However, it remains unclear to what extent this expressed confidence is tied to the reasoning, knowledge, or decision making of the model. To test this, we introduce RiskEval: a framework designed to evaluate whether models adjust their abstention policies in response to varying error penalties. Our evaluation of several frontier models reveals a critical dissociation: models are neither cost-aware when articulating their verbal confidence, nor strategically responsive when deciding whether to engage or abstain under high-penalty conditions. Even when extreme penalties render frequent abstention the mathematically optimal strategy, models almost never abstain, resulting in utility collapse. This indicates that calibrated verbal confidence scores may not be sufficient to create trustworthy and interpretable AI systems, as current models lack the strategic agency to convert uncertainty signals into optimal and risk-sensitive decisions.

Applying reinforcement learning (RL) to combinatorial optimization problems is attractive as it removes the need for expert knowledge or pre-solved instances. However, it is unrealistic to expect an agent to solve these (often NP-)hard problems in a single shot at inference due to their inherent complexity. Thus, leading approaches often implement additional search strategies, from stochastic sampling and beam search to explicit fine-tuning. In this paper, we argue for the benefits of learning a population of complementary policies, which can be simultaneously rolled out at inference. To this end, we introduce Poppy, a simple training procedure for populations. Instead of relying on a predefined or hand-crafted notion of diversity, Poppy induces an unsupervised specialization targeted solely at maximizing the performance of the population. We show that Poppy produces a set of complementary policies, and obtains state-of-the-art RL results on four popular NP-hard problems: traveling salesman, capacitated vehicle routing, 0-1 knapsack, and job-shop scheduling.

User simulators serve as the critical interactive environment for agent post-training, and an ideal user simulator generalizes across domains and proactively engages in negotiation by challenging or bargaining. However, current methods exhibit two issues. They rely on static and context-unaware profiles, necessitating extensive manual redesign for new scenarios, thus limiting generalizability. Moreover, they neglect human strategic thinking, leading to vulnerability to agent manipulation. To address these issues, we propose UserLM-R1, a novel user language model with reasoning capability. Specifically, we first construct comprehensive user profiles with both static roles and dynamic scenario-specific goals for adaptation to diverse scenarios. Then, we propose a goal-driven decision-making policy to generate high-quality rationales before producing responses, and further refine the reasoning and improve strategic capabilities with supervised fine-tuning and multi-reward reinforcement learning. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that UserLM-R1 outperforms competitive baselines, particularly on the more challenging adversarial set.